Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
MATERIALSELECTIONFORREPAIROFDAMAGEDPROCESSPIPINGINHIGHTEMPERATURE
SULFIDATIONSERVICEINTHENO.4CRUDEUNIT1
ExecutiveSummary
OnAugust6,2012,afireoccurredintheNo.4CrudeUnit(CrudeUnit)attheRichmondRefinery,
ownedandoperatedbyChevronU.S.A.Inc.(CUSA).Whiletheinvestigationintothecauseofthefire
isongoing,preliminaryinformationindicatesthatthefireoccurredintheareaofaleakina5feetlong
sectionofthe200feetlong4sidecutcarbonsteelpipeinhightemperatureservice.Itisbelievedthat
theleakresultedfromacceleratedsulfidationcorrosioninthe5feetlongsectionofpipe,whichhad
lowsiliconcontent(lessthan0.10wt%Si).
CUSAhassubmittedapplicationstotheCityofRichmondforpermitspursuanttotheCaliforniaFire
Code(CFC)toreplacefiredamagedpipinginhightemperaturesulfidation(HTS)serviceinthe
CrudeUnitwith9Chromealloypipe(9Cr).Becausequestionshavebeenraisedbycertainmembers
ofthepublicaboutCUSAsselectionof9Cr,theCityhastemporarilydelayedissuingpermitsforsuch
workandBillLindsay,RichmondCityManager,hasrequestedadditionalinformationconcerningCUSAs
selectionofmaterial.
Asexplainedbelow,CUSAsselectionof9CrpipetoreplacefiredamagedpipeinHTSservicesatisfiesall
engineeringandfiresafetystandards,andotherindustryrecommendedpractices,fortheuseinthe
CrudeUnit.WhilecertainmembersofthepublicandtheChemicalSafetyBoard(CSB)havesuggested
300seriesstainlesssteel(300SS)asanalternativematerialbasedonitsincreasedresistanceto
sulifdationcorrosion,theuseof300SSwouldintroduceanewdamagemechanismnotpresentwith9Cr
thatismoredifficulttomonitorandinspectthansulfidationcorrosion.
MaterialsSelectionProcess
AstheownerandoperatoroftheRefinery,CUSAhastheresponsibilityandtechnicalexpertise
necessaryforselectingmaterialsforaparticularservicebasedonsoundengineeringandindustry
practices.Inselectingmaterials,CUSAreliesuponexperiencedmaterialsengineers,whousetheir
expertjudgmenttochooserobustandpredictablematerialssuitablefortheplannedservice,takinginto
accounttheriskspresented.Anymaterialselectionmustbesupportedbyacomprehensivemonitoring
andinspectionprogramtoensurethattheselectedmaterialisperformingconsistentwithexpectations.
1
PreparedwiththeassistanceofBarbaraSmith,SeniorBusinessManager,RichmondRefinery,CUSA.
December12,2012
Page2
Thematerialselectionprocessiscomplexandbaseduponconsiderationofmultiplefactors,including
operatingconditions(particularlytemperature),operatinghistory,processchemistry,velocitiesand
otherflowconditions,localunitconditions,potentialunusualoperatingconditions,andturnaround
considerations.Itisalsoimportanttoconsidertheriskfromallpossibledamagemechanisms,aswellas
theabilitytomonitortheequipmentagainstthosedamagemechanisms.Otherwise,adecisioncould
inadvertentlyshifttheriskfromonedamagemechanismtoanother.Wheneverpossible,CUSAselectsa
materialthatbestaddressesthesemultipleconsiderations.
TheCitysScopeofReview
Oncematerialsareselectedfortherepairwork,CUSAappliesforpermitsfromtheCity,whichreviews
thepermitsforcompliancewiththeCaliforniaBuildingStandardsCode,inclusiveoftheCalifornia
BuildingCode(CBC)andtheCFC,asimplementedbytheCity.2Theinstallationofprocesspiping
suchasthepipingbeingreplacedaspartoftheCrudeUnitrepairisregulatedintwoways:
SupportstructuresforthepipingsystemsrequireabuildingpermitpursuanttotheCBC;
Thematerialsforprocesspipingandthedesignofthepipingsystemarereviewedfor
compliancewiththeCFC.
PursuanttotheCFC,theCityspermittingroleistoconfirmthatthematerialsCUSAhasselectedto
replacefiredamagedpipinginHTSserviceintheCrudeUnitcomplywiththeengineeringstandardsof
theAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASME)CodeforProcessPiping(ASMEB.31.3)and
thefiresafetystandardsoftheNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA)Flammableand
CombustibleLiquidsCode(NFPA30).3
TechnicalAnalysisforReplacementofFireDamagedPipeinHTSServiceintheCrudeUnit
PursuanttoASMEB31.3andNFPA30,carbonsteel,5Chromealloy(5Cr),9Cr,and300SSaresuitable
forserviceintheCrudeUnit.Inadditiontoadheringtotheseengineeringandfiresafetystandards,itis
importanttoconsideramaterialssulfidationresistancewhenselectingmaterialsforHTSservice.API
939Cidentifiescarbonsteelwithadequatesilicon,5Cr,9Cr,and300SSasexamplesofmaterials
suitableforHTSservice,dependingonvariousfactors.4Anadditionalconsiderationinselecting
materialsforHTSserviceispriorexperienceandinformationconcerningamaterialspastperformance
inthatservice.5
2
SeeRichmondMunicipalCode(RMC)6.02etseq.
