I. Distinction between Civil Action and Special Proceeding the law.
the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite
PATRICIA NATCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HEIRS OF
GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO
2001-10-02 | G.R. No. 133000
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Patricia
Natcher alleging that upon the death of their father Graciano del Rosario,
petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and
forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443 by making it appear that Graciano executed
a deed of sale in favour of Natcher. As a consequence of such alleged
fraudulent sale, private respondents legitimes have been impaired.
Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano and thus
under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. She
also alleged that during Gracianos lifetime, the latter already distributed in
advance, properties to his children, hence, private respondents may not
anymore claim against Gracianos estate or against Natchers property.
The RTC of Manila rendered a decision holding that the deed of sale
executed by late Graciano in favour of Natcher is prohibited by law and thus
a complete nullity. It cannot also be regarded as a donation as it was equally
prohibited by law. The deed of sale may however be regarded as an extension
of advance inheritance of Natcher being a compulsory heir of late Graciano.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
May the RTC, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matter relating
to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly in questions
as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
RULING:
The Supreme Court in resolving the issue in the instant case
distinguish an action from a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand
of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by
established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an
application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law
expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those
proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary
rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special
proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense,
but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the
case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without
regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. X X X A special
proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent
proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a
pending action, by petition or motion upon notice.
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment
of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement
of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by
the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the
Rules of Court. Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of
the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate
court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir
may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir.
In this case, the RTC was not properly constituted as a probate court
so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent
Graciano to Natcher. Before a court can make a partition and distribution of
the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose. Trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve
Page | 1
to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to
specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject
property as an advance inheritance.
The Supreme Court holds that a probate court, in the exercise of its
limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue
of advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of
Grcianos estate.
II. Payment of Docket Fees
EDEN BALLATAN and SPS. BETTY MARTINEZ and CHONG CHY LING vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GONZALO GO, WINSTON GO, LI CHING YAO,
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE and JOSE N. QUEDDING
G.R. No. 125683. March 2, 1999
FACTS:
Eden Ballatan, together with other petitioners, is living in and
registered owners of Lot No. 24. Respondent Winston Go is living in and
registered owners of Lot No. 25 and 26. And Li Ching Yao is living in and the
registered owner of Lot. 27. The Lots are adjacent to each other. When Ballatan
constructed her house in her lot, she noticed that the concrete fence and side
pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the
entire length of the eastern side of her property. She was informed by her
contractor of this discrepancy, who then told respondent Go of the same.
Respondent, however, claims that his house was built within the parameters
of his fathers lot; and that this lot was surveyed by engineer Jose Quedding,
the authorized surveyor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA). Petitioner
called the attention of AIA on the matter and so the latter authorized another
survey of the land by Engineer Quedding. The latter then did the survey twice
which led to the conclusion that Lots Nos 25, 26 (owned by respondent Go)
and 27 (owned by Li Ching Yao) moved westward to the eastern boundary of
Lot 24 (owned by petitioner Ballatan.) (it was later on discovered by the courts
that Go encroached 42 square meters from the property of Ballatan and Yao
encroached 37 square meters on Gos property, all of which were in GOOD
FAITH) Ballatan made written demands to the respondent to dismantle and
move their improvements and since the latter wasnt answering the petitioner
filed accion publiciana in court. Gos filed their Answer with Third-Party
Complaint impleading as third party defendants respondents Li Ching Yao,
the AIA and Engineer Quedding.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner ordering respondent Go to
demolish their improvements and pay damages to Petitioner but dismissing
the third-party complaint. CA affirmed the dismissal of the third party-
complaint as to AIA but reinstated the the complaint against Yao and the
Engineer. CA also affirmed the demolition and damages awarded to petitioner
and added that Yao should also pay respondent for his encroachment of
respondent Gos property. Jose Quedding was also ordered to pay attorneys
fees for his negligence which caused all this fuzz.
ISSUE:
What is the proper remedy in this situation where everyone was in
good faith?
RULING:
Art 448 is the proper remedy (Lower Courts are wrong in awarding
the damages). It was established in the case that the parties had no knowledge
of the encroachment until Ballatan noticed it there all of them were builders
in Good faith. In that scenario they have two options. 1st option is that the
land owner will buy the improvements and the 2nd option is to oblige the
builders to buy the land given that the value of the land is not considerably
more than the buildings or tree; otherwise the owner may remove the
improvements thereon.
The builder, planter or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase
the land if its value is considerably more than the building, planting or sowing.
In such case, the builder, planter or sower must pay rent to the owner of the
land. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the
court must fix the terms thereof. The right to choose between appropriating
the improvement or selling the land on which the improvement of the builder,
planter or sower stands, is given to the owner. If the option chooses is to sell
the lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of
payment.
Page | 2
 Petitioner was given by SC 30 days to decide on what to do or which
right to exercise. Likewise, Go was also given time to do the regarding Yaos
encroachment. Engineer Quedding was still asked to pay attorneys fees.
III. Cause of Action
ARBA vs. NICOLAS, et al.
G.R. No. 168394
Oct. 06, 2008
FACTS:
The Philippine Banking Corporation (PhilBanking) was the registered
owner of two parcels of land located in Barangay Mintal, Davao City.
On September 7, 1989, the DAR issued a notice of coverage to PhilBanking
and declared that subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of the CARL
or RA No. 6657. PhilBanking immediately filed its protest and despite its
objections, the DAR caused the cancellation of the titles of the subject parcels
of land and ownership was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines. This
was followed by the distribution of said land to the farmer-beneficiaries
belonging to ARBA by virtue of a CLOA, more particularly described as TCT
No. CL-143.
On March 24, 1994, PhilBanking executed a deed of assignment in
favor of respondents, Loreto G. Nicolas and Olimpio R. Cruz. As assignees and
successors-in-interest, respondents continued PhilBankings protest
over DARs takeover of their lands. Respondents filed their complaint before
the local DARAB in Tagum City, Davao del Norte. PhilBanking instituted before
the RTC a complaint for reinstatement of title and recovery of possession. In
their complaint with the DARAB, respondents prayed for the cancellation of
the CLOA and reinstatement of titles previously registered under the name of
PhilBanking. The DARAB found the subject landholdings clearly beyond the
coverage of CARL as according to them the lands have already been re-
classified as within the Urban/Urbanizing Zone (UR/URB) as per City
Ordinance No. 363, Series of 1982. The reclassification was subsequently
approved by the City Zoning Administrator and the HLURB Regional
Office. Later, the reclassification was reflected in the Official Comprehensive
Zoning Map of Davao City. Petitioner appealed to the DARAB Central Office
and the latter overturned the decision of its local office as it pointed out that
the DAR followed proper procedures to effect compulsory land acquisition,
from the issuance of a notice of coverage to the actual distribution of CLOAs. It
noted that PhilBanking did not even pose any objection to the acquisition of
the property for inclusion in the CARP; and that as PhilBankings assignees,
respondents could not argue that they were not accorded due process.
Respondents then filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental
motion for reconsideration but both were subsequently denied by the DARAB.
Dissatisfied with the Central DARAB ruling, respondents elevated the matter
to the CA as they contended, among others, that the DARAB erred in ruling
that the subject parcels of lands were within the coverage of RA No. 6657.
On October 12, 2004, the CA granted the appeal reiterated that the
subject parcels of lands have long been reclassified as being within an urban
zone before the enactment of RA No. 6657. Not being agricultural land, the
subject lands are clearly not within the scope of the CARL. Thus, petitioners
have resorted to the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing forthwith the present
case for lack of cause of action.
RULING:
NO, the CA was correct in not dismissing forthwith the present case
for lack of cause of action. A cause of action is defined as an act or omission
of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right. The elements of a cause of action: (1) a right in favor of plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate the
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of defendant violative of the right
of plaintiff or constituting a breach of an obligation to the latter. It is only when
the last element occurs that a cause of action arises. The test of sufficiency of
facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or
Page | 3
not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint, and that in determining
sufficiency of cause of action, the court takes into account only the material
allegations of the complaint and no other, is not a hard and fast rule. In some
cases, the court considers the documents attached to the complaint to truly
determine sufficiency of cause of action. The Court ruled that a complaint
should not be dismissed for insufficiency of cause of action if it appears clearly
from the complaint and its attachments that plaintiff is entitled to relief. The
converse is also true that the complaint may be dismissed for lack of cause of
action if it is obvious from the complaint and its annexes that plaintiff is not
entitled to any relief. Respondents as lawful assignees and successors-in-
interest of PhilBanking, stand to be directly benefited or injured from the
resolution of this case. Hence, they have a valid cause of action.
IV. Test to Determine Cause of Action
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Inc. v. First Farmers Milling Co. Inc.
103 SCRA 436 (1981)
FACTS:
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. filed an action for injunction and
prohibition with damages against First Farmer Milling Co, (FFMC) and others,
alleging that the defendant FFMC established and operated a sugar central
known as the First Farmer Sugar Central (FFSC) and for the crop years 1964-
1966, the defendants transferred their quota A allotments to FFSC and are
actually milling their sugar with the said entity, and constitutes an illegal
transfer with the illegal approval of the Sugar Quota Administration.
Subsequently, a motion to admit amended and supplemental complaint was
filed, including PNB and National Investment and Development Corp (NIDC)
as defendants, alleging that they have extended loans to FFMC amounting to
Php16,210 000, to assist in the illegal creation and operation of the said mill
and thus, a joint tortfeasor in violation of the plaintiffs rights. In answer to
this, PNB and NIDC contends that the granting of loans in favor of FFMC were
intended in the ordinary and usual course of business, and that they have no
participation on the alleged illegal transactions complained of.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations of the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint constituted a sufficient cause of action against the PNB and NIDC.
RULING:
No, PNB and NIDC granted loans in the ordinary and usual course of
business after the borrowing entity had established itself as capable of being
treated as anew milling district as it could already operate and had its array of
adhering planters. The doing of an act which is in itself perfectly lawful will not
render one liable as for a tort, simply because the unintended effect of such
act is to enable or assist another person to do or accomplish a wrong,
assuming that there was such a wrong. The subject Amended and
Supplemental Complaint fails to meet the test. It should be noted that it
charges PNB and NIDC with having assisted in the illegal creation and
operation of defendant sugar mill. Granting, for the sake of argument, that,
indeed, assistance in the "illegal" act was rendered, the same, however, is not
supported by well- pleaded averments of facts. This absence is fatal and buoy-
up instead the PNB-NIDC's position of lack of cause of action.
V. Joinder of Causes of Action
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City
and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y
ANDRADE
G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996
FACTS:
Page | 4
 The Regional Trial Court decided the petition for adoption of Kevin
Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the
change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the
surname Munson y Andrade which he attained consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner argues the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the
same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for
adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding,
arguing that these petitions should be conducted and pursued as two
separate proceedings.
Petitioner contends that a petition for adoption and a petition for
change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose,
are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively
governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that
what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter
of right, to conform to that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of
the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered
given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of
ones legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should
accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites
therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for
adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2
which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and
vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules
against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two
separate but related causes of action in a single petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in granting the prayer
for the change of the given name of the adoptee.
RULING:
No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal
effect of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the
right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to
bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It
is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is
the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed
for by petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first
or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered
in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer
upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered Christian or
first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption
thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a
mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer
therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot
properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil
register is the name appearing therein. If a change in ones name is desired,
this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and
procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or
grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict
compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest
the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete
special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori,
it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a
mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to
denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under
our remedial law system.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of
respondent judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private
respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y
Page | 5
Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law.
In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.
VI. Verification and Non-Forum Shopping
Negros Oriental Planters Association vs. Presiding Judge of Negros
G.R. No. 179878, December 24, 2008
FACTS:
On March 17, 1999, Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract
with Damages against Negros Oriental Planters Association (NOPA) for
alleged failure of delivering the agreed subject molasses. The said failure was
due to disagreements as to the quality of products partially delivered.
NOPA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure
to file the correct filing fee. According to NOPA, the adverse party intentionally
concealed the correct amount of actual damages in order to circumvent the
correct docket fees.
