Outnumbered and Outgunned: The Story of General H.R.

McMaster

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the MFA Writing Department

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Fine Arts in Writing
at The Savannah College of Art and Design
Joshua Lewis
Savannah, GA May 2015 Josh Lewis

Committee Chair Lee Griffith,

Committee Member Beth Concepcion
Committee Member James Lough
 Acknowledgements

A very special thanks to my old pal and company commander, Major Nathan Thor

Rozea. Im indebted to you for the direction and focus on some of the big ideas in this

thesis. Aztecs!

I couldnt get away without mentioning Dean Beth Concepcion, Ph.D., and James Lough,

Ph.D. at Savannah College of Art and Design for your sound judgment calls on the

editing. Last but not least, thank you to Professor Lee Griffith, M.F.A., at SCAD for

spurring me to write this book proposal.

 Table of Contents

Thesis Abstract.1

Book Proposal Abstract2

The Market..13

Author Biography18

CV...19

Book Proposal Table of Contents Overview...21

Sample Chapter: Reborn in the Fire of Combat..28

Sample Chapter: McMaster Performs Another Miracle: Counterinsurgency.40

Sample Chapter: The Architect of the Future Army...52

Notes60

Bibliography.66
 Lewis 1

Abstract

Outnumbered and Outgunned: The Story of General H.R. McMaster

Josh Lewis
December 2015

Thesis Description

Written in the format of a trade book proposal, this thesis focuses on General H.R.

McMasters command during the Gulf War, the War on Terrorism, and his battles innovating the

U.S. Army at ARCIC (Army Capability and Integration Center), which led the general to

become one of the most important thought-warriors of the 21st century. Three selected chapters

reveals the generals transformation: from the captain who commanded the new Abrams tank, to

the colonel who developed a ground-breaking strategy at Tal Afar, to the general today, planning

for future war. The proposal posits his victories and personal accomplishments arose from his

scholarship of military history. Simultaneously, the thesis acknowledges General H.R. McMaster

is a product of the times when, over a span of 30 years, the U.S. Army innovated its warrior

training and weaponry in response to global threats. From a biographical, narrative non-fiction

perspective, the thesis renders the unique, human side of the man and posits that the U.S. Armys

future depends on unconventional heroes like H.R. McMaster.

Keywords: War, Military, General, Leadership, Non-fiction

 Lewis 2

Book Proposal Abstract

Outnumbered and Outgunned: The Story of General H.R. McMaster

From the beginning of his officership to the present day, H.R. McMaster has fought

numerically superior numbersboth in combat and within the U.S. Army officer corpsto

become a classic yet unconventional war hero. But his story is also one of an ordinary, flawed

man who, staying true to his ideals, challenged military conventions and altered the ways we

train for and wage war. In simple terms, Outnumbered and Outgunned chronicles not only one

warriors journey down the hard road to greatness, but all warriors search for understanding.

When I returned from Iraq in 2010, I sought a superior officers under the oak tree

counseling. I trusted his counsel because he was an infantry officer, who had also served as a

tank commander as I had. I was just a lieutenant trying get perspective, and I asked him for

oversight about the war and officership. To be accurate about the conversations context, my

career was finished, and I had made up my mind the war in Iraq was unwinnable. We spoke one

mechanized officer to another. We were frank about why Army policies manufactured a host of

incompetent, careerist officers. My pragmatic thinking was that the war in Iraq is won when the

enemy is defeated, and if the future of combat holds politicking officers holding back a victory,

rather than warfighters doing what is necessary to win, then the future wasnt bright. This is an

on-going talk in todays military, and a story as old as warfare.

I told the officer that the answer to the systemic problems alluded me; it was above a

lieutenants pay-grade. I said the policy makers must keep the secret hidden in the Pentagon, far

away from me, who was collecting dust in the West Anbar province. Our conversation was not a

prevalent dialogue in the officer corps, but Ive had the fortune of meeting warriors who do ask
 Lewis 3

these questions. They seek the knowledge and power to fight and win. They crave it night and

day. The Major leveled it at me in a plain-spoken way: incompetent, careerist officers continue

to get promoted, and it spells disaster now or later for the Army. I dont recall everything the

officer said during that counseling session, though the conversation led to him recommending a

book that stuck with me: Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam by General H.R. McMaster.

General McMasters book made a lasting impression because of its honesty and remarks

on leadership. His experiences and observations in the Armor Corps paralleled mine at the junior

officer level. It put my career in perspective. Furthermore, I was interested that General H.R.

McMaster was still in military office, given the controversy he had stoked. In Dereliction of

Duty, McMaster opened up about how the Joint Chiefs of Staff had failed to challenge the

Johnson administrations motives for Vietnam, officers were suppressed for doing so, and they

had not delineated a winning strategy to win the war, out of political and career advancement.

Military officers of the era had a code to never dissent against the White House or each other,

which had created a culture, where if everyone says yes in agreement to their boss, then no

problems are addressed for the betterment of the Armys ability to fight and win. While the war

went on, the White House and the Joint Chiefs perpetuated failure by refusing to acknowledge

systemic problems in strategy, which Americans paid for in blood and treasure. At the time of

the books publication, these Vietnam-era officers were Major McMasters bosses. They did not

appreciate the criticism.

Other books I had read on the Commandants Reading List in basic officer school

textbooks on officership, guerrilla warfare, war memoirshad been mild by comparison to

Dereliction of Duty. While todays Army receives cutting-edge combat training, junior officers
 Lewis 4

are not trained in the political nature of war, political wars between officers, or how it adversely

affects the small and big picture. The political nature of war refers to a militarys long and short-

term plan to address political issues associated with the conduct of war. War is an extension of

the states politics. Junior officers are not given the framework or platform for discussion. In

service to the country, soldiers are trained to divorce themselves from grand politics. Politics is

not useful in combatthe primary mission, and its a slippery slope into questioning authority,

which is not always a good thing for a cohesive unit. On the other hand, McMaster was a

believer in articulating problems to improve combat effectiveness, so that gains in war were

consolidated. He advocated for learning from military history and retaining continuity to prepare

for future wars so the Army did not reset from square one, going into another war, or if a soldier

assumed a new position and responsibilities. Upon reading the book, I researched the trajectory

of General H.R. McMasters career, essayed his command philosophy, and conducted inquiries

and interviews about him. Two successive years of research culminated in my proposed book,

Outnumbered and Outgunned, the book I wish Id read as a Captain.

After nine years in uniform, I rarely encountered a leader in life like McMaster, who

answered the call for systemic change. I could relate to him as I saw the loss of life when poor

decision-making went unchecked. McMaster was an officer who questioned orders out of

contentiousness and morals to protect his soldiers and increase their lethality, and hed faced

extreme adversity from his superiors for it. Even though I had left the service, I understood he

was a general whose virtues translated well into civilian life.

General H.R. McMaster remains relatively obscure, though hes one of the most

important combat commanders of the 21st century. Hes been called a celebrated strategist, a war

hero, and a smart guy with enemies. And we know if a soldier doesnt have enemies, then hes
 Lewis 5

not in the fight. Time Magazine has recently put him on the 2014 list of the 100 most influential

people in the world.

In 1991, over a decade before my career began, the U.S. Army had recovered from

Vietnam and rebuilt and modernized in response to the Soviet Red Army. With a change of

enemy, the Army collectively agreed to forget about Vietnam, instead focusing on developing

the most lethal and sophisticated fighting force the world had ever seen. And while a great line

clash with the U.S.S.R never materialized, a new generation, including the young Captain H.R.

McMaster, went on to fight in the Gulf War. McMasters took part in the Battle of 73 Easting,

which is considered one of the last great tank battles of the 20th century, and is taught at the U.S.

Army Armor school.

In late February 1991, as combat actions began, Captain McMasters scout element, Echo

Troop, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, had crossed east at the Saudi Arabian border to cut off several

tank divisions of Saddams Republican Guard retreating from Kuwait. They called the maneuver,

as a part of a wide scale movement, The Left Hook. McMasters mission was simple: Scout for

the enemy so the main force could assault forward. The mechanized scout troop was comprised

of twelve Bradley Fighting Vehicles and nine Abrams tanks. They had a decisive edge against

the enemys T72 tank due to innovations in weaponry, including the Abrams tank and a secret

satellite mapping systemthe GPS (Global Positioning System). But the new technology had

not been tested in conflict. McMasters fate and the state-of-the-art Abrams were intertwined.

On the 26th of February, Captain McMaster was ordered to advance to a grid coordinate,

70 Easting, amidst a sandstorm, where he encountered a flush brigade of more than 100 T72

tanks, 100 personnel carriers, about as many trucks with machine guns, and 900 infantry. Captain

McMaster found himself outnumbered and outgunned at nearly ten to one. He did not have time
 Lewis 6

to evade the larger force, call for supporting elements from the rear, or plan an attack. Rather

than retreating from the terrible odds, Captain McMaster led an old-fashioned cavalry charge and

destroyed the entire brigade without suffering a single loss. When the smoke settled and machine

guns cooled, they had arrived at the 73 Easting coordinate. News of the battle spread rapidly

throughout the army and media. Overnight he became a national icon and his after-action review

is publicly available at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning library.

Based on McMasters accounts of the battle, its hard to refute that miracles do still

happen in a modern age. But I argue the victory is attributed to a well-trained, sophisticated

Army. Captain McMasters heroism was a clear-cut case of military leadership at its finest. The

probability of victory, however, also resided in the advanced military technology, the Abrams

tank, which gave Echo Troop a decisive edge in combat. Shortly after the fighting concluded at

73 Easting, DARPA (Defense Advance Research Projects Agency) interviewed every man in the

Echo troop to assess what had happened. Analysts have conflicting viewpoints about the battles

success. Some said the Iraqi brigade was poorly trained and was caught sleeping. More said the

Abrams and U.S. soldiers superiority decided the outcome of the battle. A captured Iraqi officer

declared the assault as something comparable to wielding the power of God.

Within a few days, analysts at Army think-tanks went into quick action and produced a

computerized simulation program based on the Battle of 73 Easting to implement it into training

across the entire U.S. Army. Computer simulators incorporated into training were state-of-the-art

in the early 90s and recruit tankers at Armor School were duplicating the battle scenario before

the 100-hour war was won.

My other contention is that Captain H.R. McMasters victory was a testament to

individual will. The Battle at 73 Easting transformed McMasters psychology, or triggered the
 Lewis 7

inner defiance already within him, which cultivated the rest of his turbulent career. Here we

arrive at the dark, undefined matter at what makes a warrior a warrior. He was not soldier who

simply had a brush with insanitya soldier with a death wish. McMaster faced his fears,

overcame them, and the experience (combined with intelligence) transformed McMaster into a

very dangerous mana danger to others in his profession who did not fully understand him.

From a biographical standpoint, McMaster was your classical scholar-soldier. He

attended Virginia Military Institute and graduated from West Point Military Academy in 1984.

He played on the rugby team. Following Desert Storm, he published an account of the battle

based on a copious after-action review, which hinted that he was an avid reader of military

history. He had researched literature on Iraqi culture, army and weapons. He went on to take a

brief hiatus from uniformed service and earned a M.A. and Ph.D. in military history at

University of North Carolina. His dissertation was the beginnings of Dereliction of Duty. This

book wasnt an ordinary bit of writing officers composed to supplement their careers at the war

college. Dereliction of Duty has been referred to as a scathing criticism of the militarys

reluctance to challenge the presidential administrations justification for war and define a plan of

action to win the war. In essence, it was an anti-war, anti-Vietnam book by a young, in-service

hero when the old Vietnam-era soldiers were still running the show. Actors within the U.S. Army

viewed the book with contempt, and it put his career in jeopardy.

When McMaster returned to active service, his chain of command felt his convictions

were not what a team player represented. U.S. Army culture did not accept his dissent at the

time; the Army image did not need another black eye, having worked tediously to improve it

after Vietnam. They saw him as a liability. On top of this, command decorum in the Army was

still very, dont ask why; do what you are told. Then there were those who had seen their share
 Lewis 8

of combat and simply regarded him as a lucky decorated ducka show pony for the media.