3
Afurtherdescriptionofthemannerinwhichengineeringandfiresafetystandardsarepromulgatedandincorporatedinto
theCitysreviewisprovidedinAppendixI.
4
SeeAppendixII.
5
Id.
December12,2012
Page3
Takingintoaccounttheabovedescribedfactors,aswellastheriskspresented,theRefineryMaterials
Engineerexercisedherexpertjudgmentandselected9Crastheappropriatematerialforreplacement
offiredamagedpipingsystemsinHTSserviceintheCrudeUnit.Thisdecisionwaslaterconfirmedby
otherexpertswhohavesincereviewedthedecision.
Asnoted,9Crsatisfiesallregulatoryengineeringandfiresafetystandardsforcontainmentand
processingofcrudeoil.Further,asshownbytheModifiedMcConomyCurvesintheAPI939C,the
sulfidationcorrosionratesofcarbonsteelwithadequatesilicon,5Cr,9Cr,and300SSdemonstratethat
eachmaybesuitableforHTSserviceintheCrudeUnit,inparticularwhenonetakesintoaccountthe
CrudeUnitsoperationalhistory.6Thus,basedonallapplicabletechnicalstandardsandrecommended
practices,9CrisasuitablematerialforreplacingthefiredamagedpipingsystemsinHTSserviceinthe
CrudeUnit,andprovidessignificantlyincreasedresistancetosulfidationcorrosionwhencomparedto
thelowsiliconcarbonsteelcomponentinvolvedintheAugust6incident.
CUSAunderstandsthatcertainmembersofthepublicandtheCSBhavecommentedthat300SSmight
beabettermaterialfortherepairworkbasedonitshighersulfidationresistanceascomparedto9Cr,in
particularinlightoftheFebruary2012lossofcontainmentthatoccurredattheBPCherryPoint
Refinery,wherethepipethatfailedwas9Crandthedamagemechanismwassulfidationcorrosion.
WhiletheBPCherryPointincidentmayseemrelevanttotheselectionof9Crforpartsoftherepair
work,basedonthepubliclydisclosedBPinvestigationofthisincident,wedonotbelievetheincident
presentsananalogoussituationtotheRichmondCrudeUnit.Thepipinginthatinstanceappearsto
havebeenasemistagnantdeadlegwhich,after29yearsinhightemperatureservice,allowed
corrosivestobuildupinavaporspaceatthetopofthepiping,leadingtothefailure.Weunderstand
thattheflowinglinesinHTSserviceintheBPCherryPointrefineryhadnoproblems,andthatBP
replacedthepipeinquestionwith9Cr.Thus,thisincidentdoesnotsupportaconclusionthat9Crisnot
suitableforHTSservice,butrathersupportsindustryeffortstoeliminatedeadlegsystemsasmuchas
possibleandemphasizestheimportanceofexistingindustrystandardsrequiringaspecificdeadleg
inspectionprogramfordeadlegsremaininginservice.
Importantly,theselectionof300SSwouldalsointroduceanewdamagemechanismtotheCrudeUnit
intheformofstresscorrosioncracking(SCC)fromchlorides,andpotentiallyfrompolythionicacids,
thatwouldnotoccurwith9Cr.
Whereas9CrisimmunetoSCC,chloridesinthepresenceofwatermaycauseSCCofany300SSpiping
attemperaturesaboveabout140F.LossesofcontainmentduetochlorideSCCarewelldocumented
intheliterature.7Further,CUSAhasidentified10instancesofSCCinstainlesssteelpipesinhigh
6
Id.
7
ASMMetalsHandbook,Volume13CCorrosion:EnvironmentsandIndustries;CorrosioninPetroleumRefiningand
PetrochemicalOperations,R.D.Kaneeditor
December12,2012
Page4
temperatureserviceincrudeunits,mostlyfromchlorides.8Thepipesthatcrackedintheseinstances
wereinsimilaroranalogousservicetothepipingbeingreplacedaspartoftherepairoftheCrudeUnit,
whichissubjecttopotentialrisksfromchlorideSCCbecausethecrudeoilsprocessedcontainchlorides,
asdoesambientmoisturesuchasthatfromthedriftfromtheadjacentNo.3CATCoolingTower.
Anotherpotentialdamagemechanismwith300SSispolythionicSCC,whichoccurswhensulfurscales
combinewithoxygenandwatertoformsulfurousacidsthatcancracksensitizedstainlesssteel.
Althoughthepotentialforthisdamagemechanismcanbemitigatedbyusingtheappropriategradeof
stainlesssteel,itisstillarelevantconsideration.9
Afinalbutvitallyimportantconsiderationinselectingmaterialsforaparticularserviceistheabilityto
monitortheequipmentagainstdamagemechanisms.Akeyreasonfortheselectionof9Crisits
predictablecorrosionrate,whichmakesmonitoringofsulfidationcorrosionmoreeffective.Onthe
otherhand,SCCfromchloridesorpolythionicacidsresultsinmicroscopiccracksthataredifficultto
detectpriortofailure.Thus,theuseof9Crpresentslessoverallriskthat300SSwhenitcomesto
detectingandpredictingcorrosion,anddoesnotintroduceanewdamagemechanismtotheCrude
Unit.
CUSAsselectionof9Cradherestotheapplicableengineeringandfiresafetycodesandisthebest
choiceforpurposesoffireandoperationalsafetybecauseiteffectivelyreducestheriskfrom,and
providestheabilitytoeffectivelymonitor,sulfidationcorrosion,whileavoidingtheriskofSCC
altogether.
8
SeeAppendixIII.
9
ThebenefitsofstainlesssteeldosometimesoutweighthepotentialforSCC,suchaswhenarefineryprocessesnaphthenic
acidcrudes.TheRichmondRefinerydoesnotprocesssuchnaphtheniccrudes,however,sothisisnotaconsiderationfor
theselectionofmaterialsforrepairoftheCrudeUnit.
December12,2012
Page5
Appendices
AppendixI ApplicationofTechnicalStandardstoNo.4CrudeUnitRepairWorkThroughCalifornia
BuildingStandardsCode
AppendixII AmericanPetroleumInstituteRecommendedPractice939CGuidelinesforAvoiding
Sulfidation(Sulfidic)CorrisionFailuresinOilRefineries
AppendixIII IncidentsofStressCorrosionCrackinginStainlessSteelPipingCircuitsinHigh
TemperatureServiceinCrudeUnits
The City of Richmonds review of permit applications for the repair work being
undertaken by Chevron to the No. 4 Crude Unit and related equipment (Crude Unit) is
conducted pursuant to the California Building Standards Code (CBSC), Title 24 of the
California Code of Regulations (CCR), which has been adopted and incorporated by the
City in Chapter 6.02 of the Richmond Municipal Code (RMC).
o State law (Cal. Health & Safety Code 18930 et seq.) provides that the CBSC are
the minimum standards applicable to all "occupancies," i.e., all buildings and
structures, in the state.
o The California Building Standards Commission adopts these technical codes based
on input from expert agencies, and reviews and amends the codes on a regular
cycle. Cal. Health & Safety Code 18929.1; see also
(http://www.bsc.ca.gov/codes/adoptcycle.aspx).
o Local agencies such as Richmond may adopt local modifications to provide more
restrictive standards provided the agency makes express findings that amendments
are necessary because of local climatic, geological or topographical conditions.
Amendments are not effective until copies of both the express findings and the
amendments have been filed with the California Building Standards Commission.
Cal. Health & Safety Code 18941.5.
The CBSC includes multiple technical codes, divided into Parts, including as
applicable to the repair work:
o The California Building Code (CBC), 24 CCR Part 2, which regulates demolition
and repair of buildings and structures. 24 CCR 1.1.3.
o The California Fire Code (CFC), 24 CCR Part 9, which regulates structures,
processes, premises and safeguards concerning, among other things, the hazard of
fire and explosion arising from the storage, handling or use of structures, materials
or devices. CFC 101.2.
o The California Electrical Code (24 CCR Part 3) and the California Mechanical
Code (24 CCR Part 4) are also applicable.
The installation of process piping, i.e., the piping in the Crude Unit through which
flammable and combustible liquids flow, is regulated in two ways:
1
o Repairs of the support structures for the piping systems require a building permit
pursuant to the CBC. A building permit must be obtained from the Citys
Building Official for all such work under the CBC. CBC 3405.1.
o The selection of the materials for process piping and the design of the piping
system require fire construction permits pursuant to CFC 105.1 (General),
105.1.2.2 (Construction permit), 105.7 (Required construction permits), and
105.7.7 (Flammable and combustible liquids). The fire code official, which in
Richmond is the Fire Marshal, is responsible for reviewing and issuing fire
construction permits. RMC 8.16.030(c); CFC 105.1.1.
