G.R. No.
103047 September 2, 1994 As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M.
CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for
private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by
private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As
ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license
was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of
their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to
file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in
default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F.
Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by
Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City.
The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of
Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally
attended to the processing of the documents required for
the celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the
marriage contract itself states that marriage license no.
3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting
parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband
and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's
parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro
discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to
live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for
four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On
October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was
adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of
Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow
her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital
status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted
a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the
possible annulment of her marriage. Through her
lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no
marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage.
certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro
Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN
F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M.
CASTRO who were allegedly married in
the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970
under an alleged (s)upportive marriage
license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the
municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be
located as said license no. 3196182
does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed
Atanacio.(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of
Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a
license. Neither did she sign any application therefor.
She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract
on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-
issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of
the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the
"inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage
license is not conclusive to show that there was no
marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to
respondent appellate court. She insisted that the
certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently
established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed
the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage
between the contracting parties null and void and
directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject
marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that
respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the
certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage
license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately
proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner
also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-
serving and uncorroborated testimony of private
respondent Castro that she had no part in the
procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner
thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated
testimony of private respondent are insufficient to
overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of
a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage
between the parties as null and void, respondent
appellate court disregarded the presumption that the
solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly
performed his duties when he attested in the marriage
contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly
presented to him before the solemnization of the subject
marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is
whether or not the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient
to establish that no marriage license was issued by the
Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the
marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on
June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was
the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage
shall be solemnized without a marriage license first
issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the
essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a
license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil
registrar of due search and inability to find a record or
entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was
issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-
issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification
in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A
written statement signed by an officer
having custody of an official record or by
his deputy, that after diligent search, no
record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents
to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find"
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability
to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue
marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her
testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a
ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other
witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the
peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be
remembered that the subject marriage was a civil
ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The
subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a
"secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. The records
show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas
was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro
testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her
husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with
notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition.
Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same.
For failure to answer, he was properly declared in
default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her
husband's lack of interest to participate in the
proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on
record to show that there was collusion between private
respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the
appellate court that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage
license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious
marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil
registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by
Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the
case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently
established the absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being
no showing of any reversible error committed by
respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
ILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and
FERNANDO SY, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 21, 1996 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144,
which affirmedthe decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition 3 for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent
Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15,
1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon
City. 4 Both were then 22 years old. Their union was
blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll
who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978,
respectively. 5
The spouses first established their residence in
Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later
at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a
lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. 6
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal
dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and
their two children were in the custody of their mother.
However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's
residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,
1988, and from then on, lived with his father. 7
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal
separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later,
upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended
to a petition for separation of property on the grounds
that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that
they have been living separately for more than one year;
and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the
rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership. 8 Judgment was rendered dissolving their
conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of
separation of properties based on the Memorandum of
Agreement executed by the spouses. 9 The trial court
also granted custody of the children to Filipina. 10
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted
parricide against her husband, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon of May 15,
1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay,
Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by
his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San
Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son,
the boy ignored her and continued playing with the
family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer
away from her son, and started spanking him. At that
instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son,
and punched her in the different parts of her body.
Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking
her when she fell on the floor, and released her only
when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from
hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body
as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband,
evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain
Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time
Fernando maltreated her. 11
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its
decision 12 dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando
only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and
sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation
against private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No.
8273, on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical
violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent
against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her
husband without justifiable cause for more than one
year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, in its decision 13 dated December 4, 1991,
granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical
violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of
legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter
Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to
respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition 14 for the
declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She
points out that the final judgment rendered by the
Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for
separation of property and legal separation, and
Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which
led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical
injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She
also cites as manifestations of her husband's
psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual
alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her
part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3)
refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act
only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that
such psychological incapacity of her husband existed
from the time of the celebration of their marriage and
became manifest thereafter. 15
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga,
in its decision 16 dated December 9, 1993, denied the
petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute
nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the
alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do
not constitute psychological incapacity which may
warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the
decision 17 of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996,
it ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning
respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls
short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a
marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential
requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held
that petitioner failed to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at
the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It
reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's
marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten
years from the date of the celebration of their marriage.
And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living
together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to
be in accordance with law and the evidence on record. 18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 19 which the
Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated
November 21, 1996. 20
21
Hence, this appeal by certiorari wherein petitioner now
raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY
OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE
DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15,
1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT
FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE
LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING
THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY
APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT
CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER
MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING
THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT
THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS
OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR WERE
PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE
WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE
ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING
ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT
TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES
THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE
PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY
WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE
OF SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS (240
SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO. 22
In sum, two issues are to be resolved:
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of
a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically
incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to
warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the
marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license
at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to
her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage
and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and
marriage license are different and incongruous.
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot
raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would
contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, 23 in a
number of instances, we have relaxed observance of
procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends
in themselves but exist to protect and promote
substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules
ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so
doing, the very reason for their existence would be
defeated. 24 Hence, when substantial justice plainly
requires, exempting a particular case from the operation
of technicalities should not be subject to cavil. 25 In our
view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue
of the validity of the marriage between Filipina and
Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to
arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent
conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here
the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required
now is a declaration of their effects according to existing
law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically
state in her petition for annulment of marriage before the
trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the
marriage license and the celebration of the marriage
itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to
Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out
that these critical dates were contained in the documents
she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the
marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17,
1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was
attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and
thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the
trial. 26 The date of celebration of their marriage at Our
Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15,
1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private
respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's
petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court, and private respondent's answer
admitting it. 27 This fact was also affirmed by petitioner,
in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct
examination, 28 as follows:
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that
you were married on November 15, 1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of
marriage of the parents in both their son's and
daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as
Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and
thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course
of the trial. 29 These pieces of evidence on record plainly
and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage
license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract
shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519,
was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner
nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona. 30
was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court
when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration
of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of
the view, therefore, that having been admitted in
evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object
thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of
the facts contained therein. 33
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of
private respondent need no longer detain us. It is
mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner
to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga,
dated December 9, 1993 as well as the Decision
promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals
and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R.
No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on
November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and
private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void
ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time of
celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on

record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly
state in her petition before the trial court that there was
incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage and the date of the issuance of their
marriage license. From the documents she presented,
the marriage license was issued on September 17,
1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on
November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that
the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage
license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying
these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code 31 is
clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of
an exceptional character, the purported marriage
between petitioner and private respondent could not be
classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-
79 32 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under
Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning.

We note that their marriage certificate and marriage

license are only photocopies. So are the birth certificates
of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll.
Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits
during the course of the trial below, which shows that
these have been examined and admitted by the trial
court, with no objections having been made as to their
authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECI SI ON
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal
of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint 3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O.
Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969,
through machinations, duress and intimidation employed
upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's
father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed
forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the
City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain
Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the
Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused
him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the
said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he
never applied for a marriage license for his supposed
marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any
marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently,
no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing
officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of
Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married
civilly on 19 May 1969, 4 and in a church ceremony
thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer
Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered
with the local civil registry of Manila and the National
Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of
marriage license after having been married to her for 25
years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime]
testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant
[Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo
D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city
hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage
Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain
Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an
aide of defendant's father accompanied them,
and who, together with another person, stood as
witness to the civil wedding. That although
marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued
in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was
indicated in the marriage contract, the same was
fictitious for he never applied for any marriage
license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made
by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola,
with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a
Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E")
was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license
no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On
May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again
wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor
Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish
Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they
executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F")
with the same marriage license no. 2770792
used and indicated. Preparations and expenses
for the church wedding and reception were
jointly shared by his and defendant's parents.
After the church wedding, he and defendant
resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their
first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970.
As his parents continued to support him
financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for
some time, for his medical studies. Eventually,
their marital relationship turned bad because it
became difficult for him to be married he being a
medical student at that time. They started living
apart in 1976, but they underwent family
counseling before they eventually separated in
1978. It was during this time when defendant's
second son was born whose paternity plaintiff
questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree
against defendant in the United States in 1981
and later secured a judicial separation of their
conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the
plaintiff, himself manifested that when his
service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the
latter narrated to him the circumstances of his
marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of
Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed
marriage license was obtained and with the
Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish
where the religious wedding ceremony was
celebrated. His request letters dated March 3,
1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March
9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh.
"K") were all sent to and received by the Civil
Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto,
issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh.
"I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and
September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued
by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy
Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified
copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and
defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of
Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"),
wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious
ceremony, having been civilly married on May
19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage
License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal
on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the
Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11,
1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael
Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and
testified that their office failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have
been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she
and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship
after they met and were introduced to each other
in October 1968. A model, she was compelled
by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas
beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to
lose her, asked her to run away with him to
Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned
back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff
in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she
and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in
Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs.
Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were
hostile when they learned of the elopement, but
Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take
care of everything, and promised to support
plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still
fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry
him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her
family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4)
on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where
she was made to sign documents. After the civil
wedding, they had lunch and later each went
home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had
the church wedding, which the Sevilla family
alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's
mother just came from hospital. Her family did
not participate in the wedding preparations.
Defendant further stated that there was no
sexual consummation during their honeymoon
and that it was after two months when they
finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero,
plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding
sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing
psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98,
p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded
by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has
unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over
her knees of which he would take endless
pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have
sex with her in between the knees which she
called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between
them was far and between like 8 months, hence,
abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff
exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant
attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-
98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a
bad temper who breaks things when he had
tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines,
benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept
him from sleep and then would take barbiturates
or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried
very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but
failed as it has become a habit to him. They had
no fixed home since they often moved and partly
lived in Spain for about four and a half years,
and during all those times, her mother-in-law
would send some financial support on and off,
while defendant worked as an English teacher.
Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did
nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as
plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and
this led to a break up in their marriage. Later,
she learned that plaintiff married one Angela
Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified
that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his
daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and
grandson came to stay with him after they
returned home from Spain and have lived with
him and his wife ever since. His grandsons
practically grew up under his care and guidance,
and he has supported his daughter's expenses
for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs.
"9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister,
testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's
family that attended to all the preparations and
arrangements for the church wedding of her
sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that
the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to
the church wedding. She also stated that she
and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff
inspite of the marital differences between
plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff
testified that because of irreconcilable
differences with defendant and in order for them
to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce
each other; that when he applied for and
obtained a divorce decree in the United States
on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the
knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact
authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to
represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During
his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent
certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE")
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same
marriage license appearing in the marriage
contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to
be fictitious. 6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the
nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court made
the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for
the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence
of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It
was shown under the various certifications
(Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the
office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent
 one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued
by that office, hence, the marriage license no.
2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts
executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on
May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a
certification enjoys probative value under the
rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the
civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and
Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev.
Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on
May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of
marriage solemnized under religious rites by
Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer
Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for
lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the
marriage contract of the parties under Registry
No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local
Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in
the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the
Office of the Solicitor General for its record and
information. 7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals
disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025,
February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence
of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it
is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus,
unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita
Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they "failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered," for the reason that "the
employee handling is already retired." With
said testimony We cannot therefore just
presume that the marriage license specified in
the parties' marriage contract was not issued for
in the end the failure of the office of the local civil
registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the
marriage license was attributable not to the fact
that no such marriage license was issued but
rather, because it "failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book
were available for scrutiny, there is a strong
possibility that it would have contained an entry
on marriage license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the
parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with
defendant is defective with respect to an
essential requisite of a marriage contract, a
perception that ultimately was not substantiated
with facts on record. 8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6
January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a
Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by
Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was
issued in accordance with law to the parties
herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in
question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly
applied and relied on the presumption of
regularity of officials acts, particularly the
issuance of a marriage license, arising solely
from the contents of the marriage contracts in
question which show on their face that a
marriage license was purportedly issued by the
Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila,
and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly
invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a
marriage arising from the admitted "fact of
marriage." 9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of
whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License
No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of
the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their
marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the
negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law
in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are
Articles 53, 10 5811 and 80. 12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is
an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The
marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no
exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily
dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license
based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil
Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case
of Cario v. Cario13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of
such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that such a certification
is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all
date relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the
burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage
is valid and that they secured the required
marriage license. Although she was declared in
default before the trial court, petitioner could
have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings
before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and
chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the
presumed validity of their marriage cannot
stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage
between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the
certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should
be read in line with the decision in the earlier case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of
documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist
in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents,
civil registrars are public officers charged with
the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications
for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil
Registrar must categorically state that the document
does not exist in his office or the particular entry could
not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such
certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of
record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written
statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that
after diligent search, no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of
his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or
entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the
certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in
connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied
with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be
accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11
March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were
(sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards
(sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792, 16 we
exert all effort but we cannot find the said
number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot
give you our full force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994
and provides:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
 This is to certify that no marriage license
Number 2770792 were ever issued by this
Office with regards to Marriage License Number
2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find
the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot
give you our full force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification, 18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of
this office, no Marriage License Application was
filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792
allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS.
CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application
and license do not exist in our Local Civil
Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be
fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the
request of the interested party for whatever legal
intent it may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement
that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot give
you our full force locating the above problem." It could
be easily implied from the said statement that the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts
to locate and determine the existence of Marriage
License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise,
both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty
whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the
representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they
cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person
in charge of the said logbook had already retired.
Further, the testimony of the said person was not
presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that
the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or
missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This
belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or
prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were
required to bring to this Court among other
things the register of application of/or (sic) for
marriage licenses received by the Office of the
:Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of
Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did
you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3
of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only
book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of
marriage of marriage applications that your
office maintains as required by the manual of the
office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion
marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question
whether marriage license 2880792 is
the number issued by their office while
with respect to license no. 2770792 the
office of the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan is very definite about it it was
never issued. Then ask him how about
no. 2880792 if the same was ever
issued by their office. Did you ask this
2887092, but you could not find the
 record? But for the moment you cannot
locate the books? Which is which now,
was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired,
sir. 19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the
effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the
logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have
been entered, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official function by the Local Civil
Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively
rebutted.
According to Section 3(m), 20 Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed is among the disputable
presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a
species of evidence that may be accepted and
acted on where there is no other evidence to
uphold the contention for which it stands, or one
which may be overcome by other evidence. One
such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that
an official act or duty has been regularly
performed. x x x. 21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure
to perform a duty. 22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty is disputable and can be overcome by other
evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption
has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and
second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive
proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792.
It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar,
that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of
showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook,
we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also
means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the
law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds. 23 The courts look
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be
lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of
great weight. 24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and
wife and lived together for several years producing two
offsprings, 26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime
several years before he filed the petition for declaration
of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual
sometime in 1991. 27 We are not ready to reward
petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and
give him his freedom and in the process allow him to
profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State
is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger
anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the
family members alone. 29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution
in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being,
they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio Always presume marriage." 30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based
on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. 31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not
trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we
have said in Carating-Siayngco v.
Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one,
where neither law nor society can provide the specific
answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April
2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON
C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.
VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge,
and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court
II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta,
Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are
Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process
Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are
respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of
the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein
respondents were charged with the following offenses, to
wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification
of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-
issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity
in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring
payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court
respondents filed their respective Comments. 2 A Reply
to Answers of Respondents was filed by
complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to
Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial
Court, Naga City, for investigation report and
recommendation. The case was however transferred to
First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when
Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife
is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the
factual antecedents of this administrative matter, as
culled from the records thereof, are set out under each
particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized
marriages even without the requisite marriage license.
Thus, the following couples were able to get married by
the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage
license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin,
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias
and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga,
Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy
Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their
marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A,
respectively) did not reflect any marriage license
number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their
marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to
wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the
parties which was usually several days after the
ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not
filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon
Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the
attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses
and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter
opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was
appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court
were already hostile to her, especially complainant
Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest
against her appointment. She avers that it was only
lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage
Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was
Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the
marriage contract and to register these with the local civil
registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these
marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative
case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file
copies of the marriage contracts were kept by
respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had
instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the
contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of
his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the
marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin
falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is
exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he
gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish
the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the
same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so;
that in order to solve the problem, the spouses
subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a
marriage license and executing their marriage contract,
a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the
other five marriages alluded to in the administrative
complaint were not illegally solemnized because the
marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did
not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies
of these marriage contracts are in the custody of
complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias
and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris
Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario
were not celebrated by him since he refused to
solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license;
that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte
was celebrated even without the requisite license due to
the insistence of the parties in order to avoid
embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he
did not sign their marriage contract which remains
unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July,
1991 regarding the number of marriages
solemnized and the number of
documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that
he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July,
1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those
marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise
made it appear that they have notarized only six (6)
documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will
show that there were one hundred thirteen (113)
documents which were notarized during that month; and
that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50
for each document, although in fact they collected
P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage
registry where all marriages celebrated by respondent
judge are entered is under the exclusive control and
custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the
only one who should be held responsible for the entries
made therein; that the reported marriages are merely
based on the payments made as solemnization fees
which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She
further avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the
custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be
held accountable for whatever alleged difference there is
in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those
payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the
notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts;
that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to
the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development
Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme
Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that
the discrepancies in the monthly report were
manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he
is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly
report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous
number of marriages celebrated was intentionally placed
by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages
solemnized should not be based on solemnization fees
paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for
are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there
were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the
month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts
issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should
be held accountable for any unreceipted payment for
notarial fees because he is the one in charge of the
Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant
Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to be
appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent
judge contends that he is not the one supervising or
preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the
ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an
appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of
the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the
Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado,
Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were
surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as
clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out
that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because
she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to
respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in
Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning unit but
when she was appointed clerk of court she had to
transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed
the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to
respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by
the latter in his office was with the consent of the Mayor
of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the
applications for the position of clerk of court to the
Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such
appointments and that he had no hand in the
appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the
air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992,
eight (8) months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of
court. He claims that he would not be that naive to
exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended
as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled
"People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria
Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to change her
property bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of
P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor nor
was it made to appear in the records that the bond has
been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the
money was never returned to the bondswoman; and that
it has not been shown that the money was turned over to
the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was
deposited with the former clerk of court, then turned over
to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under
a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is deposited
with the bank; and that should the bondswoman desire
to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper
procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No.
5438 was archieved for failure of the bondsman to
deliver the body of the accused in court despite notice;
and that he has nothing to do with the payment of the
cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
 5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got
detention prisoners to work in his house, one of whom
was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No.
5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while
Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the
former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order
to conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant to
an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that
he never employed detention prisoners and that he has
adequate household help; and that he had to order the
case archived because it had been pending for more
than six (6) months and the accused therein remained at
large.
6. Unlawful collection of dock et fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket
fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the
payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding
receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the
amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she
deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-
Designate Felimon Montenegro (because respondent
judge was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand
payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that the
bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not
allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash the
check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same
in any bank account for clearing; that respondent
deposited the same in her account; and that after the
check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the
Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-
Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and
submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated
May 20, 1994, together with the administrative matter.
We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are
favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive
presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in
said report. We commend the investigating judge for his
industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said
report which, being amply substantiated by the evidence
and supported by logical illations, we hereby approve
and hereunder reproduce at length the material portions
thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents
is illegal solemnization of marriage.
Judge Palaypayon is charged with
having solemnized without a marriage
license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya
and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano
Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B),
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido
(Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria
Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay
and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages,
the blank space in the marriage
contracts to show the number of the
marriage was solemnized as required by
Article 22 of the Family Code were not
filled up. While the contracting parties
and their witnesses signed their
marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon
did not affix his signature in the
marriage contracts, except that of
Abellano and Edralin when Judge
Palaypayon signed their marriage
certificate as he claims that he
solemnized this marriage under Article
34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
In said marriages the contracting parties
were not furnished a copy of their
marriage contract and the Local Civil
Registrar was not sent either a copy of
the marriage certificate as required by
Article 23 of the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte
is shown to have been solemnized by
Judge Palaypayon without a marriage
license. The testimonies of Bocay
himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the
witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya
and Besmonte, and the photographs
taken when Judge Palaypayon
solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to
K-9) sufficiently show that Judge
Palaypayon really solemnized their
marriage. Bocaya declared that they
were advised by Judge Palaypayon to
return after ten (10) days after their
marriage was solemnized and bring with
them their marriage license. In the
meantime, they already started living
together as husband and wife believing
that the formal requisites of marriage
were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he
solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte because the parties allegedly
did not have a marriage license. He
declared that in fact he did not sign the
marriage certificate, there was no date
stated on it and both the parties and the
Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy
of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which
show that he solemnized the marriage
of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge
Palaypayon explains that they merely
show as if he was solemnizing the
marriage. It was actually a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real
one. This happened because of the
pleading of the mother of one of the
contracting parties that he consent to be
photographed to show that as if he was
solemnizing the marriage as he was told
that the food for the wedding reception
was already prepared, visitors were
already invited and the place of the
parties where the reception would be
held was more than twenty (20)
kilometers away from the poblacion of
Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon
is difficult to believe. The fact alone that
he did not sign the marriage certificate
or contract, the same did not bear a
date and the parties and the Local Civil
Registrar were not furnished a copy of
the marriage certificate, do not by
themselves show that he did not
solemnize the marriage. His
uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail
over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola
who also declared, among others, that
Bocaya and his bride were advised by
Judge Palaypayon to return after ten
(10) days with their marriage license
and whose credibility had not been
impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of
the wedding ceremony up to the signing
of the marriage certificate in front of
Judge Palaypayon and on his table
(Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-
4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8,
K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just
to show a simulated solemnization of
marriage. One or two pictures may
convince a person of the explanation of
Judge Palaypayon, but not all those
pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to
believe that Judge Palaypayon would
allows himself to be photographed as if
he was solemnizing a marriage on a
mere pleading of a person whom he did
not even know for the alleged reasons
given. It would be highly improper and
unbecoming of him to allow himself to
be used as an instrument of deceit by
making it appear that Bocaya and
Besmonte were married by him when in
truth and in fact he did not solemnize
their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano
and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon
admitted that he solemnized their
marriage, but he claims that it was
under Article 34 of the Family Code, so
a marriage license was not required.
The contracting parties here executed a
joint affidavit that they have been living
together as husband and wife for almost
six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not
bear any date either when it was
solemnized, it was stated that Abellano
was only eighteen (18) years, two (2)
months and seven (7) days old. If he
and Edralin had been living together as
husband and wife for almost six (6)
years already before they got married as
they stated in their joint affidavit,
Abellano must ha(ve) been less than
thirteen (13) years old when he started
living with Edralin as his wife and this is
hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon
should ha(ve) been aware of this when
he solemnized their marriage as it was
his duty to ascertain the qualification of
the contracting parties who might ha(ve)
executed a false joint affidavit in order to
have an instant marriage by avoiding
the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this
case was already filed, Judge
Palaypayon married again Abellano and
Edralin, this time with a marriage license
(Exh. BB). The explanation given by
Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized
the marriage of the same couple for the
second time is that he did not consider
the first marriage he solemnized under
Article 34 of the Family Code as (a)
marriage at all because complainant
Ramon Sambo did not follow his
instruction that the date should be
placed in the marriage certificate to
show when he solemnized the marriage
and that the contracting parties were not
furnished a copy of their marriage
certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of
solemnizing the marriage of Abellano
and Edralin for the second time with a
marriage license already only gave rise
to the suspicion that the first time he
solemnized the marriage it was only
made to appear that it was solemnized
under exceptional character as there
was not marriage license and Judge
Palaypayon had already signed the
marriage certificate. If it was true that he
solemnized the first marriage under
exceptional character where a marriage
license was not required, why did he
already require the parties to have a
marriage license when he solemnized
their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon
that the first marriage of Abellano and
Edralin was not a marriage at all as the
marriage certificate did not state the
date when the marriage was solemnized
and that the contracting parties were not
furnished a copy of their marriage
certificate, is not well taken as they are
not any of those grounds under
Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the
Family Code which declare a marriage
void from the beginning. Even if no one,
however, received a copy of the
marriage certificate, the marriage is still
valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil.
179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just
absolve himself from responsibility by
blaming his personnel. They are not the
guardian(s) of his official function and
under Article 23 of the Family Code it is
his duty to furnish the contracting parties
(a) copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido
(Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and
Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio
executed joint affidavits that Judge
Palaypayon did not solemnize their
marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both
Carrido and Nacario testified for the
respondents that actually Judge
Palaypayon did not solemnize their
marriage as they did not have a
marriage license. On cross-examination,
however, both admitted that they did not
know who prepared their affidavits. They
were just told, Carrido by a certain
Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a
certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to
the Municipal building and sign their
joint affidavits there which were already
prepared before the Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato
Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their
marriage contract was signed by them
and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty.
Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy
(Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other
aforementioned marriages, the
solemnization fee was also paid as
shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992
and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh.
F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having
solemnized the marriage of Gamay and
Belga allegedly because there was no
marriage license. On her part,
respondent Baroy at first denied that the
marriage was solemnized. When she
was asked, however, why did she sign
the marriage contract as a witness she
answered that she thought the marriage
was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14;
10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk
of court of Judge Palaypayon. She
signed the marriage contract of Gamay
and Belga as one of the two principal
sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the
impression that she did not even know
that the marriage was solemnized by
Judge Palaypayon. This is found very
difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same
denial of having solemnized also the
marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh.
D). The contracting parties and their
witnesses also signed the marriage
contract and paid the solemnization fee,
but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not
solemnize their marriage due to lack of
marriage license. Judge Palaypayon
submitted the affidavit of William
Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to
corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14).
Medina, however, did not testify in this
case and so his affidavit has no
probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his
procedure and practice have been that
before the contracting parties and their
witnesses enter his chamber in order to
get married, he already required
complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he
assigned the task of preparing the
marriage contract, to already let the
parties and their witnesses sign their
marriage contracts, as what happened
to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and
Gaor, among others. His purpose was to
save his precious time as he has been
solemnizing marriages at the rate of
three (3) to four (4) times everyday
(TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if
true, is highly improper and irregular, if
not illegal, because the contracting
parties are supposed to be first asked
by the solemnizing officer and declare
that they take each other as husband
and wife before the solemnizing officer
in the presence of at least two (2)
witnesses before they are supposed to
sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6,
Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however,
of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged
practice and procedure before
solemnizing a marriage, is not true as
shown by the picture taken during the
wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte
(Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony
of respondent Baroy herself who
declared that the practice of Judge
Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the
contracting parties and their witnesses
sign the marriage contract only after
Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their
marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any
evidence to show also that he was really
solemnizing three (3) to four (4)
marriages everyday. On the contrary his
monthly report of cases for July, 1992
shows that his court had only twenty-
seven (27) pending cases and he
solemnized only seven (7) marriages for
the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly
report of cases for September, 1992
shows also that he solemnized only four
(4) marriages during the whole month
(Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally
solemnized marriages, respondent
Judge Palaypayon has presented and
marked in evidence several marriage
contracts of other persons, affidavits of
persons and certification issued by the
Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-
H). These persons who executed
affidavits, however, did not testify in this
case. Besides, the marriage contracts
and certification mentioned are
immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not
charged of having solemnized these
marriages illegally also. He is not
charged that the marriages he
solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein
respondents, that of having falsified the
monthly report of cases submitted to the
Supreme Court and not stating in the
monthly report the actual number of
documents notarized and issuing the
corresponding receipts of the notarial
fees, have been sufficiently proven by
the complainants insofar as the monthly
report of cases for July and September,
1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July,
1992 both signed by the respondents,
show that for said month there were six
(6) documents notarized by Judge
Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio
Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The
notarial register of the MTC of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however,
shows that there were actually one
hundred thirteen (113) documents
notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the
said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was
no falsification of the monthly report of
cases for July, 1992 because there were
only six (6) notarized documents that
were paid (for) as shown by official
receipts. He did not, however, present
evidence of the alleged official receipts
showing that the notarial fee for the six
(6) documetns were paid. Besides, the
monthly report of cases with respect to
the number of documents notarized
should not be based on how many
notarized documents were paid of the
notarial fees, but the number of
documents placed or recorded in the
notarial register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was
not personally verifying and checking
anymore the correctness of the monthly
reports because he relies on his co-
respondent who is the Clerk of Court
and whom he has assumed to have
checked and verified the records. He
merely signs the monthly report when it
is already signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is
not well taken because he is required to
have close supervision in the
preparation of the monthly report of
cases of which he certifies as to their
correctness. As a judge he is personally
responsible for the proper discharge of
his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's
Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA
517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA
581, it was held that "A judge cannot
take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she
puts the blame of the falsification of the
monthly report of cases on complainant
Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to
prepare not only the monthly report of
cases, but the preparation and custody
of marriage contracts, notarized
documents and the notarial register. By
her own admission she has assigned to
complainant Sambo duties she was
supposed to perform, yet according to
her she never bother(ed) to check the
notarial register of the court to find out
the number of documents notarized in a
month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy
assigned the preparation of the monthly
report of cases to Sambo, which was
denied by the latter as he claims that he
only typed the monthly report based on
the data given to him by her, still it is her
duty to verify and check whether the
report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy
that Sambo was the one in custody of
marriage contracts, notarized
documents and notarial register, among
other things, is not acceptable not only
because as clerk of court she was
supposed to be in custody, control and
supervision of all court records including
documents and other properties of the
court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court),
but she herself admitted that from
January, 1992 she was already in full
control of all the records of the court
including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-
93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in
connection with the charge of
falsification, however, also shows that
respondent Baroy did not account for
what happened to the notarial fees
received for those documents notarized
during the month of July and
September, 1992. The evidence
adduced in this case also sufficiently
show that she received cash bond
deposits and she did not deposit them to
a bank or to the Municipal Treasurer;
and that she only issued temporary
receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6)
documents reported to have been
notarized by Judge Palaypayon
although the documents notarized for
said month were actually one hundred
thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial
register. For September, 1992, there
were only five (5) documents reported
as notarized for that month, though the
notarial register show(s) that there were
fifty-six (56) documents actually
notarized. The fee for each document
notarized as appearing in the notarial
register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy
and Sambo declared that what was
actually being charged was P20.00.
Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50
went to the Supreme Court and P1.50
was being turned over to the Municipal
Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any
evidence to show that she really sent to
the Supreme Court the notarial fees of
P18.50 for each document notarized
and to the Municipal Treasurer the
additional notarial fee of P1.50. This
should be fully accounted for
considering that Baroy herself declared
that some notarial fees were allowed by
her at her own discretion to be paid
later. Similarly, the solemnization fees
have not been accounted for by Baroy
considering that she admitted that even
(i)n those instances where the
marriages were not solemnized due to
lack of marriage license the
solemnization fees were not returned
anymore, unless the contracting parties
made a demand for their return. Judge
Palaypayon declared that he did not
know of any instance when
solemnization fee was returned when
the marriage was not solemnized due to
lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that
Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her
some of the notarial fees. This is difficult
to believe. It was not only because
Sambo vehemently denied it, but the
minutes of the conference of the
personnel of the MTC of Tinambac
dated January 20, 1992 shows that on
that date Baroy informed the personnel
of the court that she was taking over the
functions she assigned to Sambo,
particularly the collection of legal fees
(Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims
that Sambo did not turn over to her were
for those documents notarized (i)n July
and September, 1992 already. Besides
there never was any demand she made
for Sambo to turn over some notarial
fees supposedly in his possession.
Neither was there any memorandum
she issued on this matter, in spite of the
fact that she has been holding meetings
and issuing memoranda to the
personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF,
FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A
(supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that
on October 29, 1991 a cash bond
deposit of a certain Dacara in the
amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos was turned over to her after she
assumed office and for this cash bond
she issued only a temporary receipt
(Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash
bond in any bank or to the Municipal
Treasurer. She just kept it in her own
cash box on the alleged ground that the
parties in that case where the cash bond
was deposited informed her that they
would settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she
finally deposited the aforementioned
cash bond of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP) in February,
1993, after this administrative case was
already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93).
The Pass Book, however, shows that
actually Baroy opened an account with
the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March
26, 1993 when she deposited an
amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00)
Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims
that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos
of the initial deposit was the cash bond
of Dacara. If it were true, it was only
after keeping to herself the cash bond of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for
around one year and five months when
she finally deposited it because of the
filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month
and two days after she finally deposited
the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it
from the bank without any authority or
order from the court. It was only on July
23, 1993, or after almost three (3)
months after she withdrew it, when she
redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6;
1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case
also show that on February 28, 1993
respondent Baroy received also a cash
bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones
in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash
bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued
only an annumbered temporary receipt
(Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept
this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos
cash bond to herself. She did not
deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the
Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation
was that the parties in Crim. Case No.
5180 informed her that they would settle
the case amicably. It was on April 26,
1993, or almost two months later when
Judge Palaypayon issued an order for
the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that
since she assumed office on October
21, 1991 she used to issue temporary
receipt only for cash bond deposits and
other payments and collections she
received. She further admitted that
some of these temporary receipts she
issued she failed to place the number of
the receipts such as that receipt marked
Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy
claims that she did not know that she
had to use the official receipts of the
Supreme Court. It was only from
February, 1993, after this case was
already filed, when she only started
issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the
respondents is that in order to be
appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave
Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as
a gift. The evidence adduced with
respect to this charge, show that on
August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air
conditioner for the sum of Seventeen
Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00)
Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was
paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-
2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was
brought to court in order to be installed
in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it
was still placed in the same box when it
was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it
to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty
Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on
installment basis with a down payment
of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos
and as proof thereof the respondents
presented a typewritten receipt dated
May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt
was signed by both respondents and by
the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur and another person as
witness.
The alleged sale between respondents
is not beyond suspicion. It was bought
by Baroy at a time when she was
applying for the vacant position of Clerk
of Court (to) which she was eventually
appointed in October, 1991. From the
time she bought the air conditioner on
August 24, 1991 until it was installed in
the office of Judge Palaypayon it was
not used yet. The sale to Judge
Palaypayon was only evidenced by a
mere typewritten receipt dated May 29,
1992 when this case was already filed.
The receipt could have been easily
prepared. The Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a
witness did not testify in this case. The
sale is between the Clerk of Court and
the Judge of the same court. All these
circumstances give rise to suspicion of
at least impropriety. Judges should
avoid such action as would subject
(them) to suspicion and (their) conduct
should be free from the appearance of
impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60
SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge
Palaypayon received a cash bond
deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos from Januaria Dacara without
issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an
affidavit regarding this charge that
Judge Palaypayon did not give her a
receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she
deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit,
however, has no probative value as she
did not show that this cash bond of
P1,000.00 found its way into the hands
of respondent Baroy who issued only a
temporary receipt for it and this has
been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge
Palaypayon is the getting of detention
prisoners to work in his house and one
of them escaped while in his custody
and was never found again. To hide this
fact, the case against said accused was
ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon.
The evidence adduced with respect to
this particular charge, show that in Crim.
Case No. 5647 entitled People vs.
Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan
Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan
Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991
and placed in the municipal jail of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1,
0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence
presented that Alex Alano was taken by
Judge Palaypayon from the municipal
jail where said accused was confined
and that he escaped while in custody of
Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial,
particularly that of David Ortiz, a former
utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence
not sufficient. The complainants should
have presented records from the police
of Tinambac to show that Judge
Palaypayon took out from the municipal
jail Alex Alano where he was under
detention and said accused escaped
while in the custody of Judge
Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge
Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim.
Case No. 5047 archiving said case
appears to be without basis. The order
states: "this case was filed on April 12,
1991 and the records show that the
warrant of arrest (was) issued against
the accused, but up to this moment
there is no return of service for the
warrant of arrest issued against said
accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said
case, however, show that in fact there
was a return of the service of the
warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991
showing that Alano and Adupe were
arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his
order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim.
Case No. 5047 referred only to one of
the accused who remained at large. The
explanation cannot be accepted
because the two other accused, Alano
and Adupe, were arrested. Judge
Palaypayon should have issued an
order for the arrest of Adupe who
allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was
supposed to be confined in the
municipal jail if his claim is true that he
did not take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge
Palaypayon why he ordered the case
archived was because he heard from
the police that Alano escaped. This
explanation is not acceptable either. He
should ha(ve) set the case and if the
police failed to bring to court Alano, the
former should have been required to
explain in writing why Alano was not
brought to court. If the explanation was
that Alano escaped from jail, he should
have issued an order for his arrest. It is
only later on when he could not be
arrested when the case should have
been ordered archived. The order
archiving this case for the reason that
he only heard that Alano escaped is
another circumstance which gave rise to
a suspicion that Alano might have really
escaped while in his custody only that
the complainants could not present
records or other documentary evidence
to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents
is that they collected filing fees on
collection cases filed by the Rural Bank
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was
supposed to be exempted in paying
filing fees under existing laws and that
the filing fees received was deposited by
respondent Baroy in her personal
account in the bank. The evidence
presented show that on February 4,
1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed
ten (10) civil cases for collection against
farmers and it paid the total amount of
Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos
representing filing fees. The
complainants cited Section 14 of
Republic Act 720, as amended, which
exempts Rural Banks (from) the
payment of filing fees on collection of
sums of money cases filed against
farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had
nothing to do with the payment of the
filing fees of the Rural Bank of
Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy
who received them and besides, on
February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave.
On her part Baroy claims that the bank
paid voluntarily the filing fees. The
records, however, shows that
respondent Baroy sent a letter to the
manager of the bank dated January 28,
1992 to the effect that if the bank would
not pay she would submit all Rural Bank
cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment
by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked
whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac
was really exempt from the payment of
filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720,
as amended, instead of threatening the
bank to have its cases be submitted to
the court in order to have them
dismissed. Here the payment of the
filing fees was made on February 4,
1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00)
Pesos was only turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992.
Here, there is an undue delay again in
complying with her obligation as
accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the
evidence presented by the complainants
sufficiently show that respondent Judge
Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had
solemnized marriages, particularly that
of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte,
without a marriage license, and that it
having been shown that he did not
comply with his duty in closely
supervising his clerk of court in the
preparation of the monthly report of
cases being submitted to the Supreme
Court, particularly for the months of July
and September, 1992 where it has been
proven that the reports for said two (2)
months were falsified with respect to the
number of documents notarized, it is
respectfully recommended that he be
imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning
that the same or similar offenses will be
more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not
sign the marriage contracts or
certificates of those marriages he
solemnized without a marriage license,
there were no dates placed in the
marriage contracts to show when they
were solemnized, the contracting parties
were not furnished their marriage
contracts and the Local Civil Registrar
was not being sent any copy of the
marriage contract, will not absolve him
from liability. By solemnizing alone a
marriage without a marriage license he
as the solemnizing officer is the one
responsible for the irregularity in not
complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites
of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the
Family Code of the Philippines, he shall
be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for
his negligence or failure to comply with
his duty of closely supervising his clerk
of court in the performance of the latter's
duties and functions, particularly the
preparation of the monthly report of
cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA
16). His explanation that he only signed
the monthly report of cases only when
his clerk of court already signed the
same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty
to closely supervise her, to check and
verify the records if the monthly reports
prepared by his clerk of court do not
contain false statements. It was held
that "A judge cannot take refuge behind
the inefficiency or incompetence of court
personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA
158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that
respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the
clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been
found to have falsified the monthly
report of cases for the months of July
and September, 1992 with respect to
the number of documents notarized, for
having failed to account (for) the notarial
fees she received for said two (2)
months period; for having failed to
account (for) the solemnization fees of
those marriages allegedly not
solemnized, but the solemnization fees
were not returned; for unauthorized
issuance of temporary receipts, some of
which were issued unnumbered; for
receiving the cash bond of Dacara on
October 29, 1991 in the amount of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which
she issued only a temporary receipt
(Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the
Land Bank of the Philippines only on
March 26, 1993, or after one year and
five months in her possession and after
this case was already filed; for
withdrawing said cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April
29, 1993 without any court order or
authority and redepositing it only on July
23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of
Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos
from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case
No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, for which she issued only an
unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X
and X-1) and for not depositing it with a
bank or with the Municipal Treasurer
until it was ordered released; and for
requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on
February 4, 1992 for collection cases
filed against farmers in the amount of
Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but
turning over said amount to the
Municipal Treasurer only on March 12,
1992, it is respectfully recommended
that said respondent clerk of court Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the
service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court
deposits shall be by the clerk of court
who shall issue official receipt to the
provincial, city or municipal treasurer for
the amount withdrawn. Court deposits
cannot be withdrawn except by order of
the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of
Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183,
184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for Clerks
of Court). A circular also provides that
the Clerks of Court shall immediately
issue an official receipt upon receipt of
deposits from party litigants and
thereafter deposit intact the collection
with the municipal, city or provincial
treasurer and their deposits, can only be
withdrawn upon proper receipt and
order of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52,
26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks
of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum
Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also
provides that "all collections of funds of
fiduciary character including rental
deposits, shall be deposited immediately
by the clerk of court concerned upon
receipt thereof with City, Municipal or
Provincial Treasurer where his court is
located" and that "no withdrawal of any
of such deposits shall be made except
upon lawful order of the court exercising
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to
comply with the foregoing circulars, or
deliberately disregarded, or even
intentionally violated them. By her
conduct, she demonstrated her callous
unconcern for the obligations and
responsibility of her duties and functions
as a clerk of court and accountable
officer. The gross neglect of her duties
shown by her constitute(s) a serious
misconduct which warrant(s) her
removal from office. In the case of Belen
P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of
Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City;
A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it
was held that "The clerk of court is not
authorized to keep funds in his/her
custody; monies received by him/her
shall be deposited immediately upon
receipt thereof with the City, Municipal
or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court
Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25,
1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982.
Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the
 cash bail bonds and fine she collected
constitutes serious misconduct and her
misappropriation of said funds
constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent
Norma Hiam was found guilty of
dishonesty and serious misconduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and (the Court) ordered her
immediate dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the
conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized
by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be
beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity
in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a
necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to rank or
position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they
being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics
and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
the performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require
a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of
P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon.
Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same
or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely
dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in
any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records
and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family

Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of
marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except
in the cases provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it
declares that the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall generally render the marriage
void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties

and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we
are providing for herein pertains to the administrative
liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their
criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code
provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall
be punished in accordance with the provisions of the
Marriage Law." 9 This is of course, within the province of
the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

The recommendation with respect to the administrative

sanction to be imposed on respondent judge should,
therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the
charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does
appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled
with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage and
the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his
undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as
hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such
serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
DE CI SI ON
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges
respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a
sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent
is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17
February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her
marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without
the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines
Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the
strength of this marriage until her husband passed away.
However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners
right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not
recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the
Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against
respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office
of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator
Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June
2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required
respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge
averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo
on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the
parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that
all the documents to the marriage were complete, he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that
Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the
rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25
kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then
requested if respondent judge could solemnize the
marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he
started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he
discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite
marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriag e
and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due
to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors,
and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he
proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding,
it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who
just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he
reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and
admonished the parties that their failure to give it would
render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
respondent judge that they would give the license to him
in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to
comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but
the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the
contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the
absence of a marriage license. He attributes the
hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner
as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit
of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the
Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge
initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want
of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because
of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually
solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this
administrative case out of rage. However, after reading
the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her
own shortcomings and is now bothered by her
conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that
petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage
License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this
Application that the marriage license shall be issued on
17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia
claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar
General issued a Certification that it has no record of such
marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000.
Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May
2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage
Contract of the parties since it has no record of their
marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of
respondent judge so the latter could communicate with
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license.
Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of
Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a
Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
respondent judge that their office cannot issue the
marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the
Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report
and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found
the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage
without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so
outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was
recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or
B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and
judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro
vs. Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge held office and had
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he
solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality
of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos. We held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local
ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only
within the area or diocese or place allowed by his
Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this
Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long
as the requisites of the law are complied with. However,
judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions,
may officiate in weddings only within said areas and
not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability. [2] (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six
(6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a
marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. We further held that:
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did
not possess such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge
acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the
Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has
consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal
of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect
of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.
Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice,
as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined. [5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do not
involve purely private or personal matters. They can not
be made to depend upon the will of every complainant
who may, for one reason or another, condone a
detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act
of a complainant in a matter which involves the Courts
constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that
power may be put to naught, undermine the trust
character of a public office and impair the integrity and
dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority. [6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M.
Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not

experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn
to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be
skilled and competent in understanding and applying the
law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic
legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case.
x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly
prejudiced the status of married persons. [3]

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of

respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore
is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative
liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the
law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of
human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for

solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license. In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage
which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is
void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DE CI SI ON
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to revers e
the decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the
judgment [2] dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No.
8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo
y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and
sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed
in this petition is the resolution[3] of the appellate court,
dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a
quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran
City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years
(from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card
from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied
and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again
for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada.
Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on
August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work
in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court
(General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant
which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and
to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married
Maria Jececha Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa
BarangayParish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020.
The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration
of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground
that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with
Bigamy in an Information[5] filed by the City Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol. [6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the
arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial
nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial
question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but
subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by
the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereaft er
ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down
its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to
Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.
SO ORDERED. [7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court
discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia
was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, [8] the trial court ruled that want of a valid
marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed
to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the
fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity
of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry
again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the
trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held that the
court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort
merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no
jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the
parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios
defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage,
the trial court stressed that following People v.
Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed to know the law, and the
fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a
violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof.
 Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the
trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020
declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab
initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No
appeal was taken from this decision, which then became
final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision,
the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. [11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the
appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration
of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No.
6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is
sought to be punished by Article 349[12] of the Revis ed
Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the
CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the
beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the
divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court
could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant
to Article 15[13] of the Civil Code and given the fact that it
is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article
17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy
cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellat e
courts decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola
v. People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question of
law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be
a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied
the motion for lack of merit. [16] However, the denial was by
a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original
decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S.
Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice
Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the
first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then
there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of
the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and
since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never
married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable
doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for
our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN
CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE
REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF
CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTE D THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE
VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT
EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT. [17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether
or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his
defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted
for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the
Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the
second marriage openly and publicly, which a person
intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner
further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to
a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of
bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the
Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith
and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete
defense. He stresses that there is a difference between
the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrat e
the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his
intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to
an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case
is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General
relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which
held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided
all the elements concur, stressing that under Article
40[19] of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is
a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the
petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as
everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG
counters that petitioners contention that he was in good
faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No.
6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith
and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine
whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this
case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid down the
elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved,
or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid
had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we
note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following
decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the
marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and
Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and
further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol
to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED. [21]
The trial court found that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia
by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a
mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without
the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus
held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with
Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly
puts it, This simply means that there was no marriage to
begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to
the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents
and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration
of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under
the eyes of the law, never married. [24] The records show
that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long
become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that
the accused must have been legally married. But in this
case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married
to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak
of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being
declared void ab initio, the two were never married from
the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no
legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion,
for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at
the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha.
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being
an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The
petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be
distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter case,
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was
likewise obtained after the second marriage was already
celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as void. [26]
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first
marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice:
first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly
issued and then again six months later before a priest in
religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage
appeared to have transpired, although later declared
void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony
at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner
might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a
subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is
mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of
an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the
presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done.
Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that
petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find
that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his
defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is
now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTE D.
The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the
resolution of the appellate court dated September 25,
2000, denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the
charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not
been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
 RESTITUTO M. G.R. No. 167746
ALCANTARA, through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose
Petitioner, Present: de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March

YNARES- 1983.The marriage was likewise celebrated without the

SANTIAGO, J., parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINE Z, license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the
CHICO-NAZA RIO, marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ. resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to
apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said
ROSITA A. Promulgated:
ALCANTARA and place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their
HON. COURT OF August 28, 2007
APPEALS, child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and
Respondents. lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -x hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void
and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the
corresponding marriage contract [5] and its entry on file. [6]
DECI SI ON

CHICO-NAZA RIO, J.: Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage,

respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and
maintains that there was a marriage license issued as
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
on Certiorari filed by
Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners
petitioner Restituto Alcantaraassailing the Decision[1] of
representation, respondent gave birth to their first child
the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-
named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to
G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioners appeal and
another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27
affirming the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
October 1992. [7] Petitioner has a mistress with whom he
of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325
has three children. [8] Petitioner only filed the annulment of
dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for
their marriage to evade prosecution
annulment of marriage.
for concubinage. [9] Respondent, in fact, has filed a case
for concubinageagainst petitioner before
The antecedent facts are:
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch
60.[10] Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of
A petition for annulment of marriage[3] was filed by
marriage be denied for lack of merit.
petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging
that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch
securing the required marriage license, went to
143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a
person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met The foregoing considered, judgment is
a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a rendered as follows:

certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of 1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of
merit;
the CDCC BR Chapel. [4] They got married on the same
day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went
 2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent 127263, 12 April 2000 [330
the sum of twenty thousand pesos SCRA 550]).
(P20,000.00) per month as support for
their two (2) children on the first five (5) d. The Honorable Court of Appeals
days of each month; and committed a reversible error
when it failed to relax the
3. To pay the costs. [11] observance of procedural rules
to protect and promote the
substantial rights of the party
litigants. [14]
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision dismissing the petitioners appeal.His Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the We deny the petition.

Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005. [12]

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was

parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner no marriage license because he and respondent just went

had not presented any evidence to overcome the to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer who arranged

presumption. Moreover, the parties marriage contract everything for them. [15] The wedding took place at the

being a public document is a prima facie proof of the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel

questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the

Rules of Court. [13] marriage belongs. [16] He and respondent did not go
to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the license. Assuming a marriage license

following issues for resolution: from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor
the respondent was a resident of the place. The
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
committed a reversible error
when it ruled that the Petition for of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the
Annulment has no legal and
factual basis despite the certification states that Marriage License number
evidence on record that there 7054133 was issued in favor of
was no marriage license at the
precise moment of the Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but
solemnization of the marriage. their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals their marriage license number.

committed a reversible error
when it gave weight to the
Marriage License No. 7054133 The marriage involved herein having been solemnized
despite the fact that the same
on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the
was not identified and offered as
evidence during the trial, and Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validit y
was not the Marriage license
number appearing on the face of is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of
the marriage contract. its celebration.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals

committed a reversible error A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
when it failed to apply the ruling
laid down by this Honorable Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders
Court in the case of Sy vs. Court
the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[18] in
of Appeals. (G.R. No.
relation to Article 58 of the same Code. [19]

Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law
applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized
unless all these requisites are complied
with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting
parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a
marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the
States demonstration of its involvement and participation
in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. [21]
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage
license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases
where the court considered the absence of a marriage
license as a ground for considering the marriage void are
clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, [22] the
Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search
and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that
Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the
parties. The Court held that the certification of due search
and inability to find a record or entry as to the purport ed
marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the
Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that
would render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of
therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal
that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. The court
held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar
is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage
license. Their marriage having been solemnized without
the necessary marriage license and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement ,
the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals, [24] the marriage license was
issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court
held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage
was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a
marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be
considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number. A certification to this effect was
also issued by the local civil registrar
of Carmona, Cavite. [25] The certification moreover is
precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom
the marriage license was issued,
namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the
parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L.
Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry
Records of Marriage filed in this office,
Marriage License No. 7054133 was
issued in favor of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss
Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
for publication are considered mere irregularities that do
not affect the validity of the marriage. [30] An irregularity in
any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its
validity but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively
liable. [31]
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the
marriage license number in the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage

This Certification is being issued upon license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the
the request of Mrs. Rosita marriage contract states that the marriage license number
A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpos e
or intents it may serve. [26] of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this
argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume
that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty
scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping
has been regularly performed and the issuance of the
of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of
may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does
official business. [27] The presumption of regularity of
not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come
presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than
with clean hands, [32] petitioner cannot pretend that he was
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus,
not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration
unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
which he now insists took place without the requisite
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in
marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil
support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an
marriage took place because he initiated it. [33] Petitioner
officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should
is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by
be in favor of its lawfulness. [28] Significantly, apart from
profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to
these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage
the Manila City Halland likewise, knowingly and
license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite. [29]
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He
cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probat ive
himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when
value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor
the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to
respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then,
his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His
we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul
attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage
petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a
betrays his bad faith. [34]
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
residence of either of the contracting parties, and
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of
ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing
publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period
the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went
through the second wedding ceremony in church under That is why the San Jose
duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was de Manuguit church copied the
same marriage License in the
executed without nary a whimper on the part of the Marriage Contract issued which
petitioner. Marriage License is Number
7054033.

In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and WITNESS

respondent, they presented to the San Jose Yes your honor. [35]
de Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed
during the previous wedding ceremony before
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable
the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners
and a willing participant to all that took place at that
testimony as follows
time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory
of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever
WITNESS
irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. [36]
As I remember your honor, they asked us
to get the necessary document
prior to the wedding. Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they

COURT appeared before a fixer who arranged everything for them

and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain
What particular document did the church
asked you to produce? I am Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the
referring to the San Jose
CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The
de Manuguit church.
authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have
WITNESS
performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the
I dont remember your honor. absence of any showing to the contrary. [37] Moreover, the

COURT solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigat e

whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
Were you asked by the church to present
a Marriage License? regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the
solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has
WITNESS
been issued by the competent official, and it may be
I think they asked us for documents and
presumed from the issuance of the license that said
I said we have already a
Marriage Contract and I dont official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the
know if it is good enough for the
marriage and they accepted it contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. [38]
your honor.

COURT Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is

always in favor of the validity of the marriage. [39] Every
In other words, you represented to the
San Jose de Manuguit church intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of
that you have with you already a
the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this
Marriage Contract?
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
WITNESS
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
Yes your honor. weight.

COURT

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City,
dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED.Costs against
petitioner.
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., G.R. No. 191425
Petitioner,
Present:
31538. The appellate court affirmed the 19 November
2007 Decision4 of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-
129031.
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
(Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment. Co-accused
Rowena Geraldino(Geraldino) was acquitted for the
prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, The Facts

BRION,
- versus -
PERALTA, * The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
PEREZ, and

MENDOZA, ** JJ.
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond
Jonathan B. Lledo filed an
Informationagainst Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) and
Rowena P. Geraldino (Geraldino) for the crime of
Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads :
PEOPLE OF THE Promulgated:
PHILIPPINES,
September 7, 2011
Respondent. That on or about the 8th day of
December 2001 in Quezon City,
x- ------- ------- ------- ------ ------- ----- Philippines, the above-named accused
----------x ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then
legally married to one JESUSA PINAT
NOLLORA, and as said marriage has
not been legally dissolved and still
subsisting, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a
subsequent or second marriage with her
DE CI SI ON [sic] co-accused ROWENA P.
GERALDINO, who knowingly consented
and agreed to be married to her co-
accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR.
CARPIO, J.: knowing him to be a married man, to the
damage and prejudice of the said
offended party JESUSA PINAT
NOLLORA.
The Case

Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005,

G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the
Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009 as well as
the Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the
Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No.
accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter
his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the
Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other hand,
entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14,
2005. On even date, pre-trial conference was held and
both the prosecution and defense entered the following
stipulation of facts:
1. the validity of the first marriage
between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
and Jesusa Pinat Nollorasolemnized on
April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose
del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted
the second marriage with Rowena
P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in
Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit
of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted
that he contracted the second marriage
to Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to
her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of
Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
dated December 8, 2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena
P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
as admitted in her Counter-Affidavit.
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the
RTCs resolution is whether or not the second marriage
is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was
terminated and the case was set for initial hearing.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the
respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses were as
follows:
xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx
testified that she and
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in
Saudi Arabia while she was working
there as a Staff Midwife in
King Abdulah Naval Base
Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted
her and on April 6, 1999, they got
married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic]
in Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit A). While
working in said hospital, she heard
rumors that her husband has another
wife and because of anxiety and
emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia
and returned to the Philippines (TSN,
October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival
in the Philippines, the private
complainant learned that
indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
contracted a second marriage with co-
accused Rowena P. Geraldino on
December 8, 2001 (Exhibit B) when she
secured a certification as to the civil
status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit
C) from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) sometime in November 2003.
Upon learning this information, the
private complainant confronted Rowena
P. Geraldino at the latters workplace in
CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she
knew of the first marriage between
complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
to which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly
affirmed and despite this knowledge,
she allegedly still
married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because
she loves him so much and because
they were neighbors and childhood
friends. Private complainant also knew
that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her
marriage with AtilanoO. Nollora, Jr.,
because when she (private complainant)
was brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at
the latters residence in Taguig, Metro
Manila and introduced her
to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.s parents,
Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the
house together with a friend and she
heard everything that they were talking
about.
Because of this case, private
complainant was not able to return to
Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff Midwife
thereby losing income opportunity in the
amount of P34,000.00 a month, more or
less. When asked about the moral
 damages she suffered, she declared
that what happened to her was a
tragedy and she had entertained
[thoughts] of committing suicide. She
added that because of what happened
to her, her mother died and she almost
got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
left her alone in their residence in Saudi
Arabia. However, she declared that
money is not enough to assuage her
sufferings. Instead, she just asked for
the return of her money in the amount
of P50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005,
pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos
testified that she knew of the marriage
between the private complainant
and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she
was one of the sponsors in said
wedding. Sometime in November 2003,
she was asked by the private
complainant to accompany the latter to
the workplace of Rowena
P. Geraldino in
FTI, Taguig, MetroManila. She declared
that the private complainant and
Rowena P. Geraldino had a
confrontation and she heard that
Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that she
(Rowena) knew of the first marriage
of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private
complainant but she still went on to
marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because
she loves him very much (TSN, October
24, 2005, pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the
herein assailed Decision, is as follows:
Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted
having contracted two (2) marriages, the
first with private
complainant Jesusa Pinat and the
second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He,
however, claimed that he was a Muslim
convert way back on January 10, 1992,
even before he contracted the first
marriage with the private complainant.
As a [M]uslim convert, he is allegedly
entitled to marry four (4) wives as
allowed under the Muslim or Islam
belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim convert
even prior to his marriage to the private
complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
presented a Certificate of Conversion
dated August 2, 2004 issued by
one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and
approved by one Khad Ibrahim
A. Alyamin wherein it is stated
that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly
converted as a Muslim since January
19, 1992 (Exhibit 2, 3 and 4). Aside from
said certificate, he also presented a
Pledge of Conversion dated January 10,
1992 issued by the
same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and
approved by one Khad Ibrahim
A. Alyamin (Exhibit 7).
He claimed that the private complaint
knew that he was a Muslim convert prior
to their marriage because she [sic] told
this fact when he was courting her in
Saudi Arabia and the reason why said
private complainant filed the instant
case was due to hatred having learned
of his second marriage with Rowena
P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified
that Rowena P. Geraldino was not
aware of his first marriage with the
private complainant and he did not tell
her this fact because Rowena
P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does
not want to lose her if she learns of his
first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage
Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is
indicated that he was a Catholic
Pentecostal but that he was not aware
why it was placed as such on said
contract. In his Marriage Contract with
Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion
Catholic was also indicated because he
was keeping as a secret his being a
Muslim since the society does not
approve of marrying a Muslim. He also
indicated that he was single despite his
first marriage to keep said first marriage
a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages
2-13).
Defense
witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testi
fied that he is the founder and president
of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of
the Philippines and as
such president, he has the power and
authority to convert any applicant to the
Muslim religion. He alleged that
sometime in 1992, he met
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
in Mabini (Manila) who was then going
abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to
become a Muslim (Exhibit 14) and after
receiving the application, said accused
was indoctrinated regarding his
obligations as a Muslim. On January 10,
1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced
the Muslim faith. He was then directed
to report every Sunday to monitor his
development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
visited him and asked for a certification
because of the filing of the instant case.
On October 2, 2004, he issued a
Certificate of Conversion wherein it is
stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a
Muslim convert since January 10, 1992.
Apart from the above-mentioned
document, their Imam also issued a
Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit 7). He
declared that a Muslim convert could
marry more than one according to the
Holy Koran. However, before marrying
his second, third and fourth wives, it is
required that the consent of the first
Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first
wife is not a Muslim, there is no
necessity to secure her consent (TSN,
October 9, 2006, pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he
declared that if a Muslim convert gets
married not in accordance with the
Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the
teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim
also can marry up to four times but he
should be able to treat them equally. He
claimed that he was not aware of the
first marriage but was aware of the
second. Since his second marriage with
Rowena P. Geraldino was not in
accordance with the Muslim faith, he
advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-
marry Rowena P. Geraldino in
accordance with Muslim marriage
celebration, otherwise, he will not be
considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June
25, 2007, pages 3-7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged
that she was only a victim in this
incident of bigamous marriage. She
claimed that she does not know the
private
complainant Jesusa PinatNollora and
only came to know her when this case
was filed. She insists that she is the one
lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr., having been married to the latter
since December 8, 2001. Upon learning
that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a
first marriage with the private
complainant, she confronted the former
who admitted the said marriage. Prior to
their marriage, she
asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was
single and the latter responded that he
was single. She also knew that her
husband was a Catholic prior to their
marriage but after she learned of the
first marriage of her husband, she
learned that he is a Muslim convert. She
also claimed that after learning that her
husband was a Muslim convert, she
and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got
married in accordance with the Muslim
rites. She also belied the allegations of
the private complainant that she was
sought by the private complainant and
that they had a confrontation where she
admitted that she knew
that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married
to the private complainant and despite
this knowledge, she went on to marry
him because she loved him very much.
She insisted that she only came to know
the private complainant when she
(private complainant) filed this case
(TSN, August 14, 2007, pages 2-8). 5
The Trial Courts Ruling

In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court
convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions
to prosecution for bigamy: Article 417 of the Family
Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 180 8 of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, or
Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited
Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, which provides the qualifications for allowing
Muslim men to have more than one wife: [N]o Muslim
male can have more than one wife unless he can deal
with them in equal companionship and just treatment as
enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases.
In convicting Nollora, the trial courts Decision further
stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general
rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent needs.
Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be
permitted to have a second wife subject to certain
requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is
merely tolerated, not encouraged, under certain
circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the
Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J.
Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is
necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract
subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify
the Sharia Circuit Court of the place where his family
resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to
the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an
Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said
council fails to secure the wifes consent to the proposed
marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide
whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162,
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife,
co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with
the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did
not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both
marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his converting
to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the
mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again
after marrying the private complainant. What is clear,
therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled
right to just marry anybody the second, third or fourth
time. There are requirements that the Sharia law
imposes, that is, he should have notified
the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy of
said notice should be furnished to the first wife. The
argument that notice to the first wife is not required since
she is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to
notify the said court rests upon accused Atilano Nollora,
Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Sharia law. It is
the Sharia Court that has this authority.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the
accused recelebrated their marriage in accordance with
the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the
criminal liability that has already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person
of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is no
sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena
P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented by the
prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of
the first marriage between private complainant
and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to
several interpretations. Private complainant alleged that
when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the
latters house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena
P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and
heard their conversation. From this incident, private
complainant concluded that said Rowena
P. Geraldino was aware that she and Atilano Nollora, Jr.,
were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced
since it could not be reasonably presumed that Rowena
P. Geraldino understands what was going on between
her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic
that (E)very circumstance favoring accusedsinnocence
must be tak en into account, proof against him must
survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion
must not be permitted to sway judgment (People vs.
Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore, has to
acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution
to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
This court hereby renders judgment imposing upon him
a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum of his
indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory
penalties provided by law.
b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the
crime of Bigamy for failure of the prosecution to prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED. 9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the
allowance of his temporary liberty under the same bail
bond pending appeal. The trial court
granted Nolloras motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned
only one error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-
appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the
prosecutions failure to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. 10
The Appellate Courts Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court
dismissed Nolloras appeal and affirmed the trial courts
decision. 11
The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his
second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful exercise of
his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Quran. The
appellate court denied Nollorasinvocation of his religious
beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim
women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil
laws. Nolloras two marriages were not conducted in
accordance with the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the
Philippines should apply. Nolloras claim of religious
freedom will not immobilize the State and render it
impotent in protecting the general welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate
court denied Nolloras motion for reconsideration. The
allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere
rehash of Nollorasearlier arguments, and there was no
reason for the appellate court to modify its 30 September
2009 Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this
Court on 6 April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
The Courts Ruling
Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of
the appellate court and of the trial court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity. 13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the
elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to
Pinat; 14 (2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been
legally dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his
second marriage to Geraldino; 15and
(4) Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity
of Nollora due to his prior marriage. 16
The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinats marriage
states that Nollora and Pinat were married
at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April 1999. Rev. Jonathan
De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the
ceremony. The marriage
certificate18 of Nollora and Geraldinos marriage states
that Nollora and Geraldino were married at Maxs
Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila
on 8 December 2001. Rev. HonoratoD.
Santos officiated the ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of
the Civil Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is
alleged to have been born on February 22, 1968 from
ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT,
appears in our National Indices of Marriage for Groom
for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following information:
Date of Marriage Place of Marriagepresence of the person solemnizing the marriage and
a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL setMONTE,
a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, by METRO
(2nd District)19 attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. One
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his
Muslim religion as his sole defense. He alleged that his
religion allows him to marry more than once.
Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith
at the time of celebration of both
marriages, 20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage
ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree
No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but
a civil institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents
are governed by this Code and the Sharia and not
subject to stipulation, except that the marriage
settlements to a certain extent fix the property relations
of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract
shall be perfected unless the following essential
requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by
at least two competent persons after the proper guardian
in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly
witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim
male at least fifteen years of age and any Muslim female
of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from
any impediment under the provisions of this Code may
contract marriage. A female is presumed to have
attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of
marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and
the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the
the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be
BULACAN
forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked
MANILA
the contracting parties and said witnesses, and
copy shall be given to the contracting parties and
another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing
officer who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage
maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person
who is competent under Muslim law to solemnize
marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court
or Sharia Circuit Court or any person designated by the
judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable
reason, to authorize the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be
solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of
the Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar,
residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other
suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of
dower may be fixed by the contracting parties (mahr-
musamma) before, during or after the celebration of
marriage. If the amount or the value thereof has not
been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon
petition of the wife, be determined by the court according
to the social standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws states that [i]n case of a marriage between a
Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code,
the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive
Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the
Philippines] shall apply. Nolloras religious affiliation is
not an issue here. Neither is the claim
that Nolloras marriages were solemnized according to
Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed
religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for
the crime of bigamy. 21
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate
with Geraldino that his civil status is single. Moreover,
both of Nolloras marriage contracts do not state that he
is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of ones religion in the marriage certificate is
not an essential requirement for marriage, such
omissions are sufficient proofs of Nolloras liability for
bigamy. Nolloras false declaration about his civil status
is thus further compounded by these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness,
with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion,
Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that since
January 10, 1992, you are already a [M]uslimconvert. . .
you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a
[M]uslim convert since January 10, 1992. However, in
your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no
indication here that you have indicated your religion. Will
you please go over your marriage contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic
but I didnt know why they did not place any Catholic
there.
xxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your
attention with respect to your marriage contract with
your co-accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino,
x x x will you please tell us, Mr. Witness, considering
that you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert
on January 10, 1992, why in the marriage contract
with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your
religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was
then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my being
my Balik-Islam, thats why I placed there Catholic
since I know that the society doesnt approve a
Catholic to marry another, thats why I placed there
Catholic as my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, civil status, why did
you indicate there that youre single, Mr. Witness?
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier
married. 22 (Emphasis supplied
xxx
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you
allow that your faith be indicated as Catholic when in fact
you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in
your marriage contract?
xxx
[A:] I dont think there is anything wrong with it, I just
signed it so we can get married under the Catholic rights
[sic] because after that we even got married under the
[M]uslim rights [sic], your Honor.
xxx
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife,
are you required under your faith to secure the
permission of your first wife to get married?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first
wife, Jesusa Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her
because she was very mad at me, at the start, she was
always very mad, maam. 23
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on
the validity of his marriage to Geraldino. Nollora may not
impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate
himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be
opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of
multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated
in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself
that such a marriage, although void abinitio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed
in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences
of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs
of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538
promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution
promulgated on 23 February 2010 are AFFIRMED.
Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-
129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and
one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight
years and one day of prision mayor as maximum of his
indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory
penalties provided by law.
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECI SI ON
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV
No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring
the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and
respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and
Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588. 3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and
void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his
answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to
set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The
RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to
conduct an investigation and determine the existence of
a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant
Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not
make a determination for failure of both parties to appear
at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the
prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-
trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision, 5 the RTC declared the
marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios
and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning.
As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement,
petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent
as she never acquired any right over it and so as to
avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of
respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. 6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each
other for convenience only. Giving credence to the
testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer
to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay
him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a
farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated
February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It
explained that the marriage was declared void because
the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the
CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the
CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA
stated that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married and that their
case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further
explained that the parties never intended to enter into
the marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that
their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for
Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the
consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION
OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTE D FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING
FOREIGN CITIZENS HIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
OFCONSENT. 8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios
to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be
paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to
the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered
into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the
OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the
latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall
within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios
to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment 9 to the
petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was
similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void
from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply 10 reiterating
its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question
of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of
consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first
examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the
purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant
benefits. This has led to the development of marriage
fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular
benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple
marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire
specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited
purpose" marriages. 11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization
of a child. 12 Another, which is the subject of the present
case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is
usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the
time of their marriage, 13 and it attempts to filter out those
who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status. 14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in
immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if
the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life
together at the time they were married. "This standard
was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now
requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws of the United States." The
focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to
establish a life together, to determining the intention of
evading immigration laws. 16 It must be noted, however,
that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage
declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose
of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The
early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United
States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable
case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein
in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the
parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and
to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through
Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert
temporary into permanent permission to stay in the
country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to
wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never
married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every
contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the
parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do
not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may
always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this
rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is
quite true that a marriage without subsequent
consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to
the outside world and with the understanding that they
will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose
to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married
at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood
as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others. 18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of
Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain
entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage
could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was
entered into for a limited purpose." 20 The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee, 21 further
recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was
intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of
consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic.
The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration
benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary. 22 At present,
United States courts have generally denied annulments
involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple
married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have
upheld such marriages as valid. 23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC
ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying
the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on
to explain that the marriage was declared void because
the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means for the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC,
the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the
Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be
similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties
only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of
American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and
never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on
the parties supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of
the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the
absence of any essential requisite shall render a
marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be
(1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the
sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and
undue influence. 24Consent must also be conscious or
intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their
act. 25 Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. 26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of
an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of
consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a
pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual
marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the
parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not
followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter
into such a relation. 27 It is a pretended marriage not
intended to be real and with no intention to create any
legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any
genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not
for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine
consent because the parties have absolutely no intention
of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a
marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the
very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be
married would allow them to further their objective,
considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus,
an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly
present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the
Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and
family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage
might have no real intention to establish a life together
is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely
entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1
provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void
or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is
no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into
for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid. 28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and
complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the
kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their
right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions. 29 The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children
or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes,
limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites, 31are equally
valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents
attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It
cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondents marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void
ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the
ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code.
Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the
same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-
disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral
turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by
another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a
ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a
marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration
laws does not qualify under any of the listed
circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the
ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or
innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured
party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter
into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred

institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize
this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such
a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for
immigration benefits, after they have availed of its
benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a
marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to
again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as

an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State. 32 It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices
of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the
impression that marriage may easily be entered into
when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case
No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DE CI SI ON
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11,
2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the
Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October
5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109,
Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the
CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner
Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC
of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM,
and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article
4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines,
as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract 3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated
that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona,
Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the
solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to
the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that
he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and
they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei
Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He arrived in the Philippines in
December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5
oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws
residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila,
when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He
testified that he was told that he was going to undergo
some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in
the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not know that the
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He
further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to
apply for a marriage license, and that he had never
resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check
on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy
of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license
number could be found. 5 The Municipal Civil Registrar,
Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July
11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number
appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of
another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. 6 Said certification reads
as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage
License filed in this office, Marriage License No.
9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO
GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on
January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to
MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO
on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar
Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may
serve. 7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had
filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and
that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not
there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel. 8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an
employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and
brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No.
9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. 9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for
marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
chronologically. 10 He testified that the certification dated
July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina
Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona,
Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967
was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan
on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued
any other license of the same serial number, namely
9969967, to any other person. 11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and
presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was
a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and
that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the
Philippines. 12 He testified that he solemnized the
marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the
residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. 13 He stated
that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty.
Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola. 14 He testified that he
had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he
is familiar with the requirements. 15 Rev. Dauz further
testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage
license the day before the actual wedding, and that the
marriage contract was prepared by his secretary. 16 After
the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz
submitted the marriage contract and copy of the
marriage license with that office. 17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the
sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo
by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo. 18 He testified
that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the
marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin
secured the license and gave the same to him on
January 8, 1993. 19 He further testified that he did not
know where the marriage license was obtained. 20 He
attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993,
signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed
the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann
Ceriola. 21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter
and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she
was present at the wedding ceremony held on January
9, 1993 at her house. 22 She testified that she sought the
help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing
the marriage license, and that a week before the
marriage was to take place, a male person went to their
house with the application for marriage license. 23 Three
days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to
Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. 24 She further testified that she did
not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and
that she was told that the marriage license was obtained
from Carmona. 25 She also testified that a bigamy case
had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for
Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch
47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for
both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the
sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas
on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding
photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in
said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of
Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her
husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing
their signatures as proof. 27 She and her mother sought
the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license,
and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain
Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the
marriage license for them, and after several days
returned with an application for marriage license for
them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin
returned with the marriage license, they gave the license
to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed
were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence. 28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with
Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against
Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon
Buenaventura during the existence of the previous
marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila. 30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been
married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did
not know if said marriage had been celebrated under
Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their
marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the
time were Chinese. 31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held
that no valid marriage license was issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of
Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had
been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan,
and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had
certified that no marriage license had been issued for
Gloria and Syed. 32 It also took into account the fact that
neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued,
in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. 33 As the
marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license
is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of
Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as
follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property
relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was acquired
during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity
of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the
Civil Registrar General, National Statistics
Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their
respective civil registries the marriage
contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9,
1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED. 34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the
Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following
assignment of errors:
I marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER
AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE
TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE
DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING
THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID
MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE
CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING
PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING
OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL
DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH
OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE
PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO
WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING
ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES
ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN
ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT
BELOW. 35
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and
granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that
a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and
Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification
could not be accorded probative value. 36 The CA ruled
that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary
evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married
and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law. 37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to
having signed the marriage contract. The CA also
considered that the parties had comported themselves
as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his
petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
bigamy. 38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and
Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-
CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The
Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains
valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April
1, 200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated July 24, 2008. 41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN
CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE
COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND
SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL
AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE. 42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on
January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family
Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The
pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular
case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
 (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render
the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those
covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art.
2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of
the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct
of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that
is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage
license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The
resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a
valid marriage license had been issued for the couple.
The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been
issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage
license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage
license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage
contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to
prove the existence of said license. To prove that no
such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had
allegedly issued said license. It was there that he
requested certification that no such license was issued.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such
certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement
signed by an officer having the custody of an official
record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no
record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the
records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the
Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the
documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a
particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found
in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data. 44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued
by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty
was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where
the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly
issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such
marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and
that the serial number of the marriage license pertained
to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage
License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued
in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria
and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of
the certification, stating that it did not comply with
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words
"despite diligent search" in the certification, and since
the certification used stated that no marriage license
appears to have been issued, no diligent search had
been conducted and thus the certification could not be
given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting that in
that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding
of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking,
relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of
Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage
license could not be located as the same did not appear
in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it
categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a
diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration
absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a
disputable presumption that an official duty has been
regularly performed, absent contradiction or other
evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." 46 No
such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal
Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking
the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search
having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court.
The fact that the names in said license do not
correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a
diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage
license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to
explain why the marriage license was secured in
Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither
party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license,
so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and
existence of said license. Neither could the other
witnesses she presented prove the existence of the
marriage license, as none of them applied for the license
in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not
even testify as to the contents of the license, having
admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez,
one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo
approached for assistance in securing the license,
admitted not knowing where the license came from. The
task of applying for the license was delegated to a
certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the
license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the
testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to
present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that
the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license
were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply
been secured from that office and submitted to the court.
However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further
weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage
license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario, 47 following the case of
Republic, 48 it was held that the certification of the Local
Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-
issuance of said license. The case of Cario further held
that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties
had been overcome, and that it became the burden of
the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the
marriage was valid, and that the required marriage
license had been secured. 49 Gloria has failed to
discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can
be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued.
It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in
the marriage license that would not affect the validity of
the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have
been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the
alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to
support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly
married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence,
testimonial and documentary, that appellant and
appellee have been validly married and there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both
parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of
legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of
Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave
their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature
above his name in the marriage contract was his.
Several pictures were presented showing appellant and
appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses
and other members of appellants family, taken during
the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony.
Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee
signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and
wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo
Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee
more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August
2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note
that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him
only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated
10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a
second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon
(Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward
(appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and
give him his freedom and in the process allow him to
profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding
ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was
signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear
when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the
Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized
without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under
Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code. 51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as
among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.1wphi1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his

marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are
less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be
that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure
of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage
license, given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be
attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to
procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent,
the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is

hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March
11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated
October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM
annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on
January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECI SI ON
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17
August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin)
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court).
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401.
Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he
married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.
They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin,
and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship
with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in
the auto parts and supplies business owned by
Benjamins family. In December 1981, Azucena left for
the United States of America. In February 1982,
Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife.
Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7 March
1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought
Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they
signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing
Benjamins marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two
children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their
cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 registered in the name of Benjamin,
married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of
Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in
the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994
when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley
with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using
their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin,
in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before
the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally
was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to
a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for
the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his
appointment as administrator of the properties during the
pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice
and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44
registered properties became the subject of the partition
before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37
properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a
demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally
filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court
also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the
Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to
present any evidence before the trial court citing the
pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals.
The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to
present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July
2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2
October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November
2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court,
Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the
trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled
in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the
certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local
Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that
only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150
were issued for the month of February 1982 and the
purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued
to Benjamin and Sally. 5 The trial court ruled that the
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar
and the National Statistics Office because it could not be
registered due to Benjamins subsisting marriage with
Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that
the second marriage was void not because of the
existence of the first marriage but because of other
causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license.
Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial
court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of
Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to
the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for spousal
support because she was not married to Benjamin. The
trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and
Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for
support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally
could not claim the 37 properties she named in her
answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin.
The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to
Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was
claiming were owned by Benjamins parents who gave
the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as
advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of
Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to
Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamins civil
status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they
were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that
Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money,
property or industry in their purchase. The trial court
found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots
covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as
well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot
under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units
were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone.
The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos.
61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin
and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamins right to
dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate
proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith
because she knew that Benjamin was married to
Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the
trial court forfeited Sallys share in the properties
covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor
of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamins share reverted
to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN
BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at
Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL
and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared
NONEXISTE NT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of
the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722,
17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-
86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951,
193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624,
194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630,
194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636,
194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210,
206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B.
Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B.
Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to
the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete
the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven
(37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860,
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from
petitioners money without contribution from respondent,
hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his
lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the
administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is
ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of
income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No.
61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender
control and possession of these properties including the
documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-
253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the
parties shared by them equally. However, the share of
respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice
Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of
the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with
Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and
distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further
processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10
of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later
proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondents claim of spousal support, children support
and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, no declaration of the status of the parties
children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their
counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and
the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and
Caloocan.
SO ORDERED. 6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition
with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27
August 2009, 7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally
appealed the trial courts decision before the Court of
Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals
partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for
decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six
resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally,
for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly
warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or
the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present
her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who
was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the
presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that
Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that
Benjamins action was based on his prior marriage to
Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage
was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted
the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring
Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of
Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong
to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties,
the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under
TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of
Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was
able to establish that they were acquired by him solely.
The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence
of proof of Benjamins actual contribution in their
purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property
under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common,
to be shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin
shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his
existing marriage with Azucena while Sallys share shall
accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing
proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that would show
bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that
would justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal
is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order
dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby
AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720
and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-
appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656
and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall
be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the
other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and
common and to be shared equally but the share of the
petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal
partnership under his first marriage while the share of
respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the
decision stands.
SO ORDERED. 8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming the trial courts ruling
that Sally had waived her right to present
evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming the trial courts
decision declaring the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and
non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming with modification the
trial courts decision regarding the property
relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the trial courts ruling that she waived her right to present
her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to
present evidence that she and Benjamin were married,
the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as
an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance
or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed
to the discretion of the trial court. 9 In this case, Sallys
presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February
2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case:
on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28
October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all
made at Sallys instance. Before the scheduled hearing
of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in
case she still failed to present her evidence, the case
would be submitted for decision. On the date of the
scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other
available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting
Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day.
Sallys counsel insisted that the trial court could not
dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented,
disregarding the trial courts prior warning due to the
numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not
complain that she had been deprived of her right to
present her evidence because all the postponements
were at her instance and she was warned by the trial
court that it would submit the case for decision should
she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November
2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued
refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to
have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by
the Court of Appeals, Sallys continued failure to present
her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial
court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the
case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the
case because she was waiting for the decision of the
Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial
courts denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the
fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any
temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally
could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect
marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial
court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds
despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by
one of the parties. 10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a
marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same
time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if
she were allowed to present her evidence, she would
have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her
marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider
that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as
his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that
Benjamin was the informant in their childrens birth
certificates where he stated that he was their father; and
that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as
his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real
property registered in the names of Benjamin and
Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the
informant in the birth certificates of his children with
Azucena.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September
1973 was duly established before the trial court,
evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage
contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a
purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage
between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and
subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally,
Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the
Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there
was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and
Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence
Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of
February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not
match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further
testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not
issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and
Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the
certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. 11 Clearly,
if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage
contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for
lack of a marriage license. 12
It was also established before the trial court that the
purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by
Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Pasig; 13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives
Division of the Records Management and Archives
Office, National Commission for Culture and the
Arts; 14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil
Registration Department of the National Statistics
Office. 15 The documentary and testimonial evidence
proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin
and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in
jest" 16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of
Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social
humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society
especially from her parents seen as Chinese
conservatives." 17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth
certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes
that Benjamin was the informant in Bernices birth
certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were
married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant
in Bentleys birth certificate which also stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March
1982. 19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on
7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on
the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and,
at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the
Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this
case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established
that no marriage license was issued to them and that
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the
marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982.
The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article
3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-
existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts
which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
"inexistent and void from the beginning." 21 Thus, the
Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts
ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of
properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects
the trial courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the
decision stands." 22 While the Court of Appeals did
notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from
the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the
rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals
adopted the trial courts discussion that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally is not
bigamous.1wphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous
under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that
the first or former marriage shall not be null and void.
The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be
assumed as the one that is valid, there being no
evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of
invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage
contract. However, if the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but for
other causes such as lack of license, the crime of
bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51
O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was
contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not
under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal
Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is
therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage
license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent
that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any
instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to
petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would
be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be
invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner
and Azucena. 23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage
must have all the essential requisites for validity except
for the existence of a prior marriage. 24 In this case, there
was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally
just signed a purported marriage contract without a
marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property
relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article
148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or
her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in
such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of
the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply
even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of
marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which
were given by Benjamins father to his children as
advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the petition
before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamins late
father himself conveyed a number of properties to his
children and their respective spouses which included
Sally x x x." 25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that
the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord
with the evidence on record. Only the property covered
by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses. 26 The properties under
TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of
Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally."
The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
registered in the name of Sally 28 with the descriptive title
"married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT
Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name
of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the
words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are
merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered
owner. 29 Such words do not prove co-ownership.
Without proof of actual contribution from either or both
spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article
148 of the Family Code. 30

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella

(Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the
case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to
accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She
further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled
her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his
partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is

primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on
the part of the judge. 31 To justify the call for inhibition,
there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad
faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable
error which may be inferred from the decision or order
itself. 32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that
Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for
decision because of Sallys continued refusal to present
her evidence.

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while

Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words
in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his
prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith
in deciding the case that would justify the call for his
voluntary inhibition.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011

Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

SO ORDERED.
 RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO, Respondents.
DE CI SI ON
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in the present petition for review
on certiorari are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006
and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR. CV No.
69218. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside
the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case No.
464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an action he filed
for declaration of nullity of his marriage with private
respondent, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein petitioner with the
RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the
Petition allege as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972,
petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon,
now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal
treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare
whatever necessary papers were required for the
intended marriage between petitioner and respondent
supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1,
1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the
marriage ceremony;
4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged
marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took
place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1,
1972, on account that there was a public dance held in
the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to the
church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the
dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early
morning of June 1, 1972;
5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local
Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not
seen much less signed any papers or documents in
connection with the procurement of a marriage license;
6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the
aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office was told to
obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31,
1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming
marriage up to the moment the actual marriage was
celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage
license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby
rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null
and void for want of the most essential requisite;
7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and
Respondent's marriage aforestated was solemnized
sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void
from the beginning and neither was it performed under
circumstances exempting the requirement of such
marriage license;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due
notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner
and respondent held on June 1, 1972, at Arteche,
Eastern Samar, null and void ab initio and of no legal
effect;
x x x x 4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is
a Certification5 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record
nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and
respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on
June 1, 1972.
Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition
be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of action
because there is no evidence to prove petitioner's
allegation that their marriage was celebrated without the
requisite marriage license and that, on the contrary, both
petitioner and respondent personally appeared before
the local civil registrar and secured a marriage license
which they presented before their marriage was
solemnized.
Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was
subsequently transferred to the RTC of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the parties submitted
their respective pleadings as well as affidavits of
witnesses.
On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision
granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
hereby declares the marriage contracted between
Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972
null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil
Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code. The
foregoing is without prejudice to the application of
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar for proper
registration of this decree of nullity of marriage.
SO ORDERED. 7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently
established the absence of the requisite marriage
license when the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that
based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage
license rendered the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void ab initio.
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu
City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its
assailed Decision, disposing thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision
dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between
the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is
declared valid and subsisting for all intents and
purposes.
SO ORDERED. 8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact,
solemnized between the contending parties, there is a
presumption that a marriage license was issued for that
purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such
presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of any
indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage
license was issued is a mere defect in the formal
requisites of the law which does not invalidate the
parties' marriage.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 but the CA
denied it in its Resolution dated January 14, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to
wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED
"ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE,
ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH
ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN REVERSING
THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH
VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH
RESPONDENT;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST
PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE
OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN
COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE
WITH RESPONDENT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING
PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF
MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD
TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and
4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR
REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR
ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE
LICENSE. 10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition
centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give due
credence to petitioner's evidence which established the
absence or lack of marriage license at the time that
petitioner and respondent's marriage was solemnized.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the case
not on the basis of law and evidence but rather on the
ground of what the appellate court calls as ethical
considerations as well as on the perceived motive of
petitioner in seeking the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
At the outset, the State, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural question by
arguing that the issues presented by petitioner in the
present petition are factual in nature and it is not proper
for this Court to delve into these issues in a petition for
review on certiorari.
The Court does not agree.
The issues in the instant petition involve a determination
and application of existing law and prevailing
jurisprudence. However, intertwined with these issues is
the question of the existence of the subject marriage
license, which is a question of fact and one which is not
appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is
not without exceptions, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the
trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on
record. 11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA,
on whether or not there was indeed a marriage license
obtained by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting.
Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review these
findings.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was
celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. 12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their
union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out
the essential requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all
these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character. 13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the
Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. 14 Under the
Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72
to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo
mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2)
marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4)
ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious
ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or
pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's
and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of
these exceptions.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a
marriage performed without the corresponding marriage
license is void, this being nothing more than the
legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage contract. 15 The
rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage
license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority
granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
proper government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage. 16Stated differently, the
requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the
State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested. 17
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and
petitioner were able to secure a marriage license which
they presented to the solemnizing officer before the
marriage was performed.
The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is
always in favor of the validity of marriage and that any
doubt should be resolved to sustain such validity.
Indeed, this Court is mindful of this principle as well as of
the Constitutional policy which protects and strengthens
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar,
coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar,
is sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject
marriage license.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to
be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cario v. Yee
Cario. 18 There, it was held that the certification of the
Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a
marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-
issuance of said license. 19 It was further held that the
presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had
been overcome, and that it became the burden of the
party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage
was valid, and that the required marriage license had
been secured. 20
As stated above, petitioner was able to present a
Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any
marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho
[petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose
marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972." 21 Thus, on
the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of
the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been
overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to
prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges
such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not
able to discharge that burden.
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged
marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. In
addition, the Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the
officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the
said marriage license. Respondent could have obtained
a copy of their marriage contract from the National
Archives and Records Section, where information
regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and
license number, could be obtained. However, she also
failed to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the
RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation that the
statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as
respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage
ceremony was conducted but neither one of them
testified that a marriage license was issued in favor of
petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's
categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to
obtain a marriage license, she failed to present evidence
to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence. 23
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with
respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license or of any evidence to show that such
license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact,
issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said
that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in
the requirements of the law which would not affect the
validity of the marriage. The fact remains that
respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage
license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage
which is performed without the corresponding marriage
license is null and void.
As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG
further argues that, on the basis of this Court's ruling
in Sevilla v. Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the
local civil registrar, which attests to the absence in its
records of a marriage license, must categorically state
that the document does not exist in the said office
despite diligent search.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court considered the certification issued
by the Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due
search and inability to find the record or entry sought by
the parties despite the absence of a categorical
statement that "such document does not exist in their
records despite diligent search." The Court, citing
Section 28, 26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held that
the certification of due search and inability to find a
record or entry as to the purported marriage license,
issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Based on said certification, the Court held that there is
absence of a marriage license that would render the
marriage void ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case
of Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario, 27 this Court considered
the marriage of the petitioner and her deceased husband
as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no
marriage license number and, as certified by the local
civil registrar, their office has no record of such marriage
license. The court held that the certification issued by the
local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of the marriage license. Their marriage having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license and
not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, the marriage of the
petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Go-
Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr. 28
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v.
Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v.
CA30 that, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that
a marriage license was lacking, this Court relied on the
Certification issued by the local civil registrar, which
stated that the alleged marriage license could not be
located as the same did not appear in their records.
Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in the
Certification was it categorically stated that the officer
involved conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this
Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court does not require a categorical statement to this
effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a
disputable presumption that an official duty has been
regularly performed, absent contradiction or other
evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No
such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal
Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking
the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. x x x 31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and
unequivocal finding of the absence of the subject
marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be
considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties. 32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a
wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the
absence of a valid marriage license. 33 As cited above,
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except marriages of exceptional character
under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier
stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his
marriage to respondent, it may well be that his motives
are less than pure - that he seeks a way out of his
marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another
woman. Be that as it may, the same does not make up
for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a
valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil
Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is void ab initio.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu
City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No.
464 is REINSTATED.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCI A-
RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A.
RECIO, respondent.
DE CI SI ON
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorc e
must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven according to our law on
evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in
Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed
as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage
between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as
dissolved and both parties can now remarry under
existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties. [3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the
above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987. [4] They lived together as husband and wife
in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorc e,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship
issued by the Australian government. [6] Petitioner -- a
Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12,
1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City. [7] In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. [8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent
lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia. [9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on
the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January
12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent s
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back
as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution. [11] He
contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen
had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained
in Australia in 1989; [12] thus, he was legally capacitated to
marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the
couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration of
nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a
divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia
because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down. [13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint
be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action. [14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent. [15] The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties. [16] After they
submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution. [17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on
the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid
and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage
ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack
of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision
on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The
Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there
was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition. [18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our
consideration:
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce
decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson
thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage
with the petitioner.
2 were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized
Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to
marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent
3 discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26
of the Family Code in this case.
4 Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code
The trial court patently and grievously erred in
disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the
Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the
divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry,
without first securing a recognition of the judgment
granting the divorce decree before our courts. [19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of
this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones:
(1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was
proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no
more necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and
Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the
divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, [20] petitioner
argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign
judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction
only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law
allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorc e
decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed
to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized
abroad are governed by the law of the place where they
Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show
the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was
performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal
principles as the take-off points for our
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. [21] A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 [22] and
17[23] of the Civil Code. [24] In mixed marriages involving a
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. [26] A divorc e
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective national laws. [27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far
as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van
Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. [28] Therefore, before a foreign divorc e
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it. [29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be
admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of
the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of
the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil
registrar which shall specify the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has
been previously married, the applicant shall be required
to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has
been previously married, the applicant shall be required
to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate
required in the last preceding article, the death certificate
of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the
absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x
x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute
nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the
Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a written
official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it
requires no further proof of its authenticity and due
execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a
foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence. [30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. [31] The decree purports to
be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country. [32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other
hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested[33] by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. [35] However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorc e
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidenc e,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but
only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. [36] The trial court ruled
that it was admissible, subject to petitioners
qualification. [37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure
to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible
as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney,
Australia. [38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52)
of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. [39] Naturalization
is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen. [40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their
adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal
laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove
Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she
is the party challenging the validity of a foreign
judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with
the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of
the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and
worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the
Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine
courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign
laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with
the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. [41] In
civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are
denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. [42] Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon
him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. [43] Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function. [44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised
with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to
Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient
proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated
to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their
marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorc e
decree, which was validly admitted in evidenc e,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under
Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict
legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force. [45] There is no showing in the case at
bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
 Respondent presented a decree nisi or an
interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected. [46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court
may under some foreign statutes and practices, still
restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions,
remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party
in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery
may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may
allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. [47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree
contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again
before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits
the offence of bigamy. [48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the
divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity
to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find
no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneous ly
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the
divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on
Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple
reason that no proof has been presented on the legal
effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian
laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity
required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not
submitted together with the application for a marriage
license. According to her, its absence is proof that
respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract
marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the
legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in
court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is
prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part
of the alien applicant for a marriage license. [50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that
proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner.A
review of the records before this Court shows that only the
following exhibits were presented before the lower court:
(1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint; [51] (b) Exhibit B
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on
January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; [52] (c)
Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A.
Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on
March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; [53] (d) Exhibit D
Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between
Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its
records; [54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; [55] (2) for respondent: (a)
Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer; [56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law
Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the
Family Court of Australia; [57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; [58] (d) Exhibit
4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family
Court of Australia Certificate; [59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A.
Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995. [60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude
that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on
January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioners contention
that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorc e
decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduc e
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare
her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law,
he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct
result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the
most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial
court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners
legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the
court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage
on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidenc e
two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila
dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City
dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure
and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the
court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed.No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 152577
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, Present:

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the

PUNO,
filing of a Complaint [3] for declaration of nullity of marriage
Chairman,
by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to
AUSTRIA-MARTINE Z,
the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on
- versus- CALLEJO, SR.,

TINGA, and 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones

CHICO-NAZA RIO, JJ. Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had
Promulgated:
five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and

Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration
CRASUS L. IYOY, September 21, 2005
of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely
R e s p o n d e n t.
was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984,
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -x Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America

(U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest

DECI SI ON
then being only six years old, to the care of respondent

Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A.,

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting

that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded

the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children,

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the that Fely got married to an American, with whom she

Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the

General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not

2001, [1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not

(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB- be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused

20077, dated 30 October 1998, [2] declaring the marriage him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more:

between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal- in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.;

Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child,

Code of the Philippines. Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely
continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was

U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her

because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and
American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For
lack of sincere effort to find employment and to
the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations
contribute to the maintenance of their household. She
made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus.

At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years could not have been extravagant since the family

since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed,

there was no more possibility of reconciliation between Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as

them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint

respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then
that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family,
earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines
and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
was insufficient to support their family. Although she
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such

incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she

ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article continued to provide financial support to them, as well

36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was

Code of the Philippines.

able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for

one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical

Fely filed her Answer and reasons. While she did file for divorce from

Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a

asserted therein that she was already an American letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the

citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorc e

Micklus. While she admitted being previously married from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American

to respondent Crasus and having five children with husband and acquired American citizenship. She

him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by argued that her marriage to her American husband

respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained was legal because now being an American citizen,

that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal her status shall be governed by the law of her present

person, and she may had been indignant at nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent
 Crasus himself was presently living with another wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely

openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus. [9]

woman who bore him a child. She also accused

respondent Crasus of misusing the amount

of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to financ e Felys counsel filed a Notice, [10] and, later on, a

the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis Motion, [11] to take the deposition of witnesses, namely,

Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon

of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC
written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the
declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and
Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the
void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay
said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders [12] and

to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with Commissions [13] issued by the RTC to the Philippine

interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the

attorneys fees, and litigation expenses. depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories ,

not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC.

Taking into account that it had been over a year since

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their
respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that
respective Pre-Trial Briefs, [5] the RTC afforded both
Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the
parties the opportunity to present their evidenc e.
RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October
Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the
1998, [14] considering Fely to have waived her right to
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. [6]
present her evidence. The case was thus deemed

submitted for decision.

