For the past two years, several governments, corporations, and academics from across the Asia-

Pacific region have repeatedly asked me about a single issue: Whether the departure of President
Benigno Aquino could usher in a new type of bilateral relationship with China. In the coming
months, the Philippines will enter the election season, and as candidates from varying political
persuasions jostle for the top office, such speculative question will gain more currency.

Some people have even suggested that the Aquino administration should be primarily blamed for
the sorry state of bilateral relations with Beijing, notwithstanding the strategic implications of
Chinas aggressive pursuit of its territorial claims in the South China Sea. Even in the Philippines,
where majority (57% in one survey) of the population holds favorable views towards the
incumbent leader, some sensationalist columnists have gone so far as outrageously claiming that
Aquino is to be entirely blamed for Chinas massive reclamation activities and growing
assertiveness across the Western Pacific.

I wont be surprised if the leadership in Beijing is simply waiting for a new government in Manila
before exploring the possibility for more substantive dialogue. Indeed, one can sense that China is
waiting for someone it thinks it can deal with, and they have simply concluded that Aquino is not
that person.

However, a more careful look at the Philippines domestic politics shows how the succeeding
administration will have limited room for maneuver vis--vis China unless the more powerful
party makes some genuine compromises (a farfetched prospect). To be seen as tough on China is
simply good domestic politics, especially for populist Filipino leaders. And to do the opposite
would surely risk massive political backlash.

The Anti-Machiavelli

One of the most interesting aspects of Aquinos leadership is its constant emphasis on moralizing
in a realm which many see as amoral: state affairs. As the son of the two of the most revered
political figures in modern Philippine history, he never shied away from portraying his foray into
politics as a moral endeavor to redeem a fallen nation, ridding the country of corruption and
reforming state institutions.

From the very beginning, Aquino launched what in many ways look like a moral crusade against
his predecessor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and her holdovers in the government. His good
governance (Matuwid na Daan) looks more like a moral vision for an ethical nation than a 21st
century strategy aimed at enhancing governance structures in an emerging market.

In many ways, Aquino reverted to the pre-Machiavellian understanding of politics, where

leadership and morality are inseparable. For Aquino, the end doesnt justify the means; or, at
least, is how he has sought to portray his branch of leadership. Astonishingly, Aquino extended
his moralpolitik to the realm of foreign affairs, where he began, particularly since 2012, to frame
the Philippines territorial standoff with China as a David vs. Goliath battle, where right triumphs
over might.

Viewing politics through the prism of morality, the Aquino administration has heavily invested in
its inherently uncertain legal battle against China. It is an approach that fuels the Philippines
sense of righteousness, but may not necessarily facilitate the resolution of the maritime disputes
in the South China Sea.
The Aquino administration has even prevaricated on joining the China-led Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) and welcoming any major Chinese investments in the country. Today,
the Philippines is one of the fewcountries in the region that doesnt count China as its top trading
partner.

Much Ado about Nothing

Earlier this year, Malcom Cook, a Southeast Asia expert, went so far as to claim that the 2016
Philippines presidential election looks like it could lead to a sharp change in Philippines policy
towards China. After all, Philippine-China relations enjoyed a brief honeymoon during the
Arroyo administration, while one of the leading 2016 presidential candidates - who is now rapidly
losing support among voters has repeatedly expressed his preference for a more pragmatic
approach to China.

Though more Filipinos are now skeptical of Aquinos China policy, to think that his departure
from power will radically change the Philippines foreign policy is misguided. First of all, in the
past, especially during the Arroyo administration, there was a very limited public awareness vis-
-vis the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, thereby creating space for striking difficult
deals with limited outside scrutiny.

Today, in contrast, the maritime disputes with China constantly attract public attention, with
leading media practitioners, academics, and even civil society groups relentlessly mobilizing their
resources for a minute-by-minute analysis of how the Philippine government is standing up to
China.

Moreover, Chinas aggressive behavior, particularly its coercive occupation of the Scarborough
Shoal in mid-2012 and its massive reclamation activities across Spratly chain of islands in recent
months, has rekindled age-old prejudice against Communism, China, and even people of Chinese
background. Majority of the Filipinos see China as a threat, with as many 93% worried about
prospects of war in the South China Sea. The Aquino administrations combative
language against China hasnt helped either.

Today, to even talk about engagement with China is seen as defeatist by many Filipinos. The
Arroyo administration, which entered into a highly secretive and controversial joint development
agreement with China that went along with corruption-ridden business deals soon after, managed
to leave a very negative impression among Filipino people, who sometimes view diplomacy as a
euphemism for surrender to China.

No wonder then, there isnt much hand-wringing among Manilas top allies in Washington and
Tokyo. To put it bluntly, I dont think the next Filipino administration will change the countrys
China policy in any significant way.