RTC denied the said motion. In turn, CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari because it said that there was no substantial compliance with the
procedural requirements. According to CA, there was a failure in submitting
the proper verification, wanting a verification that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records and
failure to attach the necessary documents in its pleadings as required by
Section 1, Rule 65, Rules in Civil Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA committed a reversible error when it ruled that
there was no substantial compliance with the procedural requirements
concerning the proper verification as required by the Rules of Court.
RULING:
No. The CA was held to be correct in its decision. The amendment
effected by AM No. 00-2-10 to Sec. 4, Rule 7 has the intention of making it
stricter. Following said amendment, it would not be sufficient for the parties
to just merely state under oath that they believe their allegations to be true
and correct. It should be based on personal knowledge or at least based on
authentic records. Otherwise, it would produce no legal effect. This is without
prejudice to the courts discretion of allowing the error to be remedied.
However, in the case at bar, the court refused to do so.
Vicar International Construction Inc. v. FEB Leasing and Finance
Corp.,
G.R. No. 157195, April 22, 2005, 456 SCRA 588
FACTS:
This controversy originated from a Complaint for unjust enrichment
and damages, filed in the RTC of Makati by herein petitioner, Vicar
International Construction, Inc. (Vicar), against Respondent FEB Leasing and
Finance Corporation (now BPI Leasing Corporation) and the Far East Bank and
Trust Company. In turn, FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation filed a Complaint
against Vicar, Carmelita Chaneco Lim and one John Doe, for a sum of money,
damages and replevin.
These Complaints stemmed from loans obtained from FEB by Vicar,
a corporation engaged in the construction business, for the purchase of
certain heavy equipment. In obtaining the loans, Deeds of Absolute Sale with
a lease-back provision were executed by the parties. In those Deeds, Vicar
appears to have sold to FEB the equipment purchased with the loan proceeds
and, at the same time, leased them back. For the total loan of P30, 315,494,
Vicar claims to have paid FEB an aggregate amount of P19, 042,908 in monthly
amortizations.
Nevertheless, FEB maintains that Vicar still had an outstanding
balance of about P22, 000,000, despite the extrajudicial foreclosure of sixty-
three (63) subdivision lots. These lots, comprising an aggregate area of 20,300
square meters in Calamba, Laguna, were used by the corporation as additional
collateral. As a consequence, the auction sale produced P17, 000,000 which,
Vicar claims, should have been applied to its loans.
In the course of the second (replevin) case, the trial court issued
several Orders pertaining to the possession/custody of eight (8) units of the
subject equipment. In an Order dated August 2, 2002, the RTC quashed the
Page | 6
property counterbond filed by Vicar and denied the latters Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint, which was grounded on forum shopping. In an Order dated
September 30, 2002, the RTC denied the corporations Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of the trial judge.
On October 3, 2002, Vicar filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, to stop the implementation of the Writ of Replevin issued
against the subject equipment.
The Petition was, however, instantly dismissed by the CA in its herein
assailed Resolution dated October 23, 2002, because the Verification and the
Certification against forum shopping had been executed by Petitioner
Carmelita V. Lim without any showing that she had the authority to sign for
and on behalf of petitioner-corporation.
On November 23, 2003, the day after receiving its copy of the
Resolution, Vicar filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for
Admission of the Attached Secretarys Certificate. Nevertheless, the CA denied
the Omnibus Motion in this wise.
The belated filing by the petitioners of the Certification of their
Corporate Secretary, to the effect that petitioner Carmelita Lim has been duly
authorized by petitioner corporation to file the subject petition for certiorari,
did not cure the defect of said petition. Absent any compelling reason for
petitioners failure to comply at the first instance with the required
certification, we cannot, therefore, accept their subsequent compliance.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners subsequent submission of the secretarys
certificate is a sufficient compliance with the requirement of the law.
RULING:
Petitioners candidly admit that they inadvertently failed to attach the
above Resolution to their CA Petition. In preparing the Petition, their counsel
supposedly worked overnight without sleep. She wanted to file it immediately
to avoid the trial courts quashal of their counterbond and, thus, the immediate
seizure of their equipment -- their only means of livelihood.
Their counsel allegedly believed in good faith that the secretarys
Certificate was attached to the Petition. When they received a copy of the
October 23, 2002 CA Resolution on November 11, 2002, they lost no time in
filing the following day their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for
Admission of the Attached Secretarys Certificate.
Petitioners merely missed attaching to their Petition a concrete proof
of Lims authority from Vicar to execute the said Verification/Certification on
its behalf. The latter, however, lost no time in submitting its corporate
secretarys Certificate attesting to the fact that, indeed, Petitioner Vicars board
of directors had unanimously approved a Resolution on October 2, 2002,
authorizing its president and general manager, Carmelita V. Lim, to file the
Petition and to execute and sign x x x the verification and certification against
forum shopping.
The Certificate was submitted to the CA on the day right after it had
denied the Petition. Such swiftness of action indicates that the Resolution --
authorizing Petitioner Lim to file the Petition and execute the Verification and
the Certification against forum shopping on behalf of Petitioner Vicar -- did
exist at the time the Petition was filed. Such fact also lends credence to the
assertion of petitioners that it was only due to inadvertence and oversight that
they failed to attach the Secretarys Certificate to their Petition for Certiorari.
In closing, the Court stresses once more that technical rules of
procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial
justice is an even more urgent ideal. Rules of procedure are but tools designed
to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of justice.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the appealed Resolutions
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals,
which is directed to continue the proceedings in CA-GR SP No. 73117 with
deliberate speed. No costs.
KENNETH ROY SAVAGE v. JUDGE APRONIANO B. TAYPIN
GR No. 134217, May 11, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Kenneth Roy Savage and K Angelin Export Trading seek
to nullify the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin
of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure of
certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners located
Page | 7
in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu. Their motion to quash the search warrant was denied
by respondent Judge as well as their motion to reconsider the denial.
The complaint was lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza,
president and general manager of Mendco Development Corporation
(MENDCO), Supervising Agent Jose Ermie Monsanto of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) filed an application for search warrant with the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City. The application sought the authorization to search
the premises of K Angelin Export International located in Biasong, Talisay,
Cebu, and to seize the pieces of wrought iron furniture found therein which
were allegedly the object of unfair competition involving design patents,
punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. The assailed
Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 was issued by respondent Judge on 16
October 1997.
On 30 October 1997 petitioners moved to quash the search warrant
alleging that: (a) the crime they were accused of did not exist; (b) the issuance
of the warrant was not based on probable cause; (c) the judge failed to ask the
witnesses searching questions; and, (d) the warrant did not particularly
describe the things to be seized.
On 10 November 1997 petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to
Quash where they additionally alleged that the assailed warrant was applied
for without a certification against forum shopping. On 30 January 1998
respondent Judge denied the Motion to Quash and the Supplemental Motion
to Quash. On 2 March 1998 petitioners moved to reconsider the denial of their
motion to quash and alleged substantially the same grounds found in their
original Motion to Quash but adding thereto two (2) new grounds, namely: (a)
respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter; and, (b)
respondent court failed to "substantiate" the order sought to be reconsidered.
The denial of their last motion prompted petitioners to come to this Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the respondent judge had authority/jurisdiction to issue the
said search warrant.
2. Whether the instant case be dismissed out rightly since it was not
accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping.
RULING:
1. No. Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 113-95 designating
certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities as Special Courts for IPR. The courts
enumerated therein are mandated to try and decide violations of IPR including
Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code committed within their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Subsequently, Supreme Court Administrative Order No.104-96
was issued providing that jurisdiction over all violations of IPR was thereafter
confined to the Regional Trial Courts.
The power to issue search warrants for violations of IPR has not been
exclusively vested in the courts enumerated in Supreme Court Administrative
Order No.113-95. But the Court has consistently ruled that a search warrant is
merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction
and not a criminal action which it may entertain pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in all courts and
may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction.
2. No. Petitioners cited as authority therefor Washington Distillers, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals. In that case, the court sustained the quashal of the search
warrant because the applicant had been guilty of forum shopping as private
respondent sought a search warrant from the Manila Regional Trial Court only
after he was denied by the courts of Pampanga. The instant case differs
significantly, for here there is no allegation of forum-shopping, only failure to
acquire a certification against forum-shopping. The Rules of Court, as
amended, requires such certification only from initiatory pleadings, omitting
any mention of "applications." In contrast, Supreme Court Circular 04-94, the
old rule on the matter, required such certification even from "applications."
Hence, the absence of such certification will not result in the dismissal of an
application for search warrant.
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of
the Philippines (FASAP)
G.R. No. 143088, January 24, 2006, 497 SCRA 605
FACTS:
Page | 8
 Petitioners are before the Court seeking the reversal of the resolution
of the CA in dismissing their appeal and the resolution denying their motion
for reconsideration.
When the petitioners filed for a subsequent appeal to the Court of
Appeals, it was accompanied by a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping
executed by non-parties to the case. The CA dismissed the case for failure to
show the authority of the affiants to sign for PAL and for the failure of other
petitioners to join in the execution of the certification. A motion for
reconsideration was filed with a Secretarys certificate attached evidencing
that affiants have been authorized by Board Resolution No. 00-02-03 to
initiate and/or cause to be filed on behalf of PAL petitions and pleadings in all
labor-related cases. As to the other petitioners, it was argued that they are
mere nominal parties so that their failure to execute the certification does not
justify dismissal of the petition. Despite this submission, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition is with merit.
RULING:
The petition is without merit. Under Rule 65, Section 1, in relation to
Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the necessity for a certification of non-
forum shopping in filing petitions for certiorari must be executed by the
corresponding petitioner or petitioners. As no distinction is made as to which
party must execute the certificate, this requirement is made to apply to both
natural and juridical entities. When the petitioner is a corporation, the
certification should be executed by a natural person. Furthermore, not just any
person can be called upon to execute the certification, although such a person
may have personal knowledge of the facts to be attested to.
This Court has explained that a corporation has no power except
those conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or
incidental to its existence. The exercise of these powers is done through the
board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents. Given these
corporate features, the power of a corporation to sue in any court is generally
lodged with the board of directors. The board, in turn, can delegate the
physical acts needed to sue, which may be performed only by natural persons,
to its attorneys-in-fact by a board resolution, if not already authorized under
the corporate by-laws.
Thus, only individuals vested with authority by a valid board
resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a
corporation. In addition, the Court has required that proof of said authority
must be attached. Failure to provide a certificate of non-forum shopping is
sufficient ground to dismiss the petition. Likewise, the petition is subject to
dismissal if a certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the
signatorys authority.
In the present case, the petition filed with the Court of Appeals had
a certification of non-forum shopping but the certification was without proof
of authority to sign. When a motion for reconsideration was filed, a Secretarys
Certificate was submitted as proof that the board of directors of PAL had
authorized the two to execute the certificate. Nonetheless, the Court finds that
this belated submission is an insufficient compliance with the certification
requirement. A perusal of the Secretarys Certificate submitted reveals that the
authority to cause the filing of the petition was granted on February 15,
2000. The petition, on the other hand, was filed on January 24, 2000 and was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals on January 31, 2000. This means that at the
time the certification was signed, the executors were not duly authorized by
the Board of Directors of PAL and, consequently, their signing and attestations
were not in representation of PAL. This effectively translates to a petition that
was filed without a certification at all.
ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. J. QUITAIN
G.R. No. 135042, September 23, 1999
FACTS:
Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land which the National
Power Corporation (NPC) is seeking to expropriate. The property forms part
of a proposed low-cost housing project. NPC filed a Complaint for Eminent
Domain against Robern. Instead of filing an answer,Robern countered with a
Motion to Dismiss, alleging (a)that the Complaint suffered a jurisdictional
defect for not showing that the action bore the approval of the NPC board of
directors; (b) that Nemesio S. Caete, who signed the verification and
Page | 9
certification in the Complaint, was not the president, the general manager or
an officer specifically authorized under the NPC charter (RA 6395);(c) that the
choice of property to be expropriated was improper, as it had already been
intended for use in alow-cost housing project, a public purpose within the
contemplation of law; and the choice was also arbitrary, as there were similar
properties available within the area NPC filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ
of Possession based on PD No. 42. NPC deposited 6,121.20at PNB.RTC denied
the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. Robern filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
pointing out that (a) the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss could be
resolved without trial, as they could be readily appreciated on the face of the
Complaint itself vis--vis the applicable provisions of law on the matter; and
(b) the grounds relied upon for dismissing the Complaint did not require
evidence aliunde. RTC denied the Motion. Robern filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order arguing among others that Section 15-A of RA
6395was virtually amended when Caete was allowed to verify and sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping in regard to the Complaint for expropriation
filed by NPC.NPC filed a Motion to Implement the Writ of Possession. In spite
of Roberns opposition, RTC issued a Writ of Possession. Before counsel for
the petitioner received any order from the trial court directing the
implementation of the Writ of Possession, NPC occupied the disputed
property. Before the CA. Robern assailed the Writ on the following grounds: (a)
patent on the face of the complaint were its jurisdictional defect, prematurity
and noncompliance with RA 6395; and (b) the issuance of the Writ of
Possession was irregular, arbitrary and unconstitutional, as the trial court had
yet to fix the appropriate value for purposes of taking or entering upon the
property to be expropriated.
CA upheld the RTC. The verification and certification of the Complaint
by someone other than the president or the general manager of NPC was not
a fatal jurisdictional defect. It was enough to allege that theexpropriating
body had the right of eminent domain. The issues of whether the
expropriation was properly authorized by the board of directors and whether
Caetes verification and certification of the Complaint was likewise authorized
were evidentiary and could be ruled upon only after the reception of evidence.
Hence, this Petition.
Roberns argument:
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because, (1)
Atty. Caete who signed the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping was neither the president nor the general manager of NPC; and (2)
under Section 15-A of RA 6395,only the NPC chief legal counsel, under the
supervision of the OSG is authorized to handle legal matters affecting the
government power corporation.
NPCs argument:
Caete, as its regional legal counsel in Mindanao, is authorized to
prepare the Complaint on its behalf.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the verification and certification by Atty. Caete is
valid.
RULING:
SC found the disputed verification and certification to be sufficient in
form .Verification is intended to assure that the allegations therein have been
prepared in good faith or are true and correct, not mere speculations. Lack of
verification is merely a formal defect that is
neither jurisdictional nor fatal. Its absence does not divest thetrial court of
jurisdiction. The trial court may order the correction of the pleading or act on
the unverified pleading, if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of
justice. The certificate of non-forum shopping directs the plaintiff or principal
party to attest under oath that (1) no action or claim involving the same issues
have been filed or commenced in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and that, to the best of the plaintiff's knowledge, no such other action or claim
is pending; (2) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of its present status shall be made; and (3) if it should be learned
that the same or a similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, the
plaintiff shall report this fact to the court where the complaint or initiatory
pleading was filed. This rule is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall
not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different forums, as this
practice is detrimental to orderly judicial procedure. Administrative Circular
No. 04-94, which came before the 1997 Rules of Court, is deemed mandatory
Page | 10
but not jurisdictional,
as jurisdiction over the subject or nature of the action isconferred by law. The
questioned verification stated that Atty.Caete was the acting regional legal
counsel of NPC at the Mindanao Regional Center in Iligan City. He was not
merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel and officer, whose
basic function was to prepare legal pleadings and to represent NPC-Mindanao
in legal cases. As regional legal counsel for the Mindanao area, he was the
officer who was in the best position to verify the truthfulness and the
correctness of the allegations in the Complaint for expropriation in Davao
City. As internal legal counsel, he was also in the best position to know and to
certify if an action for expropriation had already been filed and pending with
the courts .Atty. Caete was not the only signatory to the Complaint; he was
joined by Doromal, OIC-assistant general counsel; and Pablo -- both of the
NPC Litigation &Land and Land Rights Dept. They all signed on behalf of the
solicitor general in accordance with the NPC charter. Their signatures prove
that the NPC general counsel and the solicitor general approved the filing of
the Complaint for expropriation. Clearly then, the CA did not err inholding that
the Complaint was not dismissible on its face, simply because the person who
had signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was not
the president or the general manager of NPC.CA decision, affirmed.
Verification and certification against forum shopping -Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7.
MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP. vs COURT OF APPEALS,
SHERYL OABEL AND MANILA RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT CORP.
(MANRED)
G.R. No. 149660, January 20, 2009
FACTS:
In 1955, Sheryl Oabel began working with Maranaw Hotels in one of
the latters hotel branches. In 1996, Maranaw Hotels contracted the services of
Manila Resource Development Corporation (MANRED), a manpower services
provider. Maranaw Hotels transferred Oabel to MANRED. Oable later filed a
petition for regularization against MANRED and MANRED thereafter
dismissed her.
Oabel then filed a labor case against Maranaw Hotels, however,
MANRED intervened deporting itself as the real employer of Oabel. She lost
in the labor arbiter but the NLRC reversed the decision of the arbiter. Maranaw
Hotels appealed before the Court of Appeals but the latter court dismissed
the petition because apparently Maranaw Hotels failed to attach the board
resolution authorizing their counsel to file said petition before the Court of
Appeals. Maranaw Hotels filed a Motion for Reconsideration with an
appended Certification of Non-Forum Shopping and board resolution but the
CA denied the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petition filed by Maranaw Hotels should prosper.
RULING:
No. There is no substantial compliance in this case. The filing of a
subsequent MFR appended by the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping and
the board resolution did not cure the defect. It contradicts the very purpose
for which the certification against forum shopping is required to inform the
Court of the pendency of any other case which may present similar issues and
involved similar parties as the one before it. The requirement applies to both
natural and juridical persons.
A lawyer acting for the corporation must specifically authorized to
sign pleadings for the corporation. Specific authorization could only come in
the form of a board resolution issued by the Board of Directors that specifically
authorizes the counsel to institute the petition and execute the certification,
to make his actions binding on his principal, i.e., the corporation.
CECILIA AMODIA VDA. DE MELENCION, VENERANDA AMODIA, FELIPE
AMODIA, EUTIQUIO AMODIA and GO KIM CHUAN vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY
G.R. No. 148846, September 25, 2007
FACTS:
Page | 11
 Lot No. 3368 (subject property) located in Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, is
part of a larger property under TCT No. 20626 (entire property) in the name
of the late Go Kim Chuan.
The entire property was originally owned by Esteban Bonghanoy who
had only one child, Juana Bonghanoy-Amodia, mother of the late Leoncia
Amodia and petitioners (the Amodias). The entire property was brought under
the operation of the Torrens System. However, the title thereto was lost during
the Second World War.
In 1964, the Amodias allegedly executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of
Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale over the estate of Esteban Bonghanoy
and conveyed the subject property to Aznar Brothers Realty Company
(AZNAR) for a consideration of P10,200.
On August 10, 1964, the said Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed
of Absolute Sale was registered under Act 3344 as there was no title on file at
the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City. Thereafter, AZNAR made some
improvements and constructed a beach house thereon.
On February 18, 1989, the petitioners Amodias executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale conveying the subject property in
favor of Go Kim Chuan in consideration of P70,000. The lost title covering the
subject property was reconstituted pursuant to Republic Act No. 26. A
reconstituted title (OCT No. RO-2899) was issued in the name of Esteban
Bonghanoy, and, subsequently, a derivative title (TCT No. 20626) was issued
in the name of Go Kim Chuan on December 1, 1989. Thereafter, Go Kim Chuan
exercised control and dominion over the subject property in an adverse and
continuous manner and in the concept of an owner.
In 1990, a Notice of Adverse Claim was annotated by AZNAR on TCT
No. 20626. AZNAR also filed a case against petitioners Amodias and Go Kim
Chuan for Annulment of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 20626 alleging that
the sale to Go Kim Chuan was an invalid second sale of the subject property.
The RTC dismissed AZNAR's complaint and declared Go Kim Chuan
as the real owner of the subject property. The signatures of the Amodias in
the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale executed
in favor of AZNAR were found by the document examiner of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) Crime Laboratory to be forged.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. The CA held that the Deed
executed by the Amodias in favor of AZNAR was registered ahead of the Deed
in favor of Go Kim Chuan, thus, pursuant to Article 1544 of the New Civil Code,
the former deed should be given preference over the latter. The CA also held
that AZNAR's adverse claim was annotated earlier than the execution of the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale in favor of Go Kim Chuan;
hence, the latter should have respected said adverse claim and should have
made inquiries as to possible defects in the title.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari filed in the name of the
Amodias and Go Kim Chuan. Counsel for petitioners later filed a Motion for
Leave to Admit Amended Petition for Review on Certiorari in order to implead
the Heirs of the late Go Kim Chuan as the new petitioners and to delete the
names of petitioners Amodias because they could no longer be located.
AZNAR opposes the Amended Petition because it was allegedly filed
to cure a fatal defect in the original petition - non-compliance with the rules
on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. AZNAR argued that
the Petition is dismissible because the Verification and Certification of Non-
forum Shopping in the Original Petition were not signed by all the petitioners,
and was signed only by one April Socorro Go, daughter of the late Go Kim
Chuan, who did not even appear to be authorized to file the instant case in
behalf of the other petitioners.
ISSUE:
WON there is a valid certification and verification by only one of the
plaintiffs.
RULING:
Yes, the Court reiterated the ruling in the case of Iglesia ni Cristo, 505
SCRA 828, that Commonality of interest is material and crucial to relaxation of
the Rules. The Rules may be reasonably and liberally construed to avoid a
patent denial of substantial justice, because it cannot be denied, that the ends
of justice are better served when cases are determined on the merits- after all
parties are given full opportunity to ventile their causes and defenses rather
than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.
The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification
against forum shopping. The general rule is that the certification must be
signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is
insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed in a number of cases that
Page | 12
the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.
The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the
contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict
compliance with the provisions merely underscored its mandatory nature in
that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded.
VII. Independent Civil Action
San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119771, April 24, 1998
FACTS:
At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a passenger bus of
San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection
of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig City totally
wrecking the Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and
injuring Ms. Jao and her two passengers in the process.
A criminal case was filed with the RTC of Pasig charging the driver of
the bus, Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with multiple physical injuries
About four months later, Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation
(PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against
petitioner SILI with the RTC of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the
assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages.
SILI filed a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Civil Proceedings
grounded on the pendency of the criminal case against Javier in the Pasig RTC
and the failure of PISC to make a reservation to file a separate damage suit in
said criminal action. This was denied by the Manila RTC.
The matter was raised to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed
the Manila RTC. Both lower courts treated the suit of PISC as an independent
civil action which does not depend on the outcome of the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an independent civil action based on quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the
said criminal case.
RULING:
No. Prior reservation is still required before an independent civil
action can be instituted. Section 3, Rule 111 of the (1988) Rules of Court which
reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the independent civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the
offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence
The so-called 'independent civil actions' based on the
aforementioned Civil Code articles are the exceptions to the primacy of the
criminal action over the civil action as set forth in Section 2 of Rule 111.
However, it is easily deducible from the present wording of Section 3 as
brought about by the 1988 amendments to the Rules on Criminal Procedure
- particularly the phrase . . . "which has been reserved" - that the "independent"
character of these civil actions does not do away with the reservation
requirement. In other words, prior reservation is a condition sine qua non
before any of these independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter
have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal
action.
A reservation of the right to institute these separate civil actions is
required, otherwise, said civil actions are impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the former are waived or filed ahead of the criminal action.
PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt
from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on
Page | 13
quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of Javier complained of in
the criminal case. As PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner
of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural
requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil
case.
VIII. Joinder of Parties
Remedio V. Flores v. Hon. Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps,
Ignacio Binongcal and Fernando Calion
G.R. No. L-66620
FACTS:
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Heilia
S. Mallare-Phillipps of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet
Province which dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The order
appealed from states that the first cause of action alleged in the complaint
was against respondent Ignacion Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of
P11,643.00 representing the cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit
from petition on various occasions; and the second cause of action was against
respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of
P10,212.00 representing the cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit
from petitioner on various occasions.
The counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said
respondent is less than P20,000.00 which is the jurisdictional amount in order
for RTC to exercise original jurisdiction of the case under section 19(8) of BP
129. It was further averred in said motion that although another person,
Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his
obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent. At the
hearing, counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of
the complaint on the grounf of lack of jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the regional trial court has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
The regional trial court has no jurisdiction over the case The Court
rules that the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to
the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint,
it appears that here is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims
against the respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and
neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
The application of the totality rule under Section 33(i) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to the
requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3.
The Court held that there is no difference between Section 88 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 (former rule), and Section 33(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules (present rule) in cases where a plaintiff
sues a defendant on two or more separate causes of action. In such cases, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of
action irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions. Needless to state, if the causes of action are separate
and independent, their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not
mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is equal
to or less than the jurisdictional amount may be the subject of a separate
complaint filed with a metropolitan or municipal trial court.
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where
two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant
join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate
causes of action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint.
However, the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against
the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series
Page | 14
of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as
provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as
defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now
furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or
being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the
parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the
jurisdictional test.
IX. Jurisdiction over Parties
SPS. ISAGANI MIRANDA and MIGUEL JOGUILON vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, LUCILA L. VDA. DE JAVA (Deceased) Substituted by the Heirs
ESTELLA JAVA BACALLA, Assisted by her husband APOLONIO
BACALLA and JAIME JAVA
G.R. No. 114243, February 23, 2000
FACTS:
In 1965, Luneta Motor Company filed an action for recovery of a jeep
and for recovery of sum of money against Lucila Java. Java did not appear in
court nor did she file responsive pleadings despite notice hence she was
declared in default. As a result, LMC won the case and eventually a writ of
execution was issued in their favor. Pursuant to said writ certain properties of
Java were sold in a public auction including a parcel of land which LMC was
able to buy in said action. LMC then sold said parcel of land to spouses
Miranda.
In 1977, Java filed an action to annul the previous judgment, the
auction proceedings, and the subsequent transfers of the auctioned property.
Java alleged that the reason why she did not appear in court and why she
never filed an ANSWER was because she never received any summons from
the trial court.
The Court Sheriff however testified that he handed a copies of the
summons and the complaint to a certain Ernesto Elizondo (son in law of Java)
in the compound where Java resides; that said service was by way of
substituted service.
The trial court ruled that there is a proper service of summons. The
Court of Appeals however reversed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid service of summons.
RULING:
No, there is none. The Sheriffs report did not fully explain why he did
a substituted service. Particularly, sheriff did not explain why personal service
was not done. Substituted service can only be effected if personal service,
under certain circumstances, cannot be effected. Service of summons upon
the defendant is essential for the court to acquire jurisdiction over his person.
The modes of service should be strictly followed in order that the court may
acquire jurisdiction over the person. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot
be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may
be made.
Another glaring defect in the service of summons is that assuming
that substituted service can be effected, still the service of summons in this
case is invalid because said service was upon Elizondo who testified in court
that though he lives in the same compound as Java, he does not reside in the
same dwelling as Java (they live in different houses) hence, this is a violation
to the strict requirements of the Rules of Court.
As a result, the judgment of the trial court, as well as the public
auction and the subsequent transfers of the properties involved are all void.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction over Java.
Jose v. Boyon,
G.R. No. 147369, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 216
FACTS:
Petitioners lodged a complaint before the RTC for specific
performance against respondents to compel them to facilitate the transfer of
Page | 15
ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. Respondent
judge, through the acting Branch Clerk of Court issued summons to the
[respondents]. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted
to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons
personally to the [respondents] failed. Petitioners filed before the trial court
an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication which
was granted. The respondent judge, sans a written motion, issued an Order
declaring herein [respondents] in default for failure to file their respective
answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, [petitioners] were
allowed to submit their evidence ex-parte. The lower court ruled in favor of
petitioners. On appeal, the CA held that the trial court had no authority to
issue the questioned Resolution and Orders. According to the appellate court,
the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over respondents because of the invalid
service of summons upon them.
ISSUE:
WON there was valid service of summons.
RULING:
NO. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant by the service of summons. Where the action is in personam and
the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or
substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. As can be gleaned from the rules,
personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the
former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter.
Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility
of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted
to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a
person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who
is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is
likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be
stated in the proof of service or in the officers return. The failure to comply
faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted
service renders the service of summons ineffective. In the instant case, it
appears that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted
service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate
respondents. Summons by publication in this case was also improper. It must
be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication
applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem.
SPOUSES VIOLETA S. VENTURANZA and ROMY VENTURANZA, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE BERNARDO P. PARDO, HON. JUDGE
ERNESTO MADAMBA, AND NIEVES SENORAN
1987-12-11 | G.R. No. 77760
FACTS
Nieves Senoran (now private respondent) filed a complaint against
spouses Violeta Venturanza and Romy Venturanza (now petitioners) with the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Manila for collection of sum of money. Summons
was issued against the petitioners and served on Augosto Soan, father of
Petitioner Violeta Venturanza at the address of spouses Venturanza stated in
the complaint. For failure of the petitioners to file their answer, the court
rendered a decision in favor of Senoran. Spouses Venturanza filed a motion to
set aside the decision and declare past proceedings null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, alleging that there has been no proper and valid service of
summons and that the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioners. Such motion was denied. The RTC of Manila affirmed the
decision of Metropolitan Trial Court in Manila. Likewise the Court of Appeals
also affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court in Manila acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners when the summons was served
upon the father of petitioner Violeta Venturanza which address is no longer
the residence nor the place of business of petitioners.
RULING:
It is the general rule that finding of facts of the Court of Appeals when
supported by substantial evidence, are beyond the Supreme Courts power of
review. However, in the instant case, there is no substantial evidence that the
petitioners were bona fide residents of the address where the summons was
served upon Augosto Soan.
Page | 16
 Under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, there are three methods of
service of summons in civil actions, namely: 1) personal service; 2) substituted
service; and 3) service by publication. Strict compliance with these modes of
service is required in order that the court may require jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. The case at bar is an action for collection of sum of
money which is an action in personam thereby requiring personal service of
summons on defendants.
It is only when a defendant cannot be personally served with
summons within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be availed
of. It is further required by law that an effort or attempt should first be made
to personally serve the summons and after this has failed, a substituted service
may be caused upon the defendant, and the same must be reflected in the
proof of service. Upon careful examination of the sheriff's Return in this case,
no statement is made that an effort or attempt was exerted to personally serve
the summons on the defendants and that the same had failed. In fact, said
Return does not even indicate the address of the defendants to whom
summons was supposed to have been served. The presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this
case where it is patent that the sheriff's return is defective.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals
decision and remanded the court of origin for further proceedings, including
a valid service of summons.
Cezar v. Ricafort-Bautista
G.R. No. 136415, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 322
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Specified Material Corp praying for
collection of sum of money P1,860,000 plus 3% monthly interest against
petitioner Cezar due to the latters failure to pay the construction materials it
purportedly purchased under a credit line from Specified.
Cezar had expressed willingness to pay Specified after an inventory
is made and the parties conflicting records as to materials delivered and actual
materials used are reconciled. After Cezar failed to show up in meetings for
verification of documents, Specified sent a final demand letter and later on
filed the complaint. Sheriff Marquez served the summons to Robles, an alleged
employee of Cezar.
As Cezar failed to answer the complaint, the respondent judge
declared him in default. Specified filed an amended complaint, raising the
obligation to P2,005,000, a copy of the which was personally received by
Cezar. Cezar, by way of special appearance, filed a motion to set aside decision
arguing that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. After
RTC denied the motion, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment and
preliminary injunction with CA, which was dismissed. SC also denied the
certiorari due to non-compliance with procedural requirements.
After SCs resolution became final and executor, Specified moved for
execution however the scheduled hearing on was reset after Cezar filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Re-Set Hearing.
ISSUE:
WON RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
Yes. A court can acquire jurisdiction over the defendant or
respondent either through service of summons or voluntary appearance. The
service of summons is intended to give official notice to the defendant or
respondent that an action had been commenced against it.Whenever
practicable, summons must be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person and he refuses to receive and sign it, by tendering the
summons to him.
It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a
reasonable time that a substituted service may be made. Impossibility of
prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the
defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed in the proof service.
In the case, the sheriffs return is patently defective for failure to state
impossibility of personal service.
However, the defect in service was cured and the RTC acquired
jurisdiction by virtue of Cezars voluntary through his motion for re-setting the
courts hearing on the motion for execution.
An appearance in whatever form without expressly objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of
Page | 17
the court over the person of the defendant or respondent. A voluntary
appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice.
LITTON MILLS, INC. vs COURT OF APPEALS and GELHAAR
UNIFORM COMPANY, INC
G.R. No. 94980, May 15, 1996
FACTS:
Litton Mills, Inc (Litton) filed a complaint for specific performance and
sought the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to compel Empire
Sales Philippines Corporation (Empire) to issue certificate of inspection
pursuant to an agreement. Litton agreed to supply Gelhaar Uniform Company
(Gelhaar) of 7,700 dozens of soccer jerseys, and Empire, as a local agent of
Gelhaar, would inspect the goods and issue a certificate of inspection before
Litton could collect from the bank on the letter credit. Litton sent five
shipments but Empire refused to issue the required certificate of inspection
for the fifth shipment. Empire only issued the inspection certificate pursuant
to the writ issued by the trial court, so that the cargo was shipped on time.
Atty. Remie Noval filed an answer as well as pre-trial brief in behalf
of defendants Empire and Gelhaar but the law firm of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano
and Hernandez moved to dismiss and to quash the summons on the ground
that Gelhaar was a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines,
and as such, was beyond the reach of the local courts. It also contended that
Atty. Noval's filing of answer did not amount to Gelhaar's submission to the
jurisdiction of the court for it denied the authority of the former to appear for
the latter. Atty. Noval withdrew his appearance with respect to Gelhaar and
claimed that he had been authorized by Gelhaar to appear for it but the
belated repudiation of such authority was caused by the problems that
occured between Gelhaar and Empire.
The trial court denied Gelhaar's motion to dismiss and to quash the
summons and held that the service of summons on Gelhaar was valid. The
Court of Appeals held that it was an error for the trial court to rely on the mere
allegations of the complaint that Gelhaar was doing business in the Philippines
because under the doctrine of Pacific Micronisian, the fact of doing business
must first be established before summons can be served upon its agent
pursuant to Rule 14 of Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Gelhaar by
the service of summons through Gelhaar's agent and by the voluntary
appearance of Atty. Noval as counsel of Gelhaar.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
Gelhaar by service of summons upon its agent pursuant to Rule 14. Jurisdiction
and venue of actions are initially determined by the allegations of the
complaint. The fact of doing business must then, in the first place, be
established by appropriate allegations in the complaint. In the case at bar, the
allegation that Empire, for and in behalf of Gelhaar, ordered 7,770 dozens of
soccer jerseys from Litton and for this purpose Gelhaar caused the opening of
an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Litton is a sufficient allegation that
Gelhaar was doing business in the Philippines. The trial court was certainly
correct in holding that Gelhaar's act in purchasing soccer jerseys to be within
the ordinary course of business of the company considering that it was
engaged in the manufacture of uniforms.
In accordance with Rule 14, service upon Gelhaar could be made in
three ways: (1) by serving upon the agent designated in accordance with law
to accept service of summons; (2) if there is no resident agent, by service on
the government official designated by law to that effect; and (3) by serving on
any officer or agent of said corporation within the Philippines. Here, service
was made through Gelhaar's agent, the Empire. There was, therefore, a valid
service of summons on Gelhaar, sufficient to confer on the trial court
jurisdiction over the person of Gelhaar.
The Supreme Court further held that the appearance of Atty. Noval
in behalf of Gelhaar was not binding on the latter. Atty. Noval admits that he
was not appointed by Gelhaar as its counsel. What he claims is simply that
Gelhaar knew of the filing of the case in the trial court and of his representation
but Gelhaar did not object. Atty. Noval contends that there was thus a tacit
confirmation of his authority. No voluntary appearance by Gelhaar can,
therefore, be inferred from the acts of Atty. Noval. Nor can Atty. Noval's
Page | 18
representations in the answer he considered binding on Gelhaar. Gelhaar
should be allowed a new period for filing its own answer.