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of

evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgat ed
testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially
its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent
reiterated the allegations in his Complaint; [7] (2) the
Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the
Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health
following findings
Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage

Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the

Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place The ground bearing defendant s
psychological incapacity deserves a
on 16 December 1961; [8] and (3) the invitation to the reasonable consideration. As observed,
plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible.
The Court finds that defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of
psychological incapacity to comply with
her marital duties such as striving for
family unity, observing fidelity, mutual
love, respect, help and support. From the
evidence presented, plaintiff adequately
established that the defendant practically
abandoned him. She obtained a divorc e
decree in the United States of America
and married another man and has
establish [sic] another family of her own.
Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation,
wherein he is married to a wife who is
already married to another man in
another country.
Defendants intolerable traits
may not have been apparent or manifest
before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE
nonetheless allows the annulment of the
marriage provided that these were
eventually manifested after the wedding.
It appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture
being an irresponsible wife erringly
reveals her very low regard for that
sacred and inviolable institution of
marriage which is the foundation of
human society throughout the civilized
world. It is quite evident that the
defendant is bereft of the mind, will and
heart to comply with her marital
obligations, such incapacity was already
there at the time of the marriage in
question is shown by defendants own
attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by
plaintiff which is defendant s
psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations which
already existed at the time of the
marriage in question has been
satisfactorily proven. The evidence in
herein case establishes the
irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony
which is decidedly credible, the Court
finds that the defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of such
psychological incapacity to comply with
her marital obligations. These are her
excessive disposition to material things
over and above the marital stability. That
such incapacity was already there at the
time of the marriage in question is shown
by defendants own attitude towards her
marriage to plaintiff. And for these
reasons there is a legal ground to declare
the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy
and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null
and void ab initio.[15]
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quot ed
Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidenc e,
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellat e
court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed
the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible
error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for
declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and
Fely null and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorc e
from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has
remarried, and is now permanently
residing in the United States. Plaintiff-
appellee categorically stated this as one
of his reasons for seeking the declaration
of nullity of their marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code
provides:
Art. 26. All
marriages solemnized
outside the Philippines
in accordance with the
 laws in force in the
country where they were
solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also
be valid in this country,
except those prohibit ed
under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
truth and in fact does not exist and to
remain married to a spouse who is
incapacitated to discharge essential
marital covenants, is verily to condemn
him to a perpetual disadvantage which
this Court finds abhorrent and will not
countenance. Justice dictates that
plaintiff be given relief by affirming the
trial courts declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties. [16]

WHERE A
MARRIAGE BETWEEN
A FILIPINO CITIZE N
AND A FOREIGNER IS
VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A
DIVORCE IS After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution,
THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINE D dated 08 March 2002, [17] denied its Motion for
ABROAD BY THE
ALIEN SPOUSE Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant
CAPACITATING HIM
OR HER TO
Petition before this Court, based on the following
REMARRY, THE
FILIPINO SPOUSE
SHALL LIKEWISE arguments/grounds
HAVE CAPACITY TO
REMARRY UNDE R
PHILIPPINE LAW. I. Abandonment by and sexual
infidelity of respondents wife do not per
seconstitute psychological incapacity.
The rationale behind the second
II. The Court of Appeals has
paragraph of the above-quoted provision
decided questions of substance not in
is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation
accord with law and jurisprudenc e
of a Filipino citizen still being married to
considering that the Court of Appeals
his or her alien spouse, although the
committed serious errors of law in ruling
latter is no longer married to the Filipino
that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
spouse because he or she has obtained
Code is inapplicable to the case at bar. [18]
a divorce abroad. In the case at bench,
the defendant has undoubtedly acquired
her American husbands citizenship and
thus has become an alien as well. This
Court cannot see why the benefits of Art.
26 aforequoted can not be extended to a In his Comment [19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus
Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually
embraces another citizenship and thus maintained that Felys psychological incapacity was
becomes herself an alien.
clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that

It would be the height of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the

unfairness if, under these circumstances,
plaintiff would still be considered as
married to defendant, given her total Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of
incapacity to honor her marital covenant s
to the former. To condemn plaintiff to respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had
remain shackled in a marriage that in
already become an American citizen. He further
questioned the personality of petitioner Republic,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to
institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the
Family Code of the Philippines authorizes
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial
court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf
of the State, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the
applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds
the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I serious cases of personality disorders
The totality of evidence presented during
trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more
controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted
by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes
psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court
laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
the
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological
incapacity was defined, thus
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most
clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated[21]
The psychological incapacity must be
characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. [22]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic
v. Court of Appeals and Molina, [23] which, although quite
lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduc ed
below
(1) The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged
their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against every one
of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job
(5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further
illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, clarified that there is no requirement that the
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in examined by a physician or psychologist as a
the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage. marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such

psychological incapacity, however, must be established

(6) The essential marital
by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital Using the guidelines established by the
obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that
included in the text of the decision.
the totality of evidence presented by respondent

(7) Interpretations given by the

Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore,
be given great respect by our courts
there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and

(8) The trial court must order the void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for Philippines.
the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, The only substantial evidence presented by
as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) testimony, which can be easily put into question for
days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The
being self-serving, in the absence of any other
Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other
1095. [24]
pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the
recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage As has already been stressed by this Court in

Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such previous cases, Article 36 is not to be confused with

marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the

and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a

their eldest son, in which Fely used her American serious psychological illness afflicting a party even

husbands surname. Even considering the admissions before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so

made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent grave and so permanent as to deprive one of

Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidenc e awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the

is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had matrimonial bond one is about to assume. [28]

such a grave mental illness that prevented her from

assuming the essential obligations of marriage. The evidence may have proven that Fely committed

acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging,

Code of the Philippines contemplates downright and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent

incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her

assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere flaunting of her American family and her American

refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the surname, may indeed be manifestations of her

part of the errant spouse. [26] Irreconcilable alleged incapacity to comply with her marital

differences, conflicting personalities, emotional obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was

immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was

habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily

and abandonment, by themselves, also do not established as a psychological or mental defect that

warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in

the said Article. [27] existence at the time of celebration of the marriage;

nor that it is incurable. While the personal

 remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of
to a special situation wherein one of the couple
the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a
in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must still
foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By
have complied with the requirement laid down
its plain and literal interpretation, the said
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[30] that the
provision cannot be applied to the case of
root cause of the incapacity be identified as a
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at
psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature
the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
be fully explained.
Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not

established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of
before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
the validity of the marriage. [31] No less than the
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the
Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and
United States in 1984, after which she married her
strengthen the family as the basic social institution
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
and marriage as the foundation of the family. [32]
alleged that she had been an American citizen since

1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
Code of the Philippines is not applicable
to the case at bar.
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of

the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the on family rights and duties, status, condition, and

Family Code of the Philippines legal capacity, even when she was already living

abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do

Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereaft er not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to
spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained intervening in proceedings for annulment or

a divorce from respondent Crasus. declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order

No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code

of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the

III

The Solicitor General is authorized to principal law officer and legal defender of the
intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in
proceedings for annulment and Government. [33] His Office is tasked to represent the
declaration of nullity of marriages.
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and

instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any

litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor

Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the General shall constitute the law office of the

prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC Government and, as such, shall discharge duties

may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings requiring the services of lawyers. [34]

for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages ;

hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the

personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State

State. Article 48 provides is represented and protected in proceedings for

annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by

ART. 48. In all cases of
annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order preventing collusion between the parties, or the
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing
State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law
the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
officer and legal defender of the land, then his

intervention in such proceedings could only serve and

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than

Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from thwart it.
 marriages that were appealed before it, summarized

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]

General is authorized to bring or defend actions on

In the case of Republic v. Court of
behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this
Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 48 of
once the case is brought before this Court or the
the Family Code, one of which concerns
the role of the prosecuting attorney or
Court of Appeals. [35] While it is the prosecuting fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the State:
attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf
(8) The trial
of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or court must order the
prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the General to appear as
counsel for the state. No
Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the decision shall be handed
down unless the
case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will
be quoted in the
Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the
decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for
case to the appellate courts when circumstances his agreement or
opposition, as the case
demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General,
even while the proceeding is still being held before along with the
prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court
the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can
such certification within
fifteen (15) days from
already exercise supervision and control over the the date the case is
deemed submitted for
conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General
better guarantee the protection of the interests of the shall discharge the
equivalent function of
the defensor
State.
vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095. [Id.,
at 213]

In fact, this Court had already recognized and
affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several
cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of
This Court in the case
of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285
(2001)] reiterated its pronouncement
in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.]
regarding the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the
State[37]

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, [38] which became
effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other
doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the
Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf
of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the
Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher
courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of
petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies.
The petitioner shall serve a copy of the
petition on the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor, within five days
from the date of its filing and submit to the
court proof of such service within the
same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court
may require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Offic e
of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda in support of their
claims within fifteen days from the date
the trial is terminated. It may require the
Office of the Solicitor General to file its
own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other
pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of
the period herein provided, the case will
be considered submitted for decision,
with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the
Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of
the decision personally or by registered
mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action,
the dispositive part of the decision shall
be published once in a newspaper of
general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final
upon the expiration of fifteen days from
notice to the parties. Entry of judgment
shall be made if no motion for
reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is
filed by any of the parties, the public
prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(2) Notice of Appeal. An
aggrieved party or the Solicitor General
may appeal from the decision by filing a
Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from
notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice
of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion
contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals,
and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage
between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys
abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but
not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36

of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with

respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to

what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one

of those situations where neither law nor society can

provide the specific answer to every individual problem. [39]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the

assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV

No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of

the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-

20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE.

The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada

Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380

Petitioner, In this petition for review, the Solicitor General

assails the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the

Present:
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,

Jr., C.J.,23 and its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002

Davide, Branch

- versus - (Chairman),
denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
Quisumbing,
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano
Ynares-Santiago,

Carpio, Orbecido
and III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the

Azcuna, JJ.
impugned Decision reads:
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision
Respondent. Promulgated: of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code and by reason of the
October 5, 2005divorce decree obtained against him by
his American wife, the petitioner is given
the capacity to remarry under the
x---------------------------------------- Philippine Law.
----------x
IT IS SO ORDERED. [3]

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.: The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are

as follows.

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady
citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign
Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise
blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz
remarry under Philippine law?
V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

Before us is a case of first impression that

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States
behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as
of law.
an American citizen.
 Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son
that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her
child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove
Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDE NT
CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26
OF THE FAMILY CODE [4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because
it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a
marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an
alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file
a petition for annulment or for legal
separation. [5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no
law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits
that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination. [6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not
directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. [7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to
remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section
1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR
REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny
person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1)
there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests
are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is
ripe for judicial determination. [8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens
where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen,
insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries ,
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his
second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was
the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino
signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwis e
known as the Family Code, which took effect on August
3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized
outside the Philippines in accordanc e
with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the
original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39
of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to
Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages
solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not
appear to govern the situation presented by the case at
hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at
the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains

two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorc e,

as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage

Hearings [9] on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held

Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien

following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26: spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the

1. The rule is discriminatory. It

discriminates against those Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These law.
spouses who are divorced will
not be able to re-marry, while the
spouses of foreigners who Does the same principle apply to a case where at
validly divorce them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
recognition of the validity of
divorce even for Filipino citizens. were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a
For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them foreign citizenship by naturalization?
abroad will also be considered to
be validly divorced here and can
re-marry. We propose that this
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998
be deleted and made into law
only after more widespread
consultation. (Emphasis case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. [11] In Quita, the parties
supplied.)
were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got

married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen

Legislative Intent
in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code

Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a

deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of

Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no

Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a

longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid

 Thus, taking into consideration the legislative In view of the foregoing, we state the twin

intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include as follows:

cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration 1. There is a valid marriage
that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a
of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
foreigner; and

them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and 2. A valid divorce is obtained

abroad by the alien spouse
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should capacitating him or her to
remarry.
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were

a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of
remarry.
the legislature, it should be construed according to its

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized

spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the

as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage

letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to

that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As

cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long

fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently

as they come within its spirit or intent. [12]

obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then
allowed to remarry.
the instant case must be deemed as coming within the

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory

contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file

either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal proved. [15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that

separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as

process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would

considering that the marriage of the parties appears to be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated

have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal to enter into another marriage.

separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that
not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No.
Filipino spouse would still remain married to the
209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpret ed
naturalized alien spouse.
to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a

However, we note that the records are bereft of spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and

competent evidence duly submitted by respondent remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in

concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of the present petition there is no sufficient evidenc e

respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based

fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was

evidence. [13] naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a

divorce decree and had remarried an American, that

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as
declaration could only be made properly upon
an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorc e
respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party
favor.
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and

demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the

it. [14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated

cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the

fact, such laws must be alleged and

 commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April

Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE. 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt
G.R. No. 186571
Petitioner, and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canadaand filed a
Present:
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert s
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorc e
BRION,
decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. [5]
BERSAMIN,
- versus - * ABAD, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved
on and has found another Filipina to love.Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines,
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
Promulgated:
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
August 11, 2010
Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL, the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between
Respondents. -- -
him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be

DECI SI ON judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court,

pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. [6]
BRION, J.:

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial

recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading
of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for
but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to
review on certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert s
(present petition).
petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
Gerberts.
through naturalization on November 29,
2000. [3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina,
In its October 30, 2008 decision, [7] the RTC
in Pasig City. [4] Due to work and other professional
denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is
a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, [8] in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine
law. [9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized
outside the Philippines, in accordanc e
with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the
legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; [10] the provision
was enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. [11]
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling, [12] Gerbert filed the present
petition. [13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC
is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed
in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of
his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he
contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit
of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing
to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an
interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He
considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient
legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility
that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his
Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and
Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, [14] both support
Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of thi s
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The
alien
spouse
can
claim
no
right
under
the
second
paragr
aph of
Article
26 of
the Where a marriage between a
Family Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
Code validly celebrated and a divorce is
as the thereafter validly obtained abroad by
substa the alien spouse capacitating him or
ntive her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
right it shall likewise have capacity to
establi remarry under Philippine law.
shes is
in
favor
of the Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Filipino
spouse Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this
Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. [20] and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera. [21] In both cases, the Court refused to

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights

legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective
marriages void[15] and voidable[16] marriages. In both
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the
time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage. [17] Our family laws do not
recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. [18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility
in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative
powers under the Freedom Constitution, [19] enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the
Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien
and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the
foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws,
[the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien
spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just.[The
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be
served. [22]

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized
outside the Philippines, in accordanc e
with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. [23] The legislative intent is for the benefit
of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorc e
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the The
foreign
alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating divorce
him or her to remarry. [24] Without the second paragraph decree
is
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of presu
the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding mptive
eviden
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue
ce of a
in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the right
that
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorc e
clothes
as a mode of severing the marital bond; [25] Article 17 of the
party
the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
with
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgat ed legal
in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second interes
t to
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the petitio
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for n for
its
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the recogn
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse. ition in
this
jurisdic
tion
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the
that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this complementary statement that this conclusion is not
jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the
the alien spouse (other than that already established by RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second
the decree), whose status and legal capacity are paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does
generally governed by his national law. [26] not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition
the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorc e
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
Given the rationale and intent behind the authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law
enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of have been duly proven according to our rules of evidenc e,
Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of This Section states:
the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right
under this provision.
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign
judgments or final orders.The effect of a
 judgment or final order of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order
is as follows:
(a) In case of a
judgment or final order
upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title
of the thing; and
(b) In case of a
judgment or final order
against a person, the
judgment or final order
is presumptive
evidence of a right as
between the parties
and their successor s
in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or
final order may be repelled by evidenc e
of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the
foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts
for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorc e
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorc e
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to
his or her national law. [27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country. [28] This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. [29] The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorc e
decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his
or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official
acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his
petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity, [30] but failed
to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce. [31] Under this situation, we can, at this point,
simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand
the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorc e
decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter
course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be
served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time,
will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken
to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is
made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall
have the effect of res judicata[32] between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. [33]
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register. The law requires the
entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produc e
legal consequences touching upon a persons legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal
qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. [35]

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is
served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the
foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis
for extending judicial recognition and for considering the
alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as
discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse
were it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree,
although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity
and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or
the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires
the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil
register is established for recording
the civil status of persons, in which
shall be entered:

Consid (a) births;

eration
s (b) deaths;
beyond (c) marriages;
the
recogn (d) annulments of marriages;
ition of
the (e) divorces;
foreign (f) legitimations;
divorce
decree (g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural

As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note children;
that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
(i) naturalization; and
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
(j) changes of name.
Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree. [34] We consider the
recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw xxxx

attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Sec. 4. Civil Register Book s. The

local registrars shall keep and preserve
in their offices the following books, in
which they shall, respectively make the
 proper entries concerning the civil status
of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in
which shall be entered not
only the marriages
solemnized but
also divorces and
dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation,
acknowledgment, adoption,
change of name and
naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree
in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the
decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decrees registration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree
presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was
aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, [36] and Department of
Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] both of which
required a final order from a competent Philippine
court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage,
can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless,
allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary
to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void
and cannot produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that
the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authoriz e
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition
for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for
the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil
registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108
of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be
filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located; [38] that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings; [39] and that the
time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation. [40] As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should
not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings
for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact.Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding [41] by
which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for

review on certiorari, and REVERSE theOctober 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We
order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a
copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONE R,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI
MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECI SI ON
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition
assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2
March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue
and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to
file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national
who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15
May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan
which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara
and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National
Statistics Office (NSO). 6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC
immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and
withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The
RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family
Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months
prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident
respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines,
at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the
petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions.
The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a
ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only
"the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or
Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil
actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special
proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or
a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action which is "for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the petition in the
RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant
rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2)
the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court
judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent
with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines 11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts. 12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36
of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be
absurd because only the guilty parties would be
permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of
course, difficult to realize that the party interested in
having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be
the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki
had material interest and therefore the personality to
nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is
applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation"
of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to
Article 413 of the Civil Code. 16 The Civil Register Law
imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce
or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final
decree of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage
was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that
entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject
to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC
sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the
Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also
asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its
own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue.
Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept
of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is
lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case
on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate
Appellate Court 19 which held that the "trial court cannot
pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing
the case." 20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial
court should not have "immediately dismissed" the
petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners
motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC
stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the
petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds
for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper
venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in
the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the
decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court,
which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x
x." 23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its
ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a
ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken
together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x
which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of
the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in
Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction
of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza
emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x." 27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on
the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to
dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover, the verification and
certification against forum shopping of the petition was
not authenticated as required under Section 5 29 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the
"immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same
provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and
Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file
their comment on the petition for review. 30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor
General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General
filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed
that the RTCs "pronouncement that the petitioner failed
to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set
aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court
for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued
that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an
injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The
Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic 33 which
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court
explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take
action if he or she had only discovered during the
connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the
bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and
thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden
to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and
the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is
protected by the Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact." 37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign
divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family
Court judgment also affected the civil status of the
parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events
and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of
the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the
entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce
legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and
status x x x." 38 The Japanese Family Court judgment
directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108
proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under
Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v.
Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the
Court to comply with the directive for them to comment
on the petition. 42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed
from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki. 43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of
violence on Marinay. 44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote
that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything
she say might cause misunderstanding between her and
Fujiki. 46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is
applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can
recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the
Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this
Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that
only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy." 48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under
the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court. 49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody
is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification
may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office. 50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition
for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the
trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the
service of summons, 52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor, 53 the setting of pre-trial, 54 the trial55 and the
judgment of the trial court. 56 This is absurd because it
will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the
case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be
forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering
immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in
the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public
policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine
State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according
to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides
that a foreign judgment or final order against a person
creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited
review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to
delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its
merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
The rule on limited review embodies the policy of
efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as
well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states. 62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 63 Philippine
courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between
a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully
proven under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce involves
the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended
procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse
obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family
Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires
proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule
1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a]
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule
108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life
which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil
Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public
consequence such as birth, death or marriage, 66 which
the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court
declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact." 67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any
person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize
the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground
of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil
status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he
has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of
the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal
and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the
civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances 68) his most intimate human relation, but also to
protect his property interests that arise by operation of
law the moment he contracts marriage. 69 These property
interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and
preserving the property regime of the marriage. 71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected
by the Constitution, 72 but a spouses right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title
III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife")
of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
"diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of
the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In
any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude
a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity
of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On
the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife "75it refers
to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage.
Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties
in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the
wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares
bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil
aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which
penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus,
anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any
citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention
of crimes. 77 If anyone can file a criminal action which
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage, 78 there is more reason to confer personality to
sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage.
The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of
protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is
violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-
Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden
to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in interest, the
prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can
petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact
that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to
cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil
registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has
no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of
marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct
action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied
on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of
foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve
a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an
entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, 83 support pendente lite of the spouses and
children, 84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, 85 and the investigation of the
public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts
Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other words,
a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the
civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction
or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family
Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of
a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law . The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define
the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."
In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26
which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse" 89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines
does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the
case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a
case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective
measure to address the anomaly that results from a
marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce.
The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to
the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry
under the laws of his or her country. The correction is
made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Courts
decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the
Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in
a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign
spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his
or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized
in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the
Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a
situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the
extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the
case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of
the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full
trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the
only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts
are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a
case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide
on the "family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is
a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts
are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a
citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under
the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the
Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to
repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry.
The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to
be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be
an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records
in the Philippines.1wphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying

a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution
for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. 93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of
criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised
Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of
bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court

no longer sees the need to address the questions on
venue and the contents and form of the petition under
Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order

dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2
March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107,
Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad
Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL,
ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DE CI SI ON
YNARES_SANTI AGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting
in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a
car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition
after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent,
obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a
cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father,
Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so
when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is
already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage
of plaintiffs deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are
estopped from assailing the validity of
the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their fathers death. [1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have
filed the action to declare null and void their fathers
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates
the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage. [2] Hence, this petition for review
with this Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc
m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance
with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state
the basis of petitioners averment that the allegations in
the petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as
an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect
under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. [3] However,
upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. [4]
The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. [5] A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, [6] the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article
58.[8] The requirement and issuance of marriage license
is the States demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested. [9] This interest
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." [10] Specifically, the Constitution considers
marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the
State. [11] This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union" [12] and case law considers it "not just an
adventure but a lifetime commitment." [13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the
Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with,
one of which is that provided in Article 76, [14] referring to
the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The rationale why no license
is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties
to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants
name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. [15] To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from
the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father
to respondent Norma was celebrated without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of
majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now
desire to marry each other." [16] The only issue that needs
to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to
warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife during the entire
five-year continuous period regardless of whether there
is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,
which impediment may have either disappeared or
intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have
lived together as husband and wife for five years without
the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband
and wife" where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other
words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity
that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected
as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in
order to notify the public that two persons are about to
be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or
has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the
two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. [17] The
Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall
request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to
advice the local civil registrar thereof. x
x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any
alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make
an investigation, examining persons
under oath. x x x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This
notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil
registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of
any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he
shall note down the particulars thereof
and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or
present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of
multiple marriages by the same person during the same
period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, [18] subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the
civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages
and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. [19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents
marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their
five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse
with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in
this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab
initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their fathers
marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the
Family Code[20] cannot be applied even by analogy to
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by
the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an
annulment suit "at any time before the death of either
party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not
a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is
silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage
that is void ab initio is considered as having never to
have taken place[21] and cannot be the source of rights.
The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death
of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death
of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. [22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no
legal effects except those declared by law concerning
the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution, [23] and its effect on the children born to such
void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to
Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the
Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners
father extinguished the alleged marital bond between
him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a
marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It
should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is
deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of
either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no
judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. [24] "A void marriage does not
require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though
no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet
as well for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the
nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and
declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." [25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect
of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage
had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no
legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after
the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which
cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so
that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40
of the Family Code expressly provides that there must
be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect. [28] For the
same reason, the law makes either the action or defense
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. [29] Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration
of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan, respondent.
RE S OLU T ION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two
contracting parties who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant
complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez,
Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act,
complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a
sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the
late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21
May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Aranet a
Avenue, Caloocan City. [1] Four children were born out of
that marriage. [2] On 22 March 1993, however, her
husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. [3] When
respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or
ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as
the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his
Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was
legally married. What he knew was that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years
already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in
their joint affidavit. [4] According to him, had he known that
the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the
latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could
be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being
designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the
Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of
the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would
be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties
to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case
for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus
filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation
reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and
setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the
attention of the Court to two separate affidavits [5] of the late
Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed
by a member of his staff upon his instruction.In those
affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja
and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their
respective marriages had been marked by constant
quarrels, they had both left their families and had never
cohabited or communicated with their spouses
anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of
those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in
question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital
cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment
to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment
between the parties must be present at the
time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating
that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to
marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a
sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their
marriage. [6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case
at bar. It is significant to note that in their separat e
affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before
respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior
existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was
indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a
subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment,
which would make the subsequent marriage null and
void. [7] In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he
known that the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another marriage.A nd
respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos
and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same
was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
 The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living
apart from their respective spouses for a long time already
is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows
spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation
to live separately from each other, but in such a case the
marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less
authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the
more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the
case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the

Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife
for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to
marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from
marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for
respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage
vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross

ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law
excuses no one has special application to judges, [8] who,
under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should
be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. [9] And
when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the
failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [10]

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court

Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with
theMODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed
upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to
P20,000.
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DE CI SI ON
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166, 2 declaring that (1)
Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the
petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts
in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied
for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had
their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and
had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the
couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the
marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to
push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license,
they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating
that they had been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years. The couple got married on the
same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband
and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child
named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs
birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of
her income as a government dentist and from her private
practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for
support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City (trial court. 3 In her complaint, respondent
alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the
latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to
financially support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as
his child." 4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent,
claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the
marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he
was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the
marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and
possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant
state; and that he was not able to get parental advice
from his parents before he got married. He also averred
that they never lived together as husband and wife and
that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, 5 the trial court
ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized
without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus
obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court
committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis
of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide
support to the child when the latter is not, and could not
have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by
the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting
until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the
appellate court declared that the child was born during
the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In
addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioners
refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity
and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty
the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent,
saying that petitioners "forgetfulness should not be used
as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward
him of his being irresponsible." 6 Moreover, the Court of
Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed
by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is
the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an
action for support, it was improper for the trial court to
declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null
and void in the very same case. There was no
participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion
between the parties, as required by the Family Code in
actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The
burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an
action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court
should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to
support the child and his wife on the basis of the
marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by
petitioner and respondent. 7 The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National
Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No.
4626, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the
appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the
marriage on 13 March 1995 between the
appellant and the appellee valid until properly
annulled by a competent court in a proceeding
 instituted for that purpose. Costs against the
appellant. 8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. 9 Hence this
petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly
annulled his marriage with respondent because as
shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties,
the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license.
He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a
marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the
truth being that he and respondent never lived together
as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be
allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of
a marriage license. 10 Petitioner additionally argues that
there was no need for the appearance of a prosecuting
attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action
for support and not an action for annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case,
petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to
determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was
validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant
action for support. Citing several authorities, 11 petitioner
claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a
collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute
another independent proceeding for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of
another case for declaration of nullity where the same
evidence and parties would be presented would entail
enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-
consuming for the parties, and would increase the
burden of the courts. 12 Finally, petitioner claims that in
view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and
his vigorous denial of the childs paternity and filiation,
the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child
as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court
required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the
petition. 13
In her Comment, 14 respondent claims that the instant
petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of
the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the
findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues
that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked
collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a
direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With
regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that
compared to her candid and straightforward testimony,
petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering
questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she
adds that despite the challenge from her and from the
trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected
to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation. 15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court to
declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and
respondent in the action for support. Citing the case
of Nial v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass
upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support,
since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the
existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence
presented during the proceedings in the trial court
showed that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was solemnized without a marriage license,
and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus,
it concludes the trial court correctly held that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is not
valid. 17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of
the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of
petitioner and thus entitled to support. 18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether
the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the
validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent in an action for support and second, whether
the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court
had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked. 19 Thus, in Nial v.
Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage,
no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment
of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage. 20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario, 21 the Court
ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass
upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case
being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we
held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. However, evidence must
be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an
absolute nullity. 22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage voidable. 23 In the
instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that
petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage
license when they contracted their marriage. Instead,
they presented an affidavit stating that they had been
living together for more than five years.24 However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the
affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination,
thus
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have
not been living together as husband and wife for
the last five years on or before March 13, 1995,
you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir. 25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a
mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The
law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for
a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicants name for a marriage
license. 26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous
cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner
and respondent executed so they could push through
with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere
scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner
as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit
waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent,
admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA
A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3,
1995 at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro
Manila; 30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following
findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent
with the petitioner is supported not only by the
testimony of the latter, but also by respondents
own admission in the course of his testimony
wherein he conceded that petitioner was his
former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts,
he used to visit petitioner at the latters house or
clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have
sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances,
petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led
to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled.
While respondent claims that he was merely
forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the
pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise
(Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2,"
"D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F,"
"F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H,"
"H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D,"
"D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the
wedding ring on petitioners finger and in
another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2")
respondent is seen in the act of kissing the
petitioner. 31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and
the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of
Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is
hereby REINSTATED.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is

petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to
support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate

filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children. 27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate
filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws. 28
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECI SI ON
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No.
175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic
of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa),
respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose
and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The
marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. 2 In
lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a
sworn affidavit, 3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting
that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and
that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint 4 for Annulment
and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25.
He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham,
as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the
parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit
stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife
for at least five years; and that his consent to the
marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events
which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he
was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter,
he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter
being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,
ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by
her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall,
upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing
three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the
package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused
to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that
his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother
who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he
signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man
who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he
discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa.
He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of
the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused
the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his
marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted
Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses
allegations and defended the validity of their marriage.
She declared that they had maintained their relationship
as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the
early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting
marriage with him on account of their age difference. 5 In
her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31
August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for
bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of
the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board. 6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively
liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted
out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one
year without emolument. 7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a
Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of
the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds
and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a
favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled
case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against
[Jose]. 9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence
presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and
Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed
Joses version of the story as implausible, and
rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily
suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank
sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that
something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay
City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who
was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of
the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could
have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own
admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill
them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him,
more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces
of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the
marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that
ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a
ride" by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage
was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa
Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the
duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled
up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and
false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name
of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of
emergency. This Court does not believe that the only
reason why her name was written in his company I.D.
was because he was residing there then. This is just but
a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the
name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand,
under oath, she testified that she signed her name
voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage
certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and
she further testified that the signature appearing over the
name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother
that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page
26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when
she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she
believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her
brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all
the more belied his claim that his consent was procured
through fraud. 10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that
Joses action had prescribed. It cited Article 87 11 of the
New Civil Code which requires that the action for
annulment of marriage must be commenced by the
injured party within four years after the discovery of the
fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his
consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery
and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged
sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take
any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x
x x. 12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11
August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to
be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate
courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. 13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the
marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate
court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud
as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article
8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage
between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed
beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The
Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the
following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or
intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent
to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had
already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil
Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage
on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained
by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by
said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the
fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or
intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was
allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he
had only until February, 1991 within which to file an
action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only
on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for
annulment of his marriage to Felisa. 15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses
assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was
solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of
exceptional character, with the parties executing an
affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in
the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived
together as husband and wife for the period required by
Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage,
seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court
of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of
the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit.
The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side
of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the
solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument
that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to
which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to
the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did
not require that either one of the contracting parties to
the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers
church or religious sect. The prescription was
established only in Article 718 of the Family Code which
does not govern the parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose
filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His
central opposition was that the requisites for the proper
application of the exemption from a marriage license
under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the
legal condition that the man and the woman must have
been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained
that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him
and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for
Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November
2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is
RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered
declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and
Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local
Civil Registrar of Pasay City. 19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on
the ruling of this Court in Nial v. Bayadog, 20 and
reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a
marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the
basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of
majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together
for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry
each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date
of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.
This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period
of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning
no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years
and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is
based on the approximation of the requirements of the
law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to
not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in
order to notify the public that two persons are about to
be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or
has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the
two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
of exceptional character, shall be void from the
beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and
Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement
of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio
because of the absence of a marriage license. 21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision,
but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a
Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas
motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for
Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying
that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7
November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of
merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be
declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474,
similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended
Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to
consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity
of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
resolution. 23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following
arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE
PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE
COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD
NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS
OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM
ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICEN[S]E. 24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of
Appeals misapplied Nial. 25 She differentiates the case
at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties
therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance
which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.
Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the
annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for
bigamy and an administrative case had been filed
against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises
that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would
exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between
Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the
issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments
vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and
Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several
circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part,
Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing
this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals. 26 To
buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986,
attesting that they have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a
marriage license. It is the Republics position that the
falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect
the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal
requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the
said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by
the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so
must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the
parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their
affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at
least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the
parties marriage contract states that their marriage was
solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also
bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses,
and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage.
To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the
following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he
wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated
25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192,
Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose
and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in
said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2
May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule
on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article
76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in
order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa
was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil
Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code
spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a
contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all
these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the
local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of
an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code,
but not those under Article 75. 28 Article 80(3)29 of the
Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this
being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of
the marriage contract. 30 This is in stark contrast to the
old Marriage Law, 31 whereby the absence of a marriage
license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for
the compulsory character of a marriage license under
the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the
State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage. 32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character
are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72
to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in
articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or
war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular
marriages, 33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4)
religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan
or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages. 34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital
cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a
man and a woman who have attained the age of majority
and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state
in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages
and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law, 35 as espoused by the Code
Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage
license may discourage such persons who have lived in
a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status. 36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and
Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu
thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they
have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried,
they have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years; and that because of this union, they desire to
marry each other." 37 One of the central issues in the
Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit
of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement,
effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of
a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the
formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of
statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule,
should be strictly 38 but reasonably construed. 39 They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. 40 Where a general
rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court
will not curtail the former or add to the latter by
implication. 41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is
a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman
must have attained the age of majority, and that, being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves
us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is
plainly written. The exception of a marriage license
under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and
desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement
of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law
can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise.
The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an
indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a
marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this
material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in
the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that
partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to
mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite facts 42 in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister
who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have
not lived together for five years at the time they executed
their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The
Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before
the celebration of their marriage. 43 The Court of Appeals
also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced
to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in
February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution. 44 The appellate court also cited Felisas own
testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house. 45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to
whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is
factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is
a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts. 46Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not
subject to this Courts review. 47 It is already well-settled
that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court
of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized
exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and
the trial court, or in this case the administrative body,
make contradictory findings. However, the exception
does not apply in every instance that the Court of
Appeals and the trial court or administrative body
disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals
remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on substantial
evidence. 48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November
1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from
the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond
question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the
falsity of the statements in the parties affidavit will not
affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and
formal requisites were complied with. The argument
deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that
the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated
without the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so
as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of
marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we
speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference
to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. 49 Restated more
explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. 50 The present case does not involve an
apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs
to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa
actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24
November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated
Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that
every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity
of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and
extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law.
The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into
without the requisite marriage license or compliance with
the stringent requirements of a marriage under can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not
marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the prescribe, and may be raised any time.
law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the
perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation
prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a period under Article 76 means a five-year period
valid marriage. 52 The protection of marriage as a sacred computed back from the date of celebration of marriage,
institution requires not just the defense of a true and and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as the absence of a marriage. 57 It covers the years
well. 53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was
the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the involved at any time within the five years - and continuity
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive that is unbroken. 58
schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our
laws.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage
the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a any. No costs.
fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for
at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of
the marriage license, and not to the absence of one.
Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore,
the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating
to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an exception to
the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a
mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that
the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to
by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there
was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth

the argument that based on equity, Jose should be
denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and
cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a
misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds
no room for application where there is a law. 54 There is a
law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set
in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the
declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without
prejudice to their criminal liability. 55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of

error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the
legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is
claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from
1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent
marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that
it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is

imprescriptible. 56 Jose and Felisas marriage was
celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922
Petitioner, heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios
Present: Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson, Parcel No. 1
AUSTRIA-MARTINE Z,
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO, Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUP A
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ. of the Court of Land Registration.
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. Exemption from the provisions of Article
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated: 567 of the Civil Code is specifically
CARLOS II, reserved.
Respondents. December 16,
2008 Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

x- ---- ---- ---- ----- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----- -

----------x Parcel No. 2

DE CI SI ON A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a

portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Pro
REYES, R.T., J.: vince of Rizal, x x x containing an area of
Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty
One (13,441) square meters.

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the

Parcel No. 3
marital bond for marriages solemnized during the
effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd.
plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a
prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a non-subd. project), being a portion
marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun.
of Muntinlupa,
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded
judgment. on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to
5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1
by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by
We pronounce these principles as We review
Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the
on certiorari the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) subd. plan, containing an area
of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ.
which reversed and set aside the summary judgment [2] of
METERS, more or less.
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration
of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of
property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages. PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd.

The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant
suit are unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died
intestate. They left six parcels of land totheir compulsory
plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of
Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec.
No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang,
Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along
lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on
the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by
Mangangata River; and on the West.,
along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd.
plan x x x containing an area
of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX
(1,076) SQUARE METERS.
 Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of
PARCEL No. 5 petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de
Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela
49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was
SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo
la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un
punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 &
halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el
6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad
punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un
mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of
Manila, situado on el esquina E. que
forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878,
Castillas, continiendo un extension respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
superficial de CIENTO CINCUE NTA
(150) METROS CUADRADOS.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against
PARCEL No. 6 respondents before the RTC in MuntinlupaCity, docketed
as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51,
Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De submitted and caused the approval of a partial
Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela
50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the
SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la parties acknowledged their respective shares in the
Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un
punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of
halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-met er
Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que
es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de portion of said land.
Manila, situado on el esquina E. que
forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo una extension On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a
superficial de CIENTO CINCUE NTA
(150) METROS CUADRADOS. [3] deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing
the remaining land of the first parcel between them.

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v.
transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in
Carlos, [4] 2,331 square meters of thesecond parcel of
order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo,
land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The
in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the
remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided
other legal heir, petitioner Juan De DiosCarlos.
between petitioner and respondents.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were

The division was incorporated in a supplemental
transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. Thes e
compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994,
three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of
with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties
Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds
submitted the supplemental compromise agreement ,
of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of
which was approved accordingly.
Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties
equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack
of land. of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed
for the dismissal of the case before the trial
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondent s and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, be
before the court a quo with the following causes of action: granted.
(a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child;
(c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum But before the parties could even proceed to pre -
of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to trial, respondents moved for summary
Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa. judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the
justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth
marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent of respondent Teofilo II.In the certificate, the late Teofilo
Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as
required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his parents.
deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive
father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the
motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularit y
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same
contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary
respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the
the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that
name of respondents. He argued that the properties there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
covered by such certificates of title, including the sums
received by respondents as proceeds, should be Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion
reconveyed to him. for summary judgment the testimony of respondent
Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v.
by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her
litigation expenses, and costs of suit. testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-
respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo. [5]
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted
their answer. They denied the material averments of Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
petitioners complaint. Respondents contended that the Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and
dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion
did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to between the parties.
Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the RTC and CA Dispositions
illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with
another woman. On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment,
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises
considered, defendants (respondent s )
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
granted and summary judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as
follows:
1. Declaring the marriage
between defendant Felicidad Sandoval
and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang,
Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by
the Marriage Certificate submittedin this
case, null and void ab initio for lack of the
requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant
minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the
natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted
child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval
to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum
of P18,924,800.00 together with the
interest thereon at the legal rate from
date of filing of the instant complaint until
fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole
and exclusive owner of the parcel of land,
less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 11975, covered
by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of
Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said
Register of Deeds to cancel said title and
to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex
K of complaint, between plaintiff and
defendant Sandoval null and void, and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati
City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the
name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue
another title in the sole name of plaintiff
herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex
M of the complaint, between plaintiff and
defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation
of TCT No. 210877 in the names of
defendant Sandoval and defendant
minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering
the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue
another title in the exclusive name of
plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation
of TCT No. 210878 in the name of
defendant Sandoval and defendant
Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering
the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue
another title in the sole name of plaintiff
herein.
Let this case be set for hearing
for the reception of plaintiffs evidence on
his claim for moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, appearanc e
fees, and litigation expenses on June 7,
1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED. [6]
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In
the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial
court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering
summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr.
and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an
illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set
aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary
judgment appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in
lieu thereof, a new
one is entered REMANDING the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings .
SO ORDERED. [7]
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the
herein appealed summary judgment by
the court a quocontrary to law and public
policy as ensconced in the aforesaid
safeguards. The fact that it was
appellants who first sought summary
judgment from the trial court, did not
justify the grant thereof in favor of
appellee. Not being an action to recover
upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory
relief, the rule on summary judgment
apply (sic) to an action to annul a
marriage. The mere factthat no genuine
issue was presented and the desire to
expedite the disposition of the case
cannot justify a misinterpretation of the
rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and
101 of the Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of
decree of annulment of a marriage upon
a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to
the petition for summary judgment
practically amount to these methods
explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of
appellees argument that the foregoing
safeguards have traditionally been
applied to prevent collusion of spouses in
the matter of dissolution of marriages and
that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May
13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the
marriage herein impugned. The fact,
however, that appellees own brother and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived
together as husband and wife for thirty
years and that the annulment of their
marriage is the very means by which the
latter is sought to be deprived of her
participation in the estate left by the
former call for a closer and more
thorough inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the case.Rather that the
summary nature by which the court a
quo resolved the issues in the case, the
rule is to the effect that the material facts
alleged in the complaint for annulment of
marriage should always be proved.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides:
Section
1. Judgment on the
pleadings. Where an
answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwis e
admits the material
allegations of the
adverse party's
pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions
for annulment of
marriage or for legal
separation, the material
facts alleged in the
complaint shall always
be proved.
(Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to
sustain the applicability of the rules on
summary judgment to the case at bench,
Our perusal of the record shows that the
finding of the court a quo for appellee
would still not be warranted. While it may
be readily conceded that a valid marriage
license is among the formal requisites of
marriage, the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of
the Civil Code the failure to reflect the
serial number of the marriage license on
the marriage contract evidencing the
marriage between Teofilo Carlos and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although
irregular, is not as fatal as appellee
represents it to be. Aside from the deart h
of evidence to the contrary, appellant
Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the
existence of said marriage license is
corroborated by the following statement
in the affidavit executed by Godofredo
Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
That as far as I
could remember, there
was a marriage license
issued at Silang, Cavit e
on May 14, 1962 as
basis of the said
marriage contract
executed by Teofilo
Carlos and Felicidad
Sandoval, but the
number of said marriage
license was
inadvertently not placed
in the marriage contract
for the reason that it was
the Office Clerk who
filled up the blanks in the
Marriage Contract who
in turn, may have
overlooked the same.
Rather than the inferences
merely drawn by the trial court, We are of
the considered view that the veracity and
credibility of the foregoing statement as
well as the motivations underlying the
same should be properly threshed out in
a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the
marriage contract the primary evidenc e
of marriage is not proof that a marriage
did not take place, neither should
appellants non-presentation of the
subject marriage license be taken as
proof that the same was not
procured. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage, it must
be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff
and any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of
proof also rests on the party who
 disputes the legitimacy of a particular
party, the same may be said of the trial
courts rejection of the relationship
between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and
his putative father on the basis of the
inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad
Sandovals statements. Although it had
effectively disavowed appellants prior
claims regarding the legitimacy of
appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment
in the answer that he is the illegitimate
son of appellees brother, to Our mind, did
not altogether foreclose the possibility of
the said appellants illegitimate filiation,
his right to prove the same or, for that
matter, his entitlement to inheritanc e
rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having
been conducted in the case, We find
appellees bare allegation that appellant
Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased
from an indigent couple by appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole,
insufficient to support what could well be
a minors total forfeiture of the rights
arising from his
putative filiation. Inconsistent though it
may be to her previous statements,
appellant Felicidad Sandovals
declaration regarding the illegitimate
filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more
credible when considered in the light of
the fact that, during the last eight years of
his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said
appellant the use of his name and the
shelter of his household. The least that
the trial court could have done in the
premises was to conduct a trial
on the merits in order to be able to
thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining
to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos
II. [8]
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for
reconsideration and for the inhibition
the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA
denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the
following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting
aside the Summary Judgment under the
Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying
petitioners Motion for reconsideration
under the Resolution, Annex F hereof,
with respect to the nullity of the impugned
marriage, petitioner respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed a
grave reversible error in applying Articles
88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the
fact that the circumstances of this case
are different from that contemplated and
intended by law, or has otherwis e
decided a question of substance not
theretofore decided by the Supreme
Court, or has decided it in a manner
probably not in accord with law or with
the applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and
reversing the Summary Judgment and, in
lieu thereof, entering another remanding
the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully
submits that the Court of Appeals
committed a serious reversible error in
applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section
1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court
providing for judgment on the pleadings ,
instead of Rule 35 governing Summary
Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting
aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
thereof, entering another remanding the
case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully
submits that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion, disregarded judicial
admissions, made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and conjectures,
or otherwise committed misapplications
of the laws and misapprehension of the
facts. [9] (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a
of
marriage may be declared void ab initiothrough a
judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and
without the benefit of a trial.But there are other procedural
issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse
in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage must be proved.Neither judgment
on the pleadings nor summary judgment is SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding
judge shall personally conduct the trial of
allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. the case. No delegation of evidence to a
commissioner shall be allowed except as
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, to matters involving property relations of
the spouses.
Rule 19[10] of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides :
(2) The grounds for declaration
SECTION 1. Judgment on the of absolute nullity or annulment of
pleadings. Where an answer fails to marriage must be proved. No judgment
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
material allegations of the adverse partys confession of judgment shall be
pleading, the court may, on motion of that allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation, the Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement
material facts alleged in the complaint in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We
shall always be proved. excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from
the application of summary judgments.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the
Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of
the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Prescinding from the foregoing
discussion, save for annulment of
marriage or declaration of its nullity or for
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding
legal separation, summary judgment is
solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on applicable to all kinds of
the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA actions. [14] (Underscoring supplied)
likewise considered the provisions on summary
judgments, to wit: By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court
has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to
Moreover, even if We are to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not
sustain the applicability of the rules on
terminated by the declaration of the public
summary judgment to the case at bench,
Our perusal of the record shows that the prosecutor that no collusion exists between the
finding of the court a quo for appellee parties. The State should have been given the opportunit y
would still not be warranted. x x x [11] to present controverting evidence before the judgment
was rendered. [15]
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and
rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public
judgments have no place in cases of declaration of prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of
absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression
marriage. of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that
the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule is not fabricated.
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the question on the To further bolster its role towards the preservation of
application of summary judgments or even judgment on marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public
has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle prosecutor, viz.:
laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March
15, 2003[12] is found in Section 17, viz.: SEC. 13. Effect of failure to
appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x
 (b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court regular courts. On the other hand, the
shall require the public prosecutor to concern of the State is to preserve
intervene for the State during the trial on marriage and not to seek its
the merits to prevent suppression or dissolution. [17] (Underscoring supplied)
fabrication of evidence.(Underscori ng
supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor
the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving,
or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the
peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who
State is represented and protected in proceedings for
can decide when and how to build the foundations of
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the
marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their
fabrication or suppression of evidence. [16]
marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and
actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage case s
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the
10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages
effectivity of the Civil Code.
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under
the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages ,
which took effect on August 3, 1988. [18]
the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
Nullity of Void Marriages marks

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the
of absolute nullity of void marriages. deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case
against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended
(a) Who may file. A petition for
to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the successional rights.
husband or the wife. (Underscoring
supplied)
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate
absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can
is enlightening, viz.: still protect their successionalright, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Only an aggrieved or injured
spouse may file a petition for annulment Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
of voidable marriages or declaration of Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such can still question the validity of the marriage of the
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of
State. The Committee is of the belief that nullitybut upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
they do not have a legal right to file the the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs
in the regular courts. [19]
have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor,
and, hence, can only question the It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not
validity of the marriage of the spouses
apply to cases already commenced before March 15,
upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the 2003 although the marriage involved is within the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule
which became effective on March 15, 2003[20] is True, under the New Civil Code
which is the law in force at the time the
prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held respondents were married, or even in the
in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, [21] viz.: Family Code, there is no
specific provision as to who can file a
As has been emphasized, A.M. petition to declare the nullity of marriage;
No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages however, only a party who can
under the Family Code of the Philippines, demonstrate proper interest can file the
and is prospective in its same. A petition to declare the nullity of
application.[22] (Underscoring supplied) marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest and must be
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial
case against respondent Felicidad in 1995.The marriage v. Badayog, the Court held that the
children have the personality to file the
in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which
petition to declare the nullity of marriage
law would govern depends upon when the marriage took of their deceased father to
place. [23] their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.

