Plotinus on the Structure of Self-Intellection

Author(s): Ian Crystal

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Aug., 1998), pp. 264-286
Published by: BRILL
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 Plotinus on the Structureof Self-Intellection'

IAN CRYSTAL

ABSTRACT
In this paper, I argue that Plotinus offers us a new and interesting account of
self-intellection. It is an account which is informedto some extent by a dilemma
that Sextus Empincus raised about the intellect being to apprehenditself. The
significance of Sextus' dilemma is that it sets out the frameworkwithin which
such a cognitive activity is to be dealt with, namely the intellect must apprehend
itself qua part or qua whole, both of which according to him are impossible.
Plotinus, I think, successfully gets around this dilemma and is able to explain
how the intellect can think itself qua whole. In the process of doing so, he offers
an account of self-intellection in which the thinking subject or thinker becomes
active in terms of generatingits intellectualcontent, namely itself; a move which
is a break from the traditionalPlatonic/Aristotelianaccount of the intellect. The
paper itself is set up as follows. I start by mentioningthe dilemma which Sextus
raises about self-intellection. Then I attempt, through an analysis of the noetic
intellect's structure,to show how Plotinus is able to offer an account of self-
intellection in terms of whole apprehendingwhole. I conclude with Plotinus'
analysis of the light analogy as a means of explaining how this intellectual
process works.

Muchof Plotinus'epistemologywas influencedby SextusEmpiricus.2 One

of the ways in which this influencecan be discernedis throughthe man-
ner in which the intellect,Plotinus' second hypostasis,apprehendsitself.

AcceDtedDecember 1997
I I would like to thankM.M. McCabe, RichardSorabji,ChristopherGill and Gerard
O'Daly for their invaluable comments on earlier versions of this paper. I would also
like to thank the editors, Keimpe Algra and ChristopherRowe, for their extremely
helpful comments. Any errors are solely those of the author.
2 This claim is by no means novel. For comments on the influence of the sceptical
arguments,in particularthose of Sextus, on Plotinus, cf. J. P6pin, "Elementspour une
histoire de la relation entre l'intelligence et l'intelligible chez Platon et dans le n6o-
platonisme,"Revue Philosophique 146 (1956), pp. 54-5, Richard T. Wallis, "Scepti-
cism and Neoplatonism,"Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischenWelt H. 32.2 (1987),
pp. 922-25, E.K. Emilsson, "Plotinus on the Objects of Thought," Archiv fur Ge-
schichte der Philosophie Band 77 (1995), pp. 32-3, 36 and Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus
(London: Routledge Publishers, 1994), p. 248, n. 46, E.K. Emilsson, "Cognition and
its Objects," The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1996), pp. 217-49 and Sarah Rappe, "Self-knowledge and Subjectivity
in the Enneads," The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), pp. 250-74.

C Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 1998 Phronesis XL11113

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTELLECTION 265

Accordingto Plotinus, the intellect, if it is to think itself properly,must

do so qua whole not qua part.3The natureof this accountis, at least in
part,informedby a dilemmathatSextusEmpiricusarticulated.4 For Sextus
maintainedthat the intellect,if it were to know itself, it must do so either
qua whole or qua part.
For if the mindapprehends itself,eitherit as a wholewill apprehend
itself,or it
will do so not as a whole but employingfor the purposea partof itself. Adv.
Mathematicos, VII 310-311

Both positions, accordingto Sextus, were untenable.In the case of the

intellect apprehendingitself in terms one part graspinganotherpart,one
falls into an infiniteregress because the subject-partwill become identi-
cal with its object when it apprehendsit. As a result, anotherepistemic
subjectwill be needed and so on ad infinitum:
... while if with a part,how will thatpart[sc. of the intellectiin turndiscern
itself? And so on to infinity. Adv. Mathematicos,VII 312
If, on the other hand, the epistemic subjectapprehendsitself qua whole,
then,accordingto Sextus,therewill be no objectforthesubjectto apprehend:
Now it will not be able as a whole to apprehenditself. For if as a whole it ap-
prehends itself, it will be as a whole apprehensionand apprehending,and, the
apprehendingsubject being the whole, the apprehendedobject will no longer be
anything; . . . If as a whole, the object sought (8Tou(pEvov) will be nothing. Adv.
Mathematicos, VII 311-312

Thus the whole/whole readingrules out satisfying both the subject-slot

and the object-slotof the intellectualact, renderingthat act vacuous.
Now Plotinus also rejects the part/partmodel as an adequatestructure
upon which to base self-intellection.To illustratethis, he explainsthat an
awareness or apprehensionwhich we might have of our historical self
does not qualify as self-intellectionpreciselybecause in that context it is
a matterof one partof ourselves thinkingor perceivinganotherpart:
For it would not be the whole which was known in these circumstances, if that
thing which thought the others which were with it did not also think itself, and
this will be, not what we are looking for (4iyro{>iEvov),5
a thing which thinks
itself, but one thing thinking another. 5.3 [49].1.9-136

I See 5.3
[491.6.6-8 and 5.8 [311.4.22-25 quoted below.
I I say at least in partbecause Sextuswas not the only influenceon Plotinus.Obviously,
Plato and Aristotle also had an enormous influence on the development of Plotinus'
account of the intellect and self-intellection.
I Even some of Plotinus' phraseology is strikingly similar to Sextus'. So we read
in Sextus: OO&v &,tat tO ~Tol4tRVOV, while in Plotinus we find: `a&at?t oi tO nToliREvOV.
6 Also 5.3 [49].6.6-8 quoted below. Text and translations,unless otherwise stated,

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266 IAN CRYSTAL

However,as I shall argue,Plotinuschallengesthe second hornof Sextus'

dilemmaand arguesthat the whole/whole model is the appropriatestruc-
ture upon which to base self-intellection.For Plotinuswill take the view
that the intellect does grasp itself qua whole in a such a way that the
subject-objectdistinctionis not lost. Thus, Sextus' dilemma,in particular
the second part,informsPlotinus'accountof self-intellectionin thatit sets
out the frameworkwithinwhich Plotinusoperates.Of course,Plotinusdis-
agrees with Sextus' objectionto the whole/whole readingbut in doing so
he reworksthe relationbetween the epistemic subjectand its intelligible
object(s), therebydeveloping a new structureupon which to base self-
intellection.

I. The DiscursiveIntellect'sRelationto Objects

To understandthe Plotinianaccount of the intellect (and, consequently,
self-intellection),it must be viewed in the largerPlotinianpsychological/
epistemologicalcontext.For Plotinusheld thereto be two, not one, intel-
lectual activities,the discursiveor the dianoetic(Btavota)8and the noetic.
Let me begin, however, by stressing a central point which is common
to both of these intellectualactivities.Accordingto Plotinus,any sort of
intellectualact, discursiveor otherwise,is a process in which the think-
ing subjectcomes to think some kind of object:
It is necessary to know and understandthat all thinking (v6icat; xicoa) comes
from something (Ebz
ctv0';) and is of something ('rtvo6). 6.7 (38].40.5-69

