Project on:

Checkmating Chinas
Strategic encirclement of
india: india needs a multi-
pronged strategy

Submitted By: Submitted To:

Brijesh Dr. Sarabjit Kaur
B.A.LL.B.(Hons.)
6th Semester
Roll No.: 76/14

1
Nations are living in an age of growing interdependence for achieving their national
policy objectives of various kinds. No country can live in complete isolation from the
other countries of the world and hence maintains relations with other nations to
achieve its national objectives. Foreign policy of any country towards others, mirrors
national policy objectives and also reflects periodical shifts in it. So, every State has
to take note of the attitude of the other states, not only towards itself but also towards
others, the task is extremely complex, the complexity arising from the very nature of
international politics. And a state has no sure means of controlling the behaviour of
other states and it cannot be certain that another state will act in the ways it desires.1

Demographically, two largest countries of the world, India & China, have common
borders, traditions and colonial history. Though political relations between the two
countries started in 1950s, the cultural relations are said to be more than 3000 years
old. There was a peaceful penetration of Indian culture to China that became more
marked since the Ashokan priests went to China to propagate Budhism. Both the
countries were the victims of western colonization; common problems gave rise to
sympathy. Thus, a warm Indo-Chinese relationship was the logical outcome and
culmination of long history and hoary traditions2. Since the commencement of Sino-
Indian political relations in 1950s, Tibet has remained an important issue. The
differences over Tibet flowed from the divergent concepts of suzerainty and
sovereignty over Tibets autonomy.3 However, the relative importance of Tibet issue
has declined as India has accepted the suzerainty of China over Tibet.
Notwithstanding, the Sino-Indian Agreement of April 1954, containing five principles
of peaceful existence, boundary dispute between the two countries betrays solution.
The sources of tension between India and China are multi-faceted, driven in large part
by Chinas concern with an emergent India, the desire to consolidate its position on
Tibet4 and to assume the role of an economic and geo-strategic superpower in Asia

2
having a dominant say in world affairs. As far as border is concerned, Chinese have
since 1954 maintained the ambiguous position that matters will be settled when the
time is ripe. Thus, even when a section of LAC (Line of Actual Control) is mutually
determined, the Chinese are unwilling to demarcate it and exchange maps. 5
Geopolitical rivalry and calibrated cooperation, seemingly antithetical, coexist within
the framework of our relationship with China. The latter has pinned its colours to the
Pakistani mast as recent developments have demonstrated. It is suspicious about our
friendship with the United States, our closeness to Japan, and our naval cooperation in
the East and South China Seas with these countries. It challenges us with its myriad
dalliances in our neighbourhood6.

Chinas unfriendly gestures with India and in its neigbourhood

China seems to have hegemonic ambitions, perceiving itself as an ascendant power in
Asia. It challenges Indias sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh in a routine manner.
Chinas bonhomie with Pakistan - Indias troubling neighbour and its occupation of
territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) ceded to it in 1963 by Pakistan are the
major irritants for India. So for China, Pakistan is an instrument to keep India
confined to south Asia rather than be Chinas competitor in the whole of Asian
continent and indeed globally.7 Chinas refusal of visa to one of Indias top generals
(Lt. Gen. B.S. Jaiswal) bound for Beijing to lead the Indian delegation in a high level
exchange, is a typical example of its unneighbourly behaviour. Chinas intention
seems to have unipolar Asia by preventing the emergence of rival powers. In
consonance with the expansion of its strategic space, China is creating rings of
influences in Indias neighbourhood. China has enduring strategic partnerships with
Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh and other countries. Chinese infrastructure projects
in Gilgit area has added new dimension to military cooperation between Pakistan and
China. The Karakoram Highway which connects Chinas Xinjiang region with Gilgit-
Baltistan was constructed by Pakistani and Chinese engineers over a period of time
and was completed in 1986. Besides involving Pakistan in many infrastructure

