ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCIONSADAYA vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CEBU
ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCIONSADAYA vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CEBU
40 scra 464
FACTS: Petitioners sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot alleging that
in 1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and
material possession of it and used it for the widening of a national road, without paying just
compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of
repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants
Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are immune from suit.
HOLDING: NO. Where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of
possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial
liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government
itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the court except with
the consent of said Government. In as much as the State authorizes only legal acts by its
officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an
action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by
such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit.
NOTE: When the government takes any property for public use, which is condition upon the
payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to
the jurisdiction of a court. The Court may proceed with the complaint and determine the
compensation to which the petitioner are entitle
(Ministerio vs.CFI, 40 SCRA 464)
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 155832 : December 7, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division) and
IMELDA R. MARCOS,Respondents.
FACTS:
On February 28, 1986, immediately after assuming power, President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Executive Order 1, creating the PCGG.She empowered the PCGG to recover all ill-
gotten wealth allegedly amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, and
close associates during his 20-year regime.
PCGG Commissioner Raul Daza gave lawyers Jose Tan Ramirez and Ben Abella PCGG
Region VIII Task Force Head and Co-Deputy, respectively, written authority to sequester any
property, documents, money, and other assets in Leyte, belonging to former First Lady Imelda
R. Marcos,Benjamin Romualdez, Alfredo Romualdez, and their agents. On March 18,
1986, Attys. Ramirez and Abella issued a sequestration order against
the Marcoses Olot, Tolosa, Leyte property (lot Resthouse).
On August 10, 2001, Mrs. Marcos filed a motion to quash the sequestration order against
the Olot Resthouse,claiming that such order, issued only by Attys. Ramirez and Abella, was
void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The rules required the
signatures of at least two PCGG Commissioners. Mrs. Marcos filed a Supplement to her earlier
motion, claiming no prima facie evidence that the Olot Resthouse constituted ill-gotten
wealth.She pointed out that the property is the ancestral home of her family. The Republic
countered that Mrs. Marcos was already stopped from questioning the order.
On February 28, 2002 the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution, granting the motion
to quash and ordering the full restoration of the Olot Resthouse to Mrs.
Marcos.The Sandiganbayan ruled that the sequestration order was void because it was
signed, not by PCGG Commissioners, but by mere PCGG agents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the March 18, 1986 sequestration order against the Olot Resthouse,
issued by PCGG agents before the enactment of the PCGG rules, was validly issued.
HELD:
POLITICAL LAW
Under Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution, an order of sequestration may only issue
upon a showing "of a prima facie case" that the properties are ill-gotten wealth under Executive
Orders 1 and 2. When a court nullifies an order of sequestration for having been issued without
a prima facie case, the Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG but simply
applies the law.
The Republics supposed evidence does not show how the Marcoses acquired the sequestered
property, what makes it "ill-gotten wealth," and how former President Marcos intervened in its
acquisition. Taking the foregoing view, the resolution of the issue surrounding the character of
the property sequestered whether or not it could prima facie be considered ill-gotten should be
necessary.
Although the two PCGG lawyers issued the sequestration order in this case on March 18,
1986, before the passage of Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules, such consideration is immaterial
following the above ruling.
Finally, Mrs Marcos is not estopped from questioning the order because a void order produces
no effect and cannot be validated under the doctrine of estoppel.
DISMISSED
Santiago v Republic, 87 SCRA 294
Facts: On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for
revocation of a Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the
Bureau of Plant Industry as the Donee, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr.
Santiago alleged that the Bureau, contrary to the terms of donation, failed to install lighting
facilities and water system on the property and to build an office building and parking lot
thereon which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on before December7,
1974. That because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago concluded that he was exempt from
compliance with an explicit constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos case,
a 1952 decision which is similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor of
the respondent on the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v
Santos case is discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the dismissal
on ground of constitutional mandate. Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.
Held: The Supreme Court rules, that the constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where there
is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be implied. In this case
it must be emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its
agency being a Donee, is entitle to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of
such donation.
The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the order of dismissal of October 20, 1977 is
nullified, set aside and declare to be without force and effect. The Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this case, observing the
procedure set forth in the rules of court. No cost.
USA v. RUIZ
GR No. L-35645; May 22, 1985
FACTS:
Sometime in May 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for certain naval
projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co. Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequently, the company received two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price. In June
1972, the copany received a letter which said that the company did not qualify to receive an
award for the projects. The company then sued the United States of America and individual
petitioners demanding that the company perform the work on the projects, or for the petitioners
to pay damages and to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from
entering into contracts with third parties concerning the project.
ISSUE:
1) Do the petitioners exercise governmental or proprietary functions?
2) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
The rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another state
without its consent or waiver. This is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of states. However, state immunity now extends only to
governmental acts of the state. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. In this
case, the projects are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of the
USA and Philippines which is, indisputably, a function of the government. As such, by virtue of
state immunity, the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the case for the US
government has not given consent to the filing of this suit.
Republic vs. Villasor (Consti1)
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the Sheriff of the City of Manila,
the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and
International Construction Corporation, respondents.
November 28, 1973
Fernando, J:
Facts:
The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan
and International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by Respondent
Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. And for
the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks,
specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits; the
Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and
allocated for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and civillian
personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP, hence
the notices and garnishments are null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
Held:
No
Ratio:
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It
is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty
that the state and its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is
exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends.
Philippine National Bank vs Judge Javier Pabalan
83 SCRA 595 Political Law Constitutional Law Immunity of the State from Suit
On December 17, 1970, Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution followed thereafter by
a notice of garnishment on the funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) in
the sum of P12,724.66 deposited with the Philippine National Bank in La Union. PNB La Union
filed an administrative complaint against Pabalan for grave abuse of discretion, alleging that
the latter failed to recognize that the questioned funds are of public character and therefore
may not be garnished, attached, nor may be levied upon. The PNB La Union Branch invoked
the doctrine of non suability, putting a bar on the notice of garnishment.
ISSUE: Whether or not PNB may be sued.
HELD: Yes. Funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued are not exempt from
garnishment. PVTA is also a public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome is
attributed. The government has entered with them into a commercial business hence it has
abandoned its sovereign capacity and has stepped down to the level of a corporation.
Therefore, it is subject to rules governing ordinary corporations and in effect can be sued.
Therefore, the petition of PNB La Union is denied.
Bermoy v PNC
Facts: On July 6, 1954, (24) twenty four employees from its dormitory known as Normal Hall of
the Philippine Normal College, filled an action in the COF of Manila against the PNC for the
recovery of salary differentials and overtime pay. The Solicitor General on behalf of the
defendant answers and denies the latter liability. The court ordered it dismissed before the
case was tried on the merits, on the ground that neither one of the defendants was a
corporation or a juridical entity with capacity to be sued. The plaintiffs took an appeal to
Supreme Court, alleging that it was an error to dismiss their case on the ground that, R.A. No.
416 took effect July, 1949 converted PNS to PNC, thus created a Board of Trustees to
administer the affairs as a corporation under section 13 of the amended Act 1455 (Corporate
Law), with the power to sue and to be sued in any court.
Issue: Whether or not the PNC as a government corporation can be sued.
Held: The state has already given the consent by investing the college with express power to
be sued in the court. The act Authorizes the College to be sued is also made clear in Section
6, where it is provided that all process against the Board of Trustees shall be served on the
President or Secretary thereof. The order appealed from is re revoked and the case remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings. No cost.
Arcega vs Court of Appleals
G.R. No.L-20869 August 28, 1975
ALICIA O. ARCEGA, assisted by her husband RAF.L. ARCEGA, doing business under the firm
name of FAIRMONT ICE CREAM CO., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
respondents.
FACT:
The petitioner Alicia O. Arcega, doing business under the firm name Fairmont Ice Cream
Company, filed a complaint before the court against the respondents Central Bank of the
Philippines and Philippine National Bank, for the refund from allegedly unauthorized payments
made by her of the 17% special excise tax on foreign exchange.

The Central Bank moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds, among others, that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action, because the judgment sought
will constitute a financial charge against the Government, and therefore the suit is one against
the Government, which cannot prosper without its consent, and in this case no such consent
has been given.

The petitioner appealed, but the court dismissed the complaint on the ground set forth in the
Central Banks motion to dismiss.

The petitioner Arcega filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution to which an opposition
was filed by the Central Bank. This time, the Central Bank submitted a certification that the
balance of the collected special excise tax on sales of foreign exchange was turned over to the
Treasurer of the Philippines. Then the court denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration
as a result Arcega appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Holding that the suit is indirectly against the Republic of the Philippines which cannot be sued
without its consent, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

Finally the petitioner filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether a suit against the Central Bank for refund a suit against the State?

Held:
It is not a suit against the state. The charted of the Central Bank of the Philippines authorize
that it can to sue and be sued. The consent of the tate to be sued, therefore, has been given.

End of digest

The Supreme Court impleaded the National Treasurer and the Secretary of Finance as parties
defendant.