CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN INDONESIA:

PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES1

Hurriyah 2

Introduction
Not so long ago, Indonesias democratization seemed impossible. When the so -called
third wave of democratization reached Asia in the late 1980s, Indonesia still appeared
to be a safe place of authoritarian rule. Being a latecomer to democracy, Indonesias
transition to democracy has also surprised many observers, given the fact that
Soehartos New Order had often been depicted as one of the most durable authoritarian
regimes in the world. With strong military backing and characterized as a bureaucratic -
authoritarian regime, Soehartos long period of more than three decades authoritarian
rule has in fact endured until the mid of 1990s. However, the financial crisis that hit the
country in 1997/1998 has created an impetus for significant political change, with the
forced-resignation of Soeharto as political culmination point. The successful of political
reform movement herein called as Reformasi has undoubtedly opened a path toward
democratization in the country. Interestingly, the emergence of Indonesias new
democratic regime has occurred precisely at the time in which the reversals of
democracy significantly out space the transitions to democracy.3
Nowadays, one decade after the Reformasi, Indonesia has been addressed as one best
example of democracy in Southeast Asia the region that is well known for its deep-
rooted authoritarianism. In addition to that, Reformasi has also transformed Indonesia
into the third largest democratic state in the world. By the criteria of Dahls polyarchal
democracy, Indonesia is in fact has fulfilled the criteria for a consolidated democracy,
and thus, can be regarded as a democracy. With three relatively free and fair elections in
the aftermath of 1998 Reformasi movement, freedom of expression, and lively civil
society, Indonesias democratization seems to stay on track and move towards a well-
functioning democracy. As Diamond conceives, Indonesia has made appreciable
progress on a large number of governance and socio -economic development measures
during its first full decade of democracy. In a comparative context, Indonesia also has

1 Paper presented at the 3rd Yale-Indonesia Forum International Conference, Social Justice and Rule of
Law: Addressing the Growth of A Pluralist Indonesian Democracy, Semarang, 14-15 July 2010.
2 Lecturer Staff at Department of Political Science, Universitas Indonesia, and Res earcher at Center for

Political Studies FISIP UI. Her research interes ts include Democratization Studies, Indonesian Politics, and
Islam Politics. She can be contacted at hurriyah@ui.ac.id or Department of Political Science, B Building,
2nd Floor, Kampus FISIP UI D epok, 16424, Indonesia.
3 Larry Diamond gives a handful of good analytic studies of what he called as democratic recession in the

world in the late 1990s. He argues that the very year that Indonesia became a democracy in 1999, has
actually marked the begi nning of a significant democratic recession in the world. However, he insists that
such phenomena has not yet a full of reverse wave of democracy. For further on this subject see Larry
Diamond, Indonesias Place in Global Democracy, in Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall (eds) (2010),
Problems of Democratization in Indonesia: Elections, Insti tution, and Society, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing,
pp.21-49. For more information on the trends and s tatistics of loss of democracy during 1999-2009, see
Freedom House (various years), http://www.freedomhouse.org.
 2

levels of support for democracy and liberal democratic values that compare favorably
with those in most of its Asian peers.4
The progress of Indonesian democracy today can even be described as essentially
consolidated. At this point, Liddle and Mujani offers the three dimensional typology of
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan encompassing behavior, attitudes and constitutional
commitments to be applied on the analysis of Indonesian democracy. The arguments
run as follow; (1) behaviorally, there is no significant political group currently threatens
to overthrow democracy or to separate from the Indonesian nation-state, (2)
attitudinally, there is a pretty substantial and steady mass support for democracy as the
best form of government; and (3) constitutionally, key political and social actors are
committed to solving their disputes and pursuing their interests non-violently and
through the constitutional process.5 Although there are still fears of an imminent
democratic reversal in the country, all in all, Indonesia has undoubtedly been a
democracy since 1998. The contentious issue is more on whether its democracy is going
to be fully consolidated and become the only game in town.
In the discourse of democratization and democratic consolidation, the importance of
civil society is a very popular topic among scholars. Yet, the topic is always given
attention and debate in both optimistic and skeptical interpretation at the same time.
On the one hand, some experts have revealed that civil society plays a pivotal role in the
democratization process and often lead the movements to overthrow the a uthoritarian
regime. Berman, for example, argues that a weak political institution with low
legitimation will make civil society become an alternative channel for democratization
process.6 On the other hand, critics have also pointed out that there are still questions
regarding with the capacity of civil society in bringing about democratization and
democratic consolidation. The reason why these questions often raised is due to the fact
that civil society and its organizations are still suffering from lingering organizational
constraints and, at the same time, burdened with overwhelming expectations to have
been greater contribute in the process of democratic consolidation.
On the other hand, the assumption of civil societys democracy-building agent is always
contested. One of the often raised questions concerning democratization and
democratic consolidation is whether the elites or the society make and consolidate
democracy. The role of elites in creating democracy has been emphasized in many
studies. Likewise for democratic consolidation, which, as one study suggests, depends
on the emergence of a unified elitist group that commits itself to democratic rule .7
However, as indicated above, an observation on the trend of a wave of democratization
in Asia suggests that one cannot overlook the contribution of the public masses to
democratization and democratic consolidation. In Indonesia, as well as other Asian
democracy like the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand, without the participation of

4 Ibid, p.19.
5 Ibid, pp.46-47, quoted from the ori ginal 2009 manuscript of William Liddle and Saiful Mujani,
Indonesian Democracy: From Transition to Consolidation, in M.Kuenkler and Alfred Stepan
(forthcoming), eds, Indonesia, Islam, and Democratic Consolidation, forthcoming.
6 See Sheri Berman (1997), Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic, World Politics, Vol. 49,

No. 3, April, pp. 401-429.

7 See Larry Diamond (1999), Development Democracy: To ward Conso lidation, Baltimore: The John

Hopkins University Press, p.218.

 3

the masses or civil society, democratization would not have been achieved. As
Bunbongkarn argues, although their role was only supportive, it lent popular weight to
the democratic transition and helped deepen democracy.8
Regardless of the optimistic and skeptical interpretations of the role of civil society in
democratizing and consolidating democracy, it would be advantageous to comprehend
the role of civil society in the process of democratization and democratic consolidation
in Indonesia. It is no doubt that civil society has prominent role in the democratization
process in Indonesia. When the economic crisis in 1997/1998 happened in the midst of
environmental changes favoring democratization, which thus created the impetus for
democratization, many believed that it was civil society that took the initiative. The role
of civil society in encouraging democratic transition in Indonesia, for example, was
reflected in a series of student demonstrations against the authoritarian rule and
demanding for democratization. Although the successful of Reformasi was led by the
student movements, it would not erode the significant role and contribution of civil
society in fostering the democratization process, principally in the aftermath of
Reformasi. Harney and Olivia portray that situation like this: if student protest and a
collapsed economy brought down Soeharto, it is civil society that is held out as the force
that will bring down Soehartoism.9

Examining the role of civil society in the process of democratization in Indonesia, the
main questions guiding this paper are as follow: How does the role of the civil society in
the democratic consolidation in Indonesia? How did the civil society contribute to the
democratization? What sort of problems did the civil society have? What implications
do the problems have for the role of civil society in consolidating democracy? How can
the civil society contribute to further consolidate Indonesias democracy? In order to
answer these questions, this paper attempts to analyze the role of civil society in the
consolidation of Indonesian democracy. The paper argues whilst the condition of
Indonesias democracy in the post-Reformasi suffers from hurdles, the role of civil
society in the consolidation process is less instrumental compared to th e transitional
phase. The paper further argues that this situation happened due to the limits of civil
society in Indonesia. Despite the tremendous growth and development of CSOs in the
post-Reformasi, they failed to become the driving force for the democratization in
Indonesia. In addition to that, the prominent role of CSOs has remained declined.

The paper posits that such conditions occurred because of Indonesian CSOs have been
halfhearted to engaged with political activism and maintained themselves as apolitical
and outside the system. As a result, they become alienated from the political activism
and their importance for democratization is being undermined. The role of civil society
and CSOs as agents of democratic consolidation is also being questio ned by the fact that
they are challenged by internal constraints. In the end, the paper suggests that given the
fact that the role of civil society and CSOs are remain importance not only promoting
but also deepening democracy in Indonesia, they need to address these issues.

