Ballistic Missile Defense Overview

– 8th Annual Missile Defense Conference –

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.

22 MAR 10

LTG Patrick J. O’Reilly, USA

Director
Missile Defense Agency
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 Ballistic Missile Threat – 2010
Belarus Ukraine Syria Turkmenistan Kazakhstan
• Threats are expected to Scud Scud Scud Scud Scud
SS-21 SS-21 SS-21 SS-21
grow quantitatively and
qualitatively
• Long-range threats from
regional states did not
emerge last decade, but the Libya
potential threat remains Scud
North Korea
Toksa, Scud
• Shorter-range threats within Egypt
Scud
ER Scud
No Dong
key regions are growing SS-1 New IRBM
Taepo Dong-2
rapidly
Iran
• The threat is inherently Fateh-110, CSS-8
Shahab 1 & 2 Vietnam
unpredictable and requires Shahab 3
India
Scud
Shahab 3 Variant
that the U.S. be well hedged New MRBM
Prithvi 1 & 2
Pakistan Dhanush, Agni 1
against future developments Yemen
Ghaznavi, Agni 2, Agni 3
Shaheen 1 Sagarika
Rest of World Force Levels Scud
Ghauri, Shaheen 2
SS-21
2008
SRBM 5,500
MRBM 350
IR/ICBM <40
Sources: NASIC, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2009; DIA, Annual Threat
Totals 5,900 Assessment 2008; DIA/MSIC Message 2009281441SS(U)
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 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Policy Priorities
– Guidance From The President, Published February 2010 –

• The United States will continue to defend the homeland against

the threat of limited ballistic missile attack

• The United States will defend against regional missile threats to

U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling
them to defend themselves

• Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing

that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions

• The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable

over the long term

• U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats

change

• The United States will seek to lead expanded international efforts

for missile defense
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 Layered Ballistic Missile Defense 2010

ICBMs Upgraded
Ground-based Early
Interceptor > 5,500 km
Sea-based Warning
(15→26)
X-band Radar Radar
C2BMC Upgraded
Early Warning
Radar Early
Upgraded Ft. Greely Warning
Early Thule, Radar
Warning Greenland
Radar Shemya, Alaska

Fylingdales,
THAAD Fire Units (1→2)
Beale Air Force Base Hundreds of THAAD Interceptors (0→25) United Kingdom
Aegis Ships (19→21) IRBMs /MRBMs
Ground-based 1,000-5,500 km
Interceptor
(3→4)
SM-3 Interceptors (35→61)
Vandenberg AN/TPY-2
Air Force Base
Thousands of
SRBMs
AN/TPY-2 < 1,000 km Israel

SRBM = Short Range Ballistic Missiles

Patriot Fire Units (44→52) MRBM = Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
Shariki, Japan PAC-3 Interceptors (727→791) SM-2 Interceptors (72) IRBM = Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
ICBM= Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

• THAAD provides rapid worldwide response against SRBMs and MRBMs

• Aegis provides mobile and semipermanent response against SRBMs, MRBMs and IRBMs
• Ground-based missile defense provides permanent defense of homeland against limited ICBM attack
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 Early Intercept Strategy

2016
2009
2020
2020
Altitude

Threat Interceptor
Launch Launch
Time After Lift-Off

2009 Benefits of Early Intercept

1. Large Raid Handling
2016 Boost Tracking 2. Shoot-Look-Shoot
Limited Tracking
2020 3. Hedge Against Maneuvering
Fire-control Tracking Threats
Interceptor Flyout 4. Constrained Countermeasure
Hit Assessment Deployments
Intercept
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 Phased Adaptive Approach In Europe

• Phase 1: Use existing / maturing systems versus SRBM / MRBM threat

- Sea-based missile defenses will be used as necessary to protect parts of
southern Europe, combined with other missile defenses (2011 timeframe)
- Deploys forward-based sensor in Europe

• Phase 2: Enhanced missile defense systems versus SRBM / MRBM threat

- Use advanced sensors and improved version of the SM-3 interceptor, the
Block IB, to improve the performance once the technology is proven, including
a combination of sea- and land-based configurations (2015 timeframe)

• Phase 3: Improved area coverage versus MRBM / IRBM threat

- As threat matures, use the more capable SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, including
a combination of sea- and land-based configurations (2018 timeframe)

• Phase 4: Capability versus potential ICBM threat

- If potential ICBM threat emerges, advanced missile defense technologies
could eventually provide some capability against a regional ICBM threat
- Once proven and tested, can be made available for deployment to NATO
Europe (2020 timeframe)
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 Missile Defense Initiatives

SM-3 1B IIA IIB

Precision Tracking Airborne Infrared
High Performance Directed Energy
Satellite System System To
Interceptors Research
Planning Support BMD

Engage on Airborne Infrared Engage on Airborne Infrared

Engage on STSS Demo Satellites
(sea-based SM-3) (Aegis Ashore)

Enhanced C2BMC
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 International Activity Highlights
R&D Cooperative Efforts Foreign BMD Projects / Interests
Netherlands: PAC-3, Maritime
UK: Fylingdales Upgraded Early Warning Radar, BMD Cooperation
Joint Project Arrangements for Cooperative
Projects France: Discussions

Italy: MEADS partner

Poland: Agreed to host Aegis
Ashore
Denmark: Upgrade Thule Early
Warning Radar Russia: Strategic cooperation
/transparency dialogue
Australia: Advanced technology
cooperation United Arab Emirates: Request
for THAAD, PAC-3
Japan: Forward-based X-Band
Israel: Arrow Deployed, Arrow
radar siting, 21" Missile
System Improvement Program;
Development
development of short-range BMD,
Upper Tier program
Czech Republic: RDT&E ROK: Missile defense
Cooperative Projects discussions

Germany: MEADS partner, laser

cross-link technology

NATO: Missile defense Architecture Analysis. Working with ALTBMD to Ukraine: Conducting a missile
demonstrate connectivity between NATO and U.S. missile defense defense project
systems
Kuwait: Missile defense Saudi Arabia: Missile defense
discussions Bahrain: Missile defense
discussions
discussions
Romania: Agreed to host Aegis Ashore Qatar: Missile defense
discussions
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