Overall they felt McMaster had betrayed them. In light of this adversity, McMaster would have

to work harder to compete with his peers for prime choice duty assignments and promotion.

Internal politics in the military is the same as anywhere else. Once more, McMaster found

himself at a turning point and fighting a larger force uphill, when others careers were coasting.

Whats more interesting is that Major McMaster, having known the daunting challenges ahead of

him, could have left the service as an untarnished war hero. Yet he chose to stay. This choice

demonstrated his love of the profession, and disproved the unsubstantiated criticism.

Despite other officers careerist maneuvering, Major McMaster received pristine officer

evaluation reports over the years, as if his raters thought they could effectively control him by

absorbing his talents, or maybe biding their time for the opportunity to end him for good. The

Army culture was changing into a culture becoming ever more bureaucratic and peacetime,

which meant more political and cutthroat. McMasters could be was derisive, mouthy to his

superiors, and a thorn in the status quos side. Behind the scenes, his wife, Kathleen McMaster,

was a strong character and a model Army wife, who supported him through his successes and

failures. As he promoted to lieutenant colonel and full bird colonel, he published more essays on

a variety of topics regarding the future outlook of the army and the nature of conflict. By all

signs, he was a good soldier with a lot of smart-ass personality, true to what the Army ideal

representsa warfighterand not what politicking, sterilized officers say the Army represents.

His further study of military history remained an enduring ally. As McMaster continued to be

promoted, he served at a series of command and staff positions with U.S. Central Command and

the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment.

 Lewis 9

By 2003, a second Iraq war devolved into an insurgency after Saddam Hussein had been

ousted, the Iraqi Army disbanded, and the Baathists removed from power. In 2015, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff acknowledge their policies in Iraq and Afghanistan to be critical errors, which

compounded failures to develop a winning strategy or end game. Colonel McMaster, retaining a

majority opinion, had mixed feelings about another war in Iraq and its justificationsthough he

muted his criticism with a war on. Instead he viewed the brigade command of the 3rd Armored

Cavalry Regiment as a second chance to reconcile his past political dissent within the ranks and

prove himself. He was eager to lead troops into combat once again.

In early 2005, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment had deployed to Tal Afar in the

Ninewah Province, Iraq. The city was one of the hottest insurgent strongholds in Iraq,

comparable to Sadr City and Fallujah. It was a strategic hub for Sunni insurgents moving arms

and fighters from Syria into Mosul, Fallujah, and Bagdad. U.S. forces had lost control of the city.

Arguably U.S. forces were losing a guerrilla war across the board. Public approval at home had

plummeted. With the city spiraling into extreme carnage, Colonel McMaster delivered an

innovation in modern warfare. Calling upon his studies of the Vietnam war, specifically Viet

Cong guerrilla warfare, which had fallen out of vogue and short-term memory, since the average

officer had adopted the Cold War strategy of linear war (the Gulf War mantra), McMaster would

pacify the insurgency in Tal Afar with a plan now widely called Counterinsurgency Doctrine or

COIN. Linear warfare is loosely defined as a conventional uniformed army fighting against

another uniformed army.

As an interesting side note, General David Petraeus mentored Colonel McMaster,

recognizing his intelligence and aptitude for tactics. Petraeus had also written a book about the

lessons learned in Vietnam, but a far less controversial one, and he held a slightly more linear
 Lewis 10

warfare mindset than McMaster on how to contain and defeat the insurgency. More Pentagon

minded, Petraeus incorporated McMasters success at Tal Afar into the plan for The Surge in

2006. By most accounts, Petraeus and McMaster differed on strategy but had an excellent

working relationship. It should be chronicled that in the early years of the Iraq war, McMasters

ideas on counterinsurgency were unpopular among Pentagon loyalists. The tally count of his

friendly enemies grew to include those unwilling to change. However Colonel McMaster did not

disappoint his supporters or critics.

Prior to McMasters 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment assuming responsibility of Tal Afar,

the previous unit rotations standard operating procedure was to enter the city by day to suppress

insurgents, and return to their base in the city center at night, a linear warfare pattern. Linear

warfare is a routine difficult to break away from, once the business wheel and logistics of war

gets turning. Even counterinsurgency doctrine has a tendency to revert back into a form of

routine if leaders do not maintain situational awareness. The previous unit was unable to

effectively suppress an insurgency terrorizing the civilian population. Tal Afar spiraled into a

scene of extreme savagery.

In a televised news interview from the war zone, a recently-assumed, in-command

McMaster cited an insurgent killing a boy and sewing a bomb into his stomach that was set to

detonate when his father recovered the corpse. The insurgents intent was to inspire fear into any

local who supported the Americans or local dignitary attempting to return the city to a state of

normalcy. Speaking in the aftermath of the matter, Colonel McMaster did not appear a rough,

hardcore soldier expressing hatred or scripted lines. Rather he was soft-spoken, struggling to

keep stern, on the edge of tears for the boy. To win the hearts and minds of the locals and defeat

the insurgents, he stated that his soldiers must live in the city with the locals and insurgents, not
 Lewis 11

in comfortable forward operating bases behind walls and wires. In the fire of combat, McMaster

adopted a new plan.

The plan worked. As the occupying forces remained in the city at night, the locals were

reassured the army would provide protection and stability. In return, Tal Afarians provided

critical human intelligence as to how the insurgents operated and exploited the population. The

culmination of this intelligence resulted in Operation Restoring Rights, a weeklong shaping

operation that captured and killed hundreds of Al Qaeda operatives, foreign fighters, and Sunni

terrorists. Hope in Tal Afar was restored. Recognizing the merits of McMasters ideas, in 2005,

Petraeus launched an Army-wide campaign to revisit and revise the counterinsurgency doctrine

of the Special Operations Forces (U.S. Marines Corps and Army Special Forces) that had not

been implemented since Vietnam, and to recalibrate basic combat training for every line soldier

to meet the current threat.

The following year, the thought-warrior was up for promotion to brigadier general. Once

more, it happened, the powers-that-be were decided his unorthodox streakthe book, his

tendency to question authoritydid not fit the bill of general officer. If he was given rank, in all

likelihood, theyd have a radical general on their hands. McMaster was passed over for

promotion twicean indicator that an officers career is finished, and hed be forced into

retirement. In response to the injustice, a New York Times article Challenging the Generals

named him one of the most celebrated soldiers in the Iraq war. Subsequently, the Internet went

red with public outrage. Warfighters unleashed a fury of blogs and articles, addressing their

concerns that the officer corps had better learn their lesson fast. No detailed explanation has been

publicly offered for McMaster being passed over, other than it was surmised he had angered too

many of the wrong people for too many years. Others blamed the incompetence of the
 Lewis 12

promotions system. Not until the push became so invasive and publicly messy so that it could not

be ignored, the Secretary of the Army Pete Green, selected Petraeus to personally oversee the

next round of promotions. McMaster was finally promoted to brigadier general. In 2011, officers

on the selection committee tried one last time to bar his promotion to major general, but he was

selected in the next round with considerable support.

For his next assignments, McMaster led a Joint anti-corruption task force in Afghanistan

with the mission of cleaning up the Afghan political-military administration, which was

degrading an endgame strategy. Afterward he served as the director of the U.S. Army Training

and Doctrine Command at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Georgia. There he

was responsible for testing, implementing, and supervising the requirements of the Armys

weapon systems and technologies. General McMaster has recently received his third star, and he

was the deputy director of Army Capabilities and Integration Center. He is now the gatekeeper

for the modern Army and its vision. But with the wisdom and oversight of his past challenges, he

faces further obstacles to improve and innovate the Army for the next war. The flawed man,

having arrived at the highest echelons, takes on systemic Flaws more powerful than he.

By the end of Outnumbered and Outgunned, the reader will gain insight as to whether or

not America is prepared to win the next war. McMasters fate will determine the outcome.
 Lewis 13

The Market

The Core Audience

No books are currently in print about the most innovative general of our lifetime.

Outnumbered and Outgunned: The Story of General H.R. McMaster will be a hot sell, given

military trade non fiction: biography, military history, and memoir historically does excellent at

the market. Because of his heroic exploits in three foreign wars and current position at ARCIC,

General H.R. McMasters biography will be a must-read amongst:

*Foreign Affairs Analysts

*Governmental and U.S. Army Policy Makers

*Military Personnel and Strategists

*Defense Industry Professionals

*Soldiers looking for a good book at the post-exchange

*Civilians interested in military history and strategy

A first run trade non-fiction of General H.R. McMaster would also attract historians and

academics in their research. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will be remembered through

military non-fiction books. Unlike World War II, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were archived

in after-action reviews and reports on computer hard drives while the authors remained in a war

zone. Most written correspondence is electronic and classified for many years. When a military

unit returns from deployment, digital correspondence is destroyed or withheld from the public.

Tremendous amounts of knowledge and history are lost.

 Lewis 14

Course Adoption

Authoritative biography, war memoir, journalism and other personal accounts are

necessary to ensure the continuity of a sound military education. This book should reach the

hands of cadets and junior officers. Since the general prescribes the future nature of conflict, in

all likelihood, military academies and basic officer training schools will recommend

Outnumbered and Outgunned as a part of course adoption. In 2008, at basic officer school, I was

required to read Bing Wests The Village and T.E. Lawrences The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, war

memoirs about soldiers, who had performed counterinsurgency tactics. I wrote research papers

about how the books applied to the U.S. Armys Counterinsurgency Doctrine. Every second

lieutenant performs research on counter insurgency and guerrilla warfare at the Fort Benning

library, which is housed in the U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, the Armor and

Infantry training centeralso known as the Training and Doctrine Command or TRADOC.

McMaster was formerly the Commanding General of TRADOC, and presently the deputy

director of ARCICTRADOCs oversight. Like the books I studied, theres a high probability

his biography will make the Commandants Reading List at the basic officer leadership course.

Over 4,000 junior officers cycle through basic officer leadership courses each year.

In the words of McMaster himself, As historians Williamson Murray and MacGregor

Knox observed in a seminal book on military innovation, militaries that prepared successfully for

the demands of future war took professional military education seriously. McMasters service

today will define the next wars outcome.

 Lewis 15

Timing

The war genres readership is diverse because war is a collective strand in American

culture. Virtually everyone loves the American hero story, especially when the hero is an

underdog as General McMaster was. But also, war affects everyone. Currently we are combating

terror in numerous countries, most prominently ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Politically, this is an

important story because it strikes at key issues facing our country:

*The Political Nature of War

*Internal Politics between top U.S. Military Personnel, Presidential Administrations, Congress

*Internal Politics among Officers in the U.S. Army

*The U.S. Army Acquisition Process

*Political Consideration for War

*International Affairs and Diplomacy

*Paradigm Shifts and Social Change within the U.S. Army

*The U.S. Armys Efforts to Deter and Win Future Wars

Marketing

Large book retailers, such as Barnes and Noble, dedicate one or more shelves to the

genre, usually blended with Current Affairs, U.S. History, or stand alone War. In recent

years, war trade fiction has seen exponential increases in online retail sales, which works towards

primary sales advantage. Many veteran and war literature groups exist online, such as Goodreads

with subcategories of Military History Books or Popular Military Reads. They have
 Lewis 16

extensive marketing and public relations potential. While more research is necessary to

approximate exact readership and resources available, some of the publicity platforms include:

*NYUs Veterans Writing Workshop

*The Military Writers Society of America

*Words After War

*War Writers Campaign

*Warrior Writers

*Syracuse Veterans Writers Group

*Dispatches

*War Literature and the Arts

*The Journal of Military Experience

*College and University ROTC programs

*Military Installations

Due to the uniqueness of General H.R. McMasters career, the immediate online reach

will likely be explosive. A few online newspapers and blogs that could publicize the book are

The Small Wars Journal, Foreign Affairs, Breaking Defense, The Wall Street Journal, and

others, all with circulations of 25,000 or more. I am also a writer for a private intelligence

company and a journalist for the U.S. Army Acquisitions. My colleagues work directly with

General H.R. McMaster and some have participated in several of the events within the book. I

plan to tap these publications, and more, to make connections and write promotional articles.