8 See Suchit Bunbongkarn (2001), The Role of Civil Society in Democratic Consolidation in Asia,
http://www.apcss.org.
9 Stefano Harney and Rita Olivia (2003), Civil Society and Civil Society Organizations in Indonesia, Paper in

the SES Series, International Labour Office, Geneva, August.

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Conceptualizing Civil Society

The idea of civil society has a long rooted history in political philosophy and can be
traced back to the writings of 18 th century European philosophers. The concept has
altered with Roman, Hegelian, Marxist, and Gramscian interpretations and definitions.
Yet it was only in the nineteenth century that the idea of civil society has become
popular after democratization process began in Eastern Europe, later in the rest of the
world. The Latin notion of civilis societas referred to communities, which conformed to
norms that rose above and beyond the laws of the state. For many centuries, theorists
did not clearly distinguish civil society from the state and often use the two terms
interchangeably,10 which inevitably makes the concept is somewhat ambiguous and
leads to confusion. As Lembruch puts it, Quite often, when civil society is used in the
political literature or the media, it is no longer clear what exactly the respective author
has in mind. The denotations of civil society have undergone significant changes over
time and in different national contexts. As a consequence, the meaning of the concept in
the contemporary discourse is fraught with considerable ambiguity. 11

In general, there are two dominant conceptions of civil society today. The first
conception view civil society as opposition to the state. It is identified with voluntary
associations and community bodies through which individuals govern themselves. The
non-government, non-party associations of civil society is here seen as forums of direct
participation which can intervene to curtail the increasing power and authoritarianism
of the state. In the second, civil society is associated with a set of institutions that
mediate between the individual and the state. 12 Many scholars, however, agree in
describing civil society as a social force in society, characterized with autonomous and
voluntary organizations, that is aside from but not necessarily in opposition to the state.
Linz and Stepan, for instance, define civil society as an arena of the polity where self-
organizing groups, movements and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state,
attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their
interests. 13
A more extensive definition is offered by Larry Diamond. He defines civil society as the
realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially
self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared
rules. It is distinct from society in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively
in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to
exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on the state, to
improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials
accountable. Civil society is an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere

10 J. Kean (1988), ed,, Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives, London: Verso, p.35.
11 See Gerhard Lehmbruch (2001), Germany, in Yamamoto Tadashi, ed., Governance and Civil Society in a
Global Age, Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, p. 230.
12 Gurpreet M ahajan (1999), Civil Society, State and D emocracy, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34,

No. 49, December 4-10, p.3471.

13 See Linz, J. Juan and Alfred Stepan (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:

southern Europe, South America, and Post-Co mmunist Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopki ns University
Press, p.7.
 5

and the state. 14 According to Diamond, civil society is alive and well when citizens
participate in church groups, professional associations, women's groups, trade unions,
human rights groups, and civic associations in order to press for state and economic
reforms. It encompasses a vast array of formal and informal organizations engaged in a
wide range of activities to achieve economic, cultural, educational, and developmental
goals. Pluralism and diversity characterize the groups comprising civil society. It is not
synonymous with society and beyond being voluntary, self-generating, autonomous,
and rule-abiding, the organizations of civil society are distinct from other social groups
in several respects. It is concerned with public rather than private ends and relates to
the state not to gain formal power but rather to seek from the state concessions,
benefits, policy changes, relief, redress, or accountability. 15

Diamond highlights that civil society is distinct from political society, which
encompasses all those organized actors (in a democracy, primarily political parties and
campaign organizations) whose primarily goal is to win control of the state or at least
some position for themselves within it. Organizations and networks in civil society may
form alliances with the parties, but they become captured by parties, or hegemonic
within them, they move their primary locus of activity to political society and lose much
their ability to perform certain unique mediating and democracy-building functions.16
By these definitions, the existence of an alive and well civ il society is thus linked to the
vitality of the political democracy. Merkel and Land identify a number of functions that
civil society has for democracy: 17 (1) protecting the citizens against state arbitrariness,
(2) maintaining a balance between society and the state based on the rule of law, (3)
disseminating the democratic values of tolerance, honesty and mutual acceptance, (4)
the creation of a public sphere of discussion, and (5) moderating social conflicts by
creating overlapping networks of organizations and crisscrossing socio-cultural
loyalties.
To draw up a comprehensive list of the types of associations which make up civil society
would be futile, as by their nature these organizations are interest-based and as such
many are volatile and fluid, forming and disbanding around different issues which are
important at the time, Atkinson makes what she calls a broad distinction between profit
making and non-profit organizations. The former refers to the private business sector.
The latter are those organizations distinct from this sector. They are associations of
professionals, workers, women, students, employers, journalists and consumers,
religious organizations, recreational and cultural clubs, human rights groups and, some
would add even political parties. 18 Thus, the concept of civil society can be defined as a
politically active sector of society, autonomous and not controlled by the state, and

14 Larry Diamond (1996), Civil Society and The Development of Democracy, paper presented on Seminar
Developing D emocracy: Toward Consolidation, Center for Adv anced Study in the Social Science, Juan
March Institute, Madrid, 7,12-14 November, p.5.
15 Ibid, p.7.
16 Ibid.
17 W.G. Wolters (2002), The M aking of Civil Society in Historical Pers pective, Research Programme

(2001-2005) on The Making of Civil Society in Indonesia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives , A
Collaboration of the universities of Nijmegen, Utrecht and Twente, and University of Indonesia and
University of Satya Wacana, Jakarta, 2002. Quoted from Wolfgang Me rkel and Hand-Jochim Land 91998),
De Rol van Civil Society in Het D emocratisch Proces, Oost-Europa Verkennigen, June.
18 D. Atkinson (1996) Civil Society after the Transition, In J. Coetzee and J. Graaf. (eds), Reconstruction,

Development and People, Johannesburg: International Thompson Publishing, p. 290.

 6

encompasses masses of citizens engaged in public protest, social movements, free

associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), acting in the public sphere to
promote and defend their interests, including against the state.

Although the key characteristic of civil society organizations is that they encompass
numerous local citizens groups, not all voluntary organizations do contribute to the
growth of civil society. At this point, Wolters 19 suggests looking at the CSOs, Civil Society
Organizations, as those organizations which explicitly contribute to the emergence of
civil society. CSOs thus involve a wide range of associations in which people try to
advance their vision of the good society. Among them, NGOs are almost taken as the
equivalent of civil society due to their visibility and popularity. More often, NGOs
emerge as the most visible, articulate and influential organizations among the CSOs.

Democratic Consolidation
Debates about democratic consolidation are often discourses about the meaning of
consolidation itself, although it presupposes an end of the democratization process
from previously authoritarian to a democratic regime. However, before going further to
define democratic consolidation, one should first understand about transitions to
democracy since the two are interrelated but yet distinct. In general, democratic
transition can be defined as a phase where power from the authoritarian regime takes
out and replaced by the new democratic regime. This phase leads to a typically lengthier
process of democratic consolidation where institutions find a basis for the long term.
Democratic consolidation, hence, always begins with the transitional phase.

