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CHAPTER 85

Human Factors at the

Interface between Road and
Rail Systems
Christian Wullems, Narelle Haworth & Andry Rakotonirainy
Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety Queensland
Queensland University of Technology
Brisbane, Australia
c.wullems@qut.edu.au

ABSTRACT

Railway level crossings present an arguably unique interface between two

transport systems that differ markedly in their performance characteristics, their
degrees of regulation and their safety cultures. Railway level crossings also differ
dramatically in the importance they represent as safety issues for the two modes.
For rail, they are the location of a large proportion of fatalities within the system
and are therefore the focus of much safety concern. For the road system, they
comprise only a few percent of all fatalities, although the potential for catastrophic
outcomes exist. Rail operators and regulators have traditionally required
technologies to be failsafe and to demonstrate high levels of reliability. The
resultant level of complexity and cost has both limited their extent of application
and led to a need to better understand how motorists comprehend and respond to
these systems.

Keywords: railway level crossings, human factors

1 INTRODUCTION

According to (Independent Transport Safety Regulator, 2011), collisions

between road and rail vehicles account for approximately 30% of rail related
fatalities, excluding suicides, and remain one of the biggest safety challenges for rail
operators in Australia. In the 10-year period between 2000 and 2009, there were 695

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collisions, in which 97 people were fatally injured. Approximately 36% of

collisions occurred at public level crossings with passive controls (i.e. give-way or
stop signs) and approximately 51% occurred at public level crossings with active
controls (i.e. flashing lights only or flashing lights and boom barriers). The
remaining 13% of collisions occurred at level crossings on private roads. Despite a
significant decrease in collisions over the 10-year period from 2000 to 2009, the
number of fatalities remains relatively constant (Independent Transport Safety
Regulator, 2011).
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Fatalities at level crossings comprise a relatively small proportion of road

fatalities (an average of 0.6% over the 10-year period), however, given the
significant decrease in road fatalities (Bureau of Infrastructure, 2011), the
proportion of road fatalities that occur at level crossings has effectively increased.
From the perspective of rail operators, crashes at level crossings are becoming more
severe compared to other railway collisions, and from the road safety perspective
they are becoming a relatively larger road safety problem.
Differences in perceptions of risk in road and rail drive different approaches to
traffic control. Many of the examples in this paper are from Australia, which is
largely similar to North America in terms of legislative responsibility for rail and
road safety (Williams and Haworth, 2007). Contrasts with European practice are
made where appropriate. The scope of traffic considered in this paper is limited to
road and rail vehicles; and non-motorized transport is not included (although it is
recognized that pedestrian fatalities at level crossings are another important issue).

2 DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS OF RISK

REDUCTION MEASURES IN ROAD AND RAIL CONTEXTS

One of the key differences in perception of risk between a crash at a road

intersection and a railway level crossing is the potential for catastrophic
consequences. Catastrophic accidents have the potential to fast-track policy changes
for controlling risks from what is economically reasonable to prevention of future
occurrences of the accident. Society has greater expectations of safety on the
railway than it does for the road, due to the high frequency of crashes that occur on
the road compared to collisions at railway level crossings. The number of road
fatalities does not vary by a large fraction from year to year, unlike smaller numbers
such as commercial airline crashes or passenger train crashes which can easily
double from one year to the next. The relative stability and predictability of the
number of highway fatalities gives an aura of being under control, suggesting there
is no crisis to which a response is required.
Much of the lower public profile of road fatalities relates to their scattered
nature, in ones and twos across the country (Williams and Haworth, 2007) with
little public awareness of the total number of deaths. For example, from 1996 to
2002, ninety-four percent of the US road deaths occurred in crashes where one or
two people died (Farmer and Williams, 2005). The contrast is usually made with
commercial airline crashes, which effectively capture public attention and concern

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despite the total number of deaths per day being much less. It is only the worst bus
crashes in which large numbers of passengers are killed that seem to capture public
and political concern and lead to the introduction of measures that would not have
otherwise satisfied economic criteria.
The criteria for determining whether a given risk control is economically viable
typically involves a comparison of costs and benefits. The cost of a treatment is
compared to benefits such as the monetary value of mitigated safety loss, which
includes human costs, avoided property damage, avoided delays and other general
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costs that are avoided. Human costs are often estimated as a value for preventing a
fatality (VPF) and are commonly calculated using one of two approaches: human
capital or willingness to pay (WTP). Refer to (Tooth, 2010) and (Tooth and
Balmford, 2010) for a discussion of issues in determining the socio-economic costs
of road crashes and accidents at railway level crossings. The WTP approach is
currently considered good practice for determining a VPF.
A key difference between road and rail is who makes the decision on the
implementation of risk controls. In the road environment, the authorities (state
departments of transportation) are responsible for these decisions, whereas in rail,
accredited rail operators (AROs) are responsible. Consistent with a safety
management systems approach to regulation, it is up to the AROs to demonstrate
that they have sufficiently controlled risks to safety in their operations and that they
meet their obligations under the Rail Safety Act.
In determining applicability of a risk control, road authorities would typically
seek a benefit to cost ratio (BCR) of greater than or equal to 1. While a similar
approach seems reasonable for AROs, legislative obligations under the Rail Safety
Act require that risks are eliminated, and where this is not reasonably practicable,
that those risks are reduced so far as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP) (National
Transport Commision, 2006). The Australian National Transport Council provides
guidance for interpretation of this requirement (Salter, 2008). The guideline states
that in considering the cost of eliminating or reducing the risk, practitioners must
demonstrate that the likelihood of the risk eventuating is remote or that the cost is
grossly disproportionate to the safety benefit (Salter, 2008). While the likelihood of
the risk of a collision at a level crossing eventuating is relatively low, a higher
disproportion factor is likely to be required in order to account for societal concerns.
Legislative requirements for safety in the road environment differ significantly
from the rail environment. In contrast, road safety legislation typically relates to
individuals (i.e. prosecution of individuals for dangerous driving behavior, lack of
roadworthiness of road vehicle, etc.) (Tingvall and Haworth, 1999).

3 DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO TRAFFIC CONTROL BY

ROAD AND RAIL AUTHORITIES

For several years, appropriateness of road traffic control approaches at railway

level crossings has been a topic of discussion as part of a strategy to reduce the costs
and in same cases improve the efficacy of warnings at railway level crossings. This

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section compares different approaches to traffic control at road intersections and

railway level crossings within the context of a simple conceptual framework.
Human factors issues relating to warning design in both contexts are discussed.

3.1 Traffic Conflict Management at an Intersection

Figure 1 illustrates a hierarchy of controls for managing traffic conflicts at an

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intersection. Two methods of traffic conflict management have been identified in

the hierarchy: spatial separation and time separation. Spatial separation requires that
flows of traffic be physically separated, whereas time separation requires that an
intersection with multiple flows of traffic is time-shared, such that flows of traffic
are separated into stages of non-conflicting phases. Time-sharing can be facilitated
by signals or rules of precedence.

Spatial A. Grade
Separation separation
C1. Signed
Trafc
Control C. Non-
signalized
Time C2. Non-
Separation signed
B.
Signalized

Figure 1. Traffic control hierarchy at an intersection (note that C1. Signed includes road
markings)

A series of traffic control classes have been defined for the two methods of
traffic conflict management. Table 1 provides a comparison between types of traffic
control used at road intersections and railway level crossings, and a brief description
of the decision making process required of the user is provided.

Table 1. Traffic control type comparison

Traffic control Road Rail level Decision making process
class intersection crossing (road users perspective)
A. Grade Overpass, Road passes None required.
separation underpass over or under
railway
B. Signalized Traffic lights Level crossing Attend to warning and decide
with active whether to comply. Decision
warning lights not to comply requires violation.
B. Signalized No equivalent at Level crossing Attend to warning and decide
a road with active whether to comply. Decision
intersection warning lights not to comply requires gross
and boom- violation.
barrier.
C1. Signed (non- Stop sign Level crossing Attend to warning and situation;
signalized) with Stop signs decide to come to complete stop.

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Decide to give way to all other

vehicles. Decision not to
comply requires violation.
C1. Signed (non- Give-way sign Level crossing Attend to warning and situation,
signalized) with Give-way decide to slow down and be
signs ready to stop, decide to give
way to all other vehicles.
C2. Non-signed Road markings Uncontrolled Attend to situation, recall rules,
(non-signalized) only (i.e. no level crossing then look for traffic and
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vertical signs) proceed.

C2. Non-signed Intersection with Uncontrolled Attend to situation, recall rules,
(non-signalized) no vertical or level crossing then look for traffic and
horizontal signs proceed.

We expect the paradigms for stop and give-way signs to be similar for road
intersections and railway level crossings. Stop signs appear to be more effective at
level crossings than Give-way signs, potentially due to road rules that require road
users to come to a complete stop. Failure to do so is a punishable violation.
Stopping, or at least reducing speed, in theory affords the road user more time to
look for trains and determine whether the level crossing is safe to traverse.
An analysis of the performance of level crossing controls in Australia and the U.S.
was performed by (Independent Transport Safety Regulator, 2011), comparing
flashing lights with half boom barriers, flashing lights only, stop signs and give-way
signs. They observed a significantly lower number of collisions at level crossings with
stop signs compared to give-way signs. The figures indicate approximately 37% less
crashes per million trains and 100 million road vehicles than give-way signs. Of
particular interest to us is the comparison of traffic lights and active warnings at
railway level crossings in terms of differences in risk perception and human factors
issues. The following sections discuss traffic control signals in more depth.

3.2 Traffic control signals

One of the key differences between traffic control signals at road intersections
and at railway level crossings is that communication of system state varies
significantly between the two. While nominal (correct operation) states and failure
states of traffic lights at road intersections are well known, the states of level
crossing warnings are not easily differentiated by the road user. For most road users,
the train approach warning appears to be identical to the indication of failure.
Confusion of what the level crossing warning device is attempting to communicate
can potentially encourage the road user to engage in risky behavior, and this
behavior can influence road user performance at other railway level crossings,
especially if the failure condition occurs frequently or for prolonged periods of time.
This state of confusion is often termed mode error, where an individual applies
the operation appropriate for one mode when in fact they are in another (Norman,
1993). This leads to the execution of an inappropriate action. Mode errors occur
frequently in systems that do not provide clear feedback of their current state.

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Table 2 compares the signal states of traffic lights at road intersections and level
crossing warning systems.

Table 2. Traffic signal states from the road users perspective

Signal state Road intersection Rail level crossing
Nominal signal Traffic lights have the The RX5 flashing light assembly
aspects following signal aspects: (Standards Australia, 2007) consists of
red (stop), amber (if safe, flashing red lights that activate on
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prepare to stop short of approach of a train and deactivate once

the intersection), green the railway is safe to cross. Some level
(proceed). crossings have boom barriers and
audible alarms.
Signal right-side If a right-side failure The right-side failure mode for the RX5
failure (a failure occurs, the signal shows flashing light assembly is equivalent to
that is detected a flashing amber aspect. the train approach warning; however,
by the system This indicates that the the flashing rate may be different. Level
and results in the road user should crossings with boom barriers will close
system entering a exercise caution as on detection of a failure.
safe state) opposing traffic may
enter the intersection.
Signal wrong-side If a wrong-side failure If a wrong-side failure occurs, it is a
failure occurs (e.g. power fundamentally dangerous state, as road
(a failure that is failure), the road user users are inadvertently trained to
undetected by the reverts to road rules, assume that no signal means safe. For
system and giving way to traffic on crossings with boom barriers, depending
results in the their right. on the type of wrong-side failure, the
system entering boom barriers may close. A train
an unsafe state) detection failure will not result in closure
of the crossing, whereas boom barriers
are designed to close by gravity if there
is a power failure.
The following subsections discuss control paradigms and traffic procedures
associated with traffic control signals.

3.2.1 Signal Control Paradigms

Vehicle detection is a prerequisite for signal phase control, as it allows the

signals logic controller to optimize traffic flow based on information of vehicle
presence and potentially vehicle rate for each traffic flow. Road traffic signals
typically use magnetic induction loops to detect vehicles. In contrast, rail level
crossings typically use one of the following type approved train detection
mechanisms, depending on the performance of the mechanism in the target context
and environment:
Jointed / jointless track circuits
Axle counters
Treadles (for low speeds)

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In road signal control, vehicle detection is typically used either to change signal
stage (i.e. multiple non-conflicting phases) or to extend the period of the current
stage, depending on where vehicles are detected. The road signals are configured
with a cycle consisting of a sequence of stages. Conflict detection functionality
insures that the signal reverts to the failure mode in the case conflicting phases are
detected (i.e. green aspect for conflicting flows of traffic). Failure of vehicle
detection can result in a delay in passing to the next stage of the cycle. While the
condition is not technically unsafe, sufficiently long delays are likely to encourage
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the road users to engage in risky driving behavior.

In rail level crossing warning controls, train detection is used to activate the
warning at least 25 seconds before the train enters the level crossing (Standards
Australia, 2007), and deactivate the warning once the train has left the clearance
point. The road authority for the particular level crossing defines the exact pre-
emptive timing required for the level crossing. This is typically in the range of 25 to
35 seconds and depends on site characteristics such as sighting distance and whether
heavy vehicles (e.g. B-doubles) operate on the route. There are several signal failure
conditions that can occur as a result of train detection failures:
Warning not given when train is approaching level crossing. This is an
unsafe condition, as the road user assumes it is safe to traverse the level
crossing (refer to previous discussion on signal states).
Insufficient or excessive warning is given when train is approaching level
crossing. Insufficient warning is an unsafe condition. Excessive warning
may encourage road users to engage in risky behavior.
Warning extinguished before train has passed the level crossing clearance
point. This is an unsafe condition, as in low-visibility conditions, the road
user may not be aware that the level crossing is occupied.
Warning remains active for excessive time after train has passed the level
crossing clearance point (i.e. trail ringing condition). This can be
particularly dangerous in situations where there is a second train. Frequent
tail ringing may condition the road user to assume that the level crossing is
in a state of failure rather than a second train approaching.

There are significantly higher consequences to failure of train detection at a

level crossing compared with failure of vehicle detection at an intersection. This is
mainly due to the fact that failed train detection is likely to result in the crossing
entering an unsafe state (i.e. a state of wrong-side failure). While there are human
factors issues relating to lengthy delays at an intersection, road signals remain in a
technically safe state.

3.2.2 Traffic Procedures

Another key difference between traffic signals at road intersections and railway
level crossings relates to traffic operating rules. At a road intersection, all vehicles
are subject to the same set of rules, whereas at railway level crossings, the rules for
trains vary depending on the type of crossing and jurisdiction. For the most part,

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trains in Australia have right of way, regardless of the level crossing signal state.
The level crossing warning signal serves to indicate to the road user when the
crossing is clear, rather than timesharing the intersection. Table 3 compares the
warning and decision making process at different types of level crossings from the
train drivers perspective.

Table 3. Level crossings from train drivers perspective

Level crossing Warning to rail traffic Decision making process from train
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type drivers perspective

Interlocked Aspect to proceed is Aspect may be enforced where ATP
given on the basis that (automatic train protection) or TPWS (train
level crossing is protection & warning system).
protected.
Autonomous with Health state indication or Health state indication allows a driver to
healthy-state sidelights are visible on determine whether the level crossing
indication or side approach to the warning is working correctly. It does not
lights crossing. The indication necessarily provide sufficient warning to
is a flashing light on the be able to stop before the crossing.
top of a mast. Section is assumed clear given that train
has authority for section. Train driver
decides to inform train controller of failure.
Train controller decides to stop or slow
down subsequent traffic.
Autonomous No warning of level None. Section assumed clear given that
crossing state. train has authority for section.

The white or red side lights commonly found on level crossings in Australia are
provided to the train driver to indicate that the level crossing warning device is
working. Some level crossings provide a healthy state indication. According to the
ARTC code of practice (Australian Rail Track Corportation, 2009), the driver must
inform the train controller of a failure, who will subsequently advice the signal
maintenance technician for the area. The train controller will advise any trains or
other rail vehicles in the affected section to approach with caution, and arrange for
any further rail traffic from entering the section. (At the time this paper was written,
the Australian Railway Industry Safety and Standards board were in the process of
developing a national code of practice for Australian Network Rules and Procedures
(ANRP). In the absence of national rules, the code of practice from the railway that
spans the largest number of jurisdictions has been cited).
To the authors knowledge, similar operating rules exist in the U.S. Some
countries in Europe have installed level crossings that provide an obstacle detection
feature, indicating to the train driver the protection state of the level crossing and
whether it is clear. The indication must be installed at a distance from the crossing
sufficient for a train at line speed to come to a complete stop before the level
crossing. In this paradigm, while trains have right of way, they can also be stopped
if the crossing is not clear. Stopping trains, however, may have significant economic
consequences, especially if the obstacle detection system regularly exhibits false
positives.
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3.2.3 Summary of Traffic Control Signal Human Factors Issues