Also, I will create social media accounts to expand online reach.

 Lewis 17

New war journalism such as Generation Kill, Black Hawk Down, Last True Story Ill

Ever Tell have seen revenues in the millions. Autobiographies and biographies of top

commanding generals: Stanley McCrystals My Share of the Task and Team of Teams, and All

In: The Education of David Petraeus by Paula Broadwell have made best-selling lists.

Outnumbered and Outgunned will be fundamentally different than episodic memoirs and recent

war biographies because McMasters career has inspired innovations in warfare made over the

last three decades. Moreover, he is still in military office. Many of the most significant

innovations in weaponry and training are credited directly to him. Also, his biography provides

guidance on what to expect in the future army and armed conflicts. McMasters story will be an

important read for many years to come because this is more than the literary soldiers tale. It is

the story of modern global warfare.

 Lewis 18

Author Biography

In 2002, Josh Lewis enlisted into the U.S. Army as a combat engineer. With the war on,

and still in high school, Lewiss company commander gave him the choice to deploy to

Afghanistan or take an ROTC scholarship to Florida State University. Recognizing his talent for

writing at the school newspaper, the CO recommended him to pursue officership. Lewis

accepted the scholarship and entered the FSU creative writing program, where he produced

mostly essays and experimental non-fiction with special studies in Russian dissident literature.

After graduating with a B.A. and commissioning into the infantry, 2nd Lt. Lewis was assigned to

an Armor company in the Republic of South Korea. He served as an executive officer, tank

platoon commander, and infantry platoon leader. In 2010, Lewis deployed to Iraq with the 3rd

Infantry Division out of Savannah, Georgia. He remained a platoon leader, seeing light combat

action, and then moved to staff positions during his short tour. His experience in Iraq was the

deciding factor for him to leave the U.S. Army at the end of his contract. By 2012, Captain

Lewis left the service to pursue politics. Ultimately, though, he felt too disillusioned for politics,

and he moved to Miami to try writing about the visual arts and short fiction. Moving forward

with his writing, Lewis attended Savannah College of Art and Design to earn a Masters of Fine

Arts in Writing. In addition to Outnumbered and Outgunned, hes currently working on a

historical novel about his military experience. Today hes a technical writer for a private

intelligence company in San Diego, and simultaneously produces articles for the Department of

Defense about future warfare and weapon systems.

 Lewis 19

CV

Josh Lewis
Savannah, Georgia
618-889-7019, jlewis@disciplinavisuals.com

Education

M.F.A. in Writing with emphasis in Article, Essay, Non-fiction Technique and Business Writing,
Savannah College of Art and Design, 2013-2015.
Special Studies Poetry and Fiction Technique, Miami Dade College, 2012.

B.A. in Creative Writing with Emphasis in Military Science and 20th Century Russian Dissident
Literature, Florida State University, 2004-2008.

Special Studies Russian Language, Moscow State University (Moscow, Russia), 2007.

Academic Awards

Artistic Honors Scholarship, SCAD, 2013.

4-year ROTC Scholarship, Distinguished Military Student, Superior Cadet Decoration Award,
Deans List, FSU, 2004-2008.

Military Education

U.S. Army Basic Officer Leadership Course & Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course (Fort
Benning, GA.), 2008.

U.S. Army Mechanized Leadership Course (Fort Benning, Georgia), 2008.

U.S. Army Combat Lifesaver Course (Fort Benning, Georgia), 2008.

U.S. Army Airborne School (Fort Benning, Georgia), 2005.

U.S. Army Combat Engineer Basic Training (Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.), 2003.

Literary Trade Memberships

Southern Illinois Writers Guild, Vice President, 2012.

Work Experience
 Lewis 20

Chief Executive Officer, Disciplina Visuals LLC, April 2013 June 2014.

Business Developer, ARTMIAMI.TV INC , July 2012 April 2013.

Editor-in-Chief, Staff Writer, ARTMIAMI.TV INC, July 2012 April 2013.

County Chairman, Presidential Campaign, February 2012 June 2012.

Battalion/ Brigade Plans Officer, U.S. Army, May 2008 February 2012.
Mechanized/ Light Infantry Platoon Leader, July 2009-May 2010.

Tank Commander/ Company Executive Officer, April 2009-July 2009.

Combat Engineer December 2002-August 2004.

Publications

Art

Man Meets Machine at Moscows Geek Picnic The Moscow Times.

The Joy and Beauty of Memorials at the Moscow Jewish Museum The Moscow Times.

The Digeridoo Comes to Russia The Moscow Times.

LAURA KNOTT Talks the culture and history of the art fair at the Lowe Art
Museum ArtMiami.tv.

Preview: Overture | Miami Contemporary Art Fair, 100 Warhols Featured ArtMiami.tv
 Lewis 21

Table of Contents Overview

Foreword: A Retired General Officer Yet to Be Determined

Chapter I: Reborn in the Fire of Combat
Chapter II: The Army Got it Right and Wrong
Chapter III: The Young and The Publicized
Chapter IV: On the Literary Offensive
Chapter V: A Return to West Point
Chapter VI: Betrayal
Chapter VII: Marginalized with Good Performance
Chapter VIII: Beside Every Great Man Stands a Stronger Woman
Chapter IX: Iraq Didnt Forget
Chapter X: A Hero Revived
Chapter XI: McMaster Performs Another Miracle: Counterinsurgency
Chapter XII: Its Hot in the Spotlight
Chapter XIII: Outnumbered and Outgunned
Chapter XIV: Cleaning House in Afghanistan
Chapter XV: Against Hero Worship
Chapter XVI: The Architect of the Future Army
 Lewis 22

Foreword: A Retired General Officer Yet to be Determined

A retired general officer sets the tone, context, and spirit of the times of General H.R. McMaster

and explains why the man is an important asset for the U.S. Army.

Chapter I: Reborn in the Fire of Combat

The narrative chapter introduces the Abrams tank, the young Captain H.R. McMaster, and how

the man and the machines beginnings were interconnected in the Gulf War. Specifically we look

at the Battle of 73 Easting, one of the last great tank battles of the twentieth century, when

technology gives U.S. forces a decisive edge against the Iraqi Army. Old ways of thinking step

aside for new, creative destruction.

Chapter II: The Army Got it Right and Wrong

Shortly after his victory at the Battle of 73 Easting, Captain McMaster becomes one of the most

celebrated officers of the Gulf War, and one of the most studied by analysts. The U.S. Army and

private think tanks interview Echo Troop and launch research to develop training programs

modeled on McMasters mission success. This chapter provides background about the

overshadowed wars such as Somalia, Kosovo, Panama, and Grenada and how their failures were

due to the follies of their respective administrations.

Chapter III: The Young and The Publicized

After the Battle of 73 Easting, Captain McMaster is thrust into the media spotlight. The U.S.

Army uses him as a poster American hero and he gains massive media attention. This break

narrative chapter reflects on how the young officer dealt with emotional and professional stress
 Lewis 23

with newfound fame. We also look at how the U.S. Army and the media have formed a warmer

partnership after Vietnam, which has had both positive and negative effects on reporting from a

war zone.

Chapter IV: On the Literary Offensive

Captain McMaster, a scholar and a warrior, takes a brief hiatus from uniformed service and

attends University of North Carolina where he earns a M.A. and Ph.D. in American history. His

thesis becomes the groundwork for a book called Dereliction of Duty, published in 1997, a

scathing criticism of the military and Presidential administration during the Vietnam War. As

suggested in Chapter II, Captain McMaster observes the errors of the prevailing administration

and is motivated out of duty to shine light on problems for the greater good. Dereliction of Duty

goes on to raise many alarms in the Army and sets the stage for a turbulent career that he didnt

foresee.

Chapter V: A Return to West Point

Flashing forward, the break narrative cues on Major McMasters return to the West Point

Military Academy to lecture students on the importance of studying military history in order for

cadets to better understand their own places in it. The book turns light-hearted, as we flash back

to cadet McMaster and his studies at West Point, playing on the rugby team, and how he became

a perpetual student of life.

Chapter VI: The Tragedy of Betrayal

 Lewis 24

Chapter VI resumes where Chapter IV leaves off. When he returns to active service, McMaster

has written Dereliction of Duty and the book has angered all the wrong people. He falls from

grace within his chain of command and he is no longer regarded as the hero among the ranks.

His chain of command perceive the book to be a betrayal. This chapter focuses on how a young

man deals with professional and emotional adversity and conflict when he is forced to stand

alone. We also get a glimpse of the U.S. Armys culture and thought paradigm.

Chapter VII: Marginalized with Good Performance

Despite adversity, Lieutenant Colonel McMaster continues to rise in the ranks. He takes on a

series of command and staff positions with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and U.S. Central

Command. By all appearances, his career performance is in good order, but he faces tremendous

pressure from his superiors who marginalize his career and intellect. Hard work, perseverance,

and studies of military history remained enduring allies.

Chapter VIII: Beside Every Great Man Stands a Stronger Woman

Behind the scenes, H.R. McMasters wife, Kathleen McMaster, is a strong, supportive character

and model Army wife. This break narrative covers the role Kathleen played in influencing his

decisions, successes, and failures.

Chapter IX: Iraq Didnt Forget

September 11, 2001 has happened, and once again, the U.S. is at the brink of war with Iraq. This

context chapter looks at Colonel McMasters perspective and reflections on the days leading up

to the preparation for war, specifically the absence of a big game strategy for winning a war in
 Lewis 25

Iraq. McMaster has ambiguous feelings about Operation Iraqi Freedom. Nevertheless, to prove

himself a loyal soldier, albeit a controversial one, he is optimistic about deployment, leading

troops into combat and to prove himself worthy.

Chapter X: A Hero Revived

In 2004, Colonel McMaster assumes command of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and is

deployed to the city of Tal Afar. President Bush has declared the end of major combat operations

and the Iraqi army is disbanded, which we know to be one of many critical errors of the Iraq

War. Now an insurgency is on the rise and Tal Afar is in jeopardy. Will Colonel McMaster and

other leaders learn from history, ask the right questions, and develop a plan to save the city?

Chapter XI: McMaster Performs Another Miracle: Counterinsurgency

An insurgency breaks out in the city of Tal Afar, and the city descends into chaos and butchery.

Sectarian insurgents murder the locals to destabilize the fledgling government. All attempts by

the U.S. ground forces to suppress the insurgency with Cold War tactics are ineffective.

Ultimately Colonel McMaster develops a plan based on his knowledge of history and he wins

back Tal Afar. His successful strategy becomes the U.S. Armys widespread playbook called

Counterinsurgency Doctrine. The irony of McMasters success lies in the fact that he defied the

conventional wisdom he once contributed to founding and reinvented his own new vision.

Chapter XII: Its Hot in the Spotlight

McMaster returns to the media spotlight. Just as his actions in the Gulf War sparked a major

reconsideration of the U.S. Armys paradigm, counterinsurgency doctrine becomes the new
 Lewis 26

strategy and its turning the tide of the war. But is there an end game? Nonetheless, the U.S.

Army has resurrected an old hero to put a positive media spin on an unpopular war that is

deteriorating fast. The times are changing and many officers will adapt or be purged.

Chapter XIII: Outnumbered and Outgunned

This is perhaps the most controversial portion of the book. After a second success in Iraq,

Colonel McMasters future seems bright for promotion to general officer. But his ideas and

stardom have made him too many enemies on his way to the top. For heresy dating back to

Dereliction of Duty, the stars align against him and the promotion board passes him over for

promotion three times over the course of seven years. Usually this signals the end of an officers

career. His fate of being outnumbered and outgunned returns full circle.