There are many scholars offered explanations about transitions to democracy through
the examinations of the third wave of democratization in some countries in the late
1980s and early 1990s.20 While terminology often differs, there are some common
elements in much of this work; first, a transition to democracy could happen in one of
several ways, but in all of the ways elites within and outside of power are seen as the
most important actors. Second, democracy can evolve when a reform minded leader
takes the reigns of power and marginalizes hard-liners in power; third, democracy can
come about because of a negotiated process between reform-minded opposition leaders
and allies in power, or when an old order collapses and is replaced by democratically
inclined newcomers.21
As noted by Lee, the transition phase of democratization is regarded as a period of great
political uncertainty. This phase entails the broader and more complex processes
associated with the institutionalization of a new democratic set of rules for political life,

19 W.G. Wolters, op.cit, p.9.

20 There are at least three mos t prominent works on transitions to democracy, which are: Guillermo
ODonnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986), Transitions fro m Autho ritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions
about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press ; Samuel P. Hunti ngton (1991),
The Thi rd Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press;
and Adam Przeworski (1991), Democracy and the Market: Poli tical and Economic Reforms in Eastern
Europe and Latin America, New York: Cambridge University Press.
21 Amy L. Freedman (2006) Poli tical Change and Consolidation: Democracys Rocky Road in Thailand,

Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia, New York and England: Palgrave M acMillan, p.4.
 7

so this stage is regarded as a hybrid regime. The main feature of this stage is that
institutions of the old regime coexist with those of the new regime and authoritarians
and democrats often share power, whether through conflict or by agreement. The end of
the period of democratic transition is complete when a new democracy has
promulgated a new constitution and held free elections for political leaders with few
barriers to mass participation. 22
However, evidence shows that there is several of newly emerging democratic regimes in
the world that are far from consolidated, instead, they are merely surviving without
consolidating. In fact, some democratic regimes either have been terminated by coups
and other violent events or gradually have given way to single party authoritarian
regimes.23 At this point, Carothers argues that the trend of democratization that have
taken place during the so-called Third Wave of democratization tend to show an
unimpressive feature. Among 100 countries that has dismantled authoritarian regime
and gave way to democratization in the early 1990s, only less than 20 countries have
clearly transformed into well functioning democracy. 24 As noted by Subono,25 those
countries are now experiencing stagnancy in their transitional phase, and entering the
so-called twilight zone (Diamond, 1999) or grey zone (Carothers, 2002). In this light,
scholars who support transition paradigms try to explain these phenomena by saying
that between authoritarian system and democratic system, there are another system
called semi-democracy, formal democracy, electoral democracy, faade
democracy, pseudo-democracy, weak democracy, partial democracy, virtual
democracy (Coliier & Levitsky, 1997) illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997), and
broken-back democracy (Rose & Shin, 2001). Nevertheless, these labels are actually
used to justify the fact that those countries are failing in consolidating democracy.26

Given these facts, when then the transition to democracy can be said over? When can we
call a new democracy consolidated? How does one know when consolidation is
complete? What does it take to create institutions, cultures, or systems that can sustain
democracy? In order to ascertain how far a country has gone towards a transition to
democracy and move towards consolidation, Linz and Stepan argue that a democratic
transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political
procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that
is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the
authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial
power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other
bodies de jure.27

22 See Sangmook Lee (2007), Democratic Transition and the Consolidation of Democracy in South Korea,
Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3, No 1, p.103.
23 See John Higley and Richard Gunther (1992), eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America

and Southern Europe, New York: Cambridge University Press, p.3.

24 Thomas Carothers (2007), The Sequencing Fallacy, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 1, January,

http://www. journalofdemocracy.org.
25 Nur Iman Subono (1997), Prospek D emokrasi di Indonesia: ke Arah Tertib Politik, (The Prospect of

Democracy in Indonesia: Toward Political Order?), http://www.lakpesdam.or.id

26 Ibid. More readings about this see Fareed Zakari a (1994), The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, Foreign

Affairs, No. 76 (NovemberDecember), pp. 2243.

27 See Juan J.Linz and Alfred Stepan (2001), op.cit., p.19.
 8

Furthermore, Linz and Stepan argue that there are three minimal conditions must be
obtained before there can be any possibility of speaking of democratic consolidation. 28
First, in a modern polity, free and authoritative elections cannot be held, winners cannot
exercise the monopoly of legitimate force, and citizens cannot effectively have their
rights protected by a rule of law unless a state exists. Second, democracy cannot be
thought of as consolidated until a democratic transition has been brought to completion.
Third, no regime should be called a democracy unless its rulers govern democratically.
In addition to that, Linz and Stepan describe the more detailed state of consolidated
democracy when it combines behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions.
Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant
national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources
attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or by
seceding from the state. Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a
strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic pro blems and
deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and
institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for
anti-system alternatives is quite small or more-or-less isolated from prodemocratic
forces. Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and
nongovernmental forces alike become subject to, and habituated to, the resolution of
conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned
by the new democratic process.29 In short, Linz defines a consolidated democracy as
one in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces,
or institutions consider[s] that there is any alternative to the democratic process to gain
power and that no political institutions or groups has a claim to veto the action of
democratically elected decision makers.... To put it simply democracy must be seen as
the only game in town.30

Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation

Based on modernization theory of democracy, democracy happened from below when
citizens group themselves together to affirm their interests on the state. In the context
of democratic consolidation, democracy can be called consolidated not on ly when a
reversal to authoritarianism is unthinkable, but also when a free and vigorous civil
society does exist. Bearing in mind that one of the major assumptions behind the
concept of civil society is that it is a positive factor for the development of democracy,
civil society therefore can help consolidate democracy. However, as Atienza points out,
the aim of civil society is not to transform the state but to democratize society. 31
According to Porio, civil society acts as the agents for consolidating an d maintaining
democracy rather than initiating it. The more extensive functions of the civil society
outlined by Diamond, consists of ten democratic functions: (1) setting the limit on state
power; (2) supplementing the role of political parties; (3) developing democratic

28 For more discussion about the concept of democratic consolidation s ee Juan J.Linz and Alfred Stepan
(1996). Toward Consolidated Democracies, Journal of Democracy Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 14-33.
29 Ibid.
30 See Juan J.Linz (1990), Transition to Democracy, Washington Quarterly, No. 13, p. 158
31 Jun Atienza (1995), The Asian Spectrum, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 29-43.
 9

attributes; (4) creating channels for the articulation, aggregation, and representation of
interest, and generating opportunities for participation and influence at all levels of
governance; (5) mitigating the principal polarities of political conflicts; (6) recruiting
and training new political leaders; (7) monitoring elections; (8) disseminating
information and aiding citizens; (9) supporting economic reform; (10) strengthening
the democratic state.32

Although civil society and CSOs can help consolidate democracy in a number of ways, it
is important to note that the success of CSOs in doing so depends on the circumstances
they are dealt with. Hence, the skills and strategies utilized by CSOs in relating to the
state are in part dependent on the stage of social mobilization and political transitions.
Thus, in different stages of democratic transition, CSOs assume different roles and
utilize different strategies in their relationship to the state. Porio argues that in order to
understand the dynamics of civil society, there are two essential elements involves: first,
the plurality of groups that make up civil society and recognizing their class dimensions.
Second, fractions of the elite/dominant groups and their tendency to appropriate certain
groups in civil society to gain legitimacy and suppress those who will challenge them.
Porio further argues that recognizing these elements would allow one to see more
clearly the limits and potentials of CSOs' pluralism and heterogeneity. While diversity is
considered as a potential strength among CSOs and networks, it also becomes their
main weakness. Often, this creates the divisions within civil society, which make them
susceptible to the political maneuvers of the dominant groups. 33

In the process of democratic consolidation, the diverse strategies used by civil society
and CSOs has often caused fragmentation among CSOs. This was clearly illustrated in
Indonesias civil society during the phase of consolidation of democracy. During the
struggle against the authoritarian regime of Soeharto, there was a relative unity among
CSOs and networks vis--vis the state. Indonesias civil society and CSOs were solid in
doing social protests against the regime, in fact, they became a big power which
effectively brought down the Soeharto regime. Nonetheless, after Soehartos downfall
and the transition were set in motion, they became fragmented again. There was no
such common value that can unite them and brought them together to effectively
supporting the consolidation process. As Porio puts it, the overwhelming unity of civil
society groups is quite impressive against a common enemy like an oppressive state,
but once this common enemy is dislodged, the fragility of their alliances is unmasked. 34
The resurrection of civil society, as ODonnell and Schmitter argue, is likely to disappear
after the transition, as the common identity is split into gender, class, ethnicity, and
language.35 In addition, Boussard posits that the functions of civil society in building

32 Larry Diamond (1994), Rethi nking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation, Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 5, No 3, p.317.
33 Emma Porio (2002), Civil Society and Democratization in Asia: Prospects and Challenges in The New

Millennium, in Yue Man Yeung (ed), New Challenges for Development and Modernization: Hongkong and
The Asia Pacific Region in The New Mi llennium, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese
University Press, p.235.
34 Ibid.
35 Guillermo ODonnell and Philippe C. Schmi tter (1986), op.cit, p.55.
 10

democracy, however, constrained by a number of factors.36 One aspect is the ruling

elites strategies towards civil society. Civil society cannot contribute to democratic
development as an agenda setter or a counterpart if organizations are being co -opted by
the government. Another aspect is the nature of CSOs; organizations that are uncivil and
undemocratic are unlikely to contribute to a democratic development or democratic
consolidation. In Indonesia, these factors are seemed to appear and lessen the role of
the CSOs in contributing to the process of democratic consolidation.