The marriage having been solemnized xxxx

prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of its celebration. [24] But the Civil Code is silent as to
who may bring an action to declare the marriage
void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action
for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a
provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a
license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage
case. Such person must appear to be the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails
suit. [25] Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-
interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest. [26]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means
material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by
the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere
incidental interest. One having no material interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-
interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of
cause of action. [27]
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan
Court of Appeals,[28] where the Court held:
In fine, petitioners personality to
file the petition to declare the nullity of
marriage cannot be ascertained because
of the absence of the divorce decree and
the foreign law allowing it.Hence, a
remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a
divorce decree and whether the foreign
law which granted the same allows or
restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a
valid divorce decree was obtained and
the same did not allow respondent
Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court
of the should declare respondents marriage as
bigamous and void ab initio but reduced
the amount of moral damages
from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages from P200,000. 00
to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained which allowed Orlando to
remarry, then the trial court must dismiss
the instant petition to declare nullity of
marriage on the ground that petitioner
Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the
same. [29] (Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine
whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to
seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.
v.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo accordance with the following
articles. (Underscoring supplied)
died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs
are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under
Indeed, only the presence of descendants ,
the law on succession, successional rights are
ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and
relatives from succeeding to the estate of the
the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation
decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or
of law. [30]
adopted child or children of the deceased precludes
succession by collateral relatives. [32] Conversely, if there
Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were to the entire estate of the decedent. [33]

respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally
spouse and child, respectively.
proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted
son of Teofilo, petitioner would then
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory
have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his
heirs, to wit:
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so,
considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and
(1) Legitimate children and descendants,
with respect to their legitimate sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the
parents and ascendants; decedent dies without issue and without ascendants
in the direct line.
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate
parents and ascendants, with
respect to their legitimate children The records reveal that Teofilo was
and descendants; predeceased by his parents. He had no other

(3) The widow or widower; siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found
and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the
natural children by legal fiction;
estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil
in Article 287 of the Civil Code. [31] Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to
seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the
compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner
as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory succeeds to the entire estate.
heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles
1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide: It bears stressing, however, that the legal
personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage
ART. 1001. Should brothers and
case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo
sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate,
sisters or their children to the other half.
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then
ART. 1003. If there are no petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate marriage of his deceased brother and respondent
children, or a surviving spouse, the
Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no
collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased in successional right to be protected, hence, does not have
proper interest. For although the marriage in controvers y
may be found to be void from the beginning, still, legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress. (Underscoring
petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presenc e supplied)
of descendant, illegitimate, [34] or even an adopted
child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the
from the decedent. legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case language of the law is unmistakable.An assertion by the
for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect
the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictl y the legitimacy of achild born or conceived within a valid
instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for marriage. [37]
lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that
Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of
adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyanc e,
of petitioner. recovery of property, and sum of money must be
vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made
IV. Remand of the case regarding the on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controvers y
question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper was null and void ab initio.
and in order. There is a need to vacate the dispositi on WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as
of the trial court as to the other causes of action follows:
before it.

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the Court in regard to the action on the
ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo
filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We Carlos II and the validity or nullity of
should not leave the matter hanging in limbo. marriage between respondent Felicidad
Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
This Court has the authority to review matters not
specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if 2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally
resolution of the case. [36] adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos,
the RTC is
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the a
having been conducted in the case, petitioners bare ction for nullity of marriage for lack of
allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an cause of action;
indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture
of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We 3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of
are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the the fallo of its decision
declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the
guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to
respondent Felicidad should not be afforded conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this
credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by case priority in its calendar.
Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of
legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be

considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its
 LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DE CI SI ON
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 33566. 1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
72322 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on
29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F.
Santos faced an Information4 for bigamy. Petitioner
pleaded not guilty, while her putative husband escaped
the criminal suit. 5redarclaw
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who
had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June
1974, 6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who
was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29
July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and
parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should
choose someone who was without
responsibility.7redarclaw
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she
could not be included as an accused in the crime of
bigamy, because she had been under the belief that
Santos was still single when they got married. She also
averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his
second marriage to her should be proven valid by the
prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their
marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the
first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution.
She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as
March and April 1997, on which occasions the former
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner
denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang
only in August and September 1997, or after she had
already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner
married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to
Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang
that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife
of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court
rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she
had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it
was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be
easily duped by a person like Santos. 8redarclaw
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of
Marriage, her marriage was celebrated without a need
for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of
the Family Code, which is an admission that she
cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of
their marriage.9 Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner
as follows: 10redarclaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the
accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and
penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended
that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having
been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the
Family Code, which provides an exemption from the
requirement of a marriage license if the parties have
actually lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her
case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not
lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to
their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a
marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null
and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held
thus: 11redarclaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her
co-accused that is null and void as it was celebrated
without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that
theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on
the validity of her marriage to accused Santos,
something this court can not do. The best support to her
argument would have been the submission of a judicial
decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such
proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and
void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her
conviction was not based on proof beyond reasonable
doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and
insisted that the former had not known of the previous
marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the
prosecution witnesses narration. It likewise disbelieved
the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage
license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim
was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to
Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her
conviction for bigamy. 12redarclaw
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be
a co-accused in the instant case, because she was not
aware of Santoss previous marriage. But in the main,
she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a
valid second marriage must be proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her
marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a
marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage
does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from
a marriage license, because they have not previously
lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at
least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the
records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four
years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the
five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage
without a license is void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), respondent advances the argument that
the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising
factual issues as regards her husbands subsequent
marriage. As regards petitioners denial of any
knowledge of Santoss first marriage, respondent
reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the
conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about
the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
In Montaez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the
elements of bigamy as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the
offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has
not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity. The felony is consummated on the
celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy
that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in
the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr.16instructs that she
should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting
marriage. People v. Archilla17likewise states that the
knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouses
existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes
her responsible as an accomplice.
The Ruling of the Court
The penalty for bigamy and petitioners
knowledge of Santoss first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint
liability of two persons who marry each other while the
previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting.
As explained in Nepomuceno:18redarclaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second
spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the
accused without being aware of his previous
marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge
of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused
could she be included in the information as a co-
accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained
petitioners knowledge of Santoss marriage to Galang.
Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first
marriage as shown by the totality of the following
circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and
visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly
showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for
a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true
civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible
witness compared with petitioner who had various
inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that
she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the
former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason
to reverse or modify the factual findings of the RTC, less
so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed
by the CA. Indeed, the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it
had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the
expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the
trial. 20redarclaw
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this
Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly
charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the
lower courts imposition of the principal penalty on
her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted
out to her the penalty within the range of prision
correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is
wrong. Archilla21 holds that the second spouse, if
indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an
accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes,
an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that a
person, whether man or woman, who knowingly
consents or agrees to be married to another already
bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the
crime of bigamy.22 Therefore, her conviction should only
be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six
years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal
participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the
sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in
degree, 23prision correccional, which has a duration of six
months and one day to six years. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty
shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two
years, four months and one day to four years and two
months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one
month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner
resulting from her marriage to
Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be
convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage
must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the
accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or
she can do it as a matter of defense during the
presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal
case. 26 In this case, petitioner has
consistently 27 questioned below the validity of her
marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages
celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage
license are void ab initio. 28redarclaw
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the
issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on
the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt
of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly
overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given that an
appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for
review, 30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of
the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the
marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this
requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate
of Marriage, which reveals that their union was
celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The
provision reads as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties
are found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would
have been exempted from a marriage license had they
cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least
five years before their marriage. 31redarclaw
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew
Santos in more or less in February 199632 and that after
six months of courtship, 33 she married him on 29 July
1997. Without any objection from the prosecution,
petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her
in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage.
However, he never cohabited with her, as she was
residing in the house of her in-laws, 34 and her children
from her previous marriage disliked him. 35 On cross-
examination, respondent did not question the claim of
petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as
an agent who sold her piglets. 36redarclaw
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and
Santos had only known each other for only less than four
years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not
have cohabited for at least five years prior to their
marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact
opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records
do not show that they submitted an affidavit of
cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family
Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the
solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had
actually cohabited for at least five years before they
married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie
was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in
which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no
marriage license was necessary, because the marriage
was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case
of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the
marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and
Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated
by them that they were eligible to contract marriage
without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation
wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy
based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos
without a marriage license despite knowing that they had
not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law;
and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her
marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is
basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to
escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on
marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individuals
deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct
character of this special bond between
spouses. 38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the
occasion to emphasize that the States penal laws on
bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape
the consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance
petitioners illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the
same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us,
to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of
marriage. 40redarclaw
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court
will lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which
the cause of action is founded.41 If the cause of action
appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left
unassisted by the courts. 42As a result, litigants shall be
denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or
deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43redarclaw
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the
falsification of public documents in order to contract a
second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos
fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and
petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for
seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment
of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard
petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that
marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. 46|||In keeping
therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms
the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed
by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G.
Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years
of prision correccional as maximum plus accessory
penalties provided by law.

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her

affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is
that her marriage with Santos was void for having been
secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated
earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of
Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted
from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and
wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In
violation of our law against illegal marriages, 44 petitioner
married Santos while knowing fully well that they had not
yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement
under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will
be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow
petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal
conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence

involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the
second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license.
In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara
married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August
1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their
marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the
marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of
the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA
ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely,
controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is
Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July
1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at
the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings
into fore the above provision which is now
invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of
the court a quo 1 and the Court of
Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its
application in his attempt to have his marriage
with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank
of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia.
The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for
Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge
Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived
with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La
Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a
baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The
ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a
"quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and
where the couple should start living independently from
Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his
own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of
America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on
01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time
by long distance telephone. She promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989.
She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a training program
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he
desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch
with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home,
Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros
Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage
Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil
Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in
a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer
(through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner
who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a
decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the
court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had
repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court,
Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she
would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed
the complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter
affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its
non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of
merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or
at the very least to communicate with him, for more than
five years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In
his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no
affection for (him) because respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all
these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years,
more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological
incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the
Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of
the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be
void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration,
was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted
from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.)
Reyes suggested that they say "wanting
in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo)
Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the
sufficient use." On the other hand,
Justice Reyes proposed that they say
"wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the
idea is that one is not lacking in
judgment but that he is lacking in the
exercise of judgment. He added that
lack of judgment would make the
marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia
Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of
judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the
latter would make the marriage null and
void and the former only voidable.
Justice Caguioa suggested that
subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any
party who, at the time of
the celebration, was
psychologically
incapacitated to
discharge the essential
marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity
is made manifest after
the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the
phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of
reason of judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage" refers to
defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since
"insanity" is also a psychological or
mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only
a ground for annulment and not for
declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that in insanity, there
is the appearance of consent, which is
the reason why it is a ground for
voidable marriages, while subparagraph
(7) does not refer to consent but to the
very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in
subparagraph (7), the word "mentally"
be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa
concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers
to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that
subparagraph (7) refers to psychological
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno
stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but
not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-)
Luciano said that it is called selective
impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the
confusion lies in the fact that in inserting
the Canon Law annulment in the Family
Code, the Committee used a language
which describes a ground for voidable
marriages under the Civil Code. Justice
Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there
are voidable marriages under the Canon
Law, there are no voidable marriages
Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the
reason why they should make a
distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon
Law, the defects in marriage cannot be
cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the
problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground
for void ab initio marriages? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that insanity
is curable and there are lucid intervals,
while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno
suggested that the phrase "even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest" be
modified to read "even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity,
at the time of the marriage, it is not
apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are
two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally
incapacitated" in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does
not know all the consequences of the
marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor
of making psychological incapacity a
ground for voidable marriages since
otherwise it will encourage one who
really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to
make excuses for invalidating the
marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage.
Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way
of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point
is that in the case of incapacity by
reason of defects in the mental faculties,
which is less than insanity, there is a
defect in consent and, therefore, it is
clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable
of convalidation for the simple reason
that there are lucid intervals and there
are cases when the insanity is curable.
He emphasized that psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof.
(Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they
do not consider it as going to the very
essence of consent. She asked if they
are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that,
ultimately, consent in general is effected
but he stressed that his point is that it is
not principally a vitiation of consent
since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the
validity of the marriage celebration and
the obligations attendant to marriage,
which are completely different from each
other, because they require a different
capacity, which is eighteen years of age,
for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt
that psychological incapacity is still a
kind of vice of consent and that it should
not be classified as a voidable marriage
which is incapable of convalidation; it
should be convalidated but there should
be no prescription. In other words, as
long as the defect has not been cured,
there is always a right to annul the
marriage and if the defect has been
really cured, it should be a defense in
the action for annulment so that when
the action for annulment is instituted, the
issue can be raised that actually,
although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the
time the action is brought, it is no longer
true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the
question: Will not cohabitation be a
defense? In response, Justice Puno
stated that even the bearing of children
and cohabitation should not be a sign
that psychological incapacity has been
cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological
incapacity is still insanity of a lesser
degree. Justice Luciano suggested that
they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa,
however, reiterated that psychological
incapacity is not a defect in the mind but
in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a
help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same
manner that there is a lucid interval in
insanity, there are also momentary
periods when there is an understanding
of the consequences of marriage.
Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit
remarked that the ground of
psychological incapacity will not apply if
the marriage was contracted at the time
when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include
physical incapacity to copulate among
the grounds for void marriages. Justice
Reyes commented that in some
instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only
temporary and only with respect to a
particular person. Judge Diy stated that
they can specify that it is incurable.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the term
"incurable" has a different meaning in
law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated
that "psychological incapacity" can also
be cured. Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the
present draft provision, it is enough to
show that at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, one was
psychologically incapacitated so that
later on if already he can comply with
the essential marital obligations, the
marriage is still void ab initio. Justice
Caguioa explained that since in divorce,
the psychological incapacity may occur
after the marriage, in void marriages, it
has to be at the time of the celebration
of marriage. He, however, stressed that
the idea in the provision is that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage,
one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations, which incapacity continues
and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however,
pointed out that it is possible that after
the marriage, one's psychological
incapacity become manifest but later on
he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice
Caguioa opined that the remedy in this
case is to allow him to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article
as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage
contracted by any party
who, at the time of the
celebration, was
psychologically
incapacitated, to comply
with the essential
obligations of marriage
shall likewise be void
from the beginning even
if such incapacity
becomes manifest after
its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if"
be substituted with "although." On the
other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that
the clause "although such incapacity
becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may
encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out
that, as in other provisions, they cannot
argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also
include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree
than psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa explained that mental and
physical incapacities are vices of
consent while psychological incapacity
is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said
on the matter in the minutes of their
February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground,
Bishop Cruz indicated
that the phrase
"psychological or
mental impotence" is an
invention of some
churchmen who are
moralists but not
canonists, that is why it
is considered a weak
phrase. He said that the
Code of Canon Law
would rather express it
as "psychological or
mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they
deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He
explained that "psychological incapacity"
refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members
that, at the last meeting, they have
decided not to go into the classification
of "psychological incapacity" because
there was a lot of debate on it and that
this is precisely the reason why they
classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked
that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from
psychological incapacity, Civil Law
should not reconcile with Canon Law
because it is a new ground even under
Canon Law.
 Prof. Romero raised the question: With
this common provision in Civil Law and
in Canon Law, are they going to have a
provision in the Family Code to the
effect that marriages annulled or
declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The
other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired
if Article 37 should be retroactive or
prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its
retroactivity because it is their answer to
the problem of church annulments of
marriages, which are still valid under the
Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice
Reyes and Justice Puno were
concerned about the avalanche of
cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the
issue to a vote, which the Committee
approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and
Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean
Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director
Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put
in the prescriptive period of ten years
within which the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage should be filed in
court. The Committee approved the
suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision
Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision
with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so
designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by
Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994);
thus: 8
The Committee did not give any
examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would
limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the
judge to interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from
Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of
contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of
discretion of judgment concerning
essentila matrimonial rights and duties,
to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological
nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps
all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular
effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at
the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot
be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at
least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal
provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving
an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095
has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon
does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden
the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
proposed first:
Those who cannot
assume the essential
obligations of marriage
because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly
(ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are
unable to contract
marriage (cf. SCH/1975,
canon 297, a new
canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
 . . . because of a grave psychological
anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon
1049);
then the same wording was retained in
the text submitted to the pope
(cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological
nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-
sexual to psychological anomaly, then
the term anomaly was altogether
eliminated. it would be, however,
incorrect to draw the conclusion that the
cause of the incapacity need not be
some kind of psychological disorder;
after all, normal and healthy person
should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological
incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on
Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada
and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to
the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other
disorders of personality can be the
psychic cause of this defect, which is
here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a
real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding
contract to deliver the crops which he
cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to
commit oneself must refer to
the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring;
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. The mere
difficulty of assuming these obligations,
which could be overcome by normal
effort, obviously does not constitute
incapacity. The canon contemplates a
true psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from giving what
is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R.
Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under
this incapacity, it must be proved not
only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the
defect did in fact deprive the person, at
the moment of giving consent, of the
ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and consequently of the
possibility of being bound by these
duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing
disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family
Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by
the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This
pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception
of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46,
Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity
of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly
the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the
family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure
at all, can come close to the standards required to
decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and
understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither
law nor society itself can always provide all the specific
answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are

established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of
that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-
considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might
be helpful or even desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment.

We should continue to be reminded that innate in our
society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now
still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of

permanent union between a man a
woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino

family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social

institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.
(Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-
TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to
steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters.
Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much
reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen
hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife
against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the
annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's
decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly
denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the
trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its
decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts
were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married
the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their
Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and
wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati,
they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in
the same room for the first night of their married
life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to
her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just
went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then
turned his back and went to sleep . There was
no sexual intercourse between them during the
first night. The same thing happened on the
second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private
place where they can enjoy together during their
first week as husband and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew.
They were all invited by the defendant to join
them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4)
days. But, during this period, there was no
sexual intercourse between them, since the
defendant avoided her by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room. They
slept together in the same room and on the
same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15,
1989. But during this period, there was no
attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
[S]he claims, that she did not: even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for
medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag,
a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on
January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were
that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husband's examination was
kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor
prescribed medications for her husband which
was also kept confidential. No treatment was
given to her. For her husband, he was asked by
the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is
impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis. She said, that she had observed
the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
And that, according to her, the defendant
married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country
and to publicly maintain the appearance of a
normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her
husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the
defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled
by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault
lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage
with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz:
(1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has
no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any
differences between the two of them, it can still
be reconciled and that, according to him, if either
 one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further
claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured
by the intervention of medical technology or
science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage
on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March
15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between
them. But, the reason for this, according to the
defendant, was that everytime he wants to have
sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her
private parts, she always removed his hands.
The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to
have sex with him only once but he did not
continue because she was shaking and she did
not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the
defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid
that she will be forced to return the pieces of
jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband,
the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will
remain valid because they are still very young
and there is still a chance to overcome their
differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical
examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out
whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr.
Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report.
(Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to
masturbate to find out whether or not he has an
erection and he found out that from the original
size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the
penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1)
inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that
the defendant had only a soft erection which is
why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft
erection, the defendant is capable of having
sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested
that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by
the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988
at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila,
before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City. Let another copy be furnished the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court
that there was no sexual intercourse between
the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent
to have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof
thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage
between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no
collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of
proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there
was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-
coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis
for the court's conclusion except the admission of
petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to
validate marriage and should retard acts intended to
invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in
their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced
since it could have been a product of collusion; and that
in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where
an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the
pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is
annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed
decision was not based on such a judgment on the
pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath
before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath
before the trial court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form
of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be
came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He
admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason
why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides
that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession
of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of
Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule
19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner
does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only
shows that there is no collusion between the parties.
When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with each
other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are
reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged
resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by
Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was
affirmed by this Court is not based on a
stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not
the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to
discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary
and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations
with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such
abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative
of a serious personality disorder which to the
mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning
of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in
holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and
the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points
out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a
categorical finding about the alleged psychological
incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for
such refusal which may not be necessarily due to
physchological disorders" because there might have
been other reasons, i.e., physical disorders, such as
aches, pains or other discomforts, why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse
from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of
10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual
contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that
there has never been coitus between them. At any rate,
since the action to declare the marriage void may be
filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex
with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence
on record to show that any of the parties is suffering
from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that
he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the
reason for private respondent's refusal may not be
psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could
have discussed with private respondent or asked her
what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him
everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with
her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record
to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the
problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is
not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the
part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon
him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
 incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless
and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under
the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor
is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is
useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man
is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to
say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing
but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us
that the husband's plea that the wife did not
want carnal intercourse with him does not
inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22,
1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the
same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty
for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for
not having asserted his right seven though she
balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599,
cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides,
if it were true that it is the wife was suffering
from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not
go to court and seek the declaration of nullity
weakens his claim. This case was instituted by
the wife whose normal expectations of her
marriage were frustrated by her husband's
inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of
the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she
would expose her private life to public scrutiny
and fabricate testimony against her husband if it
were not necessary to put her life in order and
put to rest her marital status.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between
petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared
feeling which between husband and wife must be
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by
the other can go a long way in deepening the marital
relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for
two consenting adults who view the relationship with
love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its
value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in
which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations,
can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects
and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that

what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or
lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which
is not phychological incapacity, and which can
be achieved "through proper motivation." After
almost ten months of cohabitation, the
admission that the husband is reluctant or
unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly, and who
has not posed any insurmountable resistance to
his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality
disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital
covenants within the contemplation of the Family
Code. 7
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an
entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of
a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity."
Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages
void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity
in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in
applying said novel provision in specific cases. In
the present case and in the context of the herein
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be
sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in
the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving
the present case, finds the need to lay down specific
guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet,
which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel
Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab
initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with
the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was
born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo show ed
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a
husband and a father since he preferred to spend
more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that
sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved
of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been
the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October
1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that
in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in
Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio
City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel
and their child, and had since then abandoned them;
that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual
who thought of himself as a king to be served; and
that it would be to the couple's best interest to have
their marriage declared null and void in order to free
them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo
admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live
together as husband and wife, but contended that
their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were
due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of
her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3)
Roridel's failure to run the household and handle
their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the
following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally
married on April 14, 1985 at the
Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child
named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina
was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-
fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking
support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking
for damages;
6. That the common child of the
parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of
her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie
Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth
G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita
Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1."
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner
was denied by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the
Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase 'psychological
incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family
Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to
the facts of the case," adding that the appealed
Decision tended "to establish in effect the most
liberal divorce procedure in the world which is
anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the
respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's
findings "that the marriage between the parties
broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that
"the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family
rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage,
We view psychologically incapacity
as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she
regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct
in the long haul for the attainment of
the principal objectives of marriage.
If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives
of marriage, then there is enough
reason to leave the spouses to their
individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the
trial judge committed no indiscretion
in analyzing and deciding the instant
case, as it did, hence, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings
and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these
discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining
that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and
duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the mea ning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no
clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be
more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical)
illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely
showed that she and her husband could nor get
along with each other. There had been no showing
of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the
recommendation of
the psychiatrist based
on your findings that
it is better for the
Court to annul (sic)
the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
 Q There is no hope for
the marriage?
A There is no hope,
the man is also living
with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand
of the psychiatrist that
the parties are
psychologically unfit
for each other but
they are
psychologically fit
with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they
psychologically unfit
for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The
Court
has no
more
questio
ns.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his
alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made to
prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre -nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and
blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go
beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-
visexisting law and jurisprudence. In view of the
novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the
difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to
invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend
Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice
Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code
Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion
to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the
oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they
followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own
deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict
on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence
may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
"the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision.
synodal cadence towards the same goal of
protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision sha ll he
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under
Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we
have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling
becomes even more cogent with the use of the
foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina
subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate

Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:

The following are incapable of

contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our

Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that
to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also
be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident

source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church while remaining independent, separate
and apart from each other shall walk together in
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G.
MARCOS, respondent.
DE CI SI ON
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring
the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality
of evidence presented. There is no requirement ,
however, that the respondent should be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for
such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and
the marriage between the parties is hereby declared
valid." [2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3,
1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled
thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda
B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos,
solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is
declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the
Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is
dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129
of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties'
children.In the best interest and welfare of the minor
children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to
the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the
marriage was solemnized, the National Census and
Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent
with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were
married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was
solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the
Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8,
1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential
Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila
(Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were
born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to
the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during
the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the
other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under
the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa
Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the
military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them
were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an
escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of
President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone
conversations, they became acquainted and eventually
became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided
at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a
housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss
Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the
military service in 1987 and then engaged in different
business ventures that did not however prosper. As a
wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their
children would see him, instead of her, as the head of
the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to
engage in any gainful employment, they would often
quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat
her. He would even force her to have sex with him
despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical
harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so
severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several
times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of
selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in
the military, she would first make deliveries early in the
morning before going to Malacaang. When she was
discharged from the military service, she concentrated
on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put
up a trading and construction company, NS Ness
Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on
October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As
they were already living separately, she did not want him
to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she
saw him in their house, she was so angry that she
lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical
harm on her and even on her mother who came to her
aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their
children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's
house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where
her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G,
Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two
sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon
seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for
their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a
samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their
children were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque,
while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C.
Millan, the children described their father as cruel and
physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-
100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist
Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation
(Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on
the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to
support his family and his violent
attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x." [3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological
incapacity had not been established by the totality of the
evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of
the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity
which should also be medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in
the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the parties to assume the essential
obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71
and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such
non-complied marital obligations must similarly be
alleged in the petition, established by evidence and
explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected
to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The
psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist
Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews
conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is
essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one
of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly
incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was
assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to
assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to
show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity
was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically
identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven
by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that
would show that the appellant was suffering from an
incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not
physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was]
grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was]
incurable." [4]
Hence, this Petition. [5]
Issues
In her Memorandum, [6] petitioner presents for this
Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of
Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological
incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply
because the respondent did not subject
himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidenc e
presented and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition." [7]
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent is not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological
incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she
presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
 Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the
results of various tests that were submitted to determine
respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the
obligations of marriage should not have been brushed
aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because
respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner
adds that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other
sources of information in order to determine the
psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to
submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina, [8] the guidelines
governing the application and the interpretation
of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the
Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in
the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it 'as the foundation of the
nation.' It decrees marriage as legally
'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be 'protected'
by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidenc e
must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully
explained.Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at 'the time of the celebration' of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,
such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage,
like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but not be psychologically capacitated
to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition,
 as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095." [10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic
requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals: [11] "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed,
if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the
evidence presented in the present case -- including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children,
petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to
sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated.
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71,
220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. [12] At best, the evidenc e
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal
separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient
divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural
requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner,
however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of
the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the
alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her
failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed
Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring
personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non
to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

We rule in the negative. Although this Court is

sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts
does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity
on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
"defects" were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed

to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully
employed for a period of more than six years. It was
during this period that he became intermittently drunk,
failed to give material and moral support, and even left the
family home.

Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced

only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidenc e
showing that his condition is incurable, especially now
that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady
so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DE D EL
a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-
respondent.
DE CI SI ON
YNARES-SANTI AGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L.
Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the advertising
business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship
and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of
marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September
28, 1966. [1] The civil marriage was ratified in a church
wedding on May 20, 1967. [2]
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly
Jane, born on September 18, 1968; [3] Stephanie Janice
born on September 9, 1969; [4] Kenneth David born on
April 24, 1971; [5] and Ingrid born on October 20,
1976. [6] The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired
neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon
turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and
mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a
dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a
Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and
later a Jordanian national.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon
was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she
committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for
remorse, even bringing with her the two children of
Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity
and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family
are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder
amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. [8]
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and
church marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and
SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28,
1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
part of the respondent to perform the essential
obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing
between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a
regime of complete separation of property between the
said spouses is established in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without
prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.

Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the
City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical proper civil and property registries in accordance with
Article 52 of the Family Code.
psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment,
Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the
Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she SO ORDERED. [9]
married and with whom she had two children. However,
when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the
petitioner bringing along her two children by Solicitor General, appealed alleging that
Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even
considered the two illegitimate children as his I
own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE
two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR
country on special occasions. DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with MARRIAGE.
Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking II
the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH
City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS
in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general NULL AND VOID.
circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not
reside and could not be found in the Philippines. [7] III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who
testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A
CERTIFICA TION HAVING BEEN ISSUED
petitioner and found him to be conscientious,
BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS
hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
and projects completed up to the final detail and who
exerts his best in whatever he does.
 The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the
judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. [10]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in
a Resolution dated January 8, 2002. [11] Hence, the instant
petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely
abused its discretion and manifestly erred in its
conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from
psychological incapacity to perform her marital
obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of respondent is
not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidenc e
submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove
psychological incapacity suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the
totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual
behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within
the term psychological incapacity?
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, [12] it was ruled:
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse
to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception
of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46,
Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of
that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-
considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might
be helpful or even desirable. [13]
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact
that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive
phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In
this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify
as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
she could not have known the obligations she was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof. [14] It appears that respondent s
promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a
blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in
church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity. [15] It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her
youth, immaturity [16] or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner
are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 [17] of the
Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v.
Marcos [18] that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal
separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In
short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the
trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church
marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do
so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of
the Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling
of the appellate court. We cannot deny the grief,
frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his
present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances,
like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answers to every individual problem. [19] While
we sympathize with petitioners marital predicament, our
first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how
harsh it may be. [20]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECI SI ON
YNARES-SANTI AGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning
the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of
psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal
liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of
the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines
penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that
the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted
marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on
April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B.
Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City.
Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and
without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking
this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. 1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before
Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 15. 2 When Ancajas learned of this
third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the
latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten
letter, 3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico
Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner. 4 The Information, 5 which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-
lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been
previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes,
and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA
ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the
accused has all the essential requisites for validity were
it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with
Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two
children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes
were validly married to each other, claiming that no
marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their
union. 7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract
merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office
in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further
testified that he requested his brother to verify from the
Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage
at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no
record of said marriage. 9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. 10 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following
assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS
CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING
THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXIS TE NCE OF
THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY
DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN
DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND
WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT. 11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find
no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
 (2) that the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has
all the essential requisites for validity. 12
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered
defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first
marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged
indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the
second marriage was celebrated. 13 Hence, petitioner
argues that all four of the elements of the crime of
bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal. 14
Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both
documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first
marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.
Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1)
a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and
Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on
the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall
before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and
certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila; 15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to
Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that
Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. 16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner
presented (1) a certification issued by the National
Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; 17 and (2) a
certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila,
dated February 3, 1997. 18 Both these documents attest
that the respective issuing offices have no record of a
marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and
Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense
cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in
itself would already have been sufficient to establish the
existence of a marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public
documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to
public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the
marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a
public record. When the original of a document is in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis
ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage
contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof,
was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The
marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was
celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on
November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full
faith and credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the
certification issued by the National Statistics Office on
October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly
show that neither document attests as a positive fact that
there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B.
Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective
issuing offices have no record of such a marriage.
Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is
quite different from documentary evidence as to the
absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary
evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution
serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should
be given greater credence than documents testifying
merely as to absence of any record of the marriage,
especially considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to
be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition
precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact
that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate
the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present. 19 There is no evidence presented by the
defense that would indicate that the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity,
apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused
himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes
letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of
the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners
own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the
first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps
to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to
Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such
purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the
certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and
the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7,
1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both
documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds
marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this
case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first
and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the
effects of the subsequent judicial declaration 20 of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial
declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his
marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab
initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed. 21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the
Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during
the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null
and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners
psychological capacity or incapacity. 22 Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is
not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract
a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act
of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was
celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of
the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already
been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent
reason for distinguishing between a subsequent
marriage that is null and void purely because it is a
second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent
marriage that is null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal
liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws
protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of
the sacrosanct character of this special contract between
spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard
of the permanent character of the special bond between
spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not
an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks
the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the
validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code
into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties
and their consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the
solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage
ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their
agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the
presence of at least two witnesses). 24 Under Article 5 of
the Family Code, any male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may
contract marriage. 27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the
validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and
Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they
voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the
required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the
City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at
least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is
not without legal effects. Among these effects is that
children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate. 28 There is therefore a recognition written into
the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among
these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States
penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape
the consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for
the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on
record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while
his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still
subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the
determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of this
particular case, the act of the accused displays a
deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the
State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is
a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its
permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate
pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic
social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy
step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision
mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall
be imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled
to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a
duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the
decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant

petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636,
convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of
Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 164435 JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY,
committed as follows:
Present:

That on or about the 26th day of

YNARES- November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro
SANTIAGO, J., Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Chairperson, above-named accused, Victoria S.
Petitioner, Jarillo, being previously united in lawful
CHICO-NAZA RIO,
marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and
VELASCO, JR., without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there
NACHURA, and willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
- versus - contract a second marriage with
PERALTA, JJ.
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which
marriage was only discovered on
January 12, 1999.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Contrary to law.
September 29, 2009

x--------------------------------------
------------x

On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty

DE CI SI ON
during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.

The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the

PERALTA, J.: CA, are as follows.

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21,
2003, and its Resolution[2] dated July 8, 2004, be revers ed
and set aside.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and
Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil
wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon.
Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor
of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-
2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated
November 17, 2000).

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage
in a church wedding ceremony before
Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal
Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City,
Case No. 00-08-11: Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated
November 17, 2000). Out of the marital
INFORMATION union, appellant begot a daughter,
Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975
(Exhs. F, R, R-1).
The undersigned Assistant City
Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S.
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereaft er
contracted a subsequent marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at
the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1,
before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on
November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q,
Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22,
2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and
Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows
anew in a church wedding in Manila (Exh.
E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the
appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for
annulment of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged
with bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City x x x.
xxxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed
against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000,
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of
nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a
quo promulgated the assailed decision,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE,
upon the foregoing
premises, this court
hereby finds accused
Victoria Soriano
Jarillo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the
crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said
accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty
of SIX (6) YEARS of
prision correccional, as
minimum, to TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor,
as maximum.
This court makes
no pronouncement on the
civil aspect of this case,
such as the nullity of
accuseds bigamous
marriage to Uy and its
effect on their children
and their property. This
aspect is being
determined by the
Regional Trial Court of
Manila in Civil Case No.
99-93582.
Costs against the
accused.
The motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied by the same court in
that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001. [3]
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her
1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void
because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain
Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their
marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were
null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3)
the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was
affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the
CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she
contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because,
at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet
been declared null and void by the court. This being so,
the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was
still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also
struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioners
contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a
 V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
marriage as far back as 1978. NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A
PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUE L
140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003,
SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
declaring petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo
null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS
psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD
reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of
ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
nullity as a ground for the reversal of her
conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004,
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS
the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,[4] denied
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
reconsideration and ruled that [t]he subsequent NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND
declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of
EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO
psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS
not without legal consequences, among which is incurring COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
criminal liability for bigamy. [5] NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONE R
BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS
PENALTY UNDER THE REVISE D
PENAL CODE AND THE
INDETERMINA TE SENTENCE LAW.
Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where
petitioner alleges that:

The first, second, third and fifth issues, being

V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN right after the presentation of the prosecution evidenc e,
PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE
DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the
WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of
OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
nullity of petitioners marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner
claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF
PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her
BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING
motion for suspension, while the CA struck down her
PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO
MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[6] the Court
ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY categorically stated that:
FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO.
 x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he
who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a
case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the
pendency of a civil case for declaration
of nullity. x x x
xxxx
that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is
contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage,
even one which is void or voidable, shall
be deemed valid until declared otherwis e
in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even
if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was
void ab initio, the point is, both the first and
the second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled. [9]

x x x The reason is that, without a

judicial declaration of its nullity, the
first marriage is presumed to be For the very same reasons elucidated in the above -
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent quoted cases, petitioners conviction of the crime of
was for all legal intents and purposes
bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with declaration of nullity of petitioners two marriages to
petitioner. Against this legal
Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime
backdrop, any decision in the civil
action for nullity would not erase the of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second
fact that respondent entered into a marriage without the previous one having been judicially
second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
decision in the civil case is not consummated because at the time of the celebration of
essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a the second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo,
prejudicial question. x x x [7] which had not yet been declared null and void by a court
of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v.
subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the
People,[8] where it was held thus:
nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any
difference. [10] As held in Tenebro, [s]ince a marriage
The subsequent judicial
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is
to the declaration of nullity, the crime
not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
had already been
consummated.Moreover, petitioners liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of
assertion would only delay the prosecution
the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that
of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
declare his previous marriage void and second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
invoke the pendency of that action as a
prejudicial question in the criminal case. a valid marriage.[11]
We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case

for annulment of petitioners marriage
Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to
to [private complainant] had no bearing
upon the determination of petitioners fail.
innocence or guilt in the criminal case
for bigamy, because all that is required
for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
 Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
bigamy is punishable by prision mayor,which is classified
under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, [14] the

penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that [c]rimes prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should

punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in be counted only from the day on which the said crime

fifteen years,while Article 91 states that [t]he period of was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or

prescription shall commence to run from the day on which their [agents], as opposed to being counted from the date

the crime is discovered by the offended party, the of registration of the bigamous marriage. [15] Since

authorities, or their agents x x x . petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of
prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is,
therefore, ineffectual.

Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her

previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence,
prescription began to run from that time. Note that the Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed

party who raises a fact as a matter ofdefense has the an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal

burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.

to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise,

failing to establish the same, it remains self-
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that
serving. [12] Thus, for petitioners defense of prescription to
the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminat e
prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidenc e
penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which,
that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained
in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
knowledge of her previous marriage.
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty

A close examination of the records of the case next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the

reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient offense, without first considering any modifying

evidence to support her allegation. Petitioners testimony circumstance attendant to the commission of the

that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely

is already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it within the sound discretion of the court to determine the

is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the

trial court correctly observed that: range of the penalty next lower without any reference to
the periods into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminat e
x x x She did not call to the witness stand
sentence. [16]
her mother the person who allegedly
actually told Uy about her previous
marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious
that without the confirmatory testimony of
her mother, the attribution of the latter of Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the
any act which she allegedly did is penalty imposed on petitioner is proper.Under Article 349
hearsay. [13]
of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for
bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision
correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6
years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the
trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the
duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the
prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in
its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10
years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum
penalty of 10 years.

However, for humanitarian purposes, and

considering that petitioners marriage to Alocillo has after
all been declared by final judgment [17] to be void ab
initio on account of the latters psychological incapacity, by
reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulat ive
abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty
imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and
One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition

is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated
July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty
imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner
is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and
One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight
(8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECI SI ON
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision 1 dated
August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the
decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the
marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita
M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage
to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and
Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan.
They later lived in the Philippines for a month.
Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there
for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth
to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by
Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of
Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only
after the marriage. One month after their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by
Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After
sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several
times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991,
respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited
the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their
child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved
because he was no longer residing at his given address.
Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex
parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by
publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12,
1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a
copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of
general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive
pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication,
respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to
refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The
trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales
filed a report finding that no collusion existed between
the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the
evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13,
1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to
present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered
documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-
Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby
declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the
National Statistics Office are ordered to make
proper entries into the records of the afore-
named parties pursuant to this judgment of the
Court.
SO ORDERED. 4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of
Toshios psychological incapacity, the trial court held
that:
It is clear from the records of the case that
respondent spouses failed to fulfill his
obligations as husband of the petitioner and
father to his daughter. Respondent remained
irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs
and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to
the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and
child which characterizes a very immature
person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced
to respondents mental incapacity and disability
of entering into marital life. 5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the
Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision
dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which
read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and
pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on
the matter and evidence on hand, judgment
is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal.
The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent
and their daughter a month after the celebration of the
marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to
support his family and take steps to make them
Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he never
sent any support to nor communicated with them despite
the letters respondent sent. He even visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see them.
Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to
contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support"
pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other
spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and
creation of a family as a social inviolable
institution? Why should petitioner be made to
suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is
not around and worse, left them without even
helping them cope up with family life and assist
in the upbringing of their daughter as required
under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code? 7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not
be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina8and Santos vs. Court of Appeals. 9 In those
cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case
involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a
Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this
lone assignment of error:
I Family Code requires that the incapacity must
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that
respondent was able to prove the psychological
incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his
marital obligations, despite respondents failure
to comply with the guidelines laid down in
the Molina case. 10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of
his family and his insensitivity to them did not
automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His
behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the
personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable
expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe
and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio,
in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing
respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and
sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. 11 Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36 for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x
xx
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.Article 36 of the
be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita
vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I
dos." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor-General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095. 13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements
earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability." 14 The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically
or clinically identified." What is important is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to. 15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent
successfully proved Toshios psychological incapacity to
fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to
live with, care for and support his family. He abandoned
them a month after his marriage to respondent.
Respondent sent him several letters but he never
replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care
at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short
of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated
to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was
never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. After respondent testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was
presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no
need for an actual medical examination, it would have
greatly helped respondents case had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness.
This could have been done through an expert witness.
This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground
for legal separation. 16 There was no showing that the
case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in
the context of legal separation. We cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio
abandoned his family immediately after the celebration
of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough
to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must
be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness. 17 There was no proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting
and complying with the obligations essential to
marriage. 18
According to the appellate court, the requirements
in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the
present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband
being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving
psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between
an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be
lenient in the application of the rules merely because the
spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
happens to be a foreign national. The medical and
clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca, 19 this Court declared that marriage

is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes
and protects. While we commiserate with respondent,
terminating her marriage to her husband may not
necessarily be the fitting denouement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is

hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997
of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECI SI ON
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage.
This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed
into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses,
no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the
depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark
and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace
of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill the
marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The
Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment 3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the
marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie
Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After
careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the
trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when
petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36
years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they
got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the
Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church
wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog,
Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their
union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died
five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993, 7 petitioner filed a petition to have his
marriage to respondent declared null and void. He
anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the
Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondents incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the
present. 8
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological
incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent
persistently lied about herself, the people around her,
her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth
to an illegitimate son, 10 and instead introduced the boy to
petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only
confessed the truth about the boys parentage when
petitioner learned about it from other sources after their
marriage. 11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin
David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no
such incident occurred. 12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her
obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of
her friends that she graduated with a degree in
psychology, when she was neither. 13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice
talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever
witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In
the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was
held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even
presented an invitation to that effect 14 but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of
said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. 15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via
Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to
petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her
as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial
industry worth P2 million. 16 Petitioner later found out that
respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the
letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their
quarrels. 17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and
Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when
he discovered they were not known in or connected with
Blackgold. 18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater
means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear
that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set
from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired
it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She spent lavishly on
unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from
other people on false pretexts. 20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to
the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He
tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior
did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991. 21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante
Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr.
Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated,
based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative
type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondents persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined
the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust
and respect. 22 They further asserted that respondents
extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the
point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her
to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with
another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her essential marital obligations. 23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she
performed her marital obligations by attending to all the
needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no
truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies
and invented personalities. 24 She presented her version,
thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from
petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband. 25
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and
kill her because she surmised such intent from Davids
act of touching her back and ogling her from head to
foot. 26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance
graduate and had been teaching psychology at the
Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. 27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas,
an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done
three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the
advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and
Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a
Blackgold recording artist although she was not under
contract with the company, yet she reported to the
Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a
luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the
Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979. 28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not
written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious.
Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a
resident of the United States while Babes Santos was
employed with Saniwares. 29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her
husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in
a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for
chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her
husbands whereabouts. 30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as
she supported almost ten people from her monthly
budget of P7,000.00. 31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-
disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies
attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and
unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the
evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of
psychological incapacity on her part. 32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren
Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the
allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes
testified that the series of tests conducted by his
assistant, 33 together with the screening procedures and
the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale
(CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated
that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic
tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
signs that might point to the presence of disabling
trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws
in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was
not the one who administered and interpreted
respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made
use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not
reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such
test. 35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners
evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying
about almost anythingher occupation, state of health,
singing abilities and her income, among othershad
been duly established. According to the trial court,
respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of
make-believe. This made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage. 36 The trial
court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the
Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the
ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the
parties. 37 During the pendency of the appeal before the
Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was
affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only
respondent was impaired by a lack of due
discretion. 38 Subsequently, the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the
Roman Rota of the Vatican. 39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these
rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court
reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding that
respondent may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that
the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to
establish respondents psychological incapacity. It
declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals 40 governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been
satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts
pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this
Court. He contends herein that the evidence
conclusively establish respondents psychological
incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is
heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC
to the factual allegations of petitioner. 41 It is a settled
principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the
trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect from the appellate courts
because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which
may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is
likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did
not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by
petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that
such evidence was not sufficient to establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version
of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial
question remains as to whether the state of facts as
presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards
set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were
definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling
in Republic v. Court of Appeals 44 (also known as
the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals
cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the
case at bar. 46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the
Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. 47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down,
there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals, 48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that
a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article
36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the
misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of
the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court
is concerned. 49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding
cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while
undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the
declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of
nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not
foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36,
even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental
incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from
contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full
enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting
marriage." 51 Marriages with such persons were ordained
as void, 52 in the same class as marriages with underage
parties and persons already married, among others. A
partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce
under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a marriage where
"either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its
celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under
the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce on the ground of a
spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the
divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation. 55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in
1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound
mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as
a voidable marriage. 56 The mental capacity, or lack
thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the
grounds for declaring a marriage void ab
initio. 57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as
voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one
contracted by a party of unsound mind. 58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized
as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on
consent freely given which is one of the essential
requisites of a contract. 59 The initial common consensus
on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of
vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both
members of the Family Code revision committee that
drafted the Code, have opined that psychological
incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that
the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent
to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling
such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise
stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the
Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations does not
affect the consent to the marriage." 61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding
of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee.
Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to
comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of
consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage
only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x
[and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of
the marriage only." 62 At the same time, Tolentino noted
"[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity
to understand the essential marital obligations, because
then this would amount to lack of consent to the
marriage." 63 These concerns though were answered,
beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the
Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage." 65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the
inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was
further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court,
through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban
observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption
thereto." 67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that
psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume." 68
It might seem that this present understanding of
psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording
of Article 36, with its central phase reading
"psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At
the same time, it has been consistently recognized by
this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee
was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application, by avoiding specific examples that would
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law." 70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given
case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of
the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In regard to psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another
case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court. 72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of
psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision
committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity may be
informed by evolving standards, taking into account the
particulars of each case, current trends in psychological
and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under
the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers
that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which
have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has
proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary
framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time,
the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear
legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of
each situation, and Molina itself arising from this
evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no
cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the
disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that
precedent. There is need though to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition
of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court,
first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion
of canon law experts in the interpretation of
psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable,
considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly
acknowledged that the concept of psychological
incapacity was derived from canon law, 73 and as one
member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem
of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church
but still existent under civil law. 74 It would be
disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic
Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent
understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. 75 Still, it must be emphasized that the
Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in
the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept
may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation
into the Family Code and subsequent judicial
interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression.
Indeed, while Church thought on psychological
incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts,
judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological
incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another
common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too
frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying
petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and
2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state
that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total
developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State." These provisions highlight
the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the
parameters of state protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the
province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of
marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities
to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences
it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself
adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This
being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into
operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at
present through the enactment of the Family Code,
which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that
affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the
grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of
a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action
in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage,
not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage
is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of
Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a
petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying
marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated
person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement
of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the
avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the
foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the
foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-
equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages
under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote
wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent
of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply
with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we
decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines
presently recognized in the judicial disposition of
petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has
consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in
1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general
rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict
on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychologicalnot physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I
dos." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our
Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void. 77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that
the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his
reasons for his agreement or opposition to the
petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with
following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 79 Still,
Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,
collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the
consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the
petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscals
participation in the hearings before the trial court is
extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now
deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and
the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity
of these facts. As such, it must be considered that
respondent had consistently lied about many material
aspects as to her character and personality. The
question remains whether her pattern of fabrication
sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity,
consistent with Article 36 and generally,
the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the
guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in
proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart
from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who
corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and
certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine
Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents
claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also
presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of
psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of
respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity.
In any event, both courts below considered petitioners
evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court
acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest
with petitioner. 80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to
establish the cause of action with a preponderance of
evidence. However, since the action cannot be
considered as a non-public matter between private
parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family
Code likewise requires the participation of the State,
through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor
General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent with
preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among
the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts,
and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The
initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the
start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of
peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and
inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters
to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about
her actual occupation, income, educational attainment,
and family background, among others. 81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities,
were further linked to medical or clinical causes by
expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner
presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr.
Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department
of psychiatry of at least two (2) major
hospitals, 82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit
provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of
things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There
are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated
over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the
persistent, constant and repeated lying of the
"respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of
normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or
pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of
these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable
of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one
owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of
love towards the person, and it is also something that
endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is
based on communication between individuals and what
we generally communicate are our thoughts and
feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their
feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And
therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going
to happen as far as this relationship is concerned.
Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the
behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and
fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing
the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy
Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner,
testified that the respondent has been calling up the
petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the
activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of
the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six
(6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you
say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he
is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on
her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair
with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is
pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in
the same way as we also lie every now and then; but
everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that
the husband is having an affair with another woman and
if she persistently believes that the husband is having an
affair with different women, then that is pathological and
we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she
be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform
the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam. 83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish
not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but
also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He
concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that
[she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about
herself." 84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of
psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly
the trial transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as
the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these
witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the
Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos 85 that
personal examination of the subject by the physician is
not required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the
methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as
sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly,
Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of
respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on
their own acceptance of petitioners version as the true
set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted
the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no
cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological
incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert
witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis,
the trial court explicated its finding of psychological
incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has
been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent
has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything,
be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing
abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She
practically lived in a world of make believe making her
therefore not in a position to give meaning and
significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently
and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent
undermined the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As
concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner,
such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and
amounts to psychological incapacity. 87
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was
established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated
friends and made up letters from fictitious characters
well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept
petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real
parentage as she only confessed when the latter had
found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological
incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately
discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a
year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner
left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the
degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the
belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as
borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent
were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce
petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate
a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth
from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners
witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on
respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to
them, were revelatory of respondents inability to
understand and perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish
between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much
less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including parenting.
One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to
adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since
respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a
reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to
perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced.
Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes
nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. Respondents ability to even
comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is
impaired at best. Considering that the evidence
convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to
the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the
marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the
Family Code which states that a marriage may be
annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous
article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity
shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action
for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to
draw linkages between misrepresentations made by
respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45
(3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the
consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude
to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own
inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred
to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the
essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68
to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins
the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an
inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based
on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed
to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of
the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The
appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it
anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners
efforts to bring the matter to its attention. 88 Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which
held that interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the
marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March
1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of
respondent. 90Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the
Roman Rota of the Vatican. 92 In fact, respondents
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of
nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another
marriage without the Tribunals consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that
matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective
and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a
Part Contractant in possession and employ of a
discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor
markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of
the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the
correct appreciation of the integral significance and
implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the
certitude required by law that based on the depositions
of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies
of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the
Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of
adverse personality constracts that were markedly
antithetical to the substantive content and
implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that
seriously undermined the integrality of her
matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative
component. In other words, afflicted with a
discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-
concrete judgment formation on account of an
adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent
was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding
matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in
the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack
of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner. 94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was
arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by
canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import
of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case.
They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar
recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of
petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead
appreciated respondents version as correct, and the
appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of
the Catholic Church on this matter would have
diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual
findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the
canonical courts, that are accorded significant
recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement
in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was
on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that
it did not appear certain that respondents condition was
incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such
effect. 95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife
initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make
their marriage work. However, respondents aberrant
behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie,
fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy.
From this fact, he draws the conclusion that
respondents condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively
concluded that respondents condition is incurable? It
would seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is
quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat.
Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners
expert witnesses characterized respondents condition
as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether
the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for
the experts taciturnity on this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and
1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10
August 1995. These events transpired well
before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made
explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity
must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in
Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was
decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first
citing the deliberations of the Family Code
committee, 96 then the opinion of canonical
scholars, 97 before arriving at its formulation of the
doctrinal definition of psychological
incapacity. 98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas
opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of
a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological
incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100 However,
in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological
incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to
incurability as a characteristic of psychological
incapacity. 101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided
months before the trial court came out with its own ruling
that remained silent on whether respondents
psychological incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the
incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least,
there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial
of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial
courts decision that required a medical finding of
incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in
1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review,
or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court
countered an argument that Molina and Santos should
not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or
construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a
part of that law as of the date the statute in
enacted. 103 Yet we approach this present case from
utterly practical considerations. The requirement that
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable is one that
necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion.
Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment
from the expert witnesses that respondents
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply
because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a
declaration and the appropriate question was not
accordingly propounded to him. If we
apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be
undue prejudice to those cases tried
before Molinaor Santos, especially those presently on
appellate review, where presumably the respective
petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have
seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It
may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually
incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial
court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that

the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-
to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to
mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical
diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have
had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect
at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten
(10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are
sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents
psychological incapacity has been established by the
petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by
the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which
indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite
of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced
that respondent was so incapacitated to contract
marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his

cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36
of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the
Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition,

pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been
inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent,
despite her psychological state, remains in love with
petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the
petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed
undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment
to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these
cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality.
Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the
legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live
together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision

of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and
VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is
REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
DIGNA A. NAJERA, G.R. No. 164817
Petitioner alleged that she and respondent
Petitioner, Present:
are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is
presently living in the United States of America
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
(U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988 by Rev.
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZA RIO,Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew the Apostle
Father
VELASCO, JR.,
Church [2]
- versus - NACHURA, and at Bugallon, Pangasinan. They are childless.
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated: Petitioner claimed that at the time of the

