CITY OF MANILA VS.
LAGUIO government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON.
JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding
Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as
Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition
for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City
of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City
Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is
entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following
errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows
operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in
declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that
for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an
enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is
found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated
power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. The police power granted to LGUs must
always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process
and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only
must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social
and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives
of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means
employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the communitys social
ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and
transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance
have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the
prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the
social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social
ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in
Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the
moral welfare of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral
sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a
house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social
ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may
exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may
even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably
accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of
its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional
guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty and property.
Modality employed is unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used
for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of
the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private
property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking
occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A regulatory
taking occurs when the governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable
use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government
regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a
manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of
the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a
taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments three
(3) months from its approval within which to wind up business operations or to transfer
to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds
of business allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business operations
amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is
practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an
allowed business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty
and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area
or to convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of
permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance
is also equivalent to a taking of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning
ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a wholesome property
to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property
without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for
noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle
finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of local
government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be
stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close
down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its
execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the
unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is
to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule
by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not
specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to disturb the community,
annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible
standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without
infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are
commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the
public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is
invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a
just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of
motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment
does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.
The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory
as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession
exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in
prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers
local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in
Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to
legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code
still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the
establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare
clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet
applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not
be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the
community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven
in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its
summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the
provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted
the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the
establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse
or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light
industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to
be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council
to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and
impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes
statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently
detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to
be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is
therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.
PEOPLE v. CAYAT
FACTS: Cayat is a native of a nonchristian tribe in Baguio. He was found guilty of act 1639
which prohibits natives of non Christian tribes from acquiring wines and liquors other
than those native wines which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to.
Cayat said it violates equal protection, due process, improper exercise of police power.
HELD: Equal protection not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification.
Classification to be reasonable (1) must rest on substantial distinctions (2) germane to the
purpose of the law (3) not limited to existing conditions only (4) apply equally to all
members of the same class. In (1), not based on accident of birth or parentage but upon
the degree of civilization and culture. Non Christian refers not to religious belief but to
geographical area. In (2), unquestionable because it is designed to insure peace and order
in and among Non Christian tribes. In (3), it applies for all times as long as those
conditions exist. In (4), its not an argument here. The government raise their culture and
civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress with the ultimate view of
placing them with Christians on the basis of true equality.
 People v. Doria
People v. Florencio Doria [ Jun ] and Violeta Gaddao [ Neneth ]
22 Jan 1999 / Puno / Appeal from a Pasig RTC decision
Search and seizure > Nature, scope and definition > Types > Warrantless search and
seizure > Plain view doctrine
FACTS
Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one Jun [Doria]
was engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest him in a buy-
bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did not find the marked bills on
him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the house of his
associate Neneth [Gaddao], so he led the police team to her house.
The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. Jun identified her
as Neneth, and she was asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked money as PO3
Manlangit looked over her house [he was still outside the house]. Standing by the door,
PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. One of the box s flaps was
open, and inside it was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the
marijuana earlier sold to him by Jun. His suspicion aroused, so he entered the house
and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to
be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from Neneth and
they arrested her. The bricks were examined and they were found to be dried marijuana
leaves.
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA
6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21 [Attempt
and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its
warrantless seizure valid. NO
RATIO
Re: warrantless arrest
Gaddao s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the basis of
the alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his associate in the
drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification
does not necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is
no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts
implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is
legally objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her person and
home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed
legal as an incident to her arrest.
Plain view issue
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in
evidence.
Requisites
a. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for
an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area
b. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
c. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure
An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises
when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant. If the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.
It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the
box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. On cross-
examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be
marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." Each of
the ten bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and
placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted
on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana.
He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao
about its contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of
the box was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain view and its seizure without the
requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of
the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial
court.
The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddao s house
Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of
proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller and the
presentation of the drug as evidence in court.
Prosecution established the fact that in consideration of the P1,600.00 he
received, Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the
poseur-buyer
Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria
in the sale of said drug
DORIA SENTENCED TO SUFFER RECLUSION PERPETUA + 500K FINE
GADDAO ACQUITTED
MALACAT vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand grenade after he was searched
by a group of policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously when he was hanging
around Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with other Muslim-looking men.
When the policemen approached the group of men, they scattered in all directions which
prompted the police to give chase and petitioner was then apprehended and a search was
made on his person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the present petition
wherein petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that the search made
on him and the seizure of the hand grenade from him was an appropriate incident to his
arrest and that it erred in admitting the hand grenade as evidence since it was admissible
because it was a product of an unreasonable and illegal search.
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.
Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued
warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are
found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs
searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent
searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;34 and (6) a "stop and frisk.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and
of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in
terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their
allowable scope.
"stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1)
the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against the police officer.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity
of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of
these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153 (1999)
search can be made the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within
which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any FACTS:
money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to the
the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee police station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in
with the means of escaping or committing violence. the City. At the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and
accused policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left
"limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus: eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The
exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot
trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his
and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
taken without the knowledge of the two.
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . .

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200,
which prohibits wire tapping.
2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the
part of the offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be
appreciated in favor of the accused.
HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits
wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made.
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications (Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not
prohibited.
2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused,
constituted sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper
conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The
provocation must be sufficient and must immediately precede the act; and in order to be
sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must be
accordingly proportionate in gravity. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The exclamations made by Navarro
after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed that he had no intent to kill
the latter.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth
of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine and inspect the packages. She
refused and assures her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves.
Before the delivery of appellants box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the gloves contain dried
leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained inside the
cellophane wrappers.
The accused appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in admitting
in evidence the illegality of search and seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?
HELD: Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RATIONALE:
Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution
Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule
Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a
defective search warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in
Mercado vs Peoples Court.
The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity and without the intervention and participation of state authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the government
without the latter transgressing appellants rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason whty the same should not be admitted.
FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS Readily foreclose the proportion that NBI agents
conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that the
NBI agents made no search and seizure much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate
of accused / appellant.
CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof
BILL OF RIGHTS
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy,
protection against whom, protection against the STATE
Manotoc vs. CA (May 30, 1986)
FACTS:
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He was in US
for a certain time, went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a
management committee for both businesses. Such was granted. However, pending
disposition of a case filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of Immigration
not to clear him for departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effect was issued.
There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was
suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the
petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged with estafa and
was allowed by the Court to post bail.
Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating
his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such was
opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition for
certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request
denying his leave to travel abroad.
According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the
courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could
prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
ISSUE: WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated.
HELD: NO.
The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country because
this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition
imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his constitutional right to travel. In
case he will be allowed to leave the country without sufficient reason, he may be placed
beyond the reach of courts.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel,
duration thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not able
to show the necessity of his travel abroad. He never indicated that no other person in his
behalf could undertake such business transaction.
Article 3 Sec6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. According to SC, the order of trial court in
releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the provision
on right to travel.
 Yap vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating
amounts equivalent to P5,5 Million. After the records of the case were transmitted to the
Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the motion
and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5 Milion on condition that he will secure
a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident
of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant. He
sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He
contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his
right to bail. He also contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a
certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.
Issues:
1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against
excessive bail.
2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to
travel.
higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount
equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is
to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability
that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a
punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the
judgment of the appellate court.
2. Liberty of abode and right to travel
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner,
are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful
order as contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of
Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to
ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires
his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner
is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case
he does so. (Yap vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001)

Held:

1. Right to Bail

The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an

effective denial of petitioners right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The amount
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no
 People v Obrero
G.R. No.-122142 May 17, 2000
Appellant was convicted of robberry with homicide.He executed a written confession as a
result of a custodial ivestigation.The issue is whether such is valid.
Held:
The extrajudicial confession was invalid. The perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights is
inadequate to transmit information to the suspect. Also, Art IIISec12(1) requires an
independent and competent counsel of the suspects choice. Atty de los Reyes was not
an independent counsel being the PC Captain and Station Commander. As held in P v
Bandula, the independent counsel cannot be a special prosecutor, private or public
prosecutor, municipal attorney or counsel of the police whose interest is adverse to the
accused.
While there is evidence to the homicide consisting of the corpus delicti, there is no
evidence of the robbery except the confession. The lack of objection of appellant to the
introduction of the constitutionally proscribed evidence did not satisfy the burden of
proof which rested on the prosecution. Acquitted of robbery with homicide.
Francisco Yap, Jr., a.k.a Edwin Yap, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals
and the People of the Philippines
JULY 7, 2015JULY 7, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner, Francisco Yap, Jr. was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City and was sentenced to four years and two months of Prision correctional, as
minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for
each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty
(20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under
the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial
court in an order dated February 17, 1999. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to
post bail in the amount of P5,500,000 on condition that he will secure a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of
the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant. He
sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He
contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his
right to bail. He also contests the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a
certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.
Issue:
1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioners right
against excessive bail.
2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and
right to travel.
Ruling:
1. The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order as contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by
the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail
bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times
whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the
questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing
abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.
2. Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents
him from leaving the Philippines unless expressly permitted by the court which
issued the order. In fact, the petition submits that the hold-departure order
against petitioner is already sufficient guarantee that he will not escape.Thus, to
require him to inform the court every time he changed his residence is already
unnecessary.
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner,
are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.
 Mejia vs. Pamaran (G.R. No. L-56741-42)
Facts:
6 ejectment cases were filed separately in the City Court of Manila by Eusebio Lu against
Feliciano F. Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico Bontia, Rolando Antillon, Jose
Mabalot and Vicente Villamor. All cases were decided by the City Court of Manila against
Endangan, et. al., all of whom appealed in due time to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Manila, where the cases were raffled to Branch XXVI, presided over by the Honorable Jose
P. Alejandro.
On 12 August 1979, Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot, and Villamor entered into a
compromise agreement with Lu whereby the Endangan, et. al. individually received from
Lu the sum of P5,000 in consideration of which Endangan, et. al. agreed to vacate the
premises in question and remove their houses therefrom within 60 days from the date of
the execution of the agreement, failing which the appellee shall have the authority to
demolish Endangan, et. al.'s houses with costs thereof chargeable against them. The
compromise agreement was submitted to the court. Josefina Meimban did not join her
co-defendants in entering into the compromise agreement. Up to that stage of the cases.
In July 1979, Meimban went to Court where she met Atty. Mejia who told her that the
case has not yet been decided because there was still one party who has not signed the
compromise agreement prepared by Atty. Doron. Atty. Mejia also remarked that she was
surprised why rich people were helping in that case, like a certain Atty. Lu, a brother of
Eusebio Lu, who has been approaching the presiding judge; and then told her she would
help them provided they give P1,000 each for a gift to the Judge
They were able to give partial amount of the money being asked. Atty. Mejia also
attempted to bribe the Tanodbayan Investigator (Christina Corall-Paterno), through
intricate gold chain with a pendant hearing an inscription of letter "C," which the
investigator returned through an employee. Corall-Paterno investigated the complaints of
Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista against Atty. Aurora Mejia for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On 23 April 1981, the Sandiganbayan, Mejia was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and
sentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as
minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office
and to indemnify the victim Josefina Meimban the sum of P1,000.00 representing the
money given to her. The Sandiganbayan also found Mejia, in Criminal Case 1989, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and likewise
sentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as
minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office
and to indemnify the victim Pilar Bautista the amount of P500 representing the money
given to her. Mejia was also ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. Mejia filed a
petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Mejia contended that the proceedings taken by respondent Sandiganbayan in the case at
bar is void ab initio. She argued that only one stage of appeal is available to the petitioner
under PD No. 1606 which effectively deprives her of the intermediate recourse to the
Court of Appeals and that in said appeal to this Court, only issues of law may be raised
and worse still the appeal has become a matter of discretion rather than a matter of right.
Petitioner contends this is a denial of the equal protection of the law.
Issue:
WON the accused is denied of due process and the equal protection of the law.
Held:
There is no denial of equal protection of the law. The classification satisfies the test
announced by this Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera requiring that it must be
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences it must be germane to the
purposes of the law it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class. To repeat, the Constitution specifically makes the
urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows
that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far
back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different
procedure for the accused therein, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
There is no violation of due process. What is required for compliance with the due process
mandate in criminal proceedings? This Court with Justice Tuason as ponente, succinctly
Identified it with a "a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the
preparation of defense. In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the
accused is "informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he hall to meet,
with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full
opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being implied in accordance with a valid
law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that rendered the decision is one of
competent jurisdiction. Thus: This court has had frequent occasion to consider the
requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally
speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished
after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a
judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due
process of law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. AQUINO MINGOA
Facts:
Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of
Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P 3, 938 upon
demand by the provincial auditor, the defendant Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of
malversation of public funds in the CFI of Romblon. Respondent Mingoa insisted that she
left the money on her table and was alleged lost thereon. She created alibis regarding the
missing fund.
Issue:
W/N there was violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumedinnocent?
Held: NO! The fact is that the trial court did not believe defendants explanation that the
money was lost, considering it mere cloak to cover actual misappropriation. That is why
the court said that whether or not the defendant is guilty of malversation for negligence
is of no moment the presumption of misappropriation is found on Art. 217 of the RPC
which provides that failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by and duly authorized officer, shall
prima facie evidence that he has put the missing funds or property to personal use. The
legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proven they shall be prima facie
evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof
provided there be rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts
presumed so that the interference of the one from the others is not unreasonable and
arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience
PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO [85 PHIL 752; G.R.L-2809; 22 MAR
1950]
Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with
slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he
did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in
the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia
Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he
was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter.
Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.
Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appearswithout attorney, he
must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and
must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to
defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was the intended act is felonious.2. the resulting act is likewise a felony3. the unintended
violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to graven wrong was primarily caused by the actor's wrongful acts.
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused
"shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be
no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.