All thinking(v6ict;) must have some sort of object or content about which
to think(ntv6;). If not, the act itself will be rendered vacuous. Thus, under-
standingthe differencesbetweenthese intellectualacts will lie in the type

are based upon A.H. Armstrong's Loeb edition. The Enneads, 7 vols., trans. A.H.
Armstrong(London: Loeb Classical Library.William HeinemannLtd., 1966-88).
7 E.K. Emilsson in "Plotinuson the Objects of Thought"also developed this point.
However, I think Emilsson's interpretationis incorrect in that he takes the notion of
"wholes" and the subject-objectdistinctionto be incompatible.In this sense, Emilsson
regards Plotinus as having accepted the force of Sextus' claim that the intellect can-
not know itself qua whole and still have an intelligible object.
8 Cf. 5.3 [49].3.35. For a discussion of the terms Plotinus employs when discuss-
ing discursive reason such as so 8&avolrticov,Xoytawrcv or Xorago'6,cf. John Rist
"Integrationand Undescended Soul in Plotinus," American Journal of Philology 88
(1967), p. 416 and L. Gerson, Plotinus, p. 250, n. 63.
9 The fact that Plotinus thinks that all thinking is of something,which presumably
includes self-intellection, does not help Emilsson's thesis as discussed in n. 7.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTUREOF SELF-INTELLECTION 267

of objects each faculty has and in the type of relationsthe thinkingsub-

ject has with that object.
According to Plotinus, the part of the soul that reasons discursively
combines (;ouvayov),divides (Btatpouv)and comparesincoming impres-
sions (ru'xotor e!8wXa)which it receives from both sensory and noetic
worlds with ones which it had previouslyreceived.'"So, for example,one
recognisesan individual,say Socrates,by comparingan incomingimpres-
sion of that individualwith an earlierimpressionof him." In the case of
normativejudgements,such as Socrates is good, one can pass this type
of judgementin virtue of what Plotinuscalls the rules (cav&v6q) embed-
of
ded in the rational part the soul. However, these rules too, like the
images, do not have their point of origin in the rationalpartof the soul.
Rather,the discursive subject acquiresthem throughthe intellect's illu-
mination."2 The soul "is written upon by the intellect."'3So the cavovE;
can also be groupedwith the tmicotinasmuchas they form part of the
overall body of contentwhich is given to the rationalpartof the soul, dif-
fering only in function: the soul employs them as a means of passing
judgementon other things.
What conclusions can be drawn from the discursive activity as out-
lined? The fact that the dianoeticfaculty or subject is receptiveof vu6iot
or Et6o)aXis crucial. For it implies that this faculty focuses upon objects
which enjoy a separate,independentandexternalexistence.The discursive
subject's relationto its objects is mediatedby the images which resonate
from these objects. The discursive subject does not have direct contact
with the objects themselves.'4Even the lcavove4which reside in this fac-
ulty are only images, images of thatwhich, strictlyspeaking,exists in the
noetic world.'5Now as the faculty requiresexternaldata in orderto per-
form its discursivefunction,it can be inferredthat the faculty itself is not
generativeof its own contentbut ratheris structuredin such a way as to
look outwards,away from itself:
Does then this reasoning part (8tavonrtwCov)of the soul returnupon itself? No it
does not. Ratherit has understandingof the impressions(Miirwv)which it receives
from both sides. 5.3 [49].2.23-26

'? 5.3 [491.2.7-14 and 5.3 [49].3.35-40.

11 5.3 [49].3.3-7.
12 5.3 [491.3.10-12 and 4.15-19.
'3 5.3 [49].4.22. No doubt Plotinus has Aristotle's De Anima 3.4 in mind here.
14 Cf. E.K. Emilsson, "Cognition and its Objects," The
Cambridge Companion to
Plotinus, p. 225.
IN 5.3 [491.4.21-23.

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268 IAN CRYSTAL

In virtueof this relation,the discursivesubjectdirectsits gaze exclusively

towardsexternalobjects.
Two very importantconsequencesfollow from discursivereasonbeing
disposedin this way: Firstly,it is fallible becauseits relationto its objects
is mediatedby impressions.Here Plotinus is incorporatingthe Sceptic's
attack on impressionsand their unreliability.However,he limits fallibil-
ity to the discursive intellect. His incorporationof the Sceptic's claim
about the fallibility of impressionswill inform his accountof the struc-
ture of the noetic intellect to the extent that at the latterlevel he effec-
tively derives a way in which to eliminate impressionsfrom that realm
entirely.'6A directconsequenceof such a move, i.e. the eliminationof im-
pressions,is that the noetic intellectis infallible.The mannerin which he
is able to rid the noetic intellectof impressions,as we shall see, is through
the thesis that intellect's objects are internalto it. And this thesis - call
it the "internalitythesis"- will in turnhave a directeffect on how Plotinus
is able to circumventthe second horn of Sextus' dilemma.That is, the
"internalitythesis"will play a pivotalrole in his accountof how it is that
the intellect is able to apprehenditself qua whole.'7
The second conclusionto be drawnfrom the dispositionof the discur-
sive intellect is that the type of relationin which the subjecthas itself as
an object of intellectiondoes not occur at the discursivelevel. For the
relationbetween the subjectand object at this level does not involve an
identity relation. It is only at the noetic level that the identity relation
becomes an issue and, along with it, self-intellection:
But why do we not give self-thinking to this part, and finish with the subject?
Because we gave this partthe taskof observingwhat is outsideit (ta&Ewaicone-tGoa)
and busying itself with it, but we think that it is proper to Intellect to observe
what belongs to itself and what is within itself (vi) &? &ttoi6v rniXpXetv'Xatuo
ra;t tit Ev autuCaiconEitaOal 5.3 [49].3.16-19"8

16 Emilsson, I think, states the matter well: "So, rather than attempting to show

where the sceptic goes wrong, Plotinus sees it as his task to find adequate assump-
tions that provide a foundationof knowledge that is immuneto sceptical attacks."E.K.
Emilsson, "Plotinus on the Objects of Thought,"p. 36.
17 See the final section.
18 Also cf. 5.3 [49].7.25-26. In this passage, the part of the soul directed inwards
does not affect my argumentbecause, for all intents and purposes, it is the intellect.
This has its origins in the Plotinian doctrinethat the entire soul does not descend from
intellect; a doctrine which subsequent Neoplatonists go on to reject, cf. Proclus,
Elements of Theology, ?? 211.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTELLECTION 269

So with a view to developingthis notion of self-intellection,let me now

turn to the noetic intellect.'9

II. The Noetic Intellect'sRelationto Itself

The noetic activity, if it is to qualify as an intellectualactivity, must also
think about something.20It must have some intellectualcontent.Now, in
order to appreciatePlotinus' account of the intellect and its relation to
what it thinks,the formal structureof the intellect's activity must first be
set out. There are two phases or stages.2"The first is that of an inchoate
and undefinedintellect which has not yet turnedtowardsits source, the
One. Plotinuscomparesthis stage to thatof unformedsight.22The second
phase is both the act of conversion (itcatpEpe1tv) itself and what results
from such an act. It is in this second phase that the intellect's true form
is realised:
This, when it has come into being, turns back upon the One and is filled, and
becomes intellect by looking towards it. Its halt and turning towards the One
constitutes being, its gaze upon the One, intellect. Since it halts and turns to-
wards the One that it may see, it becomes at once intellect and being. 5.2
[IIt.1-10-1423

19However, it would be wrong to infer from this account that the dianoetic faculty
is unreflexive simpliciter. It does have some sort of self-knowledge. For instance, it
knows that it is discursive reason and that it has a grasp of the world around it which
acts upon it. As Plotinus puts it, it thinks itself as belonging to another (cf. 5.3
[491.6.3-6, quoted below), and thus is not direcfly self-reflexive. Cf. E.K. Emilsson,
"Plotinus on the Objects of Thought,"p. 32.
20 See n. 9.

21
Cf. 5.9 [51.8.20-22. Here Plotinus explicitly remarksthat it is our thinkingwhich
places these stages in temporal succession, when strictly speaking they should not be.
Rather, they are the structureof the intellectual activity, an activity which is eternal.
Also cf. Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus, p. 45.
22 5.3 [49].11.10-13. For a discussion of the inchoate intellect, see J. Bussanich, The

One and its Relation to the Intellect in Plotinus (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), pp. 11-14.
23 Also cf. 5.1 [10].5.18-19, 5.3 [491.11.26-31. and. 5.6
[24].1.5-6. However, it
should be noted that the last of these passages has proved most troublesomefor mod-
em commentators.The difficulty centres aroundwhether the propersubject of ?xbpa is
the One or voi;. I follow Armstrong,O'Daly and Schroeder who take it to be voi;u
instead of the One because the One is beyond any sort of activity, including self-
intellection or awareness. See Armstrong,Plotinus: Enneads, vol. 5 (London:William
Heinemann Ltd., 1984), pp. 34-5, n. 1, G.J.P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self
(Shannon: Irish University Press, 1973) p. 72 and F.M. Schroeder, "Conversion and
Consciousness in Plotinus, 'Enneads"' 5.1 [10), 7 Hermes 114 (1986), p. 187.