3
projects in POK region, China has also engaged Pakistan in 2006 to upgrade the
Karakoram highway. This will facilitate Chinas free access to the oil rich Gulf region
through the Pakistani port of Gwadar in Balochistan 8. The Qinghaosu-Tibet railway,
the highest railway in the world, completed in 2005 and one of the greatest
engineering feats of this century is being extended from Lhasa to Ligase near the
border with Nepal. The line is being further extended to Chiding, near the border with
India. The railway will be connected to the inland port of Yadong, situated 300 km
from Thimpu in Bhutan and 600 km from Dhaka in Bangladesh. Among the tracks
planned by China are the ones to the Nepalese and Indian borders from Ligase. 9 In the
land and mountain locked kingdom of Nepal, China has inspired Maoists and wants to
complete a railway line from the Tibetan capital of Lhasa to Kathmandu10. Bangladesh
is doorway for China to Indias northeast and both share a common ground on many
issues. China is also a major supplier of arms and equipment to Bangladesh11.

China does not hesitates to showcase its military prowess in running her foreign
and strategic policies. It conducts major military exercises in close proximity to LAC,
routinely intrudes its armed forces into Indian territory in Ladakh and Arunachal
Pradesh. While China seeks a multi-polar world, it wants uni-polar Asia and hence its
policy of downsizing India.12 Indias matching demographic potential, Strategic &
economic rise, ties with US and other countries in the Chinas hinterland are viewed
by China with distrust.13 Chinese leaders are habitual of expressing themselves
through seemingly innocuous and obviously planned incursions and politically
hostile statements.14 Chinese construction companies misuse business visas15 to bring
illegal Chinese personnel to India,16 and Chinese embassy issues stapled visas for
Indian residents of J&K and Arunachal Pradesh to highlight their disputed status.
Diverting by China, the flows of Brahmputra River before it enters India near the
great bend are seen as the attempts to provoke India. Due to Chinese heavy
diversion of lean-season flows from its hydel projects in the year 2000, the vast areas
in the Brahmputra downstream in Arunachal Pradesh were flooded. China is known to

4
plans its infrastructural projects for dual use to meet both the peace and war time
needs,17so, India must remain prepared.

In fact, the relationship between India and China is unequal - in Chinas favour.
This is so at diplomatic and economic levels. Never has a top Chinese leader visited
India without including nearby countries in his itinerary. India for China is one among
many. Never has an Indian leader visited China except on a stand alone basis; China is
never one among many. India exports virtually nothing to China while more than 10%
of Indias total imports are from China. Traditional local industries like Sivakasis
fireworks were devastated by cheap Chinese imports. Most importantly, Chinas
border politics is intriguingly aggressive. Every time a senior government leader
arrives from Beijing, there is a sudden rush of demonstrative incidents in Ladakh,
this time (during September 2014 -visit of Chinese President Xis to India) more
demonstrative than before. Xi is the head of the Chinese military and intelligence
establishments as well. He could have easily kept the borders peaceful at least during
the three days, he was in India. But he stuck to the familiar pattern of visits coinciding
with incursions.18 Veteran Journalist Kuldip Nayar19 questions the very justification of
inviting the Chinese President when Beijing has made no amends for the betrayal in
1962 when it attacked the unprepared India. Nor has it vacated the territory which it
forcefully captured since then. He further laments that the various steps China has
taken, which he prefers to refer as plethora of irritations, from the stapling of visa
on passports to amassing PLA soldiers in Gilgit-Baltistan, should make things clear
for New Delhi.

India believes and most of the world powers agree that Indian Ocean is Indias
strategic backyard. With a powerful navy, India believes that it can command the sea
routes between the east and the west, through which a third of the world trade travels.
But, China doesnt agree. According to it, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), an open
sea, can not be called Indias backyard20.