Obana vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 78635, April 27, 1989
FACTS:
Rafael G. Suntay was the former counsel of Liberty H. Dizon and her
minor children, Nicolas and Noel Patrick, both surnamed Torio, in an intestate
proceeding and in the petition for guardianship over said minors. Suntay
claimed P10,000 as attorney's fees. The Juvenile and Domestic Court
(guardianship court) ruled that the entire amount was too burdensome for the
wards to shoulder alone and the guardian should be able to be responsible
for half of it. Hence, Liberty Dizon was ordered to pay P5,000 out of the ward's
guardianship estate.
Atty. Suntay thereafter filed with the CFI of Bulacan an action for a
sum of money (Civil Case 4238) against Liberty Dizon and the wards, claiming
that his attorney's fees was not paid by his former clients, despite repeated
demands. He moved for the issuance of an order of attachment upon a certain
parcel of land belonging to Liberty Dizon and her wards, located at 48 Damar
Village, Quezon City. By virtue of the Writ of Attachment issued, a levy was
made on said property, which levy was annotated at the back of TCT No.
173792.
Due to the failure of the sheriff to serve the summons issued in Civil
Case 4238 for the reason that Mrs. Dizon and her wards no longer resided at
their last known address at 34-H Kaingin Road, Cypress Village, Quezon City,
and that their present address cannot be ascertained, Atty. Suntay filed a
'Motion for Service of Summons by Publication' which was granted by the
court. Accordingly, summons were served upon Mrs. Dizon and her wards
through publication.
Meanwhile, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between Liberty
Dizon and Leonora Obana involving the attached property. The Register of
Deeds of Quezon City issued in favor of Leonora Obana a new TCT No. 191059
necessarily transferring in the process the encumbrance consisting of notice
of levy in favor of appellant.
In Civil Case No. 4238, Liberty Dizon et al were declared in default.
Decision was rendered in favor of Atty. Suntay and the property attached was
levied on and sold at execution sale, with Atty. Suntay being the highest
bidder. Mrs. Dizon and her wards and Leonora Obana failed to redeem the
property within the prescribed period. Consequently, the LRC Court issued an
order cancelling TCT No. 191059 and directing the Register of Deeds of
Quezon to issue a new title in the name of Rafael G. Suntay.
In response, Leonora Obana filed an action for annulment of
judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 4238, contending that the decision
rendered in said case is null and void for the reason that CFI Bulacan did not
acquire jurisdiction over Liberty Dizon and her wards, since they were not
properly served with summons.
The court nullified the judgment in Civil Case No. 4238 on the ground
that no jurisdiction was acquired over the persons of defendants therein, the
action being strictly in personam and summons by publication is insufficient;
and that no valid attachment and levy were made by the sheriff as no personal
service of the copy of the notice to the occupant of the property was made.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed Obana's complaint on the
grounds of lack of cause of action and res judicata. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the parties thru
Service of Summons by Publication.
RULING:
No. An action for collection of a sum of money is an action in
personam thereby requiring personal service of summons on the defendants.
Civil Case No. 4238 was an action for sum of money filed by Atty. Suntay
against Liberty Dizon and her minor children in an effort to collect attorney's
fees in the guardianship case he handled for them.
The sheriff's sale was effected without any personal notice to Liberty
Dizon on the ground that she had moved out of her old address and her
"present address" was unknown. No notice was served on Obana because she
was not a party in the collection case. All notices and summonses in the
collection case were served through mail to defendant Dizon at 34-H Caingin
Road, Cypress Village Quezon City. As earlier stated, because the Sheriff could
Page | 19
not serve the complaint and the summons on Dizon who had moved out of
the above address, service by Publication upon Dizon was authorized by the
court in the collection case.
An action for collection of a sum of money is an action in personam
thereby requiring personal service of summons on the defendants. The
creditor, however, in an action in personam can take the recourse to locate
properties, real or personal of the resident defendant-debtor with unknown
address and causing said properties to be attached under Rule 57 of Section
1(f) in which case the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem
or quasi-in-rem and the summons by publication may then be deemed valid
and effective.
It should be noted that Section 7 of Rule 57 requires that in attaching
real property a copy of the order, description, and notice must be served on
the occupant, in this case the occupant at 48 Damortiz Street, Damar Village,
Quezon City. [in this case, the notice of levy on attachment of the disputed
property, the notice of levy on execution and the notice of sheriff's sale were
served through mail to Dizon at 34-H Caingin Road, Cypress Village Quezon
City.] The trial court in the annulment case ruled that the attachment was void
from the beginning. The action in personam which required personal service
was never converted into an action in rem where service by publication would
have been valid.
The order of the land registration court which directed the
cancellation of Obana's transfer certificate of title cannot assume finality. The
CA committed reversible error in using it as a basis for res judicata. There is
the added factor that a land registration court in a cancellation of title case
could not possibly inquire into the controversial matters raised in the
annulment of judgment case.
Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals,
Third Division and Rosita Dimalanta
G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte are
husband and wife. They are both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South
Seattle, Washington, U.S.A.
On March 9, 1992, private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, filed a complaint for partition of real property
and accounting of rentals against petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo
D. Valmonte before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48.
Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte, who at the time, was at his office in Manila. Petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte accepted the summons, insofar as he was concerned, but refused to
accept the summons for his wife, Lourdes A. Valmonte, on the ground that he
was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the
process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with
Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her
Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to declare her in default.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf of his
wife and opposed the private respondents motion.
In its Order dated July 3, 1992, the trial court, denied private
respondents motion to declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. A
motion for reconsideration was similarly denied on September 23, 1992.
Whereupon, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with the Court of Appeals.
On December 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
granting the petition and declaring Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. A copy of
the appellate courts decision was received by petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte
on January 15, 1993 at his Manila office and on January 21, 1993 in Seattle,
Washington. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served
summons.
Page | 20
RULING:
The Court held that there was no valid service of summon.
The Court determined that the action instituted against the petitioner which
is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in nature of action quasi in
rem. Accordingly, since Lourdes A. Valmonte is a non-resident who is not
found in the Philippines her service of summons must be in accordance with
Rule 14 Sec. 14 (17a). Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must
be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in
which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other
manner which the court may deem sufficient.
PABLO C. MONTALBAN, ET AL. vs. GERARDO MAXIMO
G.R. No. L-22997 March 15, 1968
FACTS:
The chronological order of events spawned the present case:
August 15, 1958. Plaintiffs commenced suit against Fr. Gerardo
Maximo who, according to the complaint, was residing at the parish church at
Concepcion, Malabon, Rizal. Plaintiffs' cause of action for damages sprang
from a motor vehicle accident which occurred at Padre Faura St., Manila, on
December 16, 1957. Paul Hershell Montalban, son of plaintiffs, suffered
injuries.
August 15, 1958. On this same day that the complaint was filed,
summons was served on defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo at the parish church
of Concepcion, Malabon, Rizal, through Fr. Arsenio Bautista - a priest in the
same parish church.
August 23, 1958. Fr. Arsenio Bautista sent a letter (dated August 21)
to Macario M. Ofilada, Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
informing him that defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo left for Europe on August
7, and "will be back on the first week of November." Actually, Fr. Maximo
returned from abroad "about the second week of October, 1958."
September 20, 1958. The lower court declared defendant in default,
on plaintiffs' motion of September 13, 1958.
June 8, 1959. Upon plaintiffs' evidence, the court rendered judgment
in favor of plaintiff.
December 16, 1959. Plaintiffs themselves wrote defendant Fr.
Gerardo Maximo, at the Malabon Catholic Church, informing the latter of the
lower court's decision, quoting therein the dispositive part of the decision just
transcribed, requesting prompt compliance therewith and suggesting that he
communicate with or personally see their lawyer, Jose W. Diokno, at the latter's
address, 332 Regina Building, Escolta, Manila.
December 20, 1959. Defendant, through his legal counsel, Dr.
Nicanor T. Santos, answered the foregoing letter expressing regret that he
could not comply with plaintiffs' request, because he (defendant) was not
aware of the said civil case, and that, in the criminal action arising out of the
same incident, said defendant was acquitted by the Municipal Court of Manila.
January 14 1960. Deputy Sheriff Liberato C. Manalo of Rizal notified
defendant of the issuance of the writ of execution dated January 7, 1960, and
demanded payment of the amount set forth therein. The Sheriff's return to the
writ shows that in response to such demand, defendant alleged that he was
then "financially hard up," and that the Sheriff found no property that could
be subject to execution.
January 30, 1962. An alias writ of execution was issued. Copy thereof
was received by defendant on February 9, 1962.
February 1, 1962. The Deputy Sheriff attached and levied on a
residential house located in Caloocan City and purportedly belonging to
defendant.
February 20, 1962. Two years and two months after defendant
admittedly learned of the lower court's decision from counsel for plaintiffs
herein, said defendant, by counsel, filed a verified motion in the same case
praying for the annulment of the entire proceedings. His ground is this:
Summons was not duly served upon him "as provided under Sec. 7, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court"; accordingly, the lower court "did not acquire jurisdiction
over his person"; and "the trial and decision by default" are "null and void."
March 3 1962. The court denied this motion.
March 24 1962. Defendant's move to reconsider was rejected by the
court. Hence, this appeal from the orders of March 3 and March 24, 1962, duly
certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals.
Page | 21
 September 2, 1965. After the case was submitted for decision,
defendant's lawyer informed this Court of the death of defendant on August
1, 1965.
October 18, 1967. Following extensive efforts to have the deceased
defendant substituted by any of his heirs or the executor or administrator of
his estate, which were to no avail, this Court appointed the Clerk of Court of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, representative of the deceased
defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether summons in a suit in personam against a resident of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom may be validly effected by
substituted service under Section 8, Rule 14 (formerly Section 8, Rule 7) of the
Rules of Court.
RULING:
The court rules in the affirmative. For, plaintiffs make the point that
even with defendant temporarily abroad, substituted service is valid under
Section 8 by leaving a copy of the summons "at the defendant's dwelling
house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein." Plaintiffs argue that if the ordinary method prescribed by
the rules that is, personal service under Section 7, Rule 14, is not feasible, then
the substituted service in Section 8 aforesaid comes into play. Section 8 says:
Sec. 8. Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is now long recognized, that domiciliaries of a state, though
temporarily out of its territorial jurisdiction, are always amenable to suits in
personam therein. And this precept is the foundation for the American rule
that declares substituted service binding on absent residents. The leading case
Milliken vs. Meyer, furnishes the rationale:
. . . the authority of a state over one of its citizens is not terminated by
the mere fact of his absence from the state. The state which accords him
privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his
domicile may also exact reciprocal duties. "Enjoyment of the privileges of
residence within the state, and the attendant right to invoke the protection of
its laws, are inseparable" from the various incidences of state citizenship. . . .
The responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of the relationship to the state
which domicile creates. That relationship is not dissolved by mere absence
from the state. The attendant duties, like the rights and privileges incident to
domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the state. One such
incident of domicile is amenability to suit within the state even during sojourns
without the state, where the state has provided and employed a reasonable
method for apprising such an absent party of the proceedings against him.
There should be no doubt, therefore, that in suits in personam, courts
have jurisdiction over residents temporarily out of the country.
When the framers of our Rules adapted Section 8, it is to be implied
that they intended to give the provision the same meaning shaped out by the
jurisprudence of the jurisdiction from whence it was patterned. Section 8 is to
be viewed in the same context it is understood in the American legal system.
The word "defendant" in that provision is to be construed as including any
resident of this country. By comparative construction, Section 8 is to be
applied to all resident defendants without distinction as to whether he is
physically present in this country or not.
This construction is but fair. It is in accord with substantial justice. The
burden on a plaintiff is not to be enlarged with a restrictive construction as
desired by defendant. Under the rules, a plaintiff, in the initial stage of suit, is
merely required to know the defendant's "dwelling house or residence" or his
"office or regular place of business" and no more. He is not asked to
investigate where a resident defendant actually is at the precise moment of
filing suit. Once defendant's dwelling house or residence or office or regular
place of business is known, he can expect valid service of summons to be made
on "some person of suitable age and discretion then residing" in defendant's
dwelling house or residence, or on "some competent person in charge" of his
office or regular place of business. By the terms of the law, plaintiff is not even
duty-bound to see to it that the person upon whom service was actually made
Page | 22
delivers the summons to defendant or inform him about it. The law presumes
that for him.