Role of Indonesian Civil Society in Democratic Transition

Like other Asian countries, democratization in Indonesia would not have been achieved
without the active role of civil society. Although there are number of factors that helped
giving pressure and impact on political change in the country in 1998, yet the role of
civil society was undoubtedly crucial in the process that marked a transition from
authoritarianism to a new democracy. The role of civil society in fostering democratic
transition in Indonesia was reflected in a series of student demonstrations against the
authoritarian rule and demanding for democratization. With the support of some very
notable and high-profile individuals namely Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais,
Moslem leaders from the NU and Muhammadiyah, they called for Suharto to step down.
It was not until May of 1998 that Soeharto finally stepped down after several protests
and riots happened in the country throughout the rest of 1997 and in 1998. On top of
that, the occupation of parliament by students from 18 May 1998 until the fall of
Soeharto on 21 May 1998 have became a pinnacle of democracy movement in
Indonesia.

Although the successful democracy movement in May 1998 has witnessed the absence
of other foremost elements of the CSOs, the so-called NGOs, but it did not necessarily
erode the significance of the CSOs. Given the fact that it was the student movements that
played crucial role as core groups in a broad-based social movement demanding for
Soehartos resignation, they are in fact only representing one of the elements of civil
society in Indonesia. Arguably, there are at least two reasons for not undermining the
contributions of the NGOs in fostering democratization in Indonesia. First, the less
contribution of the NGOs in the early stage of democratic transition has given them a
breathing space to reassess their position and role in the radically different conditions
of the post-Soeharto period. While it is acknowledged that they were a representative of
the society, the systematic emasculation of civil society has indeed weakened its ability
to counterbalance the state. Therefore, the successful of Reformasi movement has
created the impetus for the resurrection of civil society in general.
Second, civil society in the forms of NGOs and other CSOs have contributed to formulate
and further pursue the Reformasi agenda and help to channel peoples aspirations in
ways that promote democracy and good governance. While the students were the
avant-garde of the Reformasi, NGOs and other CSOs became the dynamic force of the
democratization and took over the relay stick to continue the game. Their role became

36Caroline Boussard, (2003) Crafting Democracy: Civil Society in Post-Transition Honduras, PhD
Dissertation, Lund Political Studies 127, Department of Political Science, Lund University, p.111.
Downloaded from http://www.svet.lu.se/lps/lps.html.
 11

much more instrumental due to the fact that the process was seen hijacked by the
claimed pro-democracy elites, who try to domesticate and yet benefit from the radicals
protests while basically focusing on negotiating and winning reasonably free and fair
elections, and then forming pragmatic coalitions and striking the best possible deal with
sections of the establishment. Moreover, as Tornquist critics, the existing political
society in the forms of political parties and the parliament- have been suffering from
public legitimacy and trust, as well as plagued by low credibility and bad image.37
More specifically, Hikam points out significant role of NGOs in the political reforms
through their involvement in the public policy making process and empowerment of
citizens in defending and pursuing their basic rights as well. 38 Hikam notes that many
cases related to human rights abuse, political violence, environmental destruction, etc,
which were otherwise being swept under the carpet by the state apparatus have been
investigated by the NGOs. 39 In the area of political reform, the NGOs have played role by
investigating the political corruption and power abuse in the political society level. For
instance, in the mid of 1999, there were two NGOs namely the UPC (Urban Poor
Consortium) and the ICW (Indonesias Corruption Watch) investigated corruption cases
done by the political parties and the government. 40 In the public policy making process,
for example, there are two government regulations (regarded as National Law)
promoted by a coalition of NGOs: Law Number 10/2004 on the establishment of
regulations (Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-undangan) and discussion about
package of revision of Political Laws 2009 (pembahasan paket revisi UU Politik tahun
2009). 41 Another example in the regional level was in Sulawesi Tengah, distr ict
Donggala, whereby the coalition of local NGOs succeeded in promoting district
regulation concerning with womens role and participation in the village representative
body.42

37 See Olle Tornquist (1999), On Dynamics of Indonesias Democratisation, Third World Quarterly, Vol.
21, No. 3, p.383
38 Muhammad A. S. Hikam (2008b), One Decade of Political Reform in Indonesia: A Half or A Half Empty

Glass?, The Hikam Forum, April.

39Muhammad A. S. Hikam (1999), 1999) The Role Of NGOs in the Empowerment of Indonesian Ci vil Society:

A Political Perspective, paper pres ented i n 12th INFID Conference, Bali 14-17 September
40 Such cas es involving corruption were also reported by almost all national media in Indonesia. On its

press conference, UPC claimed that the pov erty alleviation program or known as the Social Safety Net
(SSN) fund, which amounted to US$ 800 million, had been mis -used for political campaigns in the
provincial areas of Greater Jakarta, West Jav a, West Nusa Tenggara, and East Jav a. ICW has also blown the
whistle in a press conference that, in effect, alleged the Attorney General and his wife had received a total
of 9.2 billion rupiahs through their bank accounts. The amount includes 450 million rupiahs transfers
from two well-known Indonesias Chinese tycoons, The Nin King and Prayogo Pangestu. These two cas es
illustrate the extent to which the NGOs have play ed significant role in the political reform during the
phas e of democratic transition in Indonesia. Nonetheless the subs equent number should not be
dismissed.
41 For more reading on this see Wawan Ichwanuddin, et.al (2006), Masyarakat Sipil dan Kebijakan Publik:

Studi Kasus A ktivitas Masyarakat Sipil dalam Mempengaruhi Kebijakan Publik, (Civil Society and Public
Policy: Case Study of Civil Society Activity in Promoting Public Policy), YAPPIKA.
42 For more reading on this see Nor Hikmah (2008), Perda Keterwakilan Perempuan: Menciptakan

Bulonggo Baru di Sul awesi Tengah (District Regulation on Womens Representatives: Creating A New
Bulonggo In Central Sulawesi), in Nor Hikmah, et.al, Gerakan Ekstra Parlementer Baru: Mendorong
Demo krasi di Tingkat Lokal, (New Extra Parliamentary Movement: Promoting Democracy in the Local
Level), Jakarta, YAPPIKA.
 12

A national survey on Civil Society Index by YAPPIKA in 2006 reveals that Indo nesias
CSOs were recognized to be active in influencing public policies making process by
establishing an umbrella organization concerning with particular issues. One of the
primary roles that the umbrella organization played in the reform era was to pro mote,
advocate, defend and extend the civil and political rights that they attained through
advocacy in order to influence the policy making process. The NGOs actively establish
various coalitions at the national level in order to influence public policy making so it
shall take into account the good governance principles, such as: advocacy networking
for the elimination of violence against women, NGOs coalition for the law on foundation,
NGOs coalition for the freedom of information, working group for law o n state defense,
NGOs coalition for participatory law making process, NGOs coalition on the new
constitution. These kinds of coalitions were found to be existed in several provinces in
Indonesia.43 In this context, the efforts are often carried out in varying forms of
advocacy and policy dialogue such as seminars and workshops, public campaigns and
information dissemination, lobbying, public hearing with the parliament, including
providing pressures by taking to the streets and protests. 44

In addition, there are other main dimensions where the Indonesias civil society actively
involved and succeed in fulfilling its essential functions. According to the survey, it
comprises the following dimensions: (1) influencing public policy; (2) holding state and
private corporation accountable; (3) responding social interests; (4) empowering
citizens, and (5) meeting social needs. Overall, the survey reveals that in spite of their
active part in performing various essential functions, however, the impact have been
limited due to some reasons. The arguments are follow:45 first, Indonesia is such a vast
country that it would be impossible for CSO programs to reach the entire nation. Second,
the financial resources of CSOs are limited. Thirdly, the bargaining power of civil society
vis--vis the government in decision-making processes is weak, mainly due to a lack of
capacity in lobbying and negotiation, and the rocky relations between CSOs, the
government and the private sector.