Several human factors issues have been discussed in relation to traffic control
signals and their meaning to the road user. While the authors acknowledge that there
are other factors at play, this discussion has focused on road user interpretation of
how signals communicate state and signal control issues. Table 4 summarizes
safety issues identified in this discussion.
In developing new interventions for level crossings, a number of issues
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discussed in this paper need to be taken into consideration:

While state communication of level crossing warning devices can be
potentially improved, designers or new interventions must be aware that
road users have been inadvertently trained to recognize the absence of a
signal at the level crossing to mean safe.
The safety integrity of a level crossing warning system, and the reliability
of vehicle detection at level crossings are more safety critical that at road
intersections. Making an argument for reliability equivalent to road traffic
signals needs to take into consideration the failure modes of the signal and
how they are interpreted. There are also significant legal issues in
demonstrating that risks have been controlled so far as is reasonably
practicable. Less than fail-safe interventions should not be considered in a
manner that is inconsistent with duty of care obligations.

Table 4. Summary of safety issues related to signal state communication

Signal Condition Road intersection Rail level crossing
Signal wrong-side failure Mitigated by procedures Unsafe
Signal right-side failure Mitigated by procedures Potentially unsafe
Timing failures Can lead to unsafe behavior Can lead to unsafe behavior

The Centre of Accident Research and Road Safety Queensland (CARRS-Q) is

currently leading a project investigating the effects of right-side failures on human
behavior at railway level crossings (Gildersleeve and Wullems, 2012). The project
will develop human reliability assessment models to quantify human performance at
level crossings, and will help inform reliability targets as well as the design of
improved state communication methods.

5 CONCLUSIONS

The approaches taken to managing safety in road and rail have been shown to be
very different. Some of these differences stem from the divergent performance
characteristics of road and rail vehicles, while others reflect historical differences in
safety cultures. Recent changes in approaches to road safety appear to be creating
more similarities, however. The traffic control hierarchy at intersections (road-road
or road-rail) developed and discussed in this paper provides a novel framework for
identifying potential human factors issues arising from road user confusion.

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REFERENCES

Australian Rail Track Corportation 2009. Working of Level Crossings: Rules 1 to 7. TA20 -
ARTC Code of Practice for the Victorian Main Line Network.
Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics 2011. Australian Infrastructure
Statistics Yearbook. Canberra, Australia
Farmer, C. M. & Williams, A. F. 2005. Temporal factors in motor vehicle crash deaths.
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Injury Prevention, 11, 18-23.

Gildersleeve, M. & Wullems, C. 2012. A human factors investigation into the unavailability
of active warnings at railway level crossings. ASME/IEEE 2012 Joint Rail Conference.
American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
Independent Transport Safety Regulator 2011. Level crossing accidents in Australia.
Transport Safety Bulletin.
National Transport Commision 2006. Model Legislation - Rail Safety Bill. F2006L04074.
Australia: http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2006L04074/.
Norman, D. A. 1993. Design rules based on analyses of human error. Communications of the
ACM, 26, 254-258.
Salter, P. 2008. National Guideline for the Meaning of Duty to Ensure Safety So Far As Is
Reasonably Practicable. National Railway Safety Guideline. National Transportation
Commission.
Standards Australia 2007. AS1742.7-2007 Manual of uniform traffic control devices Part 7:
Railway crossings.
Tingvall, C. & Haworth, N. 1999. Vision Zero - An ethical approach to safety and mobility.
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Melbourne
Tooth, R. 2010. The cost of road crashes: A review of key issues. LECG.
Tooth, R. & Balmford, M. 2010. Railway Level Crossing Incident Costing Model. Railway
Industry Safety and Standards Board (RISSB).
Williams, A. F. & Haworth, N. L. 2007. Overcoming barriers to creating a well-functioning
safety culture: A comparison of Australia and the United States. Improving Traffic
Safety Culture in the United States: The Journey Forward. Washington, DC: AAA
Foundation for Traffic Safety.

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