Chapter XIV: Cleaning House in Afghanistan

Despite his aforementioned career success, McMaster has been passed over for promotion to

brigadier general. The publics reaction is outrage. So Secretary of the Army Pete Green pulls

General Petraeus to personally oversee the next round of promotions. McMaster is then

promoted, and faith in the system is restored for the time being. Incidentally, General

McMasters new assignment places him with a Joint Task Force in Afghanistan whose mission is

to clean up corruption in the Afghan political and military administrations that will assist an

endgame strategy.

Chapter XV: Against Hero Worship

 Lewis 27

Major General McMaster takes charge of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command at

Fort Benning, Georgia, where he orchestrates the new army in training as it prepares for future

wars. By 2014, McMaster is widely celebrated, has contributed to numerous publications, and

led transformative changes. However, he says a new generation of warfighters must carry the

torch to win the next war. He must empower them to think for themselves or he will become the

very tyrant he had always despised.

Chapter XVI: The Architect of the Future Army

Now a three star general, McMaster takes over the position of Deputy Director of ARCIC (Army

Capabilities and Integration Center) at Fort Eustis, Virginia, responsible for overseeing the

development of new weapon systems, training, and the requirements of the next, modern army.

Here we explore his visions of war and how we will prepare for them in the 21st century.
 Lewis 28

Sample Chapter I:
Reborn in the Fire of Combat

Two days ago, Echo troop crossed the Saudi berm into the waste and wadis of the Iraqi

desert where the enemy waited. So far contact with the enemy had been light, but Captain

McMaster knew their unabated drive to the northeast wouldnt last. Golf and Iron troops on the

north and south flanks had reported increased contact with Iraqi T72 tanks and BMPs. Echo had

only engaged a few lost BMPs along the way and McMaster assessed these skirmishes as small

fish.

Intelligence said the armored division of the Republican Guard lurked out there, directly

in their avenue of advance. A sandstorm had brewed up, and friendly and enemy units had been

scouting their way through the fog of war, occasionally bumping into one another. In this poor

visibility, McMaster thought hed have to be right on top of a T72 to see it. Rather than

navigating by terrain or compass in the storm, he charted a course with a new secret satellite

mapping system, the Global Positioning System (GPS).1 Their approach was leading them to a

village, and the 70th Easting beyondhis limit of advance, where hed hold the line and regroup

with the main assault force.

McMaster had read literature that throughout history, many armies invading this land had

been defeated by the perilous desert. Invaders easily veered off course, became lost, and their

ranks died of thirst. Saddams army still counted on the lay of the land, the weather, as a strategic

advantage. In a modern day, higher headquarters had had significant issues coordinating mass

movement of the division over the terrain.2

At about 4 p.m., though, the GPS turned out to be a reliable piece of equipment and a

sunburnt village lay in their path. With the sun at their backs, Echo troop could discern the

nondescript silhouette of a mud brick enclave without getting too close. No cars or people were
 Lewis 29

moving within the village. Captain McMaster mustered the tanks to form a wedge-shaped

formation and to creep parallel to a road. He designated two platoons to protect his left and

right flanks. McMaster would approach the villages heart.

Then contact happened just as hed suspected. From four hundred meters out, at the

village outskirts, trucks with large machine guns bore down on them. The rounds pattered off

their tank hulls, no match for the armor plating, but the noise got his tank crews adrenaline

going.3 The Iraqis were using the buildings as an outpost, possibly a hardened fortification.

McMaster could not determine the Iraqis exact number in the dust. This small arms fire could be

bait to get Echo troop to commit and hed be outflanked.

The captain suddenly changed his mind about the troops formation. He decided to recall

his platoons into a line, and hed lead the attack from the front. His people were well-trained and

capablethis was their first combat experience, as it was his, but part of him wanted to keep his

men out of harms way until it was necessary. At once he ordered the flank platoons to halt and

scan their sectors.4

Within moments of opening fire suppression on the trucks, McMasters instincts proved

correcta T72 tank and BMP moved into his turret reticle. He replied with swift, smooth

retaliation by unleashing his HEAT (high explosive) rounds. The Bradleys hit them with 25-

millimeter rounds and TOW missiles. The enemys heavy combat vehicles and trucks were

reduced to charred junk. Then a couple more T72s and BMPs maneuvered from their cover and

concealment. They moved too slowly and didnt get a shot off. McMaster was greedy and

destroyed them himself. All that was left were embedded ground troops with RPGs taking cover

in the buildings. Captain McMaster felt confident his platoon leaders could handle the mop up

job.
 Lewis 30

Echo troop had sustained no loss in equipment or people, and so hed press on to the

objective coordinate, 70 Easting. Echo troop had to keep on line with Golf and Iron troops, or the

Iraqi division would punch through the sag. He ordered two platoons to clear the remaining

threat in the village, while he and three platoons pushed north and around the village. According

to McMasters report of the skirmish, he never once mentioned anything going wrong, and he

even went as far as to say, he didnt feel significant emotions or pity for the enemy.

The following events gradually were shaping into what would be the last great tank battle

of the 20th century.5 Captain H.R. McMasters combat prowess bloomed in the harshest of trials,

and if one talks about H.R. McMaster, then maybe all of the soldiers who fought in Desert Storm

can be decoded. His storied command in his tank began in the 100-hour war. But to be accurate,

war is never a clean report and theres a lot of legend surrounding him. To this day, in the Armor

Corps, and to those who follow his progress, hes revered as a demigod, or a symbol of radical

change. He will always be known for his combat actions at the Battle of 73 Easting. Somewhere

at the intersection of the lore and fact, soldiers gather the officer was a peculiar hero and not the

parallel to describe his peers. War brings out unique qualities in people. Foremost, McMaster is a

tanker, and one cannot talk about him without first talking about the tank.

At factory conception, the M1A1 Abrams tank was designed to take a beating. Then its

capabilities were improved upon. In the hands of effective soldiers, the 120-millimeter long-

range gun on a stabilized turret and superior armor plating dominated the Iraqi Soviet-made T72

tank, giving General Schwarzkopfs ground strategy a wide advantage. The T72 tank, equipped

with refurbished scrap, could not stand up to the Abramss high tech modifications in optics and
 Lewis 31

laser-sighting systems. Better infrared thermal vision meant the Abrams could reach out and

touch the blind enemy from over a mile under the concealment of darkness. The secondary

weapon was a high-caliber machine gun mounted on top of the turret to cut down loose infantry

in bulk when a large exploding shell was overkill or wasteful. The swiveling machine gun was

not meant for accuracy, but to send out a cloud of bullets. If the T72 managed to get in range

before the Abramss long-reach could return fire, the T72s 125-millimeter rounds usually

missed. The Abrams could out maneuver the rival, and its flat, slimmer hull casted a low profile.

Imagine a tank effortlessly running over a minivan blocking a street or knocking down a brick

wall in a house. Along with fire superiority and crush factor, the Abrams could really haul in the

desert, which played a part in the speed at which the tank could move vast distances, remain

operable, and deliver violence.6

In the winter of 1991, the newly fielded M1A1 Abrams tank, a long time in the making,

debuted in Desert Storm. The U.S.s existential enemy, the Soviet Union, collapsed under its

own weight, and within months, the American military turned its energy upon Saddam Hussein,

a villain pillaging Kuwait. This began the era of the Abrams, and as more armor battalions

racked up battle streamers in the desert, the brass marveled at the lethality, maneuverability,

protection, and sustainability of their creation. The volume of after action reviews point toward a

great interest taken in the tanks performance.

There was the new soldier commanding the tank to consider, as well. The junior officers

and their cadres behind the wheel had been combat proven as the most effective, lethal army

the world had ever beheld. They liberated the Kuwaitis, and the mold was cast for the Army to

follow into the 21st century. Strategic theories were permanently codified and inscribed into U.S.
 Lewis 32

Army doctrine. This war was a decisive victory for the Abrams and the new leaders, as much as

it was about defeating Saddam Hussein.

On February 24, 1991, analysts were ablaze with record-keeping and tallying of the

Abrams victories in action. In a surprise move, the 7th Corps soldiers had rapidly mobilized from

Saudi Arabia to the Iraqis left flank in the southern provinces.7 The attack was called the Left

Hook, and in two days, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment spearheaded the operation,

navigating in their tanks with a secret, state-of-the-art technologythe GPS. They expected to cut

off several armored divisions of Iraqi Republican Guard, comprising a stronghold of several

hundred T72s to a thousand. One of the greatest tank battles since WWII was about to happen

and everyone seemed to anticipate the arrival of something big and nasty.

McMaster and Echo Troop received a change in orders, redirecting them to the forefront

of the eastward drive. He had been scouting for the armored division of Iraqi Republican Guard,

which they would locate (undetected), then report back the enemys position so the larger, main

assault force, the 2nd ACR behind him could advance and make a concentrated blow. McMaster

had only encountered scattered resistance. As they patrolled northeast into the vast, empty desert,

they squared off against a few T72s and BMPs (light troop carriers), but they had not found the

armored division. It was assumed the resistance had consisted of scouts conducting the same

reconnaissance as they were. Incidentally, higher command hesitated, having had difficulty

coordinating the movements of its subordinate units. They had wanted to shape a picture perfect

attack, but due to communication issues and the desert terrain it was not working out. The
 Lewis 33

sluggish delay and complexity of the whole awkward process frustrated them, and so they

changed their plan.

With Captain McMaster far out in front scouting a way ahead, higher decided to commit

Echo Troop to the lead effort, rather than waiting to pull up another contingency unit. The order

came down for Echo troop to proceed toward a grid coordinate called 70 Easting and decisively

shake hands with the primary target if they encountered them. They had received the official

green light and McMaster and his tankers would be out there alone.

By nature, Captain McMaster took the new orders with pride. His tankers had been

chosen. His moment had arrived. Since a few skirmishes transpired the day before, he was ready

to get in a real battle, though he understood that over-confidence and arrogance could be just as

lethal as the T72. He had trained his tankers to exhaustion to simulate the real thing, and he had

mentally prepared himself to fight his mirror image or better.

In McMasters log, he described researching the Iraqi army. Not much writing had been

published on its culture or doctrine. Apparently, the Iraqi Republican Guard were not your

garden-variety line soldiers; they were Saddams elite, and they had no reservations about dying

because it was Allahs will.8 They wouldnt tuck tail and run from the sight of the Abrams. It is

common knowledge a motivated soldier with resolve is the most dangerous weapon in the world,

and the Republican Guard were thirsty for American blood.

He had wanted to come to the table with that same mentality. McMaster was a copious

note taker during his training and preparation, and he was a scholar of military history. He wrote

vividly about his experiences in the desert down to the full names of his soldiers, their

hometowns, colleges, their personal quirks, and their strengths and weaknesses. He preoccupied

himself in writing these details of his tankers. It served the purpose of filling the unknown gaps
 Lewis 34

regarding how they would fare in combat. He concluded they were readyand he felt a close

bond to them and his machine.

A sandstorm rolled in during the afternoon. Daily sandstorms are frequent throughout the

western and southern provinces. The feeling of being caught in a sandstorm never feels familiar,

especially when you cant see an enemy ambush. Every action is made doubly difficult and

slower. Captain McMasters eyes were glued to the commanders reticle in the turret, his head on

the constant swivel, scanning the dust-covered veil for T72s. He switched to thermal optics to

pick up the heat signatures of tank engines. No luck. The Abramss edge of long-range gunnery

was gone. Nature had leveled the playing field. The other downside of the storm was that attack

helicopters were not authorized to fly or else the sand will gum up the rotary wings, causing

them to crash. If they decisively engaged the enemy, he could not call in close air support, nor

could he request an airlift medical evacuation if they took casualties.

As he recalled, the workload of managing a troop left him too busy to dwell on being

afraid. He spoke into the built-in helmet mic, giving the formation orders to keep tight so none of

them would move too far ahead or behind the other in line. With limited visibility, friendly fire

was a real worry.