Having these evidences, it is clear that civil society in Indonesia seems to have
important functions in the democratic transition period. Civil society is engaged in
broad range of issues and various activities, particularly in the forms of NGO coalitions.
However, perhaps the most important function of Indonesias civil society in the
democratic transition period has been the capacity to act as an agenda setter.
Indonesias civil society has played an important role by calling attention to issues that
politicians have avoided or neglected. On top, civil societys democracy-building
potential has also been affected by the political context. The Indonesias case clearly
illustrates that any attempt to analyze civil societys role and democracy-building
potential should start by examining the surrounding political context and the strategies
towards civil society. When civil society became stronger and louder, the government
invited civil society to participate in different forms of cooperation. This has been most
obvious under the Soehartos New Order governance. Although the New Order included
civil society, but that was not because Soeharto believed that he needed it, but because
the foreign donors demanded civil society participation in the development process.

43 See CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report, op.cit, p.73.

44 Ibid.
45 Ibid. p.86
 13

Thus, in order to understand the dynamics of civil societys role, and the political
societys attitudes towards civil society, the external dimension must also be taken into
consideration.

Towards Consolidation: What Challenge Civil Society?

While the above section demonstrates the importance of civil societys role in the
democratization process, one should bear in mind it is still insufficient to bring about
democratic consolidation in Indonesia. The role of civil society and CSOs has been wide -
ranging but at the same time, it has been limited as well. Burdened with high
expectations to have been greater contribute in strengthening democracy-building in
the country, civil society has in fact suffers from many constraints which consequently,
lessen their significance as agent for consolidation. While it is acknowledged that
Indonesian democracy is challenging hurdles to consolidate itself, the call for greater
role of civil society and CSOs is increasingly critical. Ironically, Indonesias one decade
of Reformasi has been witnessed two contrasting facets of its civil society: one is a
vibrant and active civil society, and the other is a fragile and hollow civil society. Among
the many weaknesses that Indonesian civil society have dealt with, the paper comes
with at least three main constraining factors that hamper the ability of civil society to
further consolidate democracy in Indonesia; (1) lack of organizational capacity, (2) the
presence of uncivil and undemocratic CSOs, and (3) lack of engagement with political
activism. Apart from that, it is also important to look at the external factors constraining
the role of civil society in Indonesia. Potential threats to limit freedom of speech,
criminalization of the media, intimidation of the activists, still haunt Indonesian
democracy.

There have been abundant studies attempt to identify and analyze the structural
problems at the organizational level of most of Indonesias CSOs. Yet the findings are
comparable. Basically, the foremost organizational constraint of the CSOs is relating to
their particularly limited resources. Based on Civil Society Index 2006, many of the CSOs
in Indonesia particularly facing the problem of having limited financial, human,
technical and infrastructural resources. Most CSOs do not yet have adequate self -
supporting and sustainable resources, and as a result are unable to achieve their stated
goals effectively. CSOs also lack the ability to attract, form cadres of, and maintain the
human resources they need for their organizations to function effectively. Membership
fees have been unpaid by the members of membership-based organizations. Indonesias
NGOs are dependent on foreign aid. Funds from the Indonesias public, financial
assistance from government and financial contributions from the private sector amount
to only a small sum.46

Similarly, Hollaender points out a number of concrete problems confronting Indonesia's

NGOs: Many of them, though registered formally, exist only on paper. Others lack
financial and human resources. High staff-fluctuation rates often imperil the success of
their work. People are less and less willing to engage in social and political activities.

46CIVICUS (2006) Civil Society Index Report for the Republic of Indonesia, Indonesian Civil Society 2006: a
Long Journey to a Civil Society, written by Rustam Ibrahim, Jakarta.
 14

Regular group memberships are rare. Pronounced fragmentation along traditional

social fault lines limits the NGOs' access to decision-making processes. Many groups are
self-centered, give themselves elitist airs, and have hardly any support among the
population. NGOs with sponsors and financial resources for their activities are the
exception rather than the rule in Indonesia. Many Indonesian activists speak English
only badly, a grave problem because competence in foreign languages is so important.
Many also lack practical experience in project management. Reflecting development
gradients within Indonesia, regional disparities negatively affect the NGOs' work.
Another obstacle on their way is the ethnic, cultural, and religious fragmentation of the
country's own civil society. 47 In addition, a recent series of academic studies of the civil
society sector, NGOs and the pro-democracy movement in Indonesia have revealed
what constitutes the main weaknesses of the Indonesias NGOs. 48 Antlov, Ibrahim, and
Van Tuijl summarize some key characteristics of Indonesias NGOs today, which
encompasses the following issues: Centralistic and urban located, elitist and middle-
class, floating in-between the state and the community, sectoral and fragmented, lack of
managerial and advocacy skills, lacking focus and ideology, and on top of that, lack of
accountability.

The most fundamental difficulty and constraint faced by many CSOs particularly
NGOs is perhaps their ability to be financially self -sustaining and independent. Most of
them are completely rely on external financing, particularly from foreign donor
agencies. A bit sarcastic but true to say that many NGOs have survived from one
proposal to another proposal, to describe how dependent are the NGOs in terms of
financial capacity. The only Indonesian NGOs which relatively success in mobilizing
domestic financial support are WALHI, Dian Desa, and Bina Swadaya. 49 Having displayed
these evidences, it is important to note that these problems exist partly as a
consequence of systematic emasculation of civil society for more than three decades,
which adversely affected civil society. Thus, the New Order regime was partially to
blame for the weaknesses of the organizational capacity of the CSOs.

Another challenge from within civil society is the emergence of the so called uncivil
and undemocratic civil society groups, which adversely affected the quality of
Indonesian democracy. In particular, the emergence of such groups is affected by the
strong primordial character of CSOs. Although primordial ties may not necessarily drag
CSOs into what Whitehead calls the uncivil interstices between civil and political

47 Michael Hollaender (2006), Consolidating Indonesias Democracy by Educati ng Civil Society Leaders in
Democratic Politics, Auslandsinformationen, Vol. 7, http://www.kas.de.
48 Amongs t well-analyzed studies of the weaknesses of the NGOs are done by DEMO S, WACANA; LP3ES,

PIRAC, UTS/Trisakti, John Sidel, and Bob Hadiwinata. See for exampl e: Adi P. Stanley, A.E. Priyono and
Olle Tornquist (2003), eds, Indonesias Post Reformasi Movement, Jakarta, DEMOS; Wacana (1999),
Masyarakat Sipil (Civil Society), Ins titute for Soci al Transformation (INSIST), Yogyakarta, Edisi 1, Vol. 1;
PIRAC (2002), Inves ting in Ourselves: Giving and Fund Raising in Indonesia, Jakarta; John Sidel (2004),
Wateri ng the Flowers, Killing the Weeds: The Promotion of Local Democratization and Good Gov ernance
in Indonesia. Unpublished Report to the Ford Foundation, Jakarta, September; Bob S. Hadiwinata (2003),
The Poli tics of NGOs in Indonesia: Developing Democracy and Managing a Movement. London and New
York: Routledge Curzon.
49 By creating such channel as Dana Mitra Lingkungan (friends of the environment fund), WALHI had

been able to raise funding for their activity. Dian Desa has also success increasing its domestic income by
providing consultancies and selling technology that it has developed. Yet many other NGOs faci ng
difficulties in doing s uch efforts to gain domestic funds to support thei r activities.
 15

society that produce less-than-ideal civil society, there is the chance that extremists,
who delight in stirring up religious and ethnic hatred, might be able to use civil society
organizations as vehicles for their extreme movements, seeing these organizations
adopt anti-social agendas which could constrain democracy. 50 Ironically, it seems that
the authorities have been reluctant to take action, realizing that these groups are often
influential not only socially but politically as well. More worrisome, the existences of
such groups are often facilitated by NGOs, claiming that they truly represent grassroots
interests. Although some scholars argue that such religious extremist groups are not the
part of Indonesias civil society, 51 the evidences show how a vibrant civil society may
not be totally supportive of democracy. While some scholars posit that some CSOs
promote civic engagement that strengthen democracy, other organizations also weaken
the domain of civil society and represent uncivil and undemocratic attitudes of the civil
society. In Indonesian context, the number could even be extended further, considering
that such primordialism is still strongly rooted in Indonesias society which divided into
various ethnics, religions, and other heterogeneity.

Threats from Systemic Level

Apart from those limitations which is actually can be classified as internal constraint
it is also important to see whether there have been external factors constraining the
role of civil society in the country. In general, it might be true to say that there are no
larger constraints at the systemic level that can hinder the ability of the civil society to
play its role and function as an agent of democratization. Freedom of speech, freedom of
press or forming associations is already guaranteed by the law. In the public policy
making process, the CSOs have been often contributed in consulting or monitoring the

50 Bob S. Hadiwinata (2009) in M arco Bunte and Andreas Ufen, Democratization in Post-Soeharto
Indonesia, London and New York: Routledge, p.291. In Indonesia, some civil religious groups such as
Laskar Ji had and Front Pembela Islam (FPI) were promoting an extreme anti -democratic sentiment
among the Indonesias Muslims. Laskar Jihad for instance, not only it was renowned for its rejection of
liberal democracy, it also promoting anti-Christi an sentiment. It also involved in religious conflicts in
Moluccas and Poso, the east regions of Indonesia, whereby it established the paramilitary of the Forum
Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah or FKAWJ (Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah Communic ation Forum) to
defend Muslims from violence perpetrated by Christians in the Moluccas. In the regional scope, there was
also extreme ethno-nationalist organization called LMMDD-KT (Dayak D eliberative Council of Central
Kalimantan) which was es tablished during the final years of Soehartos reign when the growing weakness
of the New Order gov ernment duri ng the early 1990s came to light, encouragi ng Day aks to take action in
line with thei r growing belief that they should ri ghtfully control more of thei r local society. 50 Likewise the
Laskar Ji had, this organization was involved in the so called Sampi t massacre, whereby it played a cruci al
role in stirring up anti-Madurese sentiment among D ayaks which then mounted into one of the bloodiest
ethnic conflicts in Indonesias history. Ironically, this group was facilitated and supported by a number of
environmental and communi ty development NGOs which actively campaigned for the recognition of
indigenous ri ghts, Among these extremist groups, perhaps FPI is the most notable and influential in
terms of social and politics. It also known as the most active group which often involve and provoke
violence.
51 Herry Priyono, for example, states that religious extremism is not a part of civil society groups due to

twofold reasons; one concerns the issue of power, the other issue of civility. Moreover, he insists that far
from bei ng part of civil society, these religious extremists are the enemi es of civil society. for more
readings see B. Herry Priyono, Is Religious Extremism Part of Indonesias Civil Society ?, The Jakarta
Post, December 29, 2006.
 16

policy making processes both in the parliament and the government. All in all,
Indonesian civil society has been in a free and conducive situation.

However, recent dynamics in Indonesia lately shows potential threat for the role of civil
society in helping consolidate Indonesias democracy. During the second period of
Yudhoyonos administration, it is noted that there have been several threats not only to
the development of civil society but also to Indonesian democracy in particular. In 2009,
the media reported the commitment of the government and the House of
Representative (DPR) to passing the state secrecy bill which, as many argued, contains
too many controversial articles. This controversial bill was accused of not only limiting
individual rights, but also gives too much power to the state and criminalizes the
people. Moreover, the bill was seen potential to be abused by the government to stifle
public criticism and threatens press freedom. For civil society, the bill is also feared to
constitute a constraint on ability of CSOs to monitor and criticize government policies.
Above all, the endorsement of the bill will be a serious threat to democracy and, at the
same time, empower political authoritarianism in the country.

There are at least three most critical points to be noted here, regarding the
controversial secrecy bill which is feared to be abused by the government. First, the
definition of state secrecy gives no clear-cut definitions of state secrets and has a wide
range of interpretations that could facilitate unaccountable state operations. 52 Second,
the contents of the secrecy bill that would allow any bureaucrats to use any
interpretation they wanted to classify sensitive information as confidential. 53 Arguably,
the clause of confidentiality is of course contradicted with the spirit of good governance
and transparency. Third, the stiff punishment for guilty violation on the state secrets,
between Rp 50 billion and Rp 100 billion to be imposed upon firms found guilty of
violations. It also threatens individuals found guilty of leaking highly secret information
during wartime with the death penalty. 54 Seen in this light, the punishments of heavy
fine and even the death penalty show that the law will be used to restrain peoples
rights to access information and impede their opportunity to participate in the public
policy making process. At the same time, it also makes the state more powerful and free
to criminalize people who suspected of violating the law. For example, a journalist
reporting on sensitive issues which the bureaucrats consider to be confidential would
face imprisonment or even be subject of the death penalty if the country is at war.

52 According to Lendong, this definition has at leas t three cri tical points : (1) too broad and too general, (2)
the kind of information categorized as secret is too wide, such as information on national defense, the
military, intelligence and the national economy, and (3) it gives the President too much power to
determine the defi nition of state secrecy. Similarly, Teten Masduki, the s ecretary secretary -general of
Trans parency International Indonesia (T II), points out that the endors ement of the bill will make
Indonesia accused of being a country that opposes the UN Convention Agains t Corruption (UNCAC) that
Indonesia ratified in 2003. See Romanus Ndau Lendong, State Secrecy Bill: A Threat to Our D emocracy,
The Jakarta Post, August 24, 2009. For interview with Teten Masduki, see The Jakarta Post, July 25, 2009.
53 For example, Article 6A in the bill stipulates that information on the state budget and its allocation is

regarded as confidential. Article 12 s tipulates that all the standards, procedures, and scope of the
protection and management of state secrets is formulated and determined by the President and will be
regulated in a government regul ation. Apart from that, articles 18 to 35, as well as article 49 encompass
contentious regulations which threaten press freedom and limit the publics access to information.
54 The Jakarta Post, September 16, 2009.
 17

For civil society and CSOs, the endorsement of the bill will of course hamper their ability
to monitoring and advocacy. Not only will it lessen their basic function as government
watchdog, but also their functions to advocate publics interest over the governments
policies. Although the bill was eventually withdrawn after mounting pressures from
NGOs coalition named The Coalition Against the State Secrecy Bill, skepticism still arises
as the government only decided to cease deliberating the bill instead of rescind the
bill. 55 The possibility of the bill to be endorsed in the future is likely to happen,
considering that the discussion of the bill is already meet the deadline and because
budget allocations had already been made for it.56 The statement from State Secretary
Minister, Hatta Rajasa, on September 7, 2009 has also implied such possibility. 57

In addition, there are also many challenges that lie ahead which need to be paid
attention regarding with some laws that are not in line with the idea of press freedom.
Defamation Laws, for instance, have been criticized and sparked concerns for freedom
of press in Indonesia. Under these laws, the government officials can charge almost
anyone with defamation, an act that can land critics and activists in jail. According to
Elaine Pearson, the director of U.S.-based Human Rights Watch, public officials are using
these laws to deflect attention from their own misconduct, so that the interests of the
powerful, the interests of politicians are protected, and their criminal defamation
complaints are pursued quite aggressively while the underlying complaint that led to
the defamation charges often fails to be investigated. 58

Concerns about deterioration of freedom are more reasonable when th e Ministry of

Communication drafted a plan that would allow internet service providers to block
websites the government deemed a threat to public order. Of course, protests against
the plan were mounted to force the government withdraw the review. Althoug h the
government insists that it would only limit pornography contents and sensitive issues,
nonetheless, such censorship is somehow reflecting governments uneasiness with the
exercise of freedom expression in Indonesia. To a large extent, internet censor ship also
reflects the governments attempt to silence critics of public officials. Basically, the
attempts to control freedom had already been established by the Ministry of
Communication, with four Government Regulations which have decrease the authority
of Indonesia Broadcast Commission (KPI), the obligation to register pre -paid cell phone
number, Bill of Act on Electronic Information and Transaction (UU ITE), Freedom of
Information Act (UU KIP).

55 Such opinion for instance expressed by Marzuki Darusman, He believed that the only reason the
government withdrew the bill is because it is unhappy with the current version of the bill, and that the
government and DPR will improve the bill to be more democratic and completely different from the
original draft that was very repressive. See The Jakarta Post, September 16, 2009.
56 According to the House s ecretariat general, a deliberation process of the bill costs between Rp 1 billion

(US$ 100.000) and Rp 2 billion on average.