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270 IAN CRYSTAL

and, as a result, self-intellectionoccurs:

- so that if it [sc. intellect]is in itself (?v iaxzU) and with itself (aiv Eiauvr),
and thatwhich it is, is intellect(therecouldnot even be an unintelligentintel-
lect), its knowledgeof itself must necessarilyaccompanyit (&vy ouveival
acxeptiv vuitv iat)tob) - 5.3 [49].6.32-3424

For thinking itself is, at least in part, the function (ro i?pyov) of the intel-
lect.25Unlike the discursiveintellect,the noetic intellectis entirelyoriented
towardsitself, with the result that the noetic subjectalways has itself as
its object of intellection:
For the soul thoughtitself as belongingto another(ivO6EaEaUtiVOrt &aXou), but
intellectdid so as itself (o 8E voiq 0X1 autTo), andas whatandwho it is and [it
startedits thinking]fromits own natureand thoughtrevertingbackuponitself
(?it1otp?po)v E'i4 aro6v). 5.3 [49].6.3-6

The noetic intellectcannotintelligisewithoutintelligisingitself. The con-

tent of its thoughtis itself. The thinkerand the object are in some sense
identical with one another.26Thus, prima facie, self-intellection is secured
because the subjectis the same as its object, since that object is itself.
However,this is an over-simplification.At the outset of this section, it
was said the realisationof intellect came about throughits directingits
attentiontowardsthe One. The One is that in virtue of which the intel-
lect is what it is. It would seem, therefore,somewhatmisguidedto say
thatthe intellectis exclusively self-directed,i.e. only has itself as an object
of intellection.For such a claim would seem to be incompatiblewith the
claim thatthe intellectgazes uponthe One, i.e. has it as an object,assum-
ing, of course, that we do not equatethe One with the intellect.Plotinus
does not.27So therewould seem to be a case for saying that the activity
of the intellect is not exclusively self-directed.Plotinus'responseto such
a claim would, I think,be the following:The intellectneverstrictlyappre-
hends the One.28Even in its inchoate state, the intellect only has some
kind of image or impression(qpaivraaj?& ti) of the One.29Keeping to the
sight imagery,Plotinusdoes not say that the intellect,when fully articu-
lated, sees an independentexternalobject differentfrom itself, something

24 Also cf. 5.3 [491.6.39-42.

25 5.3 [49].6.35.
26 Cf. 3.8 [301.3.19.
27 Cf. 6.7
[381.41.12-22.
28 Cf. 5.3 [49].11.10-12 and J. Bussanich, The One and its Relation to the Intellect

in Plotinus, p. 14.
29 5.3
[491.11.7.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTUREOF SELF-INTELLECTION 271

which one might expect if it saw the One. But rather,he says, it sees the
seeing itself, i.e. its own activity: xartyap il v6onot; paot; o6p(ia a`g?xp
TEEV.2 The purposeof the One in this context is to cause the intellect
to turn towards itself; to take itself as an object, thereby attaining its
proper intellectualself-directedrelation. The intellect's apprehensionof
the One is really the intellect's apprehensionof itself.3'It sees the One
qua intellect:
Because what it contemplates is not the One. For when it contemplatesthe One,
it does notdo as one:If it did, it wouldnotbecomeintellect(E; 8'? i'i, 0oi ytVETat
voi;). 3.8 [30].8.30-2

The intellect's relationto itself, therefore,is not in any way hinderedor

made opaque by the One in this context but instead is realisedwith the
help of the One. The intellect still has itself as an object of intellection:
The being of intellect, therefore, is activity, and there is nothing towards which
that activity is directed (np'o acxir &apa);so it is self-directed.Thinking itself, it
is thus with itself and holds its activity directed to itself (Eit; EauTOV TImV pVEpyEtaV
5.3 [49].7.18-213"
icFXF-t).

30 5.1 [101.5.19-20. It should be noted that there is some question about the "X'" in
the manuscripts.I follow Armstrong and Henry and Schwyzer in retaining the "TE."
See A. Armstrong,Enneads, vol. 5, p. 28, n. 1 and Henry and Schwyzer, Plotini Opera,
vol. II (Brussels: L'Edition Universelle, S.A., 1959), p. 272. As for the "seeing
the seeing," I shall returnto this notion at the end of my study, since it is of pivotal
importance.
3' It might be said that the intellect sees the One inasmuch as it sees the effect of
the One on itself, its intellectual or epistemic unity.
32 As will become apparentin the next section, there is another very good reason
why the intellect cannot have the One as a properobject of thought. Namely, all the
objects of the intellect are intemal to it. Consequently,the One would have to be within
the intellect itself, a point which Plotinus is aware of and rules out: ROvov yiapiEv
?KE7tVO' KA ei ?1y naivma, v T4 oucFtv av 'v. &aTO-UToEKEtO Ol)&V REV 'DTOVEV TM,
vqp,... 5.1 [101.7.21-23. Having said this, I must make some mention of 5.6
[241.5.16-17, a passage in which Plotinus speaks of the intellect thinking the One first
and foremost and itself only incidentally (icacar 4v0EPqKo;). Does this undermineall
that has been said and entail that the intellect is not directly reflexive? I would say no
it does not. Two points must be made to defend this claim: First, it could be argued
that in this middle Ennead, [24], Plotinus was still under the sway of Alexander of
Aphrodisias much more than by the time he came to write 5.3 [49], his last Ennead.
For as O'Daly has pointed out (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, pp. 79-80) Plotinus
gets this notion of caTa&a Ca)ehKO; from Alexander's Commentaryof Aristotle's De
Anima (Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Anima, 86, 17ff. Bruns). For there Alexander,
developing Aristotle's doctrine of the intellect, also speaks of the thinker knowing
itself incidentally (ixcaa avgePr3ic0'). Secondly, there is the issue of topic. 5.6 is

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272 IAN CRYSTAL

The sketch thus far of Plotinus'positionis such that the intellectualsub-

ject is clearlyidenticalwith its object,given thatthatobjectis itself. How-
ever, having said this, it is still very unclearas to how such an account
of the intellecthas been reworkedso thatthe relationbetweenthe subject
and its object is one of whole apprehendingwhole. For the claim that the
intellectualsubject is identicalwith its object and thus thinks itself does
not explain the whole/whole relation. In order to achieve this end, the
natureof the intellect'scontentand how it relatesto that contentmust be
explored.

III. The Noetic Intellect'sRelationto its Objects

To begin, thatwe are not dealingwith an entitywhich is absolutelysimple
and self-identicalis clear from the fact that Plotinusspeaks of the intel-
lect as a one-many (?V noX0X), as opposed to the One which is just one,
i.e. is absolutelysimple.33The intellect,if its self-relationis not to be jeop-
ardised,must see itself transparently in the "many."If not, Plotinus'claim
that the intellect is directly self-reflexive,i.e. has itself as a transparent
object of knowledgein all of its acts, will go unfounded.
The way Plotinusdeals with the intellecthaving many objectsand yet
remainingself-directedis to locate the objectswithin the intellect.They,
the objects, are somehowpartof the intellect:... vx 6? 4tobgiv bna'pxetv
'ca aiiroli xatatev aivr axonitaOatY. The intellect's thinkingis focused

specifically about how and why the intellect must focus on the first principle.Whereas,
5.3 is specifically about self-intellection.So if one had to chose, 5.3 would be the safer
of the two as far as self-intellection is concerned. As Emilsson says, with 5.3 we have
Plotinus' most thoroughand authoritativeaccount of self-intellection. Thus, the worst
case scenario for me is that Plotinus did not hold the intellect to be directly self-
reflexive early on in his philosophicalcareer(althougheven in the early Enneads there
is evidence to the contrary).Whereas on the best case scenario, given the difference
in topic between the two Enneads, one should be cautious with 5.6 when it comes to
how the intellect's self-relation should be understood.
33 In this regard, Plotinus sees himself as adhering to the second hypothesis of