For all the fine army leadership traits he exhibited on the mission, McMaster also

possessed a unique quality what some might have later condescended to say was an unforeseen

flaw in the Abrams design and the type of officers they had manufactured.9 From a cultural

standpoint in the new army, McMaster was programmed to be the classic armor officer and the

expectations placed on him were the same as those before him. However, McMaster was

fundamentally different.
 Lewis 35

Officers and line soldiers alike thought he was a groomed cowboy, who went looking for

a fight. To be around him, you could sense the air of danger. In times of war, this is a good trait

to possess. As long as there is a real enemy and a battlefield to fight on, the army will never find

a substitute for these types of warriors. At a glance, like his demeanor, the bulldoggish, husky

build of his body appeared to be ill fit for the sardine life in a tank. If looks could have revealed

the inner workings of a person, he surely stuck out. The mans presence would fill the room and

left many who didnt know him with the view that he was a post-human, re-made man of flesh,

sitting inside the machine. But personas dont hold up for long inside a tank, and he was a down

to earth guy. He encouraged freedom of personality in his tankers so that they might make their

own judgment calls. It is a requisite for promoting a unit that can independently think through

any situation in a leaders absence. Inside his tank, he was very informal with his driver, loader,

and gunner. They were one big dysfunctional family. Spending enough time with someone in a

tank, it doesnt take long to learn everything about them. A good tank crew quickly bonds. A

tank crew must perform as equal constituent parts to operate efficiently. A bad tank crew retains

its prejudices and is concerned with the formalities of rank.

With Echo Troop on the move, McMaster gathered situation reports from his platoon

leaders on the radio and logged them down. They were his vigilant eyes and ears in the

sandstorm and he stored a mental image of his tanks and Bradleys in his mind. There wasnt

much scenery in the desert besides wadis and gentle rises in the flat terrain dimmed by a mauve

haze. Iron Troop in the north and Golf Troop in the south had engaged with heavy resistance.
 Lewis 36

McMaster passed on the information for everyone to be ready. Intellectually it felt like he was

moving closer to death.

After McMaster left a platoon to clear the threat at the village, he assembled the two

remaining platoons to advance with him to the northeast. Back into the sandstorm, it became

apparent they were moving up with a steady rise in the terrain. They crested a ridge and looked

down from the high ground into a wadi in front of them. By chance, the sand storm dissipated at

that very moment of surveying the land below, and McMaster did not have time to adjust on

what he observed under the bright and clearing sky. In the short distance, on the other end of the

embankment, eight T72s were dug into defensive positions. Behind them was an armored

brigade of over fifty to a hundred T72s, a hundred BMPs, about the same number of high caliber

machine gun-borne trucks, nine hundred infantry with rocket propelled grenades and shoulder-

fired missiles, an intricate network of bunkers, an anti-aircraft gun re-allocated for tank defeating

purposes if need be, anti-tank minefields on all sides, and they were still receiving fire from the

village. They had found the command post of the Iraqi Republican Guard, the Tawakalna

mechanized brigade10.

McMaster in actuality did not count their numbers. It would have taken a minute he did

not have. While he was out numbered and out gunned at ten-to-one, he only perceived a

gargantuan force spaced out across a flat plain. His instincts ran on overdrive, which he silenced,

along with his training. This was the basic training all officers received, which dictated that a

company-sized element should not attack the enemy unless the enemy was overmatched three to

one. It was kill or be killed, and no matter how sophisticated the Abrams was, he doubted its

ability to pull him through death. Extreme fear and commitment to enter the void brought him to

what historians later called an old-fashioned cavalry charge.

 Lewis 37

Captain McMaster ordered his gunner to Fire, fire, sabot. Across the embankment, a

T72 erupted into flames. He was awe-struck that the exploding tank ejected the Iraqi commander

vertically into the sky in a fiery ball. He had won the first kill, commencing the battle. The

platoons maneuvered to the right and left with weapons freetwelve Abrams and three Bradleys

in total. The troop executive officer designated hasty targets and called in mortars on the radio.

His loader smoothly chucked another sabot round into the breach and yelled, Up! The

Abrams typically was fielded with two main rounds. The first round was the HEAT, which

McMasters tank had run dry on. When a HEAT struck a tank or BMP in the face, the damage

penetrated the armor and had an incendiary effect. The other round was the sabot, made of

depleted uraniumone of the densest metals on the periodic table. The sabot didnt explode on

impact like the HEAT; it shot out in the shape of a snub, dull spear. When the sabot struck steel,

the uranium super-heated and changed into a molten knife. Once the knife penetrated the hulls

interior, it sprawled around, tearing up the tanks guts.

The short range targets, all eight T72s on the embankment were destroyed. But Echo

troop was hooked into a fight now. If McMaster stalled the assault, hed lose the element of

speed and violence of action. Then hed be surrounded and overwhelmed as they retreated,

blowing the whole operation and giving away higher commands position. Combat momentum

had made the choice for them anyhow, tugging them into an orchard of death.

The troop moved in a wedge, cutting into the Iraqis lazy formation. The initial shock of

the attack disoriented the Iraqis, and they scrambled into their tanks and trucks in order to man

their guns. Ground troops dove into their bunkers to retrieve their RPGs. Capitalizing on the

chaos and confusion, tank crews hollered at each other for their next targets of opportunity.

Black smoke and thrown up dust helped to mask their blitz forward. Iraqi tank after tank was
 Lewis 38

knocked out as the gunners yelled, Target identified, away, splash, destroyed, just like theyd

trained11. They cut down infantry with their machine guns, and collapsed Iraqi bunkers with

sabots, burying them dead or alive. The bravest of the Iraqi infantry crawled from their bunkers

and hastily shot RPGs at them; the projectiles ricocheting off the armored plating. They did not

live, nor did the ones who tried to run away.

From a distance, the Bradleys moved into position and they hammered T72s and BMPs

with TOW missiles, a small, spring-guided rocket. The Bradleys also designated 25-millimeter

rounds made of depleted uranium to destroy trucks. Organic mortars suppressed the enemy from

afar.

McMaster realized he had caught the Republican Guard by surprise. At first contact, the

Iraqis hadnt figured the Abrams could attack so fast and violently, believing jets were bombing

them. They cried out to Allah in the empty, blue sky, but prayers were ineffective. When the T72

crews saw the half-sized troop of tanks assault their position, they responded too slowly. The

T72 turret did not have automatic stabilization like the Abrams and required a gunner to

manually crank on a wheel to turn and aim their guns.

The killing continued for a few hours, over a span of three kilometers. Corpses littered

the desert. By dark, Captain McMaster had prevailed. The entire brigade of Republican Guard

had been annihilated, with forty Iraqi soldiers surrendering. Most had preferred death to capture.

McMasters respect for the dead and living became profound.12

His mind aflutter, he could hardly take in what he was hearing. Echo troop reported back

that they had suffered zero casualties or losses of equipment, except a Bradleys tracks had been

damaged by a land mine.13 To be sure he called back on the radio for another accountability

report. It seemed the Abrams had delivered them across a Rubicon of blood. Eventually the rest
 Lewis 39

of Echo troop had rejoined the battle, along with reinforcements from Division, where they

formed a defensive line at the 73rd Easting. To close the seam with Iron Troop in the north,

higher sent a platoon to establish a linkup point. Enroute to the linkup, a platoon engaged, closed

with, and destroyed a handful of orphaned T72 tanks.

The Iraqis did attempt a weak counterattack after nightfall. They were easily repelled,

and in the morning the survivors were taken prisoner and interrogated. Actionable intel revealed

three Republican Guard divisions were retreating further to the northeast.

In the proceeding hours, the media scooped the Battle of 73 Easting. They flocked to the

scene like vultures. Echo troop would not take part in the attack of the Iraqi armor division

further to the east; higher had diverted the troop to sell the big win story to the reporters, which

meant as they enemy moved away, Echo troops combat role in Desert Storm had concluded.

Higher command had a lot of questions for this young armor officer whom everyone was

talking about. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency analysts had also arrived at the

scene. They wanted to know how the Abrams performed, the conditions of the battle, and the

body count. Each man was interviewed to record the battle exactly as it had happened so they

could recreate the battle for a tank simulator program at Armor School. Within days, green tank

commanders would be training with dry runs based on Echo troops combat actions.

McMaster needed a bath. Afterward he returned to his tank, closed the hatch, and he

wrote in his report, In general, the Iraqis were unprepared for the United States Army.

Americans are better trained and equipped. The true decisive factor, however, was the American

soldier.
 Lewis 40

Sample Chapter XI:

McMaster Performs Another Miracle: Counterinsurgency

In early 2005, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment rotated to Tal Afar with Colonel

McMaster at the helm. Tal Afar was a small city in the Ninewah province, roughly sixty

kilometers from the Syrian border. The citys nearness to the border made Tal Afar a strategic

strong point and safe haven for terrorists funneling arms and fighters into the southern half of

Iraq. And so when McMaster and the 3rd ACR arrived, it was one of the hottest areas for

significant terrorist activity, rivaling Fallujah and Sadr City. Months of long fighting transpired

over a complex weave of neighborhoods, full of nooks for insurgents to hole up and maneuver.

The new part of the city had grown around an ancient Assyrian castle, and beneath the surface,

insurgents could negotiate the old catacombs if they could not move in the broad daylight. On

the Tal Afars outskirts, many hills, wadis, and canals provided cover and concealment for the

enemy, as well.14 The insurgents were primarily Sunnis or former Baathists, but also Al Qaeda

and Syrian foreign intelligence. As the insurgents directed attacks on U.S. soldiers and Iraqi

army, Squadrons killed or captured them in large swathes, but cells continuously reconstituted

their ranks in a relatively short amount of time. The enemys mission was to incite fear into the

population, as they waged jihad, so they could retake the city from the Americans.

These were desperate times for the civilian Turkmen-Iraqi people, especially the targeted

Shia Turkmen. Sunni terrorists evicted the Shia from their homes or slaughtered their families. If

they could flee, they did, but most stayed and endured. As for the Tal Afarians who stayed, they

lived through incredible hardship. Essential infrastructure such as electricity and water had

collapsed. Because of the short supply of food and medical stuffs, the people relied upon U.S.

Army aid. Insurgents used schools, mosques, and hospitals as strongholds from where they

carried out their attacks. Responding to the ethnic targeting, Shia factions formed deathsquads to
 Lewis 41

conduct revenge killings. At night, Shia deathsquads massacred entire tribes and the Baathist

NCOs loyal to the former regime. Their vigilante justice was counterproductive to the restoration

process. Then there was had the ordinary civil disturbances and crime in a city without secular

rule of law. Iraqi police could not stem the violence or looters due to corruption and poor

training, and cowardice. Tribal sheiks vied for powersome sheiks were legitimate and some

not. Counsel efforts to establish a democratic government produced mixed results. Tal Afar had

fallen into total civil war.15

After a few months of protracted skirmishes, McMaster judged his initial strategy of

conducting raids and patrols to deter and defeat the enemy wasnt working. The 3rd Armored

Cavalry Regimented had combatted the insurgents on a whack-a-mole basis. This strategy too

often amounted to reacting to the enemy as he presented himself, rather than proactively striking

at the source. McMaster, as did others, thought if you simply killed all the insurgents, the

assumption being, a limited a number of them existed, then victory was theirs. Their combined

arms unit (heavy armor and dismount infantry) had successfully killed and captured hundreds of

terrorists, destroyed caches, and defeated improvised explosive devices. However, a new cell

always regenerated in the place of another. Moreover, the 3rd ACR could not contain the flood of

arms pouring across the Syrian border. The insurgents held a death grip on Tal Afar and the 3rd

ACR took the brunt. In the long view, McMaster knew the initial strategy was unsustainable.

Hed have to reassess the battle space.

