Week 1:

01 Tanada vs. Tuvera (EA to the president)

Facts: Lorenzo M. Tanada filed for a writ of Mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders. The case was however dismissed on the ground that the petitioners
have no legal standing.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity.
Issue: Whether or not the government is required to publish presidential decrees regardless if the
date of effectivity is stipulated within the words of the law
Held: Yes
Ruling: The very first clause of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: There shall be
published in the Official Gazette. The word shall used therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people
to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself
makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances of a public nature or
of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

02 In the matter of the adoption of Elizabeth Mira, Gilbert Brehm and Ester
Mira Brehm vs. Republic
Topic: Article 5 Mandatory and Prohibitory Laws
Facts: Petitioner Gilbert Brehm, a US citizen, was a member of the US Naval Forces with
temporary assignment in Subic Bay. He married a Filipina named Ester who had a daughter
named Elizabeth. Elizabeth was Esters daughter with another man who left them for good.
Brehm, together with Elizabeth and her daughter resided in Intramuros, Manila after their
marriage. In 1959, the spouses Brehm filed for the adoption of minor Elizabeth before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, to give paramount consideration to the welfare of the
minor Elizabeth.
An opposition to the petition with respect to Gilbert R. Brehm was registered by the
Republic of the Philippines because Brehms residence in the Philippines was merely temporary
by reason of his tour of duty, thus disqualifying him from making an adoption citing Art. 335 [4],
New Civil Code; Sec. 2, Rule 100, Rules of Court), and that being a non-resident alien, the Court
has no jurisdiction over him. The petitioners allege that Art. 338 is applicable to the case instead
of Art. 335 because Art, 338 expressly authorizes the adoption of a stepchild by a stepfather, in
which category petitioner Brehm falls.
Issue: Whether or not the in act of adopting the minor Elizabeth, Art. 335, a mandatory law
should be first established before construing Art. 338 in favor of the petitioners
Held: Yes
Ruling: We should construe, however, Article 338 in connection with Article 335. Art. 335
clearly states that The following cannot adopt: (4). Non-resident aliens. It is, therefore,
mandatory, because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the negative
terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated (50 Am.
Jur. 51). On the other hand, Art. 338, provides the following may be adopted: (3) a step-
child, by the stepfather or stepmother, which is merely directory, and which can only be
given operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of Art. 335.
Moreover, as heretofore been shown, it is Article 335 that confers jurisdiction to the court over
the case, and before Article 338 may or can be availed of, such jurisdiction must first be
established. We ruled out the adoption of a stepchild by a step-father, when the latter has a
legitimate child of his own

03 DM Consunji v. Juego
Topic: Article 6 Right and Waiver
Facts: Jose Juego fell from a 14 story construction site, because the platform they were on broke
which instantly resulted to his death. His widow. Herein appellee filed a complaint for damages,
however, appellant DM CONSUNJI, the employer of the deceased averred that appellee Juego
waived her right for damages when she availed of the compensation from the State Insurance
Fund. This was proven to be true, however, the widow Juego averred that she had no knowledge
of such right to file for damages when she availed of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

The petitioner further avers that pursuant to Art. 173 of the labor code:
ART. 173. Extent of liability.Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer
to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf
of the employee or his dependents.

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other
rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury.

Issue: Whether or not the appellees waiving of her right is valid in this case
Held: No.
Ruling: There was no intentional relinquishment of a known right and the appellee was not
knowledgeable of her rights and the facts of the accident when she filed for compensation under
the labor code.
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case,
the fact that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioners
employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a
resolution stating that there may be civil liability.
There is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash
when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The
police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the
form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990. There is also no
showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the
ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights.

04 People v. Donato
Topic: Article 6 Rights and Waiver
Facts: Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion were accused of allegedly leading the NPA for
their Rebellion. Respondent Judge Donato granted other respondents Josefina Cruz and Jose
Milo Concepcion the right to bail for P50,000 even though they opted to hand themselves to the
legal custody of the authorities. According to the petitioners, this is an outright waiver of their
right to bail.
Issue: whether the right to bail may, under certain circumstances, be denied to a person who is
charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and whether such right may be waived
Held: Yes, the right to bail may be waived
Ruling: In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo, it was held: Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime
fall naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the state, as well as the accused, is interested;
and (b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges.
Those of the first class cannot be waived; those of the second may be.
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed
by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a
waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against
public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; the right to counsel and to remain silent; and the right
to be heard.
The court ruled that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be
waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law. The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion
in granting bail to the private respondent.