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BCIM-EC and MSR
BCIM-EC (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar - Economic Corridor)
emerging from the deliberations of Kunming Initiative21 seeks to open up the whole of
the northeastern region of India to Southeast Asia and China and turn it into a
significant channel of trade. The BCIM-EC is proposed to run from Kunming (China)
in the east to Kolkata (India) in the west, broadly spanning the region, including
Mandalay (Myanmar), Dhaka and Chittagong (Bangladesh) and other major cities and
ports as key nodes. With the linkages of transport, energy and telecommunication
networks, the Corridor is proposed to form a thriving economic belt that will promote
common development of areas along the Corridor. Cooperative undertakings may
include22 but is not limited to the following areas:

(i) Physical connectivity

(ii)Trade in goods, services and investment, including finance
(iii)Environmentally sustainable development
(iv)People-to-people contacts

More specifically, a call was made to revive the ancient Southern Silk Route
between Assam and Yunnan23. Despite the apparent willingness of the four countries,
they have been limited by several factors in their endeavour to make the initiative
prosper. One of the prime reasons for this is the fact that there is considerable political
reluctance that hinders its success.24 The state of affairs between India and China is
the most vital aspect impacting the proper functioning of the BCIM. From India's
perspective, two reasons are pointed out in regard to the 'China factor'. One, the
concerns that opening up of the northeast would flood the Indian markets with
Chinese goods and two, that the same prospect would make the northeastern border
security vulnerable. Many believe that it is part of Chinese policy to keep the border
issues unresolved, wean away Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar and arm Pakistan,
thereby limiting India's influence in the subcontinent. On the other hand, there is the

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much talked about 'Asian Century' and the view that "India and China need not fear
each other, as it is not 'India or China' but 'India and China' which would redefine the
global economy." In either instance, clearing the geopolitical air may prove more
beneficial on both domestic as well as international levels, than keeping them in the
shadows.25 Uttam Sen observes that India is less circumvent about the BCIM corridor
and has agreed to consider it. Strategy among giant countries is in many ways a
competitive, one-way street. But it could be turned to mutual benefit as China
demonstrated during its halcyon detente with the US. China went on to flood the US
market with inexpensive goods and mount an unprecedented trade surplus. Yet it is
noteworthy that China has never dropped its guard against the US and probably
anticipates the same to India.26

Chinas rise has been phenomenal. In 1980, Chinas share of global GDP was
merely 2% (lower than even Indias 2.40%) while Americas share was 22.6% which
went upto 23.3% (nearly one-fouth of world GDP0 in 2000. Chinas dominance is not
confined to top place in the GDP ranking. Chinas is also the largest exporter in the
world. China holds the worlds largest trade and current account surpluses, is the
owner of a third of worlds currency reserves and holds the worlds largest flow of
savings.27 Hemmed in by the Pivot to Asia led by Washington and its allies, including
Japan, Australia and the Philippines, to contain the perceived rise of an aggressive
China, Beijing has responded with its bold home-grown riposte the Silk Road
initiatives, that include the proposal to form the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The
Chinese are bending over backwards to assign a benign role to the MSR based on
trade and investment as well as physical and cyber-connectivity among a large
number of countries belonging to the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and South Asia, including India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.28

During his visit to India, Chinese President Xi-Jinping, amplified its vision of
Maritime Silk Road (MSR) amid the repositioning of American forces in Asia-Pacific

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and an emerging trade deal between Washington and its traditional regional allies.
Overlooking the Taiwan Straits, Quanzhou, a major city in Chinas Fujian province,
has emerged as the focal point of MSR. The revival of the MSR from Quanzhou
echos Chinas rich maritime traditions. The city is known to be the starting point of
original MSR, and was central to voyages that prominently covered South and
Southeast Asia including India, Maldives and Sri Lanka, which were undertaken by
Zheng He, the 15th century mariner. Picking up the historical threads, President Xi,
who is personally helming the initiative, has included Maldives and Sri Lanka.
Chinese officials proclaim that the MSR embeds the search and development of new
markets and investment destinations following the economic downturn in the west,
which has, so far, galvanised China. Further, as per Chinese version, it is not just
about the markets and economy, for the MSR also seeks to revive civilization linkages
through extensive people to people contacts.29 Aneja30 views MSR as an initiative to
string together partnerships with countries in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean,
including India, in the wake of the decision by the United States to bolster its military
capability in the region. India has already supported Chinas initiative on the
formation of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor, but would have
to take a call on the MSR, at a time when Chinas detractors are slamming Beijing for
its alleged India-containment strategy, borrowing from the string of pearls theory.
India believes that China is building a series of strategic assets, called string of
pearls, around the Indian peninsula from where the Chinese navy would be allowed
to operate31.