In reviewing and issuing fire construction permits, the Fire Marshal determines whether
the proposed process piping systems comply with the general provisions of the CFC, as
well as technical standards that are incorporated into the code as set forth in CFC Chapter
47 Referenced Standards.
The General Provisions applicable to storage, dispensing, use and handling of hazardous
materials, including combustible liquids and flammable solids, liquids and gases, are set
forth in CFC Chapter 27. Section 2703.2.2.2 of this chapter provides that supply piping
for these materials shall be in accordance with ASME B31.3.
o ASME B31.3 - Process Piping sets forth the engineering requirements deemed
necessary for the safe design and construction of process piping typically found in
petroleum refineries; chemical, pharmaceutical, textile, paper, semiconductor, and
cryogenic plants; and related processing plants and terminals. ASME B31.3 sets
forth, among other things:
2
704007280v2
- Requirements and data for evaluation and limitation of stresses, reactions, and
movements associated with pressure, temperature changes, and other forces
In conjunction with CFC Chapter 27, CFC Chapter 34 Flammable and Combustible
Liquids, sets forth the requirements for prevention, control and mitigation of dangerous
conditions related to storage, use, dispensing, mixing and handling of flammable and
combustible liquids. Section 3403.6.2 - Design, fabrication and installation of piping
systems and components, provides that piping system components shall be designed and
fabricated in accordance with the applicable standard listed in Chapter 27 of NFPA
30.
o NFPA 30 also provides standards for the installation of piping systems ( 27.6)
and the testing of piping systems ( 27.7).
There are numerous other standards and codes incorporated into the CFC as set forth in
CFC Chapter 47, including certain American Petroleum Institute (API) standards.
3
704007280v2
Scope of Fire Marshal Review and Approval of Permits
When the Fire Marshal reviews and issues fire construction permits pursuant to the CFC,
he is determining that the proposed process piping, including materials, complies with
engineering (ASME B31.3) and fire-safety (NFPA 30) standards that have been
promulgated and peer-reviewed by international standards organizations. CFC 105.2.4.
The Fire Marshal does not determine in the first instance whether a material proposed for
use by an applicant, such as 9 Chrome alloy pipe, is adequate for the proposed service
from an engineering or fire-safety perspective. Rather, the Fire Marshal confirms that a
proposed material such as 9 Chrome has been recognized as suitable for the proposed
service in the applicable technical standards. CFC 105.3.
4
704007280v2
APPNDIX II: API RP 939-C (SUBMITTED IN HARD COPY ONLY)
SCCIncidentsin300SeriesStainlessSteelHotPipingPortionsofCrudeUnitsChevron
188SS
Issue
Number Date Author Source Summary
PrivatecommunicationbetweenDave SaltLake:Externalcrackingofstainlesssteellineattributedtowater
Chevron1 1970s DLCooke CookeandformerSaltLakeinspector andchloridesusedduringfirefightingoperations.
ElSegundo:Externalcrackingof316SSpipingatoutletofE356
duringstartup,followingshutdown,duetoeitherchlorideSCCor
Chevron2 1971 WGHalsted ChevronE241.01 PTASCC.
*"Hotpiping"referstopipingthatoperatesabovewhereliquidwaterormoisturewouldbeexpectedduringnormaloperation,nominallyabove~400F
Footnote:
1)ThesedonotincludecasesofSSinstrumenttubingcracking.
SCCIncidentsin300SeriesStainlessSteelHotPipingPortionsofCrudeUnitsIndustry
188SS
Issue
Number Date Author Source Summary
InternalchlorideSCCof316SStransferlineatalowspotthatwas
Industry1 1997 TomFarraro(Citgo) 1997NACERefincor likelynotdrained.
InternalSCCofSStoCrMotransferline(eitherchlorideorPTA
Industry2 1997 RalphBlee(Exxon) 1997NACERefincor SCC).
*"Hotpiping"referstopipingthatoperatesabovewhereliquidwaterormoisturewouldbeexpectedduringnormaloperation,nominallyabove~400F
Footnote:
1)Thesearchforstresscorrosioncrackingincrudeunitsalsouncovered"dozens"ofcasesofchloridecrackinginotherunitssuchashydroprocessing.Aswediscussed
duringoutmeetingonNovember26,2012,thehotpipingportionofcrudeunitscanexperienceduringstartupandshutdownconditionssimilartohydroprocessing
units.
Chevron 1
(Private communication between Dave Cooke and former Salt Lake inspector)
Chevron2
I'fI . L. l .
{
SHAN\- :
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This lrork wab requested by D. D. Prlce.
J G tlerr/p7;6-
J. G. KERR
9-24-7L
MATERIALS IABOITATORY
RICHT"OND
.\
PIPE, f fIE z E-24L.0L
)'
FALLURE OF STAINTBSS STEET ,.
t-r+ffi!nn
EL SEGUNpO N0. 2 C8,U!E ul,EL_ eL igJ.lt
AL your request the MateriaLs rboratory conducued
inLo the circumferential cracking of the stan1"es6 ""AD.JSJ"l?H'Z
st,eeL piping epooi
I
fron the outlet of exchanger E-356 n the EL, Segundo No. 2 Crude ltnfr/
The falure sras discorered July 30 when th9'pplng spooL started Leaklng
I
1l''
I.-.-t t. {g5gg the start-up after a shutdown..' During the shut,doldn a verticaL
I
T-joint was wetded into the tw year oLd stainless steeL pping spool.
The field welds were stress reLieved at about 1600F with an Ex+o-met,
sress relef kit while the piping spooL.was boLted up and highly
rest,rained. The'spool was found to be Leaktng at two circrunferenEial
icracks about 1/8 inch apart.and about, LlL inch long. The cracks were
nj ilocated on the opposte side of the plpe fronr the ltTtt, and.about 8-lnchee
il*( tt,,'( t'|\ rfrom one of the T-joint weLds. et nonnat operating conditione the 6 Llz-
inch 0D stanless steel plpe containe gas olL at about 450F and about
.y .'r 225 psL,
A chemical anaLysis of the pipe lndicates that it 1s made of Type 316L
sEainless steeL. The result,s of the chenricaL analysis are glven in TabLe 1.
The pipe has a hardness of about Rockwell B 78. This lndicates that the
stainless steeL plpe is annealed, and hs a yield strength of about 30
ksi and a tensLe strength of about B0 ksl.
A Lo'ngitudna1 cro6s sect,ion contaning both circumferentlal cracks was
cut from the pipe. Figure L shows photomicrographs aken at the ID and
OD of a crack excendng through the pipe wall. Apparently Lhe cracklng
started at the OD snce the crack is more open there. Also, several
other cracks startng at the OD and not extending through the alt were
found within a L/4 fnch of the crack sho!i ln Figure 1. The tip of one
of these cracks is shown ln Fgure 2. This crack appears to be inter-
granular and tightly cLosed.
Figure 3 shows an etched cross sectons of one of the cracks noc extendlng
through the pipe lall. This photomfcrograph cLearLy lndlcaces tht the
cracklng is intergranuLar The photomicrograph in Figure 4 rhows that
carbides have precipitated at the graln boundares, which suggesLs hat he
Type'316L scafnless seel pipe has been sensitized.
It does not appear lkeLy that thls failure vlas caused by stress
relief cracking sLnce Type 316L stainLess steeL is not generally
belleved to be susceptible to this kind of cracklng. Ln generaL only
the grades of stafnLess st,eeL containing coLumblum are Busceptib].e to
stress rellel cracking Type 316L stanless steel would not be expected
o lose much ductility durlng a stress relief'heat treatment eince no
coLubium ls present to form columbium carbidee and cause precipitation
hardening, Therefore, Type 316L sLainLess steel should be abLe to
pLastically deform enough during a st,res6 reLef heat treatment t,o
reJ.eve the stresses needed to cause crackfng. For these reasons it is
not believed that this feLure l'ras caused by stress reLief cracking even
though the pping spool was boLted up and highly restrained during the
stress rellef heat treatmen.
It is beleved that the cracks are from ntergranular etress corroslon cracking
of the senstized Type 3L6L stainLess steeL. Chlordes and poLythioaic
acids are the most common corroslve agents found around the Refinery tha
cause'stress corrosio'n cracking n Type 3L6L stainless steel. ChLoride
crackng generalLy starts as int,ergranular cracking and then develops as
transgranuLar crackng. Polythionic acids onLy cause intergranuLar stress
corroson cracking. Therefore, it appear.s thag the fallure of the sLalnless
steel ppe vras caused by polythionic aclds rather'than chLorides, slnce only
intergranuLar cracklng was found.
rrPolythionc acidsrr is used as a general term referring to sulfur acids,
such as sulfurous acid., The lntergranuLar faiLure of sensitized Type 3L6L
stainless steel nay occur 1n any plane where ron suLfide corrosion
products are formed. Durlng shut,dons the lron sulfide oxldizes on contact
wth air to form sulfur dloxide. Ir the presence of moisturereulfurous
acid 1s created. Thls process ls descrlbed by the follovrlng two reactlons:
(1) '4Fes + 702 ----+ 4sO2 + ZFe2Og
(2) soz + H2o 4 H2so3
It is not cLear how the outsde of the Btainless steeL piping spooL fron
the outlet of exchanger E-356 came n'contact wth poLythionic acids.
However, it appears that ths dfd occur after the stress relief heat
treaLment, during whlch the Type 316L stafnless steeL was sensitized. Even
though the exposure of the outside of the plpe spooL to polythionic acids
is probabLy.not coirunon, precautons shouLd .be'taken to prevent, recurrence
by keeping suLfur containlng materLal"s off he pipe. At the operating
tmperacure of 450F it is possible but improbable that sulfur contaning
materials on the pipe could nake'lron sulfide. However at stress relief
temperatures any sutfur contalning material would corrode the staLnless
steeL pipe leaving an iron sulfide residue that wouLd produce polythlonic
aclds af,t,er contact wlth alr and vrater.
'l.d. .,b.''tlotr(
I^IGH/ hh W. G. HALSTED \
Attah.
cc: B. P. Faae
Table 1.
Elemgnc Pgr.ceng
c 0.03
Cr 17.00
Gu o.L4
Mo 2,2(+
ln ..63
Ni 13. L5
P 0.030
s 0.013
si ' 0.65
Pipe Pipe ID
FIGURE 1. Cross sectf.on of circumferenial crack extending through pipe wall. unetched 50X.
FIGIIRE 2. Cross eection of crack tiP not exending through. pipe.
unetchd 250X.
)
-oD
)/
.;'f.
\;
Crack
\
1.1
.';
'::i4
!!t'.
FIGURE 3. Cross sectlon of crack not qIcURE 4. Cross secion of crack tip
exending through pipe. showing carbide preciptates
at grain boundaries.
etched 42.5X.
etched 500X.
)
MEMORANDUM Go.I44
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Engineering Department
RT01 12843 taLerial-s Laboratory
Rchrnoncl, Calif ornia
TviR. R. L. BREEHOFT:
iavrai
The attached Maeral-s Laboratory repor:L concLudes that a sensitzeC
Type 30lr line n vacuuin bottoms sersce at 6B0F fail-ed by sulfur
acid crackng fronr the ID. Sensitz-aton may have occurred during
fabrication bu more probabl-y was the result of servce. Cracking
by thi-s mechanisnr wouLd have occurred durng shutdor,ms cvhen raosture
eontaced inernaL sulfide scal-e. Because of the fLre ltazerd presented by
the possble fornation of addtj.onal cracks, we recomrnend tha al-L
Type 304 parts of the pipe spooL be replaced. The use of a stabil-ized
stainlesg steeL, J-ike Type 32L or Type 347, in stress reLieved repLaeement
piping, should preven both cracking and corrosion, Carbon steeJ- or
chrore-moJ.y steels rriL1- preven cracking, but, ca corrode rapdi-y at
6B0F in the presnce of. H2S, the corroson rat,e depending on the
quantty of I{2-S presen, Careful study of projecEed corrosion rates
based oa servce experience v.th related equipment should be made before
any of the chrome-rno1-y steeLs are used.
\
i; Ii;;{,:,+
,...'
J. G. KERR
DEF/Jhh
;S C A .1 N E D iF:tri?5tuS|,l
l.iATJlliI\LS LAUOP.ATOIY - P.IC( rNl)
I :
RACKGROU}ID
Irr nid=Septernber t-re 6-inch clj.aneter portiorr of the vacrtlim bottoms lir,e in
lraruaiit" ruo Unit clevelope<l cracl:s acljacent Lo r rv?-I.-d. joining the line E,o .,ti)'l
a redtrcing elboi.r. The bottoms line iaricatecl of Type 3QLr',' ada"'
"-apotd*tl
sLainless steel-. The craclcs, r,'hch rere in the l-2 otcl-oc.k position cin the
line ru'ere vreld repaired rth E-308 manual r,reldmetal and the Line r''as pi-aced
back in service. ter only one day of operaLion, a. secolrd crack appeared at
about the 4 orclock postion n he sare general area. The line had been in
vacuum bottons serviee at 680f ancl 350 ps:'-g for 15 years rhouL ilrcidenE.
Becruse the line s nsulated, metal- lqal-J- t.emperature l,ras probably very c1.ose
to the 6B0F sock ternperature, No records vre aval-abJ-e to indicate thether
the pipe had been stress relieved.
Thrty inches of the line, irrcluding the cracked segment, &'ere replaced rvith
Type 321. Welds r.lere rnade ,ith E-347 manual rel-drnetal ancl rvere sress
relieved at l-600F for one hour. A brace ras installed near the fal-ed area to
reituce the loads appliecl by a nearby valve rnanfolcl, The ci:acked erea vlas
f lane-cut frorn the 30t' p.pe section removecl; both pieces t/ere senL to the
l'later.als Laboratory for an nvestigation of the failure mechanisrn.