05 NAMARCO v. Tecson
Topic: Article 13 Effectivity of Laws and Period of Time
Nature: Appeal from an order of the CFI Manila
Facts: In a prior case of Price Stabilization Corporation (PSC) vs. Miguel D. Tecscon and Alto
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff PSC which ordered
respondent Tecson to pay a sum of money with interests to PSC. A copy of this decision was
served to respondents on 21 November 1955, which became final on 21 December 1955 or 30
days from the notice of judgment. On 21 December 1965, The National Marketing Corporation
(NAMARCO), as successor and judgment creditor of PSC, filed for the revival of the judgment
in the previous case.
Respondent Tecson moved to dismiss the case for lack of judgment and prescription,
alleging that more than ten years have passed since the final judgment of the previous case
pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of the civil code (an action upon a judgment "must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues,") which, in the language of Art, 1152 of the
same Code, "commences from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final."
Because the years 1960 and 1964 are leap years, and that those years had 366 days as
opposed to the provisions of the Art. 18 civil code which indicated that when the law speaks
of years, it shall be understood that years are of 365 days, the period of 21 December 1955
to 21 December 1965 should be considered more than 10 years, thus prescribed.
Plaintiff NAMARCO insists that the respondent "is erroneous, because a year means
a calendar year (Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crowford, p. 383) and
since what is being computed here is the number of years, a calendar year should be used
as the basis of computation. There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December 21
to December 21 of the following year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of
the year, because it is the 366th day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong
to the year where it falls and, therefore, that the 366 days constitute one year."
Issue: Whether or not a year in should be considered strictly 365 days
Held: Yes.
Ruling: Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that When the law speak of years, months, days or
nights, it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each, months of 30 days If months are
indicated by their names, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively
have.
Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not
realistic, for failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-
appellant herein cannot be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art, 13 of our Civil
Code, and reviving Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, thereby engaging in
judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress. If public interest demands a
reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through
legislative process, not by judicial decree.
NOTE: Article 13 has been superseded by Sec. 31 of EO 292 (1987) which provides that
Sec.31 Legal Periods Year shall be considered 12 calendar months
06 Tibajia vs. CA and Go
Topic: Effectivity of Laws and Period of Time

07 Garcia vs. Recio

Topic: Art. 15, 16, 17 Conflict or Rules with a Foreign Element
Facts: Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
Citizen, at Malabon, in 1987. In 1989, a decree of divorce purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Austrian family court. In 1992, respondent Recio became an Australian citizen.
In 1994, petitioner Garcia was married to respondent at Cabanatuan City. In their application for
a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. In 1995, petitioner and
respondent lived separately without judicial notice and in 1996, their conjugal assets were
divided accordingly. In 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of Bigamy, alleging that respondent had a subsisting marriage when they were
married. Respondent answered that his former marriage was known to petitioner and that he was
legally capacitated to remarry based on the divorce decree obtained in Australia. The trial court
ruled in favor of respondent, saying that the divorce decree was enough to prove respondent
Recios legal capacity to marry. Thus, the petition.
Issue: Whether the marriage of respondent to his first wife Editha Samson was proven enough to
be divorced. / Whether respondent has legal capacity to remarry remanded to trial court to
check admissibility of evidence
Held: Yes.
Ruling: A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained
abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. decrees that
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient. (Art. 15 is only applicable to Filipino citizens, Art. 17 is applicable in
relation to Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132: a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication, or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.)

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance
with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for respondents
cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject
to petitioners qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible
as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted
articles (11, 13 and 52 provisions on the application for a marriage license) of the Family
Code is not necessary, respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after
he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. (Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.)