Way out for India

Rivalry between China and India, to some extent, is inevitable. They are the
worlds fastest growing economies, though at the moment Chinas economy is larger
than Indias. Indeed, China is worlds largest economy and a sense of growing
strength has given Beijing a measure of superiority.32 Chinas inroads into the strategic
neighbourhood are in sync with its grand design. India needs to formulate a pragmatic

8
national security policy coupled with a firm combination of sound economics and
smart diplomacy. But at the same time it is very unlikely that China will take
recourse to military confrontation, not because this might come in the way of
achieving their larger strategic objective of reaching parity with US as early as
possible but also because they are doubtful, if this would succeed.33 But Ignoring
Dragons growing capability would be serious strategic blunder for India. India need
to further enhance its potential in the application of combat power on its northern
borders and enhance force projection capability in the region34.

It is timeless maxim in international triangular politics that when one state has
better bilateral ties, it is in a geopolitically advantageous position. For decades, India
has been at the wrong end of the triangular politics. Whether it was the U.S.- Pakistan
-India triangle, the India-China-Pakistan triangle or the U.S.-China-India triangle,
New Delhi was always in the enviable position of managing simultaneously
unfriendly dyads. India, now being wooed by both Tokyo and Beijing, even as Japan-
China relations remain sour, has opened new vistas for both Indias domestic
transformation, and its role in Asia and the world. 35 India must meaningfully engage
ASEAN countries in economic ties in a supportive friendly gesture. We must agree
upon an economic development programme for SAARC countries to enhance their
confidence in India and not leave them to any vulnerable threat from outside. With a
credible nuclear deterrence, a fairly well trained and well deployed army, India cannot
be bullied or treated with arrogance. India could do well by organising some sort of
offensive capabilities along the north-eastern borders. Indian defensive capabilities
are fairly well developed and she is capable of countering any limited misadventure
by China.36

India wants a stable relationship with China, hoping that its ties with China will

Historically, the dragon was the symbol of the Emperor of China. Sometimes Chinese
people use the term "Descendants of the Dragon. But, it is generally used as the symbol of
culture.

9
open up the possibility that Beijing might use its leverage with Islamabad to shape
Pakistans behaviour that might benefit India. India wants to fights terrorism
effectively whereas China can play a vital role in countering cross-border terrorism.
India needs investment and high technology. China can invest and provide the
necessary technology to India. On the other hand, China wants to limit Indias
growing relations with the US and Japan as well as the other countries which the
China considers its backyard. While China is preoccupied with eastern maritime
disputes and the North Korean situation, stable relations on its southern and south-
western flank would also help China. Chinas ambitious plan of Maritime silk Road
and the Silk Road Economic Belt cannot be realised without Indias approval and
consent.37

New Delhi should also reach out to Taiwan, Vietnam and other South-East Asian
countries which are feeling the assertiveness of China. India will have to follow its
Look East Policy. It will have to develop and strengthen relations with the East and
South-East Asian countries which are feeling the heat of Chinese assertiveness. India
has to manage its relations with China with prudence. Visits of the Indias Prime
Minister to Japan and Australia and of the President Pranab Mukherjee to Vietnam are
the good moves taken in the right direction. 38 Presidents Vietnam tour was part of
Indias twin-track diplomacy that aims to simultaneously improve relations with
China and its rivals in the region. India and Vietnam must continue to hold each other
in tight embrace to checkmate the rising and assertive big brother in their
neighbourhood.39 Ties between China and Japan have soured over contested islands in
the East China Sea and over the sensitive issue of war-time history. Further, China has
asserted territorial rights in the South-China Sea against the claims of the Philippines
and Vietnam.40 Zorawar Daulet Singh41 emphasizes on recognition of Pacific Ocean
as an immensely complex theatre where old histories continue to cast their shadow
over contemporary politics. Conflicting identities - China-Japan, South Korea -Japan,
North Korea -Japan, Russia-Japan, China-Vietnam, China and the South China Sea

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littorals continue to animate East Asias international relations. In sum, both China
and Japan are struggling to define a role that can carry the rest of Asia along with
them. Ironically, and in a strange way, India legitimises both Chinas and Japans role
in Asia. For Japan. India is the state that is eager for a larger Japanese role in Asias
future. India and other Chinese neighbours want to ensure that China does not
assume a dominant position in the region. Further, Indo-US relations give India a
leverage and it works as offshore balancer. U.S. and Japan have made no secret of
their desire to draw India into an anti-China security alliance 42. Therefore, India
should take sufficient measures to develop its relations with the US. Kuldip Nayar
remarks that Beijing should be made to realise that India has accepted Chinas
suzerainty over Tibet but not the demographic change or the ruthless repression in that
territory.43

Sheel Bhadra Kumar is of the view that India needs to adopt multi-pronged
strategy to tackle the dragons moves. India has to build trust and improve
communication with China. It needs to increase political, economic and even military
cooperation with China on bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Instead of getting
drawn into process of LAC clarification, India and China should move boldly to settle
the boundary dispute. Simultaneously, India will have to be patiently ready to
compete with China because in international politics you have either to speak as an
equal or from a position of strength to be heard. Therefore, India needs to increase its
military preparedness and strength to ward of any misadventure from the Chinese
side. It has to tenaciously develop infrastructure in border area. It needs to consolidate
and expand development activities in our border regions.44

If India has stoutly to defend its supreme interests, it has to realize that the
international context in which it has to function has become more complex and
difficult45. India should learn how Vietnam has managed to turn the diplomatic tables
on China by not shying away from spotlighting the latters aggressive designs. A

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stable equation with China is more likely to be realized if India puts premium on
leveraged diplomacy and avoids a trans-Himalayan military imbalance46. G.
Parthasarthy also remarks that while it would be counter-productive for India to
respond in kind to aggressive Chinese rhetoric, diplomatic inaction is not an
answer.47 Lt. Gen. Harbhajan Singh (Retd.) says that the Indian leadership does not
have to panic but has to think long-term on how to co-exist with the dragon.
According to him48 prudent Indian policy can include engaging China in trade and
avoiding a military conflict, development of conventional military and nuclear
deterrence so that China does not violate Indian border and keeps away from
neighbours and sea-lanes. Further Indian policy should include deterring Pakistan
against any military adventurism, diplomatic neutrality of Pakistan in case of
hostilities with China, working towards engagement of a strategic ally having
sufficient military and economic muscle to caution China on any adventurism against
India; and carrying out effective psychological and information warfare to make it
clear to China and Pakistan that though India desires peace, it is taking required steps
to build its military muscle and strategic alliances, taking into account their military
capabilities and their stance.

On the trade and economy front, as the demand for Chinese goods has relatively
shrunk in the West, China is now increasingly focusing on Asian markets, It is also an
aspect of Chinas going out strategy to productively invest its $4 trillion foreign
exchange reserve. China has also transformed itself from worlds major manufacturer
within China to major manufacturer worldwide. Through this initiative, China kills
two birds with one stone; while China gets an outlet for investments in India which in
turn also enables her to reach out to Indian States, a policy that China has been
following from quite some time.49 Souring of ties with several of its other neighbours
including the Philippines and Vietnam, in recent years, over competing claims to
some island in the South China Sea, is also one of the contributory factors for Chinas
growing inclination towards India.

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 Xi Jinping, President of China, expects that, as emerging markets, each with its
own strength, India and China, need to become closer development partners, drawing
upon each others strengths and work together for common development. China has
rich experience in infrastructure building and manufacturing whereas India is
advanced in information technology and pharmaceutical industry. The combination of
the worlds factory and the worlds back office will produce the most competitive
production base and the most attractive consumer market. 50 He remarked during his
visit to India in September 2014 that China and India should be express trains
driving regional development as well as twin anchors of regional peace. When
China and India Join hands for cooperation, it will benefit not only the two countries
but also the entire Asia and the world at large. 51 No doubt, China is a business partner
of immense potential to India but continues to be a strategic threat to contain for
which India needs partnerships with other powerful powers that feel threatened by
China. The Indian Prime Ministers U.S. visit prior to his rendezvous with Chinese
President Xi Jinping, was a culmination of a strategic quest, after his meetings with
Japanese and Australian apex leaders, both of whom have similar strategic goals 52.
Economic benefits alone cannot help in overcoming troubled relationships. 53 Chinese
watchers see Xis moves in India as being in consonance with his countrys growing
duality in foreign policy. While the quest for international economic engagement to
fuel its domestic growth remains strong, there is growing assertiveness, even
muscular approach, to what Xi calls Chinas core national interest. With Chinas
global power surging, there is a demand, particularly among PLA, to be more
assertive about its territorial concerns, whether Taiwan, Tibet, maritime disputes in the
South China Sea or boundary differences with India.54

During the three-day India visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in September

2014, both the sides have reiterated their willingness to proactively resolve all
outstanding differences based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence through

13
friendly negotiation without letting them affect the overall ties. Both the countries
have been guilty of passing-up the opportunities, but this is the time to work
purposefully towards a resolution of the India-China border issue. It is only then that
the Roof of the world that currently rattles the base of Sino-India ties will transform
itself into a strong foundation for the two countries to build their relations on. 55 India
must demonstrate that it is willing and able to arrive at a fair compromise by give
and take. It is for China also to demonstrate that. 56 Irony is that, each country has its
own historical baggage and finding convergence is not an easy task and failure to find
an amicable solution will only lead to LAC (Line of Actual Control) becoming a
Locked in Armed Conflict zone for ever.

China is in occupation of Aksai Chin in northwestern part of Jammu and

Kashmir since her attack on India in 1962. China needed it to build a road network to
Xinjiang. This is a matter of fact and no amount of propaganda put out by the
government in New Delhi will alter this. It is better that the Delhi and Beijing
acknowledge this and sign this reality into their respective official papers. If, India
and China succeed in solving their border dispute in an amicable fashion according to
the reality on the ground, their ought to be no reason for incursions into other
countrys territory thereafter and media to go ballistic about the same, but every
reason for bilateral trade and investment to blossom57. Despite attempts by the Indian
and Chinese governments, settlement to boundary dispute proved elusive owing to
political concerns. Governments in both India and China have baulked at the prospect
of selling a deal to their domestic audiences. Having insistently laid claims to
Arunachal Pradesh, Beijing is concerned about dropping them for good. Indian
Governments, for their part, have paled at the thought of pushing through a
constitutional amendment - one that will require two-third majority in both houses as
well as ratification by 50 per cent of the State legislatures. The problems is not just of

China illegally occupies 38000 square kilometers of land in Jammu and Kashmir. It also holds
5180 square kilometers of Indian territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) under Sino-Pak
Agreement of 1963. Source: The Economic Times, Nagpur, September 19, 2014.

14
numbers. Even governments with commanding majorities such as those led by Nehru,
Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi have hesitated to grasp the nettle - owing mainly to
the opposition from their own party and concerns about adverse political fallout.58

It is the easiest thing for China and India to spew venom against each other.
Given the residual bitterness of the past, this is the default option. There are already
manifestations of this in the public space. But, consider the terrain. 59 Policy makers of
both the countries cannot ignore the fact that the macro and micro frameworks of
political economy of the 21st century have to be kept in mind while dealing with the
legacies of the old and dead colonial past. Both have common stakes and interest in
maintaining peace to achieve economic growth with social equality 60. China is not
expected to enter into any major military misadventure with India but is likely to
continue with un-neighbourly overtures discussed above. However, China would try
to ensure that India is not able to challenge or undermine Chinese territorial
sovereignty, strategic interests or core concerns.61 India must respond decisively to
counter dragons anti-India propaganda and acts on an equal footing. Indias economic
relationships with potential adversaries can be independent of its security
relationships. This is reflected in developments like the economic agreements reached
between India and China, the formation of BRICS Bank and AIIB (Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank). Further, the relationship with the one country will
not constrain that with others - cooperation with China will not affect that with Japan.
Both will be evaluated in terms of Indias objective of building national power. 62
Chinas recent thwarting of Indias membership bid to Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) has frozen Indo-China diplomatic relations for the time being. The NSG drama
has brought to the surface trends which have been incipient so far but whose
implications go beyond the immediate issue of NSG membership and reflect the
ongoing changes in the geopolitical landscape. We should take advantage of the NSG
experience to carefully assess these changes, their impact on India and fashion an
appropriate response strategy. That is more important than the pursuit of NSG