The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The
record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and
whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea
guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the
accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a
good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court
became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and
found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was
wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to
overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it
that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by
him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.
HON. GREGORIO. N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila
vs.
HON. FELIXDOMINGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila
FERNANDO,
Facts:
In Branch I the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were
commenced, by appropriate informations eight (8) criminal actions against respondent
Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana.

The accused wanted for the speedy trial so they requested to held the trial even on
People vs Ortega (276 SCRA 166) Saturday on the chamber of Judge Gamboa. The petitioner granted the request.(as police
officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as
soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal
Facts:
trial days (Monday, Wednesday and Friday).On appeal the prosecution said that there
In 1992, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia and a certain John Doe were charged with
was no trial, therefore the petioner judge order should be reversed.
murder for thekilling Andre Man Masangkay. As narrated by a witness, the victim
answered the call of nature and wentto the back portion of the house where they were
Issue:
having a drinking spree. Accused Ortega followed him and later they heard the victim
Whether or not the judge denied the accused of public trial.
shouting for help and when they ran towards the scene he saw the accused on top of the
victim and stabbing the latter with along bladed weapon. Thereafter, Ortega and Garcia
Held:
brought the victim to a well and dropped him and placed stones into the well. The trial
Yes. Public trial possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner
court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The accused appealed averring
a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on
that the trial court erred in holding them criminally liable because at the time the victim
such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to
was dropped into the well, he was still alive.
the parties need be shown. There is the well-recognized exception though that warrants
the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to
Issue:
decency or public morals."
Whether or not the accused may be held criminally liable for the death of the victim
which is not attributable to the stab wounds but due to drowning?
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted
Decision:
A person who commits a felony is criminally liable for the direct natural and logical
consequences of his wrongful act even where the resulting crime is more serious than
that intended. The essential requisites for this criminal liability to attach are as follows:1.