08 Republic vs. Orbecido

Week 2:
09 Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. CA and Tobias
Topic: Art. 19. Norm of Conduct
Facts: Respondent Tobias was a purchasing agent and an administrative assistant to the
engineering operations manager. Respondent reported fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions to his superior and to petitioner Herbert Hendry, then executive vice president. One
day after respondent Tobias reported the incidents, he was confronted by Hendry who accused
him of being the #1 suspect, ordered him to take a forced leave for 1 week, not to communicate
with the office and to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys. Upon returning
to work, respondent Tobias was even called by petitioner Hendry, a crook and a swindler, and
was asked to take a lie detector test. Petitioners even asked a private investigator to determine
whether respondent was guilty. According to an investigation conducted by the police, Tobias
was not guilty and although the private investigator found Tobias guilty, he ruled that there
should be further investigation.
Petitioners then filed 6 criminal charges against respondent Tobias, eventually dismissed
him, and even made remarks generalizing Filipinos as thieves. When Tobias was applying for
another job at Republic Telecommunications Company (RETELCO), petitioners told Retelco
that Tobias was dismissed for dishonesty, which is why Tobias was denied a job. Tobias then
filed for damages against herein petitioners. The RTC ruled in favor of Tobias, the CA affirmed
the decision. Thus, the petition. Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for
damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss private respondent.

Issue: Whether petitioner Tobias is entitled to damages

Held: Yes.
Ruling: Article 19 provides: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays
down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
In the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain
significant circumstances, finds that petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke,
causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

10 Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs. CA and Baltao

Topic: Art. 19. Norm of Conduct
Facts:
Issue: Whether or not damages exist in this case, that warrants payment for damages by the
petitioners
Held: No.
Ruling:

11 Sps. Custodio vs. CA and Mabasa

Topic: Art. 19 Damnum Absque Injuria (damage w/o injury)
Facts: -Indicate the placing of the properties of the petitioners and respondents
-
Issue: Whether or not respondent is entitled to damages by way of Damnum Absque Injuria
Held:
Ruling: There was damage but there was no injury. (emphasize on the difference of damage and
injury.)

12 Rellosa vs. Pellosis

Topic: Arts. 20, 21. Abuse of Right
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Ruling:

13 Vasco v. CA & Vasco

(Note: The petitioner in this case is Antonio Vasco, the father. Respondents are the illegitimate
children)
Topic: Article 24: Parens Patriae
Facts: In October 1976, the Juvenile and Justice Relations Court of Quezon City found that
Reynaldo Vasco and Lolita Vasco (born on April 8, 1952 and April 27, 1954, respectively) are
the illegitimate children of Antonio Vasco and Angelina Reyes. It ordered Antonio to pay them
the sum of P200 as monthly allowance for support, beginning October, 1976 plus P500 as
attorneys fees. Antonio Vasco appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which the lower
court approved on record, which is why the judgment was not yet executed, thus still pending.
During this time, the Vasco children filed for a motion of execution of the judgment ordering
Antonio Vasco to give the illegitimate children support support. The Court of Appeals in its
decision of August 10, 1977 upheld that order of execution pending appeal in the interest of
substantial justice and on the theory that the judiciary is an agency of the State acting as parens
patriae and that if the said order is erroneous, the error is only an error of judgment and is not a
grave abuse of discretion or an act in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not illegitimate filing for support who are not minors are entitled to parens
patriae according to Article 24 of the Civil Code
Held: No.
Ruling: Article 24 of the CC provides that: In all contractual, property or other relations,
when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for
his protection. The Court of Appeals in sustaining the trial courts order of execution cited the
demands of substantial justice and the role of the State as parens patriae in protecting the interest
of minors. It is axiomatic that the courts should endeavor to do substantial justice in all cases and
that as much as possible technicalities should be eschewed. However, we should not forget that
procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice.
Justice has to be administered according to the rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice or
whimsicality. As to the doctrine of parens patriae (father of his country), its relevancy to this
case is doubtful because the recipients of the support granted by the lower court are no
longer minors. The doctrine refers to the inherent power and authority of the state to provide
protection of the person and property of a person non sui juris. Under that doctrine, the state has
the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability.

14 Valenzuela vs. CA and Telosa

Topic: Art. 24. Parens Patriae (state protection of the disadvantaged)
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Ruling:

15 Nessia vs. Fermin

Topic: Art. 27. Malice or Inexcusable Negligence of Public Servant/Employee
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Ruling: