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ALLIED COMMAND
TRANSFORMATION
NORFOLK, VA
OPC 08-2/08 07/07/2008

COMASC
INTSUM
072300Z JUL 08

OPERATIONAL PLANNING COURSE 08-2

(OPC 08-2)

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CAVEATS

This document is an updated version of the ‘deliverable’ produced by the

International Solutions Group, Limited in fulfilment of SHAPE Consultancy Support
Services Contract, Blanket Purchase Agreement 4001959-1, dated 14 Nov 02. It is one of a
series designed to set the training environment for Allied operational planning staff officers
participating in the Operations Planning Courses which are held at NATO School
Oberammergau (NSO). The geographical location for this training event is in the Constellatia
synthetic theatre of operations.

The Alliance referred to throughout these documents is a generic international

military alliance in a ‘parallel world’. This Alliance is comprised of several generic European
and North American nations. It has a political body called the Council and a strategic level
military headquarters referred to as the Alliance Strategic Command (ASC). The ASC
Commander is referred to as COMASC (for Commander ASC). The Alliance forces are
organised, trained and equipped similar to NATO forces. All Alliance and other nations, their
political/military organisations and/or their forces portrayed in this document were developed
from open sources in support of specific preconditions required to achieve the established
training objectives.

Although some information in this document may resemble actual NATO policies,
processes, arrangements or procedures it should not be considered as such and does not imply
how NATO would respond to current or possible future events. The information in this
document is not to be construed as an official position of any NATO headquarters/agency or
any member nation of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Requests for the use of OPC training materials and/or any comments or suggestions
for improvement of this document should be forwarded to Exercise Branch, Operations
Research Division (ORD), NATO C3 Agency (NC3A) 2501CD The Hague, Netherlands.

This document is NATO UNCLASSIFIED.

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041820Z JUL 08
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DTG: 072300Z JUL 08
ORGID / COMASC / CMD //
AIG: 6006
AIG: 6007
SIC: UAJ
PRIORITY
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HIGHLIGHTS

The situation in the Zoran Sea region remains grave. Since December 2007, when the
Vulpeculan backed Batari Liberation Army (BLA) commenced its latest guerrilla offensive to
regain its traditional homelands that now form part of Auriga and Perseus, the United
Nations (UN) and the international community have failed to stop the fighting. International
and UN efforts to provide humanitarian assistance continue to be attacked by the BLA.
Recent atrocities by the BLA have been widely reported and there is an international outcry
for the UN to act. The UN has responded to the recent escalation in violence with two
Security Council resolutions (UNSCRS) 1652 and 1655 which authorise military intervention
by the alliance under chapter VII of the charter of the UN.

GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

The Zoran Sea crisis in central Constellatia centres on the eastern Djeras mountain regions
of Auriga and Perseus and their borders with Vulpecula. However, the wider region includes
Aquila, Vulpecula, Sagitta, Cetus and Corvus, and all could become embroiled in a military
conflict unless the crisis is resolved. The Zoran Sea, with its huge oil and gas deposits and
the associated energy pipelines from there to the Kama Sea, bring these two maritime areas
into the crisis region. The terrain in Auriga and Perseus is rugged favouring guerrilla warfare,
and movement of conventional military forces is difficult. There are only a few airfields and
seaports in Auriga and Perseus.

GENERAL SITUATION

Vulpecula and Aquila are vying for regional hegemony and control of the movement of oil
and gas resources from the Zoran Sea. Vulpecula is supporting and exploiting the extremist
BLA that is fighting a guerrilla campaign to establish an ethnically pure, anti-western and
independent Batari state based on their traditional homelands in the eastern regions of
Auriga and Perseus. Attacks on oil and gas terminals and pipelines have impacted the world
energy markets seriously affecting g-8 nations’ economies. The BLA commenced its latest
offensive in December 2007. This has so far resulted in the loss of at least a further 2,500
civilian lives and caused over 170,000 refugees. Attacks have been conducted against
international organisations (IO) aid workers, non-government organisations (NGO) relief
convoys and refugee centres. In May 2008, approximately 1,700 civilians, which had been
massacred in the Kasari village of Rutana (1115N2446E), were found in mass graves; in mid
June, it was confirmed that they had died from mustard gas chemical weapons (CW). In late
June, 52 civilians were found that had been brutally massacred in the Kasari village of
Yonjugol (1001N2421E), and on 25 June, the UNHCR reported a further massacre of 77
civilians southwest of Yirga Alam (0943N2454E). In early June, the BLA pushed south
towards the Aurigan capital, Capella (0710N2422E), taking Serenje (0850N2522E) and Rilati
(0814N2426E), and threatening the UN refugee centre near Duru (0742N2446E). On 10
June, the BLA attacked and closed Capella international airport (CIA), and on 23 June, they
attacked and overran the international commercial zone at Sindara (0719N2404E) taking

Analyst: M. W. Bolton 1
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170 foreign hostages. The downing of an air Europa charter Boeing 737 on 1 July with the
loss of 127 lives, reportedly by a BLA launched surface-to-air missile (SAM), further
outraged the international community. The government of Auriga (GOA), supported by
Perseus, has failed to control BLA activity and stop their attacks on non-Batari civilians,
IO/NGO aid workers and relief convoys and refugee centres. There is now a massive
refugee problem that threatens to overwhelm the GOA. The Aurigan military is losing the
battle against the BLA. On 26 June, the president of Auriga pleaded with the UN secretary
general to provide assistance in restoring peace and security, and on 3 July, he asked the
alliance for assistance within the alliance’s partner-for-peace (PFP) programme. On 4 July,
UNSCR 1655 condemned the shooting down of the civilian Boeing 737 at Capella, and
authorised a multi-national force under unified command to: protect refugees and civilians
and those providing humanitarian assistance; safeguard natural energy recourses and the
environment; and to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations. This followed UNSCRS
1627 and 1652 that noted the problems being encountered in the region by UN aid workers,
the attacks on civilians and the closure of CIA, and warned the BLA to cease armed activity
and withdraw. On 5 July, the alliance council (ac) directed COMASC to commence planning
for the deployment of alliance forces into the region to implement UNSCR 1655.

MILITARY SITUATION

The BLA is a collection of twenty armed Batari groups that share a common separatist
cause. Allied with the BLA is an extremist group of around 300 terrorists known as “Simbas”
with cells operating covertly in most major cities in central and eastern Auriga; they are
controlled directly by the BLA central council of tribes and act as ‘special forces’. Vulpecula
is providing the BLA with sophisticated conventional weapons including SA-14 man portable
air defence missiles (Manpads), CW agents, intelligence and sanctuary. Vulpecula has also
supported the BLA with military advisors and Special Forces. The BLA now controls some
30 per cent of eastern Auriga and areas of southeast Perseus. BLA forces have infiltrated
Capella, attacked and closed CIA. Upward of 6,700 foreign civilians, including many from
alliance member nations, are now potentially at risk in areas threatened by fighting, plus a
further 3,150 already in areas controlled by the BLA. The BLA and probably Vulpecula have
attacked oil and gas pipelines leading from the Zoran Sea causing a crisis in international
energy markets. Aurigan government forces are losing the battle to contain the BLA guerrilla
activity.

Accusing Perseus of escalating the violence, Vulpecula has reinforced its southern and
western military districts bordering Auriga and Perseus as well as its forces in the Kama Sea
and has threatened to intervene militarily. Vulpecula has developed an asymmetric warfare
doctrine to counter a superior military force.

LAND SITUATION

The BLA have secured and now control parts of the eastern Djeras Mountains between the
Kandar Valley (0928N2406E) and the border with Vulpecula, including areas in the southern
foothills. This area extends into both Auriga and Perseus. Perseus has been successful in
containing BLA actions, and its ground forces have supported Aurigan forces in their
common border region. Perseus has deployed ground forces to the Kandar Valley in
northern Auriga to assist Aurigan military operations and to secure lines of communication
between the two countries.

Vulpecula has deployed ground forces elements from its southern and western military
districts to areas bordering Auriga and Perseus. Vulpecula’s substantial conventional ground
forces are augmented by a variety of short- and medium-range SSMs, some of which may
have chemical warheads available. VP ground forces unit/location/strength are as follows:

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• 11 VP INF DIV
o 1532N02539E
o 100 PER CENT
o Forward Deployed Within Western Military District From Maramma Garrison
(1447N02620E)
• 2 VP ARMD DIV
o 1238N02654E (DUBIAXO)
o 100 PER CENT
o Forward Deployed From Southern Military District, Bastiani Garrison
(0742N03238E)
• 9 VP INF DIV
o 0628N02540E (BANSKO)
o 100 PER CENT
o Forward Deployed Within Southern Military District From Sundah
(0617N02656E)
• 6 VP MECH INF DIV
o 0419N02732E (ALALI)
o Forward Deployed Within Southern Military District From Kepo
(0136N02544E)
• 201 VP MSL BDE
o 1520N02531E
o 100 PER CENT SS-21,
o Forward Deployed Within Western Military District From Weta Camp
(1737N02708E)
• 2 VRG MSL BDE
o 1259N02607E
o 100 PER CENT /SS-1C,
o Forward Deployed Within Western Military District From Glome
(1551N02709E)

MARITIME SITUATION

Vulpecula has a well-equipped and trained naval force with bases in the Kama and Zoran
Seas. The naval forces in the Kama Sea have been augmented by the deployment of naval
coastal SSMs and some additional units from its Indian Ocean fleet. Forces deployed in the
Kama Sea now include anti-ship missile and torpedo capabilities that are deployed in a
variety of ships and submarines. Its submarine forces deployed in the Kama Sea are armed
with both wire-guided torpedoes and 50 nm anti-ship sea-skimming missiles. Vulpecula has
invested heavily in mine warfare capabilities. Sea denial mining weapons include several
hundred UDM bottom influence mines fitted with remote arming mechanisms, around 1,000
SMDM mobile mines and several hundred EM 55 mines. VP maritime forces
unit/location/strength are as follows:

• 2X SSK (RVSM ROSANT AND OLAFUR)

o 1715N02535E (TARTARY)
o 100 PER CENT/SS KILO
o Deployed From Red Sea.
• VP COASTAL PATROL SQN 7
o 1606N02524E (LERNA)
o 100 PER CENT /10X VP PBC
o Deployed From Red Sea-Indian Ocean Fleet, Cabbalussa (1836N03753E)
• 203 VP MSL BDE
o 1536N02448E
o 90 PER CENT /36X CSS-N-8 LAUNCHERS

Analyst: M. W. Bolton 3
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The BLA has no regular type naval forces, although it has a capability to deploy ground
forces for a sea borne assault by small boats as demonstrated by its successful attack
against the port of Lisala last June.

AIR SITUATION

The BLA does not have an air force, but Vulpecula flies covert special missions in support of
the BLA. Coalition and civilian aircraft operating over Auriga are at risk from Manpads.
Vulpecula is known to have stocks of SA-7 and SA-14, and reporting indicates that stocks of
SA-14s have been given to the BLA. The civilian airliner was shot down on take-off from CIA
by a SAM, and the BLA have shot down a number of Aurigan helicopters using SA-14
Manpads.

Vulpecula has moved air and air defence units to its north-western region providing it with
the capability to directly intervene in the crisis. Vulpecula has forward deployed at least four
fighter squadrons, ground based air defences (GBAD), and MR SSM to forward operating
bases (FOB) close to its borders with Auriga and Perseus.

Fighter Sqn deployments identified:

• 63 FB Sqn (SU-24 Fencer D from Kayoss AB) has joined the 32 F/A Sqn (F-4E from
Uxal AB) at Minda AB;
• 38 FTR Sqn (Mig-27) from Kayoss AB to Glome AB;
• 64 FTR Sqn (SU-24 Fencer D w/Sardine anti-ship missile) from Kayoss AB to Lerna
AB;
• and 13 F/A Sqn (F6) from Felinia AB to Jaru AB.

Airbase GBAD units are from NE and SE air armies. The Vulpeculan air force is capable of a
full range of air defence, ground attack and interdiction missions and is well supported by
reconnaissance as well as some air-refuelling and electronic warfare (EW) assets. There are
around 300 combat aircraft in front line service. All ground attack/interdiction aircrew are
capable of conducting close support of ground forces, and some units are capable of
conducting tactical air support of maritime operations (TASMO). Aircraft serviceability is
assessed to be around 55-60 per cent. Air defence aircraft and their weapons systems’
capabilities include several roughly equivalent to those of the alliance. However, low aircrew
proficiency and poor aircraft serviceability affect the air force defence forces from realising
their full potential. Vulpeculan aircrews have little combat experience, but all are assessed
as being aggressive and willing to take extraordinary risks in combat to accomplish their
assigned missions. They are equipped with range of modern air-to-air missiles acquired from
the west and Russia, and operate a variety of surface-to-air missile (SAM) defence systems.
They also possess the CPMIEC c801c Sardine anti-ship cruise missile. Ground-based air
defence radars and other air defence ground-based elements have antiquated sensor and
command and control equipment with a poor-to-moderate in-service rate. Vulpecula has a
number of SDPR vbl-2000 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) with a range up to 1,000km;
some of these may have been modified to carry munitions. Vulpecula is also developing
biological weapons (BW) as well as fuel-air-explosives (FAE), also referred to as volumetric
weapons (VW).

SPACE SITUATION

Vulpecula has acquired NO DONG MRBMS, and these could be modified to provide a
limited space launch capability. VULPECULA also is known to have contracted commercially
available satellite imagery.

Analyst: M. W. Bolton 4
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COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (CI) AND SECURITY SERVICES

Auriga’s counter-intelligence (CI) and security services are assessed to be only marginally
effective at local levels and national coordination is minimal. Perseus CI and security
services remain generally effective. The security situation in Auriga remains tense and
unstable, and alliance forces deployed to Auriga will be at risk from BLA guerrilla and
terrorist activity including suicide bombings.

OTHER INTELLIGENCE

Vulpecula has a biological weapons (BW) development programme and may have produced
some unspecified biological weapons. Vulpecula is also seeking nuclear weapons capability
although we assess that development of its first crude nuclear explosive device will be
several years away.

ASSESSMENT

Opposing forces to the alliance led international coalition are likely to be restricted primarily
to those of the BLA and Vulpecula. In addition, the Tamasura Shama terrorist organisation
(MO) operates internationally from secure bases in Delphinia and Cetus, and is assessed to
be directly involved in terrorist activity against international interests in the Zoran Sea region,
particularly against oil and gas resources. Other regional military forces are unlikely to
become a major military factor to future coalition operations, although possible military
actions by Aquila in response to any attacks by Vulpecula would complicate the alliance
operations.

Neither the BLA nor Vulpecula has the military capability to win a force-on-force conflict with
an alliance led coalition once it has been fully deployed. However, during initial entry
operations and the build-up phase, alliance forces may be at risk from Vulpeculan attempts
to interrupt the deployment of the international force. If Vulpecula sees the possibility of
achieving a successful military attack against alliance forces during deployment, it may be
tempted to risk a fight. Both the BLA and Vulpecula will develop and use asymmetric
methods to counter the coalition’s superior conventional forces. These means will likely
include the use of Manpads, CW, Special Forces operations and terrorism. The use of
TBMS by Vulpecula against coalition forces at airfields and ports, or against large civilian
targets in Auriga, cannot be ruled out. Both Vulpecula and the BLA will activate aggressive
information operations (info ops) campaign against the alliance using TV, radio, newspapers
and the www to discourage coalition action and reduce host nation support for the coalition
forces. Computer network attacks (CNA) directed against the coalition forces and their
respective governments are likely.