57 Hatta said because of fears arising among the general public about whether the bill would effectively

mean a return to an authoritarian regime, the government had decided not to push for the bill's
endorsement this year and to make a further assessment on the extent of the need for the bill. In addi tion,
Presidential spokesman Andi Mallarangeng and presidential legal advisor Denny Indrayana also said that
the President preferred the House to delay endorsing the bill this month to avoid problems wi th future
enforcement, given some contentious parts. See The Jakarta Post, September 16, 2009.
58 Sara Schondhart, Defamation Laws Spark Concerns for Press Freedom, 13 May 2010,

http://www1.voanews.com
 18

The case of Prita Mulyasari probably best exemplifies the uneasiness of the online
media. Using the Bill of Act on Electronic Information and Transaction, Mulyasari a
housewife and a mother of two was sued due for writing an email to friends
complaining about the treatment she received at a private hospital. The case was given
public wide attention when she was jailed for three weeks and demanded an indemnity
of Rp 200 million for allegedly defaming the hospital. While significant pressure
eventually led to Prita being released, the important aspect of her arr est is the questions
it raises in relation to freedom of speech and the right of the consumer to complain
about medical services. Furthermore, concerns have been raised about the prosecutors
lack of sensitivity, fairness and proportional punishment when dealing with suspects,
and their unsubstantiated interpretation of the Bill of Act on Electronic Information and
Transaction. As noted by Schondhart,59 Mulyasaris trial sparked public outrage and
drew more than 100,000 people to a Facebook page set up to support her. The courts
eventually acquitted her, but the message her case sent was clear the law could
criminalize anyone for even peaceful acts of criticism.

A cynical point of view expressed by Usman Hamid, human rights activist who has also
scrutinized from officials after questioning the acquittal of a senior intelligence agency
official in the murder trial of his fellow campaigner, saying that as long as public officials
can threaten journalists, activists and consumers with defamation lawsuits, the country
can hardly claim to be a champion of freedom and openness.60 Seen from this
perspective, it is no exaggeration for one to say that the existence and use of the
defamation laws are indeed put freedom of speech in jeopardy. The latest case involving
a media office and a CSO activist have become the most critical evidence of how freedom
of speech in Indonesia is truly at risk. The office of Tempo news magazine was attacked
with Molotov cocktails after it published a report on suspicious bank accounts of at
least seven high-ranking police officers allegedly containing billions of rupiah. The
attacked is widely believed to be linked to the publications report, although the police
insisted that it was the work of a third party who exploited the situation. However, the
impression that they were particularly disturbed by the news is clearly visible with the
disappearance of the magazine edition from the market. As reported by the media, the
attack on Tempo was quickly followed when an anti-graft activist from ICW was
assaulted.

All in all, these evidence indicate that such potential threats are remain exist. In regards
with civil society, the consolidation of civil society is urgently needed to prevent such
precedents. Consolidation becomes more important as these threats would inevitably
situate civil society vis--vis the state. Seeing that Indonesian democracy has been
hijacked by the elites and moving towards an oligarchic democracy, tendencies to
secure their interests and powers by controlling critical voices will always there. Thus,
this situation will encounter civil society and the CSOs that act as a counterbalance
power for the state.

59 Sara Schondhart, Indonesia and Free Speech, 11 June 2010, http://www.the-diplomat.com

60 Ibid.
 19

For More Consolidation of Democracy: Recommendation for Civil Society

With oligarchic democracy in stable or established democracy becoming disengaged
from the public they are intended to serve, how can civil society maintain
democratization to stay on track and move towards consolidation? With their power
and influence being challenged and threaten by the state, can civil society strengthen
itself and play its role excessively in helping consolidate democracy? Much of the
discussion presented in this paper shows that despite its tremendous contributions in
democratizing the country, civil society in Indonesia still facing several challenges
which hinder its ability in greater contribute to consolidate Indonesias democracy.
Whilst the 2009 elections left foundation for democratic consolidation in terms of
procedural democracy, it also left great challenges for maintaining a substantive
democratic consolidation that civil society has to deal with. Hence, this part discusses
some recommendations for civil society in order to greater contributes for more
consolidation of democracy in Indonesia. Much of the recommendations are based on
the analysis of the limitations of civil society in Indonesia, as it is argued that those
limitations has been constraining the ability of civil society to help further consolidating
democracy.
Most agree that civil society contributes towards both the substance and process of
democracy. It promotes better democratic process particularly through its watchdog
functions. In fact, many of the significant achievements of Reformasi would not have
been made without contribution of civil society. Civil society and CSOs are operating in
an increasingly complex field, which often creates new tensions in their role. On the one
hand, they need to carry the public interests along in support of their work as facilitator
for public vis--vis the state. On the other hand, they need to become increasingly
professional in dealing with issues and engaging with the state; this entails developing
strong organizations, with solid structures and professional management. Whilst impact
becomes one of the most important dimension used to assess the state of civil society, it
thus requires that CSOs must become specified and specialize their work areas in scale
in order to make a greater impact and maintain their influence on society.

In terms of capacity building, there have been recommendations suggested by many of

the international forum of civil society in order to strengthen its organizational
capacity. 61 However, it should be noted that for CSOs to be able to strengthen their
capacity, they need to measure their own strengths and weaknesses and then take

61 For example, Jacques offered four levels of organizational development i n order to develop a strong
organization of civil society. First, by building the capacity of CSOs to be more s trategic and effective, i.e.
through traini ng leaders. Second, by building alliances wi thin a s ector or domain will support individual
sector members or issue-based communiti es in order to improved information through sharing best
practices and avoiding duplication, as well as to make a greater impact at policy level and as a means to
set standards in accountability. In addition to that, alliances and networking can also create solidarity.
Third, bridge-building across sector boundaries, which can strengthen both by generating a larger body of
interest and also new resources. Fourth, es tablishing transnational or international engagement, which
can also enhance civil society roles in governance. This is particularly important as the growing attention
paid over the last decade to the NGO meetings held in parallel to intergov ernmental summits and
conferences bears testimony to the importance of such forms of civil society intervention. A more
comprehensive readi ng on this see Wilton Park Conference (2006), Strengthening Democratic
Governance: The Role of Civil Society, wri tten by Isobelle Jacques, Report on Wilton Park Conference
S06/10, 12-14 June 2006.
 20

action based on needs, assets and institutional environment. This agenda has to be
considered as the first priority in order to strengthen civil society in Indonesia.
Moreover, in the context of democratization, a strong civil society is a prerequisite for a
strong democracy. Thus, it is necessary to improve the capacity of civil society by
improving its role, functions, and position of the CSOs. With these thoughts in mind, the
above recommendations meet its relevance with the condition of the CSOs in Indonesia.
Besides, such condition is commonly found in the CSOs in any societies, especially a
society like Indonesia, where democracy is still newly developed. However, those
recommendations are placed on the idea of civil society empowerment. What this paper
posits is that such empowerment is needed in order to develop a strong and effective
civil society, and it is feasible and realistic to be done but the problem is whether civil
society and CSOs are willing to put them into actions.

Engagement with Politics: How does it Matter?

Aside from internal capacity-building, it should be noted that relations between civil
society and state is also important factor to in further consolidating Indonesias
democracy in the future. Yet discussing about relationship between civil society and
state is quite dilemmatic. On the one hand, there has been reluctance amongst the CSOs
in Indonesia to engage with the state or political activism. Many of the CSOs in Indonesia
insist to maintain their high degree of autonomy towards the state, and highly felt
uncomfortable to work together with the government. On the other hand, the situation
with the government is vice versa. Given that the patronage system still rooted in the
government with dysfunctional parties and elites, they are most likely unwilling or
unable to aggregate interests of diverse groups and translate its policy proposals and
campaign promises into governmental action after election. Besides, governments
believe that they have know-how and expertise to make right decisions and know what
is in the best interest of the people without consulting them . With these as backdrop,
most of the CSOs in Indonesia preferably put themselves as opposition to the state,
rather than associate themselves with a set of institutions that mediate between the
people and the state.

However, democratization agenda was too big and too important to be left to the state.
Whilst the state in the forms of government, parliament and the political parties have
been suffering from public trust and plagued by credibility, the role of the civil society
and the CSOs becomes much more important in ensuring the democratization agenda to
be carried out by the state. Engagement of the civil society to political activism is thus
becomes a necessity. For democratic consolidation to be essentially reached, both civil
society and the state have to position themselves with a consideration of mutual
relation. Seen from this perspective, civil society and state are not seen as antagonistic
bodies. As Mahajan puts it, in a democracy the state and civil society act together, in
tandem with each other, to promote citizenship rights and the conditions of subjective
freedom.62 Where the government and civil society organizations are pursuing the

62Gurpreet M ahajan (1999), Civil Society and Its Avtars: What Happened to Freedom and D emocracy?,
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 20, M ay 15-21, pp.1188-1196.
 21

same agenda, then the role of the latter is to support and strengthen the governments
capacity to advance democratic governance. 63

Although the post-Reformasi has witnessed the considerably changed relationship

between civil society and state, in the sense that both of them have been able to
establish much better communications and cooperation, their relations are still pretty
much colored by a trust deficiency among each other. On the one hand, the state still
seems unwilling to involve civil society and seek inputs from CSOs in the public policy
making, although such involvement is necessary in order to solve issues and problems.
This is more obvious when it comes to such contentious issues as corruptions, human
rights, good governance, rule of law, etc. The CSOs, on the other hand, are often too
demanding and have too much prejudice without giving enough inputs. Whereas civil
society can actually become a valued source for expertise and skills that are badly
needed by the state, especially the political parties and the parliament members, and
thus play its pivotal role in strengthening democracy, such trust deficiency becomes a
stumbling block for further cooperation to strengthen democracy and sustain a
workable and strong democratic system in Indonesia. With hurdles still hinder
Indonesian democratic consolidation, the need for greater mechanism for interaction
and cooperation between state and civil society becomes more urgent.

However, in order to lessen the risk of civil society being co-opted by the state, civil
society has to strengthen its capacities so that it can maintain its high degree of
autonomy vis--vis the state and at the same time, have great abilities to be an excellent
source of expertise and skills for the state. Hence, continuous efforts in the area of trust
building between the two parties need to be improved. Should this successfully carried
out, it would give opportunity for civil society to acquire more clout and a better
position vis--vis the state. At the same time, however, civil society has to make sure that
the institutions of civil society do not depart from their purposes of promoting,
supporting, and strengthening democracy. It is also crucial for civil society and CSOs to
be more specialized in their role as expertise source, otherwise many good ideas and
aspirations from the civil society and CSOs cannot be channeled to the state and put into
actions simply because the formers lack of capacities. In addition to that, they have to
represent civil society as a whole rather than displaying factionalism, extremism,
personal or institutional interests. As this paper posits civil society engagement is
important to strengthen democracy in Indonesia, it should be noted that what such
engagement must be put properly so that it would shield the autonomy of the civil
society to the state. Given experience of being co-opted and forced in the past, this
paper suggests that critical and constructive engagement can be considered as the most
suitable formula for civil society and states relations.

At this point, the idea of Democratic Political Block (DPB) herein known as Blok Politik
Demokratik (BPD) offered by DEMOS is worthwhile to consider. 64 There are two

63 IDEA (2000), Forum for Democratic Reform, International, Democratization in Indonesia An Assessment,
Capacity-Building Series 8, Stockholm: International IDEA Publication, p. 115.
64 Olle Tornquist, Apa dan Mengapa Blok Politik Demokratik, http://www.demosindonesia.org, See also

DEMOS (2009) Democracy Building On the Sand: Advances and Setbacks in Indonesia, Executive and
Summary Report from the 2nd Natio nal Expert-Survey on Problems and Options of Indonesian
Democracy (2007 2008), English edi tion, edi ted by Luciana Ferrero, Jakarta, DEMO S. A more
 22

major lessons outlined by DEMOS: First, basic popular and civic groups must co-
ordinate instead on an intermediate political level, between the specific grass -roots
issues and the top-level perspectives. This is in order to define joint platforms, wide
support and alliances, and control genuine politicians rather than being the victim of
fragmentation and dominated by various parties or political actors. Second, this may
also be the level on which it is possible to combine parliamentary and extra
parliamentary activities, as well as representative and direct participation. Thus, the
establishment of DPBs at local and central levels would help any democratic social
movements, popular and civic associations, including CSOs, wishing to engage in
politics.

For such blocks to work effectively in representing and aiming the interests of the CSOs
in political activism, however, requires readiness from the CSOs. First, they have to
deprive the awkwardness and unwillingness to join politics. Being outside the system
and remain apolitical will only lead to domination of the elites, and impede the ability of
the CSOs to contribute in consolidating and strengthening democracy. Second, they need
to ensure once they join politics, they are equipped with sufficient resources and ability
to mobilize those resources for their political interests. Third, they must be influential to
the grassroots before they can be considered important and necessary resource by the
elites. For this to happen, hence, CSOs have to take their relations with the grassroots
seriously. Not only because it will create much public supports for the CSOs, but because
this will also help the CSOs in developing social capital-building. Relations between civil
society and grassroots are crucial for the sustainability of the CSOs in Indonesia, due to
the fact that despite the tremendous growth of CSOs in the post-Reformasi, many of the
CSOs are still unable to representing and articulating the interests and asserting the
rights and power of the people.

Concluding Remarks

As this paper shows, the role of civil society in Indonesias democratization is somewhat
paradoxical. On the one side, the facet of civil society is lively and vigorous; having wide-
ranging activities and supplementing democratic agenda in the country. In the
aftermath of Indonesias transition to democracy, civil society and CSOs in particular
has contributed to democratic development through their role as countervailing power
to the state and cultivating democratic ideas and democratic orientation of reforms. On
the other side, however, Indonesian civil society shows a contrasting facet of itself: a
fragile and hollow civil society. Whilst enjoying public trust and high expectations, they
were in fact emerged from a politically marginalized position and suffering from lacks o f
capacities. The systemic emasculation of civil society during the Soehartos
authoritarianism becomes the most affecting factor which makes Indonesian civil
society weak, and at the same time, alienated from political activism. Although
Reformasi has opened the path for civil society to be a driving force for democratization

comprehensive readi ng about Democratic Political Block, see DEMOS (2008), Blok Politi k Demokrati k:
Panduan Pelatihan, written by Syafaatun Kariadi and Willy Purna Samadhi, edited by Saleh Abdullah,
Roem Topatimasang, Jakarta, DEMO S.
 23

and consolidation, somehow Indonesian civil society has failed to live up with such
theoretical expectations.

Emerged from the shadow of authoritarian rule, Indonesian civil society has been
reluctant to engage with political activism. Because of negative experience being co -
opted and silenced by the government, most of the civil society organizations in
Indonesia maintain themselves to be apolitical and outside the system. By doing that,
they believed it would maintain their high degree of autonomy towards the state. Seen
from Hegelian perspective, most of the CSOs in Indonesia viewed themselves as
opposition to the state rather than associate themselves with a set of institutions th at
mediate between the people and the state. Such positioning is in fact makes civil society
become more alienated from the political activism. Consequently, political activism has
been dominated by the elites particularly political parties and the government.
With several limitations lie ahead, there remains great challenges for the civil society to
greater contribute in consolidating Indonesian democracy. This paper emphasizes the
need for civil society and CSOs to seriously address the lingering issues should they
willing to evoke their role as agents for democratic consolidation. To a certain extent,
recent dynamics of Indonesian politics seemed to be evidence for resurrection of the
civil society, emerging rays of hope for more democratic consolidatio n. All of these
developments are undoubtedly encouraging, but taken together they are insufficient to
change the most likely prospect. Given the multifaceted problems it faces, Indonesian
civil society is probably not going to lift itself out of its doldrums in time to play a key
role as an agent of democratic consolidation. In addition to that, the seemingly
increasing role of civil society in Indonesia is likely to be very much driven by reaction .
It only appears when democracy seems at risk and threatens fundamental freedom.
Although it might sounds cynical, such were the cases illustrated in this paper have
supported the argument. Having argued as that their active role was often driven by
reactions, one still has to wait whether Indonesian civil society is able to recapture their
momentum and be a major force in Indonesian politics once again. As this paper
suggests that civil society has to be able to overcome their own limitations before they
can really meet a criteria of a strong and lively civil society, and thus, able to help
consolidating Indonesias democracy. Should they fail to address those challenges, the
resurrection of civil society under the period of Yudhoyonos government may likely to
disappear again. However, if they success to take this momentum to consolidate their
power and become a driving force for the democratic consolidation, it would make
Indonesia as another successful story of the civil society phenomena in
democratization, and follow other Asian well-established democracies like South Korea
and Taiwan.

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