Plato's dialogue, the Parmenides (144e5; 145a2). Cf. 4.8 [61.3.11, 5.1 [10].8.27, 5.3
[49].15.11ff., 6.2 [431.2.2, 6.2 [431.10.12, 6.2 [431.15.14-15, 6.2 (431.21.7, 6.2
[43].22.10, 6.5 [231.6.1-2, 6.6 [341.8.23, 6.6 [34].13.52-4, 6.7 [38].14.11-12 and 6.7
[381.39.11-14. Also cf. M. Atkinson, Ennead V.l: On the Three Principal Hypostases:
A Commentarywith Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 196-8
and L. Gerson, Plotinus, pp. 44-5.
-u 5.3 [49].3.18-19. This epistemological reason, i.e. the intellect being self-directed,
is by no means meant to be the only reason why Plotinus would want to locate the
objects of the intellect within it. There are several other reasons (epistemological,

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTUREOF SELF-INTELLECTFION 273

within and not outside: xiat ak voiiv 'V E'amipicKaoiic &.3 Thus by being
part of the intellect, the intellect in a sense is thinkingthem in thinking
itself. However, this is still insufficientto explain how the intellect can
have itself as a transparentobjectand yet relateto the manyobjectswhich
are supposedto be partof itself.
For a start, let me be clear what is intendedby objects in this noetic
context. Accordingto Plotinus,the objects of the intellect are the forms
or ideas:
If then the thought[of intellect]is of what is withinit, thatwhich is withinit
is its immanentform,and this is the Idea. Whatthen is this?Intellectand the
intelligentsubstance;each individualIdea is not otherthanintellect,but each is
intellect.And intellectas a whole is all the Forms,.. . 5.9 [5].8.1-436
As for the nature of the relation the intellectual subject has with these
object(s), there is evidence, I think, that shows that they enjoy a certain
sort of reciprocal relation. For the two sides entail one another in the

metaphysical and even cosmological) which are just as, if not more, central to his phi-
losophy which would motivate him to place the intellect's objects within it. For a start,
we have already seen that it is a way of circumventingthe Sceptic on the issue of the
fallibility of impressions. There is also the following metaphysical motivation: As
the intellect is the most unified principle after the One, it should, after the One, be the
most unified. One way to accomplish this is to make its objects internalto it, thereby
making it more unified than, say, the soul whose objects are external to it. Cf. 5.4
[7].2.1-3. Placing the objects within the intellect is also conducive to his cosmologi-
cal account. For it is not the case in the Plotinian cosmos that the intellect transcends
the soul in the sense that it is outside of it. Rather, Plotinus speaks of voi; being a
circle around the One which in turn is contained by a larger circle, the soul (cf. 4.2
[1].1.25ff. and 5.1 [10].7.45). Thus, the noetic faculty is to be regardedas being inside
(EvuxOaca) or within the soul and discursive reason, affecting, i.e. illuminating, the
latter by flowing outwards. (Dillon draws our attention to this point, remarkingthat
"the intellect presides over soul and the world transcendentlywithin." J. Dillon, "The
Mind of Plotinus," The Boston Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy (New York: The
American Press, 1987), p. 351.) Such a picture helps to explain why when Plotinus,
discussing the two intellectual processes, refers to the dianoetic process as a super-
structure(?x1KEipE0V) over or aroundthe noetic (6.7 [38].40.5-19). However, as I am
looking at the intellect from the point of view of self-intellection, I shall not concern
myself either with the metaphysical problems which surroundemmanation from the
One and how and why the three hypostases and the physical world have the hierar-
chical structurethat they do.
35 6.2 [43].8.11-12.
36 Also cf. 5.9 [5].3.4-8. The Middle Platonists, such as Albinus, spoke of the forms
as the ideas of God. For a thorough study of the Middle Platonic tradition, see
J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1977).

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274 IAN CRYSTAL

following manner:The intellect, unlike its dianoetic counterpart,by its

very act of thinkingestablishesthe existence of its objects:iS6iXov 6o'ri
voi; (ov ovToKvotr Ta ovTa cai biptaTqtv.7 It is generative of them.38As
a consequence,these objects - the intelligibles- do not enjoy an inde-
pendentexistence outside of the intellect.Their ontologicalstatus is de-
pendent on their being thought by vois;: [OXX'Cottv&aial 'a 6' ikntv
a&Xa, ?i vsv6'rat, 'robT' "Triv aVTroI% Jtvat.39This, of course, is to be
TO6
expected given that these objects are internalto the intellect. However,
such an account,if takenout of context,eclipses what is, in fact, a recip-
rocal relation.For these objects by being thoughtconfer existence upon
that which thinksthem. In a sense, they make the intellectthe intellect:
But each of them is intellect and being, and the whole is universal intellect and
being, intellect making being exist in thinking it (o EV voii icara To VOetv
W'ta'ra&;oov), and being giving intellect thinkingand existence by being thought
(r6 6?8"OVT voEtIoOat r v~ 6t66v rTO VOetVcaiTroEtvat). 5.1 [10].4.27-30'

and at 5.4 [7].2 we read:

Thinking, which sees the intelligible and tums towards it and is, in a way, being
perfected by it, is itself indefinite like seeing, but is defined by the intelligible.
5.4 [71.2.4-7 '
Thereare two reasonsfor Plotinusto place so muchemphasison the onto-
logical status of the intelligibles:Firstly, the objects which the intellect
thinks are intendedto be real living entities, as opposed to what Plotinus
sometimes calls the lifeless abstractionsof the Stoics ('a' atca)42 Sec-
ondly, Plotinusis a good Platonistin the sense that these objectsare sup-
posed to be causes of the many particularinstantiationsof them in the
spatio-temporalrealm.43As for the natureof this reciprocalrelationbe-
tween the intellect and its objects (i.e. whetherit is causal or logical), I
thinkthe answerwould have to be that it is strongerthansimply a logical

3" Also cf. 6.7 [38].2.25-27.

31 Cf. 6.7 [381.40.11-15.
39 6.2 [431.8.4-5. Henry and Schwyzer delete &u' E'rtv &uXa. See Henry and
Schwyzer, Plotini Opera, vol. m, p. 65.
40 Also cf. 3.8 [30].8.7-9 and 6.7 [38].41.18-21.
41 Yet, by the same token, at 5.4 [7].2.44-47 Plotinus explicitly rules out the objects
of the intellect taking priorityand coming first. For Plotinus is explicit in this matter:
voi'; &i icadov xaluc,o'v.ov yap T(iCvipaygat6v - 7oiEp 11aldOatq Tdv aiaoT@iv -
npOOvThv,&XX'a&xokvoi; ,racpaiy1taa, E'L1Ep jl? ?Ei&qauGv Kogi4erat.
42 Cf. 5.4 [7].2.43 and 5.5 [32].1.38-9. Also cf. E.K. Emilsson, "Plotinus on the
Objects of Thought,"p. 40.
4' Cf. 6.3.9.24-9. Also cf. L. Gerson, Plotinus, pp. 45-6.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTUREOF SELF-INTELLECTION 275

relation.It is not mere coextensivity.However,one hesitatesto speak of

it in causal terms because both the intellect and its object are eternally
coexistent.44Yet each side acts upon or makes the other what it is.45
Given such a dynamicrelationbetween the intellectualsubjectand its
object(s),how is this compatiblewith the identityconditionwhich is sup-
posed to hold betweenboth sides. To put it anotherway, how can Plotinus
hold these two apparentlyincompatibletheses:The intellectand its objects
form a complex dynamicwhole - what he refersto elsewhereas a-ognko
1cat atv0eOat - and yet they are identical.Y6
To be able to understandhow the relationbetweenthe intellectand the
ideas can allow for both complexityand identity,it is necessaryto have
a sense of how the intellect is occupiedby these objects.47Accordingto
Plotinus' account, the intellect is not filled with discrete objects, like a
Trojanhorse filled with a group of warriors.The ideas do not constitute
discrete partswithin the intellect.For that matter,the notion of parts,in
this noetic context, is entirelymisplaced:
Intellect there is not like this, but has all things and is all things, and is with
them when it is with itself and has all things without having them. For it is not
one thing and they another (o'Uyap XkXa,bo ? a&o;); nor is each individual
thing in it separate (ov& XCopit ekaatov 'w.v ?Vain&); for each is the whole and
in all ways all (okov TE yfap artv iEcKaarov Kict navran- icav). 1.8 [51].2.15-20

Thus the intellect is not a nexus in which part"a" is externalto part"b."