EDUARDO J. NAJERA, July 3, 2009
celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically
Respondent.
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became
manifest only after marriage as shown by the following
facts:
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------x
(a) At the time of their marriage,
petitioner was already employed with the Special
DE CI SI ON
Services Division of the Provincial Government of
Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless.He did not
PERALTA, J.:
exert enough effort to find a job and was dependent on
petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioners
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able
Decision dated February 23, 2004 of theCourt of Appeals to land a job as a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew
in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053 and its Resolution August 5, Shipping Agency.
2004, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of (b) While employed as a seaman,
the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial
68 (RTC), which found petitioner Digna A. Najera and support and she had to rely on her own efforts and the
respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal separation, help of her parents in order to live.
but not annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
(c) As a seaman, respondent was away
from home from nine to ten months each year. In May
1989, when he came home from his ship voyage, he
The facts are as follows: started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her
of having an affair with another man. He took to smoking
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it. When she
RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of refused, he insulted her and uttered unprintable words
Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, against her. He would go out of the house and when he
with Application for Designation as arrived home, he was always drunk.
Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership
of Gains. [1] (d) When respondent arrived home from
his ship voyage in April 1994, as had been happening
every year, he quarreled with petitioner. He continued to
be jealous, he arrived home drunk and he smoked lot were acquired through his sole effort and money. As
marijuana. On July 3, 1994, while he was quarreling with counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award
petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical of P200,000.00 as moral damages, P45,000.00 as
violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a attorneys fees, and P1,000.00 as appearance fee for
bolo. She was able to parry his attack with her left arm, every scheduled hearing.
yet she sustained physical injuries on different parts of her
body. She was treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor
was reported at the Bugallon Police Station. General filed its Notice of Appearance.

(e) Respondent left the family home, On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an
taking along all their personal belongings. He lived with Order[4] terminating the pre-trial conference after the
his mother at Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he parties signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which
abandoned petitioner. stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal
partnership of gains and divide equally their conjugal
Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped properties.
ship while it was anchored in Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a Compliance manifesting
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, that after conducting an investigation, he found that no
an Order be issued appointing her as the sole collusion existed between the parties. [5] The initial hearing
administrator of their conjugal properties; and that after of the case was held on November 23, 1998.
trial on the merits, judgment be rendered (1) declaring
their marriage void ab initio in accordance with Article 36
of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative, decreeing legal Petitioner testified in court and presented as
separation of petitioner and respondent pursuant to Title witnesses the following: her mother, Celedonia
II of the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of Aldana; psychologist Cristina R. Gates; and Senior Police
the conjugal partnership of petitioner and respondent and Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the
the forfeiture in Philippine National Police (PNP), Bugallon, Pangasinan.
favor of petitioner of respondents share in the said
properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Petitioner testified that she was a commerce
Family Code; and (4) granting petitioner other just and graduate and was working as an accounting clerk in a
equitable reliefs. government agency in Manila. She and
respondent married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced by
On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order their marriage contract. [6] At the time of their marriage,
granting the motion of petitioner to effect service by respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed
publication as provided under Section 17, Rule 14 of the as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the Provincial
Rules of Court. Government of Pangasinan with a monthly salary
of P5,000.00. It was petitioners brother who helped
On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his respondent find a job as a seaman at the Intercrew
Answer[3] wherein he denied the material allegations in Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent
the petition and averred that petitioner was incurably was employed as a seaman, and he gave petitioner a
immature, of dubious integrity, with very low morality, and monthly allotment of P1,600.00. After ten months at work,
guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the subject house and he went home in 1989 and then returned to work after
three months. Every time respondent was home, he including her Automated Teller Machine card
quarreled with petitioner and accused her of having an and jewelry. [10]
affair with another man. Petitioner noticed that respondent
also smoked marijuana and every time he went out of the Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the
house and returned home, he was drunk. However, there police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan. [11]
was no record in their barangay that respondent was
involved in drugs. [7] Since then, respondent never returned home. He
stayed with his mother in Banaga, Bugallon,
In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to Pangasinan. Petitioner learned that he went abroad
purchase a lot out of their earnings. In 1991, they again, but she no longer received any allotment from
constructed a house on the lot. [8] him. [12]

On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were
invited to a party by the boyfriend of petitioners
sister. Respondent, however, did not allow petitioner to go
with him. When respondent arrived home at
around midnight, petitioner asked him about the party, the
persons who attended it, and the ladies he danced with,
but he did not answer her. Instead, respondent went to
the kitchen. She asked him again about what happened
at the party. Respondent quarreled with her and said that
she was the one having an affair and suddenly slapped
and boxed her, causing her eyes to be bloodied. When
she opened her eyes, she saw respondent holding a bolo,
and he attempted to kill her. However, she was able to
parry his attack with her left arm, causing her to sustain
injuries on different parts of her body. When respondent
saw that she was bloodied, he got nervous and went
out. After 10 minutes, he turned on the light in the kitchen,
but he could not find her because she had gone out and
was hiding from him. When she heard respondent start
the motorcycle, she left her hiding place and proceeded
to Gomez Street toward the highway. At the highway, she
boarded a bus and asked the conductor to stop at a clinic
or hospital. She alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and
proceeded to the clinic of one Dr. Padlan, who sutured her
wounds. After a few hours, she went home. [9]
When petitioner arrived home, the house was
locked. She called for her parents who were residing
about 300 meters away. She then asked her brother to
enter the house through the ceiling in order to open the
door. She found that their personal belongings were gone,
Petitioner testified that her parents were happily
married, while respondents parents were
separated. Respondents brothers were also separated
from their respective wives. [13]
Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition
for the annulment of her marriage with the Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the
ground of psychological incapacity of respondent. [14]
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she
interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who was
abroad. She confirmed her Psychological Report, the
conclusion of which reads:
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON
THE INTERVIEWS:
It is clear from the interviews that
Respondent is afflicted with
psychological hang-ups which are rooted
in the kind of family background he
has. His mother had an extramarital affair
and separated from Respondent s
father. This turn of events left an
irreparable mark upon Respondent ,
gauging from his alcoholic and marijuana
habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind
of a double bind where he both deeply
loved and resented his mother.
His baseless accusation against his wife
and his violent behavior towards her
appears to be an offshoot of deep-seat ed
feelings and recurrent thoughts towards
his own mother. Unable to resolve his
childhood conflicts and anger, he turned
 to his wife as the scapegoat for all his
and respondent, but not the annulment of their
troubles.
marriage. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is afflicted WHEREFORE, in view of the
with a Borderline Personality Disorder as foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
marked by his pattern of instability in his as follows:
interpersonal relationships,
his marred self-image and self- 1. Decreeing legal separation
destructive tendencies, his of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna
uncontrollable impulses.Eduardo Najera and
Najeras psychological impairment as respondent/defendant
traced to his parents separation, Eduardo Najera;
aggravated by the continued meddling of
his mother in his adult life, antedates his 2. Ordering the dissolution of
marriage to Petitioner Digna Aldana. the conjugal partnership of
the petitioner/plaintiff and
Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited respondent/defendant, and
substances (alcohol and marijuana), to divide the same equally
known to cause irreparable damage between themselves
organically, and the manifest worsening pursuant to their Joint
of his violent and abusive behavior Manifestation/Motion dated
across time render his impairment grave April 27, 1998. [18]
and irreversible. In the light of these
findings, it is recommended that parties
marriage be annulled on grounds of
psychological incapacity on the part of Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully in a Resolution[19] dated May 2, 2000.
assume his marital duties and
responsibilities to Digna Aldana- Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and
Najera. [15] Resolution to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court

Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the
of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the
chances of curability of respondents psychological
dispositive portion of which reads:
disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the
established organic damage was minimal -- referring to WHEREFORE, premises
considered, appeal is hereby
the malfunction of the composites of the brain brought
DISMISSED and judgment of the Trial
about by habitual drinking and marijuana, Court is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs. [20]
which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline
personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses. [16]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated August 5,
Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of
2004.
the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3,
1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
respondent arrived at their house under the influence of
liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her 1. The Court of Appeals failed to take
part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint into consideration the Decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial
was entered in the police blotter. [17]
Tribunal, contrary to the guidelines
decreed by the Supreme Court in the
On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 198.
that decreed only the legal separation of the petitioner
 2. The evidence of petitioner proved
the root cause of the psychological
incapacity of respondent Eduardo
Najera.
3. The factual basis of the Decision of
the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal is practically the same set of
facts established by petitioners
evidence submitted before the trial
court and therefore the same
conclusion ought to be rendered by
the Court.
4. Credence ought to be given to the
conclusion of Psychologist Cristina
R. Gates as an expert in
Psychology. [21]
The main issue is whether or not the totality
of petitioners evidence was able to prove that respondent
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriagewarranting
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. [22]
Petitioner contends that her evidence established
the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
respondent which is his dysfunctional
background. With such background, respondent could
not have known the obligations he was assuming,
particularly the duty of complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
The Court is not persuaded.
Republic v. Court of Appeals [23] laid down
the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are
to be protected by the state.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of
the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological -- not
physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the
the
principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
family
(3) The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged
their I dos. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against every one
of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
 (5) Such illness must
be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an advers e
integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital
obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
The following
are incapable of
contracting
marriage: Those who
are unable to assume
the essential obligations
of marriage due to
causes of psychological
nature.
Since the purpose of including
such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason
that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellat e
tribunal.Ideally -- subject to our law on
evidence -- what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in
view of the evident source and purpos e
of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation
is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church -- while remaining
independent, separate and apart from
each other -- shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal
of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of
the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition,
as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic
requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability." [24] The foregoing guidelines do not require
that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. [25] In fact, the root cause
may be "medically or clinically identified." [26] What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed,
if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to. [27]
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of
Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by
petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of
respondentsalleged psychological incapacity was not

sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist
Cristina Gates conclusion that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed
to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal
knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding
is unscientific and unreliable. [28] Moreover, the trial court
correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty
that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was
incurable as may be gleaned from Psychologist Cristina
Gates testimony:
Q You mentioned in your report that
respondent is afflicted with a
borderline personality
disorder.[D]id you find any
organic cause?
A No, sir.
Q Do you think that this cause you
mentioned existed at the time of
the marriage of the respondent?
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you
examined the [respondent s
family] background, there was
strong basis that respondent
developed mal-adoptive pattern.
Q Did you interview the respondent s
family?
A No, sir , but on the disclosure of
petitioner (sic).
xxxx
Q Have you [seen] the respondent?
A He is not in the country, sir.
Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you
stated in your report which the
respondent is allegedly affected,
is this curable?
A The chances are nil.
Q But it is curable?
A It depends actually if the
established organic damage is
minimal.
Q What is this organic damage?
A Composites of the brain is
malfunctioning.
Q How did you find out the
malfunctioning since you
have not seen him
(respondent)?
A His habitual drinking and marijuana
habit possibly afflicted the
respondent with borderline
personality disorder. This [is]
based on his interpersonal
relationships, his marred self-
image and self-destructi ve
tendencies, and his
uncontrollable impulses.
Q Did you interview the respondent in
this regard?
A I take the words of the petitioner in
this regard. [29]
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that
the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the
physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of
respondent toward petitioner and
respondents abandonment of petitioner without justifiable
cause for more than one year are grounds for legal
separation[30] only and not for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed
to consider the Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal which her counsel sought to be
admitted by the Court of Appeals on February 11,
2004, twelve days before the decision was promulgat ed
on February 23, 2004. She contended that the Court of
Appeals failed to follow Guideline No. 7 in Republic v.
Court of Appeals, thus:
(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
The following are incapable of
contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.
 effect waiving his right to
Since the purpose of including be heard, hence, trial in
such provision in our Family Code is to absentia followed)
harmonize our civil laws with the religious corroborate and lead
faith of our people, it stands to reason this Collegiate Court to
that to achieve such harmonization, great believe with moral
persuasive weight should be given to certainty required by law
decisions of such appellat e and conclude that the
tribunal.Ideally subject to our law on husband-respondent
evidence what is decreed as canonically upon contracting
invalid should also be decreed civilly marriage suffere d
void. from grave lack of due
discretion of
This is one instance where, in judgment, thereby
view of the evident source and purpos e rendering nugatory his
of the Family Code provision, marital contract: First,
contemporaneous religious interpretation his family was
is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the dysfunctional in that as a
State and the Church while remaining child, he saw the break -
independent, separate and apart from up of the marriage of his
each other shall walk together in synodal own parents; his own
cadence towards the same goal of two siblings have broken
protecting and cherishing marriage and marriages; Second, he
the family as the inviolable base of the therefore grew up with a
nation. domineering mother
with whom [he] identified
and on whom he
Petitioners argument is without merit. depended for advice;
Third, he was according
to his friends, already
into drugs and alcohol
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court
before marriage; this
of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to affected his conduct of
consider the decision of the National Appellate bipolar kind: he could be
very quiet but later very
Matrimonial Tribunal.Nevert heless, it is clear that the talkative, peaceful but
Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunals later hotheaded even
violent, he also was
decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it aware of the infidelity of
resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration.In the his mother who now
lives with her paramour,
said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of
also married and a
the very same issues now raised before this Court and policeman; Finally, into
correctly held that petitioners motion for reconsideration marriage, he continued
with his drugs and
was devoid of merit. It stated: alcohol abuse until one
time he came home very
The Decision of the National drunk and beat up his
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated wife and attacked her
July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this with a bolo that wounded
Court only on February 11, 2004, reads her; this led to final
as follows: separation.
x x x
The FACTS collated WHEREFORE,
from party complainant premises considered,
and reliable witnesses this Court of Second
which include a sister-in- Instance, having
law of Respondent invoked the Divine
(despite summons from Name and having
the Court dated June 14, considered the pertinent
1999, he did not appear Law and relevant
before the Court, in Jurisprudence to the
 Facts of the Case
hereby proclaims,
declares and decrees
the confirmation of the
sentence from the
Court a quo in favor of
the nullity of marriage
on the
ground contemplated
under Canon 1095, 2 of
the 1983 Code of
Canon Law.
However, records of
proceedings before the Trial Court show
that, other than herself, petitioner-
appellant offered the testimonies of the
following persons only, to wit: Aldana
Celedonia (petitioner-appellants mother),
Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP,
Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina
R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses
testified, in particular, to the unfaithful
night of July 1, 1994 wherein the
respondent allegedly made an attempt
on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the
hearing and finding before
Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-
appellants sister-in-law and friends of the
opposing parties were never presented
before said Court. As to the contents and
veracity of the latters testimonies, this
Court is without any clue.
True, in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198),
the Supreme Court held that the
interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our
courts. However, the Highest Tribunal
expounded as follows:
Since the purpose of
including such provision
in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve
such harmonization,
great persuasive weight
should be given to
decisions of such
appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject
to our law on
evidence what is
decreed as [canonically]
invalid should be
decreed civilly void x x x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34
of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no
evidence which has not
been formally
offered. The purpose of
which the evidence is
offered must be
specified.
the
Given the preceding
disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should
not expect us to give credence to the
Decision of the National Appellat e
Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it
was made on a different set of evidenc e
of which We have no way of ascertainin g
their truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary
rule that judgments must be based on the
evidence presented before the court
the (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430
[2001]). And based on the evidence on
record, We find no ample reason to
reverse or modify the judgment of the
Trial Court. [31]
Santos v. Santos [32] cited the deliberations during
the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the
import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part
of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon
1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are
incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient
use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a
grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning the
essential matrimonial rights
and obligations to be
mutually given and
accepted;
3. those who, because of
causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to
assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
 It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Tribunal.
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in
Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological
affirming the Decision of the RTC.
nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which
refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity,
68053, dated February 23, 2004, and its Resolution dated
the pertinent portion of the decision of the National
August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:

The FACTS collated from party

complainant and reliable witnesses
which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the
Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not
appear before the Court, in effect waiving
his right to be heard, hence, trial in
absentia followed) corroborate and lead
this Collegiate Court to believe with moral
certainty required by law and conclude
that the husband-respondent upon
contacting marriage suffered from
grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory
his marital contract x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises
considered, this Court of Second
Instance, having invoked the Divine
Name and having considered the
pertinent Law and relevant
Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case
hereby proclaims, declares and decrees
the confirmation of the sentence from
the Court a quo in favor of the nullity
of marriage on the
ground contemplated under Canon
1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon
Law. x x x

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the

factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by
petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the
decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not
based on the psychological incapacity of
respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the
conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the
psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,
vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTI AGO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution
dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004,
respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision1 denying the
petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage
with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering
from epilepsy does not amount to psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the
evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an
Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court
reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held
that the evidence on record did not convincingly
establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were
incurable and already present at the inception of the
marriage. 4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr.
Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of
respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to
explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the
respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she
failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or
supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral
element in respondent's character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the
essential marital obligations. 5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied 6 for
lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on
certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition
for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show
that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible
error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for
reconsideration. 7 The Court required respondent Brix
Ferraris to file comment 8but failed to comply; thus, he is
deemed to have waived the opportunity to file comment.
Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for
reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner
and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on
the facts of the case. 9 Such factual issue, however, is
beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the
function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again
the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination. 10 It is a well-established principle that
factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, 11 save for
the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the
findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of
the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to
the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or
when there is a misappreciation of facts, 12 which are
unavailing in the instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for
the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. 13 As all
people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or
isolated characteristics associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. 14 It is for this reason that the Court relies
heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of
the human personality. However, the root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature must be fully explained, 15 which petitioner failed
to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in
the resolution of marital annulment cases is the
presence of evidence that can adequately
establish respondent's psychological condition.
Here, appellant contends that there is such
evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the
evidence on record did not convincingly
establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no
showing that his "defects" were already present
at the inception of the marriage, or that those
are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving,
petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's
alleged failure to perform his so-called marital
obligations was not at all a manifestation of
some deep-seated, grave, permanent and
incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the
couple's relationship before the marriage and
even during their brief union (for well about a
year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively
short period of time, petitioner was happy and
contented with her life in the company of
respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own
reckoning, respondent was a responsible and
loving husband. x x x. Their problems began
when petitioner started doubting respondent's
fidelity. It was only when they started fighting
about the calls from women that respondent
began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and
failed to perform his so-called marital
obligations. Respondent could not understand
petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant
naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational.
Respondent could not relate to her anger,
temper and jealousy. x x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she
arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a
mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and
why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In
fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering
from such mixed personality disorder is
dependent on others for decision x x x lacks
specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of
theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's
information that respondent had extramarital
affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself.
Notably, when asked as to the root cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity,
Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and
inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can
be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She
stated that there was a history of respondent's
parents having difficulties in their relationship.
But this input on the supposed problematic
history of respondent's parents also came from
petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly
demonstrate that there was really "a natal or
supervening disabling factor" on the part of
respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in
respondent's character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby
complying with, the essential marital obligations.
Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that
respondent's supposed psychological or mental
malady existed even before the marriage. All
these omissions must be held up against
petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved
the onus of establishing nullity of the marriage.
Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility
of the marital vinculum. 16
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder,
the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they
quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks,
the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of
support, and his preference to spend more time with his
band mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 17 where therein
respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends
than his family on whom he squandered his money,
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and
was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the
Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were
more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations and that
a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological, not physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals 18 that
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds
for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed
and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the
remedy however is not always to have it declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and
void marriage. 19 No less than the Constitution
recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the
family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state. 20
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from
Articles 35, 21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would likewise, but
for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio,
or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these
various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the
matter. 26 Article 36 should not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. 27 Neither it is to be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment and the like. 28

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for

reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004
denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of
the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED
WITH FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.
ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.
DE CI SI ON
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This case presents another occasion to reiterate this
Courts ruling that the Guidelines set forth in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Ronidel Olaviano Molina 1 "do not
require that a physician should examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. What is
important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the
partys psychological condition." 2
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, are the (a) Decision3 dated December 8, 2000
and (b) Resolution4 dated April 5, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915, entitled "Rosa Yap-
Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras, Defendant-
Appellee."
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married
respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy
Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.
Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,
Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her
marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged that
Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage as shown by the
following circumstances:
(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged
her signature in one mortgage transaction;
(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child
with her;
(c) he did not give financial support to his
children; and
(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a
husband and as a father.
To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary
and testimonial evidence.
This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She
was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu
City. 5 He courted her, frequently spending time at her
"Botica." 6 Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved
her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was
considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages in
Bindoy. 7
After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in
Davao for their honeymoon. 8 Upon returning to Bindoy,
they resided at her parents house. It was their residence
for three (3) years until they were able to build a house
of their own. 9 For the first five (5) years of their marriage,
Justo did not support her and their children because he
shouldered his sisters schooling. 10 Consequently, she
was the one who spent for all their family needs, using
the income from her "Botica" and store. 11
Justo lived the life of a bachelor. 12 His usual routine was
to spend time with his "bark adas" until the wee hours of
the morning. Oftentimes, he would scold her when she
sent for him during lunchtime. 13 He also failed to provide
for their childrens well-being. 14 Sometime in 1975, their
daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was
her family who paid for her medication. Also, in 1984,
their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their
rest house with his "bark adas." He did not heed her
earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the
latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop. 15
To cope with the death of the children, the entire family
went to the United States. Her sisters supported them
throughout their two-year stay there. However, after
three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the
Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was
shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy
in debt. She then realized Justo was a profligate. At one
time, he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece
of land. 16 At other times, he permitted the municipal
government to take gasoline from their gas station free
of charge.
She endured all of Justos shortcomings, but his act of
maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child
was the last straw that prompted her to file the present
case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in
1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation
resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose,
obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased
daughter Cindy Rose Paras. 17
As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.
He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the
bar examinations in Manila. 18 He frequently spent time in
her store. 19 Believing he loved her, he courted her and
later on, they became sweethearts. In 1963, they
decided to get married. However, it was postponed
because her family demanded a dowry. Their marriage
took place in 1964 upon his mothers signing a deed of
conveyance involving 28 hectares of coconut land in
favor of Rosa. 20
He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets
from the slump of the price of sugar and not to his
alleged profligacy. 21 Due to his business ventures, he
and Rosa were able to acquire a 10-room family house,
expand their store, establish their gasoline station, and
purchase several properties. He also denied forging her
signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained
that he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that
he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar
crop loan before the banks authorized employe e. 22
As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in
Rosas attitude after her return from the United States.
She became detached, cold, uncaring, and overly
focused on the familys businesses. 23 He tried to reach
her but Rosa was steadfast in her "new attitudinal
outlook." Before other people, he merely pretended that
their relationship was blissful. 24
He did not abandon his family in the United States. It
happened that they only had tourist visas. When they
were there, their childrens tourist visas were converted
into study visas, permitting them to stay longer. For his
part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as
municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately
returned to the Philippines. 25
He spent for his childrens education. At first, he
resented supporting them because he was just starting
his law practice and besides, their conjugal assets were
more than enough to provide for their needs. He
admitted though that there were times he failed to give
them financial support because of his lack of income. 26
What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosas
act of embarrassing him during his birthday celebration
in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When
confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with
his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of
concern. 27 This was further aggravated when she denied
his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in
a mountainous and NPA-infested area. 28
As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn
Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law
Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain
Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is
not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a
Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. It found
that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he
was forced to leave after Rosa posted guards at the
gates of their house; 29 (b) the conjugal assets were
sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no
need for Justo to shell out his limited salary; 30 and (c) the
charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated. 31 The RTC
observed that the relationship between the parties
started well, negating the existence of psychological
incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of
their marriage. 32 And lastly, it ruled that there appeared
to be a collusion between them as both sought the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. 33
Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for
disbarment against Justo, docketed as A.C. No. 5333,
premised on the same charges alleged in her complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage. On October 18,
2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty
of falsifying Rosas signature in bank documents,
immorality, and abandonment of his family. He was
suspended from the practice of law, thus:
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for SIX (6) MONTHSon the charge of falsifying
his wifes signature in bank documents and
other related loan instruments; and for ONE (1)
YEAR from the practice of law on the charges
of immorality and abandonment of his own
family, the penalties to be served
simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be
spread in respondents record as an attorney,
and notice of the same served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this
Court promulgated the Decision in A.C. No. 5333, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the
present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff
(Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to
decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos alleged
defects or idiosyncracies "were sufficiently explained by
the evidence," thus:
Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the
record first, the income which supported their
children came from the earnings of their
conjugal properties and not singularly from
Rosas industry; second, Justo gave his share of
the support to his children in the form of
allowances, albeit smaller than that derived from
the conjugal property; third, he was booted out
from their conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid
for re-election and as such did not voluntarily
abandon his home; and fourth, although
unjustifiable in the eyes of the law and morality,
Justos alleged infidelity came after he was
driven out of his house by Rosa. x x x.
The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosas inability
to offer the testimony of a psychologist is fatal to her
case, being in violation of the tenets laid down by this
Court in Molina. 34 Thus, she failed to substantiate her
allegation that Justo is psychologically incapacitated
from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. 35
Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Rosa contends that this Courts factual findings in A.C.
No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the present
case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in
rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that
she filed the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993,
well before this Courts pronouncement in Molina relied
upon by the Court of Appeals. She states that she could
have presented an expert to prove the root cause of
Justos psychological incapacity had she been required
to do so. For relief, she prays that her marriage with
Justo be annulled on the bases of the
Courts conclusive factual findings in A.C. No. 5333; or
in the alternative, remand this case to the court a quo for
reception of expert testimony in the interest of due
process.
In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the
present case is a "new matter completely foreign and
removed" from A.C. No. 5333; hence, the factual
findings of this Court therein are not conclusive on this
case. Besides, no hearing was conducted in A.C. No.
5333 as it was decided merely on the bases of pleadings
and documents.
The parties opposing contentions lead us to the
following three (3) vital issues:
first, whether the factual findings of this Court in
A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present
case;
second, whether a remand of this case to the
RTC for reception of expert testimony on the
root cause of Justos alleged psychological
incapacity is necessary; and
third, whether the totality of evidence in the case
shows psychological incapacity on the part of
Justo.
The petition is bereft of merit.
I relief suggests, what she wants is for this Court to annul
Whether the factual findings of this Court in
A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.
Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A
reading of the Court of Appeals Decision shows that she
has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate
court even assumed that her charges "are true," but
concluded that they are insufficient to declare the
marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The pertinent portion of the Decision reads:
Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence,
we find that even if we assume Justos alleged
infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged
abandonment of their family home are true, such
traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become
an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves,
these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage
void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These
grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he
was truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
he must assume and discharge as a married person.
While they may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged
psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show
incurability, such that while his acts violated the
covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show
that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of
psychological incapacity which prevents him from
undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the
future. 36
The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution
denying Rosas motion for reconsideration, thus:
Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of
the Supreme Court in the disbarment case
appellant filed against her husband, namely,
appellees falsification of documents to obtain
loans and his infidelity, these facts, by
themselves, do not conclusively establish
appellees psychological incapacity as
contemplated under Article 36 of the Family
Code. In fact, we already went as far as to
presume the existence of such seeming
depravities in appellees character in our
earlier judgment. However, as we
emphasized in our Decision, the existence of
such eventualities is not necessarily
conclusive of an inherent incapacity on the
part of appellee to discern and perform the
rudiments of marital obligations as required
under Article 36.37
Clearly, Rosas insistence that the factual findings in
A.C. No. 5333 be considered "conclusive" on the present
case is unmeritorious. The Court of Appeals already
"went as far as to presume the existence" of Justos
depravities, however, even doing so could not bring
about her (Rosas) desired result. As Rosas prayer for
her marriage on the bases of its findings in A.C. No.
5333. 38 Obviously, she is of the impression that since
her charges in A.C. No. 5333 were found to be true,
justifying the suspension of Justo from the practice of
law, the same charges are also sufficient to prove his
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
Her premise is of course non-sequitur.
Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against
lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases. The basic premise is that criminal and
civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in
the first two will not inevitably govern the third
and vice versa.39 The Courts exposition in In re
Almacen40 is instructive, thus:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action
or a suit, but are rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in
no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court
motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office
of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus
be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.
Accordingly, ones unfitness as a lawyer does
not automatically mean ones unfitness as
a husband or vice versa. 41 The yardsticks for such roles
are simply different. This is why the disposition in a
disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosas charges
sufficiently proved Justos unfitness as a lawyer,
however, they may not establish that he is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a
husband. In the disbarment case, "the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose
is "to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court." On the other hand,
in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage based
on the ground of psychological incapacity, the question
for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a
grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that
renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party from
a meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be seen in
the following discussion, Justos acts are not sufficient to
conclude that he is psychologically incapacitated, albeit
such acts really fall short of what is expected from a
lawyer.
II
Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is
necessary.
The presentation of an expert witness to prove
psychological incapacity has its origin in Molina. 42 One of
the Guidelines set forth therein states:
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological -- not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the Court
clarified that the above Guideline does not require that
the respondent should be examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage. What is important is
"the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the partys psychological condition."
Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was
decided, the Court backtracked a bit when it held
in Republic v. Dagdag44 that, "the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified and sufficiently proven by
experts" and this requirement was not deemed
complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor
testified on the alleged psychological incapacity of one
party.
Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,45 promulgated by this Court on March 15,
2003, geared towards the relaxation of the requirement
of expert opinion. Section 2, paragraph (d) states:
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of
the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both
parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations
of marriage at the time of the celebration of
 marriage even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the
physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the
time of the celebration of the marriage but
expert opinion need not be alleged.
In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court
categorically explained that under the New Rules, a
petition for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code need not allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity or on its root cause. What must
be alleged are the physical manifestations indicative
of said incapacity. The Court further held that
the New Rules, being procedural in nature, apply to
actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
adoption.
Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine
in Republic v. Iyoy.47 Thus:
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further
clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for
the declaration of nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is
no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a
petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. Such psychological incapacity,
however, must be established by the totality of
the evidence presented during the trial.
Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v.
Pesca.48 Pesca stemmed from a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 filed by
a battered wife sometime in April 1994. The trial court, in
its Decision dated November 15, 1995, decreed the
marriage void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial courts Decision, applying
the Guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of
Appeals 49 and Molina.50 When the matter was brought to
this Court, the wife argued
that Santos and Molina should not have retroactive
application, the Guidelines being merely advisory and
not mandatory in nature. She submitted that the proper
application of Santos and Molina warranted only a
remand of her case to the trial court for further
proceedings, not a dismissal. The Court declined to
remand Pesca51 on the premise that
the Santosand Molina Guidelines "constitute a part of
the law as of the date the statute is enacted," thus:
The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article
8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the
courts establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent of the law. The latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus
constitute a part of the law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling
of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine
may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non
replicit.
The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It
affirmed that the wife failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. The
Court then concluded that "emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility" cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.
Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy,
and Pesca, to the instant case, there is no reason to
remand it to the trial court. The records clearly show that
there is sufficient evidence to establish the psychological
condition of Justo.
III
Whether the totality of evidence in the case
shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.
The last issue left for this Courts consideration is
whether the totality of the evidence is sufficient to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity on the part
of Justo so as to justify the dissolution of the marriage in
question.
At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be
reminded of the States policy on marriage. Article XV of
the Constitution mandates that:
SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family
as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.
SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.
This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has
been enshrined in Article 1 of the Family Code which
states that:
 ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of
permanent union, between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law, and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and
statutory law, this Court has held fast to the position that
any doubt as to the validity of a marriage is to be
resolved in favor of its validity. 52 Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.
Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are
made in heaven. Imperfect humans more often than not
create imperfect unions. Thus, when the imperfection is
psychological in nature and renders a person
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, the State provides refuge to the aggrieved
spouse under Article 36 of the Family Code which reads:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who,
at the time of celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the
interpretation and application of Article 36, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological -- not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I
dos." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
 shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic
requirements mandated by the Court in Santos, 54 to
reiterate: psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability.
A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and
documentary evidence, shows that Rosas main grounds
in seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Justo are his infidelity, profligacy which includes the
falsification of her signature in one of the loan
documents, failure to support the children,
and abandonment of the family. Both the courts below
found the charges unsubstantiated and untrue. However,
this Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found the
evidence sufficient to support Rosas charges of sexual
infidelity, falsification of her signature, and abandonment
of family, thus:
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF
COMPLAINANTS SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National
Bureau of Investigation on the signatures of complainant
Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras
vis--vis the questioned signature "Rosa Y. Paras"
appearing in the questioned bank loan documents,
contracts of mortgage and other related instrument,
yielded the following results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard
sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS
were written by one and the same
person.
2. The questioned and the standard
sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS
were not written by one and the same
person. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26,
emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical statement
that respondent forged the signatures of
complainant. However, an analysis of the above
findings lead to no other conclusion than that the
questioned or falsified signatures of complainant
Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent as
said falsified signatures were the same as the
sample signatures of respondent.
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented
a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in
his favor by complainant to negotiate for an
agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural
Bank of Bais City. Instead of exculpating
respondent, the presence of the SPA places him
in hot water. For if he was so authorized to
obtain loans from the banks, then why did he
have to falsify his wifes signatures in the bank
loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is to
especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign
for and on behalf of the principal using his own
name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND
CONCUBINAGE
The evidence against respondent is
overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his
children and three other persons who used to
work with him and have witnessed the acts
indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy this
Court that respondent has strayed from the
marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee
Rose Paras where respondent was named as
the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108);
his naming the child after his deceased first-born
daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing
Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in their house
in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that
respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms.
Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.
While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled
against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity,
falsification of her signature, abandonment and
inadequate support of children, are true , nonetheless,
there is nothing in the records showing that they were
caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other
words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to
show that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
The records indicate that the marriage between the
parties had a good start, resulting in the birth of their four
(4) children. The early days of their cohabitation were
blissful and harmonious. Justo was deeply in love with
Rosa, even persuading his mother to give her a dowry.
They were able to build a 10-room family home and
acquire several properties, thus, proving themselves to
be responsible couple. Even Rosa admitted that Justo
took care of their children when they were young.
Unfortunately, the passage of time appeared to have
taken its toll on their relationship. The acts committed by
Justo appeared to have been the result of irreconcilable
differences between them caused by the death of their
two (2) children and financial difficulties due to his failure
to win the mayoralty election and to sustain his law
practice. Furthermore, the superior business acumen of
Rosa, as well as the insolent attitude of her family
towards Justo, busted his ego and lowered his self-
esteem.
There is no evidence that Justos "defects" were
present at the inception of the marriage . His "defects"
surfaced only in the latter years when these events took
place; their two children died; he lost in the election; he
failed in his business ventures and law practice; and felt
the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely, these
circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case
only after almost 30 years of their marriage.
Equally important is that records fail to indicate that
Justos "defects" are incurable or grave.
The following catena of cases provides an adequate
basis why the marriage between Justo and Rosa should
not be annulled.
In Dedel v. Court of Appeals 55 which involved a
promiscuous wife who left her family to live with one of
her many paramours, this Court ruled that the acts
of sexual infidelity and abandonment do not
constitute psychological incapacity absent a
showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the
inception of the marriage, thus:
x x x. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity
can hardly qualify as being mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that she could not
have known the obligations she was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof. It appears that
respondents promiscuity did not
exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the
records is a blissful marital union at its
celebration, later affirmed in church rites,
and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could
her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be
equated with psychological incapacity. It must
be shown that these acts are manifestations of
a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual
promiscuity.
In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, 56 the wifes inability to
conceive led her husband to other women so he could
fulfill his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and
blood. This Court ruled that this is not a manifestation of
psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the
Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,57 this Court declared that
a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities does not
constitute psychological incapacity. And, again, in
Iyoy, 58 a Filipina left her husband, married an American
and had a family by him, which she flaunted to her
former husband. This Court ruled that these acts,
while embarrassing and hurting to the latter, did not
satisfactorily establish a serious or grave
psychological or mental defect of an incurable
nature present at the time of marriage; and that
irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant
a finding of psychological incapacity under Article
36.
What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone
astray from the path of marriage because of a conflicting
relationship with his wife and her family and repeated
lifes setbacks. While these do not justify his sins, they
are not sufficient to establish that he is psychologically
incapacitated.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse. 59 As this Court repeatedly declares,
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with
a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. These marital obligations are
those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225
of the Family Code. 60
Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the
like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers
only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a
marriage void. 61
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the
ruling of the Court of Appeals. While this Court
commiserates with Rosas plight, however, it has no
choice but to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 49915 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, G.R. No. 165424
Petitioner, never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly
CORONA,
- v e r s u s - VELASCO, JR., * a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
PERALTA, * JJ. seeing respondent and started dating other women.
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI
and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
to stop dating other women as he was already a married
J
u
n man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out
e
9 that the marriage was not fake.
,
2
0 Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be
0
9 suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly
x----------------------------------------
----------x dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as

diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan.

RE S OLU T ION
The court a quo held that petitioners personality disorder
CORONA, J.:
was serious and incurable and directly affected his

This resolves the motion for reconsideration of capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to

the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void. [3]

petitioners petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside
decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of
the January 26, 2004 decision[1] and September 24,
the evidence presented failed to establish petitioners
2004resolution[2] of the Court of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
reconsideration. It was denied.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition
The case was elevated to this Court via a petition
to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-
for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision
Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological
and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage

in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.

Petitioner then filed this motion for

reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage

He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites
to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the
thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they

basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the
evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his
expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the
findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and
still is psychologically incapable of complying with the
essential obligations of marriage.
We grant the motion for reconsideration.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the
Republic of the Philippines,[4] this Court reiterated that
courts should interpret the provision on psychological
incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very
nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must consider as
essential the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental disposition of the parties. [5]
In this case, the testimony [6] of petitioners expert
witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from
dependent personality disorder. Thus:
Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the
examinations and interviews which you
conducted, can you briefly tell this court
your findings [and] conclusions?
A. Well, the petitioner is suffering
from a personality disorder. It is a mixed
personality disorder from self-defeat ing
personality disorder to [dependent]
personality disorder and this is brought
about by [a] dysfunctional family that
petitioner had. He also suffered from
partner relational problem during his
marriage with Chona. There were lots of
fights and it was not truly a marriage, sir.
Q. Now, what made you conclude that
Lester is suffering from psychological
incapacity to handle the essential
obligations of marriage?
A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation
for marriage was very questionable. It
was a very impulsive decision. I dont
think he understood what it meant to
really be married and after the marriage,
there was no consummation, there was
no sexual intercourse, he never lived with
the respondent. And after three months
he refused to see or talk with the
respondent and afterwards, I guess the
relationship died a natural death, and he
never thought it was a really serious
matter at all.
xx xx xx
Q. Likewise, you stated here in your
evaluation that Lester Halili and
respondent suffered from a grave lack of
discretionary judgment. Can you
expound on this?
A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciat e
the civil [rites which] they had undergone.
[It was] just a spur of the moment
decision that they should get married
xx xx I dont think they truly considered
themselves married.
xx xx xx
Q. Now [from] what particular portion of
their marriage were you able to conclude
xx xx that petitioner and respondent are
suffering from psychological incapacity?
A. xx xx they never lived together[.]
[T]hey never had a residence, they neve r
consummated the marriage. During the
very short relationship they had, there
were frequent quarrels and so there
might be a problem also of lack of respect
[for] each other and afterwards there was
abandonment.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality
disorder[7] as
[a] personality disorder
characterized by a pattern of dependent
and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and
 frequently belittle their capabilities; they
fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others comments. At times they actually
bring about dominance by others through
a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder
usually begins in early adulthood.
Individuals who have this disorder may
be unable to make everyday decisions
without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of
their important decisions (such as where
to live), tend to agree with people even
when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things
on their own, volunteer to do things that
are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feel uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and are often
preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.
In her psychological report, [8] Dr. Dayan stated
that petitioners dependent personality disorder was
evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached
to his parents and depended on them for
decisions. [9] Petitioners mother even had to be the one to
tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what
action to take upon learning that his marriage to
respondent was for real. [10]
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of
persons suffering from a dependent personality disorder,
petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and
displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive
attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of
him. [11] This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed
himself to be dominated, first, by his father who treated
his family like robots [12] and, later, by respondent who was
as domineering as his father. [13] When petitioner could no
longer take respondents domineering ways, he preferred
to hide from her rather than confront her and tell her
outright that he wanted to end their marriage. [14]
Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder
to his dysfunctional family life, to wit: [15]
Q. And what might be the root
cause of such psychological incapacity?
A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago
that Lesters family is dysfunctional. The
father was very abusive, very
domineering. The mother has been very
unhappy and the children never had
affirmation. They might [have been] x x x
given financial support because the
father was [a] very affluent person but it
was never an intact family. x x x The wife
and the children were practically robots.
And so, I would say Lester grew up, not
having self-confidence, very immature
and somehow not truly understand[ing]
what [it] meant to be a husband, what [it]
meant to have a real family life.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners
personality disorder was grave and incurable and already
existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to
respondent. [16]
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner
had a psychological condition that was grave and
incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in
the same Te case, recognized that individuals with
diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term
concerns, and thus therapy may be long-
term. [17] Particularly, personality disorders are long-
standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much
severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of
living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and,
beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems

for those who display them and for others. [18]

From the foregoing, it has been shown that

petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological

incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform

the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the

marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared

null and void.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is

hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution of this

Court and the January 26, 2004 decision and September

24, 2004resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV

No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.