The GOA is rapidly losing public confidence and is close to collapse. If the GOA falls to BLA
hands, the government of Perseus will likely become the BLA’s next target supported by
Vulpecula. Both Auriga and Perseus are members of the alliance’s PfP programme. Any
encroachment into Auriga or Perseus by Vulpeculan military forces is likely to trigger a
military response from Aquila increasing the likelihood of a major regional conflict unless the
alliance led coalition is seen to respond decisively.

The BLA will likely escalate their attacks on Zoran Sea oil and gas infrastructure in an
attempt to leverage international pressure on the governments of Auriga and Perseus to
accede to BLA demands, and thus provide de facto recognition of a Batari state. The BLA
will probably continue to attack UN operations and refugee camps in order to discourage
DPRES from returning to their former homes. The BLA council of warlord’s ability to
command and control an extended guerrilla campaign is critical for their success. Decisive to
this is the support provided by Vulpecula. Without such support, Aurigan government forces

Analyst: M. W. Bolton 5
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are assessed to be probably capable of containing the BLA’s guerrilla activities without
international assistance, although it does not have the current ability to cope with the scale
of the humanitarian disaster. Support for the BLA by Vulpecula is therefore decisive.
Vulpecula provides bases and sanctuary to the BLA, advanced weapons, secure lines of
communication and freedom of movement in the eastern Djeras Mountains. Without this
support, the Batari council of tribes that can co-ordinate BLA activity by the various disparate
warlord led groupings would be unable to operate and continue to prosecute its operations.
The BLA would almost certainly fragment into small independent groups capable of
conducting only small scale uncoordinated terrorist style attacks against superior forces. The
BLA has one strength in their favour – their fanaticism and willingness to become martyrs to
their cause. Many of the BLA will fight to the end to retain control over their homelands in the
Djeras Mountains. In the event that the BLA are on the point of collapse, elements within
their organisation, particularly the Simba terrorists, may hold alliance members’ civilians as
hostages and at risk.

Vulpecula will continue to support the BLA and other terrorist groups as a means of attacking
western interests in the region, globalisation and international capitalism. Vulpecula will
continue its efforts to control the Zoran Sea oil and gas resources and transportation
pipelines in order to ensure its regional economic domination. Vulpecula will therefore resist
any international military intervention in the region. To support these aims, Vulpecula has
moved land, sea, air and ballistic missile units to its north-western region. These forces
provide a credible capability and could threaten an alliance build-up in Sagitta and the Kama
Sea. Vulpecula’s central state authority directs controls and carries out organised armed
violence in the Zoran Sea region by sponsoring the BLA and other terrorist groups. Critical to
its strategic aims therefore is the support it can provide to these surrogate organisations and
their willingness and ability to continue fighting. Vulpecula is assessed to be unlikely to cross
the border with land forces in the face of a fully deployed alliance led coalition but could
launch such operations to deter or pre-empt the entry and build-up of alliance forces.
Nevertheless, if Vulpecula is directly attacked by the alliance, it is likely to respond, initially
by launching a TBM attack against airport, naval port or troop concentration areas. It will
however not risk a major force-on-force confrontation unless a decisive outcome could be
gained. Should coalition forces cross its border Vulpecula will use all available means to
protect its sovereignty. Vulpecula’s naval forces based in the Kama Sea, especially its
submarine forces, will directly impact on coalition naval activities and force build-up. Its
advanced mining capabilities will potentially threaten alliance maritime forces in the area,
particularly in littoral waters. Vulpecula will continue to undertake military activity in direct
support of the BLA where it can claim either deniability or just cause in the face of threat.
Vulpecula will use all covert and asymmetric means at its disposal to counter the coalition’s
ability to operate, but limiting them to those that may be unattributable and unlikely to
provoke a direct military response by the coalition. Vulpecula’s production of short and
medium range TBMS and its development of advanced CW, including the persistent nerve
agent VX, increasingly poses a potential threat to neighbouring states and members of the
alliance. Vulpecula’s increasing political, economic and military power, combined with its
continued support for armed insurgencies and international terrorism, makes Vulpecula the
major, long term threat to the regional stability.

BT

Analyst: M. W. Bolton 6
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