15
membership.63
Hence, to view the Sino-Indian relations in terms, only of border or territorial
dispute, would be an over-simplification, of an inherent issue. Demographically, the
two largest countries in world, are vying for geo-political and economic supremacy.
Each of them wants to emerge as a regional super-power in Asia with a recognisable
say in world affairs in the era of multi-polar world. For China, unresolved boundary
dispute may be a proxy for nailing India, in case it is threatened by India on economic
or geo-strategic fronts. Perhaps, that is why China is keeping the pot of boundary
dispute boiling, with India. Hence, till the time India makes itself capable of taking
on China, boundary dispute may remain a facade of India-China relations, as it suits
the fancies of a whimsical nation.
Annexure 1

16
References

17
1
A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, Indias Foreign Policy and Relations, South Asian Publishers Pvt Ltd., New Delhi,
1985, pp. 2-3.
2
Satyavrata Ramdas Patel, Foreign Policy of India: An Inquiry & Criticism, N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd., Bombay,
1960, p.160.
3
Mohan Ram, Politics of Sino Indian Confrontation, Vikas Publishing House Private Ltd., Kanpur, 1973, pp.30-
31.
4
China Indulging in Muscular Diplomacy, The Economic Times, Delhi, September 11, 2010.
5
B.G. Verghese, Making War Talking Peace, The Tribune. Chandigarh, September 23, 2014.
6
Rao, Nirupama, A Himalayan Balancing Act, The Hindu, July 1, 2016.
7
Inder Malhotra, Chinas Double Dealing-India Must Respond Firmly, The Tribune, Jalandhar, September 3,
2010.
8
Rup Narayan Das Chinas Footprints in POK, The Tribune, Jalandhar, April 12, 2011.
9
Cherian, John, Leapfrog growth Frontline, 31(19). September 19, 2014, p.65.
10
Anita Inder Singh, Chinas Expanding Influence in South Asia, The Tribune, Jalandhar, October 13, 2010.
11
G.G. Dwivedi (Major Gen.), Checkmating the Dragons Growing Influence, The Tribune, Chandigarh, July 6,
2011.
12
R.S. Bedi, India as a Global Power, The Tribune, Chandigarh, February 5, 2010.
13
_______.,Chinas Pressure Tactics: India Needs to be Vigilant, The Tribune, Chandigarh. April 6, 2010.
14
Premvir Das, Avoid Attempts to Contain China: Cooperative Approach in Indias Interest. The Tribune.
March 29, 2010.
15
Mohan Guruswami, Relations with China: Beijing Plays a Duplicitous Role, The Tribune, Chandigarh,
November 26, 2009.
16
Gupta, Jitendra, The Long March, Outlook. XLIX(44), November 9, 2009.
17
M.S. Menon, Chinas Power Play, The Tribune, Jalandhar, January 28, 2011.
18
George, T.J.S., China Needs to see India as an Equal - Economic Ties are no Substitute to Solving Border
Problems Mainstream, LII (40), September 26 -October 2, 2014.
19
Nayar, Kuldip, Border is more Complicated after Xis Visit, Mainstream, LII (41), October 3-9, 2014. p.7.
20
Kumar, Ajit, Deep Designs, The Week, 33(31), August 2, 2015, p.43.
21
Minutes of the First Meeting of the Joint Study Group of Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor
(BCIM EC) held at Kunming, China on December 18-19, 2013.
22
Ibid.
23
Indiresan, P.V. The Kunming Initiative, Frontline, 17(7), April 1-14, 2010.
24
Pratnashree Basu, From Kunming Initiative to BCIM Corridor, August 31, 2013, Observer Research Foundation,