The decision of the Regional Trial

Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is

hereby REINSTATED.
 EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, G.R. No. 161793
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review
Petitioner, on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
Present:
the August 5, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution [2] denying the
Chairperson, motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.
AUSTRIA-MARTINE Z,

CHICO-NAZA RIO,
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE,
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
NACHURA, and
Respondent,
PERALTA, JJ.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a

Promulgated: glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a
Oppositor.
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association
in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to
February 13, 2009
Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter already had a
boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----x was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore
student and respondent, a freshman. [3]

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the

two understood one another and developed a certain
degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996,
DE CI SI ON or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena
asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused,
bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
NACHURA, J.:
however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and
sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel
Far from novel is the issue involved in this money and she, purchasing the boat ticket. [4]
petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation
in our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion in
our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a
with much ado, it having realized that current month. Their pension house accommodation and daily
jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a
perspective by which psychological incapacity should be job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila.
viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to
formulatedfree in form and devoid of any definition. his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena
kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would
commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at
her uncles place. [5]
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the
two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old,
and she, 20. [6] The two then continued to stay at her
uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe
was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also
showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to
leave Rowena. [7] At one point, Edward was able to call
home and talk to his brother who suggested that they
should stay at their parents home and live with
them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however,
suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they
could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about
this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would
be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home. [8]
After a month, Edward escaped from the house
of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family
then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they
telephoned to ask for him. [9]
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to
Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should
live with his parents, she said that it was better for them
to live separate lives. They then parted ways. [10]
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000,
Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of
his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-00-39720. [11]
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court,
on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was
collusion between the parties. [12] In the meantime, on July
27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear
on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings. [13]
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an
investigation report stating that it could not determine if
there was collusion between the parties; thus, it
recommended trial on the merits. [14]
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner
found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and
made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF
MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-
year-old] Filipino male adult born and
baptized Born Again Christian
at Manila. He finished two years in
college at AMA Computer College last
1994 and is currently unemployed. He is
married to and separated from ROWENA
GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented
himself at my office for a psychological
evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter
by the grounds of psychological
incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P.
Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who
are now in business and one deceased
sister. Both his parents are also in the
business world by whom he [considers]
as generous, hospitable, and
patient. This said virtues are said to be
handed to each of the family member. He
generally considers himself to be quiet
and simple. He clearly remembers
himself to be afraid of meeting
people. After 1994, he tried his luck in
being a Sales Executive of Mansfield
International Incorporated. And because
of job incompetence, as well as being
quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the
job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on
becoming a full servant of God by being
a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate
himself from his friends even during his
childhood days as he only loves to read
the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine
family despite having a lazy father and a
disobedient wife.She is said to have not
finish[ed] her collegiate degree and
shared intimate sexual moments with her
boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed
her kindness to petitioner and this
became the foundation of their intimate
relationship. After a month of dating,
petitioner mentioned to respondent that
he is having problems with his
family. Respondent surprisingly retorted
that she also hates her family and that
she actually wanted to get out of their
lives. From that [time on], respondent
had insisted to petitioner that they should
elope and live together. Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as
they are both young and inexperienced,
but she insisted that they would
somehow manage because petitioner is
rich. In the last week of March 1996,
respondent seriously brought the idea of
eloping and she already bought tickets
for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner
reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they
eloped to Cebu. The parties are
supposed to stay at the house of a friend
of respondent, but they were not able to
locate her, so petitioner was compelled to
rent an apartment. The parties tried to
look for a job but could not find any so it
was suggested by respondent that they
should go back and seek help from
petitioners parents. When the parties
arrived at the house of petitioner, all of
his whole family was all out of the country
so respondent decided to go back to her
home for the meantime while petitioner
stayed behind at their home.After a few
days of separation, respondent called
petitioner by phone and said she wanted
to talk to him. Petitioner responded
immediately and when he arrived at their
house, respondent confronted petitioner
as to why he appeared to be cold,
respondent acted irrationally and even
threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner
got scared so he went home
again. Respondent would call by phone
every now and then and became angry
as petitioner does not know what to
do.Respondent went to the extent of
threatening to file a case against
petitioner and scandalize his family in the
newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he
would be able to make amends and at
this point in time[,] respondent brought
the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of
frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify
her. And so on April 23, 1996,
respondents uncle brought the parties to
Valenzuela[,] and on that very same
day[,] petitioner was made to sign the
Marriage Contract before the
Judge. Petitioner actually never applied
for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should
stay first at their house until after arrival
of the parents of petitioner. But when the
parents of petitioner arrived, respondent
refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so
many ways with her uncle showing to him
many guns.Respondent even threatened
that if he should persist in going home,
they will commission their military friend s
to harm his family. Respondent even
made petitioner sign a declaration that if
he should perish, the authorities should
look for him at his parents[ ]and
relatives[ ]houses.Sometime in June of
1996, petitioner was able to escape and
he went home. He told his parents about
his predicament and they forgave him
and supported him by giving him military
escort.Petitioner, however, did not inform
them that he signed a marriage contract
with respondent.When they knew about
it[,] petitioner was referred for
counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact
respondent. Petitioner offered her to live
instead to[sic] the home of petitioners
parents while they are still
studying. Respondent refused the idea
and claimed that she would only live with
him if they will have a separate home of
their own and be away from his
parents. She also intimated to petitioner
that he should already get his share of
whatever he would inherit from his
parents so they can start a new
life. Respondent demanded these not
knowing [that] the petitioner already
settled his differences with his own
family. When respondent refused to live
with petitioner where he chose for them
to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to
stop harassing the home of his
parents. He told her already that he was
disinherited and since he also does not
have a job, he would not be able to
support her. After knowing that petitioner
does not have any money anymore,
respondent stopped tormenting
petitioner and informed petitioner that
they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward
and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in
the wreck and weakly-founded. The
break-up was caused by both parties[]
unreadiness to commitment and their
young age. He was still in the state of
finding his fate and fighting boredom,
while she was still egocentrically involved
with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
REMARKS:
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are
dubbed to be emotionally immature and
recklessly impulsive upon swearing to
their marital vows as each of them was
motivated by different notions on
marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in
this case[,] is said to be still unsure and
unready so as to commit himself to
marriage. He is still founded to be on the
search of what he wants in life. He is
absconded as an introvert as he is not
really sociable and displays a lack of
interest in social interactions and
mingling with other individuals. He is
seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that
he finds it boring and uninteresting to
commit himself to a relationship
especially to that of respondent, as
aggravated by her dangerous ly
aggressive moves. As he is more of the
reserved and timid type of person, as he
prefer to be religiously attached and
spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE ,
the respondent, is said to be of the
aggressive-rebellious type of
woman. She is seen to be somewhat
exploitative in her [plight] for a life of
wealth and glamour. She is seen to take
move on marriage as she thought that
her marriage with petitioner will bring her
good fortune because he is part of a rich
family. In order to have her dreams
realized, she used force and threats
knowing that [her] husband is somehow
weak-willed.Upon the realization that
there is really no chance for wealth, she
gladly finds her way out of the
relationship.
Before going to marriage, one
should really get to know himself and
marry himself before submitting to marital
vows. Marriage should not be taken out
of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
institution solemnized by religious and
law. In the case presented by petitioner
and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear
that both parties have impulsively taken
 marriage for granted as they are still
reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004
unaware of their own selves. He is
extremely introvert to the point of Resolution. [24]
weakening their relationship by his weak
behavioral disposition. She, on the other
hand[,] is extremely exploitative and
aggressive so as to be unlawful, Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the
insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in
her strides toward convenience. It is instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005,
apparent that she is suffering the grave, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the
severe, and incurable presence of
parties to submit their respective memoranda. [25]
Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality
Disorder that started since childhood and
only manifested during marriage. Both
parties display psychological incapacities
that made marriage a big mistake for In his memorandum, [26] petitioner argues that the
them to take. [15] CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage
void, not only because of respondents psychological
incapacity, but rather due to both parties psychological
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its
incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no
Decision[16] declaring the marriage of the parties null and
requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
void on the ground that both parties were psychologically
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it
obligations. [17] The Republic, represented by the OSG,
during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the
timely filed its notice of appeal. [18]
pleadings, the trial court orders and notices. [27]

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed

For its part, the OSG contends in its
August 5, 2003 Decision[19] in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867,
memorandum, [28] that the annulment petition filed before
reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling. [20] It ruled
the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital
that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity
obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root
of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally
cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not
examine respondent, and relied only on the information
alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically
provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity ,
not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the
incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally
evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated
examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[21] needed for
the requirements in Molina[29] were not satisfied. [30]
the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code. [22] The CA faulted the lower court for
rendering the decision without the required certification of The Court now resolves the singular issue of
the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the
agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the marriage between the parties is null and void. [31]
petition. [23] The CA later denied petitioners motion for
I.
 I of the Civil Code) that it
had been tasked by the
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its IBP and the
UP Law Center to
origin and charting the development of jurisprudenc e prepare. In fact, some
interpreting it. members of the
Committee were in favor
of a no-fault divorc e
between the spouses
Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides: after a number of years
of separation, legal or de
facto. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes was then
Article 36. A marriage contracted requested to prepare a
by any party who, at the time of the proposal for an action for
celebration, was psychologically dissolution of marriage
incapacitated to comply with the and the effects thereof
essential marital obligations of marriage, based on two grounds :
shall likewise be void even if such (a) five continuous years
incapacity becomes manifest only after of separation between
its solemnization. the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree
of legal separation, and
(b) whenever a married
person would have
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil obtained a decree of
absolute divorce in
Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, another country.
Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Actually, such a
proposal is one for
Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in absolute divorce but
her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals: [33] called by another name.
Later, even the Civil
Code Revision
Committee took time to
However, as a member of both discuss the proposal of
the Family Law Revision Committee of Justice Reyes on this
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and matter.
the Civil Code Revision Commission of
the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15,
Subsequently,
1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy
however, when the Civil
written in behalf of the Family Law and
Code Revision
Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Committee and Family
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangc o -
Law Committee started
Teodoro traced the background of the
holding joint meetings
inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
on the preparation of the
Family Code.
draft of the New Family
Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition
During its early of marriage as
meetings, the Family
Law Committee had
thought of including a
a
chapter on absolute
special
divorce in the draft of a
contract
new Family Code (Book
of
perman provide
ent d by
partner law.
ship
betwee
n a man With the above
and a definition, and
woman considering the
entered Christian traditional
into in concept of marriage of
accorda the Filipino people as a
nce with permanent, inviolable,
law for indissoluble social
the institution upon which
establis the family and society
hment are founded, and also
of realizing the strong
conjuga opposition that any
l and provision on absolute
family divorce would encounter
life. It is from the Catholic
an Church and the Catholic
inviolab sector of our citizenry to
le social whom the great majority
instituti of our people
on belong, the two
whose Committees in their joint
nature, meetings did not pursue
conseq the idea of absolute
uences, divorce and, instead,
and opted for an action for
incident judicial declaration of
s are invalidity of marriage
govern based on grounds
ed by available in the Canon
law and Law. It was thought that
not such an action would not
subject only be an acceptable
to alternative to divorce but
stipulati would also solve the
on, nagging problem of
except church annulments of
that marriages on grounds
marriag not recognized by the
e civil law of the
settlem State.Justice Reyes
ents was, thus, requested to
may fix again prepare a draft of
the provisions on such
propert action for celebration of
y invalidity of marriage.
relation Still later, to avoid the
s during overlapping of
the provisions on void
marriag marriages as found in
e within the present Civil Code
the and those proposed by
limits
Justice Reyes on judicial mentall
declaration of invalidit y y
of marriage on grounds incapac
similar to the Canon itated to
Law, the two dischar
Committees now ge the
working as a Joint essenti
Committee in the al
preparation of a New marital
Family Code decided to obligati
consolidate the present ons,
provisions on void even if
marriages with the such
proposals of Justice lack or
Reyes. The result was incapac
the inclusion of an ity is
additional kind of void made
marriage in the manifes
enumeration of void t after
marriages in the present the
Civil Code, to wit: celebrat
ion.

(
7) those as well as the following
marriag implementing provisions:
es
contract
ed by A
any rt. 32.
party The
who, at absolut
the time e nullity
of the of a
celebrat marriag
ion, was e may
wanting be
in the invoked
sufficie or
nt use pleaded
of only on
reason the
or basis of
judgme a final
nt to judgme
underst nt
and the declarin
essenti g the
al marriag
nature e void,
of without
marriag prejudic
e or e to the
was provisio
psychol n of
ogically Article
or 34.
 personality anomaly, like inflicting
physical violence upon their wives ,
A constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
rt. 33. dependence or addiction, and
The psychosexual anomaly. [34]
action
or
defense
for the
declarat
ion of In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:
the
absolut
e nullity
At the Committee meeting of July
of a
26, 1986, the draft provision read:
marriag
e shall
not
prescrib (7) Those marriages contracted
e. by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient
use of reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature of marriage or was
x
psychologically or mentally incapacitated
x xx x
to discharge the essential marital
xxxx
obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
It is believed that many hopelessly
broken marriages in our country today
may already be dissolved or annulled on
The twists and turns which the
the grounds proposed by the Joint
ensuing discussion took finally produc ed
Committee on declaration of nullity as
the following revised provision even
well as annulment of marriages, thus
before the session was over:
rendering an absolute divorce law
unnecessary. In fact, during a conferenc e
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
University, as well as another meeting (7) That contracted by any party
with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the who, at the time of the celebration, was
Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint psychologically incapacitated to
Committee was informed that since discharge the essential marital
Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been obligations, even if such lack or
declaring marriages null and void on the incapacity becomes manifest after the
ground of lack of due discretion for celebration.
causes that, in other jurisdictions, would
be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-
age or premature marriages; marriage to Noticeably, the immediately
a man who, because of some personality preceding formulation above has
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a dropped any reference to wanting in the
family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of sufficient use of reason or judgment to
a spouse by an otherwise perfectly understand the essential nature of
normal person; marriage to a woman marriage and to mentally incapacitated. It
who refuses to cohabit with her husband was explained that these phrases refer to
or who refuses to have children. Bishop defects in the mental faculties vitiating
Cruz also informed the Committee that consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack
they have found out in tribunal work that of appreciation of one's marital
a lot of machismo among husbands are obligation. There being a defect in
manifestations of their sociopathic consent, it is clear that it should be a
ground for voidable marriage because
there is the appearance of consent and it
is capable of convalidation for the simple
reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are cases when the insanity is
curable . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to marriage.
My own position as a member of
the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense,
insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice
Caguioa to use the term psychological or
mental impotence, Archbishop Oscar
Cruz opined in the earlier February 9,
1984 session that this term is an
invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it
is considered a weak phrase. He said
that the Code of Canon Law would rather
express it as psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . . Justice
Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes
a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines
enumerated in the majority opinion for
the interpretation and application of Art.
36 is: Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against every one
of the same sex.
The Committee, through Prof.
Araceli T. Barrera, considered the
inclusion of the phrase and is incurable
but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented
that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be
more problematic. Yet, the possibility that
one may be cured after the psychological
incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice
Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy .
Justice Caguioa suggested that the
remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse
to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee
classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the
essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special
situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity
was subsumed under special cases and
special situations, hence, its special
treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as
finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code
provisions on Marriage is there a ground
for avoiding or annulling marriages that
even comes close to being psychological
in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to
circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands
valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of
public policy or lack of essential
requisites, some marriages are void from
the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the
Civil Code, particularly the provisions on
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fres h
winds of change in keeping with the more
permissive mores and practices of the
time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal
provisions of Canon Law.
 Canon 1095 which states, inter
alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: 3.
(those) who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage provided the model for what is
now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A
marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in
Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only
two types of marriages with respect to
their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediat e
state, the voidable or annullable
marriages. When the Ecclesiastical
Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e.,
it never really existed in the first place, for
a valid sacramental marriage can never
be dissolved. Hence, a properly
performed and consummated marriage
between two living Roman Catholics can
only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal
procedure with a Court selection and a
formal hearing.
Such so-called church
annulments are not recognized by Civil
Law as severing the marriage ties as to
capacitate the parties to enter lawfully
into another marriage. The grounds for
nullifying civil marriage, not being
congruent with those laid down by Canon
Law, the former being more strict, quite a
number of married couples have found
themselves in limbofreed from the
marriage bonds in the eyes of the
Catholic Church but yet unable to
contract a valid civil marriage under state
laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions,
some persons contract new marriages or
enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a
satisfactory solution to such anomalous
situations that the Civil Law Revision
Committee decided to engraft the Canon
Law concept of psychological incapacity
into the Family Codeand classified the
same as a ground for declaring
marriages void ab initio or totally
inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old
Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while
it did not provide directly for
psychological incapacity, in effect,
recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: Canon
#1081 required persons to be capable
according to law in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that
persons be at least not ignorant of the
major elements required in marriage; and
Canon #1087 (the force and fear
category) required that internal and
external freedom be present in order for
consent to be valid. This line of
interpretation produced two distinct but
related grounds for annulment
called lack of due discretion and lack of
due competence. Lack of due discretion
means that the person did not have the
ability to give valid consent at the time of
the wedding and, therefore, the union is
invalid. Lack of due competence means
that the person was incapable of carrying
out the obligations of the promise he or
she made during the wedding ceremony.
Favorable annulment decisions
by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and
1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid
the foundation for a broader approach to
the k ind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment .
The Rota had reasoned for the first time
in several cases that the capacity to give
valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had
displayed such problems shortly after the
marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a
cautious willingness to use this kind of
hindsight, the way was paved for what
came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals
began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested
 themselves shortly after the ceremony as
proof of an inability to give valid consent
at the time of the ceremony. [36]
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any
examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so
doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired
that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. [37] The
law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its
application. [38]
Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phras e
psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article
68[40] of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and
render help and support. The intendment of the law has
been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significanc e
to the marriage. [41] This interpretation is, in fact, consistent
with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to
Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction
must be made between the second and
third paragraphs of C.1095, namely
between the grave lack of discretionary
judgment and the incapacity to assume
the essential obligation. Mario
Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the
difference by an ordinary, if somewhat
banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a
house to Carmela, and on the
assumption that they are capable
according to positive law to enter such
contract, there remains the object of the
contract, viz, the house. The house is
located in a different locality, and prior to
the conclusion of the contract, the house
was gutted down by fire unbeknown to
both of them. This is the hypothesis
contemplated by the third paragraph of
the canon. The third paragraph does not
deal with the psychological process of
giving consent because it has been
established a priori that both have such a
capacity to give consent, and they both
know well the object of their consent [the
house and its particulars]. Rather,
C.1095.3 deals with the object of the
consent/contract which does not
exist. The contract is invalid because it
lacks its formal object. The consent as a
psychological act is both valid and
sufficient. The psychological act,
however, is directed towards an object
which is not available. Urbano Navarret e
summarizes this distinction: the third
paragraph deals not with the positing of
consent but with positing the object of
consent. The person may be capable of
positing a free act of consent, but he is
not capable of fulfilling the
responsibilities he assumes as a result of
the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the
auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941
regarding psychic incapacity with respect
to marriage arising from pathological
conditions, there has been an increasing
trend to understand as ground of nullity
different from others, the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage, especially the incapacity which
arises from sexual
anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample
which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has
studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be
summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies
always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which
affects the higher faculties of intellect,
discernment, and freedom; or are there
sexual anomalies that are purely so that
is to say, they arise from certain
physiological dysfunction of the
hormonal system, and they affect the
sexual condition, leaving intact the higher
faculties however, so that these persons
are still capable of free human acts. The
evidence from the empirical sciences is
abundant that there are certain
anomalies of a sexual nature which may
impel a person towards sexual activities
which are not normal, either with respect
to its frequency [nymphomania,
satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity
itself [sadism, masochism,
homosexuality]. However, these
anomalies notwithstanding, it is
altogether possible that the higher
faculties remain intact such that a person
so afflicted continues to have an
adequate understanding of what
marriage is and of the gravity of its
responsibilities. In fact, he can choose
marriage freely. The question though is
whether such a person can assume
those responsibilities which he cannot
fulfill, although he may be able to
understand them. In this latter
hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage issues
from the incapacity to posit the object of
consent, rather than the incapacity to
posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been
hesitant, if not actually confused, in this
regard. The initial steps taken by church
courts were not too clear whether this
incapacity is incapacity to posit consent
or incapacity to posit the object of
consent. A case c. Pinna, for example,
arrives at the conclusion that the intellect,
under such an irresistible impulse, is
prevented from properly deliberating and
its judgment lacks freedom. This line of
reasoning supposes that the intellect, at
the moment of consent, is under the
influence of this irresistible compulsion,
with the inevitable conclusion that such a
decision, made as it was under these
circumstances, lacks the necessary
freedom. It would be incontrovertible that
a decision made under duress, such as
this irresistible impulse, would not be a
free act. But this is precisely the
question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that
the intellect is always and continuously
under such an irresistible compulsion? It
would seem entirely possible, and
certainly more reasonable, to think that
there are certain cases in which one who
is sexually hyperaesthetic can
understand perfectly and evaluate quite
maturely what marriage is and what it
implies; his consent would be juridically
ineffective for this one reason that he
cannot posit the object of consent, the
exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in
a normal way and with usually
regularity. It would seem more correct to
say that the consent may indeed be free,
but is juridically ineffective because the
party is consenting to an object that he
cannot deliver. The house he is selling
was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous
Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen
his way more clearly through this tangled
mess, proposing as he did a clear
conceptual distinction between the
inability to give consent on the one hand,
and the inability to fulfill the object of
consent, on the other. It is his opinion
that nymphomaniacs usually understand
the meaning of marriage, and they are
usually able to evaluate its
implications. They would have no
difficulty with positing a free and
intelligent consent. However, such
persons, capable as they are of eliciting
an intelligent and free consent,
experience difficulty in another sphere:
delivering the object of the
consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had
likewise treated the difference between
the act of consenting and the act of
positing the object of consent from the
point of view of a person afflicted with
nymphomania.According to him, such an
affliction usually leaves the process of
knowing and understanding and
evaluating intact. What it affects is the
object of consent: the delivering of the
goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to
Posit the Object of Consent. From the
selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra,
it is possible to see a certain progres s
towards a consensus doctrine that the
incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage (that is to say, the
formal object of consent) can coexist in
the same person with the ability to make
a free decision, an intelligent judgment,
and a mature evaluation and weighing of
things. The decision coram
Sabattaniconcerning a nymphomaniac
affirmed that such a spouse can have
difficulty not only with regard to the
moment of consent but also, and
especially, with regard to the
matrimonium in facto esse.The decision
concludes that a person in such a
condition is incapable of assuming the
conjugal obligation of fidelity, although
she may have no difficulty in
understanding what the obligations of
marriage are, nor in the weighing and
evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of
Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to
refer to this ground as moral impotence
or psychic impotence, or similar
expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and
disorders in the personality. Thes e
anomalies leave intact the faculties of the
will and the intellect. It is qualified as
moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish
it from the impotence that constitutes the
impediment dealt with by
C.1084.Nonetheless, the anomalies
render the subject incapable of binding
himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the
extent that the anomaly renders that
person incapable of fulfilling the essential
obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral
theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of
Incapacity. There is incapacity when
either or both of the contractants are not
capable of initiating or maintaining this
consortium. One immediately thinks of
those cases where one of the parties is
so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic
personality] that he does not even know
how to begin a union with the other, let
alone how to maintain and sustain such
a relationship. A second incapacity could
be due to the fact that the spouses are
incapable of beginning or maintaining a
heterosexual consortium, which goes to
the very substance of
matrimony. Another incapacity could
arise when a spouse is unable to
concretize the good of himself or of the
other party. The canon speaks, not of
the bonum partium, but of the bonum
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only
of realizing or contributing to the good of
the other party qua persona rather
than qua conjunx would be deemed
incapable of contracting marriage. Such
would be the case of a person who may
be quite capable of procuring the
economic good and the financial security
of the other, but not capable of realizing
the bonum conjugale of the other.Thes e
are general strokes and this is not the
place for detained and individual
description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a
petition where the concrete
circumstances of the case concerns a
person diagnosed to be suffering from
serious sociopathy. He concluded that
while the respondent may have
understood, on the level of the intellect,
the essential obligations of marriage, he
was not capable of assuming them
because of his constitutional immorality.
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and
capacity of the person as regards the
fulfillment of responsibilities is
determined not only at the moment of
decision but also and especially during
the moment of execution of decision. And
when this is applied to constitution of the
marital consent, it means that the actual
fulfillment of the essential obligations of
marriage is a pertinent consideration that
must be factored into the question of
whether a person was in a position to
assume the obligations of marriage in the
first place. When one speaks of the
inability of the party to assume and fulfill
the obligations, one is not looking
at matrimonium in fieri, but also and
especially at matrimonium in facto
esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985,
Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of
the respondent to assume the essential
obligations of marriage in the psychic
constitution of the person, precisely on
the basis of his irresponsibility as regards
money and his apathy as regards the
rights of others that he had
violated. Interpersonal relationships are
invariably disturbed in the presence of
this personality disorder. A lack of
empathy (inability to recognize and
experience how others feel) is
common. A sense of entitlement,
unreasonable expectation, especially
favorable treatment, is usually
present. Likewise common is
interpersonal exploitativeness, in which
others are taken advantage of in order to
achieve ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations
considered as essential matrimonial
obligations. One of them is the right to
the communio vitae. This and their
corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses
and of the children. Serious psychic
anomalies, which do not have to be
necessarily incurable, may give rise to
the incapacity to assume any, or several,
or even all of these rights. There are
some cases in which interpersonal
relationship is impossible.Some
characteristic features of inability for
interpersonal relationships in marriage
include affective immaturity, narcissism,
and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967,
it was not very clear under what rubric
homosexuality was understood to be
invalidating of marriage that is to say, is
homosexuality invalidating because of
the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because
of the inability to fulfill its
obligations. Progressively, however,
rotal jurisprudence began to understand
it as incapacity to assume the obligations
of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella
was able to consider, with charity,
homosexuality as an autonomous
ground of nullity. This is to say that a
person so afflicted is said to be unable to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage. In this same rotal decision, the
object of matrimonial consent is
understood to refer not only to the jus in
corpus but also the consortium totius
vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095
[incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage] certainly seems
to be the more adequate juridical
structure to account for the complex
phenomenon that homosexuality is. The
homosexual is not necessarily impotent
because, except in very few exceptional
cases, such a person is usually capable
of full sexual relations with the
spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity,
and a person so afflicted does not
necessarily suffer from a grave lack of
due discretion because this sexual
anomaly does not by itself affect the
critical, volitive, and intellectual
faculties. Rather, the homosexual person
is unable to assume the responsibilities
of marriage because he is unable to fulfill
this object of the matrimonial contract.In
other words, the invalidity lies, not so
much in the defect of consent, as in the
defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last
point that needs to be addressed is the
source of incapacity specified by the
canon: causes of a psychological
nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion
that the clause is a reference to the
personality of the contractant. In other
words, there must be a reference to the
psychic part of the person. It is only when
there is something in the psyche or in the
psychic constitution of the person which
impedes his capacity that one can then
affirm that the person is incapable
according to the hypothesis
contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is
judged incapable in this juridical sense
only to the extent that he is found to have
something rooted in his psychic
constitution which impedes the
assumption of these obligations. A bad
habit deeply engrained in ones
consciousness would not seem to qualify
to be a source of this invalidat ing
incapacity. The difference being that
there seems to be some freedom,
however remote, in the development of
 the habit, while one accepts as given
ones psychic constitution. It would seem
then that the law insists that the source of
the incapacity must be one which is not
the fruit of some degree of freedom. [42]
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the
courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine
whether a party to a marriage is psychologically
incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts
judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court
Appeals, [43] ruled that the findings of the trial court are final
and binding on the appellate courts. [44]
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and
declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the
pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court
Appeals, [45] explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-
examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented
evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court,
aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals,
ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of
the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating
children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be
applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had,
somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of
a set of strict standards in Molina,[46] thus:
From their submissions and the
Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code
are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof
to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devot es
an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from
of dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
of
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychologicalnot physical,
although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was petition, proven by evidence and
existing when the parties exchanged included in the text of the decision.
their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have (7) Interpretations given by the
attached at such moment, or prior National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
thereto. of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. It is
(4) Such incapacity must also be clear that Article 36 was taken by the
shown to be medically or clinically Family Code Revision Committee from
permanent or incurable. Such incurability Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
may be absolute or even relative only in Law, which became effective in 1983 and
regard to the other spouse, not which provides:
necessarily absolutely against every one
of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the The following are incapable of
assumption of marriage obligations, not contracting marriage: Those who are
necessarily to those not related to unable to assume the essential
marriage, like the exercise of a obligations of marriage due to causes of
profession or employment in a job. psychological nature.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but
Since the purpose of including
may not be psychologically capacitated
such provision in our Family Code is to
to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
harmonize our civil laws with the religious
children as an essential obligation of
faith of our people, it stands to reason
marriage.
that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal.
(5) Such illness must be grave Ideally subject to our law on
enough to bring about the disability of the evidencewhat is decreed as canonically
party to assume the essential obligations invalid should also be decreed civilly
of marriage. Thus, mild characterologic al void.
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be
This is one instance where, in
shown as downright incapacity or
view of the evident source and purpos e
inability, not a refusal, neglect or
of the Family Code provision,
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
contemporaneous religious interpretation
there is a natal or supervening disabling
is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
factor in the person, an adverse integral
State and the Churchwhile remaining
element in the personality structure that
independent, separate and apart from
effectively incapacitates the person from
each othershall walk together in synodal
really accepting and thereby complying
cadence towards the same goal of
with the obligations essential to marriage.
protecting and cherishing marriage and
the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
(6) The essential marital
obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
(8) The trial court must order the
as regards the husband and wife as well
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
Code in regard to parents and their
the state. No decision shall be handed
children. Such non-complied marital
down unless the Solicitor General issues
obligation(s) must also be stated in the
a certification, which will be quoted in the
 decision, briefly stating therein his
in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
reasons for his agreement or opposition,
as the case may be, to the petition. The incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed
Solicitor General, along with the
by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of
days from the date the case is deemed Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the
submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the world. [50] The unintended consequences of Molina,
equivalent function of the defensor however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095. [47] deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little
by little the very foundation of their families, our basic
social institutions. Far from what was intended by the
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes
the Courts membership concurred in the ponencia of then to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs ,
another threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and
pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman
Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that each Rota has annulled marriages on account of the
case must be judged, not on the basis of a personality disorders of the said individuals. [51]
priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite The Court need not worry about the possible

to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are

trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu ample safeguards against this contingency, among which

and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid is the intervention by the State, through the public

substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. [48]
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent
cases, [49] the Court has applied the aforesaid standards,
without too much regard for the laws clear intention
that each case is to be treated differently, as courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties
and/or fabrication of evidence. [52] The Court should rather
be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital
abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous
rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either

guided by experience, the findings of experts and partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not

researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually
of church tribunals. protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to
allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who
cannot comply with or assume the essential marital
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be
the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations
We now examine the instant case.
of a sociopathic personality anomaly. [53] Let it be noted
that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the
first place, as the same is void from the very
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or
beginning. [54] To indulge in imagery, the declaration of
less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in
nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial
March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways
to a stillborn marriage.
in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony
found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the
of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that
freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for
of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. [56]
the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its
business. And second, because the judicial declaration of
psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite
lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would
having the primary task and burden of decision-
have become vigilant, and never again marry a person
making, must not discount but, instead, must
with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the
the psychological and mental temperaments of the
risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
parties. [57]

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as
the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply
follows:
declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga
in Antonio v. Reyes,[55] there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition Furthermore, and equally
significant, the professional opinion of a
of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At psychological expert became
the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person's entire life, both
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis
before and after the ceremony, were
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations presented to these experts and they were
ask ed to give professional opinions about
but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for
a party's mental capacity at the time of
emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case- the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as
to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
decisive evidence of lack of valid
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and consent.
by decisions of church tribunals.

The Church took pains to point

out that its new openness in this area did
II. not amount to the addition of new
grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during
the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage
break down and premarital causes.
consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered
in isolation but in reference to the
fundamental relationship to the other
spouse.

During the 1970s, the Churc h

broadened its whole idea of marriag e Fr. Green, in an article
from that of a legal contract to that of a in Catholic Mind, lists six elements
covenant. The result of this was that it necessary to the mature marital
could no longer be assumed in relationship:
annulment cases that a person who
could intellectually understand the
concept of marriage could necessarily The courts
give valid consent to marry. The ability to consider the following
both grasp and assume the real elements crucial to the
obligations of a mature, lifelong marital commitment: (1)
commitment are now considered a a permanent and faithful
necessary prerequisite to valid commitment to the
matrimonial consent. marriage partner; (2)
openness to children
and partner; (3) stability;
Rotal decisions continued (4) emotional maturity;
applying the concept of incipient (5) financial
psychological incapacity, not only to responsibility; (6) an
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of ability to cope with the
personality disorders that incapacitate a ordinary stresses and
spouse or both spouses from assuming strains of marriage, etc.
or carrying out the essential obligations
of marriage. For marriage . . . is not
merely cohabitation or the right of the Fr. Green goes on to speak about some
spouses to each other's body for of the psychological conditions that might
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the lead to the failure of a marriage:
right to the community of the whole of life;
i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973
At stake is a type of
have refined the meaning of
constitutional
psychological or psychic capacity for
impairment precluding
marriage as presupposing the
conjugal communion
development of an adult personality;
even with the best
as meaning the capacity of the spouses
intentions of the parties.
to give themselves to each other and to
Among the psychic
accept the other as a distinct person; that
factors possibly giving
the spouses must be other oriented since
rise to his or her inability
the obligations of marriage are rooted in
to fulfill marital
a self-giving love; and that the spouses
obligations are the
must have the capacity for interpersonal
following: (1) antisocial
relationship because marriage is more
personality with its
than just a physical reality but involves a
fundamental lack of
true intertwining of personalities. The
loyalty to persons or
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage
sense of moral values ;
depends, according to Church decisions,
(2) hyperesthesia,
on the strength of this interpersonal
where the individual has
relationship. A serious incapacity for
no real freedom of
interpersonal sharing and support is held
sexual choice; (3) the
to impair the relationship and
inadequate personality
where personal
responses consistently
fall short of reasonable
expectations. Hernandez v. Court of Appeals [59] emphasizes
the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish
the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity,
xxxx
and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos [60] asserts, there is no
The
requirement that the person to be declared
psychological grounds
are the best approac h psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by
for anyone who doubts a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough
whether he or she has a
case for an annulment to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. [61] Verily,
on any other terms. A the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
situation that does not fit
into any of the more between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
traditional categories and the psychological disorder itself.
often fits very easily into
the psychological
category.
This is not to mention, but we mention
nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
As new as the
psychological grounds proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment
are, experts are already
of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
detecting a shift in their
use. Whereas originally conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
the emphasis was on the presence of psychological incapacity. [62] Parenthetically,
parties' inability to
exercise proper the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the
judgment at the time of inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
seem to be Marriages,[63] an option for the trial judge to refer the case
concentrating on the
parties' incapacity to to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an
assume or carry out their independent assessment and evaluation of the
responsibilities and
psychological state of the parties. This will assist the
obligations as
promised (lack of due courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to
competence). An
arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the
advantage to using the
ground of lack of due case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the
competence is that at parties prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
the time the marriage
was entered into civil
divorce and break up of
the family almost always
Going back, in the case at bench, the
is proof of someone's
failure to carry out psychological assessment, which we consider as
marital responsibilities
adequate, produced the findings that both parties are
as promised at the time
the marriage was afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent
entered into. [58]
 development led to certain personality
personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and
types. Thus, some disorders as
antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note described in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental
that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses
Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from
personality disorders as follows his oral, anal and phallic character
types. Demanding and dependent
behavior (dependent and passive-
aggressive) was thought to derive from
A group of disorders involving behaviors
fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics
or traits that are characteristic of a
of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional
persons recent and long-term
aloofness were thought to derive from
functioning. Patterns of perceiving and
fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the
thinking are not usually limited to isolated
phallic stage was thought to lead to
episodes but are deeply ingrained,
shallowness and an inability to engage in
inflexible, maladaptive and severe
intimate relationships. However, later
enough to cause the individual mental
researchers have found little evidenc e
stress or anxieties or to interfere with
that early childhood events or fixation at
interpersonal relationships and normal
certain stages of development lead to
functioning. Personality disorders are
specific personality patterns.
often recognizable by adolescence or
earlier, continue through adulthood and Genetic Factors Researchers
become less obvious in middle or old have found that there may be a genetic
age. An individual may have more than factor involved in the etiology of
one personality disorder at a time. antisocial and borderline personality
disorders; there is less evidence of
inheritance of other personality
The common factor among disorders. Some family, adoption and
individuals who have personality twin studies suggest that schizotypal
disorders, despite a variety of character personality may be related to genetic
traits, is the way in which the disorder factors.
leads to pervasive problems in social and
Neurobiologic Theories In
occupational adjustment. Some
individuals who have borderline
individuals with personality disorders are
personality, researchers have found that
perceived by others as overdramat ic ,
low cerebrospinal fluid 5-
paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal,
hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIA A )
without an awareness of their
negatively correlated with measures of
behaviors.Such qualities may lead to
aggression and a past history of suicide
trouble getting along with other people,
attempts. Schizotypal personality has
as well as difficulties in other areas of life
been associated with low platelet
and often a tendency to blame others for
monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and
their problems. Other individuals with
impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
personality disorders are not unpleasant
or difficult to work with but tend to be
lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits
can lead to interpersonal difficulties, Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in
reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction electroencephalograph (EEG) have been
with life. reported in antisocial personality for
many years; slow wave is the most
Causes of Personal i ty widely reported abnormality. A study of
Disorders Different mental health borderline patients reported that 38
viewpoints propose a variety of causes of percent had at least marginal EEG
personality disorders. These include abnormalities, compared with 19 percent
Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic in a control group.
theories and brain wave activity.

Freudian Sigmund Freud

believed that fixation at certain stages of Types of Disorders According to the
American Psychiatric
 Associations Diagnostic and Statistical they actually bring about dominance by
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. , others through a quest for overprotection.
1987), or DSM-III-R, personality
disorders are categorized into three
major clusters: Dependent personality disorder usually
begins in early adulthood. Individuals
who have this disorder may be unable to
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and make everyday decisions without advic e
schizotypal personality disorders. or reassurance from others, may allow
Individuals who have these disorders others to make most of their important
often appear to have odd or eccentric decisions (such as where to live), tend to
habits and traits. agree with people even when they
believe they are wrong, have difficulty
starting projects or doing things on their
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, own, volunteer to do things that are
histrionic and narcissistic personality demeaning in order to get approval from
disorders. Individuals who have these other people, feel uncomfortable or
disorders often appear overly emotional, helpless when alone and are often
erratic and dramatic. preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned. [65]

Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent ,

obsessive-compulsive and passive-
aggressive personality and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear anxious or fearful.

The DSM-III-R also lists another Characteristics include a consistent

category, personality disorder not pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the
otherwise specified, that can be used for conventional behavioral limitations
other specific personality disorders or for imposed by a society, an inability to
mixed conditions that do not qualify as sustain a job over a period of years,
any of the specific personality disorders. disregard for the rights of others (either
through exploitiveness or criminal
behavior), frequent physical fights and,
Individuals with diagnosable quite commonly, child or spouse abuse
personality disorders usually have long - without remorse and a tendency to blame
term concerns, and thus therapy may be others. There is often a faade of charm
long-term. [64] and even sophistication that masks
disregard, lack of remorse for
mistreatment of others and the need to
control others.

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the

following manner
A personality disorder characterized by a
pattern of dependent and submissive
behavior. Such individuals usually lack
self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are
easily hurt by others comments. At times
Although characteristics of this disorder
describe criminals, they also may befit
some individuals who are prominent in
business or politics whose habits of self-
centeredness and disregard for the rights
of others may be hidden prior to a public
scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of
personality disorder was referred to as
 moral insanity. The term described
immoral, guiltless behavior that was not
accompanied by impairments in
reasoning. Although on a different plane, the same may also be said
of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the
According to the classification system
used in the Diagnostic and Statistical essential marital obligations. This finding takes into
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
1987), anti-social personality disorder is
one of the four dramatic personality mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her
disorders, the others being borderline, tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the
histrionic and narcissistic. [66]
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by
society. [68] Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent
is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the
of committing suicide.
disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as
decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert
witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and
is null and void on ground of both parties psychological
incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which
marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus,
had a first-hand view of the witnesses deportment, arrived
declared null and void.
at the same conclusion.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent
for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003
personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867
fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision,
make everyday decisions without advice from others,
dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
allows others to make most of his important decisions
(such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing SO ORDERED.

things on his own, volunteers to do things that are

demeaning in order to get approval from other people,
feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. [67] As clearly
shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated
to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak
and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has
no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear
direction in life.
 BENJAMIN G. TING, G.R. No. 166562

Petitioner,
Present: The facts follow.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and
Chairperson,
respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in
CARPIO MORALES, *
- versus - 1972 while they were classmates in medical
CHICO-NAZA RIO, fell in love, and they were wed on July 26,
school. [5] They
NACHURA,
1975 inand
Cebu City when respondent was already
pregnantJJ.
PERALTA, with their first child.

Promulgated:
At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Maguikay, Mandaue City. [6] When their second child was
March 31, 2009
Respondent. born, the couple decided to move to Carmens family
home in Cebu City. [7] In September 1975, Benjamin
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----x passed the medical board examinations [8] and thereaft er
proceeded to take a residency program to become a
surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By
1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for
DECISION
the said field[9] and, in 1980, he began working
for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member
NACHURA, J.:
of its active staff, [10] while Carmen worked as the hospitals
Treasurer. [11]

The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis,

born on December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on August
25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles
Before us is a petition for review
Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on
on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003
July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16,
Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its 1991. [12]
December 13, 2004 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R. CV No.
59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and
resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision[3] of the On October 21, 1993, after being married for
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest
City,declaring the marriage between petitioner and child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified
respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the
the Family Code. [4] declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36
of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered
from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only
became manifest thereafter. [13]
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their
marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin used to
drink and gamble occasionally with his friends. [14] But
after they were married, petitioner continued to drink
regularly and would go home at about midnight or
sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and
violent. He would confront and insult respondent ,
physically assault her and force her to have sex with him.
There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun
and shot the gate of their house. [15] Because of his
drinking habit, Benjamins job as anesthesiologist was
affected to the point that he often had to refuse to answer
to finance his gambling. [21] There was also an instance
when the spouses had to sell their family car and even a
portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to
be able to pay off his gambling debts. [22] Benjamin only
stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned
therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said
he purposely committed so that he would be banned from
the gambling establishments. [23]
In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological
incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which
adversely affected his family relationship
and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought

the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other about by his excessive and regular

anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling drinking;

him for his services because they perceived petitioner to

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a
be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband
result of which Benjamin found it
about the latters drinking problem, but Benjamin refused
necessary to sell the family car twice and
to acknowledge the same. [16]
the property he inherited from his father
in order to pay off his debts, because he
no longer had money to pay the same;
Carmen also complained that petitioner
and
deliberately refused to give financial support to their family
and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for 4. Benjamins irresponsibility and

money for their children. Instead of providing support, immaturity as shown by his failure and

Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and refusal to give regular financial support to

gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his family. [24]

his hobby. [17] He rarely stayed home[18] and even

neglected his obligation to his children. [19]
In his answer, Benjamin denied being
psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a

Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said

compulsive gambling. [20] He would gamble two or three that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs

times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and

or from loan sharks whenever he had no money. for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except

Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wifes own jewelry when provoked by circumstances. [25] As for his alleged
failure to support his family financially, Benjamin claimed
that it was Carmen herself who would collect his
professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still
serving there as practicing anesthesiologist. [26] In his
testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family
financial support within his means whenever he could and
would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending
his hard-earned money on unnecessary things. [27] He also
pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took
care of their children, while Carmen played mahjongwit h
her friends twice a week. [28]
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding
Benjamins drinking and gambling habits and violent
behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who
served as nanny to the spouses children from 1987 to
1992. [29] Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed
instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in
front of their children. [30]
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza
Trinidad-Oate, a psychiatrist. [31] Instead of the usual
personal interview, however, Dr. Oates evaluation of
Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic
notes taken during Benjamins deposition because the
latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in
a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of
stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins
compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical
abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner
suffers from a personality disorder. [32]
To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented
Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the
Department of Psychiatry
in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his
expert witness. [33] Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins
psychological behavior based on the transcript of
stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluat ion
report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from
the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr.
Obras) interview with Benjamins brothers. [34] Contrary to
Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is
nothing wrong with petitioners personality, considering
the latters good relationship with his fellow doctors and
his good track record as anesthesiologist. [35]
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its
Decision[36] declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr.
Oates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in
the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found
Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler,
someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his
family, and a person with violent tendencies, which
character traits find root in a personality defect existing
even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing
considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the marriage between plaintiff
and defendant null and void ab
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family
Code. x x x
xxxx
SO ORDERED. [37]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19,
2000, the CA rendered a Decision[38] reversing the trial
courts ruling. It faulted the trial courts finding, stating that
no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that For our resolution are the following issues:
Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time
he married Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was
based only on theories and not on established I. Whether the CA violated
the rule on stare decisis when it
fact, [39] contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. refused to follow the guidelines
Court of Appeals [40] and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases;
Appeals and Molina.[41]

II. Whether the CA correctly

ruled that the requirement of
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for
proof of psychological incapacity
reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage based on
should not be applied to this case since
Article 36 of the Family Code has
the Molina decision was promulgated only on February been liberalized; and
13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her
petition with the RTC. [42] She claimed that
III. Whether the CAs decision
the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively , declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null
as it would run counter to the principle of stare
and void [is] in accordance with
decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for law and jurisprudence.
reconsideration for having been filed beyond the
prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a
manifestation explaining compliance with the prescriptive
period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. We find merit in the petition.

Undaunted, respondent filed a petition

for certiorari[43] with this Court. In a Resolution[44] dated
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and
directed the CA to resolve Carmens motion for
reconsideration. [45] On review, the CA decided to
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherenc e
reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17,
by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court
2003, it issued an Amended Decision[46] reversing its first
in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once
ruling and sustaining the trial courts decision. [47]
a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further

A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by argument. [49] Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to

Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in its relitigate the same issues, [50] necessary for two simple

December 13, 2004 Resolution. [48] reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the
principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. [51]
Hence, this petition.