Rather each part - using the term very loosely - contains the whole.48

44 Cf. 1.1 [53].8.4-6, 3.7 [45].3.36-8 and 3.7 [451.5.25-8.

4S Perhaps, it might be more helpful just to speak of the two sides, the epistemic
subject and its objects, as having a dynamic relation and not a causal one, so as to
avoid confusion with the fact that the One is the cause of the intellect by way of
emmanation. Regardless of this, what is crucial for my purposes is that the reciprocal
relation between the two sides is understood as something which is not exclusively
logical.
46 6.2 [43].21.53ff.
47 Plotinus certainly does not intend us to take the noetic world in a
literal spatial
sense. He is explicit that there is no place in that realm: icai o0S T6ico; EKce?: (6.2
[43].16.5). For what it is worth, Plotinus does actually use the term vonr6osT0o5o; twice
in 6.7. [38].35.5 and 41. However, on these occasions, he is using it for rhetoricalpur-
poses, quoting from Plato's Republic, 508c and 517b. The closest Plotinus comes to
the notion of place is when he says that each intelligible is the same as its place
(Xopa), 5.8 [31].4.18.
4" Emilsson, I think, states this very obscure matter well when he remarks:
"Plotinus,. . . claims that the intellect and the ideas are not even two distinct parts or
aspects of a thing unified into one (as one might say that the hard disk and the screen

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276 IAN CRYSTAL

Plotinus elsewhere employs the Anaxagoreanphraseto express what he

means: a&X'bjoo ?v ?vI iuvta.49 It is not the case that one part of the intel-
lectual structuregraspsanotherpartof that same intellectualstructurequa
part:... 1o?4 0"SXob &ei 'E'aaTov ical 'aa ?Kaatov icat oXov- qxavT4 at
jev yap gepo;, evopaTat8E,5T0tj el dv 6,tv OXov.... I The reasonPlotinus
will not tolerate a mereologicalaccountof the intellect, at least not an
exclusively discreteone, is because, if such were the case, then the intel-
lectual subjectand the intelligibleobjectwould be vulnerableto the claim
that they did not entirely interpenetrate one another.And for Plotinus it
is crucialthat they do. Otherwise,the intellectwill standin a similarrela-
tion to its objects as did discursivereason:two thingswhich are external
to one another.And if that were the case, the intellectwould rely upon
images. Accordingly,Plotinusremarksof the intellectualrealm:o 68 X01105
?1c?;vorp&; o&X0 o EV avXXp.5' Essentially Plotinus is after intertwined
complexity(ast,tXoKdi cn moaVOeat;), along with completeinterpenetration
of
and some kind identity.

IV. The p yuxa

a-vr
In orderto come to grips with these relationswhich are pullingin differ-
ent directions, Plotinus' interpretation of the IL&tara yFviqof the Sophist
must be considerednext. For he maintainsthat the intellectis constituted
out of them: 6 6 vo6; Ov vooiv icatai vOetov eWaivXov, oux ev Tt 'Wv

of a computerare one); they are one in a much strongersense so that each idea in all
of its parts is intellect and intellect is throughoutideas; thus, in Plotinus intellect with-
out ideas is an impossibility and likewise ideas without intellect." E.K. Emilsson,
"Plotinus on the Objects of Thought,"p. 21. Gerson, I think wrongly, does speak of
the forms in this context in terms of being aspects of the intellect. The problem with
aspects, pace Emilsson, is that they do not allow for the requiredtransparencywhich
is so crucial to Plotinus. L. Gerson, "Plotinus,"pp. 50-1. Gerson actually does use the
term partial identity (p. 51) by which he means the ideas partially overlap. There
is an analogous problem in Plotinus about how the individual intellect, which we all
supposedly have, can contain the entire intellect, what Plotinus refers to as the sc,k.
For a discussion of this problem, see G.J.P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self,
pp. 62-3.
49 6.6 [34].7.4. The phrase "opo6 naivra"occurs in the beginning of Anaxagoras'
book, Fr. Bl D-K.
5 5.8 [311.4.22-25. Plotinus goes on to compare it to the legend of Lynceus, an
individual who was supposed to have looked into the inside of the earth, see Apollo-
nius Rhodius I 151-5.
51 5.9 [51.10.10. Elsewhere we are told that the two sides, the subject and object,
are fused together (auyyKpa0Evtaq a'roitq), 5.5 [32].2.1-9.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTUREOF SELF-INTELLECTION 277

Thus it is in terms of being, motion, rest, sameness and other-

yEVWV:52
ness thatPlotinusarticulatesthe formalstructureof the intellect'sactivity;
how it is that the intellect is a '?VnoXX&.5 The geyta'ra'Ev11 make up the
conceptualskeleton of the intellect's ivipyuta.Taking Ennead6.2 as my
guide, accordingto Plotinus it is incorrectto speak of the being of the
intellectwithoutconcurrently(a`a) speakingof its movement(KIvIa;t).5I
For the latter is the activity (ivipyeta) of that which is actively actual.55
As Plotinus says elsewhere, if the intellect stands still, it does not think:
?i ' 'OMKEV, 0a VOCI.56 Rest (a'rat;) arisesbecause Kivmn;is not a chang-
ing of being's naturebut ratherits perfection.57 Being throughoutexists in
the same state and in the same way.58Othernessenters into the account
when distinguishingbeing, motion and rest from one another;59 that is,
when the intellect is graspedin its conceptualdiversity,i.e. as noUaX.60
And samenesswhen the three are graspedin their unity, i.e. as Cv.6'For
the intellect, despite being all three,is also one.62The yevil,therefore,are
one way of seeing how the intellect is, to quote, a '?VnoXX&.63
The epistemologicalmotivationfor such a move is clear: internaldif-
ferentiationthat accounts for the intellect having itself as an object of
intellection.Internaldifferentiationof some sort is necessaryif the intel-
lect is to have itself as an intellectualobject, and yet simultaneouslybe
the subject of the intellectual act. The question is whether or not the
g&ytatra yFviqin their applicationto the intellect are sufficientto account
for such an epistemic relation.Do the Ji&'ytoa yev&lpreventthe intellect
from being reducedto a simple inertentity,what Plotinuselsewhererefers

52 6.2 [431.18.11-12.
S3 6.2 [431.8.25-50 and 6.2 [43].15.1-19. Of course, the yE'" are not exclusive to
the intellect. They apply to everything, save the One.
-' 6.2 [431.15.11.
ss 6.2 [431.15.9.
56 6.7 [381.13.39-40.
57 6.2 [431.7.26-28.
58 6.2 [43].7.30-31.
59 6.2 [431.8.35-37.
60 6.2 [43].15.14-15.
61 6.2 [431.8.37-38. This is not the only delineation that Plotinus offers of the five
yvii. In 5.1 [10].4, he first discusses same and other and then introduces motion and
rest.
62 6.2 [431.15.14-15.
63 6.2 [431.15.15. Of course, one might object and say that the pytata ycvTiapply
to everything save the One and so are not unique to the intellect. They do but not in
the same way. When it comes to the intellect, we are looking at something strictly
from a self-relational perspective.

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278 IAN CRYSTAL

to as an inertlump("o ;)?" They do to this extent:the .t&yara?'yVqshow

how it is that the intellectcan be an vE'pyeta.For intelligisingin the con-
text of the intellectrequiresboth self-identity(or, perhaps,self-sameness
is more correct)and self-othernessor difference,65i.e. differentintellectual
stages or intellectualmomentswhich are not simply identicalwith one
anotherbut ratherthat lend themselvesto being distinguished:
Therefore he [Plato] rightly understandsthat there is otherness and sameness
where there is intellect and substance. For one must always understandintellect
as otherness and sameness if it is going to think (&6 y&pTovvoiv &Et ETpOwnr'a
ca rai xnxoMaXaifparvev, ETMEpvoi cEt). 6.7 [38].39.4-7*

If such distinctionswere denied to the intellect, it would be impossible

to distinguishconceptuallybetween that which thinks and that which is
thought.By ruling out the rtxa tc ycvn,it becomes impossibleto appre-
hend how the intellectcould have a relationin which it is simultaneously
the thinkingsubjectand its own object of thought.For to do so, presup-
poses that the intellect is capable of having internalepistemic relations,
in particularhaving itself as an object of thought.Withoutthe ge&ytata
-y?vTi,the intellect would be incapable of having itself as an object of
thought.It would be reducedto simple self-identity.And if that were the
case, Plotinus' accountof the noetic intellect's activitywould be vulner-
able to the objectionthat it is, at best, inconsistentand, at worst, contra-
dictory,given his earlierclaim that all thinkingis of something(ttv6;).67
It is essential,therefore,to have some way of understanding how the intel-
lect can become more than one when thinkingitself:
But if he himself thinks he becomes many, intelligible, intelligent, in motion and
everything else appropriateto Intellect. 6.7 [38].39.14-I6"4

If not, the result is something which is in a state of utter simplicity and,

as a result, incapable of the intellectual process:
It is necessary therefore to be one and a pair - but if it is, on the other hand,
one and not two, it will have nothing to think:so that it will not even be a think-

i 6.7 [381.14.8-11.
65 It must be borne in mind that Plotinus' account of the intellect in this context of
self-identity and othemess draws heavily on Plato's Parmenides (in particularthe sec-
ond hypothesis), a dialogue the dialectical exercise of which was not taken lightly by
Plotinus and the Neoplatonists. See n. 33 and also L. Gerson, Plotinus, p. 45, n. 9.
66 Also cf. 5.1 [10].4.34-35.

67 Cf. n. 9.
'
6 Similarly, at 5.6 [24].3.22ff. we read: 'ei oiuv Tr-) VoobVTI XA.XOo,&-i Ev (TO1)
nkhOEl T0 VOEIV 1?'l elvat'.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTUREOF SELF-INTELLECTION 279

ing principle. Thus it is necessary for it to be simple and not simple (&iRxoiva&pa
[sc. rOvo?v; cci
OcaVorX ox6v &6 dtvaQ). 5.6 [241.1.12-14
Thus the g' tata yevinoffer us a way of getting around the problem of sim-
ple identitywithoutnecessarilycreatinga pluralityof existentiallyindepend-
ent entities, which is necessaryfor Plotinus' theoryof self-intellection.

V. The Noetic Intellect'sRelation to Itself Revisited

Having set out the formal structureof the intellect along with the need
for its internaldifferentiation,I now need to explain how that account-
an accountwhich is the basis for the subject-objectdistinction- is com-
patiblewith the whole/whole accountof the intellect.I need to show that
Plotinus' claim that when the intellectthinksitself, being one, it becomes
two (&po ozv yivvrat'v 6v)69can somehow be reconciledwith Plotinus'
other claim:
But if it [intellect] has them [the intelligibles] themselves, it does not see them
as a result of dividing itself, but it was contemplator and possessor before it
divided itself. But if this is so, the contemplationmust be the same as the con-
templated, and intellect the same as the intelligible (Eit'roro, Srit 'V eEO)Ppiacv
rawTOVElVat XX OEcop7rriC, ca& tOVVOiv tw
r6V E XvatrapVoijt4). 5.3 [49].5.20-23

The backgroundto this argumentfrom 5.3 [49].5 is that the intellect

always possesses its objects. If this were not the case, the intellectwould
be vulnerableto the claim that it focused upon images.70In virtueof hav-
ing its objects at each conceptualstage of its activity, Plotinusconcludes
that the contemplatorand the contemplatedare the same (tar6ov).At this
point it might appear that the distinctionbetween the epistemic subject
and the intelligibleobject is untenable.7'Disregardingthe evidence from
the previous section about the need for the subject-objectdistinction,I
think that the passagejust quotedis not incompatiblewith this distinction
once it is made clear how Plotinusunderstandssuch a distinction.
For a start,that the activity of the intellect is constitutiveof multiplic-
ity within itself is clear. Plotinusspeaks of there being a sort of internal
occurrence(olov iapejRaOOv) when the intellectthinksitself, and it is this
which makes it, the intellect,many:Eiomiv voi;, oSt iEokq 'Crrt1,
watilo voiv
cnoxootovnape.ceaov6,iav c_ a&rovn1, X _t... .72 Now we know thatthe

69 5.6 [241.1.6.
70 5.3 [49].5.17-20.
7' For this view, see E.K. Emilsson, "Plotinus on the Objects of Thought," p. 33
72
5.3 [491.11.26-28. Cf. 6.9 [9].9.8 for another occurrence of ncap?lgnirro.

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280 IAN CRYSTAL

intellect's multiplicity,a multiplicitywhich is due to the intellect gener-

ating a pluralityof intelligibleobjects in its act of self-intellection,will
not be a plurality of parts." Yet neither does Plotinus regard the noetic
subjectand its intelligibleobjects as differentwholes qua substance;that
is, an epistemicsubjectseparateand existentiallyindependentfrom a plu-
rality of individuated objects: 6o[sc. voriv] &eo' icex6ptoTat tm ovat9c, a&Xa
ouvov ai)rjbpt
o 'axyo.7 If he did, then he could not claim, as he so often does,
that the act of intellection entails self-intellection.Rather,for Plotinus
internaldifferentiationtakes the form of differentinternalactivitiesor dif-
ferent active states. Thus, immediatelyafter speakingof self-intellection
as involving a sort of internal occurrence (otov napesjnoov), Plotinus
speaks of the multiplicityof ivipyctatwithin the intellect:
But whatpreventsit frombeinga multiplicityin this sense,as long as it is one
substance.Forthe multiplicity[of intellect]is nota pluralityof compositionsbut
its activities are the multiplicity ([sc. oi vo?;]v o') oUvOC'et;, a&U' ai EvE'pyEtat
ausob,o'TXOo;8*). 5.3 [49].12. 1-3715

Now given thatthe part/partreadinghas been ruledout, these active states

must be wholes.76Moreover, as the multiplicitywithin the conceptual
frameworkof the intellect is accountedfor in the primarysense by the
duality of subjectand objects, it follows that the subjectand objectswill

73 Now, although the present passage is talking about a plurality of intelligible

objects, it is still relevant to the subject-objectdistinction for two reasons: Firstly,
Plotinus is talking about self-intellection, i.e. the intellect's act of thinking itself. And
that act is premised upon the epistemic subject having itself as an object of thought.
Secondly, any time one is talking about an intelligible or intelligibles, one has to pre-
suppose the subject-objectdistinction. For what it is to be an intelligible only makes
sense within the context of the subject-objectdistinction,i.e. the thinkerand that which
is thought. Thus, I must be careful here to stress that multiplicity within the intellect
can be spoken of in two ways which must be kept distinct from one another.Firstly,
there is the multiplicity of ideas. Secondly, there is the multiplicity in that there is the
thinker and the object or objects which that thinkerthinks. However, as the plurality
of intelligibles already presupposesthe distinction between the subject and its objects,
it is of derivative importancefor my account of self-intellection.
74 5.6 [24].1.5-6.
75 Although the term "states" is not Plotinus' own, I do not think it unfair of me
to use it, since it does capturewhat, I think, Plotinus is getting at when he talks about
the intellect qua thinker, as opposed to object thought. I could just as easily use the
term "disposition" (or even "sense") and say the intellect has different dispositions
which amounts to the same thing, but again this is not Plotinus' own term. The impor-
tant point to get across is that intellect does have conceptual moments that differ from
one another connotationally.
76 See n. 3.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTUREOF SELF-INTELLECTION 281

also have to be thoughtof as wholes. In short,this is how Plotinusreworks

the conceptualstructureof the intellect and in doing so resolves the sec-
ond horn of Sextus' dilemma,save one qualification:The structureis not
dual in form but rathertriadic.The frameworkof the intellectconsists of
the intellectualsubject (voi-;), the intelligibleobjects (vonra')and the act
of thinking (vO6rat;), all of which are to be understood as wholes. But as
they are not differentwholes qua substance,their status as wholes will
have to be understoodin some othermanner,i.e. active statesor Ev?pyetat,
all of which are of the same whole qua substance."Such an account,i.e.
attributionof differentstates to the whole, enables Plotinus to deal with
the second partof Sextus' dilemmabecausethe necessaryslots which are
requiredfor self-intellection- subjectandobject- can be filled or satisfied
by this one whole, the intellect. For Plotinuscould argue in response to
Sextus that intellect qua whole acts on itself qua whole, both being the
same whole qua substancebut differentqua states.Self-intellection,there-
fore, would consist in intellectqua St bringingitself againstitself qua S2:
For in seeing the real beings it saw itself, and in seeing, it was in act, and its
actuality was itself (ta yap 6vra opwv ?aOTOv epa iccazop6v wVepyeL9 Av cai
-v?pyetaawuro);for intellectand intellectionare one; and it thinksas a whole
with the whole of itself and not one partof itself with another(voi yzapKca
vOat; D ai Ao; Ao, oV gpept &Xo po). 5.3 [49].6.6-878