By April, the Colonel and his exhausted soldiers tried something new. If the Sunni and

Shia couldnt get along, he would build a series of cordons and walls around the starfish-sharped

city and in-between successive districts.16 He needed to tourniquet the bleeding before he could

examine the pattern of skirmishes, most of those battles a trade of small arms fire or an IED, and
 Lewis 42

then the terrorists running away and disappearing into a dark rabbit hole. He designated an

engineer battalion to build vast berms, checkpoints, and combat outposts so the enemy could not

escape to the neighboring villages or another district. Not only would barriers disrupt the

insurgents freedom of maneuver, he could study how the enemy exploited the local population

and terrain. Once the engineer operations were complete, Saber and Tiger squadrons, and their

Cav. troops augmented by Iraqi infantry would conduct patrols in each AO arm of the city.

The initial shakeup smoked out the hornets, but the hornets just built new nests

elsewhere. Sporadic skirmishes increased as each Cav. troop cordoned a block with tanks,

Bradleys, and trucks, and their dismounted troops cleared their areas. Longknife squadron

provided close air support and overwatch. In total, the 3rd ACR comprised 3,500 U.S. soldiers,

the 325th Airborne, an Engineer battalion, a Special Forces group, and 5,000 ISF (Iraqi Security

Forces). However, troop strength was stretched too thin to thoroughly cover the surface of Tal

Afar and secure a population of 250,000, to include outlying villages and the Syrian border.17

At dusk patrols returned to Forward Operating Base Sykes on the southwest edge, leaving

Iraqi infantry to secure the newly created checkpoints and berms. This proved disastrous. Under

the cover of darkness was when the butchery happened. Insurgents resumed and intensified

attacks against civilians. ISF did not have the confidence or training to take them on their own.

McMasters strategy continued during the late spring of 2005, long enough for him to see

results from the berm-building. The Colonel determined there were still too many unknowns to

effectively combat the insurgents in the urban environment. He had made critical errors. Though

he had made mistakes. He was proud of his soldiers valor in combat. These warm-up errors,

however, were representative across all Iraq18.

 Lewis 43

Just over a year before in Bagdad, the Sunni insurgency began with attacks on

infrastructure and assassinations of new government dignitaries, sheiks, moderate Imams,

doctors, teachers, and anyone with intellectual standing capable of leadership. The attacks were

haphazard at the start and became sophisticated with expansion. The terrorists objective was to

agitate the Iraqi people and destabilize the fledgling government. As the insurgents gained more

ground, they opted with Al Qaeda and recruited from the disenfranchised populace.

In 2003, General Ordierno, who commanded the 4th Infantry Division, stated he did not

recognize an insurgency. Instead he described cells of criminals and Baath loyalists causing

damage to disrupt Coalition efforts. At first it wasnt apparent a low intensity guerrilla conflict

was indeed happening.19 Shortly thereafter, though, the generals and combat commanders took a

very different line. Other officers, who distinguished themselves in the invasion against a

traditional Iraqi army, did not tailor their methods to the evolving threat. They believed the best

approach was to hammer the enemy, make mass public examples and arrests, and intimidate the

local population. But war by attrition, at whatever the cost or collateral damage, only intensified

the insurgents resolve, and they found greater support from the local population wanting

protection.20

During the rotation to Tal Afar, Colonel McMaster communicated big questions over

nightly reports to Division in Bagdad. They discussed key drivers of instability in their AOs, and

the theater of operations at large. Obviously the root cause of instability in Iraq was the

insurgency. But what exactly were the insurgents goals and objectives? And how would they

defeat them and restore peace?

As these nightly reports with Division transpired, McMaster grew increasingly frustrated.

Not enough officers cut through the political soft-talk and called a spade a spade. They were
 Lewis 44

fighting a guerrilla war and it had gone beyond their control. He dared acknowledge it was

reminiscent of Vietnam. It seemed like higher received the information but did nothing about it.

Failure to adjust the plan was the same as suppressing his actionable intel. Strangely, as time

went on, only General David Petraeus, the most political-savvy of them all, gave McMaster an

ear.

One tour prior to the 3rd ACRs arrival, General Petraeus with 101st Airborne had also

identified the enemys guerrilla strategy. He had put in a plan and pacified Mosul.21 Like

McMaster, at Princeton, Petraeus wrote a dissertation on the Vietnam conflict.22 Petraeus began a

private information-sharing correspondence with McMaster.

The two officers reckoned, the Army had not fought a guerrilla campaign of this size,

scope, and magnitude since Vietnamand the pill was too bitter and big for the American

people to swallow. The war had come this point because senior leaders had not drawn the

parallel sooner, too politically and operationally early to make the call. But the evidence

suggested, rather stared them straight in the face, that the grand error was not as much a refusal

to admit realities on the ground as much as it was junior leaders and commanders did not have

the training to plan one further and adapt accordingly.23 Moreover, McMaster wanted to pursue

an aggressive course of actionall of it guided by his past studies. The like-minded thinkers

exchanged their thoughts on strategy. They must quickly respond with a new set of Army-wide

core objectives and revise the Armys highly outdated counterinsurgency doctrine24. The Joint of

Chiefs of Staff would not be warm to the idea, just as Division hadntnot enough success

stories existed as in Mosul to justify a shift in policy.25 And so McMaster, with a handful of other

officers picked by Petraeus, colluded to experiment with their own counterinsurgency plans.

Meanwhile, Petraeus would return to the States and rewrite the doctrine. If McMaster succeeded
 Lewis 45

at pacifying Tal Afar, Petraeus would incorporate it as a real-time baseline, then go around the

Joint Chiefs, and sell the way-ahead plan directly to the White House behind his bosses backs.26

The plan was called counterinsurgency doctrine or COIN27. All eyes fell on McMaster, the 3rd

ACR, and Tal Afar to see if this experiment would work. The American public needed some

good news.

In the summer of 2005, McMaster rallied his squadron commanders behind intelligence

and reconnaissance operations. He would meet with sheiks and elders to gather insight about the

city and how the insurgents leveraged the people. McMaster would express his clear intent to

defeat the insurgents and secure the Tal Afarian way of life.28 He reassured them, he needed their

help, and when the mission was complete, Iraqi security forces would assume control, and

Coalition forces would leave.

Heavy fighting persisted over the summer. Meanwhile, McMaster had picked up quite a

bit of current affairs and history from the intelligence gathering missions. The Tal Afarians

relayed that the insurgents had intimidated them into providing quarter and supply. They said

they supported the insurgents because the economy was non-existent; they had no work, and so

the terrorists easily tricked young men to join the jihad. Most men were illiterate and

unemployed.

The situation was paradoxical. McMaster reasoned that the Tal Afarians lived in constant

fear because they had no protection, which led them to lend involuntary support for the

insurgents. Not only did the Tal Afarians demonstrate little confidence in the Americans ability

to protect their life or interests, they believed the Americans could not revamp the economy.

Because of a dead economy, the insurgents tempted military-aged males with monetary gain.
 Lewis 46

McMaster did not have enough troop strength to presence-patrol the entire populace, so how

could he inspire the Tal Afarians to stop supporting the insurgents?

Then it clicked. McMaster discovered that the solution had been intricately woven into

the fabric of their culture all along, and he had been quite removed from it.29

Up until now, the most successful raids derived from human intelligence, when either

they had conducted Key Leader Engagements, or when people genuinely believed they felt safe

to come forward. McMaster had also underestimated the depth of the Tal Afarians hostility to

outsiders.30 They even regarded Iraqi Army, pooled from all over Iraq, as not to be trusted. In

conversation, they did not seem too enthused about a central government in Bagdad. It was too

far away for them to care. On top of this, the insurgents inspired paranoia. Tal Afar was an

isolated city in the Ninewah province. Historically, the tribal society had always treated outsiders

as suspect. Winning hearts and minds was more than drinking chai with influential elders.

McMaster couldnt become an insider that way. He must live amongst them night and day;

become a family member, not a day visitor. The previous unit had not done that, instead

returning to FOB Sykes at night.

Taking ownership really meant something to McMaster. His resolve went above his

career or tactics. Based on his account of the Battle of Tal Afar, he felt compassion for the

people. He believed in respect and making good on promises. If crossfire damaged a house,

either from Coalition forces or insurgents, a platoon would now reimburse the family with

money. If a militiaman or insurgent carried out an assassination, a squadron commander or the

colonel himself personally visited the family to pay respect. McMaster led by example, and he

often busied himself bringing food and medical supplies to those in need.31 Furthermore,

McMaster mandated that U.S. soldiers treat Iraqis fairly under the rule of law and their
 Lewis 47

prescribed moderate religious faith. Extrajudicial actions would not be tolerated. He adjusted the

rules of engagement to minimize collateral damage and protect innocent life as much as possible.

He knew that for every negative action that adversely affected the peoples lives, an effectand

a second and third order of effectsplayed out counterproductively to the mission. His mindset

was truly humanist. His changes were the rudiments of the new counterinsurgency strategy in

development.

As the changes took effect, McMaster saw immediate results. More and more people

came forward with actionable human intelligence. When troops carried out rewarding raids, the

insurgents sensed the Americans had possibly broke into their TTPs (tactics, techniques, and

procedures). Having their own intelligence networks, Al Qaeda committed additional attacks on

the civilians. And as the picture became clearer, McMaster familiarized himself with the Tal

Afarian culture to a greater extent.

Tal Afarians claimed their Sunni Syrian and Turkish identity rather over Bagdad politics,

which was why it seemed next to impossible for Tal Afarians to be friendly toward Iraqi Army

or a new national flag. However, money did unify them and make the world go round. To

understand the money flow was one way to perceive cultural loyalties. Even before Saddams

demise, a real economy had not existed since the Ottoman empire and British subjugation. Like

many of the towns in West Iraq, long ago, the British had established Tal Afar as a post along

their trade routes. By design, Tal Afar was an artificial oasis. Due to the locations proximity to

Syria and Turkey, these people were Turkish and Arab in heritage. They spoke their own dialect,

but retained Sunni and Shiia faith. When the British controlled the region, they had been cruel to

them. Residuals of British oppression remained in their collective memory.32

 Lewis 48

Little changed after the British left. Eventually the Turkmen trader tribes fell under the

socialist, totalitarian state of the Sunni Baath partySaddam Hussein. The Baathist dictator

enjoyed the pragmatism of murdering his people. Tal Afar was, after all, a Sunni majority,

though, an ethic minority in whole, to include Kurds and Yazidis. To keep them divided and

conquered, Saddam Hussein halved the city. Sunni Turkmen and Baathists lived in the

northmost, modernized half. Shia Turkmen lived in the direly impoverished southern half.

Saddam then introduced wahabism, allowing extremist Imams to reign terror. McMaster

suggested that wahabism inspired jihadism in order to support the terror networks and to fuel

propaganda. Saddam viewed jihadist-strain religion as a useful tool for suppressing minorities

under the Baath banner. In Captain Travis Patriquinns Using Occams Razor to Connect the

Dots: The Baath Party and the Insurgency in Tal Afar, who went one further to say that

Saddam organized the citys layout to suppress the Shia and Turkmen minority, and to rapidly

mobilize his cadres in wara guerrilla war if need be.33

Its important to mention is that Saddam was the hand that fed the Turkmen Tal Afarians

for many years, granting special privileges to his loyal subjects. They were highly dependent in a

socialist system. With Saddam Hussein and the Baathists overthrown, everything collapsed into

disarray. The Sunni insurgents sought to restore the old dictatorship. The sheer number of

insurgents, often a perceived infinite number of them, and their ability to reconstitute their ranks

was in part due to a new terror economy. Though not all Sunni in Tal Afar were ideological,

religious fanatics, or motivated by hate for humanity. Abu Musab al-Zarqawis Al Qaeda paid

well. Any boy or man could bury an IED in the road or pull a trigger to make money to feed his

family. If money did not sway someone, the insurgents held hostages or murdered them.
 Lewis 49

McMasters after-action assessment A Message from the 71st Colonel of the Regiment

chronicled specific terrorist murders. One such instance was so horrific it caught the medias

attention amidst the milieu of Iraqis killing Iraqis. A terror cell kidnapped and murdered a young

boy, then sewed an improvised explosive device into his stomach so that when the boys father

recovered the corpse, the bomb detonated. In the televised interview, McMaster conducted

himself with remarkable self-control given the demonic forces involved. The terrorists often used

women and children as human shields. While the murder was soul-shaking, and the colonel was

filled with anger and grief, he did not convey hatred to the media or use hardcore scripted lines.