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare
decisis was applied by the English courts and was later
adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now
Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos discussion on the
historical development of this legal principle in his
dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on
Elections [52] is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et
non quieta movere means stand by the
thing and do not disturb the calm. The
doctrine started with the English Courts.
Blackstone observed that at the
beginning of the 18th century, it is an
established rule to abide by former
precedents where the same points come
again in litigation. As the rule evolved,
early limits to its application were
recognized: (1) it would not be followed if
it were plainly unreasonable; (2) where
courts of equal authority developed
conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding
force of the decision was the actual
principle or principles necessary for the
decision; not the words or reasoning
used to reach the decision.
The doctrine migrated to
the United States. It was recognized by
the framers of the U.S. Constitution.
According to Hamilton, strict rules and
precedents are necessary to prevent
arbitrary discretion in the
courts. Madison agreed but stressed that
x x x once the precedent ventures into
the realm of altering or repealing the law,
it should be rejected. Prof. Consovoy well
noted that Hamilton and Madison
disagree about the countervailing policy
considerations that would allow a judge
to abandon a precedent. He added that
their ideas reveal a deep internal conflict
between the concreteness required by
the rule of law and the flexibility
demanded in error correction. It is this
internal conflict that the Supreme Court
has attempted to deal with for over two
centuries.
Indeed, two centuries of
American case law will confirm Prof.
Consovoy's observation although stare
decisis developed its own life in
the United States. Two strains of stare
decisishave been isolated by legal
scholars. The first, known
as vertical stare decisis deals with the
duty of lower courts to apply the
decisions of the higher courts to cases
involving the same facts. The second,
known as horizontal stare
decisis requires that high courts must
follow its own precedents. Prof.
Consovoy correctly observes that
vertical stare decisis has been viewed as
an obligation, while horizontal stare
decisis, has been viewed as a policy,
imposing choice but not a command.
Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the
precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish
the two kinds of horizontal stare
decisis constitutional stare decisis and
statutory stare
decisis. Constitutional stare
decisis involves judicial interpretations
of the Constitution while statutory stare
decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for
courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to
apply stare decisis in constitutional
litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the
binding effect of the doctrine in
constitutional litigations still holds sway
today. In soothing prose, Brandeis
stated: Stare decisis is not . . . a univers al
and inexorable command. The rule
of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether
it shall be followed or departed from, is a
question entirely within the discretion of
the court, which is again called upon to
consider a question once decided. In the
same vein, the venerable Justice
Frankfurter opined: the ultimate
touchstone of constitutionality is the
Constitution itself and not what we have
said about it. In contrast, the application
of stare decisis on judicial interpretation
of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice
Stevens explains: after a statute has
been construed, either by this Court or by
a consistent course of decision by other
federal judges and agencies, it acquires
a meaning that should be as clear as if
the judicial gloss had been drafted by the
Congress itself. This stance reflects both
respect for Congress' role and the need
to preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow
the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of
reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial
institutions; (2) it promotes judicial
economy; and, (3) it allows for
predictability. Contrariwise, courts refus e
to be bound by the stare decisis rule
where (1) its application perpetuates
illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings;
(2) it cannot accommodate changing
social and political understandings; (3) it
leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of
Congress; and, (4) activist judges can
dictate the policy for future courts while
judges that respect stare decisis are
stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S.
Supreme Court has refused to follow
the stare decisis rule and reversed its
decisions in 192 cases. The most famous
of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which junked Plessy
v. Ferguson's separate but equal
doctrine. Plessy upheld as constitutional
a state law requirement that races be
segregated on public transportation.
In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court,
unanimously held that separate . . . is
inherently unequal. Thus, by freeing itself
from the shackles of stare decisis, the
U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored
Americans from the chains of inequality.
In the Philippine setting, this Court has
likewise refused to be straitjacketed by
the stare decisis rule in order to promot e
public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we revers ed
our original ruling that certain provisions
of the Mining Law are unconstitutional.
Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, we overturned our first ruling
and held, on motion for reconsideration,
that a private respondent is bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition
process.
An examination of decisions
on stare decisis in major countries will
show that courts are agreed on the
factors that should be considered before
overturning prior rulings. These are
workability, reliance, intervening
developments in the law and changes in
fact. In addition, courts put in the balanc e
the following determinants: closeness of
the voting, age of the prior decision and
its merits.
The leading case in deciding
whether a court should follow the stare
decisis rule in constitutional litigations
is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It
established a 4-pronged test. The court
should (1) determine whether the rule
has proved to be intolerable simply in
defying practical workability; (2) consider
whether the rule is subject to a kind of
reliance that would lend a special
hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether
related principles of law have so far
developed as to have the old rule no
more than a remnant of an abandoned
doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts
have so changed or come to be seen
differently, as to have robbed the old rule
of significant application or
justification. [53]
To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal
guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be
applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle
of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument
was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v.
Pesca, [54] and again in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In these
cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction
of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the
date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of
this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted,
that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordanc e
therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non
respicit.
II. On liberalizing the required proof for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned
the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena
Gutierrez Yu-Te,[56] we declared that, in hindsight, it may
have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid
set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving
as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became
straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological
incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only
contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well
because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no
case can be considered as on all fours with another. [57]
By the very nature of cases involving the application of
Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight
to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties in
order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity.
However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions
declaration of nullity of marriage. [58] At best, courts must
treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable
evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact,
if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or
psychological examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to. [59] The trial court, as in any other given
case presented before it, must always base its decision
not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties
but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course
the of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary
to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
Ong
by decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply
suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set
a forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege
in the petition the particular root cause of
the psychological incapacity and to
attach thereto the verified written report
of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too
expensive for the parties. They adversely
affect access to justice o poor litigants. It
is also a fact that there are provinc es
where these experts are not available.
for Thus, the Committee deemed
it necessary to relax this stringent
requirement enunciated in the Molina
Case. The need for the examination of a
party or parties by a psychiatrist or
clinical psychologist and the presentation
of psychiatric experts shall now be
determined by the court during the pre-
trial conference.[60]

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full
opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of
psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and
incurability of a partys alleged psychological incapacity,
then such expert opinion should be presented and,
accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether
to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality
of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove
that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the
duties expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological
incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18)
years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts and the
appellate courts rulings declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the
application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significanc e
to the marriage. [61] The psychological illness that must
have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. [62]
In this case, respondent failed to prove that
petitioners defects were present at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior
to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would
occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such
statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre -
existing psychological defect on the part of her husband.
Neither did the evidence adduced prove such defects to
be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should
have been the decisive evidence in determining whether
to declare the marriage between the parties null and void.
Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions
provided by these experts strengthened respondent s
allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts
provided diametrically contradicting psychological
evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners behavior is
a positive indication of a personality disorder, [63] while Dr.
Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with
petitioners personality. Moreover, there appears to be
greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because, aside from
analyzing the transcript of Benjamins deposition similar to
what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration
the psychological evaluation report furnished by another
psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined
Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview
with Benjamins brothers. [64] Logically, therefore, the
balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning
petitioners drinking and gambling problems, or his violent
outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to
justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he
owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as
the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court
finds respondents testimony, as well as the totality of
evidence presented by the respondent, to be too
inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant
to Article 36.
 It should be remembered that the presumption is
always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. [65] In this case, the
presumption has not been amply rebutted and must,
perforce, prevail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition

for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17,
2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
MARIETA C. AZCUETA Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT
OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECI SI ON
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated
August 31, 2007, 1 and its Resolution dated November
20, 2007. 2
Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met
in 1993. Less than two months after their first meeting,
they got married on July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of
Padua Church, Antipolo City. At the time of their
marriage, petitioner was 23 years old while respondent
was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of
marriage. They have no children.
On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72, a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-
6428.
Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an
answer despite service of summons upon him. Because
of this, the trial court directed the City Prosecutor to
conduct an investigation whether there was collusion
between the parties. In a report dated August 16, 2002,
Prosecutor Wilfredo G. Oca found that there was no
collusion between the parties.
On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General
entered its appearance for the Republic of the
Philippines and submitted a written authority for the City
Prosecutor to appear in the case on the States behalf
under the supervision and control of the Solicitor
General.
In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner
claimed that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. According to petitioner, Rodolfo was
emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually
failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the
essential responsibilities and duties of a husband.
Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to
look for a job and instead always asked his mother for
financial assistance. When they were married it was
Rodolfos mother who found them a room near the
Azcueta home and it was also his mother who paid the
monthly rental.
Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged
her husband to find employment. She even bought him a
newspaper every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he
was too old and most jobs have an age limit and that he
had no clothes to wear to job interviews. To inspire him,
petitioner bought him new clothes and a pair of shoes
and even gave him money. Sometime later, her husband
told petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner
was overjoyed. However, some weeks after, petitioner
was informed that her husband had been seen at the
house of his parents when he was supposed to be at
work. Petitioner discovered that her husband didnt
actually get a job and the money he gave her (which was
supposedly his salary) came from his mother. When she
confronted him about the matter, Rodolfo allegedly cried
like a child and told her that he pretended to have a job
so that petitioner would stop nagging him about applying
for a job. He also told her that his parents can support
their needs. Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo was so
dependent on his mother and that all his decisions and
attitudes in life should be in conformity with those of his
mother.
Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that
every time Rodolfo would get drunk he became
physically violent towards her. Their sexual relationship
was also unsatisfactory. They only had sex once a
month and petitioner never enjoyed it. When they
discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say that
sex was sacred and it should not be enjoyed nor
abused. He did not even want to have a child yet
because he claimed he was not ready. Additionally,
when petitioner requested that they move to another
place and rent a small room rather than live near his
parents, Rodolfo did not agree. Because of this, she was
forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow
her. But he did not.
During the trial of the case, petitioner presented
Rodolfos first cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a witness. In
1993, Ramos, the niece of Rodolfos father, was living
with Rodolfos family. She corroborated petitioners
testimony that Rodolfo was indeed not gainfully
employed when he married petitioner and he merely
relied on the allowance given by his mother. This
witness also confirmed that it was respondents mother
who was paying the rentals for the room where the
couple lived. She also testified that at one time, she saw
respondent going to his mothers house in business
attire. She learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner that
he has a job but in truth he had none. She also stated
that respondent was still residing at the house of his
mother and not living together with petitioner.
Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a
psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas testified that after examining
petitioner for her psychological evaluation, she found
petitioner to be mature, independent, very responsible,
focused and has direction and ambition in life. She also
observed that petitioner works hard for what she wanted
and therefore, she was not psychologically incapacitated
to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Dr.
Villegas added that based on the information gathered
from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he
was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that
he was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder
associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine
strivings.
She explained that persons suffering from Dependent
Personality Disorder were those whose response to
ordinary way of life was ineffectual and inept,
characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-
doubt, inability to make his own decisions and
dependency on other people. She added that the root
cause of this psychological problem was a cross-
identification with the mother who was the dominant
figure in the family considering that respondents father
was a seaman and always out of the house. She stated
that this problem began during the early stages in his life
but manifested only after the celebration of his marriage.
According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also
severe because he will not be able to make and to carry
on the responsibilities expected of a married person. It
was incurable because it started in early development
and therefore deeply ingrained into his personality.
Based on petitioners evidence, the RTC rendered a
Decision dated October 25, 2004, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and Rodolfo as null and void ab initio,
thus:
With the preponderant evidence presented by the
petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally failed in
his commitments and obligations as a husband.
Respondents emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is
grave and he has no showing of improvement. He failed
likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife
because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of
having sexual relationship since he could not distinguish
between the mother and the wife and therefore sex
relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.
The respondent is suffering from dependent personality
disorder and therefore cannot make his own decision
and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband.
The marital obligations to live together, observe mutual
love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the
respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner
clearly show that respondent failed to comply with his
marital obligations.
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent
should be declared null and void on the account of
respondents severe and incurable psychological
incapacity.
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between
Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo B. Azcuata is hereby
declared null and void abinitio pursuant to Article 36 fo
the Family Code.
The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil
Registrar of Antipolo City are ordered to make proper
entries into the records of the parties pursuant to
judgment of the court.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public
Prosecutor and the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED. 3
On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended
Decision4 to correct the first name of Rodolfo which was
erroneously typewritten as "Gerardo" in the caption of
the original Decision.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision
objecting that (a) the psychiatric report of Dr. Villegas
was based solely on the information provided by
petitioner and was not based on an examination of
Rodolfo; and (b) there was no showing that the alleged
psychological defects were present at the inception of
marriage or that such defects were grave, permanent
and incurable.
Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and
essentially ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove
the psychological incapacity of Rodolfo or that his
alleged psychological disorder existed prior to the
marriage and was grave and incurable. In setting aside
the factual findings of the RTC, the CA reasoned that:
The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that
respondents alleged irresponsibility and over-
dependence on his mother is symptomatic of
psychological incapacity as above explained.
xxx xxx xxx
Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellees failure to
prove that respondents supposed psychological malady
existed even before the marriage. Records however
show that the parties were living in harmony in the first
few years of their marriage and were living on their own
in a rented apartment. That respondent often times asks
his mother for financial support may be brought about by
his feeling of embarrassment that he cannot contribute
at all to the family coffers, considering that it was his wife
who is working for the family. Petitioner-appellee
likewise stated that respondent does not like to have a
child on the pretense that respondent is not yet ready to
have one. However this is not at all a manifestation of
irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent has shown
that he has a full grasp of reality and completely
understands the implication of having a child especially
that he is unemployed. The only problem besetting the
union is respondents alleged irresponsibility and
unwillingness to leave her (sic) mother, which was not
proven in this case to be psychological-rooted.
The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only
by his youth and emotional immaturity which by
themselves, do not constitute psychological incapacity
(Deldel vs. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 461, 466
[2004]). At all events, petitioner-appellee has utterly
failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity
on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of
solemnization of the contract, so immaturity and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity (Pesca vs. Pesca, 356 SCRA
588, 594 [2001]). As held by the Supreme Court:
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some
marital obligations, it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-
Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007).
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed
decision dated July 19, 2005 fo the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 02-
6428 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage
berween petitioner-appellee Marietta C. Azcueta and
respondent Rodolfo B. Azcueta remains
VALID. 5 (emphasis ours)
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is
whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is
adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his
essential marital obligations.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment,
submits that the appellate court correctly ruled that the
"totality of evidence presented by petitioner" failed to
prove her spouses psychological incapacity pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code and settled jurisprudence.
We grant the petition.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. 6 Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested. The
State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid
and happy families. The break up of families weakens
our social and moral fabric and, hence, their
preservation is not the concern alone of the family
members. 7
Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines
v. Court of Appeals and Molina8 stringent guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict
on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I
dos." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
 same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x. 9 (Emphasis supplied)
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. 11 It
should refer to "no less than a mental, not physical,
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage." 12 The intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. 13
However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have
observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down
in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition
of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36.14 Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In regard to psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another
case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court. 15 With the advent of Te v. Te, 16 the Court
encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on
the interpretation of Article 36 although there has been
no major deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina
doctrine.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we
find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to
warrant the annulment of the parties marriage under
Article 36.
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to
prove the psychological incapacity of her husband.
The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas
psychiatric report, highlights the lack of personal
examination of Rodolfo by said doctor and the doctors
reliance on petitioners version of events. In Marcos v.
Marcos,17 it was held that there is no requirement that
the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. What
matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is
adequate to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the
psychologist, petitioner testified in court on the facts
upon which the psychiatric report was based. When a
witness testified under oath before the lower court and
was cross-examined, she thereby presented evidence in
the form of testimony. 18 Significantly, petitioners
narration of facts was corroborated in material points by
the testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas
likewise testified in court to elaborate on her report and
fully explain the link between the manifestations of
Rodolfos psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure
that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from
the appellate courts because the trial court had an
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while
giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack
thereof. 19 Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity
of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to
dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioners expert witness. 20
Second, the root cause of Rodolfos psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the petition, sufficiently proven by expert
testimony, and clearly explained in the trial courts
decision.
The petition alleged that from the beginning of their
marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and,
despite pleas from petitioner, he could not be persuaded
to even attempt to find employment; that from the choice
of the family abode to the couples daily sustenance,
Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that the couples
inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfos refusal to
have a child stemmed from a psychological condition
linked to his relationship to his mother.1avvphi1
These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume
his marital obligations were linked to medical or clinical
causes by an expert witness with more than forty years
experience from the field of psychology in general and
psychological incapacity, in particular. In a portion of her
psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Villegas elucidated the
psychodynamics of the case of petitioner and Rodolfo,
thus:
Marietta is the eldest of 5 siblings, whose parents has
very limited education. Being the eldest, she is expected
to be the role model of younger siblings. In so doing, she
has been restricted and physically punished, in order to
tow the line. But on the other hand, she developed
growing resentments towards her father and promised
herself that with the first opportunity, shell get out of the
family. When Rodolfo came along, they were married 1
months after they met, without really knowing anything
about him. Her obsession to leave her family was her
primary reason at that time and she did not exercise
good judgment in her decision making in marriage.
During their 4 years marital relationship, she came to
realize that Rodolfo cannot be responsible in his duties
and responsibilities, in terms of loving, caring, protection,
financial support and sex.
On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3rd among 5 boys.
The father, who was perceived to be weak, and his two
elder brothers were all working as seaman. Rodolfo who
was always available to his mothers needs, became an
easy prey, easily engulfed into her system. The
relationship became symbiotic, that led to a prolonged
and abnormal dependence to his mother. The mother,
being the stronger and dominant parent, is a convenient
role model, but the reversal of roles became confusing
that led to ambivalence of his identity and grave
dependency. Apparently, all the boys were hooked up to
his complexities, producing so much doubts in their
capabilities in a heterosexual setting. Specifically,
Rodolfo tried, but failed. His inhibitions in a sexual
relationship, is referable to an unconscious guilt feelings
of defying the mothers love. At this point, he has
difficulty in delineating between the wife and the mother,
so that his continuous relationship with his wife produces
considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and
crippled him psychologically.
Based on the above clinical data, family background and
outcome of their marriage, it is the opinion of the
examiner, that Mrs. Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is mature,
independent and responsible and is psychologically
capacitated to perform the duties and obligations of
marriage. Due to her numerous personal problems she
has difficulty in handling her considerable anxiety, at
present. There are strong clinical evidences that Mr.
Rodolfo Azcueta is suffering from a Dependent
Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy
that renders him psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a
strong and prolonged dependence with a parent of the
opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no longer
appropriate. This situation crippled his psychological
functioning related to sex, self confidence,
independence, responsibility and maturity. It existed
prior to marriage, but became manifest only after the
celebration due to marital stresses and demands. It is
considered as permanent and incurable in nature,
because it started early in his life and therefore became
so deeply ingrained into his personality structure. It is
severe or grave in degree, because it hampered and
interfered with his normal functioning related to
heterosexual adjustment. 21
These findings were reiterated and further explained by
Dr. Villegas during her testimony, the relevant portion of
which we quote below:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the
petitioner, what was your psychological
evaluation?
A: Ive found the petitioner in this case, Mrs.
Marietta Azcueta as matured, independent, very
responsible, focused, she has direction and
ambition in life and she work hard for what she
wanted, maam, and therefore, I concluded that
she is psychologically capacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of the marriage,
maam.
Q: How about the respondent, Madame
Witness, what was your psychological
evaluation with regards to the respondent?
A: Based on my interview, Ive found out that the
husband Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage suffering from a
psychiatric classification as Dependent
Personality Disorder associated with severe
inadequacy related to masculine strivings,
maam.
Q: In laymans language, Madame Witness, can
you please explain to us what do you mean by
Dependent Personality Disorder?
A: Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic)
those persons in which their response to
ordinary way of life are ineffectual and inept
characterized by loss of self confidence, always
in doubt with himself and inability to make his
own decision, quite dependent on other people,
and in this case, on his mother, maam.
Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness,
as a psychological problem of respondent,
Rodolfo Azcueta?
A: Very much, maam.
Q: Why?
A: Because it will always interfered, hampered
and disrupt his duties and responsibilities as a
husband and as a father, maam.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness,
what is the root cause of this psychological
problem?
A: The root cause of this psychological problem
is a cross identification with the mother who is
the dominant figure in the family, the mother has
the last say and the authority in the family while
the father was a seaman and always out of the
house, and if present is very shy, quiet and he
himself has been very submissive and passive
to the authority of the wife, maam.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness,
under what circumstance this kind of
psychological problem manifested?
A: This manifested starting his personality
development and therefore, during his early
stages in life, maam.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this
kind of problem existed to Rodolfo Azcueta, the
respondent in this case, before the celebration
of the marriage?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And it became manifested only after the
celebration of the marriage?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it
became manifested with thethat the
manifestation came too late?
A: The manifestation came too late because the
history of Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta was very mild, no
stresses, no demand on his life, at 24 years old
despite the fact that he already finished college
degree of Computer Science, there is no
demand on himself at least to establish his own,
and the mother always would make the decision
for him, maam.
Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of
psychological problem severe?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Why do you consider this psychological
problem severe, Madame Witness?
A: Because he will not be able to make and to
carry on the responsibility that is expected of a
married person, maam.
Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?
A: It is incurable because it started early in
development and therefore it became so deeply
ingrained into his personality, and therefore, it
cannot be changed nor cured at this stage,
maam.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that
it is Permanent?
A: It is permanent in nature, sir.
Q: And last question as an expert witness, what
is the effect of the psychological problem as far
as the marriage relationship of Rodolfo Azcueta
is concerned?
A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent
marriage relationship because standard
expectation is, the husband has to work, to feed,
to protect, to love, and of course, to function on
(sic) the sexual duties of a husband to the wife,
but in this case, early in their marriage, they had
only according to the wife, experienced once
sexual relationship every month and this is due
to the fact that because husband was so closely
attached to the mother, it is a result of the
unconscious guilt feeling of the husband in
defying the mothers love when they will be
having heterosexual relationship and therefore,
at that point, he will not be able to distinguish
between the mother and the wife and therefore,
sex relationship will not be satisfactory
according to expectation, maam. 22
In Te v. Te, we held that "[b]y the very nature of Article
36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden
of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties." 23
Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court
clearly explained the basis for its decision, which we
reproduce here for emphasis:
With the preponderant evidence presented by the
petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally failed in
his commitments and obligations as a husband.
Respondents emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is
grave and he has no showing of improvement. He failed
likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife
because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of
having sexual relationship since he could not distinguish
between the mother and the wife and therefore sex
relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.
The respondent is suffering from dependent personality
disorder and therefore cannot make his own decision
and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband.
The marital obligations to live together, observe mutual
love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the
respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner
clearly show that respondent failed to comply with his
marital obligations.
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent
should be declared null and void on the account of
respondents severe and incurable psychological
incapacity.
Third, Rodolfos psychological incapacity was
established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. Contrary to the
CAs finding that the parties lived harmoniously and
independently in the first few years of marriage,
witnesses were united in testifying that from inception of
the marriage, Rodolfos irresponsibility, overdependence
on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were
already evident. To be sure, these manifestations of
Rodolfos dependent personality disorder must have
existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his
early development and a by product of his upbringing
and family life.
Fourth, Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been
shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to render him
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The Court is wary of the CAs bases for overturning
factual findings of the trial court on this point. The CAs
reasoning that Rodolfos requests for financial
assistance from his mother might have been due to his
embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family
coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was
his "responsible" realization that he should not have a
child since he is unemployed are all purely speculative.
There is no evidence on record to support these views.
Again, we must point out that appellate courts should not
substitute their discretion with that of the trial court or the
expert witnesses, save only in instance where the
findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted
by evidence.
We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfos
irresponsibility and overdependenc e on his mother can
be attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot
overlook the fact that at the time of his marriage to
petitioner, he was nearly 29 years old or the fact that the
expert testimony has identified a grave clinical or
medical cause for his abnormal behavior.
In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the
nature of a dependent personality disorder and how one
afflicted with such a disorder would be incapacitated
from complying with marital obligations, to wit:
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent
personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for
he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice
from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with
people even when he believes they are wrong, has
difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other
people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and
is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As
clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything
dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity
as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has
no goals and clear direction in life. 24
Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with
dependent personality disorder is automatically deemed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
obligations of marriage. We realize that psychology is by
no means an exact science and the medical cases of
patients, even though suffering from the same disorder,
may be different in their symptoms or manifestations and
in the degree of severity. It is the duty of the court in its
evaluation of the facts, as guided by expert opinion, to
carefully scrutinize the type of disorder and the gravity of
the same before declaring the nullity of a marriage under
Article 36.
Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the
essential marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to
71 of the Family Code. 25 As noted by the trial court, as a
result of Rodolfos dependent personality disorder, he
cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his
responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to
fulfill the marital obligations to live together, observe
mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed,
one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife;
one who cannot independently make decisions
regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters that
spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to
the material, physical and emotional well-being of his
spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36.

Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfos condition which has

been deeply ingrained in his system since his early
years was supported by evidence and duly explained by
the expert witness.

At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes

peculiar predicament it finds itself in those instances
when it is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in
a particular point in time and apply them to situations
and people in a society in flux. With respect to the
concept of psychological incapacity, courts must take
into account not only developments in science and
medicine but also changing social and cultural mores,
including the blurring of traditional gender roles. In this
day and age, women have taken on increasingly
important roles in the financial and material support of
their families. This, however, does not change the ideal
that the family should be an "autonomous" social
institution, wherein the spouses cooperate and
are equally responsible for the support and well-being of
the family. In the case at bar, the spouses from the
outset failed to form themselves into a family, a cohesive
unit based on mutual love, respect and support, due to
the failure of one to perform the essential duties of
marriage.

This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te:

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys

psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing
the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the
sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a
person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who
cannot comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may
be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations
of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that
in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first
place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To
indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article
36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage. 26 (emphasis ours)

In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of

nullity of the parties marriage pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code is proper under the premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended

Decision dated July 19, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 72, Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428
is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C.
MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECI SI ON
BERSAMIN, J.:
To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity
of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must
sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's psychological
incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the
time of the marriage.
Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on
March 19, 2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court in
Mandaluyong City (RTC) declaring her marriage with
respondent Dominic C. Mendoza (Dominic) as null and
void.
Antecedents
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to
the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea.
They had been next-door neighbors in the appartelle
they were renting while they were still in college she, at
Assumption College while he, at San Beda College
taking a business management course. After a month of
courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy
ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom
they named Allysa Bianca. They got married on her
eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in
Pasay City on June 24, 1991, 2 after which they moved to
her place, although remaining dependent on their
parents for support.
When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to
borrow funds from petitioners best friend to settle the
hospital bills. He remained jobless and dependent upon
his father for support until he finished his college course
in October 1993. She took on various jobs to meet the
familys needs, first as a part-time aerobics instructor in
1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-time employee in
Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company. Being the one with
the fixed income, she shouldered all of the familys
expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their childs
educational needs).
On his part, Dominic sold Colliers Encyclopedia for
three months after his graduation from college before he
started working as a car salesman for Toyota Motors in
Bel-Air, Makati in 1994. 3 Ironically, he spent his first
sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends
inasmuch as she shouldered all the household expenses
and their childs schooling because his irregular income
could not be depended upon. In September 1994, she
discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-
employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication
between them became rare until they started to sleep in
separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual
relationship. 4
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu
Charade car as a birthday present. Later on, he asked
her to issue two blank checks that he claimed would be
for the cars insurance coverage. She soon found out,
however, that the checks were not paid for the cars
insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse,
she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself,
forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the
cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of
P120,000.00.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his
employment after he ran away with P164,000.00
belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged
with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for
which he was arrested and incarcerated. After petitioner
and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner
discovered that he had also swindled many clients some
of whom were even threatening petitioner, her mother
and her sister themselves. 5
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal
abode because petitioner asked him for "time and space
to think things over." A month later, she refused his
attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to
commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately
left the house to live in another place concealed from
him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her
petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage
with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition.
Ruling of the RTC
In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness,
together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson,
and Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did
not appear during trial and presented no evidence.
On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage
between petitioner and Dominic an absolute
nullity, 6 holding in part:
xxx. The result of Dr. Samsons clinical evaluation as
testified to by her and per Psychiatric Report she issued
together with one Dr. Doris Primero showed that
petitioner appears to be mature, strong and responsible
individual. Godly, childlike trust however, makes her
vulnerable and easy to forgive and forget. Petitioner also
believes that marriage was a partnership "for better and
for worse", she gave all of herself unconditionally to
respondent. Unfortunately, respondent cannot
reciprocate. On the one hand, respondent was found to
have a personality that can be characterized as
inadequate, immature and irresponsible. His criminal
acts in the present time are mere extensions of his
misconduct established in childhood. His childhood
experiences of separations and emotional deprivation
largely contributed to this antisocial (sociopathic) attitude
and lifestyle.
She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to
comply with what is required of him as a husband and
father. Besides from his adulterous relationship and
irresponsibility, his malevolent conduct and lack of true
remorse indicate that he is psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill the role of a married man. 7
The RTC found that all the characteristics of
psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence and
incurability, as set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals
(Molina), 8 were attendant, establishing Dominics
psychological incapacity, viz:
Gravity from the evidence adduced it can be said that
respondent cannot carry out the normal and ordinary
duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average
couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and
work. Respondent is totally incapable of observing
mutual love, respect and fidelity as well as to provide
support to his wife and child. Ever since the start of the
marriage respondent had left all the household concerns
and the care of their child to petitioner while he studied
and indulged in night outs with friends. This continued
even when he finished his studies and landed a job. He
concealed his salary from the petitioner and worse, had
the gall to engage in sexual infidelity. Likewise worthy of
serious consideration is respondents propensity to
borrow money, his deceitfulness and habitual and
continuous evasion of his obligations which (sic) more
often than not had led to the filing of criminal cases
against him.
Antecedence Before the marriage petitioner was not
aware of respondents personality disorder and it was
only after marriage that it begun to surface. Dr. Samson
declared that respondents behavioral equilibrium started
at a very early age of fifteen. His dishonesty and lack of
remorse are mere extensions of his misconduct in
childhood which generally attributable to respondents
childhood experiences of separation and emotional
deprivations. In fine, his psychological incapacity is but a
product of some genetic causes, faulty parenting and
influence of the environment although its over
manifestation appear only after the wedding.
Incurability Respondents personality disorder having
existed in him long before he contracted marriage with
petitioner, there appears no chance for respondent to
recover any (sic) ordinary means from such incapacity.
All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent
show that he does not possess the proper outlook,
disposition and temperament necessary for marriage.
Indeed, this ultimate recourse of nullity is the only way
by which petitioner can be delivered from the bondage of
a union that only proved to be a mockery and brought
pain and dishonor to petitioner. 9
Ruling of the CA
The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was
no showing that Dominics personality traits either
constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time
of the marriage or were of the nature contemplated by
Article 36 of the Family Code; that the testimony of the
expert witness, while persuasive, was not conclusive
upon the court; and that the real reason for the parties
separation had been their frequent quarrels over
financial matters and the criminal cases brought against
Dominic. 10
On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed
decision reversing the judgment of the
RTC. 11 Specifically, it refused to be bound by the
findings and conclusions of petitioners expert witness,
holding:
It has not been established to our satisfaction as well
that respondents condition, assuming it is serious
enough, was present before or during the celebration of
the marriage. Although petitioners expert witness
concluded that petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated even before the parties marriage, the
Court refuses to be bound by such finding, in view of the
fact that the witness findings, admittedly, were
concluded only on the basis of information given by the
petitioner herself, who, at the time of the examination,
interview, was already head strong in her resolve to
have her marriage with the respondent nullified, and
harbored ill-feelings against respondent throughout her
consultation with Dr. Samson. 12
The CA held the testimonies of petitioners witnesses
insufficient to establish Dominics psychological affliction
to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was
medically or clinically rooted. Relying on the
pronouncements in Republic v. Dagdag, 13 Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals 14 and Pesca v. Pesca, 15 the CA
observed:
In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as
immature, deceitful and without remorse for his
dishonesty, and lack of affection. Such characteristics,
however, do not necessarily constitute a case of
psychological incapacity. A persons inability to share or
take responsibility, or to feel remorse for his
misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family
members, are indicative of an immature mind, but not
necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction
that cannot be cured.
Even the respondents alleged sexual infidelity is not
necessarily equivalent to psychological incapacity,
although it may constitute adequate ground for an action
for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
Nor does the fact that the respondent is a criminal
suspect for estafa or violation of the B.P. Blg. 22
constitutes a ground for the nullification of his marriage
to petitioner. Again, it may constitute ground for legal
separation provided the respondent is convicted by final
judgment and sentenced to imprisonment of more than
six (6) years. 16
Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
Issues
Petitioner assails the CAs refusal to be bound by the
expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation she had
presented in the trial of the case, and the CAs reliance
on the pronouncements in Dagdag, Hernandez and
Pesca, supra. She contends that the report on the
psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Samson more
than complied with the requirements prescribed in
Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January
4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20) and Molina. She insists that the
CA should have applied the ruling in Marcos v. Marcos
(G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755) to
the effect that personal medical or psychological
examination was not a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity.
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
We consider the CAs refusal to accord credence and
weight to the psychiatric report to be well taken and
warranted. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings
that she harbored towards Dominic, which she admitted
during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the
basis to doubt the findings of her expert witness; that
such findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not
himself subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by
petitioners expert; and that he also did not participate in
the proceedings; and that the findings and conclusions
on his psychological profile by her expert were solely
based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and
characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and her
witnesses.
Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the
need for her to resort to other people in order to verify
the facts derived from petitioner about Dominics
psychological profile considering the ill-feelings she
harbored towards him. It turned out, however, that the
only people she interviewed about Dominic were those
whom petitioner herself referred, as the following
testimony indicated:
Fiscal Zalameda
Q: So youre saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling
towards the respondent? At the time you interviewed?
A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.
Q: How about during the subsequent interview?
A: During the subsequent interview more or less the
petitioner was able to talk regarding her marital problems
which is uncomfort(able), so she was able to adapt, she
was able to condition herself regarding her problems,
Sir.
Q: But the ill-feeling was still there?
A: But the feeling was still there, Sir.
Q: Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner
insofar as the respondent is concerned, would you say
that the petitioner would only tell you information
negative against the respondent?
A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other
people the facts given to me by the petitioner, Sir.
Q: And these other people were also people given to you
or the name are given to you by the petitioner, Madame
Witness?
A: Yes, Sir. 17
In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic
himself naturally cast serious doubt on Dr. Samsons
findings. The CA rightly refused to accord probative
value to the testimony of such expert for being avowedly
given to show compliance with the requirements set in
Santos and Molina for the establishment of Dominics
psychological incapacity.
The CAs reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca
was not misplaced. It is easy to see why.
In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with
guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband." 18 But here, the
experts testimony on Dominics psychological profile did
not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his
psychological incapacity because said expert did not
examine Dominic in person before completing her report
but simply relied on other peoples recollection and
opinion for that purpose.
In Hernandez, we ruminated that:
xxx expert testimony should have been presented to
establish the precise cause of private respondents
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 19
but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish
the precise cause of the supposed psychological
incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the
psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the
marriage.
The Court in Pesca observed that:
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her
allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make
out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the
contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the
marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by
her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. 20
Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it
was not the absence of the medical experts testimony
alone that was crucial but rather petitioners failure to
satisfactorily discharge the burden of showing the
existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of
the marriage. In other words, the totality of the evidence
proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the
marriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has
reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting: 21
By the very nature of cases involving the application of
Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight
to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties in
order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity.
However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must
treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable
evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In
fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in
any other given case presented before it, must always
base its decision not solely on the expert opinions
furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
Petitioners view that the Court in Marcos stated that the
personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent spouse therein was not a requirement for the
declaration of his psychological incapacity 22 is not
entirely accurate. To be clear, the statement in Marcos
ran as follows:
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements
earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the partys psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of
psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the
granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
the actual medical examination of Dominic was to be
dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented
was enough to support a finding of his psychological
incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of
any form of medical or psychological evidence to show
the psychological incapacity would have automatically
ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should
emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that
can adequately establish the partys psychological
condition," as the Court said in Marcos.
But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity
to present the professional and expert opinions of
psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and
incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity, then
the opinions should be presented and be weighed by the
trial courts in order to determine and decide whether or
not to declare the nullity of the marriages.
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other
cases they try, must always base their judgments not
solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties
but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of
their proceedings. 23
We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner
insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically
unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband, and that he suffered from such psychological
incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly,
the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
We have time and again held that psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not
physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must
concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage that, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to
render help and support. We have also held that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity
as a ground for nullification of marriage, a persons
psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to
indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and comply
with the essential objects of marriage, including the
rights and obligations between husband and wife. The
affliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage,
and must be incurable.
Accordingly, the RTCs findings that Dominics
psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity,
antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny.
The medical report failed to show that his actions
indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or
serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted.
His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of
remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. His
inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel
remorse over his misbehavior or to share his earnings
with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity, was
not necessarily a medically rooted psychological
affliction that was incurable. Emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility did not equate with psychological
incapacity. 24 Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and
criminal offenses manifestations of psychological
incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground only
for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code.
Finally, petitioner contends that the Courts Resolution in
A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no
longer required, and that the appeal by the OSG was a
mere superfluity that could be deemed to have become
functus officio if not totally disregarded. 25
papers may be submitted without leave of court.
After the lapse of the period herein provided, the
case will be considered submitted for decision,
with or without the memoranda. 27
c) The parties, including the Solicitor General
and the public prosecutor, shall be served with
copies of the decision personally or by
registered mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action, the
dispositive part of the decision shall be
published once in a newspaper of general
circulation. 28
d) The decision becomes final upon the
expiration of fifteen days from notice to the
parties.1wphi1 Entry of judgment shall be
made if no motion for reconsideration or new
trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the
public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General. 29
e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General
may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice
of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of
denial of the motion for reconsideration or new
trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the
notice of appeal on the adverse parties. 30
The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the
OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the capacity
of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond)
to oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor
of declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the
meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity-those
sufficiently evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical
antecedence-would succeed.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review

The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The
on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG March 19, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68615.
were no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution
explicitly required the OSG to actively participate in all
stages of the proceedings, to wit: The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the
petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor,
within five days from the date of its filing and
submit to the court proof of such service within
the same period. 26

b) The court may require the parties and the

public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office
of the Solicitor General, to file their respective
memoranda support of their claims within fifteen
days from the date the trial is terminated. It may
require the Office of the Solicitor General to file
its own memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION),
AND EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, .JR., Respondents.
DECI SI ON
BERSAMIN, J.:
The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30,
2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
declaration by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in
Lingayen, Pangasinan of the nullity of the marriage
between respondent Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo)
and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos (Catalina) based
on the latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code.
We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we
uphold once again the validity of a marriage on the
ground that the alleged psychological incapacity was not
sufficiently established.
Antecedents
Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977
in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of
Lingayen, Pangasinan. 2 The couple was not blessed
with a child due to Catalinas hysterectomy following her
second miscarriage. 3
On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage, 4 citing Catalinas
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential
marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any
objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her
share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac,
Bugallon, Pangasinan. 5 After conducting an
investigation, the public prosecutor determined that there
was no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina. 6
Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house
without his consent; that she engaged in petty
arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give
in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time
gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the household
chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she
squandered by gambling all his remittances as an
overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she
abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with
Bobbie Castro, her paramour. 7
Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric
evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a
psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on
Catalina, 8 Dr. Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits
of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer
treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalinas disorder was
mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital
obligations. 9
Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her
Answer/Manifestation, 10 whereby she admitted her
psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal
home without Eduardos consent and flirting with
different men. She insisted that she had only one live-in
partner; and that she would not give up her share in the
conjugal residence because she intended to live there or
to receive her share should the residence be sold. 11
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000,
decreeing:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
considerations, this Honorable Court finds for the plaintiff
and judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C.
de Quintos and Catalina delos Santos de
Quintos, a nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended.
2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Lingayen,Pangasinan to cancel the marriage of
the parties from the Civil Register of Lingayen,
Pangasinan in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED. 12
The RTC ruled that Catalinas infidelity, her spending
more time with friends rather than with her family, and
her incessant gambling constituted psychological
incapacity that affected her duty to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. It held that considering
that the matter of determining whether a party was
psychologically incapacitated was best left to experts like
Dr. Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation
by Dr. Reyes was the best evidence of Catalinas
psychological incapacity. 13
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE
PARTIES MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID, DEFENDANT
CATALINA DELOS SANTOS-DE QUINTOS
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN
PROVEN TO EXIST.
On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision
affirming the judgment of the RTC. The CA concluded
that Eduardo proved Catalinas psychological incapacity,
observing that the results of the neuro-psychiatric
evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes showed that Catalina
had been "mentally or physically ill to the extent that she
could not have known her marital obligations;" and that
Catalinas psychological incapacity had been medically
identified, sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the
complaint and clearly explained by the trial court.
Issue
In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), urges that the CA gravely erred
because:
I psychological incapacity; that there was not even a
THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINAS
ALLEGED PERSONALITY TRAITS ARE
CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE TIME OF
MARRIAGE CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY
OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic]
CATALINA WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE A
SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY.
III
ABANDONMENT OF ONES FAMILY IS ONLY
A GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION.
IV
GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT
LIKEWISE ESTABLISHED TO BE A SYMPTOM
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
V cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations,
THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION
AND TESTIMONY OF DR. ANNABELLE
REYES FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE
OF CATALINAS INCAPACITY AND PROVE
THAT IT EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION OF
MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND INCURABLE. 14
The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the
RTC and the CA did not conform to the guidelines laid
down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals,
(Molina); 15 and that Catalinas refusal to do household
chores, and her failure to take care of her husband and
their adopted daughter were not "defects" of a
psychological nature warranting the declaration of nullity
of their marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty,
refusal or neglect to perform her marital obligations.
The OSG further argues that Catalinas infidelity,
gambling habits and abandonment of the conjugal home
were not grounds under Article 36 of the Family Code;
that there was no proof that her infidelity and gambling
had occurred prior to the marriage, while her
abandonment would only be a ground for legal
separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code; that
the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not
sufficiently establish Catalinas psychological incapacity;
that Dr. Reyes was not shown to have exerted effort to
look into Catalinas past life, attitudes, habits and
character as to be able to explain her alleged
finding of the root cause of her alleged psychological
incapacity; and that there appeared to be a collusion
between the parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted
during the trial that he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina
in exchange for her non-appearance in the trial.
The OSG postulated that Catalinas unsupportive in-laws
and Eduardos overseas deployment that had required
him to be away most of the time created the strain in the
couples relationship and forced her to seek her friends
emotional support and company; and that her
ambivalent attitude towards their adopted daughter was
attributable to her inability to bear children of her own.
Issue
The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence
warranting the declaration of the nullity of Catalinas
marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling
We grant the petition for review.
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take
and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists
of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials
of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help,
and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c)
the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or
her responsibility and duty as a married person is not
enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to
be incapable of doing so due to some psychological
illness. 16
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 17 we decreed that
psychological incapacity should refer to a mental
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated
in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may
arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity, we then laid
down the following guidelines in the later ruling in
Molina, 18 viz:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. x x x.
xxxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x
x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x
x x.
xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. x x x.
xxxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. x x x. 19
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina
have remained as the precedential guides in deciding
cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a
spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or
absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on
the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations. 20 Indeed, the incapacity
should be established by the totality of evidence
presented during trial, 21making it incumbent upon the
petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the
psychological incapacity. 22
Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA,
insisting that they thereby explained the gravity and
severity of Catalinas psychological incapacity that had
existed even prior to the celebration of their marriage. 23
We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a
compliance with the requirement of sufficiently
explaining the gravity, root cause and incurability of
Catalinas purported psychological incapacity. Rather,
they were liberal in their appreciation of the scanty
evidence that Eduardo submitted to establish the
incapacity.
To start with, Catalinas supposed behavior (i.e., her
frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving the house
without Eduardos consent, refusal to do the household
chores and to take care of their adopted daughter, and
gambling), were not even established. Eduardo
presented no other witnesses to corroborate his
allegations on such behavior. At best, his testimony was
self-serving and would have no serious value as
evidence upon such a serious matter that was submitted
to a court of law.
Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on
the results of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr.
Reyes despite the paucity of factual foundation to
support the claim of Catalinas psychological incapacity.
In particular, they relied on the following portion of the
report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality.
This is characterized, mainly by immaturity in several
aspects of the personality. One aspect is in the area of
personal relationships, where a person cannot really
come up with what is expected in a relationship that
involves commitments. They are generally in and out of
relationships, as they do not have the patience to sustain
this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who
has to be attended to as they might end up doing things
which are often regrettable. These people however
usually do not feel remorse for their wrongdoings. They
do not seem to learn from their mistakes, and they have
the habit of repeating these mistakes to the detriment of
their own lives and that of their families. Owing to these
characteristics, people with these pattern of traits cannot
be expected to have lasting and successful relationships
as required in marriage. It is expected that even with
future relationships, things will not work out.
Families of these people usually reveal that parents
relationship are not also that ideal. If this be the
background of the developing child, it is likely that his or
her relationships would also end up as such.
xxxx
With all these collateral information being considered
and a longitudinal history of defendant made, it is being
concluded that she was not able to come up with the
minimum expected of her as a wife. Her behavior and
attitude before and after the marriage is highly indicative
of a very immature and childish person, rendering her
psychologically incapacitated to live up and meet the
responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage.
Catalina miserably failed to fulfill her role as wife and
mother, rendering her incapacitated to comply with her
duties inherent in marriage. In the same vein, it cannot
be expected that this attitude and behavior of defendant
will still change because her traits have developed
through the years and already ingrained within her. 24
Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root
cause, gravity and incurability of Catalinas supposed
psychological incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in
court by Dr. Reyes a source of vital information that the
report missed out on. Aside from rendering a brief and
general description of the symptoms of borderline
personality disorder, both the report and court testimony
of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause
that could have brought about such behavior on the part
of Catalina. They did not specify which of Catalinas
various acts or omissions typified the conduct of a
person with borderline personality, and did not also
discuss the gravity of her behavior that translated to her
inability to perform her basic marital duties. Dr. Reyes
only established that Catalina was childish and
immature, and that her childishness and immaturity
could no longer be treated due to her having already
reached an age "beyond maturity." 25
Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented
in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-
depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity. 26 We have explained this need in Lim v. Sta.
Cruz-Lim, 27 stating:
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a
maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and
unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie
the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its
own factual finding on what happened in this case. The
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie
in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in
the assistance that he can render to the courts in
showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion
and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is
founded. 28
But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and
did not personally seek out and meet with other persons,
aside from Eduardo, who could have shed light on and
established the conduct of the spouses before and
during the marriage. For that reason, Dr. Reyes report
lacked depth and objectivity, a weakness that removed
the necessary support for the conclusion that the RTC
and the CA reached about Catalinas psychological
incapacity to perform her marital duties.
Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony
by Dr. Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability
of Catalinas psychological incapacity. There was, to
start with, no evidence showing the root cause of her
alleged borderline personality disorder and that such
disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have
repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully
explained and established by the totality of the evidence
presented during trial. 29
What we can gather from the scant evidence that
Eduardo adduced was Catalinas immaturity and
apparent refusal to perform her marital obligations.
However, her immaturity alone did not constitute
psychological incapacity. 30 To rule that such immaturity
amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown
that the immature acts were manifestations of a
disordered personality that made the spouse completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth
or immaturity. 31
Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo32 that there must be
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that
effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from
complying with the basic marital obligations, viz:
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying
with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor an adverse integral element in the
respondents personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential
marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different
from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
The only fact established here, which Catalina even
admitted in her Answer, was her abandonment of the
conjugal home to live with another man. Yet,
abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity
of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also
constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a
ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the
Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity
was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that there
should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a
manifestation of a disordered personality that made her
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of marriage. 33 Needless to state, Eduardo did not
adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her
infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.
Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG
that Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The assertion was
based on his admission during trial that he had paid her
the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal
home in order to convince her not to oppose his petition
or to bring any action on her part, 34 to wit:
CROSS-EXAMINA TION BY FISCAL MUERONG
Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the
hearing, your wife, the herein defendant, Catalina delos
Santos-de Quintos, has been religiously attending the
hearing, but lately, I noticed that she is no longer
attending and represented by counsel, did you talk to
your wife?
A No, sir.
Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better
for both of you, if, she will not attend the hearing of this
case you filed against her, is it not?
A No, sir. I did not.
Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your
wife had an agreement regarding this case?
A None, sir.
Q And you were telling me something about an
agreement that you will pay her an amount of
P50,000.00, please tell us, what is that agreement that
you have to pay her P50,000.00?
A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir.
Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or
acquired at the time of your marriage?
A Yes, sir.
Q And why did you agree that you have to give her
P50,000.00?
A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house
thereat, that is why I agreed, sir.
Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not
oppose this petition for declaration of marriage which
you filed against her?
A She does not opposed [sic], sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern
[sic] about this case is the division of your conjugal
properties?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as
her share of your conjugal properties, so that she will not
pursue whatever she wanted to pursue with regards to
the case you filed against her, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00,
Mr. witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because she has already gotten her share of
P50,000.00 that is the reason why she is no longer
around here?
A Yes sir, it could be. 35
Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest
sign of a collusion between her and Eduardo.1wphi1 To
recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition
to the point of conceding her psychological incapacity,
but she nonetheless made it clear enough that she was
unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The
probability that Eduardo willingly gave her the amount of
P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his
recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to
such share was very high, so that whether or not he did
so also to encourage her to stick to her previously
announced stance of not opposing the petition for nullity
of the marriage should by no means be of any
consequence in determining the issue of collusion
between the spouses.

In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving

the psychological incapacity of Catalina, we cannot but
resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 36

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on

certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision the Court of Appeals
promulgated on July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition
for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed under
Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit.