This would allow the intellect to be conceptually divided on one level,

while leaving its identity relationintact on another.Each active state is
the whole, just with a specific connotationthat can be differentiatedfrom
the other ones. So, for example, the intellectqua thinkingsubjectis dif-
ferent from the intellect qua intelligibleobject. One thinks and the other
is thought. So too with the act of thinking, it is different from that which
has the power79to think and that which can be thought. Such connota-
tional differences are what enables Plotinus to circumvent the second horn
of Sextus' dilemma:
... andthe thoughtandthis substancearenot differentthings,and,againin that
the naturethinksitself,theyarenotdifferentexceptin definition,whatis thought

77 It should be noted that Plotinus is not always consistent in his use of these three
terms, cf. J. Bussanich, The One and its Relation to the Intellect in Plotinus, p. 58.
However, at 5.3 [49].5.44-50 it is clear that they do represent different states of the
intellectual whole.
78 Cf. 2.9 [33].1.33ff. and G.J.P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, pp. 75-6

on the identity of subject and act.

79 Plotinus does sometimes refer to the intellect as having certain powers (uva&-
iet;), powers which are always actualised, cf. 6.7 [381.35.21.

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282 IAN CRYSTAL

and what thinks, that is, a plurality (0i)XETpOV,&XX'i X6yq,TO v0ol EVoV Kat
ro voovv, xikfio;oov), as has often been demonstrated.6.7 [38].40.16-19

Because of these connotationaldifferences, Plotinus' account of self-

intellection avoids the pitfall of simple identity. For without them, the
intellect could not have itself as an object of intellection: XoA 6 X
an)oi6; y^lvetatvowv EaxuTov,a& & 86n tniv VOIiatv tiv iept arov ?tEpOi etivat,
n
'Rw $vatro voeiv avxo. Yet, by the same token,Plotinus'notionof
wholes, while satisfyingthe subjectand objectrequirement,allows for the
intellectualsubjectto have itself as an object in a completelytransparent
manner.For, as Plotinus is keen to emphasis,the intellectualprocess is
a completely transparent one: 6taqpavil yap icavra icaitaCOc?eov Ovi 8 a,v'ri-
twXov OM5?V, aXX& is&; navrt pavpEO;E; 'CO Ea(i) icat icav'a.T No whole -
be it voi;, vo6iit;, or vorlTa- eclipses any of the otherwholes. For when
one comes up against anotherit sees itself. Accordingly,Plotinus con-
cludes 5.3 [49].5 by distinguishingthese three states from one another,
while also assertingan identitythesis which binds them together:
All togetherare one, intellect,intellection,the intelligible('v a&iAnavTaeaTa,
vo6;, vo6att, rOvoit'v). If thereforeintellect's intellection is the intelligible, and
the intelligibleis itself, it will itself thinkitself:for it will thinkwith the intel-
lectionwhich it is itself andwill thinkthe intelligible,whichis itself (Li obv ij
vo6at; ai?roi X'0voTrO6v, X0 0. vo'rObvar6o;, akor; 'apa iavr6OvV0?151- VOl?
yap mj VoTia1I, Oi?p iV aci'o;, icoIVOiEt T' VOTo6V, XEp ijv aiT6;). In both ways,
then,it will thinkitself, in thatintellectionis itself andin thatthe intelligibleis
itself which it thinksin its intellection and which is itself (icO' bcaKipov apa
% X % It % I I, v I 11 1
EMYTOxvVolEt, arOO?tIca(l f` vo6icn;avro; ijv, icat6rt roTvO v avTo6;, 0ep
tov
T'j Vo'aEtI, 'Oijv actin). 5.3 [49].5.43-50
VOEtI

Now, if my interpretation of Plotinuscan be shown to hold, it would be

adequateto act as a basis for a coherenttheory of self-intellection.For
wholes and transparency,if they can be combined,enable the subjectto
have itself as an object of intellection.The accountallows for a type of
identitythesis to hold betweenthe subjectand object,which is crucialfor
any theory of self-intellectionbut it does so in a novel and uniqueway;
by allotting a pivotal role to vo6lt;, the act of the intellectualsubject.
Throughplacing as much emphasison v6raot;as Plotinusdoes, the sub-
ject never loses sight of itself in being identifiedwith its object.82For the
sake of clarity, let me call this new identityrelationor thesis epistemic
identity, given that it is founded upon the epistemic subject's act. The

"o6.7 [38].39.12-13.
81 5.8 [31].4.5-6. Cf. 5.8 [311.4.22-25.
82 Cf. n. 78.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTUREOF SELF-INTELLECTION 283

reason the epistemic subjectnever loses sight of itself in this act - never
becomes opaquebut always remainstransparentto itself - is becausethis
act is generatedby or from it. Plotinus, breakingfrom the Aristotelian
tradition,is actually allotting an active role to the intellectualsubject in
its relation with its object, namely itself.83In order to see how Plotinus
can successfully achieve such an identityrelation,i.e. epistemicidentity,
in which the intellectualsubjectand object are the same as one another,
yet connotationallydifferentiatedbut transparentlyso, I want to conclude
with an examinationof the Plotinus'originalreworkingof the traditional
light analogy; an analogy which he employs to illustratethe noetic proc-
ess, and the identity thesis - what I call epistemic identity - around which
it operates.

VI. Light
If we return to the Staxpavij passage quoted above from 5.8 [31].4,
Plotinus, as he does elsewhere, employs the image of light illuminating
light: (p*qyap [sc. e'io tatpave];Jqwrx&.By Plotinus' time, the light anal-
ogy had a very long tradition.The two most obvious instances being
Plato's Republicand Aristotle'sDe Anima.85Whatboth of these passages
have in common is that they are structuredin such a way that the Sun
and the active intellect, respectively,are that in virtue of which the visi-
ble or intelligibleobjects are able to act upon the seer or the thinker.For
in both instances they actualise the mediumin such a way that objects
become visible or intelligible.The Sun in the Republicdoes this by emit-
ting light and the active intellect by being in a certain state like light.86
Now there can be little doubt that Plotinuswas very well aware of both
these passages and this traditionaluse of light.87With this in mind, one
can appreciatewhat a significantshift there is in his reworkingof this

8 Cf. E.K. Emilsson, "Plotinus on the Objects of Thought,"p. 41.

84 5.8 [31].4.6. Also cf. 5.6 [24].1.16-22.
"' Republic 509b2-20 and D.A. 430al5-17.
16 Obviously, I am not trying to imply that the roles of the Sun and the active intel-
lect are identical in their respective analogies, since the role of the latter is both much
more complex and broaderin scope. Nonetheless they do have somewhat similar roles
in the context of allowing for the epistemic subject to be acted upon by creating the
right conditions.
17 Plotinus would certainly have known of the discussion of D.A. 3.5, if by no other

means than through Alexander of Aphrodisias. We have already witnessed his lifting
of the writing tablet analogy from D.A. 3.4. We also know he was aware of Plato's
Sun analogy because he employs a very similar, if not identical, Sun analogy at 6.7
[38].16.25ff., when speaking of his first principle.