Instead he appeared to be a man with a big heart by expressing mixed emotions of joviality and

sadness, having the clarity of knowing that the U.S. Army was fighting the true face of evil.

Justice was coming.

McMaster planned Operation Restoring Rights based on collected intelligence, slated to

advance the first week of September of 2005. The insurgents had concentrated in the Sarai

district of east Tal Afar, and they had been alerted to the Americans. To shape the operation, the

colonel performed the following: He ordered a berm to be built on the eastern outskirts of the

city so the insurgents could not escape to nearby villages in the Ninewah province. The Special

Forces would block from positions at the Assyrian castle in the city center, to disrupt enemy

movement from evading west. Further to the west, 1st Squadron, Tiger Squadron, commanded

by Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Reilly, staged on the western half of the city and the Syrian

border. Iraqi infantry augmented them. 4th Squadron, Longknife Squadron, commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Pavek, provided attack aviation support over the Sarai district. The

missions main effort was 2nd Squadron, Sabre Squadron, under the command of Lieutenant

Colonel Christopher Hickey. As a part of Sabres attack, Echo Troop in partnership two Iraqi
 Lewis 50

battalions would advance south through the Sarai district, as Fox and Golf Troops with Combat

Engineers and three Iraqi battalions attacked northward. When Sabre squadron closed the gap,

the intent was for the insurgents to escape through the hole and be cut off.34

Operation Restoring Rights lasted a full week to clear each neighborhood. First, Tiger

squadron met with heavy resistance in the western half of the city. Tiger Squadron encountered

the enemy in well-organized, layered, defensive strong points. Homes were ringed by RPGs and

machine gun positions; surrounding those positions. Other homes were rigged to explode as U.S.

and Iraqi soldiers entered them. An outer ring employed bombs buried under the roads.35

Despite their efforts to attack and evade, the insurgents were defeated by Tigers armored

vehicles and dismounted Iraqi infantry.

The toughest fighting occurred in the Sarai district. While Tiger laid waste to the enemy,

Sabre had already been in engaged in heavy fighting Sept. 5-6, killing more than 100 of the

enemy in their forward defensive positions. The enemy realized the futility of their defensive

efforts. The cowards who had kidnapped and murdered so many defenseless civilians abandoned

their positions and tried to run.

In Recardo Herreras Brave Rifles at Tall Afar, the total number of insurgents killed

were estimated at 150 with 600 detained. In the previous days shaping to Operation Restoring

Rights, an estimated 130 insurgents had been killed with another 200 insurgents captured.

Civilians had fled the district to escape the path of destructionin doing so, insurgents

attempting to flee had resorted to taking human-shields, disguising themselves as women, or

holding the hands of small children. They were captured.36

As consequence to Operating Restoring Rights, civilians returned and rebuilt their homes,

supplemented by the U.S. forces allocating millions in funds for construction. Since the Iraqi
 Lewis 51

police had gained more confidence after the battle, they established more patrol bases to solidify

their gains. Many inspired, military-aged males joined the police ranks to prevent the insurgents

from returning to the city, some 300 in the first two days. Schools and hospitals reopened. In

the coming months, foreign fighters attempted to conduct small operations in Tal Afar, but the

Tal Afarians repelled them. Hope was restored, in gratitude to the American soldiers who had

fought and died for it. In October, the Tal Afarians voted in local elections to decide their own

fate.
 Lewis 52

Sample Chapter XVI:

The Architect of the Future Army

In his office at ARCIC, the Army Capabilities Integration Center, Lieutenant General

McMaster sat at his desk, writing an article that prescribed the future of war and his vision of

how the U.S. Army would prepare for war years from now. The articles title was a long one

Continuity and Change: The Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About Future War.

It was an ambitious subject to tackle in 2015. When proposed by generals, typically nothing

about Army concepts are clear and simple. This was coming from the colonel who had banned

his squadron commanders from using Powerpoint presentations in Tal Afar. His words had been,

[Power point] is dangerous because it can create the illusion of understanding and the illusion of

control. Some problems in the world are not bullet sizable.37 McMaster allotted time each day

to holding all calls, and thinking about such matters in silence at his office, a necessity to make

sound decisions.

For the moment, as the director of ARCIC, he had much on the agenda to contend with.

His job title was almost as long as his articles title. He was also the Deputy Commanding

General of Futures, the principal oversight of developments in new weapon systems and training

programs, with budgets in the hundreds of billions, and millions of soldiers affected. Practically

everything passed over his desk for signature before Congressional approval. Beyond the

magnitude of this responsibility, and the layered bureaucracy of it, he had the clarity to foresee a

real danger on the horizon. The danger began as soon as he took command on July 15, 2014.38

The article focused on that danger, something he called The Flaw.

The Flaw camouflaged itself in the form of change. Not all change was intrinsically good,

but change made a great case for being desperately needed. The Flaw rode in upon innovation.
 Lewis 53

For all the high tech tools and weaponry that would be issued to soldiers over the years, and the

new training that would advance to operate it, McMaster perceived leaders will base the outcome

of a future war on so-called innovations. Policy makers based their decisions to go to war on

technological innovation, as well. In doing so, he wrote, they commit The Flaw, and turn war

alien to its nature, causing them to forget lessons learned from past wars, and forget that war is

won by a man in a tank who has the willpower to engage, close with, and destroy the enemy.
39
They always forgot the nature of war is a soldier determined to break down a door and kill. All

innovations must be human. Warfighters of the future must be empowered to think, to rapidly

adapt to a changing environment, to perform a broader skill set, and fight farther than before

the tech was only a means to an end.

It was a tall responsibility to watchdog. McMaster often thought in his office about his

present duties, and the long trajectory of his career. He ruminated on the definition of these

powers that he held. As a captain, hed never imagined that hed have this much power today.

And yet, by virtue of his command, he was utterly powerless. Like every general in his position

throughout history, they had fought the Flaw and seen various degrees of success and failure.

The Flaw was immortal. Generals are mortal; they are forgotten and anonymous. Sometimes the

Flaw sieged an officer until retirement, just waited him out.

Would he be remembered in a hundred years, he occasionally wonderedprobably not,

which was a good thing. His ethics required him to create a baseline criteria of measurement for

a new standard, and by no means did he consider himself the vicarious model to follow. In basic

terms, he created a measurement of effort and measurement of performancemultiply this

process many times, over thousands of programs he supervised. Soldiers must be improvements

of their predecessors, and correct their failures or gaps in capability. After he was gone, he
 Lewis 54

wanted to be known as the developer of the next, better standard. The Flaw destroyed the old

ways, new challenges arose, the ones who refuse to adapt will die. Those are the facts. The Army

underwent paradigm changes roughly every twenty years. In times of armed conflict, change

happened faster.

Sometimes all he thought were dark thoughtsmeditation on war does that. Not because

of the past. Peering into the future too much lets in dark energy, a melancholy. All good planners

are depressive. Its for the simple reason that they know whatever plan they set in motion will

never match a unique conflict on the horizon. They are never satisfied with not having all the

answers. No war has ever mirrored its preparation. No plan has survived first contact with the

enemy. Nevertheless, McMaster figured himself to be an optimist. He would build contingencies

into his plans so a hypothetical army could adapt.

Writing on the topic riled him. McMaster channeled his energy into his work. He paced

around the office and stared out the window at Fort Eustis, feeling confined and guilty so far

away from the combat units he once commanded. It was like he was withering away in the

decorum, but now his enemy was The Flaw. He was fighting The Flaw behind closed doors in an

unseen battle as a part of slow, systemic change. There were still other good men fighting it.

Most of what he did right here in this office hed never see an outcome of it, just as the Abrams

tank progenitors had not seen it in action in Desert Storm. He was leading a push to speed up the

notoriously rigid, slow, and bureaucratic acquisition process. If you control the purse, and how

the money flows, you control change. Quite frankly, in peacetime, its incredibly difficult to

make a change without a war to justify it. Politicians can only see whats right in front of them.

While his running and gunning days were behind himhe had put on a few pounds in the

gut and face from chair lifeMcMaster still longed for the vibrations of the tank from his
 Lewis 55

cavalryman youth. He missed the distinct smell of JP8 gas exhaust and the action of deployment.

He always feared he was becoming out-of-touch with the realities on the ground.

The closest he got to soldiers was testing and evaluating material developments and

pinning medals at award ceremonies. He sat at the head of table in boardrooms, listening to

computer geeks and mercenaries pitch their solutions to problems he didnt know existed, in

specialist languages he needed an interpreter to understand. Private think-tanks stole the

militarys ideas and regurgitated them. This was all in the jobs package. Some information only

distracted him, which he hauled to the chopping block for axingoften he was point blank about

it. Other times, the information enlightened him, especially when they gave him the up-front,

bottom line. The network of officers who he worked with regarded him as down to earth, but

biased toward the Armor community40.

McMaster was obligated to the continuity of war. He wrote extensively about his tours in

Iraq and Afghanistan, his readings of military history, his wanderings into the realm of science

fiction. The idea for the first tank had been inspired by a H.G. Wells short story. The concepts

his program managers came up with were sometimes entertaining, obviously ripped from Sci-fi

B movies. He marveled at officers (active and retired) inability to understand the gist of what

was going on. On more than one occasion, he was reassured the future of the army was better off

with his presence at work. Retirement had been tempting. Then there were officers who he

honestly believed did not know what their jobs wereor why they were here. He could spot

these people who only paid lip service to the warfighter but in actuality did not care about the

guy on the ground. They competed for programs and undermined each other for budgets. They

spun lines of crap. They protected their rice bowls, making it difficult to have an open and honest

dialogue. Getting them on the same page and providing them with direction was a huge feat.
 Lewis 56

The general replayed old combat scenarios in his mind, helping him to focus on his work.

His hypothesis, annotated in his numerous briefs and papers on his Army Operating Concept,

and tested in simulations at various branches of Training and Doctrine Command, is that battles

like the Battle of Tal Afar will reoccur, and guerrilla wars will be magnified in megacities.41

Very soon, world populations will double, old economic systems will fissure under their own

weight, and nation states will erode into ever more protracted conflict, marked by increased

criminality and terrorism. The enemy will adopt sophisticated technology, rivaling or copying

their own, proliferating the tech arms race. With the uptick in tech, wars will drag on longer,

become more violent, and take on added dimensions into cyber space. Politicians dream that if

they spend exorbitant amounts of money, they can innovate war to make it cheaper and more

efficient. It is a lie they sell to the American people.42 Its The Flaw in disguise. McMasters

technological legacy will be better combat vehicles, tanks, communication systems, clothing,

body armor, helmets, lighter and more accurate small arms, opticals, rockets, smaller and more

efficient batteries, computerized mortars, computer programs and hardware, guidance systems,

bullets, motors, simulators, and a bill of other things. His legacy will be just like President

EisenhowersMcMaster was wary of the military industrial complex. Months after taking

command, he had busted the tech war myth, speaking to the Association of the U.S. Army

Institute of Land Warfare Forum. He said, Big defense firms sell big-ticket systems that are

supposed to win wars. The firms use subtle and not-so-subtle advertising that you need this

system for the sake of your children and grandchildren and if you dont purchase it, youre

heartless. Congress usually obliges.43

McMaster had a reputation for denying projects he thought were substandard. In one

instance, he crushed a radio system program that had been hung up for years in the acquisition
 Lewis 57

process; hed gone to the field to test it himself. The radio system didnt work properly, had poor

connectivity, and it was too heavy. After marching a mile, the radio felt like a Cadillac on a

soldiers back. He asked the NCO at the testing site what he thought. The soldier said it was junk

in the most professional manner he could. McMaster wrote a scathing review, using the classic

harsh and abrasive language, that had almost barred him from promotion.44 No bad product

passed on his watch. He didnt care how many careers had been riding on it to pass. The bottom

line: he was entrusted with the lives of Americas sons and daughters.