Reasons for the views just expressed are not wanting. A man
temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a
dwelling where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about
him may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where one temporarily
absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of one who may be
reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary
to protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any
incident of importance that may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is
usual for such a man to leave at his home or with his business associates
information as to where he may be contacted in the event a question that
affects him crops up. If he does not do what is expected of him, and a case
comes up in court against him, he cannot in justice raise his voice and say that
he is not subject to the processes of our courts. He cannot stop a suit from
being filed against him upon a claim that he cannot be summoned at his
dwelling house or residence or his office or regular place of business.
The judgment has long since become final. It enjoys the presumption
of regularity. It is, unless stricken down, entitled to respect. Non quieta movere.
Because "public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite
date fixed by law.
Montefalcon vs. Vasquez
G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008
FACTS:
In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for
acknowledgment and support against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before
the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son Laurence (co-petitioner) is the
illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give
support to their son, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father.
According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19, 000 as
support for Laurence since Laurence was born in 1993, and allegedly refused
to give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner
Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez
has his own family.
A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in
Aro-aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur. Vasquezs grandfather received them as
Vasquez was in Manila. Vasquez mother returned the documents to the clerk
of court, who informed the court of the non-service of summons . Petitioners
then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in default. The court denied it for lack
of proper service of summons.
An alias summon was served in 2000 at the Taguig address of
Vasquez, and was received by his caretaker Bejer but the Sheriffs return
incorrectly stated Lazaro as Vasquezs surname. Another alias summon was
served this time with the correct name of Vasquez, received by Bejer and
Sheriff in turn issued a certificate that summon was duly served.
On petitioners motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for
failure to file an answer despite the substituted service of summons. Vasquez
was furnished with court orders and notices of the proceedings at his last
known address. Noting that Vasquez is a seafarer and left the country on
January 24, 2000 and came back on October 12, 2000.
Vasquez filed a petition on appeal contending that the court never
acquired jurisdiction over his person and the awarding of support as excessive.
CA granted his appeal ruling on the service of summons was defective as there
was no proof of impossibility in personal service and an attempt to effect such.
Vasquez countered that because he was abroad; service of summons
should have been personal or by publication as substituted service is proper
only if a defendant is in the country, Vasquez also added that the Sheriffs
return did not state that he exerted efforts to personally serve the summons.
In their reply, petitioners insisted that a substituted service is the
normal method if one is temporarily away from the country as personal service
abroad or by publication are not ordinary means of service.
ISSUE:
Page | 23
 Whether there is a valid substitution service of summons on Vasquez
to clothe the trial court with jurisdiction over his person.
RULING:
Yes. To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of
summons must be personal, or if this not feasible within a reasonable time,
then by substituted service. It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino
seafarers are contractual Employees.
They go back to the country one their contracts expire,and wait for
the signing of another contract with the same or new manning agency and
principal if the wish. It is therefore common knowledge that a Filipino seaman
often has a temporary residence in the urban areas like Metro Manila, where
Majority of the manning agencies hold offices, aside from his home address
in the province where he originates. In this case, respondent Vasquez hails
form Camarines Sur but he lived in Taguig City when the complaint was filed.
Notice may then be taken that he has established a residence in ether place.
Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is living at the
time when the service was made, even though he was temporarily abroad at
the time. As an overseas seafarer,Vasquez was a Filipino resident temporarily
out of the country. Hence. Service of summons on him is governed by Rule 14,
Section 16 of the Rules of Court.
Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words may and also, it necessary to importance that may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is
not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under the
Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-seaman.
Ideally, Vasquez must be personally served summons. But was
personal service of summons practicable Conversely, was substituted service
of summons justified?
Obviously, personal service of summons was not practicable since
the defendant was temporarily out of the country. To proceed with personal
services of summons on a defendant-seaman who went on overseas contract
work-would not only be impractical and futile-it would also be absurd.
The impossibility of prompt personal service was shown by the fact
that Naga City -based sheriff purposely went to a barrio in Camarines Sur to
serve the summons personally on Vasquez when service of summons failed,
said sheriff ascertained the whereabouts of Vasquez Upon being informed
that Vasquez was in Manila the Naga court commissioned a Taguig City-based
sheriff to service the summons. Both the Naga and Taguig sheriff inquired
about Vasquezs whereabouts, signifying that they did not immediately resort
to substituted service. There was no undue haste in effecting substituted
services. The fact that the Naga court allowed a reasonable time to locate
Vasquez to as far Taguig shows that there was indeed no precipitate haste in
serving the summons.
Residence is the place where the person named in the summons is
living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be
temporarily out of the country at the time. A plaintiff is merely required to
know the defendants residence, office or regular business place. He need not
know where a resident defendant actually is at the very moment of filling suit.
He is not even duty-bound to ensure that the person upon whom service was
actually made delivers the summons to the defendant or inform him about it.
The law presumes that for him. It is immaterial that defendant does not receive
actual notice.
As well said in Montalban:
A man temporarily absent form this country leaves a definite place of
residence, a dwelling where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any
inquiry about him may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where
one temporarily absents himself, he leave his affairs in the hands of one who
may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is
usual for such a man to leave at his home or with his business associate
information as to where he may be contacted in the event a question that
affects him crops up. If he does not do what is expected of him, and a case
comes up in court against him, he cannot in justice raise his voice and say that
he is not subject to be processes of our court. He cannot stop a suit from being
filed against him upon a claim that he cannot be summoned at his dwelling
house or residence or his office or regular place of business.
Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable
him to contest a suit against him. There are now advanced facilities of
communication. Long distance telephone calls and cablegrams make it easy
for one he left behind to communicate with him.
Aside from, at present, various forms of texting and short message
services by the ubiquitous cellular phones.
Page | 24
 More importantly, the letter of the law must yield to its spirit. The
absence in the final sheriffs return of a statement about the impossibility of
personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Such
failure should not unduly prejudice petitioner if what was undisclosed was in
fact done.
Proof of prior attempts at personal service may have been submitted
by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the
substituted service had Vasquez surface when the case was heard. In fact, he
was declared in default. It was only when a judgment against him was
rendered by the trial court that he questioned the validity of service of
summons before the appellate court. Such failure to appear, and then later to
question the courts jurisdiction over his person, should not be taken against
herein petitioner.
Between Vasquezs self-serving assertion that he only came to know
of the case when his mother told him about the trial courts decision and the
sheriffs return on the substituted service which carries a presumption of
regularity, the latter is undoubtedly deserving of more faith and credit. The
sheriffs certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the fact
set out in it. Only clear and convincing evidence may overcome its
presumption of regularity. Given the circumstances in the present case, we
agree that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty on the
part of the sheriff stand.
TOYOTA CUBAO, INC. vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
DANILO A. GUEVARRA
G.R. No. 126321, October 23, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner Toyota Cubao, Inc., undertook repairs on the car owned by
private respondent Danilo Guevarra. The repair cost of P76,800.47 was paid by
means of BPI Check No. 17819, dated 12 March 1991, drawn by Guevarra in
favor of Toyota. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored, i.e.,
"Drawn Against Insufficient Funds ('DAIF')." Petitioner thereupon requested
that Guevarra should make good the check. When Guevarra failed to heed the
demand, petitioner filed a civil case for collection of the unpaid account. On
07 January 1993, the trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his address
in 29 Burgos Street, Calamba, Laguna.
On 02 February 1993, Process Server Antonio Rimas of the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, submitted to the trial court a return on the
service; it read in full:
"Respectfully returned to the Branch Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 92,
Quezon City, the herein attached original summon in the above
entitled case with the information that it was duly served to the
defendant DANILO A. GUEVARRA, thru her sister-in-law, GLORIA
CABALLES, by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint but
refused to sign. "Serve[d] Feb. 2, 1993."
On 19 March 1993, the trial court granted petitioner's Motion To
Declare Defendant In Default and allowed an ex-parte presentation of
petitioner's evidence, because Guevarra had failed to file an ANSWER within
the reglementary period. A writ of execution was issued to implement the
decision.
The notice of levy was served on Guevarra personally but he refused
to sign the receipt thereof, expressed surprise over it, and stated that he was
not aware of any case instituted against him. The Sheriff issued a notice of
auction sale of the levied vehicle. The vehicle was sold at public auction to
Christopher Alex Sillano, the highest bidder, for P150,000.00.
Guevarra asked in a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals,
for the nullification of the ex-parte judgment, he claimed that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because of a defective service of
summons on him. The appellate court, finding merit in the petition, annulled
and set aside the default judgment, the writ of execution, the levy upon
execution and the sale at public auction of the vehicle.
ISSUE:
Whether the substituted service of summons effected on private
respondent was valid?
RULING:
Page | 25
 The substituted service of summons effected on private respondent
was invalid.
Section 7, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court requires that summons must
be served personally by "handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person
or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." If, however, this mode of
service cannot be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service may
be resorted to under Section 8 of the same Rule. Evidence must in such a case
be duly presented that would prove proper compliance with the rules on
substituted service. Unfortunately in these instant cases, the private
respondent failed to present evidence during the hearings of the petitioner's
separate motions to dismiss and set aside judgment to prove that substituted
service of summons was indeed effected in strict compliance with Section 8,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. During such hearings, the private respondent
could also have presented evidence to show that the petitioner did in fact
receive from Susan O. dela Torre the summonses, together with copies of the
complaints, in both cases. If indeed the petitioner received the same, the
requirement of due process would have been complied with.
BOTICANO vs. CHU, JR.
G.R. No. L-58036, 148 SCRA 541, March 16, 1987
FACTS:
Eliseo Boticano is the registered owner of a Bedford truck with plate
No. QC-870, T-Pilipinas '77 which he was using in hauling logs for a certain
fee. At 11pm in the evening of September 3, 1971, while loaded with logs, it
was properly parked by its driver Maximo Dalangin at the shoulder of the
national highway in Barrio Labi, Nueva Ecija when it was hit and bumped at
the rear portion by a Bedford truck bearing plate No. QK-516, T-Pilipinas, '77
owned by Manuel Chu, Jr. and driven by Jaime Sigua. Manuel Chu, Jr. agreed
to shoulder the expenses of the repair of the damaged truck of Botanico.
When Manuel Chu, Jr. failed to comply with the agreement as well as
to pay damages representing lost income despite Botanico's demands, the
latter filed a complaint in the CFI for damages against Manuel Chu, Jr. (truck
owner) and Jaime Sigua (his driver).
Summons was issued but was returned unserved for Jaime Sigua
because he was no longer connected with San Pedro Saw Mill, Guagua,
Pampanga, while another copy of the summons for Manuel Chu, Jr. was
returned duly served on him thru his wife Veronica Chu at his dwelling house.
Botanico moved to dismiss the case against Jaime Sigua and to
declare Manuel Chu, Jr. in default for failure to file responsive pleadings within
the reglementary period. The motion was granted, allowing Botanico to
adduce his evidence ex parte.
The CFI found Manuel Chu, Jr, liable for negligence and ordered him
to pay P6,970 as actual damages and P73,700 representing unrealized income
for the non-use of Botanico's damaged truck for 11 months.
However, the Court of Appeals set aside the CFI judgment holding
that Manuel Chu, Jr. was not properly served with summons. Motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition. Manuel Chu, Jr. does not
deny receipt of the summons. The bone of contention appears to be in the
manner of service of said summons on the wife at their dwelling instead of on
Manuel Chu, Jr. himself personally.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the question of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant can be raised for the first time on appeal?
RULING:
The question has been answered in the negative by the Supreme
Court in a long line of decisions. Upon general principles, defects in jurisdiction
arising from irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings, defective
process or even absence of process may be waived by a failure to make
seasonable objections. One of the circumstances considered by the Court as
indicative of waiver by the defendant of any alleged defect of jurisdiction over
his person arising from defective or even want of process, is his failure to raise
the question of jurisdiction in the CFI and at the first opportunity.
Page | 26
 It can be argued that the failure to question the lower court's
jurisdiction cannot be accounted against Chu for his having been declared in
default gave him no chance to participate in the court deliberations and
therefore no chance to raise the jurisdictional issue, but then, he could have
done so, in the subsequent pleadings he filed. Besides, even assuming that
such failure cannot be taken against him, the fact is he had voluntarily
submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction. Manuel Chu, Jr. voluntarily
appeared thru counsel in the trial court. Not only did he submit pleadings and
motions, but he likewise appeared in person, thru counsel in the hearing and
orally argued in open court.
Under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service. Thus, under
this principle, it has been consistently held by the Supreme Court that the
defect of summons is cured by the voluntary appearance of the defendant.
There is no question that summons was timely issued and received
by Manuel Chu, Jr. In fact, he never denied actual receipt of such summons
but confined himself to the argument that the Sheriff should prove that
personal service was first made before resorting to substituted service.
The constitutional requirement of due process exacts that the service
be such as may be reasonably expected to give the notice desired. Once the
service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the
requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are
satisfied; due process is served."
X. Dead Person: No Legal Entity to Bring Action
SULPICIA VENTURA vs. HON. FRANCIS J. MILITANTE, in His Capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial District, Branch XII,
Cebu City; and JOHN UY
G.R. No. 63145 October 5, 1999
FACTS:
Private respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money and
Damages against petitioner. However, petitioner moved to dismiss the
foregoing complaint on the ground that the estate of Carlos Ngo has no legal
personality, the same being neither a natural nor legal person in
contemplation of law. The petitioner then filed an opposition to private
respondents Motion to Dismiss. The public respondent then gave private
respondent 15 days to make the amendment of the complaint. Petitioner filed
a MR of the order of public respondent. First, she argued that the action
instituted by the private respondent to recover P48, 889.70, representing the
unpaid price of the automotive spare parts purchased by her deceased
husband during his lifetime, is a money claim which, under Section 21, Rule 3
of the Revised Rules of Court, does not survive, the same having been filed
after Carlos Ngo had already died. Second, she claimed that the public
respondent never acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
which, being an action to recover a sum of money from a deceased person,
may only be heard by a probate court. Private respondent opposed the
foregoing motion. Public respondent then issued an Order giving private
respondent 24 hours to file his amended complaint. Private respondent then
filed his amended complaint. Petitioner then filed a Comment to Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint. Private respondent then filed A Rejoinder to Defendants
Comment. Public respondent then issued the herein assailed order. Hence, the
present Petition for Certiorari assailing the said Order.
ISSUE:
WON a dead person or his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court
action.
RULING:
No. Firstly, neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party
plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not have such legal entity
as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot
lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun by a decedent's estate
cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a
legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff
will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to
amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to
sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and
may not be named a party defendant in a court action. .
Secondly, it is clear that the original complaint of private respondent
against the estate of Carlos Ngo was a suit against Carlos Ngo himself who
Page | 27
was already dead at the time of the filing of said complaint. At that time, and
this private respondent admitted, no special proceeding to settle his estate
had been filed in court. As such, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
either the deceased Carlos Ngo or his estate. It is true that amendments to
pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every
case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to
speed the trial of causes or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary
expense. But amendments cannot be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon
a court that never acquired it in the first place. When it is evident that the court
has no jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter and that the
pleading is so fatally defective as not to be susceptible of amendment, or that
to permit such amendment would radically alter the theory and the nature of
the action, then the court should refuse the amendment of the defective
pleading and order the dismissal of the case.
XI. Indispensable Parties
ANTONIO (ANTONINO) SAMANIEGO, JOSE DE LA CRUZ, JOHN
SAMANIEGO, ERNESTO SANTOS, MACARIO DE LA CRUZ, ANDRES
PASTORIN, BENETRITO DE LA CRUZ, JESUS BATAC and RODOLFO
LAGUISMA vs. VIC ALVAREZ AGUILA, JOSEPHINE TAGUINOD and
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 125567
FACTS:
Petitioners are tenants in a landholding with an aggregate area of
10.4496 hectares, more or less, in Malvar, Santiago, Isabela. The land belongs
to Salud Aguila, whose children are private respondents. It appears that the
land in question was identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)-
Region 2 as covered by the Operation Land Transfer Program of the
government. In 1976, Aguila, in behalf of her children, filed a petition for
exemption from the coverage of P.D. No. 27. Petitioners opposed the
application. The Regional Director granted the application for exemption. On
appeal to the DAR, the decision was affirmed in a decision dated September
28, 1992. However, on motion of petitioners, the DAR reversed its ruling and
denied private respondents' application for exemption and declared
petitioners the rightful farmer-beneficiaries of the land. Private respondents
appealed to the Office of the President which, in a decision, setting aside the
Order dated January 6, 1993 of DAR and confirming and reinstating the Order
dated September 28, 1992 of the said Department a modification that subject
landholdings are not covered by the OLT program of the government
pursuant to P.D. No. 27. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, but their
petition was dismissed. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, however, their
motion was denied. Hence, this present Petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the office of the president is an indispensable party in an
appeal from its decision and, therefore, must be impleaded pursuant to the
rules of civil procedure.
RULING:
No. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action without that party being
impleaded. Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the
controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, or that the
court cannot proceed without their presence. Interests within the meaning
of this rule, should be material, directly in issue and to be affected by the
decrees as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question
involved. On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is one who is joined
as a plaintiff or defendant, not because such party has any real interest on the
subject matter or because any relief is demanded, but merely because the
technical rules of pleadings require the presence of such party on the record.
In the case at bar, the failure to implead the Office of the President does not
warrant the dismissal of the case as such is considered as a pro forma party.
Page | 28
XII. Class Suit
Re: Request of Heirs of Passengers of Doa Paz
159 SCRA 623 (1988)
FACTS:
In January 1988, a complaint for damages totalling to more than one
and a half billion pesos (1,500,000,000) was filed in the name and on behalf
of the relatives or heirs of the victims of the sinking of the vessel Doa Paz
which was caused by its collision with another vessel. The complaint, instituted
as a "class suit" was prosecuted by 27 plaintiffs in their behalf and in
presentation of roughly around 4,000 persons who are all close relatives and
legal heirs of the passengers of the Doa Paz.
The plaintiffs also filed a "Motion for Leave to File Case as Pauper
Litigant." They alleged that majority of them are poor and have no sufficient
means to finance the filing of this case especially because, taking into account
the extensive value of damages involved, the expenses of the filing fee alone
will amount to thousands of pesos.
Their counsel submitted a certification of the City Assessor of Quezon
City to the effect that there is no property for taxation purposes in the names
of' seven (7) of the named plaintiffs. The motion was granted by Judge
Chingcuangco in his capacity as Executive Judge only in so far as said seven
(7) plaintiffs were concerned.
It is this order that the plaintiffs request this Court to set aside. They
ask that all of them instead be allowed to prosecute the case as pauper
litigants and be exempted from paying filing fees.
The defendants, Sulpicio Lines, Inc., et al, pointed out that there were
only 1,493 passengers on board the Doa Paz at the time of the tragedy, not
4,000. And that it is doubtful whether 27 plaintiffs are sufficiently numerous to
fully protect the interests of all the suit. Further, there are in truth only seven
plaintiffs qualified to sue as pauper litigants and that the claimants not
authorized to sue as pauper litigants may continue with the action.
ISSUE:
Whether the rule governing class suits under Section 12, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court applies in the proceedings at bar?
RULING:
No. In a class suit, what is contemplated is that (a) the subject matter
in controversy is of common or general interest to many persons, and (b) those
persons are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before
the court.
However, if there are many persons who have distinct, separate rights
against the same party or group of parties, but those rights arise from the
same transaction or series of transactions and there are common questions of
fact or law resulting therefrom, then those affected may join as plaintiffs in
one action against the same defendant. This is authorized by the above
mentioned permissive joinder-of- parties rule in Section 6 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. The other factor that serves to distinguish the rule on class
suits from that of permissive joinder of parties is the numerousness of parties
involved in the former. The rule is that for a class suit to be allowed, it is needful
inter alia that the parties be so numerous that it would be impracticable to
bring them all before the court.
XIII. Tests to Determine Whether Action Survives or Not
ROSALIO BONILLA SALVACION BONILLA Represented by PONCIANO
BONILLA (their father) vs LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA,
ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of
JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First
Instance of Abra,
G.R. No. L-41715, June 18, 1976
FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio
Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil
action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels
Page | 29
of land located in Abra. The herein defendants then filed a written motion to
dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of the said motion, the plaintiffs
counsel moved to amend the complaint which was granted. On August 4, 1975
the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that Fortunata Barcena is dead, and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue.
On August 19, 1975, plaintiffs counsel received a copy of the order dismissing
the complaint and on the 23rd of the same month; he moved to set aside the
said order. The court denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
plaintiffs counsel for lack of merit, which the counsel later on filed a written
manifestation allowing the minor petitioners to be allowed to substitute their
deceased mother but was also denied. From the order, the plaintiffs counsel
filed a second Motion for Reconsideration of the order dismissing the
complaint but the same was denied. Hence, this present petition for review
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action survives even after the death of a party
during the pendency of the case.
RULING:
The answer is in the affirmative. The question as to whether an action
survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for.
The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the
parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and
property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death.
Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is
an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily
and principally property and property rights and therefore survives even after
her death. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet
he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion.
The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place
on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed March 31, 1975. This means that
when the complaint was on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive,
and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter
she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who
died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section
16, Rule 3of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies, it
shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death,
and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian
or other legal representatives." Moreover, Article 777 of the Civil Code
provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent." When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her
claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death.
Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became
parties in interest in the case. In addition, under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court, it is the duty of the court, to order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. It is, therefore, the duty
of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased
plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. Unquestionably, the
respondent court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the
clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff
in Civil Case no. 856. Order of the respondent court, was therefore, set aside.
XIV. Nullity of Proceedings in Case of Non-Substitution
SOCORRO SEPULVEDA LAWAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS
G.R. No. L-45809, December 12, 1986
FACTS:
Pacifico Pelaez, the private respondent, filed a Complaint against
petitioner's father, Pedro Sepulveda, for ownership and partition of certain
parcels of land. Pedro Sepulveda, the defendant, filed his Answer resisting the
claim and raising the special defenses. The defendant died. The counsels for
the deceased defendant then filed a notice of death wherein were enumerated
the thirteen children and surviving spouse of the deceased. Petitioner filed a
petition for letters of administration and she was appointed judicial
administratrix of the estate of her late father. At the hearing of the case former
counsels for the deceased defendant, manifested in open court that with the
death of their client, their contract with him was also terminated and none of
Page | 30
the thirteen children nor the surviving spouse had renewed the contract, but
instead they had engaged the services of other lawyers in the intestate
proceedings.
Notwithstanding the manifestation of the former counsels of the deceased
defendant, the respondent trial judge set the case for hearing. The respondent
trial judge then issued three orders. On January 28, 1976, the respondent trial
judge rendered a decision against the heirs of the deceased defendant.
Petitioner, who had been appointed judicial administratrix of the estate, filed
a motion to intervene and/or substitute the deceased defendant which was
denied by the respondent trial judge. Petitioner then filed a special civil action
of certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was dismissed. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent court gravely erred in not following the
rule and requiring the appearance of the legal representative of the deceased
and instead dismissing the appeal of the deceased who yet had to be
substituted in the pending appeal.
RULING:
Yes. In the case at bar, in view of the pendency of Special Proceeding
No. 37-SF, Intestate Estate of Pedro Sepulveda, and the pending application
of petitioner to be appointed judicial administratrix of the estate, the
respondent trial judge should have awaited the appointment of petitioner and
granted her motion to substitute the deceased defendant. In the case at bar,
in view of the pendency of Special Proceeding No. 37-SF, Intestate Estate of
Pedro Sepulveda, and the pending application of petitioner to be appointed
judicial administratrix of the estate, the respondent trial judge should have
awaited the appointment of petitioner and granted her motion to substitute
the deceased defendant. It has been held that when a party dies in an action
that survives and no order is issued by the court for the appearance of the
legal representative or of the heirs of the deceased in substitution of the
deceased, and as a matter of fact no such substitution has ever been effected,
the trial held by the court without such legal representatives or heirs and the
judgment rendered after such trial are null and void because the court
acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the
heirs upon whom the trial and the judgment would be binding.
XV. Meaning of Residence for Venue Purposes
Raymund v. Court of Appeals,
166 SCRA 50, 54 (1988)
FACTS:
A complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo by Santiago Bitera against Carlos Bell Raymond and Agustin Alba. The
latter moved to dismiss the action on the ground of improper venue. They
argued that although Bitera's complaint gives his address as 240-C Jalandoni
Street, Iloilo City, he is, and for many years has been actually residing at the
so-called UPSUMCO Compound, Bais City, he being the officer-in-charge of
the business firm known as UPSUMCO, which has offices at Bais and Manjuyod
Negros Oriental, and that, indeed, his affidavit, appended to his complaint,
contains his affirmation that he is a resident of the UPSUMCO Compound, City
of Bais and shows that his residence certificate had been issued at Manjuyod
Negros Oriental. The Trial Court however denied their motion to dismiss. They
then filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint was properly filed.
RULING:
No. Based on Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, personal actions
may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides,
Page | 31
at the election of the plaintiff. Thus, it is held that the venue was improperly
laid in a case where the complaint was file in the Court of First Instance by the
plaintiff who was born and reared in the province of Ilocos Norte, but whose
actual residence at time of the suit was admittedly at Quezon City. The Trial
Court committed legal error, if not grave abuse of discretion, in not dismissing
Biteras action despite the fact that it was the venue had clearly been
improperly laid and had been seasonably objected to on that ground by
petitioners in a motion to dismiss.
YOUNG AUTO SUPPLY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 104175, June 25, 1993
FACTS:
On 28 October 1987, Young Auto Supply Co. Inc. (YASCO)
represented by Nemesio Garcia, its president, Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy,
sold all of their shares of stock in Consolidated Marketing & Development
Corporation (CMDC) to George C. Roxas. The purchase price was
P8,000,000.00 payable as follows: a down payment of P4,000,000.00 and the
balance of P4,000,000.00 in four postdated checks of P1,000,000.00 each.
Immediately after the execution of the agreement, Roxas took full control of
the four markets of CMDC. However, the vendors held on to the stock
certificates of CMDC as security pending full payment of the balance of the
purchase price. The first check of P4,000,000.00, representing the down
payment, was honored by the drawee bank but the four other checks
representing the balance of P4,000,000.00 were dishonored. In the meantime,
Roxas sold one of the markets to a third party. Out of the proceeds of the sale,
YASCO received P600,000.00, leaving a balance of P3,400,000.00.
Subsequently, Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy assigned all their rights and title
to the proceeds of the sale of the CMDC shares to Nemesio Garcia.
On 10 June 1988, YASCO and Garcia filed a complaint against Roxas
in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City, praying that Roxas be
ordered to pay them the sum of P3,400,000.00 or that full control of the three
markets be turned over to YASCO and Garcia. The complaint also prayed for
the forfeiture of the partial payment of P4,600,000.00 and the payment of
attorney's fees and costs. Failing to submit his answer, and on 19 August 1988,
the trial court declared Roxas in default. The order of default was, however,
lifted upon motion of Roxas. On 22 August 1988, Roxas filed a motion to
dismiss. After a hearing, wherein testimonial and documentary evidence were
presented by both parties, the trial court in an Order dated 8 February 1991
denied Roxas' motion to dismiss. After receiving said order, Roxas filed
another motion for extension of time to submit his answer. He also filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its Order dated 10
April 1991 for being pro-forma. Roxas was again declared in default, on the
ground that his motion for reconsideration did not toll the running of the
period to file his answer. On 3 May 1991, Roxas filed an unverified Motion to
Lift the Order of Default which was not accompanied with the required
affidavit of merit. But without waiting for the resolution of the motion, he filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue. A subsequent
motion for reconsideration by YASCO was to no avail. YASCO and Garcia filed
the petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not the venue for the case against YASCO and Garcia in
Cebu City was improperly laid.
RULING:
A corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term
is applied to a natural person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in a
metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal office is located
as stated in the articles of incorporation. The Corporation Code precisely
requires each corporation to specify in its articles of incorporation the "place
where the principal office of the corporation is to be located which must be
within the Philippines." The purpose of this requirement is to fix the residence
of a corporation in a definite place, instead of allowing it to be ambulatory.
Actions cannot be filed against a corporation in any place where the
corporation maintains its branch offices. The Court ruled that to allow an
action to be instituted in any place where the corporation has branch offices,
would create confusion and work untold inconvenience to said entity. By the
same token, a corporation cannot be allowed to file personal actions in a place
other than its principal place of business unless such a place is also the
Page | 32
residence of a co-plaintiff or a defendant. With the finding that the residence
of YASCO for purposes of venue is in Cebu City, where its principal place of
business is located, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether Garcia is also a
resident of Cebu City and whether Roxas was in estoppel from questioning the
choice of Cebu City as the venue. The decision of the Court of Appeals was set
aside.
XVI. Stipulation of Venue by the Parties
Unimaster Conglomeration Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
267 SCRA 759 (1997)
FACTS:
Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. and Unimasters
Conglomeration, Inc. entered into a Dealership Agreement for Sales and
Services of the former's products in Samar and Leyte Provinces. The Dealership
Agreement contained a stipulation that All suits arising out of this Agreement
shall be filed with / in the proper Courts of Quezon City. Five years later,
Unimasters filed an action in the RTC of Tacloban against Kubota, Reynaldo
Go and Metrobank for damages and breach of contracts, and injunction with
prayer for temporary restraining order.
Kubota filed two motions One for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of improper venue. The other prayed for the transfer of the injunction
hearing its counsel was not available.The court issued an order allowing the
issuance of preliminary injunction and a motion denying the motion to dismiss
on the reason that Unimasters place of business is in Tacloban City while
Kubotas principal place of business is in Quezon City. In accord with the Rules
of Court, the proper venue would either be Quezon City or Tacloban City at
the election of the plaintiff. Hence, the filing in the RTC of Tacloban is proper.
Kubota appealed both orders on the grounds they were issued with
grave abuse of discretion in a special action for certiorari and prohibition filed
with the CA. Kubota asserted that RTC of Tacloban had no jurisdiction was
improperly laid. The Court of Appeals decided in favor of Kubota and it held
that: the stipulation respecting venue in its Dealership Agreement with
UNIMASTERS did in truth limit the venue of all suits rising thereunder only and
exclusively to the proper courts of Quezon City. Subsequently, Unimasters
filed a motion for reconsideration but was turned down by the appellate court.
ISSUE:
WON the venue stipulations in a contract has the effect of limiting
the venue to a specified place.
RULING:
NO. The Polytrade doctrine was applied in the case at bar. This
doctrine enunciated that as long as the stipulation does not set forth
qualifying or restrictive words to indicate that the agreed place alone and none
other is the venue of the action, the parties do not lose the option of choosing
the venue absence of qualifying or restrictive words, venue stipulations in a
contract should be considered merely as agreement on additional forum, not
as limiting venue to the specified place.
As mentioned in the case, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the
principles generally governing the venue of actions, whether real or personal,
or involving persons who neither reside nor are found in the Philippines or
otherwise. Agreements on venue are explicitly allowed. "By written agreement
of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one
province to another." Parties may by stipulation waive the legal venue and
such waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal privilege, which is
not contrary to public policy or prejudicial to third persons. It is an established
principle that a person may renounce any right which the law gives unless such
renunciation would be against public policy.
Written stipulations may either be restrictive or permissive.
Stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be
filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties
may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed
by law (Rule 4, specifically). As in any other agreement, what is essential is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.
Since convenience is reason of the rules of venue, it is easy to
understand the proposition that normally, venue stipulations should be
deemed permissive merely, and that interpretation should be adopted which
most serves the parties' convenience. In other words, stipulations designating
Page | 33
venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as designed
to make it more convenient for the parties to institute actions arising from or
in relation to their agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or expanding
the venues indicated in said Rule 4.
The record of the case at bar expresses that UNIMASTERS has its
principal place of business in Tacloban City, and KUBOTA, in Quezon City.
Under Rule 4, the venue of any personal action between them is "where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." In other
words, Rule 4 gives UNIMASTERS the option to sue KUBOTA for breach of
contract in the Regional Trial Court of either Tacloban City or Quezon City.
On the other hand, because restrictive stipulations are in derogation
of this general policy, the language of the parties must be so clear and
categorical as to leave no doubt of their intention to limit the place or places,
or to fix places other than those expressed in Rule 4, for their actions. This is
easier said than done, however, as an examination of precedents involving
venue covenants will immediately disclose.
Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably
denoting the parties' desire and intention that actions between them should
be ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon City -- or other
contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention -- the
stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits between the parties
only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon City
or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).

Page | 34
 TABLE OF CONTENTS G.R. No. 157195, April 22, 2005, 456 SCRA 588
12
Kenneth Roy Savage v. Judge A.B. Taypin,
Page No. G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000, 331 SCRA 697)
15
I. Distinction between Civil Action and Special Proceeding Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants
Natcher v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 133000, and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP),
October 2, 2001; 366 SCRA 385 G.R. No. 143088, January 24, 2006, 497 SCRA 605
1 17
Robern Development Corp. v. Quitain,
II. Payment of Docket Fees G.R. No. 135042, September 23, 1999, 315 SCRA 150
Ballatan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125683, 19
March 2, 1999, 304 SCRA 34 Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
3 G.R. No. 149660, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 463
22
III. Cause of Action Vda. de Melencion et al. v. Court of Appeals,
Arba v. Nicolas, et al., G.R. No. 168394, Oct. 6, 2008 G.R. 148846, September 25, 2007, 534 SCRA 62
5 23

IV. Test to Determine Cause of Action VII. Independent Civil Action

Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Inc. v. First Farmers San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
Milling Co. Inc. 103 SCRA 436 (1981) April 24, 1998
7 26

V. Joinder of Causes of Action VIII. Joinder of Parties

Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, Flores v. Mallare-Philipps, 144 SCRA 377 (1986)
Feb. 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 509 28
9
IX. Jurisdiction over Parties
VI. Verification and Non-Forum Shopping Sps. Miranda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114243,
Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. (NOPA) February 23, 2000, 326 SCRA 27
v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros Occidental 30
G.R. No. 179878, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 57 Jose v. Boyon, G.R. No. 147369, October 23, 2003,
11 414 SCRA 216
Vicar International Construction Inc. v. 31
FEB Leasing and Finance Corp., Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77760,

Page | 35
 December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 305
33 XII. Class Suit
Cezar v. Ricafort-Bautista, G.R. No. 136415, Re: Request of Heirs of Passengers of Doa Paz,
October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 322 159 SCRA 623 (1988)
34 58
Litton Mills, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G. R. No. 94980, May 15, 1996, 256 SCRA 69 XIII. Tests to Determine Whether Action Survives or Not
36 Bonilla v. Barcena, 71 SCRA 491, 495-496 (1976)
Obaa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87635, 60
April 27, 1989, 172 SCRA 866
38 XIV. Nullity of Proceedings in Case of Non-Substitution
Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108538, Lawas v. Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 173 (1986)
January 22, 1996, 252 SCRA 92 62
41
Montalban v. Maximo, G.R. No. 22997, XV. Meaning of Residence for Venue Purposes
March 15, 1968, 22 SCRA 107 Raymund v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 50, 54 (1988)
42 64
Montefalcon v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 165016, Young Auto Supply Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 513 233 SCRA 670 (1993)
47 65
Toyota Cubao, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126321,
October 23, 1997, 281 SCRA 198 XVI. Stipulation of Venue by the Parties
51 Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
Baticano v. Chu, Jr., G.R. No. 58036, March 16, 1987, 267 SCRA 759 (1997)
148 SCRA 541 67
53

X. Dead Person: No Legal Entity to Bring Action

Ventura v. Hon. Francis J. Militante, et al.,
G.R. No. 63145, Oct. 5, 1999, 316 SCRA 226
55

XI. Indispensable Parties

Samaniego v. Aguila, G.R. No. 125567,
June 27, 2000, 334 SCRA 438
57

Page | 36