at http://orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/Analysis Detail. html?cmaid=56396&mmacmaid=56397
(Accessed October 11, 2014)
25
Ibid.
26
Sen, Uttam, Synchronising Sino-Indian Relations, Mainstream. LII(40), September 26-October 2, 2014. p. 3.
27
Pritam Singh, China overtakes the US, The Tribune, Chandigarh, November 3, 2014.
28
A Historic Opportunity, The Hindu, Vishakhapatnam, September 17, 2014.
29
Beijing Goes Full Steam, The Hindu, Vishakhapatnam, September 14, 2014.
30
Atul Aneja, China Woos Maldives to Maritime Silk Road, The Hindu, Vishakhapatnam. September 17, 2014.
31
Undersea Changes, The Week, 33(31), August 2, 2015, p.47.
32
Anita Inder Singh, no. 9.
33
Premvir Das, no. 13.
34
D.G. Dwivedi (Major Gen.), no. 10.
35
Zorawar Daulet Singh, The Benefits of a Multi-Polar World The Hindu, Vishakhapatnam. September 13, 2014.
36
Kartar Singh (Brig.), Countering Chinas Strategic Encirclement, The Tribune, Jalanadhar. December 21,
2010.
37
Kumar, Sheel Bhadra. In Dire Need of Proper Management to Ward Off Difference, Mainstream, LII(40),
September 26- October 2, 2014, p. 4.
38
Ibid, P. 32
39
Jathar, Dnyanesh. Hanoi Happy Beijing Bellicose, The Week, 32(39), September. 2014.
40
Krishnan, Ananth, Business Over Boundary, India Today, XXXIX(38), September 16-22, 2014.
41
Zorawar Daulet Singh, no. 32.
42
Cherian, John, Competitive Cooperation, Frontline, 31(20), October 4-17, 2014.
43
Nayar, Kuldip, no. 18, p. 7.
44
Kumar, Sheel Bhadra, no. 34, p. 32
45
Inder Malhotra, US-China Relations: Possible Impact on India, The Tribune, Jalandhar, February 19, 2010.
46
Brahma Chellaney, Let Facts Speak for Themselves, The Economic Times, Delhi, September 17, 2010.
47
G. Parthasarthy, Chinese Assertiveness: Time for Measured, Calculated Responses, The Tribune, Jalandhar,
September 16, 2010.
48
Harbhajan Singh, Strategic Alliance to Check Assertive China, The Tribune, Jalandhar, December 1, 2011.
49
Rup Narayan Das, A walk together in the park, The Economic Times, Nagpur, September 19, 2014.
50
Xi Jinping, Towards an Asian century of prosperity, The Hindu, Vishakhapatnam, September 17, 2014.
51
Border Row: Xi, Modi Find a Way Out, The Hindu, Vishakhapatnam, September 20, 2014.
52
Prasannan, R. Trip, trap, triumph, The Week. 32(41), October 6-12, 2014, pp. 43-49.
53
Singh, Gunjan, Modis Japan Visit and Reaction in Chinese Media, Mainstream, LII(44), October 25, 2014. p.14.
54
Raj Chengappa, How India Should Deal with New Chinese Duality, The Tribune, Chandigarh. September 21,
2014.
55
Suhasini Haidar, A strong foundation for the roof of the world, The Hindu, Vishakhapatnam, September 9, 2014.
56
Noorani, A.G., Surveyor or Statesman? Frontline, 31(22), November 1-14, 2014, P. 66.
57
Abheek Barman, China-India Should Settle British-Created Dispute, The Economic Times, Nagpur, September 18,
2014.
58
Srinath Raghavan, Talking trade and peace with China, The Hindu, Vishakhapatnam. September 20, 2014.
59
Rao, Nirupama, Op. Cit.
60
C.P. Bhambri, India-China Cold Peace, The Economic Times, New Delhi, November 21, 2009
61
Inder Malhotra, Modi-Xi Summit in Perspective, The Tribune, Chandigarh, October 2, 2014.
62
Arvind Virmani, Recalibrating Indias Foreign Policy, The Hindu, Vishakhapatnam, November 1, 2014.
63
Saran, Shyam, NSG Membership: The Writing on the Grate Wall, The Hindu, June 27, 2016.