INVESTICATION
After c1-eaning wth a solvent o remove tar, the ID of the cracked piece from
the l.ne appeareC es shor,m in Figure 1. Several cracks are vsble., Simflar
examinaton of the OD found onLy one short crack Lhat could be observed vsual-l.'
but thaE vras nE pked up by dye penetrant nspection, even after he piece
\.ras l.rarmed to 125F. The cracks are either very tigh or are pl-ugged with
scaLe and vacuum resicl. All--Sa,ks -are avray fiorn rveld zones,
DISCU SSTON
Records do not indj.cate vhethe.r the pipe spool \,as stre-ss relevecl . Tf
j.t had been, loc.al slress re.lief of r.relds r,ou1d have been the nost probabl.e
methocl because of tiie size a.nc1 configurati-on of the spool. Local sress
Telief of welds rvould ror-, have caused sens;itizaicn of the portion of ppe
f ron r':hich Sanpte B (see Table 2) r.ias dra'.,m. Therefore, service expobrrre
seems Lo be the mosU pr:obzrbJ-e cau.se of sensitidat.ioir, al-tholrgh a furnace
stress reliaf cor-rld haive p::oduced the sa.li:e effect. Tha bottoins tenperature
, !,,,-lof 680ir is some..hat below th-* 700F tempeatrlre that Socal considers to be the
itJ ,{,'," /lorer lrnt for sensiti.zation of Typa 304 stainless steel. }lorever, lve have
n,.t'.t,' ,: l,\
'1"
settled on this 1o'er limit from tests using exposuT:e times shorter than the
.,.
' /-n'.'
I
\.) ,t.
100,00C hours of service accumulated by the \racuum bottons line.
.1,.,
..ar1oi
' ,^',, ,,r'.Because adclitional c::ackng rnay occur n sensitized areas, and because the
.,,q it'" -,,r:|'7' entre line, not just r.;el-d areas, may be sensitized, Ehe Type 304 pipe spool-
bt.' l,", I'shoul-<l be replaced. Leaks that may forrn r,ill probably be snral1-, but he
.r-,1
r_ i,'l rislc of spontaneous ombustion of ol- saturated. insul-ation presenLs a
substantial fire l;azar. Type 304L sections may not need replacement, but no
!',,Lt, .,^.,trtt..| nonclestructve means presently exists to di.stinguish either Type 304 fron Type
. !!lr'i,, ,-r"' 304L or sensitized areas fronr unsensitized areas.
llul'' .t,, "
.'l .o,y''" .,,,;'' FasLors to b considerec{ in he sel-ector oi mat.erial-s for repla,ceinent piping
'' l[, ^,' are presented n Table 3, Sensitized ar.rstenitic stainless can fail as
.,zil ,.. described above, ancl so Type 304 should noi be use",,. Although Type 304L
')-ri"':; .,.!, \ rvorrl<l probably not have failed as above, Type 321''fype 347 s preferecl for
''', J irlproved resistance to sensitization cluring seryice. All. austenitj.c stainless
"'' ^ij
, ^.r91'.",,,)<' st,eels may be suscepcj-trle to chl-oride cracking fr:oin the 0D under insul-ation,
|'e'' t,\L- eilte:: froin salts leachecl from the nsul-ation ol: from salts carried n the
"' , at.nosphere in Hawaiits ocea.nsde envronmeni. I,le, therefore, reconrneind stre-ss
t\ /,, i.r.,,,t -..i.'.gf .
'- '-,
''
^?,
l'{,'ri';,'"'', carbon steel or chrorne-moly steel piping rvoulcl eliminate all risk of failr-rre by
.,n)u'' '.) cracking, if properly fabricated. Iiorever, at 680F, hese materi-al-s can
"-.-!.,!o',,'.'. corrocle irr the presence o 125. Corrosion rates will be dependent upon lI2S
I.i"".l 0 coneentrations and on erlJ-oy coingosition. The corroson rates of carbon steel
\..*u|.y't,.1.,1,.r, or Cr-Mo equipment operating at smiJ-ar rnetal- t,emperatures (not stock temperatures)
4'"^lu'' in resid service should be examned careful-l-y before any of these materials are
A used.
'4t' Increased chromium concentraon improves resistance to H2S,
CONCLUSIONS AND RECO}fu',IENDATIONS
i-. The Type 304 v'acuum botlorns Line r,as severely sensitized and probably
failed by sul-fur acicl cracking. Senszaton may have occurred during
service.
2. Because the rest of the J-ine presents a fre hazard from possble formaEon
of additional craci<s, we recommend repl-acement of the entre pipe spoo1.
Type 304L secLons nay not be sensitized and r.roul-d, therefore, noL requre
repl-acement. Simple Lests on sma11 sampl-es (as small as a sl-iver l-/4r'wide
L/2" Long) sent to the MaEerials Laboratory could determine rEhether he
material is sensitLzed. The 4-inch pip:i-ng should be tested in this rvay
before replaeement,.
3. For replacement piping, we recormend the use of stress relieved rype z
or Type 347l- Carbon steel.o a Cr-l'o steel (up o 9 Cr-r1/2 to) or Type 410
stan1ess steel rnay be used if operaLors carr estabiish that il2fi concenta-
tions and, therefore, corrosion rates r.ri,11 stay at satsfactory 1or, level-s.
$, i*.**,-tL
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Mo 0.18
Mn 1,74 2.0 2.O
st 0,50 0,75 0 .7 5
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Code 3 l. I piping advises against using carbon steel above 775F to avoid
graphitization of carbon steel, and only gives allowable stresses to 800F for
carbon steel. The ASME/ANSI Process Piping Code 31.3 advises against using
carbon steel above 800F to avoid graphitization of carbon steel, although it
provides allowable stresses for much higher temperatres. Currently Crude Unit
I limits the carbon steel piping to 825F which is safe for a number of years
because at 825F the rate and amount of graphitization will be slight. However,
even allowing this higher 825F limits plant operation.
The alloy piping should be used until the temperature drops to below 800F. Note
the corporate piping manual currently advises limiting carbon steel to 750F to
assure no graphitization, but we will revise the manual to match the Code
wording. [Update 5/07: Rechecking the temperature found the carbon steel to be
actually operating at only 680'F - no action required.l
8. C-1102 Vacuum Column Type 317 Stainless Steel Packing and #6 s/c
Stainless Piping
Recommendation: Upgrade the C-I102 top bed packing to Inconel or ceramic,
whichever is most economic. See also related recommendations below for online
monitoring and shutdown inspection work.
Background
Vy'e arechallenged by having very little knowledge as to the actual process or
corrosion conditions of this corrosion loop. The type 3 I 7 stainless steel packing
shows signs of conoding, and the #6 s/c piping system contains chlorides which
could lead to pitting and stress corrosion cracking of the 317L stainless steel.
In 1998 the top packing in C-l102 was heavily fouled and the 317 stainless
packing had holed through in some center portions of the bed. We believe this
was due to corrosion at chloride deposits. Naphthenic acid conosion is possible,
but less likely with the 317 stainless metallurgy. The crude unit is now again
seeing signs of packing in various components of the 6th sidecut. An informal
examination of packing samples in 2004 indicated chloride corrosion. In 2000 an
8" discharge line from P-I116 cracked underneath scale deposits from what was
believed to be chloride cracking.
Reviewing the UT and RT data of the #6 slc indicates we could be seeing
moderately high conosion rates of the stainless piping. We believe that is an
artifact of the relatively new piping and the diffrculty of monitoring thin stainless
piping. While we camot yet prove that the general corrosion rate of the stainless
is low, we expect that it is low and the real threat is from pitting or cracking at
locations where deposits and water can collect.
Fortunately the 2003 inspection of the bare C-t 102 column shell at the top packed
bed location showed only mild pitting of the carbon steel. The exchangers in the
6th sidecut circuit also have shown little damage, due to2205 Duplex stainless
installed in 1998 in E-l103 and E-l146A'. The carbon steel E-11468 bundle
showed moderate ID and OD pitting and was retubed in kind in 2003. The
4O-year-old E-l128 carbon steel frn fan exchangers showed fouling but very little
Equipment Material Description and Historical Data Max TAN Sulfu Corrosion Rate Remaining Life
Temp (wto/o) Range
Hst. Calc.
(Channel: cw)
E-1124 NB Tubes: 02 - installed; 04 - A&B: very light 200 NA 4 H2S ? <3 >10
Admiralty SB- uniform corr.
Tubes
I I l-445
3.12 Corrosion Loop #12 (System #12): Vacuum column 6th sde cut, and 7/E sidecuts
This corrosion loop consists of the #6 sidecut piping and associated equipment from the C-l102 vacuum column, through E-I103 and
E-l1464/8. From E-l146A18 the # 6 sidecut goes both back to the C-l102 cohmn via the E-I128 air cooler, and to the Isomax 2
plant via the E-l140 air cooler.
This system also includes the C-I102 vacuum column #8 sidecut from C-l102 through E-l l4lA to E-l I12. From E-l I 12 the #8
sidecut goes both to the Isomr I plant (and to Isoma:< feed storage), and back to C-I102.
Carbon steel has shown surprisingly high corrosion rates since at least the 1990s, and some historical notes link the higher rates with
processing naphthenic acid crudes. We now believe water and chlorides are important factors. Upgrading much of this system to
3l7L SS in recent years will greatly reduce the general conosion, but the stainless is susceptible to pitting under deposits, or possibly
even chloride stess corrosion cracking. The 31 7SS packing in the C-l 102 column has seen significant chloride corrosion. There is
still some CS in the lower temperature piping that is showing some activity and needs rechecking.
This loop also contains#71#8 sidecut piping and associated equipment. Note that some of the lower temperature piping is still
carbon steel and seeing moderate activity. The hotter portion of this piping is in the range where relatively smll increases in
temperature (20-30F) and TAN levels could substantially increase carbon steel corrosion in this part of the circuit. Discuss if
we should put in a probe here, or other monitoring.
Make sure the emergency wash oil line near the outlet of P-1119 going from C-1102 to C-1103 is the right metallurgr and is
covered somewhere.