The other half of his job was public appearances. When it came to televised media

attention, history would show McMaster was the most desired and charismatic military

personality in our lifetime. In 2014, Time Magazine ranked him in the 100 most influential

people in the world.

Upon publication of McMasters Army Operating Concept, a capstone of his lifework,

defense industry professionals, military strategists, policy analysts, Congressmen, and almost

everyone with a vested interest, had tuned in to where the U.S. Army was headed. In the Carl

Von Clausewitz fashion, he addressed four continuities and four fallacies of war. As he saw it,

there were two transformative changes that needed to be addressed: 1) What will future battles

look like, and how will the Army fight them; and the highly understated, 2) How do we never

again make the mistakes like we made in Iraq? In the following months, he made several

televised appearance to explain these looming questions.

At a guest speaking with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, hosted by John

Hopkins University, the audience welcomed McMaster as a celebrity war hero for his actions at

73 Easting and multiple tours, and then the moderator asked him to further his continuities and

fallacies of war.
 Lewis 58

Right off the bat, the moderator dropped the buzzword hybrid warfare, a trendy

Pentagon term for guerrilla warfare. Since Russia had conducted operations in Ukraine, Putin

had skillfully leveraged the political, social, military, and cyber drivers of warin other words,

counterinsurgency tactics but in reverse, supplemented by linear warfare.

McMaster expressed that Russia had expertly invaded a country and made it look like

Ukraines fault. He stopped short of saying the Russian invasion was the model for how his

Army Operating Concept correctly functions, especially on the continuity factor of the

political nature of war.

Sitting stiffly in his chair, he went on to tell the audience, a plan to consolidate our gains

in Iraq had been non-existent. The military had divorced itself from the political nature of war.

During the early years, the White House and military had sacrificed the political realities in Iraq

on just about every level for the sake of an expedient, poorly conceived agenda. He suggested the

military now took ownership of the failures, and where we went from here depended upon

whether or not we learned from it. He said, As historians William Murray and MacGregor Knox

observed in a seminal book on military innovation, militaries that prepared successfully for the

demands of the future war took professional military education seriouslyThe military

institutions that successfully innovated between 1919 and 1940 without exception examined

recent military events in careful, thorough fashion. Analysis of the past was the basis of

successful innovation.45

The televised talk at John Hopkins University was a pivotal moment in U.S. history. The

audience witnessed a top active general criticize the consideration for the war in Iraq, the Bush

administration, Congress, and their failure to develop a winning game strategy. He was one of

the first. However large the occasion, McMaster felt gratified the celebration was so low-key that
 Lewis 59

the audience did not applause or cheer, but rather they took the comments as common. He

attributed his constructive dissent had not packed as much punch as it once had because time had

finally caught up to the truth and Dereliction of Duty. The U.S. Army was publicly

acknowledging its failures and having open conversations.

He had won. It took thirty years of perseverance to change things from the inside. Many

unnamed outsiders had helped him along the way.

He was quick to slide in some comments on another aspect of The Flaw.46 While the

soldiers benefitted from the change, the Army had cut more than 40,000 soldiers, and more cuts

were expected. Others left the service by attrition, a natural culling process. This force purge was

the money side of The Flaw, and it was still controversial and deeply political. In 2013, President

Obama and Congress had subjected the Army to severe budget cuts, and in such a way that was

completely irresponsible, so that desperate choices had to be made; the Army was placed in a

position of weakness. It had just heavy-lifted two wars. Russia and ISIS had played their hands.

At the time of McMasters speechand at the time of this writingvery few combat units are

fully mission-capable and ready to deploy. The Army would be hard pressed to find six combat

brigades fully mission-capable. A recovering force does not invite or promote deterrence. By

purging its NCOs and field grade officers, The Flaw of Attrition caused the Army to lose its

continuity. The lost years of training, money, and experience invested in these people will take a

generation or more to reconstitute. The Flaw gave McMaster the choice of either technologically

innovating or keeping his battle hardened Armythere wasnt money for both. McMaster saw

the writing on the wall. The Flaw always won and worked the seam of change.

Today, once again, the general finds himself combatting superior odds, a fight he takes

up with a happy heart. The American voter will decide the next round.
 Lewis 60

Notes

Chapter I
1
H.R. McMaster, The Battle of 73 Easting, Benning.army.mil, Published at Fort Benning

Library, 1991, 4.
2
Ibid, 35.
3
Ibid, 12.
4
Ibid, 15.
5
Greatest Tank Battles: The Battle of 73 Easting, History Channel, January 8, 2010.

www.amazon.om/The-Battle-of-73-Easting.
6
The Abrams capabilities are taken from my knowledge of the M1A2 and M1A3 Abrams tanks.

Modifications from the M1A1 to the M1A2 are accounted for.

7
CBSNews, Col. McMaster July 25, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/col-mcmaster/.
8
This assessment is based on H.R., McMasters, The Battle of 73 Easting, Benning.army.mil.

Published at Fort Benning Library, but the description of the Republican Guard is the synthesis

of many accounts of the enemys ferocity and fervor.

9
This is narrative non-fiction constructed from synthesis of multiple sources over the span of his

career.
10
Many reports are published on the number of EKIA and destroyed enemy vehicles. Exact

numbers vary by report. The Institute for Defense Analyses estimated the highest at almost 50%

more enemy vehicles. Possibly the disparity is due to faulty damage assessments or delay in time

of publication. For H.R. McMasters account, see The Battle of 73 Easting, Benning.army.mil.

Published at Fort Benning Library.

11
This dialogue is the protocol communication between gunner and tank commander when

identifying a target, shooting, and impact on target.

 Lewis 61

12
Captain H.R. McMaster wrote an account of the battle. Further interviews are underway to get

other soldiers perspectives.

13
Greatest Tank Battles: The Battle of 73 Easting, History Channel. January 8, 2010,

www.amazon.om/The-Battle-of-73-Easting.

Chapter XI
14
Travis Patriquinn. Using Occams Razor to Connect the Dots: The Baath Party and the

Insurgency in Tal Afar, Military Review, Jan.-Feb. 2007, 3.

15
This paragraph is my summary narrative to encapsulate the terrorist activity in the early part of

the 3rd ACRs tour. Captain Travis Patriquinn, Colonel H.R.McMaster, and Ricardo Herrera

wrote the best documented accounts.

16
This is more of summary narrative, which describes the by-neighborhood effort to establish

control measures and cordons in the city. In early 2005, Colonel McMaster and the 3rd ACR

conducted multiple sweeps of each district. Eventually, McMaster built berms around large parts

of the city. While the berms and cordons helped to stem the flow of insurgents and weapons, the

enemy adapted and intensified their resolve. See Battle of Tal Afar: Part I, Discovery Channel,

http://www.discovery.com/tv-shows/other-shows/videos/combat-zone-battle-of-tal-afar-part-1/.
17
Ibid.
18
In recent years, General McMaster has publicly commented about the insurgency 2003-2006.

Most of these broad comments admit how the combat commanders had made early mistakes as

to how to handle the insurgency.

 Lewis 62

19
Thomas E. Ricks, Fight Club: Excessive Force Nearly Lost Us the Iraq War, The Brass Who

Gave the Orders Still Dont Get It, Washington Monthly, Aug-Oct. 2006 issue,

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0808.ricks.html.
20
Ibid.

21 Joshua Hammer,Our Man in Mosul, Princeton Review, January 28, 2004,

http://www.princeton.edu/~paw/archive_new/PAW03-04/07-0128/features2.html.

22
Michael Keane, The Pentagons Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Rise and Fall of

Coindinistas. The Blaze. March 24, 2013. http://www.theblaze.com/contributions/the-

pentagons-insurgents-david-petraeus-and-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-coindinistas/..
23
This assessment was fully realized in hindsight in 2006 when Petraeus began the groundwork

for the revised Counterinsurgency Doctrine. In the Summer of 2005, General Petraeus and

Colonel McMaster had already gone semi-rogue and semi-public with their strategy.

25
Michael Keane. The Pentagons Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Rise and Fall of

Coindinistas, The Blaze, March 24, 2013, http://www.theblaze.com/contributions/the-

pentagons-insurgents-david-petraeus-and-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-coindinistas/..
26
Michael Keane.,The Pentagons Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Rise and Fall of

Coindinistas, The Blaze, March 24, 2013, http://www.theblaze.com/contributions/the-

pentagons-insurgents-david-petraeus-and-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-coindinistas/..
27
The new Counterinsurgency manual would be called FM 3-24, published in 2006.

28 H.R.McMaster,
A Message from the 71st Colonel of the Regiment, The Mounted Riflemen.
September 2005, 1. http://thedonovan.com/archives/historystuff/HRMM3acrsep05.pdf.
 Lewis 63

29 David
R. McCone, Scott Wilbur J., Mastroni George R., The 3rd ACR in Tal Afar:
Challenges and Adaptions, Strategic Studies Institute, January 8, 2008.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/of-interest-9.pdf.
30
Travis Patriquinn, Using Occams Razor to Connect the Dots: The Baath Party and the

Insurgency in Tal Afar, Military Review, Jan.-Feb 2007, 6.

31 This
is narrative is taken from photojournalism of H.R. McMaster assisting locals. See A
Message from the 71st Colonel of the Regiment, The Mounted Riflemen, September 2005, 1,
http://thedonovan.com/archives/historystuff/HRMM3acrsep05.pdf.
32
Travis Patriquinn, Using Occams Razor to Connect the Dots: The Baath Party and the

Insurgency in Tal Afar, Military Review, Jan.-Feb. 2007, 4.

33
Ibid, 7.
34
H.R. McMaster, A Message from the 71st Colonel of the Regiment, The Mounted Riflemen.

September 2005, 9, http://thedonovan.com/archives/historystuff/HRMM3acrsep05.pdf.

35
Ibid.
36
Ricardo Herrera, Brave Rifles at Tall Afar, September 2005, In Contact!, Case Studies From

the Long War Volume 1., 137-140, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

https://www.academia.edu/609275/_Brave_Rifles_at_Tall_Afar_September_2005._.Publication

date missing, 2005.

Chapter XVI
37
It is possible McMaster banned Power Point Presentations over frustrations with his combat

commanders, who committed too much time to writing reports rather than leading in the field.

See Elisabeth Bumillers New York Times article, We Have Met the Enemy and He is

Powerpoint, The New York Times. April 26, 2010.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/27powerpoint.html.
 Lewis 64

38
Amy L. Haviland, McMaster to lead development of future force, ARMY.MIL, July 16,

2014, http://www.army.mil/article/130026/.
39
H.R McMaster, Continuity and Change: The Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking
about Future War, Military Review, March-Apr. 2015,
.http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20150430_art
005.pdf.
40
Taken from an interview by a source, who does not wished to be named in written format at

this time.
41
McMaster Discusses, Army Innovation under Force 2025 and Beyond, US ARMY

TRADOC, March 31, 2015.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W3YVhJy4XvU&list=PLiX4QSJW9_Q_FaCGwCvdAfNm

sxrVRqueG&index=3.
42
H.R. McMaster, The Pipe Dream of Easy War, The New York Times.com, July 20, 2013.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/the-pipe-dream-of-easy-

war.html?pagewanted=all.
43
David Vergun, McMaster Busts Myths of Future Warfare, ARMY.MIL, September 10,

2014, http://www.army.mil/article/133446/McMaster_busts_myths_of_future_warfare/.
44
Sandra Erwin, Army Tactical Radios in the Crosshairs After Scathing Review, June 6, 2014.

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1531.
45
McMaster Discusses, Army Innovation under Force 2025 and Beyond. US ARMY

TRADOC, March 31, 2015.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W3YVhJy4XvU&list=PLiX4QSJW9_Q_FaCGwCvdAfNm

sxrVRqueG&index=3.
46
H.R McMaster, Continuity and Change: The Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking

about Future War, Military Review, March-April 2015, 2.

 Lewis 65

2015.http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20150430

_art005.pdf.
 Lewis 66

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