UNIVERSITY OF THE CFORDILLERAS

Baguio City
DIGESTS OF RECENT JURISPRUDENCE
IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(July 2016)
(Bill of Rights)
By:

ATTY. LARRY D. GACAYAN

Professor of Law, College of Law
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Baguio City
(Constitutional Law I, Constitutional Law II and Constitutional Law Review)

BAR REVIEWER IN CONSTITUTIONAL/POLITICAL

LAW

CPRS BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City, Cebu City, Cagayan de Oro City, Zamboanga City, Tacloban City,
Iloilo City, Iligan City and Davao City)

POWERHAUS BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City, Manila, Dipolog City, Naga City, Santiago City, San Fernando City,
[LU] and Tagbilaran City)

EXCELLENT BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City, Cebu City and Tacloban City)

HOLY TRINITY COLLEGE BAR REVIEW CENTER

(General Santos City)

COSMOPOLITAN BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City)

UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN BAR REVIEW CENTER

Dagupan City
 2

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

When bail is allowed in a non-

bailable case like Plunder.

SENATOR JUAN PONCE

ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION),
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
213847, August 18, 2015

THE FACTS:

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and

several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). In accordance with the
Plunder Law, no bail was recommended for his provisional liberty

Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital , and his Motion to Fix Bail, both dated July 7, 2014, which were
heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. In support of the motions,
Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong;
(b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only
be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk,
and his (d) age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.

Senator Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail
because while he is charged with plunder, the maximum penalty that may be
possibly imposed on him isreclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua. He
anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the
allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily
surrendered. Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against
Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable.

On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying

Enriles Motion to Fix Bail, where it held:

x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have

presented its evidence and the Court shall have
made a determination that the evidence of guilt is
not strong against accused Enrile can he demand
bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the
Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.

To be sure, no such determination has been made

by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not
 3

filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail

hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to
ask the Court to fix his bail.

ISSUE:

MAY THE COURT GRANT BAIL IN A

NON-BAILABLE OFFENSE WITHOUT
THE PROSECUTION GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
TO SHOW THAT THE EVIDENCE OF
GUILT IS STRONG?

HELD:

Yes, in the present case of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile.

Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be

presumed innocent

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the
guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be
released on bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose
any punishment on the accused.

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from
committing additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial
court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfil this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accuseds interest in his provisional liberty before or
during the trial, and the societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence
at trial.

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted
of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital
offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment
he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the
law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of
Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital
offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be
recognized.
 4

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon

conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present.

Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail

Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense,
and that he voluntarily surrendered. Enriles averment has been mainly
uncontested by the Prosecution.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that
the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or
otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he
had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder,
he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he
was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and
his private lives, his long years of public service, and historys judgment of him
being at stake, he should be granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling

justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not
recognize.

In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the

Director of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a
geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations conducted at
the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:

(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple

drug therapy;

(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following:

a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with

carotid and vertebral artery disease;
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications;
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial
calcifications.

(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by

 5

Holter monitoring;

(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip

syndrome

(5) Ophthalmology:

a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p

laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular
injections;
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber
intraocular lens.

(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;

. b High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in
2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented
enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).

Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or

collectively, could pose significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1)
uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could
lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under stressful
conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease,
because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful
conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered
by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen
exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or
COPD.
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enriles advanced age
and ill health required special medical attention.

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge ,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his
health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his
health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial.

The Supreme Court therefore granted bail to Senator Enrile in the

amount of P1,000,000.00.
 6

Bail is now allowed in

Malversation through falsification
of public documents cases even
though the same is punishable by
reclusion perpetua as maximum.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUZVIMINDA

S. VALDEZ AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH
DIVISION), G.R. Nos. 216007-09, December 08,
2015

THE FACTS:

The cases stemmed from the Joint Affidavit executed by Sheila S. Velmonte-
Portal and Mylene T. Romero, both State Auditors of the Commission on Audit
Region VI in Pavia, Iloilo, who conducted a post-audit of the disbursement
vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City Government. Among the subjects thereof
were the reimbursements of expenses of private respondent Luzviminda S.
Valdez (Valdez), a former mayor of Bacolod City, particularly:

1. D.V. No. 6 dated January 8, 2004 amounting to P80,000.00;

2. D.V. No. 220 dated March 24, 2004 amounting to P68,000.00;

3. D.V. No. 278 dated April 13, 2004 amounting to P19,350.00; and
4. D.V. No. 325 dated April 30, 2004 amounting to P111,800.00 for Cash
Slip No. 193402.

Based on the verification conducted in the establishments that issued the

official receipts, it was alleged that the cash slips were altered/falsified to
enable Valdez to claim/receive reimbursement from the Government the total
amount of P279,150.00 instead of only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate over-
claim of P274,306.75.

Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which (SB-14-
CRM-0317 to 0320) were for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No.
3019, while the remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents under Articles 217 and 171, in relation to Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Since the amount involved is over P22,000.00 in the case of

Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents, no bail was
recommended applying Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

She filed a Motion to Fix Bail before the Sandiganbayan which

granted it in the amount of P200,000.00.

Hence, this petition by the prosecution.

 7

I S S U E:

IS MALVERSATION THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

INVOLVING OVER P22,000.00 WHICH IS PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION
PERPETUA A BAILABLE OFFENSE?

HELD:

Yes.

The trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must still prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in
charging a complex crime, the information should allege each element of the
complex offense with the same precision as if the two (2) constituent offenses
were the subject of separate prosecutions. Where a complex crime is
charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the
component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the offense proven.

At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be found guilty of

Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00. Falsification, like an
aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and proved during the trial. For
purposes of bail proceedings, it would be premature to rule that the supposed
crime committed is a complex crime since it is only when the trial has
terminated that falsification could be appreciated as a means of committing
malversation. Further, it is possible that only the elements of one of the
constituent offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or worse, none of
them, would be proven after full-blown trial.

It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and
grant her the same only after trial if it turns out that there is no complex crime
committed. Likewise, it is unjust for Us to give a stamp of approval in
depriving the accused person's constitutional right to bail for allegedly
committing a complex crime that is not even considered as inherently
grievous, odious and hateful.

Just to stress, the inequity of denying bail as a matter of right to an

accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is
palpable when compared with an accused indicted for plunder, which is a
heinous crime punishable under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No.
7659 and R.A. No. 9346. Observe that bail is not a matter of right in plunder
committed through malversation of public funds, but the aggregate amount or
total value of ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired must be at
least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). In contrast, an accused who is
alleged to have committed malversation of public funds thru falsification of
official/public documents, which is not a capital offense, is no longer entitled to
bail as a matter of right if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, or as low as
 8

P22,000.01. Such distinction is glaringly unfair and could not have been
contemplated by the law.

The judge is correct in granting bail to

an accused charged of Murder if after
the prosecution presented its evidence,
only the crime of Homicide was proven.
There is no need for the accused to file
a petition for bail or for the court to
conduct a separate hearing for the
Petition for Bail filed by the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BONCALON G.R.

No. 176933, October 2, 2009

CARPIO MORALES, J. :

Raising only questions of law, the Peoples petition for review on certiorari assails the
January 31, 2007 Decision] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the November 12, 2002
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Br. 29 in Criminal Case No. 5144 (the
case) fixing bail for the temporary liberty of Luis Bucalon Plaza alias Loloy Plaza (respondent)
who was indicted for Murder.

The case was originally raffled to Branch 30 of the Surigao RTC presided by Judge
Floripinas Buyser (Judge Buyser).

After the prosecution rested its case, respondent, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer
to Evidence.The Demurrer was denied by Judge Buyser by Order of March 14, 2002, the
pertinent portion of which reads:

The evidence thus presented by the prosecution is sufficient to prove

the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but only for the crime of
homicide and not for murder, as charged. This is because the qualifying
circumstance of treachery alleged in the information cannot be appreciated
in this case.

The defense thereupon presented evidence in the course of which respondent filed a
Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, contending that in view of Judge Buysers ruling that the
prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide, he could be released on bail. He
thus prayed that the bail bond for his temporary liberty be fixed at P40,000.00 which he
claimed was the usual bond for Homicide in the RTC of Surigao City and Surigao del Norte.

In its Opposition to Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond the prosecution contended, in
the main, that the case being for Murder, it is non-bailable as the imposable penalty is
reclusion temporal to death; that it is the public prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine what crime the accused should be charged with; that the accused should have filed
a motion/application to bail and not just a motion to fix the amount of the bail bond; that the
accused had already waived his right to apply for bail at that stage of the proceedings; that
 9

Judge Buysers March 14, 2002 Order, being a mere opinion and not a ruling or a dispositive
part thereof, produced no legal effect inasmuch as it had no jurisdiction to rule on a matter
outside the Demurrer; and that under the Rules, the prosecution could still prove the existence
of treachery on rebuttal after the defense has rested its case.

During the hearing of the Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, Senior State Prosecutor
Rogelio Bagabuyo questioned Judge Buysers impartiality, prompting the judge to inhibit
himself and to order the case transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC for further proceedings.

Branch 29 Presiding Judge Jose Manuel Tan (Judge Tan) heard the Motion to Fix
Amount of Bail Bond.

By Order of November 12, 2002, Judge Tan, concurring with the finding of Judge
Buyser that since the prosecution evidence proved only Homicide which is punishable by
reclusion temporal and, therefore, bailable, ruled that respondent could no longer be denied
bail. He accordingly granted respondents Motion and fixed the amount of his bond at P40,000.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration cum prayer for inhibition of Judge Tan was
denied for lack of merit .

Respondent was subsequently released after he posted a P40,000 bond.

Roberto Murcia (Roberto), the victims brother, impleading the People as co-petitioner,
assailed the trial courts orders via petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

Roberto faulted Judge Tan for granting bail without an application for bail having been
filed by respondent and without conducting the mandatory hearing to determine whether or not
the prosecutions evidence is strong.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adopted Robertos argument that the grant of
bail to respondent without any separate hearing is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence.

By Decision of January 31, 2007, the appellate court, observing that the allegations in
respondents Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond constituted an application for bail, dismissed
Robertos petition and affirmed Judge Tans orders .
In its present petition, the People contends that

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE

CONTRARY TO LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED
THAT THE HEARING CONDUCTED SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF
DUE PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BAIL .
(Underscoring supplied)

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that "All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law.
 10

Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that
all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of
right.

The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused
charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Stressing this point, this Court held:

. . . [W]hen bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or

otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine
the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable
the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties. A summary hearing is defined as such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent
with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit
to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to
be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on
the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross examination .
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of the prosecution
evidence when he denied the Demurrer and the latters statement that the evidence was
sufficient to convict respondent of Homicide, holding a summary hearing merely to determine
whether respondent was entitled to bail would have been unnecessary as the evidence in chief
was already presented by the prosecution.

The Peoples recourse to Section 5 , ] Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure to support its contention that respondent should be denied bail is unavailing, for said
Section clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the accused after a judgment of
conviction has already been handed down by the trial court.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER

WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
WHEN THE OMBUDSMAN REFUSED TO
FURNISH HER A COPY OF THE SWORN
STATEMENT OF HER CO-
RESPONDENT, RUBY TUASON, WHO
WAS LATER ON ADMITTED AS STATE
WITNESS.

JESSICA LUCILA REYES VS. OMBUDSMAN, G.

R. No. 212593-94, March 15, 2016
 11

JESSICA LUCILA REYES VS.

SANDIGANABAYN 3rd DIVISION, G. R. No.
213475-76, March 15, 2016

The petitioner was charged of Plunder and/or violation of Section 3

(e) of Republic Act No. {RA) 30197 together with Janet Lim Napoles, and
others, including one Ruby Tuazon, as co-conspirators for their respective
participations in the anomalous Priority Development Assistance Fnd (PDAF)
scam, involving, as reported by whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula
(Sula), and Merlina Sufias (Sufias), the illegal utilization and pillaging of public
funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile)
for the years 2004 to 2010, in the total amount of Pl 72,834,500.00.

Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile during the times material to

this case, was charged for fraudulently processing the release of Senator
Enrile's illegal PDAF disbursements - through: (1) project identification and
cost projection; (2) preparation and signing of endorsement letters, project
reports, and pertinent documents addressed to the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) and the Implementing Agencies and (3) endorsement of
the preferred JLN23-controlled Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) to
undertake the PDAF-funded project - and for personally receiving significant
portions of the diverted PDAF funds representing Senator Enrile 's "share,"
"commissions," or "kickbacks" therefrom, as well as her own.

Ruby Tuason executed a Sworn Statement implicating the petitioner.

Thereafter, Tuazon was officially declared a state witness and granted
immunity from criminal prosecution for the PDAF scam-related cases.

Thereafter, Reyes wrote a letter to the Ombudsman requesting for a

copy of the Sworn Statement of Tuazon but was denied. Again, in a letter
dated May 7, 2014 to the Ombudsman, requested for a copy of the immunity
agreement that it entered into with Tuason. Again, the Ombudsman denied
Reyes's request for the reason that 'the immunity agreement is a "privileged
communication which is considered confidential under Section 3, Rule IV of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing [RA] 6713," 101 otherwise known as
the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees."
The Sworn Statement of Ruby Tuazon was one of the documents
relied upon by the Ombudsman in declaring the existence of probable to
charge the petitioner of Plunder and violation of Section 3 [e] of RA No. 3019.

Hence, this petition.

I S S U E:

1
 12

MAY THE SUPREME COURT INTERFERE

WITH THE FINDING OF PROBALE CAUSE BY
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN?

WAS THE PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE

PROCESS OF LAW VIOLATED WHEN THE
OMBUDSMAN DID NOT FURNISH HER OF A
COPY OF THE SWORN STATEMENT OF HER
CO-RESPONDENT, RUBY TUAZON?

H E L D:

It is the consistent policy of the Supreme Court to maintain non-

interference in the determination of the Ombudsman of the existence of
probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such
discretion. This observed policy is based not only on respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office
of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of
the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way
that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases if they could be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or
dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. "A finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure
a conviction." "[P]robable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal
information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual or positive cause' nor
does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief.

Also, it should be pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not the

occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence, and
that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary
in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits.

As held in the case of SENATOR JINGGOY ESTRADA VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN, failure to furnish a respondent in a criminal case with the
Counter-Affidavit of his or her co-respondent does not violate the right of the
former to due process of law, unlike in an administrative case.

Due process: May a respondent in a

criminal case before the Office of the
Ombudsman or Prosecutors Office
 13

entitled to be furnished copies of the

Counter-Affidavits of his co-respondents
to be able to answer and/or comment on
it?

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO vs. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015

The Facts

1. On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the
complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0313, filed by the NBI and Atty. Levito Baligod, which
prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder as defined in RA No. 7080
be conducted against Sen. Estrada.;

2. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-0313 on 9 January 2014. On 3

December 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in
OMB-C-C-13-0397, filed by the FIO of the Ombudsman, which prayed, among others,
that criminal proceedings for Plunder, as defined in RA No. 7080, and for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, be conducted against Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed
his counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-0397 on 16 January 2014.

3. Eighteen of Sen. Estradas co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-
affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.

4. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of
Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other
Filings (Request) in OMB-C-C-13-0313. Sen. Estradas request was made [p]ursuant
to the right of a respondent to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court) and to have access to the evidence on record (Section 4[c], Rule
II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).

5. On 27 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order in OMB-C-C-13-0313.

The pertinent portions of the assailed Order read:

This Office finds however finds [sic] that the foregoing

provisions [pertaining to Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court and Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman] do not entitle respondent [Sen.
Estrada] to be furnished all the filings of the respondents.
Rule 112 (3) (a) & (c) of the Rules of Court provides [sic]: n(a)
The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and
shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting
documents to establish probable cause
 14

6. On 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-

0397 a Joint Resolution9 which found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his
co-respondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of
RA No. 3019. Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the Joint Resolution
dated 28 March 2014) dated 7 April 2014. Sen. Estrada prayed for the issuance of a
new resolution dismissing the charges against him.

Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsmans 27 March

2014 Order denying his Request, Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 and sought to annul and set aside the 27 March 2014 Order.

I S S U E:

Sen. Estrada raised the following ground in his Petition:

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IN ISSUING THE

CHALLENGED ORDER DATED 27 MARCH 2014,
ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED SEN. ESTRADA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW
.

HELD:

The Ombudsmans denial in its 27 March 2014 Order of Sen. Estradas Request did
not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the denial did not violate Sen. Estradas
constitutional right to due process.

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent
with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Sen. Estrada claims that the denial
of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to
due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is
a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the
Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c),
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estradas
claim.

What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the
Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued
to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman when it states, [a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his
witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a
copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit,
 15

within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x. At this point, there is still
no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-
respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the
supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to
the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estradas
Request. Although Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman provides that a respondent shall have access to the evidence on record,
this provision should be construed in relation to Section 4(a) and (b) of the same Rule, as
well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4(a) states that the investigating
officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to
substantiate the complaint. The supporting witnesses are the witnesses of the complainant,
and do not refer to the co-respondents.

Second , Section 4(b) states that the investigating officer shall issue an order
attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and all other supporting documents, directing the
respondent to submit his counter-affidavit. The affidavits referred to in Section 4(b) are the
affidavits mentioned in Section 4(a). Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the respondent are
the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. The provision in the immediately
succeeding Section 4(c) of the same Rule II that a respondent shall have access to the
evidence on record does not stand alone, but should be read in relation to the provisions of
Section 4(a and b) of the same Rule II requiring the investigating officer to furnish the
respondent with the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant
or supporting witnesses. Thus, a respondents access to evidence on record in Section
4(c), Rule II of the Ombudsmans Rules of Procedure refers to the affidavits and supporting
documents of the complainant or supporting witnesses in Section 4(a) of the same Rule II.

Third , Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
[t]he respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. A
respondents right to examine refers only to the evidence submitted by the complainant.
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or under Rule II of
the Ombudsmans Rules of Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever that the affidavits
executed by the correspondents should be furnished to a respondent.

Justice Velascos dissent relies on the ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Reyes
(Reyes case), an administrative case, in which a different set of rules of procedure and
standards apply. Sen. Estradas Petition, in contrast, involves the preliminary investigation
stage in a criminal case. Rule III on the Procedure in Administrative Cases of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in the Reyes case, while Rule II on the
Procedure in Criminal Cases of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
applies in Sen. Estradas Petition. In both cases, the Rules of Court apply in a suppletory
character or by analogy.

In the Reyes case, failure to furnish a copy of the counter-affidavits

happened in the administrative proceedings on the merits, which resulted in Reyes
dismissal from the service. In Sen. Estradas Petition, the denial of his Request happened
during the preliminary investigation where the only issue is the existence of probable cause for
the
 16

purpose of determining whether an information should be filed, and does not prevent Sen.
Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during the pre-
trial or even during the trial. We should remember to consider the differences in adjudicating
cases, particularly an administrative case and a criminal case:

Any lawyer worth his salt knows that quantum of proof and adjective rules vary
depending on whether the cases to which they are meant to apply are criminal, civil or
administrative in character. In criminal actions, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for
conviction; in civil actions and proceedings, preponderance of evidence, as support for a
judgment; and in administrative cases, substantial evidence, as basis for adjudication.

It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial
and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. Thus, the rights of
a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.

The quantum of evidence now required in

preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to
engender a well founded belief as to the fact of the
commission of a crime and the respondent's probable
guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties evidence; it is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof.

It is a fundamental principle that the accused in

a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-
examine the witnesses which the complainant may
present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that the respondent shall only have
the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all
other evidence submitted by the complainant and,
where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound,
clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses,
to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without
the right to examine or cross-examine.

Thus, a preliminary investigation can be taken away by legislation. The constitutional

right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him does not apply in preliminary
investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary investigation be an infringement of his right
to confront the witnesses against him. A preliminary investigation may be done away with
entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to
a fair trial.

Ref:
 17

OMBUDSMAN VS. REYES, 658 SCRA

626 (October 5, 2011)

The right of the accused to due process

of law and impartial trial are violated if
the Prosecutor who handled his case
will be the Judge to decide the same---
regardless of the extent of his
participation as the Public Prosecutor.

NELSON LAI Y BILBAO v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175999, July 01, 2015

THE FACTS:

1. The petitioner was accused of the crime of Homicide which was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 17446 and raffled at RTC Branch 42;

2. That at that time, the Public Prosecutor assigned to the said sala was
Prosecutor Fernando Elumba;

3. Thereafter, Prosecutor Elumba was appointed as the Presiding Judge of

RTC Branch 42, Bacolod City, and heard the petitioners case;

4. After trial, the petitioner was convicted by Judge Elumba of Homicide;

5. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration pointing out the said
anomalous situation where he was the prosecutor handling his case and
yet he decided it but still, the Judge denied his Motion for
Reconsideration;

6. His Appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND

IMPARTIAL TRIAL WERE VIOLATED SINCE THE PROSECUTOR WHO
HANDLED HIS CASE IS ALSO THE JUDGE DECIDING THE SAME.

HELD:

As the records indicate, Judge Elumba had been assigned on March

23, 1998 as the public prosecutor in Branch 42 of the RTC in Negros
Occidental to replace the previous public prosecutor, but became the
 18

Presiding Judge of Branch 42 on April 27, 2000. Branch 42 was the trial court
hearing and ultimately deciding Criminal Case No. 17446 against the
petitioner. As such, Judge Elumba should have disqualified himself from
having anything to do with the case once he became the trial judge because
he was compulsorily disqualified. The petitioner pointed to the need for Judge
Elumba's disqualification in his Motion for Reconsideration, but the latter
ignored his concerns upon the excuse that he had appeared in Criminal Case
No. 17446 only after the Prosecution had rested its case. Judge Elumba
argued that he did not personally prosecute the case, and that, at any rate,
the petitioner should have sought his disqualification prior to the rendition of
the judgment of conviction.

The appellant claims that he was denied due process because the
judge who rendered the assailed decision was also, at one time, the public
prosecutor of the instant case.

It is not disputed that the constitutional right to due process of law

cannot be denied to any accused. The Constitution has expressly ordained
that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." An essential part of the right is to be afforded a just and fair
trial before his conviction for any crime. Any violation of the right cannot be
condoned, for the impartiality of the judge who sits on and hears a case, and
decides it is an indispensable requisite of procedural due process. The Court
has said:

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold

neutrality of an impartial judge' as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are
entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights
are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They
must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must
believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his
judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking
his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring

compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair
play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor
approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment
already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to
make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script.
There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on
the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
 19

Reprising Section 1 of Rule 137 is Section 5, Canon 3 of the New

Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which pertinently
demands the disqualification of a judge who has previously served as a
lawyer of any of the parties.

To be clear, that Judge Elumba's prior participation as the public

prosecutor was passive, or that he entered his appearance as the public
prosecutor long after the Prosecution had rested its case against the
petitioner did not really matter. The evil sought to be prevented by the rules on
disqualification had no relation whatsoever with the judge's degree of
participation in the case before becoming the judge. He must be reminded
that the same compulsory disqualification that applied to him could similarly
be demanded of the private prosecutor or the defense lawyer, if either of them
should be appointed as the trial judge hearing the case. The purpose of this
stricture is to ensure that the proceedings in court that would affect the life,
liberty and property of the petitioner as the accused should be conducted and
determined by a judge who was wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent.

A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the
duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its
fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a
judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that
reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it,
in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is
to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice

Moreover, to say that Judge Elumba did not personally prosecute or

supervise the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 17446 is to ignore that all
criminal actions were prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor. That a private prosecutor had appeared in the case was of no
consequence, for such private prosecutor still came under the direct control
and supervision of the public prosecutor.

Finally, had the Court of Appeals had thoroughly sift and scrutinize the
records of the trial court to search for errors that would reverse or modify the
judgment in favor of the accused, it would have quickly noticed a hard
indication existing in the trial records of Criminal Case No. 17446 exposing
Judge Elumba to have actually taken an active participation in the trial. The
indication was in the form of the Motion to Present Rebuttal Evidence that
then Public Prosecutor Elumba had filed on January 25, 2000, the text of
which is reproduced herein:

MOTION TO PRESENT REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

x x x That, however, after going over the records of the case, the
prosecution feels that there is a need to present rebuttal evidence.
(Emphasis supplied)
 20

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully

prayed of this Honorable Court that the prosecution be allowed to
present rebuttal evidence to refute the evidence presented by the
accused.

(Sgd.)
FERNANDO R. ELUMBA
Trial Prosecutor

The text of the motion disclosed that then Public Prosecutor Elumba had
come to the conclusion that "there is a need to present rebuttal evidence"
after his having gone over the records of the case. Clearly, he had formed an
opinion that was absolutely adverse to the interest of the petitioner.

Under the circumstances, Judge Elumba, despite his protestations to

the contrary, could not be expected to render impartial, independent and
objective judgment on the criminal case of the petitioner. His non-
disqualification resulted in the denial of the petitioner's right to due process as
the accused. To restore the right to the petitioner, the proceedings held
against him before Judge Elumba and his ensuing conviction have to be
nullified and set aside, and Criminal Case No. 17446 should be remanded to
the RTC for a partial new trial to remove any of the prejudicial consequences
of the violation of the right to due process. The case shall be raffled to a
Judge who is not otherwise disqualified like Judge Elumba under Section 1,
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.

The petitioners were deprived of

their right to due process when
they were found guilty of direct
contempt by respondent judge
himself who is the complainant
against them.

ALLEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ AND REGIDOR

TULALI VS. JUDGE BIENVINIDO
BLANCAFLOR, G.R. No. 190171, March 14,
2011

Allen Ross Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is the Provincial Prosecutor of

Palawan; and Regidor Tulali (Tulali), is a Prosecutor I of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan. Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor (Judge
Blancaflor) is the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 52, Regional Trial Court,
Palawan (RTC).

In his October 13, 2009 Decision, Judge Blancaflor found petitioners

Rodriguez and Tulali guilty of direct contempt and ordered them to issue a
public apology to the court. In the same decision, Judge Blancaflor
suspended them indefinitely from the practice of law. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
 21

Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No.

22240 for arson (arson case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan
Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor.

During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy

involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver
assigned to Judge Blancaflor but under the payroll of the Office of the
Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the
acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case
thereby impliedly implicating the judge.

On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the

decision in the arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing
his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and
collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of the administrative
complaint against Awayan filed by his superior, Rodriguez, before the Office
of the Governor of Palawan.

On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting

Ami of the crime of arson.

In an order dated August 13, 2009, Judge Blancaflor informed the

petitioners that he was proceeding against them for direct contempt and
violation of their oath of office as lawyers on the basis of Tulalis Ex-Parte
Manifestation.

On October 13, 2009 after the submission of petitioners respective

position papers, Judge Blancaflor issued his Decision finding petitioners
guilty of direct contempt and imposed the penalty of indefinite suspension
from the practice of law and a fine of P100,000.00
each.

Held:

The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all

courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly
administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise the power
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of
utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court,
and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to
declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative,
not the vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of
punishment. Such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should
not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.

Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a

court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal
 22

to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or

deposition when lawfully required to do so.

Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Assistant Provincial

Prosecutor in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be construed as
contumacious within the purview of direct contempt.

Neither should Provincial Prosecutor Rodriguez be liable for direct

contempt as he had no knowledge of the subject manifestation. It was
signed and filed by Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the
arson case. The attached complaint against Awayan and signed by
Prosecutor Rodriguez was filed with the Office of the Palawan Governor, and
not with the RTC so it could not be the basis of a contempt charge.

In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary

procedure which requires written charge and due hearing. He was the
complainant, prosecutor and judge rolled into one. Judge Blancaflor showed
that he no longer had the cold impartiality expected of a magistrate. He had
clearly prejudged petitioners.

Due Process; Right to counsel;

Accused was represented by a
fake lawyer when the prosecution
presented its evidence although
he was assisted by a lawyer when
he presented his evidence.

PEDRO CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No.

179462, February 12, 2009

The petitioner, who was charged of Robbery before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, was represented by Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes from
arraignment, pre-trial and presentation of evidence by the prosecution. Before
he presented his evidence, petitioner replaced Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes. Since
she seems not a lawyer and indeed, she was not a member of the bar.
Thereafter, petitioner was represented by Atty. Rainald C. Paggao from the
Public Defenders (Attorneys) Office of Makati City.

He was convicted by the RTC. On Appeal, he claims that his right to

due process was violated because he was not represented by counsel when
the prosecution presented his evidence.

Since the accused-appellant was already represented by a member of

the Philippine Bar who principally handled his defense, albeit unsuccessfully,
then he cannot now be heard to complain about having been denied of due
process.
 23

That appellants first counsel may not have been a member of the bar
but he was afforded competent representation by the Public Attorneys Office
during the presentation of his evidence which satisfies the requirements of
due process before a judicial tribunal. Re-trial is not justified.

Compare with:

EMMA DELGADO VS. COURT OF

APPEALS, November 10, 1986

Whether the rights to due process

and impartial trial was violated by
reason of the comments made by
the judge in the course of the trial;
Extent of questions that judges
may ask by way of clarificatory
questions.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENANCIO

MORTERA, G.R. No. 188104, April 23, 2010

During the pre-trial of the murder case against the accused, he was
asked by the Judge what is his defense. After talking to the accused, his
lawyer manifested that it is DENIAL or that he is interposing a negative
defense. When the accused was testifying on direct examination, it was very
apparent that he changed his defense of denial to self-defense.

As a result of that, the judge commented:

Well, if he had nothing to do with the death of said

person, negative defense. So, if you are not telling
the truth to your lawyer, how would I know now that
you are telling the truth? Anyway if you killed a
person you will have to pay for it Mr. Mortera, do you
agree also? You are just making a story.

After trial, he was convicted of murder.

On appeal, he claimed that his rights to due process and impartial trial
were violated as a result of the prosecutor-like conduct of the judge. He was
allegedly denied the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. He further
claimed that the judge had allied himself to the prosecution as shown by his
comments. As such, he prays for his acquittal like in the case of People vs.
Opida.

Held:
 24

In the case of Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court held

that:

The Court has acknowledged the right of a

trial judge to question witnesses with a view to
satisfying his mind upon any material point which
presents itself during the trial of a case over which
he presides. But not only should his examination
be limited to asking clarificatory questions, the
right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for
the rule is that the court should stay out of it as
much as possible, neither interfering nor
intervening in the conduct of trial hardly in fact
can one avoid the impression that the
Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more
precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution
in proving the case against Tabuena and
Peralta. The cold neutrality of an impartial
judge requirement of due process was certainly
denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with
its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of
magistrate and advocate A substantial portion
of the TSN was incorporated in the majority
opinion not to focus on numbers alone, but more
importantly to show that the court questions were
in the interest of the prosecution and which thus
depart from the common standard of fairness and
impartiality. (emphasis added)

The situation in the case at bench is, however, different. Although the
trial judge might have made improper remarks and comments, it did not
amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial trial.

Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a
negative defense only to claim otherwise during trial, he was also not candid
to his own lawyer, who was kept in the dark as to his intended defense.

The accused having admitted the killing, a reverse order of trial could
have proceeded. As it turned out, the prosecution undertook to discharge the
burden of proving his guilt, when the burden of proof to establish that the
killing was justified should have been his.

The trial judge cannot be faulted for having made those remarks,
notwithstanding the sarcastic tone impressed upon it. The sarcasm alone
cannot lead us to conclude that the trial judge had taken the cudgels for the
prosecution.

Compare with:
 25

1. PEOPLE VS. OPIDA, June 13,

1987

2. IMELDA MARCOS VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN, October 6,
1998

The right to Due Process of

Mayor Maliksi was violated when
he was not notified of the dates
when the COMELEC conducted
decryption and printing of the
ballot images

MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI VS. COMELEC

and HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, G.R. No. 203302,
April 13, 2013

During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers

proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes,
brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite
alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered
precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on
the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus
commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of
said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the
RTC granted Maliksis motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was
then installed as Mayor.

In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving

notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the
printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order
dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary
to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images.
Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment
his cash deposit.

On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the
RTCs decision and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor . Maliksi
filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to
due process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings.

On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny

Maliksis motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this case.

 26

In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Supreme Court, by

a vote of 8-7, dismissed Maliksis petition for certiorari. The Court concluded
that Maliksi had not been denied due process because: ( a) he had received
notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the
First Division referring to the orders of the First Division directing
Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and
printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections
to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then
pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to
use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts
of the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original
documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the
Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First Divisions finding that the
ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully established by
the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision.

In his Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Maliksi insisted

that his right to due process was violated by the COMELEC.

Held:

By the same vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court reversed itself in a period
of one (1) month.

Indeed, Mayor Maliksi was furnished copies of the Orders of the

COMELEC directing Saguilayan to post cash deposit for the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images and later on to augment the
earlier cash deposit for the decryption and printing of the ballot images BUT
NO DATES WERE MENTIONED THEREIN SO THAT HE COULD HAVE
PARTICIPATED.

The Court grants Maliksis Extremely Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration, and reverses the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013
on the ground that the First Division of the COMELEC denied to him the right
to due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption and printing of
the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings
conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot
images.

It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have
conducted the assailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising
appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to
conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized
under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended,
are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their
exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective
regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials, not in cases of
appeals.
 27

We should not ignore that the parties participation during the revision
and recount proceedings would not benefit only the parties, but was as vital
and significant for the COMELEC as well, for only by their participation would
the COMELECs proceedings attain credibility as to the result. The parties
presence would have ensured that the requisite procedures have been
followed, including the required authentication and certification that the
images to be printed are genuine.

The Court, by this resolution, does not intend to validate the victory of
any of the parties in the 2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the Court
as yet. The Court simply does not want to countenance a denial of the
fundamental right to due process, a cornerstone of our legal system.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Extremely Urgent

Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Emmanuel Maliksi; and DIRECTS
the Commission on Elections En Banc to conduct proceedings for the
decryption of the picture images of the ballots involved in the protest after due
authentication, and for the recount of ballots by using the printouts of the
ballot images, with notice to and in the presence of the parties or their
representatives in accordance with the procedure laid down by Rule 15 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by Resolution No. 9164.

Due process: Is there violation of the

petitioners right to due process of law if
he did not present evidence in his behalf
in the Sandiganbayan but merely
adopted the evidence presented by his
co-accused therein based on the advise
of his lawyer?

EDELBERT C. UYBOCO vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014

THE FACTS:

On January 9, 2014, petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violating

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, together with his co-accused, Governor RODOLFO G. VALENCIA. His Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan on March 14, 2014. Hence, this Petition
before the Supreme Court claiming violation of his right to due process because insufficient
legal assistance by his former lawyer.

ISSUE:
 28

Was he denied due process of law because of insufficient legal assistance by his
former lawyer who advised him just to adopt the evidence of his co-accused and not to present
his own evidence?

HELD:

Petitioner was not denied due process of law.

According to petitioner, he was accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by his

former lawyer who informed him that there was no necessity to present any evidence. His
former counsel also failed to cross examine the main prosecution witness because said
counsel was inexplicably absent on the trial date and even failed to prepare and file a
memorandum and merely relied on the defense presented by the lawyers of co-accused
Valencia and Maramot by adopting the defenses of the other accused and all their pleadings
and manifestations, even when these were clearly not applicable to petitioners defense. Thus,
petitioner avers that his constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process and of
law and to competent counsel were violated.

In its Comment dated September 30, 2014, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
opposed petitioners plea to reopen the case on the ground of denial of due process. In citing
Lagua v. CA , they claim there is no basis to set aside the assailed decision and resolution
since a client is bound by the action of his counsel.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that petitioner was given an
opportunity to be heard during trial. This opportunity to be heard is the essence of due process.
While petitioner claims that he was incorrectly advised by his former counsel that the
presentation of evidence is no longer necessary, this unfortunate mistake cannot
qualify as gross negligence or incompetence that would necessitate a reopening of
the proceedings. In fact, not once did petitioner refute, or at the very least, address the
Sandiganbayans finding that he had expressly consented to the waiver of the presentation of
evidence by affixing his signature as conformity to the manifestation submitted by his former

Petitioner also erroneously claims that his former counsel failed to prepare and file a
memorandum for him since the records show that petitioners former counsel had belatedly
filed a memorandum on his behalf, which the Sandiganbayan had admitted in the interest of
justice.

Ref:

TAN VS. TAN, G.R. No. 167139, February 25, 2010

DBP VS. COURT OF APPEALS, January 29, 1999
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY and ENGR. CHRISTINE O. BAUTISTA vs. WINSTON
JOSEPH Z. CORDERO and SPS. LUCIO CORDERO, and EVELYN CORDERO, G.R.
No. 144118, July 21, 2004 .

Due process: Failure to present

evidence by the lawyer is not gross
 29

negligence which results in violation of

the clients right to due process of law.

ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR. vs. ALEXIS C.

ALMENDRAS, G.R. No. 179491, January 14, 2015.
.

THE FACTS:

The petitioner sent letters with similar contents on 7 February 1996 to House Speaker
Jose de Venecia, Jr., and on 26 February 1996 to Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil
Carriers, Inc. The controversial portion of the first and second letters reads as follows:

This is to notify your good self and your staff that one
ALEXIS "DODONG" C. ALMENDRAS, a brother, is not
vested with any authority to liaison or transact any
business with any department, office, or bureau, public
or otherwise, that has bearing or relation with my office,
mandates or functions. x x x.

Noteworthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr.

Alexis Dodong C. Almendras, a reknown blackmailer,
is a bitter rival in the just concluded election of 1995
who ran against the wishes of my father, the late
Congressman Alejandro D. Almendras, Sr. He has
caused pain to the family when he filed cases against
us: his brothers and sisters, and worst against his own
mother. I deemed that his act of transacting business
that affects my person and official functions is
malicious in purpose, done with ill motive and part of a
larger plan of harassment activities to perforce realise
his egoistic and evil objectives. May I therefore request
the assistance of your office in circulating the above
information to concerned officials and secretariat
employees of the House of Representatives.

These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published by petitioner,
assisted by Atty. Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao del Sur and Quezon City, with evident bad
faith and manifest malice to destroy respondent Alexis C. Almendras good name. Hence, the
latter filed an action for damages arising from libel and defamation against petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City.

In the course of trial at the lower court, petitioner failed to present any evidence, except
his Answer, despite several rescheduling of hearings at his instance. The trial court thus
submitted the case for decision, and eventually ruled that respondent was libeled and defamed.
For the sufferings, social ridicule, defamation and dishonor caused by petitioners letters,
respondent was awarded damages, as follows: P5,000,000.00 as moral damages;
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; P10,000.00 for litigation expenses; and attorneys fees in
the amount of 25% of whatever amounts actually received by plaintiff for this judgment.
 30

Petitioner moved for reconsideration and/or new trial, but the same was denied by the trial
court. He appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming violation of his right to due process of law.
The CA, however, ruled that petitioner was not denied due process. It noted that petitioner was
given full opportunity to present his evidence, but he vehemently disregarded the proceedings
by merely absenting himself from trials without valid excuses. The appellate court also ruled
that the letters were not privileged communications, since petitioner was not acting as a
member of the Congress when he sent them.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived due process;

xxx

HELD:

Petition denied.

Petitioner anchors his appeal on the ground that his letters are covered by privileged
communications. He insists that he has the legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, being then a Congressman duty-bound
to insulate his office and his constituents from the dubious and mistrustful pursuits of his elder
brother.

Moreover, the letters were also not meant to be circulated or published. They were
sent merely to warn the individuals of respondents nefarious activities, and made in good faith
and without any actual malice. Respondents testimony that he learned the existence of the
letter from others cannot be countenanced, as no witness corroborated this. At best, it is only
hearsay.

On the denial of his motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, he maintains that his
own counsel Atty. Leonardo D. Suario categorically admitted that he did not know of petitioners
ailment and thus did not make the proper manifestations in Court. His failure to attend the
hearing was not of his own volition, but because of his doctors strict advice since he earlier
underwent a quadruple coronary artery bypass at the St. Lukes Medical Center-Heart Institute
in Quezon City on 16 July 2001, just a day before the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New
Trial was filed. While his counsel represents him, the latters mistakes should not deprive him of
his day in court to present his side.

Settled is the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. The only
exception is when the negligence of the counsel is so gross , reckless and inexcusable
that the client is deprived of his day in court. In such instance, the remedy is to reopen the case
and allow the party who was denied his day in court to adduce evidence. However, perusing
the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the general rule.

Petitioner was given several opportunities to present his evidence or to clarify his
medical constraints in court, but he did not do so, despite knowing full well that he had a
pending case in court. For petitioner to feign and repeatedly insist upon a lack of awareness of
the progress of an important litigation is to unmask a penchant for the ludicrous. Although he
 31

rightfully expected counsel to amply protect his interest, he cannot just sit back, relax and await
the outcome of the case. In keeping with the normal course of events, he should have taken
the initiative of making the proper inquiries from his counsel and the trial court as to the status
of his case. For his failure to do so, he has only himself to blame. The Court cannot allow
petitioner the exception to the general rule just because his counsel admitted having no
knowledge of his medical condition. To do so will set a dangerous precedent of never-ending
suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the clients case
and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law.

Presumption of innocence: Failure of the

apprehending policemen to comply with
the chain of evidence rule under
Section 21 of RA No. 9165, including
the 24-hour period to turn over to the
Crime Laboratory an alleged confiscated
prohibited drugs against a suspect,
entitles the latter to acquittal based on
presumption of innocence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DENNIS SUMILI,

G.R. No. 212160, February 4, 2015

The Facts

On June 30, 2006, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Sumili of violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 stating that That, on or about June 7, 2006, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without having
been authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell one (1)
sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug commonly known as Shabu for
the amount of P200.00

According to the prosecution, on June 7, 2006, the Philippine Drug Enforcement

Agency Iligan City Sub-Office received a report from a confidential informant that Sumili was
selling shabu. Acting on the same, SPO2 Edgardo Englatiera (SPO2 Englatiera) dispatched
SPO2 Diosdado Cabahug (SPO2 Cabahug) to conduct surveillance on Sumili, which confirmed
the truth and veracity of the aforesaid report. Consequently, SPO2 Englatiera organized a team
divided into two (2) groups and briefed them on the buy-bust operation. He also prepared the
marked money, consisting of one (1) two hundred peso (P200.00) bill, with serial number
L507313.

At around 5:10 in the afternoon of the same day, the buy-bust team headed to the
target area. Upon arrival, the poseur-buyer approached Sumilis house to buy shabu. After
Sumili let the poseur-buyer in, the latter gave the pre-arranged signal that the sale has been
consummated. Almost immediately, the buy-bust team stormed the house but Sumili escaped
by jumping through the window, throwing the marked money at the roof beside his house. The
poseur-buyer turned over the sachet of suspected shabu to SPO2 Englatiera, who marked the
same with DC-1, representing the initials of SPO2 Cabahug. SPO2 Englatiera then prepared
a request for laboratory examination and instructed Non-Uniform Personnel Carlito Ong (NUP
 32

Ong) to bring the sachet together with the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. However, NUP Ong failed to do so on the same day as the PNP Crime Laboratory
was already closed. It was only on June 9, 2006, or two (2) days after the buy-bust
operation, that NUP Ong was able to bring and turn-over the seized sachet to the
PNP Crime Laboratory.

Upon examination, it was confirmed that said sachet contained 0.32 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

The Issue

The issue for the Courts resolution is whether Sumilis conviction for violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.

The Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

In order to convict an accused for violation of RA 9165, or the crime of sale of

dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the concurrence of the following elements: ( a)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and ( b) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment. Note that what remains material for conviction is the proof that
the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the corpus
delicti. It is also important that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items be
preserved. Simply put, the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against an accused
must be the same as that seized from him. The chain of custody requirement removes any
unnecessary doubts regarding the identity of the evidence.

As held in

People v. Viterbo:

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under

Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the following elements
must concur: ( a ) the identities of the buyer and the
seller, object, and consideration; and ( b ) the delivery of
the thing sold and the corresponding payment for it. As
the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part
of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore
essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link in the
chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the
moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it
was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti .
Elucidating on the custodial chain process, the Court, in the
case of People v. Cervantes [(600 Phil. 819, 836 [2009])],
held:
 33

As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody

rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this
would ideally include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the
condition in which it was received, and the condition in
which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. x x x.

The chain of custody requirement ensures that unnecessary

doubts respecting the identity of the evidence are minimized if
not altogether removed. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

To expand, Section 2129 of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule outlining the
procedure that the apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to
preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending
team that has initial custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take
photographs of the same in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items
were seized, or the accuseds or the persons representative or counsel, a representative from
the media, the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall then sign the
copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned over to the PNP CrimeLaboratory
within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination purposes.

After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from Sumili due to unjustified gaps
in the chain of custody, thus, militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As
may be gleaned from the established facts, the buy-bust operation was conducted on June 7,
2006. When SPO2 Englatiera seized the sachet from Sumili, he marked the same with the
initials DC-1 and, later, he returned to the police station to prepare the request for the
examination of the sachets contents. Thereafter, he ordered NUP Ong to bring the sachet as
well as the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

However, NUP Ong failed to do so within 24 hours after the buy-bust operation as he
only delivered the sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory on June 9, 2006, or two (2) days after
the buy-bust operation. Undoubtedly, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
had been compromised.

It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the

presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity
of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items. Failing in which, the
acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right, as a
consequence of his right to be presumed innocent.

Ref:
 34

IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES AND

VIOLATION OF SECTION 21, RA 9165, ENTITLES THE
ACCUSED OF ACQUITTAL.

PEOPLE VS. NACUA, January 30,

2013.marking was done at the police station

PEOPLE VS. SAMMY ABDUL UMAPING, April

25, 2012The marking were obviously made at the police
station because it was there that the police learned of the
complete initial of the accused as SAU which was the
markings in the seized shabu.

PEOPLE VS. MARAORAO, June 20 2012a

maroon bag was confiscated by the police when one of two
(2) persons allegedly selling shabu escaped. There is doubt
on who of the 2 men was holding it because 1 policeman
testified it was dropped by the man who was able to escape
while another policeman testified that it was dropped by
Maraorao.
PEOPLE VS. KIMURA, April 27, 2004the shabu
was marked at the police station;

PEOPLE VS. ALCUIZAR, April 6, 2011The

accused was arrested in a buy-bust operation in the street.
After his arrest, the police searched his house revealing more
shabu. The shabu was marked only in the police station;

PEOPLE VS. PAJARIN, January 12, 2011it was

marked by the police investigator to whom the seized shabu
was turned over. Obviously, it was marked at the police
station;

PEOPLE VS. ULAT, October 5, 2011---the private

poseur buyer said he affixed his signature to the sachet of
shabu upon seizure but the policeman claims it was he who
marked the same..

ULEP VS. PEOPLE, June 11, 2011RTC Laoag

CityThe Police Chief Inspector claimed that he received the
tip from an asset so that they went to arrest the accused.
Another policeman claims that he received the tip from the
asset then they went to arrest the accused;

PEOPLE VS. GARRY DE LA CRUZ, June 8, 2011

no photographs submitted as evidence; no inventory;
 35

BONDAD VS. PEOPLE, December 10, 2008No

pictures

PEOPLE VS. SAPIA ANDONGAN, June 29,

2010only one sachet of shabu taken from the alleged
shabu queen. Unbelievable and contrary to common human
experience.

JULIUS CACAO VS. PEOPLE, January 20,

2010. One policeman claimed in his testimony that he
was the one who delivered a single sachet of shabu
recovered from the accused to the evidence custodian.
Then, another policeman claimed that it was he who
delivered it.

The Reproductive Health Law is Partly

Constitutional and Partly
Unconstitutional. The Constitutional
Rights involved in the Reproductive
Health Law are the Right to life,
freedom of religion, freedom of
expression, right to privacy, family, etc.

JAMES IMBONG, ET AL VS. HON. PAQUITO OCHOA,

ET AL., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014 and 13
companion cases

Perez, J.

These fourteen (14) cases question the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012, RA No. 10354, known as the RH Law because it
allegedly violates several constitutional provisions.

ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONERS

AND HOW THE SUPREME COURT
RESOLVED THEM

1. The right to life (Section 12, Art. II, Constitution) because of its declared
policy allowing the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine
devices and injectables which are abortives despite the policy of the law
against abortion.

The petitioners claim that though the law prohibits abortion, it allows
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
 36

mothers womb thus sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization
and prior to implantation contrary to the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life. The respondents are
of the view that life begins upon implantation of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.

Majority of the members of the Supreme Court are of the view that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided though the ponente is of the belief that life begins at fertilization or when
there is union between the male sperm and the female ovum..

Based from the deliberation of the framers of the Constitution, life begins at
conception under Art. II, Section 12. The Constitution, however, did not ban
contraceptives. Contraceptives that kill or destroy a fertilized ovum should be
deemed abortive but contraceptives that prevent the union of the male sperm and
the female ovum which takes place before fertilization SHOULD NOT BE
DEEMED ABORTIVE AND THUS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE. What the
RH Law prohibits are abortifacients.

2. The right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products
because contraceptives are hazardous to ones health as it causes cancer
and other health problems;

The petitioners claim that the law is unconstitutional because it allows the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intraurine devices, injectables, and family
products and supplies though the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is
greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women
who never use them.

Section 15, Art. II, Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Art. XIII as well as
Section 9 of Art. XVI of the Constitution all deals with the right to health of the
citizen and these provisions are all self-executory. There exists adequate
safeguards in the RH Law to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are
safe are made available to the public because the distribution and dispensation of
contraceptives shall still require the prescription of a physician.

3. The right to equal protection is violated because it discriminates against

the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use.

The argument has no basis. There is real and substantial distinction. In

fact, Section 11, Art. XIII of the Constitution recognizes the distinct necessity to
address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority
in addressing the health development of the people.

4. The right to free speech and religious freedom are violated because the
law requires a conscientious objector [to the RH Law] to refer a patient
to another who is willing to do a particular procedure if it is against his
belief and it also uses government money to procure contraceptives.
 37

The Supreme Court held that the provision which states that the conscientious
objector to the RH procedure sought (who could be a physician) has the duty to
refer the patient seeking reproductive health services and information to another
medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the patients needs is
unconstitutional. It amounts to requiring a conscientious objector to cooperate
with the very thing he refuses to do thereby violating his or her religious beliefs.

Section 5 of Art. III provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause. The first principally prohibits the State from sponsoring
any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates strict
neutrality in affairs among religious groups. Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or
prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of
the human conscience. Under this, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering
with the outside manifestation of ones belief and faith.

In case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court
adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. As held in Estrada vs. Escritur ,
benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the
spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution.

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the cpompelling

state interest test is proper. Underlying the compelling state interest test s the
notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should
be subject to strict scrutiny.

The Supreme Court held that IT IS NOT WITHIN ITS PROVINCE TO

DETERMINE WHETHER THE USE OF CONTRACEPTIVES OR ONES
PARTICIPATION IN THE SUPPORT OF MODERN REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
MEASURES IS MORAL FROM A RELIGIOUS STANDPOINT OR WHETHER THE
SAME IS RIGHT OR WRONG ACCORDING TO ONES DOGMA OR BELIEF. The
SC declared that matters dealing with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of civil courts.

Finally, the provision which punishes a health care service provider who fails
or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health
procedure on a patient due to his religious beliefs is unconstitutional for it violates his
freedom of religion.

5. It violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude because

medical practitioners are compelled to provide 48 hours of pro bono
services to indigent women to be accredited under the PHILHEALTH
Program, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment.
 38

The argument has no merit because the imposition is within the powers of the
government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a
mere privilege and not a right. The practice of medicine is imbued with public
interest and it is both a power and duty of the State to control and regulate such
profession in order to protect and promote public health as it directly involves the
life of the people.

6. It violates the equal protection of the law because it discriminates against

the poor as it makes them the target of the RH Law that promotes
contraceptive use. Likewise, the IRR which provides that provincial, city or
municipal health officers, chiefs of hospitals, head nurseswho by virtue
of their offices are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of this act CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS is unconstitutional for violative of the equal protection
clause.

Such provision is indeed unconstitutional. There is no real and substantial

distinction why medical practitioners are allowed to refuse to perform a procedure
because it violates their religious beliefs but the foregoing officials are not allowed to
follow their religious beliefs on the matter. IT MUST BE POINTED OUT,
HOWEVER, THAT EVEN A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR MAY BE FORCED
TO PERFORM A REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH PROCEDURE EVEN IF IT IS
AGAINST HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN LIFE-THREATENING CASES . THE
RIGHT TO LIFE OF THE MOTHER SHALL BE GIVEN PREFERENCE CONSIDERING
THAT REFERRAL TO ANOTHER MEDICAL PRACTITIONER WOULD AMOUNT TO
DENIAL OF MEDICAL SERVICE WHICH WOULD UNNECESARILY PLACE THE
LIFE OF THE MOTHER IN GRAVE DANGER.

7. The RH Law is avoid for vagueness in violation of the due process clause
because the law suffers from vagueness when it mentions private health
service provider who could be held liable but the same was not defined
by the law.

The argument lacks merit since the law defines a public health care service
provider and private health care service provider. The fact that private
health service provider was used in Section 7 should not be a cause of
confusion since it is definitely analogous to private health care service
provider.

8. The RH Law violates the constitutional provisions on the family when it

allows a spouse, without the knowledge and consent of the other, in
undergoing a procedure like vasectomy or tubal ligation.

The SC held this is indeed unconstitutional. This is so because family is shared

by both spouses. One person cannot found a family. There should be mutual decision-
making.

The provision which allows minors or minors who are already parents or has had
miscarriage to undergo a procedure without the consent of the parents is also
 39

unconstitutional. It is precisely in these situations when the minor needs the comfort,
care, advice and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural
mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. This is based
from the constitutional provision giving the parents the natural and primary rights and
rearing their children for civic efficiency under Section 12, Art. III of the Constitution.
BUT ACCESS TO INFORMATION BY A MINOR ON MATTERS OF REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH PROCEDURES WITHOUT THE PARENTS CONSENT IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BUT NOT ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
PROCEDURES AND MODERN FAMILY PLANNING METHODS THEMSELVES
WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE PARENTS.

9. The law violates academic freedom when Section 24 mandates the

teaching of age-and development appropriate reproductive health
education under threat of fine and imprisonment. This is so because it
effectively forces educational institutions to teach reproductive health
education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to
their students.

The Supreme Court held that this attack on the said provision of the RH Law
is premature considering that the Dep Ed has yet to formulate a curriculum on
age-appropriate reproductive health education.

10. The RH Law violates the non-delegation of legislative power;

It does not because the law is already complete in itself and that no other act
is to be done except to implement it.

11. The Implementing Rules and Regulations is invalid as it changes the

definition of abortifacient which is any drug or device that induces
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mothers womb as defined in the law to any drug or device that
PRIMARILY INDUCES ABORTION OR THE DESTRUCTION OF A FETUS
INSIDE THE MOTHERS WOMB or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mothers womb as per said IRR.

The argument if valid. The IRR is invalid. The inclusion of the word primarily is
ultra vires.

12. The RH Law violates the ONE SUBJECT rule under Section 26 [1], Art. VI
of the Constitution;

The petitioners claim that while the subject of the law in its title is
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RESPONSIBLE PARENTHOOD, but its true
intent is to act as a population control measure in violation of due process.

The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners that the whole idea of
contraception pervades in the entire RH Law because it provides for a full range
of family planning products and methods but also has provisions on pre-natal and
 40

post natal care. Be that as it may, the same does not violate the one subject rule
citing CAWALING, JR. VS. COMELEC AND REP. FRANCIS JOSEPH
ESCUDERO where the Supreme Court held that the one title-one subject rule
does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the eneactment language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. THE RULE IS SUFFICIENTLY COMPLIED WITH IF THE TITLE IS
COMPREHENSIVE ENOUGH AS TO INCLUDE THE GENERAL OBJECT WHICH
THE STATUTE SEEKS TO EFFECT, AND WHERE, AS HERE, THE PERSONS
INTERESTED ARE INFORMED OF THE NATURE, SCOPE AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSED LAW AND ITS OPERATION. As such,
reproductive health and responsible parenthood are interrelated and germane
to the overriding objective to control the population growth in achieving sustainable
human development.

13. The RH Law violates the Natural law.

The Supreme Court held that the court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis
for upholding or invalidating a law. Its only guidepost is the Constitution.

14. The RH Law violates the autonomy of local government and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao because they are also tasked to
implement the RH Law.

The said contention has no merit. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government has still the say when it comes to national priority programs
which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to
legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or
common interest.

Most provisions of the Online Libel

Law are constitutional and not violative
of the freedom of expression. Other
provisions are violative of the freedom of
expression, right to privacy and search
and seizure provisions of the
Constitution.

JESUS DISINI ET AL. VS. THE SECRETARY OF

JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 203335, February 18,
2014, and companion cases

Abad, J.

THE FACTS:
 41

The above cases seek to declare as unconstitutional the following provisions of RA No.
10175, the Cybercrime prevention Act of 2012:

1. Section 4 [a] (1) on Illegal Access;

2. Section 4 [a] (3) on Data interference;
3. Section 4 [a] (6) on Cyber-squatting;
4. Section 4 [b] (3) on Identity Theft;
5. Section 4 [c] (1) on Cybersex;
6. Section 4 [c] (2) on Pornography;
7. Section 4 [c] (3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
8. Section 4 [c] (4) on Libel;
9. Section 5 on Aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of
cybercrimes;
10. Section 6 on the penalty of one degree higher;
11. Section 7 on the prosecution both under the Revised Penal Code and RA
No. 10175;
12. Section 8 on penalties;
13. Section 12 on real-time collection of traffic data;
14. Section 13 on preservation of computer data;
15. Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data;
16. Section 17 on destruction of computer data;
17. Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data;
18. Section 20 on Obstruction of justice;
19. Section 24 on cybercrime investigation and coordinating center (CICC);
and
20. Section 26 [a] on CICCs powers on the crime of Libel.
21. Some petitioners likewise raised the constitutionality of related Articles
353, 354, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of Libel.

Held:

1. Section 4 [a] (1) on Illegal Access provides that it is an offense against

the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data systems for
the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.

The said provision is CONSTITUTIONAL. The SC held that nothing in the said
Section calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental
freedom like speech is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act---
accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemned
conduct.

[NOTE: The strict scrutiny standard deals with the test on the constitutionality
of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a
legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional. The burden, in these cases, is on the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest. Later on, the strict scrutiny standard was
used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender or
 42

race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier applications to
equal protection. (WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA, 576
SCRA 416)]

2. Section 4 [a] (3) provides that it is an offense against the confidentiality,

integrity and availability of computer data systems for the intentional or
reckless alteration, damaging, deletion, or deterioration of computer data,
electronic document or electronic data message, without right, including
the introduction or transmission of viruses.

The petitioners claims that this section suffers from overbreadth in that while it
seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and
expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedom.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally

subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep
its subject BROADLY , thereby invading the area of protected freedoms (SOUTHERN
HEMISPHERE VS. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, 632 SCRA 146). Section 4 [a] (3)
does not encroach on these freedoms because it SIMPLY PUNISHES WHAT
ESSENTIALLY IS A FORM OF VANDALISM, THE ACT OF WILLFULLY DESTROYING
WITHOUT RIGHT THE THINGS THAT BELONGS TO OTHERS, IN THIS CASE,
THEIR COMPUTER DATA, ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT, OR LECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGE. SUCH ACT HAS NO CONNECTION TO GUARANTEED FREEDOMS.
THERE IS NO FREEDOM TO DESTROY OTHER PEOPLES COMPUTER SYSTEMS
AND PRIVATE DOCUMENTS.

Of course, all penal laws have an inherent chilling effect on the citizens. But to
prevent the State from enacting laws of this nature would render the State powerless
in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.

3. Section 4 [a] (6) or cyber-squatting provides that it is an offense

against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data
systems for the acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad
faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation and deprive others from
registering the same, if such domain is: [i] similar, identical or confusingly
similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate
government agency at the time of the domain name registration; [ii]
identical or in any way similar to the name of the person other than the
registrant, in case of a personal name; and [iii] acquired without right or
with intellectual property interests in it.

The petitioners claim that the said provision violates the equal protection clause
because it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who
use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody or any other literary device.
The law is constitutional because the law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring
the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation or deprive others
who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The
challenge based on equal protection is baseless.
 43

4. Section 4 [a] (6) on Identity theft punishes the intentional acquisition,

use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration or deletion of identifying
information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without
right; Provided, that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty
imposable shall be one degree lower.

The petitioners claim that this provision violates the due process, privacy of
correspondence and freedom of the press provisions of the Constitution.

The right to privacy or the right to be let alone, is created by the constitutional
provisions on the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the right to
privacy of communication and correspondence.

In this case, the right to privacy is not violated. The law punishes those who
acquire or use such identifying information without the right, implicitly to cause
damage. The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name,
citizenship, his residence address, hisa contact number, his place and date of birth, the
name of his spouse, if any, his occupation, and similar data.

The claim that the same is overbreadth will not hold water since the specific
conducts prohibited do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. It simply
regulates acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration or deletion of
personal identification data of another. THERE IS NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
ACQUIRE ANOTHERS PERSONAL DATA.

5. Section 4 [c] (1) on Cybersex or the wilful engagement, maintenance,

control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of
sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for
favor or consideration.

The petitioner claims that the above section violates the freedom of expression
clause of the Constitution because they fear that private communications of sexual
character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as
crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done for favor
in cyberspace.

The said section is not unconstitutional where it stands a construction that it

applies only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling or
operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.

This is based on the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress

which show a lack of intent to penalize a private showing between and among two
private personsalthough that may be a form of obscenity to some. The
understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of
engaging in a business is necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex. The Act
actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, pornography for favor and consideration
which includes interactive prostitution and pornography via the Webcam.
 44

6. Section 4 [c] (2) on Pornography or the pornography described in RA No.

9775 committed through a computer system provided that the penalty
imposable shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in RA No.
9775.

This is constitutional because of the potential uncontrolled proliferation of a

particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.

7. Section 4 (3) on unsolicited commercial communication or spam is

constitutional though transmitting spam amounts to trespass to ones
privacy since the person sending out spam enters the recipients domain
without permission . But these spam do not reduce the efficiency of computers.
They can be read or deleted outright by the recipient. Unsolicited advertisements
are legitimate forms of expressions and do not violate the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression.

8. Whether the Libel provisions of the Revised Penal Code and Section 4
4 of the Cyber Crime Law are unconstitutional .

The SC held that these are constitutional because freedom of expression is not
absolute and the government has the right to protect the citizens from defamation.

9. Section 5 which deals with aiding or abetting in the commission of

cybercrime is valid but unconstitutional if it is to be applied to people who
Like, share or Comment to a post. This is so because they are not the
author of the libellous articles.

10. Section 6 and Section 8 which imposes a stiffer penalty on cyber Libel is
constitutional . Fixing of penalties for crimes is a legislative prerogative. Further,
the offender in using the internet often evades identification and is able to reach far
more victims or cause greater harm. As such, the higher penalties appear to be
proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The distinction, therefore, creates
a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes. It does not violate the equal protection
clause by reason of the graver penalty. If the same article, however, was published
in print and also posted online or vice versa, CHARGING THE OFFENDER
UNDER BOTH LAWS WOULD BE A BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE
PROSCRIPTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY. Likewise, charging the offender
under Section 4 2 and the Anti-Child Pornography Act separately would likewise
be tantamount to double jeopardy.

11. Section 12 which allows law enforcement authorities, WITH DUE CAUSE,
to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-
time which includes the communications origin, destination, route, time,
date, size, duration or type of underlying service, BUT NOT ITS
CONTENT NOR IDENTITIES ,

The said provision IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The authority given to the

authorities is too sweeping and lacks restraint. Nothing can prevent law enforcement
 45

authorities holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their
sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the
citizenry to leaked information, or worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in
these agencies. The power is virtually limitless enabling the authorities to engage in
fishing expedition choosing whatever communication they want based on due cause.
This provision violates a persons right to privacy. In WHALEN VS. ROES, 429 US
589, the United States Supreme Court classified PRIVACY into two categories: [1]
decisional privacy and [2] informational privacy . Decisional privacy involves the
right to independence in making certain important decisions while informational
privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. Informational
privacy is violated by Section 12. Further, informational privacy has two aspects:
[1] the right not to have private information disclosed, and [2] the right to live
freely without surveillance and intrusion . In determining whether or not a matter is
entitled to the right to privacy, the Supreme Court had laid down a two-fold test. The
first is the subjective test where one claiming the right have an actual or legitimate
expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test where his
or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively
reasonable.

12. Section 13 on preservation of computer data for a minimum period of 6

months by the service provider is constitutional because the service
provider has no obligation from keeping said data forever, The user ought
to have a copy of the said data and he could keep it. No violation of his
right.

13. Section 14 which allows disclosure of a data obtained through a search

warrant is constitutional since it does not violate the search and seizure
provision nor the privacy of communication since the same is done only after
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION.

14. Section 15 which provides for securing a computer system, make and
retain a copy of the computer data, and maintain the integrity of the
relevant stored computer data AFTER THE SEIZURE BY VIRTUE OF A
SEARCH WARRANT is constitutional . It merely enumerates the duties of the
law enforcement authorities to ensure the preservation of computer system or data
after seizure based from a search warrant.

15. Section 17 which provides for the destruction of computer data under
preservation and examination obtained by means of a search warrant is valid in
order to prevent the storage system of the service provider for overloading. Such
destruction of computer data does not violate the right of a person to due process
of law for deprivation of property because if wants to preserve the same, he could
save them in his computer.

16. Section 19 which authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block

access to computer data IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL for it violates the
search and seizure provision and freedom of expression. This would in
effect allows the government to seize and places a computer data under
its control and disposition without a warrant. The DOJ Order could not
 46

supplant a judicial search warrant. It would make the government the

judge, jury and executioner rolled into one. It also restrains free speech .

17. Sections 24 and 26 (a) on the creation of a Cybercrime Investigation and

Coordinating Center (CICC) is not a undue delegation of legislative power because
the law is already complete in itself. It is just mandated to formulate and implement
a national cybersecurity plan.

The right to Due Process of law on the

part of Mayor Maliksi was violated when
he was not notified of the dates when
the COMELEC conducted the
decryption, printing and photocopying of
the ballot images from the CF Cards by
the First Division of the COMELEC in an
appealed case.

MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI VS. COMELEC and

HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, G.R. No. 203302, April 13,
2013

During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan
the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered
precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the
revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease
and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC.
In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksis motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi
was then installed as Mayor.

In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the
parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from
the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit
the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot
images. Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash
deposit.

On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTCs decision
and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor . Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified of
the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images,
which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the
integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.

On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksis motion for
reconsideration. Maliksi went to the Supreme Court reiterating his objections to the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him in violation of his
 47

constitutional right to due process of law, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in
the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division.

In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 8-7,
dismissed Maliksis petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied
due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination
of the ballot images by the First Division referring to the orders of the First Division directing
Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot
images; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for
reconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion
in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of
the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the
same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that
the First Divisions finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been
fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the
revision.

In his Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Maliksi again raised the alleged
violation of his right to due process.

Maliksi insists: (a) that he had the right to be notified of every incident of the
proceedings and to be present at every stage thereof; ( b) that he was deprived of such rights
when he was not informed of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by
the First Division; (c) that the March 28, 2012 and April 17, 2012 orders of the First Division did
not sufficiently give him notice inasmuch as the orders did not state the date, time, and venue
of the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and ( d) that he was thus completely
deprived of the opportunity to participate in the decryption proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court granted Maliksis Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,
and reverses the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division
of the COMELEC denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the
decryption and printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount
proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot images.

It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the
assailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which
no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount
proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as
amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their
exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective regional (the
autonomous regions), provincial and city officials.

We should not ignore that the parties participation during the revision and recount
proceedings would not benefit only the parties, but was as vital and significant for the
COMELEC as well, for only by their participation would the COMELECs proceedings attain
credibility as to the result. The parties presence would have ensured that the requisite
procedures have been followed, including the required authentication and certification that the
 48

images to be printed are genuine. In this regard, the COMELEC was less than candid, and was
even cavalier in its conduct of the decryption and printing of the picture images of the ballots
and the recount proceedings. The COMELEC was merely content with listing the guidelines
that the First Division had followed in the appreciation of the ballots and the results of the
recount. In short, there was vagueness as to what rule had been followed in the decryption and
printing proceeding.

The Supreme Court held that the Resolution does not intend to validate the victory of
any of the parties in the 2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as yet. The Court
simply does not want to countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, a
cornerstone of our legal system.

Dismissal of a criminal case based on a

Demurrer to Evidence results in double
jeopardy and that no appeal, Motion for
Reconsideration nor petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 may be
entertained, as a general rule. Private
complainants may not, without the
participation of the Solicitor General,
question said dismissal before the Court
of Appeals or Supreme Court .

LITO BAUTISTA vs. SHARON CUNETA-PANGILINAN,

G. R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012

The petitioners who are editor and assistant editor of the tabloid Bandera were
charged of two (2) counts of Libel before the RTC of Mandaluyong City based on the complaint
of actress Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan.

In Criminal Case No. MC02-4872, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads:

That on or about the 24th day of April, 2001, in the

City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together with x x x with deliberate intent to
bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public
dishonor, shame and contempt, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause
to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro
Manila, which among others have the following insulting and
slanderous remarks, to wit:

MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON!

Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singer-actress,

Id like to believe, is really brain-dead. Mukhang
 49

totoo yata yung sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou

Tayag na ganyan siya.

Magsalita ka, Missed Cuneta, at sabihin mong hindi

ito totoo. xxx Dios mio perdon, what she gets to see
are those purportedly biting commentaries about her
katabaan and kaplastikan but she has simply refused
to acknowledge the good reviews weve done on her.

xxx

In Criminal Case No. MC02-4875, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads:

That on or about the 27th day of March, 2001, in the

City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together with Jane/John Does unknown
directors/officers of Bandera Publishing x x x with deliberate
intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public
dishonor, shame and contempt did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause
to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro
Manila, which, among others, have the following insulting and
slanderous remarks, to wit:

She doesnt want kasi her husband to win as a

senator because when that happens, mawawalan
siya ng hold sa kanya, our caller opines. Pettizou is
really sad that Sharon is treating her husband like a
wimp.

In public, our source goes on tartly, pa kiss-kiss

siya. Pa embrace-embrace pero kung silang dalawa
[na] lang parang kung sinong sampid kung i-treat niya
si Kiko. My God Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. Hes
really intelligent as compared to Sharon who appears
to be brain dead most of the time.

Upon arraignment, petitioners each entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, a joint pre-
trial and trial of the cases ensued.

On November 14, 2006, after the prosecution rested its case, petitioners filed a Motion
for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence. In their Demurrer to Evidence,
which was appended to the said Motion, Bautista and Alcantara alleged that the prosecution's
evidence failed to establish their participation as Editor and Associate Editor, respectively, of
the publication Bandera; that that the subject articles written by Ampoloquio were not libelous
due to absence of malice.
 50

On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order16 granting petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence and dismissed the above criminal cases. On August 19, 2008, respondent Sharon
Cuneta-Pangilinan filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set aside the RTC
Order dated April 25, 2008 which granted petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence and ordered the
dismissal of the cases against them.

In a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA granted respondent's petition, thereby
reversing and setting aside the RTC Order dated April 25, 2008 and ordered that the case be
remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2009 which, however, was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated September 28, 2009.

Hence, petitioners filed this petition claiming that the petition for Certiorari filed by
Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan violated their right against double jeopardy.

Held:

The petition is impressed with merit.

Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, dated April 25, 2008, granting the
Demurrer to Evidence was tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the prosecution can no longer
interpose an appeal to the CA, as it would place them in double jeopardy. Petitioners contend
that respondent's petition for certiorari with the CA should not have prospered, because the
allegations therein, in effect, assailed the trial court's judgment, not its jurisdiction. In other
words, petitioners posit that the said Order was in the nature of an error of judgment rendered,
which was not correctible by a petition for certiorari with the CA.

At the onset, it should be noted that respondent took a procedural misstep, and the
view she is advancing is erroneous. The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal
cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code
explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to
represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any
officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of the Government.

To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The
private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar
as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party
is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the
civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only
by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent
 51

the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not
undertake such appeal.

In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially
questioned the criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the case.
Consequently, the petition should have been filed by the State through the OSG. Since the
petition for certiorari filed in the CA was not at the instance of the OSG, the same should have
been outrightly dismissed by the CA.

Finally, although the conclusion of the trial court may be wrong, to reverse and set
aside the Order granting the demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners constitutionally-
enshrined right against double jeopardy. Had it not been for this procedural defect, the Court
could have seriously considered the arguments advanced by the respondent in seeking the
reversal of the Order of the RTC.

The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore, be exercised with caution,

taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the private
offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the
accused is acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such
instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right
against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the
performance of their duties as members of the Bench, always bearing in mind that their
decisions affect the lives of the accused and the individuals who come to the courts to seek
redress of grievances, which decision could be possibly used by the aggrieved party as basis
for the filing of the appropriate actions against them.

May an accused charged of selling

marijuana in the criminal information be
convicted of possession of marijuana
without violating his constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him?

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHAD

MANANANSALA, G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013

The information filed on October 20, 1994 against the accused alleges:

That on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of

October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without being lawfully
authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to
another and distributing more or less 750 grams or
kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in a small wooden
box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs,
found in his possession and control.
 52

CONTRARY TO LAW.

To substantiate the charge, the Prosecution showed that on October 18, 1994 the
Philippine National Police in Olongapo City (PNP) conducted a test-buy operation against
Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date, following the test-buy, the
PNP applied for and obtained a search warrant from the RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City
(Search Warrant No. 8-94) to authorize the search for and seizure of prohibited drugs in
Manansalas residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension, Barangay East Bajac Bajac,
Olongapo City.

SPO4 Felipe P. Bolina and other elements of the PNP, accompanied by Barangay
Chairman Reynaldo Manalang of Barangay East Bajac Bajac, conducted the search of
Manansalas house at around 5:30 a.m. on October 19, 1994. The search yielded the 750
grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the information, which the search team recovered
from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the amount of P655.00 that
included the two marked P50.00 bills bearing serial numbers SNKJ812018 and SNMN426747
used during the test buy.

After trial, accused was convicted of possession of marijuana only under Section 8 of
RA No. 6425 instead of Section 4. The said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Was his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him violated when he was charged of sale of marijuana under Section 4 of RA No.
6425 but was convicted of possession under Section 8 of the same law--- which entitles him
to acquittal?

Held:

The crime charged in the information was clearly for violation of Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 6425 or sale of prohibited drugs, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Arraigned
under such information, Manansala pleaded not guilty to it. But instead of finding him guilty of
the crime charged after trial, the RTC convicted him for violation of Section 8, of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

The accused now questions said conviction based on the alleged violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the
present circumstances, the established principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in
the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of
another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and
which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller . In this case ,
it has been satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana confiscated from accused-
appellant were the same prohibited drugs subject of the original Information. In this light, the
trial court and the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in convicting the accused-
 53

appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

To properly resolve the appeal, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the

conviction of Manansala for a violation of Section 8, which the information did not allege,
instead of for a violation of Section 4, which the information alleged, was not in violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against
him. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged. According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985), the
rule then applicable, an offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter.

Non-compliance of Section 21 of RA No.

9165 entitles the accused to acquittal
based on his constitutional presumption
of innocence.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAMMY

UMIPANG, G.R. No. 190321, April 25, 2012

Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person named Sam was selling
drugs along Cagayan de Oro Street in Maharlika Village, Taguig City, a buy-bust team from the
[Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF)] of the Taguig City
Police was dispatched on April 1, 2006 at around 6:00 in the evening. [Police Officer (PO) 2]
Gasid was assigned to act as poseur buyer and he was given a 500.00 marked money. The
operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

Upon arrival at the area, PO2 Gasid and the confidential informant sauntered the
length of the street while the other members of the team strategically positioned themselves.
The confidential informant saw the man called Sam standing near a store. The confidential
informant and PO2 Gasid then approached Sam. Straight off, the confidential informant said
Sam, pa-iskor kami. Sam replied Magkano ang iiskorin nyo? The confidential informant said
Five hundred pesos. Sam took out three (3) plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance with various price tags500, 300, and 100. After making a choice, PO2 Gasid
handed the marked 500.00 to Sam who received the same.

Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, PO2 Gasid immediately grabbed and
arrested Sam. In a few seconds, the rest of the buy-bust team joined them. PO1 Ragos
handcuffed Sam. Five (5) more plastic sachets containing the same white crystalline substance
were recovered from Sam. PO2 Gasid marked the items with the initials SAU [which stood for
Sammy A. Umipang, the complete name, including the middle initial, of accused-appellant].
Sam was forthwith brought to the police station where he was booked, investigated and
identified as accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul. PO2 Gasid then brought the
 54

confiscated items to the crime laboratory for testing. The specimens all tested positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu, a dangerous drug.

THERE WAS NO INVENTORY NOR PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BEFORE THE

CONFISCATED ITEMS WERE BROUGHT TO THE CRIME LABORATORY FOR TESTING.

Despite the above lapses, accused was convicted by the RTC and the Court of
Appeals.

Before the Supreme Court, accused moves for his acquittal because said non-
compliance of Section 21, RA No. 9165 is fatal and in furtherance of his constitutional
presumption of innocence.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of the RTC Joint
Decision in all respects because there is no evidence of improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witness to testify falsely against accused-appellant, the testimony must be given
full faith and credence.

Held:

At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed from a buy-bust operation
conducted by the SAID-SOTF.

Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official

duties of law enforcers, we stress that the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a
matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality. The provisions were crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address
potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life
imprisonment.

Stringent compliance is justified under the rule that penal laws shall be construed
strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. Otherwise, the procedure
set out in the law will be mere lip service. The conduct of the buy-bust operations was
peppered with defects, which raises doubts on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items from accused-appellant.

First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of the seized items.
According to his testimony, PO2 Gasid used the initials of the complete name,
including the middle initial, of accused-appellant in order to mark the confiscated
sachets. The marking was done immediately after Umipang was handcuffed. However,
a careful perusal of the testimony of PO2 Gasid would reveal that his prior knowledge
of the complete initials of accused-appellant, standing for the latters full name, was not
clearly established.

Evidence on record does not establish that PO2 Gasid had prior knowledge of
the complete name of accused-appellant, including the middle initial, which enabled
 55

the former to mark the seized items with the latters complete initials. This suspicious,
material inconsistency in the marking of the items raises questions as to how PO2
Gasid came to know about the initials of Umipang prior to the latters statements at the
police precinct, thereby creating a cloud of doubt on the issues of where the marking
really took place and whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
were preserved. All that was established was that it was PO1 Saez who asked
accused-appellant about the latters personal circumstances, including his true identity,
and that the questioning happened when accused-appellant was already at the police
station.

Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show genuine and sufficient effort to seek
the third-party representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. Under
the law, the inventory and photographing of seized items must be conducted
in the presence of a representative from the media, from the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and from any elected public official.

Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory and the
marking of the seized items does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible in
evidence. However, we take note that, in this case, the SAID-SOTF did not even attempt to
contact the barangay chairperson or any member of the barangay council. There is no
indication that they contacted other elected public officials. Neither do the records show
whether the police officers tried to get in touch with any DOJ representative. Nor does the
SAID-SOTF adduce any justifiable reason for failing to do so especially considering that it
had sufficient time from the moment it received information about the activities of the accused
until the time of his arrest. Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the
part of the apprehending police officers to look for the said representatives pursuant to Section
21(1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much

Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take
photos of the seized items pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. As pointed out by the
defense during trial, the Certificate of Inventory did not contain any signature, including that of
PO2 Gasid the arresting officer who prepared the certificate thus making the certificate
defective. Also, the prosecution neither submitted any photograph of the seized items nor
offered any reason for failing to do so. We reiterate that these requirements are specifically
outlined in and required to be implemented by Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.

Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically
exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she was convicted especially true when
the lapses in procedure were recognized and explained in terms of justifiable grounds. There
must also be a showing that the police officers intended to comply with the procedure but were
thwarted by some justifiable consideration/reason. However, when there is gross disregard
of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty
is generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in
evidence. This uncertainty cannot be remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the
procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties.
As a result, the prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the
 56

crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused which entitles
him to acquittal based on his constitutional presumption of innocence.

When the evidence is susceptible to two (2)

interpretations, one consistent with the guilt
of the accused and the other, his innocence,
the presumption of innocence was not
overcome and the accused is entitled to
acquittal as a matter of right.

PEOPLE VS. ZAFRA MARAORAO, G.R. NO. 174369,

June 20, 2012

Appellant was charged under an Information dated January 4, 2001 filed before the RTC of
Manila for illegal possession of shabu.

On March 19, 2001, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged
against him. Thereafter, trial ensued.

For the prosecution, PO3 Manuel Vigilla testified that on November 29, 2000, they
received reliable information at Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District (WPD) that
an undetermined amount of shabu will be delivered inside the Islamic Center in Quiapo in the
early morning of the following day. On November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he and PO2
Mamelito Abella, PO1 Joseph dela Cruz, and SPO1 Norman Gamit went to the Islamic Center.
While walking along Rawatun Street in Quiapo, they saw two men talking to each other. Upon
noticing them, one ran away. PO2 Abella and PO1 Dela Cruz chased the man but failed to
apprehend him.

Meanwhile, the man who was left behind dropped a maroon bag on the pavement. He
was about to run when PO3 Vigilla held him, while SPO1 Gamit picked up the maroon bag. The
man was later identified as appellant Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang. The police examined the
contents of the bag and saw a transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance,
which they suspected to be shabu. At the police station, the investigator marked the plastic
sachet ZM-1 in the presence of the police officers.
The specimen was then forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory
chemical analysis. When examined by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Miladenia O. Tapan, the
1,280.081 grams of white crystalline substance gave a positive result to the test for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. Her findings are contained in Chemistry
Report No. D-1121-00 .

In his defense, appellant testified that on November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he
was going to the place of his uncle, Abdul Gani, at the Islamic Center to get a letter from his
mother. He went there early because he had to report for work at the Port Area in Manila at
8:00 a.m. On his way, an unidentified man carrying a bag asked him about a house number
which he did not know. He stopped walking to talk to the man, who placed his bag down. When
they turned around, they saw four men in civilian attire walking briskly. He only found out that
they were police officers when they chased the man he was talking to. As the man ran away,
the man dropped his bag. Appellant averred that he did not run because he was not aware of
what was inside the bag .
 57

He was convicted by the RTC of illegal possession of shabu which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

Held:

Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping

with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt
is proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Now, in order to convict appellant for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, or

the shabu in this case, the prosecution evidence must prove beyond reasonable doubt the
following elements: (1) the appellant was in possession of an item or object that is identified to
be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (2) such possession was not authorized by law; and (3) the
appellant freely and consciously possessed the drug. In this case, the fact of possession by
appellant of the bag containing the shabu was not established in the first place.

The testimony of PO3 Vigilla reveals a glaring discrepancy which both the trial and
the appellate courts overlooked. In their Joint Affidavit, arresting officers PO3 Vigilla, PO2
Abella, PO1 dela Cruz and SPO1 Gamit stated that they spotted two unidentified persons
standing and seemingly conversing a few meters ahead of them. However, when one of them
noticed our presence, he hastily r[a]n away heading towards the Muslim Center leaving behind
the other person and a maroon colored bag with Adidas marking in the pavement. In other
words, the maroon bag was left behind by the man who ran away. But at the trial, PO3 Vigilla
testified during direct examination that they spotted two persons talking to each other, and upon
noticing them, one of them scampered away and was chased by my companions while the
other one dropped a bag, sir . Presumably, under his testimony, the bag was now held by the
one who did not run away referring to the accused-appellant. Later, in another part of his
testimony, he again changed this material fact. When he was asked by Prosecutor Senados as
to who between the two persons they saw talking to each other ran
away, PO3 Vigilla categorically answered, [t]he one who is holding a bag, sir .

Such material inconsistency leaves much to be desired about the credibility of

the prosecutions principal witness and casts reasonable doubt as to appellants guilt for it
renders questionable whether he in fact held the bag with intention to possess it and its
contents.

In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the accused. While a lone
witness testimony is sufficient to convict an accused in certain instances, the testimony must
be clear, consistent, and crediblequalities we cannot ascribe to this case. Jurisprudence is
consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must both come from a credible
witness and be credible in itself tested by human experience, observation, common
knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved through the years. Clearly from the
foregoing, the prosecution failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
was indeed in possession of shabu, and that he freely and consciously possessed the same.

The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional

principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving
 58

that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
evidence is susceptible to two (2) interpretations, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and
the other his innocence, the prosecutions evidence failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence, and thus, appellant is entitled to an acquittal.

Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment. Where there is
reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may not have
been established. The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy
of long standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted
as a matter of right .

There is violation of the right to due

process if the court grants a litigant
more than the relief he prayed for in his
pleadings---even if the defendant was
declared in default.

DIONA VS. BALANGUE,

G.R. No. I 73559, January 7, 2013

On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner payable

in six months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square meter property
located in Marulas, Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-12296.7
When the debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, on
September 17, 1999, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint praying that respondents be
ordered:

(a) To pay [petitioner] the principal obligation of P45,000.00, with interest thereon at
the rate of 12% per annum , from 02 March 1991 until the full obligation is paid.

(b) To pay [petitioner] actual damages as may be proven during the trial but shall in no
case be less than P10,000.00; P25,000.00 by way of attorneys fee, plus P2,000.00
per hearing as appearance fee.

(c) To issue a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public auction of the aforementioned
parcel of land, and for the disposition of the proceeds [thereof] in accordance with law,
upon failure of the [respondents] to fully pay [petitioner] within the period set by law the
sums set forth in this complaint.

(d) Costs of this suit.

Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny).
On October 15, 1999, with the assistance of Atty. Arthur C. Coroza (Atty. Coroza) of the Public
Attorneys Office, they filed a Motion to Extend Period to Answer. Despite the requested
extension, however, respondents failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of
the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed petitioner to present her evidence
ex parte.
 59

In a Decision11 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC granted petitioners Complaint. The
dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioner], ordering the

[respondents] to pay the [petitioner] as follows: a) the sum of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND
(P45,000.00) PESOS, representing the unpaid principal loan obligation plus interest at 5%
per month [sic] reckoned from March 2, 1991, until the same is fully paid; b) P20,000.00 as
attorneys fees plus cost of suit;

Held:

We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to
due process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or
in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without
first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process
considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the
pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Teston, this Court expounded that:

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to

enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings,
absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with
respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement
that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to
prevent surprise to the defendant.

It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the default order for, as alleged
in their Comment, it is not their intention to impugn or run away from their just and valid
obligation. Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence should never be construed as waiver
to contest patently erroneous award which already transgresses their right to due process, as
well as applicable jurisprudence.

Private complainant could not file a

Motion for Recosndieration of the
Supreme Court Decision acquitting the
accused based on misappreciation of
facts without violating the right of the
accused against double jeopardy.

PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB ET AL, G.R. No. 176864,

January 18, 2011 and LEJANO VS. PEOPLE, G. R. No.
176389, January 18, 2011
 60

On December 14, 2010 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and RTC of Paranaque and acquitted the accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada,
and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the

victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it denied the prosecution due
process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking
credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted
in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and
prosecution witnesses.

But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the

accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense. x x x

To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being

punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this
provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the
accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he
has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated
litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will
to fight.

As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan :

[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign
freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense
would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression.
The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be
permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense,
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty. Societys awareness of the heavy
personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual
defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a
single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the
enforcement of criminal laws.

Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible.

But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused
gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In
any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65.
 61

He ascribes grave error on the Courts finding that Alfaro was not a credible
witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the
defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review the
evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation.
This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure
Webb, et als conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can
no longer be disturbed. Double jeopardy has set in.

States right to due process of law; when

the State may validly question by
Certiorari under Rule 65 a decision
acquitting and accused or to increase
the penalty without violating the rule
against Double jeopardy

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,

IMELDA MARCOS, JOSE CONRADO BENITEZ and
GILBERT DULAY, G.R. No. 153304-05, February 7,
2012

The private respondents were the accused in two criminal informations filed before the
Sandiganbayan, charging them with the crime of malversation of public funds, defined and
penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended . The
charges arose from the transactions that the respondents participated in, in their official
capacities as Minister and Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Human Settlements ( MHS) under
the MHS Kabisig Program.

After the pre-trial conference, a joint trial of the criminal cases ensued. The
prosecutions chief evidence was based on the lone testimony of Commission of Audit ( COA)
Auditor Iluminada Cortez and the documentary evidence used in the audit examination of the
subject funds.

COA Auditor Cortez admitted that the audit team did not conduct a physical inventory
of these motor vehicles; it based its report on the information given by the Presidential Task
Force. She emphasized that the audit team found it highly irregular that the motor vehicles
were registered in the name of University of Life ( UL) and not in the name of MHS; and for this
reason, she believed that no proper liquidation was made of these vehicles by MHS.

After COA Auditor Cortez testimony, the prosecution submitted its formal offer of
evidence and rested its case.

Subsequently, separate motions to dismiss the criminal cases, by way of demurrers to

evidence, were filed by Zagala and the respondents on November 15, 1997, January 5, 1998
and January 28, 1998; on January 27, 1998, the prosecution filed a Manifestation stating
that it was not opposing the demurrers to evidence.

The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence and acquitted the

respondents in its assailed decision dated March 22, 2002 . In dismissing these criminal
 62

cases, the Sandiganbayan found no evidence of misappropriation of the subject funds in the
two criminal cases considering the unreliability and incompleteness of the audit report.

The Issues

1. Whether the prosecutors actions and/or omissions (of not presenting other
witnesses and for not opposing the Demurrer to Evidence of the accused) in these
cases effectively deprived the State of its right to due process; and

2. Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting the

demurrers to evidence of the respondents [and as such, double jeopardy has not
set in] for a review by the Supreme Court of the guilt or innocence of the private
respondents.

Held:

The petitioner claims that the State was denied due process because of the
nonfeasance committed by the special prosecutor in failing to present sufficient evidence to
prove its case. It claims that the prosecutor failed to protect the States interest in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. To support its position, petitioner cites the case
of Merciales v. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 345, where the Court nullified the dismissal of
the criminal cases due to the serious nonfeasance committed by the public prosecutor.

The petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that resulted in a miscarriage of justice prejudicial to
the States interest when it took the demurrers to evidence at face value instead of requiring the
presentation of additional evidence, taking into consideration the huge amounts of public funds
involved and the special prosecutors failure to oppose the demurrers to evidence.

As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to
an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy (PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 559 SCRA 449).
Notably, the proscription against double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on errors of
judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double
jeopardy will not attach, these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 491
SCRA 185, June 16, 2000; and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a partys due process
rights, PEOPLE VS. VELASCO, 340 SCRA 207, SEPTEMBER 13, 2000.

A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the basis of grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial of due process
implies an invalid or otherwise void judgment. If either or both grounds are established, the
judgment of acquittal is considered void; as a void judgment, it is legally inexistent and does not
have the effect of an acquittal. Thus, the defense of double jeopardy will not lie in such a case.

Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accuseds

demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based
on the narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 63

In the present case, the petitioner particularly imputes grave abuse of discretion on the
Sandiganbayan for its grant of the demurrer to evidence, without requiring the presentation of
additional evidence and despite the lack of basis for the grant traceable to the special
prosecutors conduct. The special prosecutors conduct allegedly also violated the States due
process rights.

The petitioner claims that the special prosecutor failed in her duty to give effective
legal representation to enable the State to fully present its case against the respondents,
citing Merciales v. Court of Appeals where we considered the following factual circumstances
- (1) the public prosecutor rested the case knowing fully well that the evidence adduced was
insufficient; (2) the refusal of the public prosecutor to present other witnesses available to
take the stand; (3) the knowledge of the trial court of the insufficiency of the prosecutions
evidence when the demurrer to evidence was filed before it; and (4) the trial courts failure to
require the presentation of additional evidence before it acted on the demurrer to
evidence. All these circumstances effectively resulted in the denial of the States right to due
process, attributable to the inaction of the public prosecutor and/or the trial court .

In the present case, we find that the State was not denied due process in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. There was no indication that the special prosecutor
deliberately and willfully failed to present available evidence or that other evidence could be
secured.

We take this opportunity to remind the prosecution that this Court is as much a judge in
behalf of an accused-defendant whose liberty is in jeopardy, as it is the judge in behalf of the
State, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of society. Therefore, unless the petitioner
demonstrates, through evidence and records, that its case falls within the narrow exceptions
from the criminal protection of double jeopardy, the Court has no recourse but to apply the
finality-of-acquittal rule.

Double jeopardy when not applicable in

a petition under Rule 65 to increase the
penalty as a result of grave abuse of
discretion by the trial court.

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012 AND
people of the Philippines vs. THE HOMORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 154954,
February 1, 2012

[THE LENNY VILLA HAZING CASE]

FACTS

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III,
 64

Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny
Villa (neophytes).

On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the
Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to
Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also
an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter
were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their
initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their briefing, they were brought to
the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.

The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites.
These rites included the Indian Run, which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two
parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express,
which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs
outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which
the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged
with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were
being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and
the Auxies Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict
physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with
the fraternity principles.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) arrived and demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of
initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and
Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain.
Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the
ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and
incoherent mumblings. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans

After trial, the court held that:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero,

Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada,
Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al. )
were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony

Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al. ) were
 65

found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days
of arresto menor.

3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal

were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

The People of the Philippines filed a Petition under Rule 65 questioning the acquittal
and the lower penalty on the four (4) accused and also argues that the rule on double
jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts finding of
conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.

Held:

The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates
that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal
or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused the accused cannot
again be charged with the same or an identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law
of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found
in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.

The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the State from appealing the
judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either
through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by
certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules . The requisites for
invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is
filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant
was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the defendants express consent.

This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts
acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following
recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where
there is a finding of mistrial, People vs. COURT OF APPEALS & GALICIA, 516 SCRA
383 or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion . The third instance refers to
this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. Here, the party asking for the review must show the
presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a
patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of
authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense
justice. In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the
acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. The Solicitor
 66

General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and
Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing. In our view, what the
Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties. In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot
be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the
evidence. Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari. Therefore,
pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the
Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity members .

The assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug the
four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries has to be modified.

In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:

Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the

exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and
Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the physical
punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason
of the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine
the duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance required . xxx
And when proof of the said period is absent, the crime committed
should be deemed only as slight physical injuries.

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof
that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the
only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been
proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The
accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest.

The CA Decision was therefore MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead,
Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson were found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.

The Decision of acquittal could not be reviewed for it would violate the accuseds right
against double jeopardy since it was not done with grave abused of discretion nor violated the
States right to due process of law.

A case for reckless imprudence resulting

to homicide, slight physical injuries and
damage to property may not be the
subject of more than one information.
Acquittal or conviction in either bars
 67

prosecution in the other based on the

right against double jeopardy.

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA

MODESTOSAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE
PONCE, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
(2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No.
82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Deputy Executive Secretary Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

Issue: Is the right against double jeopardy violated?

Held:

Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars

his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366 . Double
jeopardy has set in.

The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal
Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus,
the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367
involve the same offense. Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases
concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property as the [latter] requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its

Consequences on Persons and Property are Material
Only to Determine the Penalty
 68

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining
and penalizing quasi-offenses.

As held by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent

prosecution for serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence
because of the accuseds prior acquittal of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,
with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or

acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act,
not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling

under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit
the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony
but the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight x x x, a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article
365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Equal protection clause was violated

when the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 singled out only the officials and
employees of the previous
administration to be investigated for
graft and corruption and other crimes
committed by public officers.

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE

TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, G.R. No. 192935 :
December 7, 2010
 69

President Benigno Simeon Aquino III on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent
provisions of said executive order read:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1

CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF

2010

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby

created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter
referred to as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek
and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports
of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that
shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the
people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the private
sector, if any, during the previous administration; and
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to
be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice
shall be served without fear or favor.

The Philippine Truth Commissions (PTC) primary task to investigate reports of graft
and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION, and thereafter to
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.

The petitioner claims that Executive Order No. 1 is unconstitutional for violative of the
equal protection clause as it discriminates the public officials under the administration of former
President Gloria Arroyo even though there are reports of corruptions also in the administrations
before that of Pres. Arroyo.

Held:

Executive Order No. 1 violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of
the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal
protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause,
however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or
hostility from the government.
 70

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission
is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration of
former President Gloria Arroyo is plain, patent and manifest.

That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can
be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive
order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act,
event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. The
equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination.

Whether the grant of COLA to military

and police personnel to the exclusion of
other government employees violates
the equal protection clause .

VICTORIA C. GUTIERREZ, et al vs. DEPARTMENT

OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, G.R. No.
153266, March 18, 2010

Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, to rationalize the compensation of government employees.
Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already
being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain
additional compensations that the employees may be receiving from such consolidation
particularly those in the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police.

Issue:

Whether or not the grant of COLA to military and police

personnel to the exclusion of other government
employees violates the equal protection clause.

Held:

Petitioners contend that the continued grant of COLA to military and police to the
exclusion of other government employees violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

The continued grant of COLA to the uniformed personnel to the exclusion of other
national government officials does run afoul the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
 71

To be valid and reasonable, the classification must satisfy the following requirements:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of
the same class.

Certainly, there are valid reasons to treat the uniformed personnel differently from other
national government officials. Being in charged of the actual defense of the State and the
maintenance of internal peace and order, they are expected to be stationed virtually anywhere
in the country. They are likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate, and high-cost
areas. Since their basic pay does not vary based on location, the continued grant of COLA is
intended to help them offset the effects of living in higher cost areas.

Is the provision of the Omnibus

Election Code declaring appointive
officials deemed resigned from their
positions upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy while elected
officials are not violative of the equal
protection clause?

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO TOLENTINO, JR.

VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010

The main issue in this case is whether or not the second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, providing that appointive officials are deemed
automatically resigned from their jobs upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy (while the
elected officials are not) violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

On December 1, 2009, the Supreme Court through Justice Antonio Nachura held that
the questioned provisions of the above-mentioned laws are unconstitutional for being violative
of the equal protection clause. The COMELEC moved for a reconsideration of the said
Decision.

Held:

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject
to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive

officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only
upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in
a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of
the appointing authority.
 72

Accused are entitled to acquittal despite

the positive identification of a witness
who is not credible and whose testimony
is full of inconsistencies and contrary to
common human experience

PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB ET AL, G.R. No. 176864,

December 14, 2010 and LEJANO VS. PEOPLE, G. R.
No. 176389, December 14, 2010

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old,
and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City. Following an intense
investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed
confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it
had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who
claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio
Tony Boy Lejano, Artemio Dong Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Pyke Fernandez,
Peter Estrada, Miguel Ging Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged
accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact.

The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge
Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart
remained at large. The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others
corroborating her testimony.

For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying
they were elsewhere when it took place. Webbs alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed
that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the
testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition,
the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible
nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it,
the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court
remained unfazed by significant discrepancies between Alfaros April 28 and May 22, 1995
affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend,
accused Estrada and convicted all the accused..

Held:

Since Jessica Alfaros testimony is contrary to common human experience and full of
inconsistencies, her positive identification could not prevail over the documented alibis of
Hubert Webb. Positive identification to be superior over denial and alibi, it should come from a
credible witness.
 73

Inconsistent testimonies of prosecutions

witnesses on material points entitles the
accused of acquittal based on his
constitutional right to be presumed
innocent.

ELY AGUSTIN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.

158788, April 30, 2008

On October 1, 1995, at 7:20 in the evening, armed men robbed the house of spouses George
and Rosemarie Gante in Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, forcibly taking with them several
valuables, including cash amounting to P600,000.00 . The Cabugao Police applied for a search warrant
which was granted by the MTC One of the target premises was the residence of petitioner, named as
one of the several suspects in the crime.

On October 6, 1995, armed with the warrant, policemen searched the premises of petitioner's
house located in Sitio Padual, Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The search resulted in the recovery
of a firearm and ammunitions which had no license nor authority to possess such weapon, and,
consequently, the filing of a criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1651-K, for violation of P.D. No.
1866 or Illegal Possession of Firearms, against petitioner before the RTC.

The prosecution's case centered mainly on evidence that during the enforcement of the search
warrant against petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver firearm was found in the latter's house. In particular, SPO1
Cabaya testified that while poking at a closed rattan cabinet near the door, he saw a firearm on the lower
shelf. The gun is a .38 caliber revolver with five live ammunitions which he immediately turned over to his
superior, P/Insp. Baldovino.

Petitioner anchored his defense on denial and frame-up. The petitioner and his wife Lorna assert
that petitioner does not own a gun Lorna testified that she saw a military man planting the gun.

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated July 7, 1999, finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.

Petitioner insists that the trial court and the CA committed reversible error in giving little credence
to his defense that the firearm found in his residence was planted by the policemen. He also alleges
material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the policemen as witnesses for the prosecution, which
amounted to failure by the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and therefore entitled to
acquittal based on his constitutional presumption of innocence.

HELD:

The accused should be acquitted.

In convicting petitioner, the RTC relied heavily on the testimony of SPO1 Cabaya, who testified
that he discovered the subject firearm in a closed cabinet inside the former's house. The trial court brushed
aside petitioner's defense of denial and protestations of frame-up. The RTC justified giving full credence to
Cabaya's testimony on the principles that the latter is presumed to have performed his official duties
regularly; that he had no ill motive to frame-up petitioner; and that his affirmative testimony is stronger than
petitioner's negative testimony.
 74

The conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to who actually entered the house and
conducted the search, who discovered the gun, and who witnessed the discovery are material matters
because they relate directly to a fact in issue; in the present case, whether a gun has been found in the
house of petitioner; or to a fact to which, by the process of logic, an inference may be made as to the
existence or non-existence of a fact in issue.

The evidence of prosecution is severely weakened by several contradictions in the testimonies of

its witnesses. Especially damaged is the credibility of SPO1 Cabaya, none of whose declarations on
material points jibes with those of the other prosecution witnesses. The inconsistencies are material as
they delve into the very bottom of the question of whether or not SPO1 Cabaya really found a firearm in the
house of petitioner.

SPO1 Cabaya testified that he entered the house with four other policemen, among whom were
SPO1 Jara, SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3 Bernabe Ocado (SPO3 Ocado) and another one whose name he
does not remember. While searching, he discovered the firearm in the kitchen, inside a closed cabinet near
the door. He said that SPO1 Jara was standing right behind him, at a distance of just one meter, when he
(Cabaya) saw the firearm and that he picked up the gun, held it and showed it to SPO1 Jara. He asserted
that SPO2 Renon was not one of those who went inside the house.

However, SPO1 Jara, the best witness who could have corroborated SPO1 Cabaya's testimony,
related a different story as to the circumstances of the firearm's discovery. SPO1 Jara testified that he
merely conducted perimeter security during the search and did not enter or participate in searching the
house. SPO1 Jara testified that he remained outside the house throughout the search, and when SPO1
Cabaya shouted and showed a gun, he was seven to eight meters away from him. He could not see the
inside of the house and could see Cabaya only from his chest up. He did not see the firearm at the place
where it was found, but saw it only when Cabaya raised his arm to show the gun, which was a revolver. He
is certain that he was not with Cabaya at the time the latter discovered the firearm. He further
testified that SPO3 Ocado, who, according to SPO1 Cabaya was one of those near him when he (Cabaya)
discovered the firearm, stayed outside and did not enter or search the house.

While the lone defense of the accused that he was the victim of a frame-up is easily fabricated,
this claim assumes importance when faced with the rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence. It is
well to remember that the prosecution must rely, not on the weakness of the defense evidence, but rather
on its own proof which must be strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves
to be punished. The constitutional presumption is that the accused is innocent even if his
defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.

In People of the Philippines v. Gonzales, the Supreme Court held that where there was material
and unexplained inconsistency between the testimonies of two principal prosecution witnesses relating not
to inconsequential details but to the alleged transaction itself which is subject of the case, the inherent
improbable character of the testimony given by one of the two principal prosecution witnesses had the
effect of vitiating the testimony given by the other principal prosecution witness. The Court ruled that it
cannot just discard the improbable testimony of one officer and adopt the testimony of the other that is more
plausible. In such a situation, both testimonies lose their probative value.

Why should two (2) police officers give two (2) contradictory descriptions of the same sale
transaction, which allegedly took place before their very eyes, on the same physical location and on the
same occasion?
 75

In the present case, to repeat, the glaring contradictory testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
generate serious doubt as to whether a firearm was really found in the house of petitioner. The prosecution
utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving that petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of firearms
beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence of petitioner has not been
demolished and therefore petitioner should be acquitted of the crime he was with.

Accused in a rape case is entitled to

acquittal based on his constitutional
presumption of innocence when the rape
victim failed to immediately or
spontaneously identify the alleged
attacker when presented to her.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNY

TUMAMBING, G.R. No. 191261, March 2, 2011

THE FACTS:

The city prosecutor charged the accused Jenny Tumambing (Tumambing) with rape in
Criminal Case 04-227897 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.

DK, the complainant, testified that at around 2:00 a.m. on June 26, 2004 she went to
sleep, leaving the lights on, at her cousins rented room. She was startled when somebody
entered the room after she had turned off the lights. The intruder, a man, poked a knife at DK
and threatened to kill her if she made any noise. He removed DKs clothes and undressed
himself. He then succeeded in ravishing her. When the man was about to leave, DK turned
the light on and she saw his face. Later, she identified the accused Jenny Tumambing as her
rapist.

On June 27, 2004 the doctor who examined DK found no bruises, hematoma, or any
sign of resistance on her body but found several fresh lacerations on her genitals.

Tumambing denied committing the crime. He claimed that on June 26, 2004 he slept
at the house of his employer, Nestor Ledesma. He went to bed at about 9:00 p.m. and woke
up at 6:00 a.m. Tumambing swore that he never left his employers house that night. Ledesma
corroborated his story. Barangay officials summoned Tumambing and he went, thinking that it
had something to do with a bloodletting campaign. He was shocked, however, when he
learned that he had been suspected of having committed rape.

When the accused was summoned by the Barangay Captain, the complainant did not
spontaneously identify the former.

HELD:

A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the
identification of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof
that a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly prove
 76

the offenders identity. The constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is
not demolished by an identification that is full of uncertainties.

DKs identification of accused Tumambing as her rapist is far from categorical. A

reading of her testimony shows that she was quite reluctant at the beginning but eventually
pointed to him when it was suggested that it might be him after all. Several witnesses attested
to DKs uncertainties regarding the rapists identity when the barangay chairman arranged for
her to meet Tumambing.

DKs above behavior during her initial confrontation with accused Tumambing gives the
Court no confidence that, as she claimed in her testimony, she was familiar with the looks of
her rapist because she saw him on the previous day as he passed by her cousins rented room
many times. If this were the case, her natural reaction on seeing Tumambing would have been
one of outright fury or some revealing emotion, not reluctance in pointing to him despite the
barangay chairmans assurance that he would protect her if she identified him. In assessing
the testimony of a wronged woman, evidence of her conduct immediately after the alleged
assault is of critical value.

There is one thing that DK appeared sure of. Her rapist wore a yellow shirt. But this is
inconsistent with her testimony that after the stranger in her room was done raping her, bigla
na lang po siyang lumabas x x x sinundan ko siya ng tingin. Since DK did not say that the
man put his clothes back on, it seems a certainty that he collected his clothes and carried this
out when he left the room. Since DK then turned on the light for the first time, she had a
chance to see him clearly. But, if this were so and he walked out naked, why was she so
certain that he wore a yellow shirt?

With such serious doubts regarding the true identity of DKs rapist, the Court cannot
affirm the conviction of accused Tumambing as a result of the accuseds constitutional
presumption of innocence.

Delay in complaining of the alleged rape

coupled with the fact that the alleged
rape victim visited the accused in jail six
(6) times entitles the accused to an
acquittal based on the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JERWIN

QUINTAL y BEO, VICENTE BONGAT y TARIMAN,
FELIPE QUINTAL y ABARQUEZ and LARRY PANTI y
JIMENEZ, G.R. No. 184170, February 2, 2011

PEREZ, J .:

On 2 May 2001, appellant Vicente, together with 15-year old Jerwin Quintal y Beo
(Jerwin), 16-year old Felipe Quintal y Abarquez (Felipe) and Larry Panti y Jimenez (Larry) were
charged in an Information for Rape allegedly committed as follows:
 77

That on or about August 29, 2002, at around 9:30 oclock in the evening,
in barangay [XXX], municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines,
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another for a common purpose, with
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lie
and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of [AAA], a minor 16 years of age,
against her will and without her consent.

That the crime of rape was committed with an aggravating

circumstance of minority, the fact that [AAA] is a minor 16 years of age when
she was raped by the herein-named four (4) accused.

On Appeal, the Supreme Court based on the accuseds constitutional presumption of

innocence, brought about by doubts as to the credibility of the testimony of the alleged rape
victim, the accused are acquitted.

This Court cannot disregard this nagging doubt with respect to the credibility of AAAs
testimony, the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the barangay tanod and barangay
kagawad, the purported confession put into writing and signed by all the accused; and the
subsequent incidents relating to the case.

First, AAA testified that she does not personally know Jerwin and Felipe. However, when
the two allegedly invited her to go with them to a party, she readily accepted the invitation and
in fact, went with them. Moreover, AAA was seen playing cards with Jerwin and his group in
the wake, as testified by Maria, Felipe, Jerwin and Federico.

Second, AAA recounted that the nipa hut where she was brought by the accused was
very dark. And yet, AAA readily identified Vicente and Larry inside the hut, as two of those who
raped her.

Third, the medical certificate only contained one finding, that there was a round-
the-clock abrasion in the labia minora. This is not at all conclusive nor corroborative to support
the charge of rape. At most, this indicates that AAA had sexual intercourse, not raped.

Fourth, AAAs belated reporting of the rape incident has relevance in this case, especially
when it appears that she really had no intention at all to inform her mother, not until the latter
actually asked her why she was walking in an unusual manner.

xxx

Seventh , in an unusual twist, records show that AAA was seen visiting Jerwin
in jail for at least six (6) times. These incidents are documented in a logbook
presented in court by the defense and which was not refuted by the prosecution.

Right to cross examine; effect of the

death of a witness before she could be
 78

cross-examined through no fault of the

adverse party

SPOUSES REUBEN DELA CRUZ AND MINERVA

DELA CRUZ vs. RAMON PAPA IV, G.R. No. 185899,
December 8, 2010

ABAD, J .

This case is about the plaintiffs lone witness who passed away due to illness before
the adverse party could cross-examine him.

In 1994, the Intestate Estate of Angela M. Butte (the Estate) filed an action for
cancellation of titles, recovery of properties worth millions of pesos, and damages against
several defendants, including petitioner spouses Reuben and Minerva Dela Cruz (the Dela
Cruzes) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City in Civil Cases 94-3447 and 95-
3816. On October 21, 1999 the Estate presented Myron C. Papa , its executor, to testify on the
substance of the complaint. At the conclusion of Myrons testimony on that day, the RTC
required the Estate and the latter agreed to present Myron anew at the next scheduled hearing
to identify the originals of certain exhibits, after which counsels for the defendants, would begin
to cross-examine him.

But the Estate never got around recalling Myron to the witness stand. He was taken ill
and diagnosed as suffering from stage four colon and liver cancer, prompting respondent
Ramon C. Papa IV (Ramon), the Estates co-administrator, to seek repeated postponements of
hearings in the case to allow Myron undergo intensive treatment. Later, the Estate filed a
motion for leave to have the defendants cross-examine Myron by deposition at the hospital
where he was confined. The RTC granted the motion on February 22, 2001 and eventually set
the deposition-taking on September 7, 2001 but Myron passed away on August 16, 2001.

On November 15, 2001 one of the defendants moved to expunge Myrons direct
testimony which the RTC granted.

The Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in reinstating Myrons testimony after the RTC ordered the
same stricken off the record for depriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross-examine
him.

Held:

But having their turn to cross-examine Myron is different from their being accorded an
opportunity to cross-examine him. The RTC set the deposition taking on September 7, 2001
but Myron died before that date, on August 16, 2001. Consequently, it was not the defendants
fault that they were unable to cross-examine him.

Since the Estate presented its documentary exhibits and had the same authenticated
through Myrons testimony, it stands to reason that the striking out of the latters testimony
altogether wiped out the required authentication for those exhibits. They become inadmissible
 79

unless the RTC, in its discretion, reopens the trial upon a valid ground and permits the Estate
to rectify its mistakes.

Ref:

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE SENERIS, 99 SCRA 92

ORTIGAS VS. LUFTHANSA, 64 SCRA 610

Right to information; right of an examinee in

the CPA Board examination to look at her
answer sheet, questionnaire and answer
sheets

HAZEL MA. ANTOLIN VS. ABELARDO DOMONDON, ET

AL., G.R. No. 165036 & 175705, July 5, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner took the accountancy licensure examinations (the Certified Public Accountant [CPA]
Board Exams) conducted by the Board of Accountancy (the Board) in October 1997. The examination
results were released on October 29, 1997; out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171 passed. Unfortunately,
petitioner did not make it. When the results were released, she received failing grades in four out of the
seven subjects.

Subject Petitioners Grade

Theory of Accounts 65 %
Business Law 66 %
Management Services 69 %
Auditing Theory 82 %
Auditing Problems 70 %
Practical Accounting I 68 %
Practical Accounting II 77 %

Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations, she wrote to respondent Abelardo T.
Domondon (Domondon), Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer
sheets be re-corrected. On November 3, 1997, petitioner was shown her answer sheets, but these
consisted merely of shaded marks, so she was unable to determine why she failed the exam. Thus, on
November 10, 1997, she again wrote to the Board to request for copies of (a) the questionnaire in each
of the seven subjects (b) her answer sheets; (c) the answer keys to the questionnaires, and (d) an
explanation of the grading system used in each subject (collectively, the Examination Papers).

Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioners request on two grounds: first, that Section 36,
Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, as
amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only
permitted access to the petitioners answer sheet (which she had been shown previously), and that
reconsideration of her examination result was only proper under the grounds stated therein:
 80

Sec. 36 An examinee shall be allowed to have access or to go over

his/her test papers or answer sheets on a date not later than thirty (30) days from the
official release of the results of the examination. Within ten (10) days from such date,
he/she may file his/her request for reconsideration of ratings. Reconsideration of rating
shall be effected only on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of his/her test
papers or answer sheets, or malfeasance.

Second, Acting Chairman Domondon clarified that the Board was precluded from releasing the
Examination Papers (other than petitioners answer sheet) by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution
No. 338, series of 1994, which provides:

Sec. 20. Illegal, Immoral, Dishonorable, Unprofessional Acts The

hereunder acts shall constitute prejudicial, illegal, grossly immoral, dishonorable, or
unprofessional conduct:
A. Providing, getting, receiving, holding, using or reproducing questions

xxxx

3. that have been given in the examination except if the test bank for
the subject has on deposit at least two thousand (2,000) questions.

After a further exchange of correspondence, the Board informed petitioner that an investigation
was conducted into her exam and there was no mechanical error found in the grading of her test papers.

Undeterred, on January 12, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages
against the Board of Accountancy and its members before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
The case was raffled to Branch 33, and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-86881. The Petition included a
prayer for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Board of Accountancy and its
members (the respondents) to furnish petitioner with copies of the Examination Papers. Petitioner also
prayed that final judgment be issued ordering respondents to furnish petitioner with all documents and
other materials as would enable her to determine whether respondents fairly administered the
examinations and correctly graded petitioners performance therein, and, if warranted, to issue to her a
certificate of registration as a CPA.

On February 5, 1998, respondents filed their Opposition to the Application for a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and argued, inter alia, that petitioner was not entitled to the relief
sought, that the respondents did not have the duty to furnish petitioner with copies of the Examination
Papers, and that petitioner had other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
namely, recourse to the PRC. Respondents also filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in the
main case, which asked that the Petition for Mandamus with Damages be dismissed for lack of merit on
the following grounds: (1) petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) the petition stated no
cause of action because there was no ministerial duty to release the information demanded; and (3) the
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern is subject to limitations provided by law,
including Section 20, Article IV, of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Petition (which was admitted by the RTC),
where she included the following allegation in the body of her petition:
 81

The allegations in this amended petition are meant only to plead a cause of
action for access to the documents requested, not for re-correction which petitioner
shall assert in the proper forum depending on, among others, whether she finds
sufficient error in the documents to warrant such or any other relief. None of the
allegations in this amended petition, including those in the following paragraphs, is
made to assert a cause of action for re-correction.

If only to underscore the fact that she was not asking for a re-checking of her exam, the following
prayer for relief was deleted from the Amended Petition: and, if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of
registration as a CPA.

On June 23, 1998, respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Application for Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, on the ground that petitioner had taken and passed the May 1998
CPA Licensure Examination and had taken her oath as a CPA. Petitioner filed her Opposition on July 8,
1998. Subsequently, on October 29, 1998, respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim to the
amended petition. They reiterated their original allegations and further alleged that there was no cause of
action because at the time the Amended Petition was admitted, they had ceased to be members of the
Board of Accountancy and they were not in possession of the documents sought by the petitioner.

Issues

The petitioner argues that she has a right to obtain copies of the examination papers so she
can determine for herself why and how she failed and to ensure that the Board properly performed its
duties. She argues that the Constitution as well as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees support her right to demand access to the Examination Papers. Furthermore,
she claims that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies, since no recourse to the PRC
was available, and only a pure question of law is involved in this case. Finally, she claims that her
demand for access to documents was not rendered moot by her passing of the 1998 CPA Board
Exams.

Held:

Any claim for re-correction or revision of her 1997 examination cannot be

compelled by mandamus. This much was made evident by the doctrine laid down in
Agustin-Ramos v. Sandoval:

After deliberating on the petition in relation to the other pleadings filed in the
proceedings at bar, the Court resolved to DENY said petition for lack of merit. The
petition at bar prays for the setting aside of the Order of respondent Judge dismissing
petitioners mandamus action to compel the other respondents (Medical Board of
Examiners and the Professional Regulation Commission) to reconsider, recorrect
and/or rectify the board ratings of the petitioners from their present failing grades to
higher or passing marks. The function of reviewing and re-assessing the
petitioners answers to the examination questions, in the light of the facts
and arguments presented by them x x x is a discretionary function of the
Medical Board, not a ministerial and mandatory one, hence, not within the
scope of the writ of mandamus. The obvious remedy of the petitioners from the
adverse judgment by the Medical Board of Examiners was an appeal to the
Professional Regulation Commission itself, and thence to the Court of Appeals.
 82

The crux of this case is whether petitioner may compel access to the Examination
Documents through mandamus. As always, our inquiry must begin with the Constitution. Section
7, Article III provides:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

Together with the guarantee of the right to information, Section 28, Article II promotes full
disclosure and transparency in government, viz:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the

State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.

Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people's right
to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving
public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law". The Court has always
grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern." As observed in Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission:

In determining whether x x x a particular information is of public concern

there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a
term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects
which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the
final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the
matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

We have also recognized the need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on some matters,
such as national security, trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential
matters.

We are prepared to concede that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams
are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would
understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure
that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical,
these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further
improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting.

On the other hand, we do realize that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the
Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience of the
examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding,
administration, and checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and answers
remain confidential for a limited duration. However, the PRC is not a party to these proceedings. They
 83

have not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the
justification for keeping the Examination Documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications
of this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that
all relevant issues may be ventilated, we deem it best to remand these cases to the RTC for further
proceedings.

Right to be informed of the nature and

cause of accusation; Civil liability
imposed despite acquittal of the
accused-when it is proper and when it is
not.

FELIXBERTO ABELLANA VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174654, August 17, 2011

Facts:

The petitioner was charged before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 13, of Estafa through
falsification of a public document but was convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by a
private individual. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals ACQUITTED the accused for he was convicted of a
crime he was not charged of in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him. However, the Court of Appeals SUSTAINED the RTC Decision imposing civil
liability on the petitioner despite his acquittal.

Issue:

The only issue therefore is whether petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held civilly
liable notwithstanding his acquittal.

Held:

The petition is meritorious.

It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor
of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not
exist.

Here, the CA set aside the trial courts Decision because it convicted petitioner of an offense
different from or not included in the crime charged in the Information. To recall, petitioner was charged
with estafa through falsification of public document. However, the RTC found that the spouses Alonto
actually signed the document although they did not personally appear before the notary public for its
notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner of falsification of public document. On appeal,
the CA held that petitioners conviction cannot be sustained because it infringed on his right to be
 84

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The CA, however, found no reversible
error on the civil liability of petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus sustained the same.

In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., we elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his exoneration in
this wise:

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to

civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to
another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the
civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole
the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x

Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses
Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses.

Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did
not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.

First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the spouses
Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating the transfer of the subject
properties in his favor. However, after the presentation of the parties respective evidence, the trial court
found that the charge was without basis as the spouses Alonto indeed signed the document and that
their signatures were genuine and not forged.

Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear before the notary
public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily nullify or render
void ab initio the parties transaction. Such non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. To overcome the presumption,
there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to
the falsity of the [deed]. In the absence of such proof, the deed must be upheld. And since the
defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said
properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of
Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alontos title and the issuance of new ones
under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the spouses
Alonto.

Presumption of innocence vs.

presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties; non-
compliance of the police of section 21 of
RA No. 9165 in drugs cases

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAPIA

ANDONGAN, G.R. No. 184595, June 29, 2010

Accused was allegedly arrested in a buy-bus operation in Manila particularly in Abad

Santos Avenue along Bambang Street, a street with many people at that time, at around 7:50
 85

p.m. of June 25, 2004. She allegedly sold shabu worth P500.00 for one (1) sachet containing
0.146 grams . No other sachet of shabu was confiscated on her person though she allegedly a
drug dealer.

HELD:
The chain of custody rule under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 was not shown to have
been substantially complied with.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties could not prevail
over the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.

For, among other things, it is incredible for an allegedly known drug-peddler to be

standing at a corner of a street at 7:50 in the evening instead of plying her trade secretly, and
with only a 0.146-gram sachet worth P500.00 of prohibited drugs in her possession the value of
which happens to be what a poseur-buyer wants to buy.

Whether the COMELEC was correct in

denying Ang Ladlad as a party-list group
on moral grounds; freedom of
expression and right to religion.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMELEC, G.R. No.

190582, April 7, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J .:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the First Assailed
Resolution) and December 16, 2009 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL)
(collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang
Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act.

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first
applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the
ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad
again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and
gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of
negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad
complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
 86

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:

x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds.

Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and
gender identity.

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional

and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with,
individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than
one gender.

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner
tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual

immorality as indicated in the Petitions par. 6F: Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already
of age. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves
for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the
Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of
Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit,

license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of
the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the
requirement to be complied with for accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code

which defines nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3)
shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The

contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause,
object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy are inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised

Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:
 87

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and

exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or
a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both
such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim

doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration to the COMELEC EN BANC, three commissioners
voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V.
Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for
Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The
COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the
First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list

system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and
marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se
would benefit the nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the
party-list system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an
organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations
would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the
framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list
system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals
whose interests are also the nations only that their interests have not been
brought to the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the
time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual
orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its
application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.

Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of

LGBTs is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males
and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same
Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

The COMELEC likewise used the Holy Bible and the Koran in denying Ladlads application.

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad
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also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which
had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by
January 25, 2010.

HELD:

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT
sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of
the sectors in the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As
we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive . The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Custodial investigation conducted by

Bantay Bayan groups or Barangay
tanods; whether the right of the suspect
to be informed of his expanded Miranda
Rights is already applicable.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO

LAUGA, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010

PEREZ, J .:

Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, the real name and the
personal circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or
compromise her identity, including those of her immediate family or household members, are
not disclosed in this decision.

The Facts

In an Information dated 21 September 2000, the appellant was accused of the crime of
QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at

Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal
knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.

On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-trial
conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the
 89

findings indicated in the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA
was only thirteen (13) years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is
the daughter of the appellant. On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely:
victim AAA; her brother BBB; and one Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay.
Their testimonies revealed the following:

The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that, the trial court gravely erred
in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA
and her brother BBB; (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without
the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right; and (3) AAAs accusation was
ill-motivated.

HELD

Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a bantay
bayan and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.

Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession

before a Bantay Bayan

Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a bantay
bayan, the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer
and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.

The case of People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine
provided for under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant
questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman
and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:

Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in

this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the
Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in
the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only
one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore,
already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the]
Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-
appellants confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to
the interrogation made by the latter admittedly conducted without first
informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the
presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant,
given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag
are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.

[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he

constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to
those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x
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x in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza,

one of the neighbors x x x [of the private complainant]. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain
whether or not a bantay bayan may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the
contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.

In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this Court had the occasion to mention the
nature of a bantay bayan , that is, a group of male residents living in [the] area
organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an
accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP.

This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay -based volunteer

organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the bantay bayan , are
recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the
preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the
legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a
custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function
and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights
provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the
Miranda Rights, is concerned.

We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a
counsel, inadmissible in evidence.

Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the
appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but from the
confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.