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284 IAN CRYSTAL

famousanalogy.ForPlotinusradicallyaltersthe relationbetweenthe intel-

lectual subject,the light and the object illuminatedby the light:
But in the intelligibleworld, seeing is not throughanother[sc. medium],but
through itself, because it is not directedoutside(?Ebit 8i oi &'
8 ?rpov, &a &'
aIxTi;, o"it pii& E`). Intellectthereforesees one lightwith another,not through
another(QXXpouv pt &aXo (pCo;
bp4, oB 5t' a&Xou).Lightthen sees another
light: it therefore itself sees itself (q* apall 9pX aX O'pc auro apa avkTr O'p0).
5.3 [49].8.21-248
In the noetic world (E;ici), seeing is not through another (&t' ETEpoi) but
throughitself (5t' airi;). This is becausethe focus of the subject,the seer,
is not directed outwards (O5tlt ?il& ). The first sentence of this passage,
I think, implies that the intellectqua the subjectof the perception,is its
own medium. For it sees 8t' abvi; and, consequently, it itself establishes
or generatesthe correctconditionsfor the occurrenceof sight. In this con-
text, the 8ta is pivotal because it is indicativeof what Plotinusconsiders
to be passive and active. For if the intellect were to see 8t' ?Tepov (the
traditionalPlatonic and Aristotelianusage), then therewould be grounds
for taking the mediumto be externalto the intellectualsubject,with the
result that when it, the medium,is in the properstate, i.e. activated,then
and only then can the subjectbe acteduponby the intelligibleobject.Thus
Plotinus, given his preference for &t' ai,ri; as opposed to 8t' irkpov,
clearly differs from both the Aristotelianand Platonic usage of light in
this epistemologicalcontext.For, accordingto theiranalogies,the source
of light was somethingindependentof the subject.It is thatwhich brought
about the right conditionswhich in turn enabledthe objects to act upon
the epistemic subject.90To make Plato and Aristotle conform to the
Plotinianusage, we would have to say that the seer and the passive intel-
lect themselvesrespectivelyactivatethe mediumin such a way as to make
the visibles or intelligiblesactuallyvisible or intelligible.In otherwords,
they would have to make what they take to be passive active. That they
do not can be tracedto the fact that they do not develop this doctrineof
noetic internality(o"rt 1gi&C%).

The Armstrongedition misprintsthis as 'ipa.

It should be noted that this sort of intellectual image of light meeting light can
9
be found in Plato's Timaeus as an account of how actual vision works, cf. 45b2-d3.
I thank GerardO'Daly for pointing this out to me.
tx Recall that even with the Aristotelian usage from D.A. 3.5, it is only when the
active intellect is in a certain state that the intelligibles are able to act upon the intel-
lectual subject: . .. .o [sc. vo6;1 6? tz nicvTa ncotetv,& ?t ct;, olov T6Opk- Tpnov yTap
Tva cat to pi iooA ta 8uv6.4t WO`vaXp(dVtOaivp'yciq XpdWxra.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTELLECION 285

Plotinus concludes (ovv) from the first sentencethat the intellectbeing

light ((pk) sees anotherlight (a&Xo(p&) with anotherlight (a&XXqpoTi)
not throughanother(5t' a&Xoi).Are we to infer from this sentence that
we are dealing with three differentlights and, if so, exactly how are they
different?Moreover,when intellect sees one light with another,what is
the force of the "with"?Taking the questionsin order,we know that the
lights are not differentfrom one anotheras discretepartsof a whole dif-
fer from one anotherfor two reasons: Plotinus has already rejectedthe
part/partreading and light, at least accordingto Plotinus,is an incorpo-
real entity,9"renderingit indivisible.92Moreover,we also know that we
are not dealingwith differentseparateindependentsubstances(thatis, dif-
ferent wholes qua substance),since he has already said in the opening
sentence that the intellect's attentionis not directedoutwards.The light
at which the intellect is looking must be itself. We are only examining
one numericalentity as far as substanceis concerned.For the seer, the
seeing and the seen belong to the same thing. But the level of substance
is not the only one with which we are working.And this bringsus to the
second question,the force of the "with."
I understandthe "with"to mean that the intellect itself, in additionto
being the first light (pC;), i.e. the intellectualsubject, is the other light
(a&XXyp'ri) qua vO6rjat93 and that light brings itself to bear on the other
light (QXXo yP) which is itself qua vonTov.For if one comparesthis sen-
tence to the sentence in the passagewe had earlier,when discussinghow
none of the wholes eclipsed one another(voifljE yap rn VOi1O, OIEEp i1V
alB,q, 1cat VOiaet X0r vonrov, O6icpI?jvar6o;, 5.3 [49].5.43-50), one can see
that the "with"picks out the bringingof the intellect's self qualifiedin a
specific way against itself qualified in another way;94 what could be called
whole against whole. This interpretationof the sentence explains the
choice of "with"over "through"in that"with"in the presentcontext,just
as 6t' airrij; in the previoussentence,rendersthe subjectactive, whereas
the "through" would make it passive.95 For the "with" articulates the con-

9' 2.1 [401.7.26-28 and 4.5 [29].6-7.

92 According to Plotinus at 6.4 [22].8.18-19 only corporeal bodies are divisible,
since they have magnitude.
9- Cf. 5.3 [491.6.7-8 and cf. n. 77.
94 The present passage which is under examination, much more than the
one we
had previously, emphasises the transparencyof the wholes in no uncertainterms.
9S Just as there were probable grounds for saying that Plotinus was consciously
altering the traditional light analogy, here it would seem as if he were consciously
inverting the through/withdichotomy which is central to Socrates' account of the epis-

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286 IAN CRYSTAL

ceptualdevelopmentor non-temporal stagesof thesubject'sact.96It identifies

the subjectnot just with the object but with the act as well.97Yet it also
conceptuallydifferentiatesthe subjectand its act from the object.
However, Plotinusdoes not jump from saying intellect sees one light
with anotherto the final conclusionthat intellectsees itself, i.e. self-intel-
lection. Ratherhe offers the interimconclusion:(p&aipa(pdSaAAoop9.
Plotinus arrivesat this conclusion,on my interpretation, because of the
work the "with"readinghas done. For we now know that we are not
dealing with somethingwhich is absolutelysimple. Theremight only be
one substanceas such but if it is not capable of internaldifferentiation,
then we are back to the simple identityclaim. And if that is the case,
then we have undercutthe entire intellectualprocess.Hence the intellect
being pl sees p&;2.The second light is differentfrom the first in as
much as the first is the seeing seer and the second the seen, the intellec-
tual subjectand object. This provides,along with the act, the necessary
internaldifferentiationfor an intellectualprocess within one substance.
Accordingly,it is crucialthat gpc see Tk2 qua aXXo.By the same token
however, since we are only dealing with one light, Plotinus is able to
reach his desired conclusionof self-intellection.For the lights might be
a.Xo connotationallybut not substantially.Thus ai&ot&paawroopq.
To conclude,we have an identityrelation,which toleratesinternaldif-
ferentiation.Moreover, it is a differentiationwhich takes the form of
whole against whole, allowing for the subject-objectdistinctionand yet
not prohibitingthe intellectfrom knowing itself. If anything,the whole/
whole relation,accordingto Plotinus,is the only way in which the intel-
lect could properlyknow itself.

Louisiana State University

temic subject in the icotv&passage of the Theaetetus. Plotinus either knows of the
Theaetetus directly or throughAlexander. Plotinus, by using "with"in this context, it
would seem, is furtheremphasising the identity between the epistemic subject and the
medium against a backdrop in the Theaetetus in which the two were heterogeneous,
i.e. the epistemicsubjectand its sense organs.Cf. Myles Burnyeat,"Platoon the Grammar
of Perceiving," Classical Quarterly26 (1976), p. 29.
96 Plotinus' use of light at 5.5 [32].7.13ff. does not contradictmy argument,because
that context, again, is one of the intellect's inner light.
97 Cf. n. 78.

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