Costs to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CESAR
ENCELAN, Respondent.
DE CI SI ON
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review
on certiorari1rl1 filed by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines challenging the October 7, 2005 amended
decision2rl1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that
reconsidered its March 22, 2004 decision3rl1 (original
decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original
decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002
decision4rl1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which
The Factual Antecedents
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5rl1 and the
union bore two children, Maricar and Manny. 6rl1 To
support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia
on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in
Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an
illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in
1991, 7rl1 Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with
her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and
Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar
filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the
declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita's
psychological incapacity. 8rl1
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she
contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her
promotions business. She insisted that she is not
psychologically incapacitated and that she left their
home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law. 9rl1
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita's
infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family
home. 10rl1 He testified that he continued to provide
financial support for Lolita and their children even after
he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin. 11rl1
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation
report 12rl1 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima
Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr.
Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any
form of major psychiatric illness[,]13rl1 but
had been "unable to provide the expectations expected
of her for a good and lasting marital
relationship;14rl1 her "transferring from one job to
the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-
workers as well as her impatience in attaining her
ambitions;15rl1 and "her refusal to go with her
husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a
good marital and family relationship.16rl1
The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision, 17rl1 the RTC declared
Cesar's marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to
declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations.cralawlibrary
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed to the CA.cralawlibrary
The CA Ruling
The CA originally 18rl1 set aside the RTC's verdict,
finding that Lolita's abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of
personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely
refused to comply with her marital obligations which she
was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that
infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the
declaration of the nullity of a marriage.cralawlibrary
Cesar sought reconsideration19rl1 of the CA's
decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The
CA set aside its original decision and entered another,
which affirmed the RTC's decision. In its amended
decision,20 the CA found two circumstances indicative
of Lolita's serious psychological incapacity that resulted
in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita's unwarranted refusal to
perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita's
willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal
dwelling.cralawlibrary
The OSG then filed the present petition.cralawlibrary
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores' psychological
evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been
suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish
its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability;
infidelity and abandonment do not constitute
psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for
legal separation.cralawlibrary
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolita's infidelity and refusal to
perform her marital obligations established her grave
and incurable psychological incapacity.cralawlibrary
The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there
exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar's marriage to Lolita
on the ground of psychological incapacity.cralawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to
annul Cesar's marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological
incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It provides that "[a] marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly
stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume the basic marital
obligations;21rl1 not merely the refusal, neglect committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its
or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. 22rl1 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving
the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time
of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of
the condition of the errant spouse. 23rl1
Cesar failed to prove Lolita's
psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesar's testimony failed to prove Lolita's
alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the
dates when he learned of Lolita's alleged affair and her
subsequent abandonment of their home, 24rl1as well
as his continued financial support to her and their
children even after he learned of the affair, 25rl1but he
merely mentioned in passing Lolita's alleged affair with
Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling.cralawlibrary
counterparts. While both spring from human relationship,
their relatedness and relevance to one another should
be fully established for them to be compared or to serve
as measures of comparison with one another. To be
sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and
submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores' further
belief that Lolita's refusal to go with Cesar abroad
signified a reluctance to work out a good marital
relationship30rl1 is a mere
generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a
rash conclusion that this Court cannot
support.cralawlibrary
In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence
of Lolita's psychological incapacity; thus, the CA
original decision.cralawlibrary
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable
social institution31rl1 protected by the State. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence its
existence and continuation and against its dissolution
and nullity. 32rl1 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of
the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to
the other during the marriage.cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET
ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly,
we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-
Encelan.cralawlibrary
Costs against the respondent.cralawlibrary

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the SO ORDERED.

conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply
grounds for legal separation. 26rl1 To constitute
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered personality that completely prevented the
erring spouse from discharging the essential marital
obligations. 27rl1 No evidence on record exists to
support Cesar's allegation that Lolita's infidelity and
abandonment were manifestations of any psychological
illness.cralawlibrary

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores' psychological

evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged
psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation,
in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any
major psychiatric illness.28rl1 Dr. Flores' observation
on Lolita's interpersonal problems with co-
workers, 29rl1 to our mind, does not suffice as a
consideration for the conclusion that she was at the
time of her marriage psychologically incapacitated to
enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time
element involved, a wife's psychological fitness as a
spouse cannot simply be equated with her
professional/work relationship; workplace obligations
and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In our decision promulgated on September 19,
2011, 1 the Court dismissed the complaint for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following
ratiocination, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no
reversible error in setting aside the trial court's Decision
for lack of legal and factual basis.
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of
these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners
allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends,
adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners
experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts,
were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented
contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the
petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent
constantly played mahjong and neglected their children
as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but
it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and
a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that
she played four to five times a week. She maintained it
was only two to three times a week and always with the
permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying
that they were with their mother when she played
mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not
present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the
mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent
neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his
sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link
this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least
that could have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondents mahjong-playing during the years when
these two children were in second grade. This was not
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent
played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents
alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out
with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other
men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her
visits to beauty salons orher frequent partying with
friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged
companion of respondent during these nights-out) in
order to prove that respondent had affairs with other
men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared
to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendothat
petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of
sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with
obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual
infidelity per seis a ground for legal separation, but it
does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent
actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that
she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed,
the totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show
that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental
duties. Not once did the children state that they were
neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated
that she took care of them, was around when they were
sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that
respondent made real efforts tosee and take care of her
children despite her estrangement from their father.
There was no testimony whatsoever that shows
abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While
petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy,
both failed the second elementary level despite having
tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short
comings to Malyns actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds
no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the CAs reversal of the
trial courts ruling that there was psychological
incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely summarized
the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the
respective parties, but it did not actually assess the
veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court
did not make factual findings which can serve as bases
for its legal conclusionof psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and,
perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them
from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and
to their children. There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity
that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision
and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV
No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. 2
In his Motion for Reconsideration, 3 the petitioner
implores the Court to take a thorough second look into
what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the
findings of the trial court as supported by the testimonies
of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that
the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically
incapacitated to perform their respective essential
marital obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to
grant the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
I Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior
to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to
deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was
about to assume. Although the Family Code has not
defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has
usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the
deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code
Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in
order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that
the members of the Family Code Revision Committee
were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end
they decided to adopt the provision "with less specificity
than expected" in order to have the law "allow some
resiliency in its application." 4 Illustrative of the "less
specificity than expected" has been the omission by the
Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples
of psychological incapacity that would have limited the
applicability of the provision conformably with the
principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee
desired that the courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and the decisions of church tribunals that had
persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having
been taken from the Canon Law. 5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos
v. Court of Appeals, 6 the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage have rendered it obvious that the term
psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the
Family Code"has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances," and
could not be taken and construed independently of "but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law on marriage." Thus correlated:-
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate." 7
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 8 the Court set
some guidelines for the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict
on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical, althoughits
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I
dos." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes
of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including suchprovision in
our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally
subject to our law on evidence whatis
decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, inview of the evident
source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.
Here, the State and the Church while
remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095. 9
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid,
such that their application to every instance practically
condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the
fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family
Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and
applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to
adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to
enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every
court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts" in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all
fours" with the next one in the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence,
every "trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court." 10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the
courts, which are concededly not endowed with
expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity
rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves
to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed,
the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent
and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by
experts. 11
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the
existence or non-existence of a partys psychological
incapacity should be final and binding for as long as
such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of
witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be
clearly and manifestly erroneous. 12 In every situation
where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently
supported by the facts and evidence presented during
trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from
substituting its own judgment. 13 It is not enough reason
to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court
and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only
because the Constitution and the Family Code regard
marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to
stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for
the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution14 only relates to a valid marriage. No
protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null and
void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal
existence. 15
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore,
the Courts really assiduously defend and promote the
sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution.
The foundation of our society is thereby made all the
more strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial
court deserved credence because it was in the better
position to view and examine the demeanor of the
witnesses while they were testifying. 16 The position and
role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence
showing the psychological incapacity were not to be
downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court
brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina
Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the
ground that their conclusions were solely based on the
petitioners version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it
improper and unwarranted to give to such expert
opinions a merely generalized consideration and
treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the
marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently
and competently described the psychological incapacity
of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of
the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by
the two expert witnesses because they were largely
drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should
not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had
accepted the veracity of the petitioners factual
premises. 17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the
transcript of the petitioners testimony, as well as on her
interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his
son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to be
unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to
disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her
expert opinion took into consideration other factors
extant in the records, including the own opinions of
another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side
of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled
that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony
on the psychological and mental state of the parties in
cases for the declaration of the nullityof marriages, for by
the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the
courts, "despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties." 18
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately
necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly
determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the
respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner). Consequently,
the lack of personal examination and interview of the
person diagnosed with personality disorder, like the
respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the
experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v.
Marcos 19 that there is no requirement for one to
bedeclared psychologically incapacitated to be
personally examined by a physician, because what is
important is the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the partys psychological incapacity. Hence,
"if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to." 20
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition
could possibly result from an assumed state of facts
existed in the record, the expert opinion should be
admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in
interpreting such other evidence on the
causation. 21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological
incapacity should be considered as conjectural or
speculative and without any probative value only in the
absence of other evidence to establish causation. The
experts findings under such circumstances would not
constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as
evidence. 22 This is so, considering that any ruling that
brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by
Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it
was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based
on the parties upbringing and psychodynamics. 23 In that
context, Dr. Gates expertopinion should be considered
not in isolation but along with the other evidence
presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of
psychological incapacity, the trial court was expectedto
compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad
Dayan, the respondents own witness, and those of Dr.
Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report, 24 Dr. Dayan
impressed that the respondent had "compulsive and
dependent tendencies" to the extent of being
"relationship dependent." Based from the respondents
psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be
reserved and seemingly detached in her ways. Although
she likes to be around people, she may keep her
emotional distance. She, too, values her relationship but
she may not be that demonstrative of her affections.
Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she tries to
maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for
rejection. To others, Malyne may appear, critical and
demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when
opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed.
And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person. At a less
conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon
her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an
enormous value on having significant others would
depend on most times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a
different person clingy and immature, doubting his
love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was
the most important person in his life. She became
relationship-dependent. 25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the
Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test 26 conducted on
the respondent, observing that the respondent obtained
high scores on dependency, narcissism and
compulsiveness, to wit:
Atty. Bretania
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?
A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be
normal is 73 percental round and there are several
scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and
these are on the score of dependency, narcissism and
compulsion.
Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness,
what is the acceptable score?
A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it
is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be
considered as acceptable.
Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?
A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under
narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84. 27
It is notable that Dr. Dayans findings did not contradict
but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect
that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic
Personality Disorder as well as with AntiSocial Disorder.
Dr. Gates relevantly testified:
ATTY. GONONG
Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic]
not quite familiar with psychology terms. So, more or
less, could you please tell me in more laymans terms
how you arrived at your findings that the respondent is
self-centered or narcissistic?
A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if
you ask about her childhood background, her fatherdied
in a vehicular accident when she was in her teens and
thereafter she was prompted to look for a job to partly
assume the breadwinners role in her family. I gathered
that paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her
siblings against the fact that her own mother was unable
to carry out her respective duties and responsibilities
towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings considering
that the husband died prematurely. And there was an
indication that Elena Fernandez on several occasions
ever told petitioner that he cannot blame her for being
negligent as a mother because she herself never
experienced the care and affection of her own mother
herself. So, there is a precedent in her background, in
her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a
particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the
tendency to repeat somekind of experience or the lack of
care, lets say some kind of deprivation, there is a
tendency to sustain it even on to your own life when you
have your own family. I did interview the son because I
was not satisfied with what I gathered from both Trinidad
and Valerio and even though as a young son at the age
of fourteen already expressed the he could not see,
according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on
the part of Elena and that he preferred to live with the
father actually.
Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that
respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?
A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts
[sic] from a deprived childhood and she is still insearch
of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would
jump from one boyfriend to another. There is this need
for attention, this need for love on other people.
Q : And that led you to conclude?
A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to
the point of neglecting her duty as a wife and as a
mother. 28
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does
not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but
rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts
in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her
criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her
conclusion is founded. 29 Hence, we should weigh and
consider the probative value of the findings of the expert
witnesses vis--vis the other evidence available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon
law expert, an advocate before the Manila Archdiocese
and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family
Code Revision Committee. Regarding Father Healys
expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity could be
informed by evolving standards, taking into account the
particulars of each case, by current trends in
psychological and even by canonical thought, and by
experience. 30 It is prudent for us to do so because the
concept of psychological incapacity adopted under
Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon
Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the
respondents level of immaturity and irresponsibility with
regard to her own children and to her husband
constituted psychological incapacity, testifying thusly:
ATTY. MADRID
Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that
she is not psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as
you read it based on the records of this case before this
Honorable Court, what can you say to that claim of
respondent?
A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological
incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic
irresponsibility with regards to her own children.
Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of
respondent that she is not psychologically incapacitated
is not true?
A : Yes. It should be rejected.
Q : Why do you say so?
A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole
lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been manifested
running through their life made a doubt that this is
immaturity and irresponsibility because her family was
dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life
and being the bread winner of the family put her in an
unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate
her own ego and she begun to concentrate her own
beauty and that became an obsession and that led to
her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to
this lifestyle that she had embraced.
Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the
children, the impact. How about the impact on the
relationship of the respondent with her husband?
A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle
to fulfill her obligation to her husband and toher children.
She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out
and her mahjong and associating with friends. They
were the priorities of her life.
Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was
merely secondary?
A : Secondary.
Q : And how does that relate to psychological
incapacity?
A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the
obligations of marriage which everybody takes for
granted. The concentration on the husband and the
children before everything else would be subordinated to
the marriage withher. Its the other way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her
mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.
Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically
do you call this?
A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with
himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.
Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?
A : Its a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up
for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of Narcissus,
the myth, and then that became known in clinical
terminology as narcissism. When a person is so
concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and
protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.
xxxx
Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this
narcissism. How do you consider this narcissism
afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or .?
A : I would say its grave from the actual cases of neglect
of her family and that causes serious obligations which
she has ignored and not properly esteemed because
she is so concern[ed] with herself in her own lifestyle.
Very serious.
Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this
narcissism afflicting respondent was already existing at
the time or marriage or even thereafter?
xxxx
A : When you get married you dont develop narcissism
or psychological incapacity. You bring with you into the
marriage and then it becomes manifested because in
marriage you accept these responsibilities. And now you
show that you dont accept them and you are not
capable of fulfilling them and you dont care about them.
Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or
congenital or what?
A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a
model and still the family was depended [sic] upon her
and she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustans, it
began to inflate her ego so much that this became the
top priority in her life. Its her lifestyle.
Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of
respondent even expanded after the marriage?
A : That could have expanded because it became very
obvious after the marriage because she was neglecting
such fundamental obligations.
Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this
medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that you
mentioned?
A : Lets say, it was manifested for so many years in her
life. It was found in her family background situation. Say,
almost for sure would be incurable now.
Q : What specific background are you referring to?
A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the
breadwinner and her beauty was so important to give in
her job and money and influence and so on. But this is a
very unusual situation for a young girl and her position in
the family was exalted in a very very unusual manner
and therefore she had that pressure on her and in her
accepting the pressure, in going along with it and putting
it in top priority. 31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon
Law, Father Healys opinions and findings commanded
respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings
could add to the judicial determination of the parties
psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive.
He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of
the malady that would warrant the nullity of marriage,
and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an
analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts
as psychological incapacity has been. We could not
justly disregard his opinions and findings. Appreciating
them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan
would advance more the cause of justice. The Court
observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te: 32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having
the primary task and burden of decision-making, must
not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional
opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire
life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented
to these experts and they were asked togive
professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at
the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive
evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new
openness in this area did not amount to the addition of
new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in
psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link
between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea
of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a
covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer
be assumed in annulment cases that a person who
could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability
to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a
mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of
incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual
anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that
incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the
spouses to each other's body for hetero sexual acts, but
is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of
life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship.
Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of
psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult personality;
as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a
distinct person; that the spouses must be `other oriented'
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-
giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity
for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more
than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining
of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on
the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious
incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held
to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to
fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but
in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other
spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six
elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to
the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity;
(5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of
a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors
possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill marital
obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality
with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense
of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual
has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fall
short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for
anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not
fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits
very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are
already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally
the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise
proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on
the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack
of due competence is that at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family
almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out
marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the
marriage was entered into."
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the
importance of presenting expert testimony to establish
the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity,
and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no
requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by
a physician, if the totalityof evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for
emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity. 33
Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended
consequences of strictly applying the standards set in
Molina, 34 the courts should consider the totality of
evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied
and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers,
had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:
xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the
Courts membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V.
Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and
another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--
took pains to compose their individual separate opinions.
Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that
"each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on all fours with another
case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the
Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too
much regard for the law's clear intention that each case
is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the
Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina,
in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity.
Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the
deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds,
and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article
36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world."
The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has
taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant
behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality
anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the
very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far fromwhat was intended by the Court,
Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit
into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
narcissists and the like, tocontinuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman
Rota has annulled marriages on account of the
personality disorders of the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of
the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the
intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor,
to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be
alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital
abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous
rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's
psychological incapacity, the Court isnot demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the
sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a
person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who
cannot comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may
be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let
itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to
speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the
very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of
nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial
to a stillborn marriage.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare
that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio
v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives
as well which should govern the disposition of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of
being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle
that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis,
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals. 35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court
declared as follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not
proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that
she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife.
Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she
played four to five times a week. She maintained it was
only two to three times a week and always withthe
permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying
that theywere with their mother when she played
mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner did not
present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the
mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent
neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his
sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link
this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least
that could have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondents mahjong-playing during the years when
these two children were in second grade. This was not
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent
played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were not
proven. 36 (Emphasis supplied)
The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing
should not have delimited our determination of the
presence or absence of psychological incapacity.
Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to
fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of
parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had
she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities,
she would have known that bringing along her children
of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would
expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices
that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondents
obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her
family life, particularly on her very young children. We do
find to be revealing the disclosures made by Valerio
Teodoro Kalaw37 the parties eldest son in his
deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his
father that his mother had been hooked on playing
mahjong, viz:
ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parents
separation, do you remember any habit or activity or
practice which your mother engaged in, before the
separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and
she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I cant remember.
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played
mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you remember?
WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I
cant, I cant
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing
mahjong say one session?
WITNESS : Really long cuzwe would go to my aunts
house in White Plains and I think we would get there by
lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in
the morning. ATTY. PISON: You, you went there? She
brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my
brothers & sisters.
ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?
WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I
guess shed go out by herself. 38
The fact that the respondent brought her children with
her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her
neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her
tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her
willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling
on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very
grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for
parenting to the gratification of her own personal and
escapist desires. This was the observation of Father
Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan
both explained that the current psychological state of the
respondent had been rooted on her own childhood
experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her
childrens moral and mental development. This disregard
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect
her children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and
Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of
parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and
responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing of
such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
the development of their moral, mental and physical
character and well-being.
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental
authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated
children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support,
educate and instruct them by right precept and
good example, and to provide for their
upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual
guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity,
self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift,
stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire
in them compliance with the duties of
citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain
their physical and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome
educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect
them from bad company, and prevent them from
acquiring habits detrimental to their health,
studies and morals;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take
into consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect
that both the petitioner and the respondent had been
psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not
assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC
would not have found so without the allegation to that
effect by the respondent in her answer, 39 whereby she
averred that it was not she but the petitioner who had
suffered from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitionerspsychological incapacity
was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:
ATTY. BRETAA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally
immature?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is your basis for your statement that
respondent was behaviorally immature?
A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage
Malyn had noticed already some of those short temper
of the petitioner but she was very much in love and so
she lived-in with him and even the time that they were
together, that they were living in, she also had noticed
some of his psychological deficits if we may say so. But
as I said, because she is also dependent and she was
one who determined to make the relationship work, she
was denying even those kinds of problems that she had
seen.
Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, Im talking here of
the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to conclude that
Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally immature?
A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of
marriage was not duly stable then. He was not really
thinking of marriage except that his wife got pregnant
and so he thought that he had to marry her. And even
that time he was not also a monogamous person.
Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the
decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I think so,
Sir.
Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned
here that the petitioner admitted to you that in his
younger years he was often out seeking other women.
Im referring specifically to page 18. He also admitted to
you that the thought of commitment scared him, the
petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner to
you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person to
enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment and
given his admission that he was a womanizer? Is it
possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways
during the marriage?
A : Sir, its difficult.
Q : It would be difficult for that person?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his
womanizing after marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is
almost only 20%.
Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent
womanized during his marriage with the respondent?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the
part of the petitioner insofar as his psychological
capacity to perform his duties as a husband is
concerned?
A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity
and also to be fully committed to the role of husband to
Malyn.
Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my
question on whether the petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only
said that the petitioner was behaviorally immature and
that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic]
you that question again and request you to answer that
directly?
A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated. 40
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the
burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the
respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish
the psychological incapacity of her husband because
she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are
justified in declaring a marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is
the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the
psychological incapacity to the other as long as the
imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed,
psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or
in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either
or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed
null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the
parties parted ways. By now, they must have already
accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that
their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law,
was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so
much damage not only to themselves, but also to the
lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a
greater injustice should we insist on still recognizing their
void marriage, and then force them and their children to
endure some more damage. This was the very same
injustice that Justice Romero decried in her erudite
dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this
Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the
law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married
to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties
has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved
in the ruling the Court makes today.1wphi1 It is not, in
effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation
of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to
maintain illicit relations with another woman or women
with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply
because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the
companionship and conjugal love which he has sought
from her and towhich he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family
Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that
we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident
purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an
opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his
marriage a nullity by reason of his wifes psychological
incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation. In
this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning
because the respondent was afflicted with psychological
incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage.
Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the
nullity of the marriage between the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of
marriage as the basic foundation of our society does not
preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-
equipped to promote family life," thus:
Now is also the opportune time to comment on another
common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of
petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too
frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying
petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and
2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state
that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total
development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State." These provisions highlight
the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should
be deemed as an implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest
in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family,
which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation,
there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend
against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life.
Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further
the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among persons who,
for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated
to understand or comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. 42 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for
Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and
REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner
and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of
the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the

parameters of state protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the
province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of
marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities
to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences
it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself
adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This
being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into
operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at
present through the enactment of the Family Code,
which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that
affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the
grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of
a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action
in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage,
not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage
is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of
Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a
petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the
Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
 GLENN VIAS, Petitioner, v. MARY GRACE PAREL-
VIAS, Respondent.
RE S OLU T ION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 rendered on January 29,
2013 and Resolution2 issued on August 7, 2013 by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448. The
CA set aside the Decision3 dated January 29, 2010 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City,
Branch 30, in Civil Case No. SP-6564(09), which
declared the marriage between Glenn Vias (Glenn) and
Mary Grace Parel-Vias (Mary Grace) as null and
void.cralawred
Antecedents
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and
23 years old, respectively, got married in civil rites held
in Lipa City, Batangas. 4 Mary Grace was already
pregnant then. The infant, however, died at birth due to
weakness and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the
infants death was caused by Mary Graces heavy
drinking and smoking during her pregnancy.
The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked
as a bartender, while Mary Grace was a production
engineer.
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home
which she shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found
out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time
the instant petition was filed, Mary Grace had not
returned yet.
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5 for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. He
alleged that Mary Grace was insecure, extremely
jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to any
pretext to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly
enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked heavily
even when she was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace
refused to perform even the most essential household
chores of cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn,
Mary Grace had not exhibited the foregoing traits and
behavior during their whirlwind
courtship. 6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not
remorseful about the death of the infant whom she
delivered. She lived as if she were single and was
unmindful of her husbands needs. She was self-
centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted
her about her behavior, she showed indifference. She
eventually left their home without informing Glenn. Glenn
later found out that she left for an overseas employment
in Dubai. 7chanRobles virtualLawlibrary
Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace, he consulted
the latters friends. They informed him that Mary Grace
came from a broken family and was left to be cared for
by her aunts and nannies. The foregoing circumstance
must have contributed to her sense of insecurity and
difficulty in adjusting to married
life. 8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought
professional guidance and submitted himself to a
psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy
Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as amply
aware of his marital roles and capable of maintaining a
mature and healthy heterosexual
relationship.9chanRobles virtualLawlibrary
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Graces
personality through the data she had gathered from
Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who
knew Mary Grace way back in college.
Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a
college graduate. She belongs to a middle class family.
Her father is an overseas contract worker, while her
mother is a housewife. At the time Dr. Tayag prepared
her report, Mary Grace was employed in Dubai and
romantically involved with another
man. 10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and
physically harmed Glenn during the couples fights. Mary
Grace is also ill-tempered and carefree, while Glenn is
jolly, kind and family-
oriented. 11chanRobles virtualLawlibrary
Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits.
Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenns
relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect,
commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag
recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the
couples marriage. 12chanRobles virtualLawlibrary
In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to
be severe, serious, grave, permanent and chronic in
proportion and is incurable by any form of clinical
intervention. It has already been deeply embedded
within her system as it was found to have started as
early as her childhood years. Because of such, it has
caused her to be inflexible, maladaptive and
functionally[-]impaired especially with regards to
heterosexual dealings.
Such disorder of [Mary Grace] is mainly characterized by
grandiosity, need for admiration and lack of empathy[,]
along with her pattern of disregard for and violation of
the rights of others[,] which utterly distorted her
perceptions and views especially in terms of a fitting
marital relationship. Such disorder manifested in [Mary
Grace] through her unrelenting apathy, sense of
entitlement and arrogance. Throughout her union with
[Glenn], she has exhibited a heightened sense of self as
seen in her marked inability to show proper respect for
her husband. x x x She is too headstrong that most of
the time[,] she would do things her own way and would
not pay close attention to what her husband needed.
She had been a wife who constantly struggled for power
and dominance in their relationship and [Glenn], being
too considerate to her, was often subjected to her
control. x x x She is into many vices and loved hanging
out with her friends at night[,] and she even got involved
in an illicit relationship[,] which was still going on up to
the present time. x x x.
The root cause of [Mary Graces] personality aberration
can be said to have emanated from the various forms of
unfavorable factors in her milieu way back as early as
her childhood years[,] which is the crucial stage in the
life of a person as this is the time when the individuals
character and behavior are shaped. [Mary Grace] came
from a dysfunctional family with lenient and tolerating
parents[,] who never impose any restrictions [upon] their
children. Considering such fact, she apparently failed to
feel the love and affection of the nurturing figures that
she had[,] who were supposed to be the first to show
concern [for] her. x x x She has acquired a domineering
character as she was not taught to have boundaries in
her actions because of the laxity she had from her
caregivers and also because she grew up to be the
eldest in the brood. She sees to it that she is the one
always followed with regards to making decisions and
always mandates people to submit to her wishes. She
has not acquired the very essence of morality [and] has
certainly learned set of unconstructive traits that further
made her too futile to assume mature roles. Morals and
values were not instilled in her young mind that as she
went on with her life, she never learned to restrain
herself from doing ill-advised things even if she is amply
aware of the depravity of her actions.
The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a
juridical antecedence as it was already in her system
even prior to the solemnization of her marriage with
[Glenn]. x x x. 13(Underlining ours)
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a
Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with
Mary Grace. Substituted service of summons was made
upon Mary Grace through her aunt, Susana
Rosita. 14 Mary Grace filed no answer and did not attend
any of the proceedings before the RTC.
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and
Rodelito were offered as evidence. Glenn and Rodelito
described Mary Grace as outgoing, carefree, and
irresponsible. She is the exact opposite of Glenn, who is
conservative and preoccupied with his work. 15 On her
part, Dr. Tayag reiterated her findings in the
psychological report dated December 29,
2008.cralawred
Ruling of the RTC
On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its
Decision16 declaring the marriage between Glenn and
Mary Grace as null and void on account of the latters
psychological incapacity. The RTC cited the following as
grounds:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn]
warrants [the] grant of the petition.
Reconciliation between the parties under the
circumstances is nil. For the best interest of the parties,
it is best that the legal bond between them be severed.
The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito]
portray the miserable life [Glenn] had with [Mary Grace]
who is a Narcissistic Personality Disordered person with
anti[-]social traits and who does not treat him as her
husband. [Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are separated in fact
since the year 2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned [Glenn]
without telling the latter where to go. x x x Had it not for
the insistence of [Glenn] that he would not know the
whereabouts of his wife. The law provides that [a]
husband and [a] wife are obliged to live together, [and]
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. x x x For all
intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace] was in a
quandary on what it really means. x x x.
From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that
[Mary Grace] failed to comply with the basic marital
obligations of mutual love, respect, mutual help and
support. [Glenn] tried his best to have their marriage
saved but [Mary Grace] did not cooperate with
him. [Mary Grace] is x x x, unmindful of her marital
obligations.
The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr.
Tayag], a clinical psychologist with sufficient authority to
speak on the subject of psychological incapacity. She
examined [Glenn], and was able to gather sufficient data
and information about [Mary Grace]. x x x This
[Narcissistic] personality disorder of [Mary Grace] is
ingrained in her personality make-up, so grave and so
permanent, incurable and difficult to treat. It is conclusive
that this personal incapacity leading to psychological
incapacity is already pre-existing before the marriage
and was only manifested after. It has become grave,
permanent and incurable. 17 (Underlining ours and italics
in the original)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for
reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its
Order18 dated December 1, 2010.cralawred
The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA
On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no
competent evidence exist proving that Mary Grace
indeed suffers from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
which prevents her from fulfilling her marital obligations.
Specifically, the RTC decision failed to cite the root
cause of Mary Graces disorder. Further, the RTC did
not state its own findings and merely relied on Dr.
Tayags statements anent the gravity and incurability of
Mary Graces condition. The RTC resorted to mere
generalizations and conclusions sansdetails. Besides,
what psychological incapacity contemplates is downright
incapacity to assume marital obligations. In the instant
case, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown,
but these do not warrant the grant of Glenns petition.
Mary Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital
duties, but this does not translate into a psychological
illness. 19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the
OSGs appeal.
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein
assailed decision reversing the RTC ruling and declaring
the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid
and subsisting. The CA stated the reasons
below:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held
that psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The psychological
condition must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary
Grace] was carefree, outgoing, immature, and
irresponsible which made her unable to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. He likewise alleged
that she refused to communicate with him to save the
marriage and eventually left him to work abroad. To Our
mind, the above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make
out a case of psychological incapacity on her part.
While it is true that [Glenns] testimony was corroborated
by [Dr. Tayag], a psychologist who conducted a
psychological examination on [Glenn], however,
said examination was conducted only on him and no
evidence was shown that the psychological incapacity of
[Mary Grace] was characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability.
Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of
persuasive value in determining the psychological
incapacity of a person as she would be in the best
position to assess and evaluate the psychological
condition of the couple, she being an expert in this field
of study of behavior. Although the psychologist stated
that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, she did not fully explain the root
cause of the disorder nor did she make a conclusion as
to its gravity or permanence. Moreover, she admitted
that she was not able to examine the respondent[,]
hence, the information provided to her may be subjective
and self-serving.
Essential in this petition is the allegation of the root
cause of the spouses psychological incapacity which
should also be medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in
the decision. The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the parties to
assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth
in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family
Code and such non-complied marital obligations must
similarly be alleged in the petition, established by
evidence and explained in the decision.
Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his
witness did not establish the root cause of the
psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] nor was such
ground alleged in the complaint. We reiterate the ruling
of the Supreme Court on this score, to wit: the root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a)
medically or clinically identified; b) alleged in the
complaint; c) sufficiently proven by experts; and d)
clearly explained in the decision.
Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court,
in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina, has this to say:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have k nown the
obligations he was assuming, or k nowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis x x x[,] nevertheless[,] such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with
a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to
a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.
From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of
the marriage of the parties for the obvious failure of
[Glenn] to show that the alleged psychological incapacity
of [Mary Grace] is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for his failure to
observe the guidelines outlined in the afore-cited cases.
Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to [Glenn]. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted from the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. 20 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and
emphasis and italics in the original)
The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution 21 dated
August 7, 2013, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration22 filed by Glenn.cralawred
Issue
Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the
issue of whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying
the RTCs declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary
Grace.
In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for
the declaration of nullity of marriage should be judged
according to its own set of facts, and not on the basis of
assumptions, predilections or generalizations. The RTC
judge should painstakingly examine the factual milieu,
while the CA must refrain from substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court. 23 Further, Glenn
argues that in Marcos v. Marcos,24 the Court ruled that it
is not a sine qua non requirement for the respondent
spouse to be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist before a marriage could be declared as a
nullity. 25 However, if the opinion of an expert is sought,
his or her testimony should be considered as decisive
evidence. 26 Besides, the findings of the trial court
regarding the credibility of the witnesses should be
respected. 27chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary
In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG
emphasizes that the arguments Glenn raise for our
consideration are mere reiterations of the matters
already resolved by the
CA. 28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ruling of the Court
The instant petition lack s merit.
The lack of personal examination or assessment of the
respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not
necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity
of marriage. If the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted
to.29chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative
testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the
documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove
the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Graces
condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace
is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to perform
household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai
and is romantically-involved with another man. She has
not been maintaining lines of communication with Glenn
at the time the latter filed the petition before the RTC.
Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative, family-
oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary Grace. While
Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible
personalities, the latters acts and traits do not
necessarily indicate psychological incapacity. Rumbaua
v. Rumbaua30 is emphatic
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that
respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated,
had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or
was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse
integral element in the respondents personality structure
that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations had to be shownand was
not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondents stubborn refusal to
cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible,
but it was never proven to be rooted in some
psychological illness. x x x Likewise, the respondents
act of living with another woman four years into the
marriage cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific
evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already
existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner
herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful
when they were going steady and for a time after their
marriage; their problems only came in later.
x x x To use the words of Navales v.
Navales:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part
of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition or
illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage and not due to
some psychological illness that is contemplated by
said rule.31 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and
emphasis in the original)
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with
each other for more or less seven years from 1999 to
2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living
together as spouses under one roof is not an
impossibility. Mary Graces departure from their home in
2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not
absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live
with her husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally
examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to
present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability of the formers
condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenns
testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the
other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenns
statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and
Rodelito both referred to Mary Graces traits and acts,
which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there is
nary a proof on the antecedence of Mary Graces
alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months
before they got married, they saw each other almost
everyday. 32 Glenn saw a loving[,] caring and well[-
]educated person33 in Mary Grace.
Anent Dr. Tayags assessment of Mary Graces
condition, the Court finds the same as
unfounded. Rumbaua34 provides some guidelines on
how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of
psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the
declaration of nullity of
marriage, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayags conclusions
about the respondents psychological incapacity were
based on the information fed to her by only one side
the petitioner whose bias in favor of her cause cannot
be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not
disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias,
her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the
application of a more rigid and stringent set of
standards in the manner we discussed above. For,
effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent
from the prism of a third party account; she did not
actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how
he would have reacted and responded to the doctors
probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the
petitioners narrations, and on this basis characterized
the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and
unremorseful person who believes that the world
revolves around him; and who used love as
adeceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence
[petitioner] extended towards him. x x x.
We find these observations and conclusions
insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that
prevented the respondent from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the
root cause of the respondents narcissistic personality
disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the
respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties
due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical,
nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr.
Tayags conclusion in her Report i.e., that the
respondent suffered Narcissistic Personality Disorder
with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to
be grave and incurable is an unfounded statement,
not a necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While
the various tests administered on the petitioner could
have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own
psychological condition, this same statement cannot be
made with respect to the respondents condition. To
make conclusions and generalizations on the
respondents psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not
different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
xxxx
A careful reading of Dr. Tayags testimony reveals
that she failed to establish the fact that at the time the
parties were married, respondent was already suffering
from a psychological defect that deprived him of the
ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities
of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she
came to the conclusion that respondents condition was
grave and incurable. x x x
xxxx
First, what she medically described was not related or
linked to the respondents exact condition except in a
very general way. In short, her testimony and report
were rich in generalities but disastrously short on
particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be
said to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder;
why and to what extent the disorder is grave and
incurable; how and why it was already present at the
time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on
the respondents awareness of and his capability to
undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All
these are critical to the success of the petitioners case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her
diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the
petitioner related to her. x x x If a psychological disorder
can be proven by independent means, no reason exists
why such independent proof cannot be admitted and
given credit. No such independent evidence, however,
appears on record to have been gathered in this case,
particularly about the respondents early life and
associations, and about events on or about the time of
the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the
testimony and report appear to us to be no more than a
diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and
meagre facts that the petitioner related, and were all
slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to
justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this
because only the baser qualities of the respondents life
were examined and given focus; none of these qualities
were weighed and balanced with the better qualities,
such as his focus on having a job, his determination to
improve himself through studies, his care and attention
in the first six months of the marriage, among
others. The evidence fails to mention also what
character and qualities the petitioner brought into her
marriage, for example, why the respondents family
opposed the marriage and what events led the
respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his
mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure,
these are important because not a few marriages have
failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either
or both of the spouses, but because of basic
incompatibilities and marital developments that do not
amount to psychological incapacity. x x x. 35 (Citations
omitted and underlining ours)
In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to
Mary Graces status as the eldest among her
siblings, 36 her fathers being an overseas contract worker
and her very tolerant mother, a housewife. 37These,
however, are not sufficient to establish and explain the
supposed psychological incapacity of Mary Grace
warranting the declaration of the nullity of the couples
marriage.

The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant

to obtaining the statements of witnesses who can attest
to the antecedence of a persons psychological
incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a
petitioner from complying with what the law requires.
While the Court also commiserates with Glenns marital
woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides
inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary
Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her obligations as Glenns spouse.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated January 29, 2013 and Resolution dated
August 7, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 96448 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner,
vs.
LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECI SI ON
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court assailing the November 20,
2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its
June 1, 2010 Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-
MIN, which reversed and set aside the September 20,
2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,
Cagayan de Oro City(RTC-Br.37), declaring the
marriage between petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert)
and private respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null
and void.
The Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972.
They begot three (3) children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, Branch
23, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC-Br. 23). On March 7,
1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the petition. Robert appealed
this judgment before the CA where it was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On January 29, 1999, the CA
reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision "due to lack of
participation of the State as required under Article 48 of
the Family Code." 3The case was remanded to the RTC
for further proceedings and its records were thereafter
transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the latter
was designated as Family Court pursuant to the Family
Code Act of 1997.
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering from
psychological and mental incapacity and
unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to
comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities.
Such incapacity became even more apparent during
their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of
immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent
rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy
and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the
complaint. She averred that it was Robert who
manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage.
Despite due notice, however, she did not appear during
the trial. Assistant City Prosecutor Isabelo Sabanal
appeared for the State. When Robert testified, he
disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA,
and had married an American. He also revealed that
when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and
dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also
claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in her
duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the
following circumstances: (1) it was he who did the
cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to
keep order; (2) it was her mother who prepared their
meal while her sister was the one who washed their
clothes because she did not want her polished nails
destroyed; (3) it was also her sister who took care of
their children while she spent her time sleeping and
looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her
schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received
anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male
students; (6) when he was not home, she would receive
male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their
house when he was away; and (6) she would contract
loans without his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna
Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance
Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the
trial court, Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment
with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed
down a decision declaring their marriage invalid ab initio
on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part
of both parties as contemplated by the second
paragraph of Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had
rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), interposed an appeal with the CA. The
OSG argued that Robert failed to make a case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Luz. It pointed
out that the real cause of the marital discord was the
sexual infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG
contended, should not result in the nullification of the
marriage under the law, but merely constituted a ground
for legal separation.
The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision, 4 granted the
petition and reversed the RTC decision. The decision,
including the decretal portion, partially reads:
[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error.
Closer scrutiny of the records reveals, as correctly noted
by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted
on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. x x x.
 xxxx
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving
declarations, the evidence adduced by Robert fell short
of establishing the fact that at the time of their marriage,
Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which in
fact deprived [her] of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
xxxx
We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellees undeserved
marital plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as a court
compels Us to apply the law at all costs, however harsh
it may be on whomsoever is called upon to bear its
unbiased brunt.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated
September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-178 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied by the CA in its June 1, 2010 Resolution, 6 stating
that the arguments of Robert were mere rehash of the
same ground, arguments and discussion previously
pointed out by him, and that no new substance was
brought out to warrant the reconsideration or reversal of
its decision.
Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
I marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL GAP
TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION OFTHE RTC
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF
PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND
VOID ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO
DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE
MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE CATHOLIC
BISHOPS CONFERENCE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACKOF
DUE DISCRETION.
III
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND
BY THE LOWER COURT AS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATE D TO
COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS.
Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the
nullity of his marriage even in the absence of any
medical, psychiatric or psychological examination of the
wife by a competent and qualified professional. To
bolster his claim, he avers that the Metropolitan Tribunal
already declared that Luz exhibited grave lack of
discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights
and obligations mutually given and accepted in
marriage. The said decision was affirmed by the NAMT.
Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz
with different men coupled with the fact that she failed to
function as a home maker to her family and as a
housewife to him incapacitated her from accepting and
complying with her essential marital obligations. For said
reason, he asserts that the case of Luz was not a mere
case of sexual infidelity, but clearly an illness that was
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition
which incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities
of a married woman. Robert avers that a sex maniac is
not just a mere sexual infidel but one who is suffering
from a deep psychological problem.
Position of the State
The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the
totality of evidence presented by Robert was not
sufficient to support a finding that Luz was
psychologically incapacitated. His evidence fell short of
establishing his assertion that at the time of their
which deprived her of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal
and the NAMT, the OSG claims that the same were only
given persuasive value and were not controlling or
decisive in cases of nullity of marriage. Further, the
decision was based on grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning matrimonial rights and obligations
due to outside factors other than psychological
incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family
Code. The OSG also raises the strong possibility of
collusion between the parties as shown by the events
that took place after the issuance of the March 7, 1996
RTC Decision. The OSG wrote:
Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court
issued its March 7, 1996 Decision unmistakably show
the collusion between the parties to obtain the reliefs
pleaded. Among others, respondents Retraction of
Testimony was executed without the presence of
counsel sometime in 1998, a few months before she
married an American. This irregularity was even noticed
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:
 xxxx
The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor
General became indispensable, in the present recourse,
when, in a whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a
VOLTE FACE executed a "Retraction of Testimony" and
a "Waiver of Custody" waiving custody of Franco Mark J
Mallillin, still a minor, her son by the Appellant. It bears
stressing that the Appellee, in the Court a quo,
obdurately denied the material allegations of the
Appellants complaint and declared that it was the
Appellant who was psychologically incapacitated. The
sudden turn-about of the appellee, in the present
recourse, to the extent of disowning her testimony in the
Court a quo and even praying for the reversal of the
Decision of the Trial Court is strongly suggestive, if not
constitutive, of collusion or a modus vivendi between the
parties, outlawed by the Family Code of the Philippines
and the Constitution. x x x
The Courts Ruling
The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence
adduced proves that Luz was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition is bereft of merit.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should
refer to no less than a mental not merely physical
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code,
among others, include their mutual obligations to live
together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render
help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. 7
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may only
emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. 8
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De
Quintos, Jr., 9 the Court reiterated the well-settled
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina, 10based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
Thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. x x x.
xxxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x
x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x
x x.
xx xx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. x x x.
xxxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
 also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. x x x.
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the
considered view that Roberts evidence failed to
establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage. Other
than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was
adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz. He
presented no other witnesses to corroborate his
allegations on her behavior. Thus, his testimony was
self-serving and had no serious value as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity of Luz was not medically or clinically
identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial. Based
on the records, Robert failed to prove that her disposition
of not cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing
the clothes, and propensity for dating and receiving
different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable within the parameters of jurisprudence on
psychological incapacity.
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife
and as a mother, as well as her emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of
the parties' marriage. The Court has repeatedly stressed
that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse. 11 Indeed, to be declared clinically
or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be
reluctant to perform one's duties is another.
Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. 12
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or
perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves,
constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based
on psychological incapacity. Robert argues that the
series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external
manifestations of the psychological defect that she was
suffering within her person, which could be considered
as nymphomania or "excessive sex hunger." Other than
his allegations, however, no other convincing evidence
was adduced to prove that these sexual indiscretions
were considered as nymphomania, and that it was
grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of
psychological incapacity embodied in Article 36. To
stress, Roberts testimony alone is insufficient to prove
the existence of psychological incapacity.
In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug
and the Republic of the Philippines, 13 the Court ruled
that the respondents act of living an adulterous life
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological
disorder, especially when no specific evidence was
shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to
establish that the respondents unfaithfulness was a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which made
her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance
Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao Medical
Center, Cagayan deOro City, was insufficient to prove
the psychological in capacity of Luz. There was nothing
in the records that would indicate that Luz had either
been interviewed or was subjected to a psychological
examination. The finding as to her psychological
incapacity was based entirely on hearsay and the self-
serving information provided by Robert.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is
insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz.
Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina, 14 the Court stated that
interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts,
still it is subject to the law on evidence. Thus:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our
Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly
void x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of
Evidence provides:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is
offered must be specified.
In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of
the NAMT cannot be given value since it was not offered
during the trial, and the Court has in no way of
ascertaining the evidence considered by the same
tribunal.
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be
pointed out that the basis of the declaration of nullity of
marriage by the NAMT was not the third paragraph of
Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological
nature similar to Article 36 of the Family Code, but the
second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those
who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations
to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the
pertinent portions of the NAMT decision are as follows:
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude
required by law that based on the deposition of the
petitioner the respondent understandably ignored the
proceedings completely for which she was duly cited for
Contempt of Court and premised on the substantially
concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman
Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through
her action and reaction patterns, before and after the
marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in
judgement for marriage intents and purposes basically
by reason of her immaturity of judgement as manifested
by her emotional ambivalence x x x.
WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS,
having invoked the Divine Name and having in mind the
Law, the Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the
Case, hereby declares and decrees the confirmation of
the nullity decision rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal
of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manil on the
Marriage Case MALLILIN JAMISOLAMIN with Prot. N.
63/2000 on the ground provided by Canon 1095 par.
2CIC on the part of the woman Respondent but NOT
on the part of the man Petitioner for lack of evidence.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)15
In Santos v. Santos, 6 the Court referred to the
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code
Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide
an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code.
It went out to state that a part of the provision is similar
to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of
Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of
discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In Najera v. Najera, 17 the Court was also confronted with
a similar issue of whether to consider an annulment by
the NAMT as also covering psychological incapacity, the
only ground recognized in our law. In the said case, the
NAMT decision was also based on the second
paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled that it was
not similar to, and only annulments under the third
paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be considered.
Elucidating, the Court wrote: Petitioners argument is
without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of
Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to
consider the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunals
decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it
resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the
said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of
the very same issues now raised before this Court and
correctly held that petitioners motion for reconsideration
was devoid of merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this
Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and
reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated
June14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in
effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in
absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate
Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and
conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital
contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a
child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own
parents; his own two siblings have broken marriages;
Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering
mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he
depended for advice; Third, he was according to his
friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage;
this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very
quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later
hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the
infidelity of his mother who now lives with her paramour,
also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he
continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one
time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and
attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to
final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of
Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and
having considered the pertinent Law and relevant
Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby
proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the
sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of
marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon
1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial
Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant
offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to
wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellants mother),
Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon,
Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist).
Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful
night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly
made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike
the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal,
petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and friends of the
opposing parties were never presented before said
Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latters
testimonies, this Court is without any clue. True, in the
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA
198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as
follows:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our
Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly
void x x x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of
Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is
offered must be specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant
should not expect us to give credence to the Decision of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when,
apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of
which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments
must be based on the evidence presented before the
court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And
based on the evidence on record, We find no ample
reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial
Court.[31]
Santos v. Santos18 cited the deliberations during the
sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which
drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of
Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the
provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095
of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of
discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the
declaration of nullity of marriage by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph
of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a
psychological nature, but the second paragraph of
Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a
grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given
and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent
(despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999,
he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his
right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed)
corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with
moral certainty required by law and conclude that the
husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered
from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby
rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of
Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and
having considered the pertinent Law and relevant
Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby
proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the
sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of
marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon
1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x.
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual
basis of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by
petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the
decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not
based on the psychological incapacity of respondent.
Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion
of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the
psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by
the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the
Decision of the RTC. (Emphases in the original;
Underscoring supplied)
Hence, Roberts reliance on the NAMT decision is
misplaced. To repeat, the decision of the NAMT was
based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which
refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion
of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted, a cause
not of psychological nature under Article 36 of the Family
Code. A cause of psychological nature similar to Article
36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of
the Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos 19), which for
ready reference reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting
marriage:
convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological
incapacity of Luz.
As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner
make a case for legal separation. Hence, this decision is
without prejudice to an action for legal separation if a
party would want to pursue such proceedings. In this
disposition, the Court cannot decree a legal separation
because in such proceedings, there are matters and
consequences like custody and separation of properties
that need to be considered and settled.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN,
dated November 20, 2009, and its Resolution, dated
June 1, 2010, are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice.
No costs.

xxxx SO ORDERED.

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological

nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.

To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the

NAMT under the second paragraph of Canon 1095
should also be covered would be to expand what the
lawmakers did not intend to include. What would prevent
members of other religious groups from invoking their
own interpretation of psychological incapacity? Would
this not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent,
interpretations?

To consider church annulments as additional grounds for

annulment under Article 36 would be legislating from the
bench.1wphi1 As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina, 20 interpretations given by the NAMT of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines are given great
respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or
decisive.

In Republic v. Galang, 21 it was written that the

Constitution set out a policy of protecting and
strengthening the family as the basic social institution,
and the marriage was the foundation of the family.
Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the
State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden
of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the
plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a
situation where the parties, or one of them, could not
have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a
grave and serious psychological illness existing at the
time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold
the indissolubility of the marital tie.

In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly.

Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient and