Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Dominik U. Niemann
Leiden University
d.u.a.niemann@umail.leidenuniv.nl
9 March 2017
Niemann 1
After the final dissolution of the Eastern Bloc in 1991, many authoritarian and socialist
countries around the world, not only in Eastern Europe but also in countries of the Global
South, turned their back to Socialism and economically, ideologically and politically adjusted
their stance in favour of the emerging phase of neoliberal globalisation (Saxonberg 2013, 10;
Carmona Bez 2004, 1-2; Westad 2010, 1). Cubas respective stance however remained
unchanged and despite enormous economic and geopolitical difficulties, Cuba as of today (and
successfully maintain a largely centralised market economy and a socialist political regime
(Sweig and Bustamante 2015, 9-10). While, in a historical context, there are undeniably
societal, cultural and economical reasons for Cuba not to turn its back on Socialism after the
end of the Cold War, and while these reasons influence one another and must not be dismissed
in general discourse, the paper will identify and examine three political factors that supported
Cubas continuation of its socialist regime and its subsequent resistance to neoliberal
globalisation: (1) the [historical] Cuba-US relations, (2) the legitimacy of Fidel Castros post-
revolutionary socialist regime and the subsequently pertaining eminence of socialist ideology,
and (3) the post-Cold-War political (and necessarily economical) ties to Russia and China
(Carmona Bez 2004, 50-53, 86-87; Morley and McGillon 2002, 4-5; Yamaoka 2004, 309-
312). Despite the distinctions established, it is important to point out that these factors
naturally coincide and greatly influence one another and thus only serve as points of departure
in order to approach and re-construct a multifaceted political agenda pursued by the Cuban
government after the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR). While necessarily referring to
Cubas historical foreign relations to the US and the USSR, particularly with regard to Cubas
political and diplomatic stance during and following the national revolution of 1959 and the
subsequent hotter period of the Cold War in which Cuba took a special and at times pivotal
Niemann 2
role between the two rivalling Superpowers, the paper will effectively focus on the period after
the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989 while eventually also drawing a line to current affairs
Cubas relations to the United States have historically been capricious as they developed
Firstly, the (I) Wars of Independence (1868-98), where the US played a significant role in
Cubas struggle against the Spanish Crown (Ibid. 5). Following the victory over Spain, the US
assumed full credit for Cubas independence, neglecting the Cuban effort entirely, and posed
this as a justification for keeping a political and economic carte blanche in Cuba, thus effectively
dominating the countrys political landscape and economy (Prez Jr. 1999, 359; Saull 2006,
millionaires and the Mafia, the countrys elite still economically benefitted from this duplicitous
Pan-American relationship (Haslam 2011, 187). Therefore, the (II) Republican phase of Cuba
prevailed from 1902-58 (Gronbeck-Tedesco 2015, 5, 16). Only then, the Cubans (other than
the political elite) realised that long-term US foreign policy did not include the retreat from
filling governmental positions and regulating Cubas economy, thus seriously confining the
islands newly gained independence (Prez Jr. 1999, 358; Gronbeck-Tedesco 2015, 9).
Emerging from the insight of this lack of sovereignty in their own land, the 26th of July
Movement around Fidel Castro instigated the Cuban Revolution and brought about the third
phase, which Gronbeck-Tedesco calls the (III) phase of Revolution and which he argues lasted
from 1959 until the present day (Ibid. 5,9). Written in 2015, the author might not have
foreseen the rapprochement of both countries in mid-2015, where diplomatic ties were slowly
Niemann 3
restored by i.a. reopening the US embassy, which could be seen as a forth phase of this shared
history1. During this third phase of Revolution, as a response to the exploitative nature of US
closeness, Cuba repulsed the idea of Good-Neighbourhood and detached completely from
the US in political as well as economic and ideological terms (Ibid. 5). The general sentiment
Castro regime, resulting in the public politicisation for the setting up of the US embargo against
Cuba in 1960, the failed US-Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961, and subsequently the Cuban Missile
Crisis in 1962 (Smith 1993, 129; Duncan 1985, 53; Sweig and Bustamante 2013, 102). Against
popular belief however, the eminence of Socialist3 ideology was developed only after the
revolution as a means to justify a strict Anti-US stance and to guarantee both the political and
economic support by the Soviet Union (Duncan 1985, 41; 53). Evolving from the deep
historical resentment to US influence and the resulting lack of sovereignty in their own country,
fuelled by the military encounters mentioned above, it can thus be argued that Cubas political
ideology, at least under the leadership of Fidel Castro, was bound to categorically reject an
opening towards the US after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, by accepting and
taking part of the neoliberal globalisation, the country would have overtly admitted the failure
of its ideology and the resulting political system, its essential dependency on the Soviet Union
and moreover, it would have had to obey to any political or economic demands by the US
1
It is worth noting however that tendencies of a US-Cuban political and economic rapprochement had been
visible since 2012, (or arguably even since 2008, when Raul Castro succeeded his brother in office) which
Gronbeck-Tedesco seems to completely neglect here (cf. Sweig and Bustamante 2013, 101-2).
2
Please note that due to the lack of space, I am unable to establish why one can speak of a neo-colonialist
dominance. In short, US firms controlled large parts of Cubas economy, which at that time was mainly based
on sugar. 60% of rural land was owned by foreign (mostly US) companies (cf. Gronbeck-Tedesco 2015, 38).
3
In fact, it has been argued that Castros rendered ideology developed during the course of the revolution and its
following years as Castro did not consider himself a Socialist during the revolution but a nationalist and only
later proclaimed it (under the increasing intellectual influence of Che Guevara) to have been a Socialist
revolution. During the course of the invasion of the Bay of Pigs, fearing further US attempts to overthrow his
regime, Castro began to seek out for political ties with the USSR and portrayed himself a Marxist-Leninist in
order to please the Soviet-government (Duncan 1985, 40-41).
Niemann 4
government which was one of the main factors to have triggered off the revolution and the
As already suggested in the previous part, Fidel Castro took the politically and
ideologically central role not only during the revolution itself, but also during the post-
revolutionary phase until his resignation from office in 2008, due to illness (Sweig and
Bustamante 2013, 101-2). While the Fund for Peace currently ascribes to Cuba a very low state
legitimacy4 (7.3/10, 10 being the lowest possible score, cf. Messner et al. 2016, 19: Cuba) and
while it has been argued that Castro already lost its ideological legitimacy before 1989 (19915),
scholars are unable to impugn that some sort of legitimacy of Castros regime, albeit possibly
not tangible through a liberal lens, prevailed since the revolution and past the collapse of the
Soviet Union (Saxonberg 2013, 20). However, if there had been no legitimacy of Castros
regime, even though opposed on Cubas citizen by his totalitarian regime, the system might
have collapsed during the dissolution of the USSR and the resulting economic crisis (Ibid. 21).
Saxonberg argues that Castro held a legitimacy that was grounded in his achievement of
overcoming US dominance by means of national revolution and the consequent public political,
cultural and ideological glorification of it (Ibid. 2013, 35; Yamaoka 2004, 311-15). In line with
this, Steve Ludlam pinpoints that [t]he fundamental claim to legitimacy of Cubas political
leadership is that only the socialist revolution can preserve the sovereignty of the Cuban state and its
constitution, which, having been approved by 98 per cent of the electorate on a 98 per cent turnout, is
probably the most popularly-endorsed constitution in history (2012, 243). Within this national
4
It should here be noted that the Fragile State Index clearly shows a Liberalist approach to understanding and
mapping the world, since it presupposes, a functioning democracy as an ideal or precondition to state legitimacy
(cf. Messner et al. 2016, 13), which is therefore one of the main factors influencing the score. (cf. Snyder 2004,
56-57)
5
Although the USSR officially dissolved in 1991, economic ties to Cuba had decreased since the mid-1980s
and Cuba found itself in an economic crisis by 1989 the latest, albeit its negative peak after 1992. (Cf. Cuba:
Total Imports; Total Exports; GDP; GDP growth: 1980-1995, World Trade Organisation and The World
Bank)
Niemann 5
mindset, Castro himself effectively integrated his charismatic authority which not only helped
to perpetuate the glorification of the nations achievements but also to justify his own position
as a quasi-totalitarian leader6 who was publicly loved and glorified by the Cuban public
(Hoffmann 2009, 233-34). Another reason for the regimes persistent legitimacy might be the
constant investment in and maintenance of the social welfare system that Cubas government
had implemented since the revolution and which was upheld even in times of economic crises,
such as during the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Carmona Bez 2004, 2, 124). The marking
of the US as the national enemy in political, economic as well as ideological terms and the
subsequent glorification of the revolution over US dominance, paired with Fidel Castros
charismatic authority and the regimes constant investment in social welfare thus seems to have
given the Cuban government enough legitimacy to overcome the collapse of the Soviet Union,
despite economic and political difficulties, and to uphold a socialist system in an increasingly
neoliberal world.
After it had lost the Soviet Union as its most important economic and political partner
and in consideration of the remaining US embargo, Cuba was obliged to reorientate itself in
terms of both its political and economic foreign relations. The situation had changed
dramatically and the new established Russian Federation, in the light of its newly affirmative
stance towards the US, immediately reduced trade and political relations with Cuba and
positioned itself strictly against the Cuban revolution and its ideology (Miller 2005, 59-60).
However, trade and political relations between the two countries did not entirely cease to exist
and a slow rapprochement process was facilitated. By 1995, the Russian government under
Boris Yeltsin had realised that the privileging of links with the West [had] not necessarily [been]
6
Please note that there exists an academic discourse on the totalitarian status that Castro held during that time.
Hence the cautious expression without further argumentation as due to the limited word count. (For the
academic debate cf. i.a. Saxonberg 2013, 33-35)
Niemann 6
in Russias best interest (Ibid. 2005, 76). Especially since US-Russian relations did not flourish
as much as initially assumed, Russia quickly sought to re-establish full political dialogue with
Cuba, granted several major credits and signed a bilateral trade protocol for sugar in exchange
for oil (Ibid. 2005, 76-77). While these Russian-Cuban relations rather slowly developed after
1991, China was one of the first countries to establish unprecedented political links with Cuba.
Already in 1989, both foreign ministers had visited each others capital and in the following
years, many more political and economic meetings were arranged, reaching its peak of
importance when both Fidel Castro and Jiang Zemin, at that time Chinas head of state,
exchanged official state visits, in 1992 and 1995, respectively (Treto 2013, 96). By then,
Castros government had already established direct links to Chinas defence and state security
ministries and had paved the way for intensive economic exchange between the two countries
which remains one of Cubas main trade partners until today (Ibid. 96-97). Cubas trade and
political relations to Western Europe, Canada and Central America, albeit a remarkable
decrease after the dissolution of the USSR mainly due to US influence, were never fully
abandoned and further contributed to Cubas ability to overcome the US embargo and the
continuation of its socialist system (Morley and McGillion 2002, 100). Building up close
political and economic ties with both China and Russia while maintaining relations to
European and Central American countries as well as Canada can therefore be seen as the
necessary and crucial effort for Cuba to have overcome the deep economic crisis that emerged
after 1991, also called the Special Period (Fernndez 1993, 17; Miller 2005, 87-89).
The collapse of the Soviet Union exposed Cuba to an existential crisis as it not only
meant the victory of the US capitalist system but also a sharp cut in Cubas foreign political
and economic relations. The country was forced to either redefine its system and commit itself
socialist system and (once again) stand up against US dominance. Pursuing the latter without
losing the support of Cubas people appears to have only been possible through a combination
of societal, cultural, economic, ideological and political factors. While focussing on the political
factors, the essay has shown that (1) the historically deep political and ideological opposition
to US dominance, combined with (2) a relatively strong political legitimacy of Fidel Castros
socialist regime and (3) the emerging trade and political relations to mainly China and Russia
enabled Cuba to maintain its socialist stance after the collapse of the Soviet Union and remain
Cuba has certainly undergone political and economic changes in its system7 and the recent
death of Fidel Castro might have marked yet another step towards a full integration to the
global market. In view of respective future policies, it will be interesting to observe whether
these recent achievements will be influenced by the new US-presidency of Donald Trump.
7
which unfortunately however were impossible to include in this essay. (cf. i.a. Sweig 2015, 101-113)
Niemann 8
Works Cited
Carmona Bez, Antonio. 2004. State Resistance to Globalisation in Cuba. London: Pluto
Press.
Duncan, Raymond W. 1985. The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence. New York:
Praeger.
Fernndez, Damin J. 1993. "Cubas Relations with China: Economic Pragmatism and
Gronbeck-Tedesco, John A. 2015. Cuba, the United States, and cultures of the transnational
Haslam, Jonathan. 2011. Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the
24259.
Messner, J. J., Nate Haken, Patricia Taft, Hannah Blyth, Kendall Lawrence, Charlotte Bellm,
Sagal Hashi, Nicole Patierno, Leo Rosenberg. 2016. Fragile States Index 2016. The
Miller, Nicola. 2005. Trying to Stay Friends: Cubas Relations with Russia and Eastern
Europe. In Cuba, The United States and the Post-Cold War World, edited by Morris
Morley, Morris and Chris McGillion. 2002. Unfinished Business: America and Cuba after the
Prez, Louis A, Jr. 1999. Incurring a Debt of Gratitude 1898 and the Moral Sources of Unites
Niemann 9
States Hegemony in Cuba. The American Historical Review 104 (April): 35698.
Saull, Richard. 2005. "Locating the Global South in the Theorisation of the Cold War:
University Press.
Smith, Wayne S. 1993. "Cuba and the Soviet Union, Cuba and Russia". In Cuba's Ties to a
Publishers.
Sweig, Julia E., and Michael J. Bustamante. 2015. Cuba After Communism. Foreign
Snyder, Jack. 2004. One World, Rival Theories. Foreign Policy 145: 53-62.
Westad, Odd Arne. 2010. The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth
Century. In The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1: Origins, edited by
Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, 1-19. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Yamaoka, Kanako. 2004. Cubas Social Policy After the Disintegration of the Soviet