Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on supposition that

the premises consisted of agricultural public land.

RAMOS VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS- Adverse Possession

The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the
claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the
adverse possession of another.
FACTS:
Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija. He
took advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and
was registered as such.
Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory information title of Romero was sold
to Cornelio Ramos, herein petitioner.
On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by
law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of
property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest,
the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.
In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of
Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the
claimant.
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked for
registration.
Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.

Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.

Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the
Spanish government.

Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract
of land under color of title.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving
color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?

HELD:
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the
claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the
adverse possession of another.

The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and
notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the
world that the land was for his enjoyment.

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Facts:
In 1882, Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a tract of land
located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija.
Ponce obtained a possessory information title of the land (by taking advantage of the
Maura Law or Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1994) and registered the land in 1896.
In 1907, the part of the land (Parcel 1) was sold by Ponce to petitioner Ramos and to
his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
The Director of Lands and Director of Forestry opposed the application on the
following grounds: Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government;
The first parcel was forest land.
RTC and CA ruled against Ramos.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to Ramos at least held this
tract of land under color of title.
Issue: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of
title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?
should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural
than for forest purposes.
Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to
the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere
formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry,
unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
Ruling:
Ramos proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked registration, under
the provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No. 926, as amended by Act No.
1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894,
and Ponces possessory information.
RTC shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as
described in plan Exhibit A.

Held: YES.
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the
possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a
constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

Ramos has a color of title, is in good faith and had been in OPN possesion
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and
notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the
world that the land was for his enjoyment.

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his
predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises
consisted of agricultural public land.

Important law: Act NO. 926

Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act
No. 1908, reads as follows:

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as
defined by said Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, under a bona fide claim of ownership except
as against the Government, for a period of 10 years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of
July, nineteen hundred and four (July 26, 1904), except when prevented by war or force
majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to
such land under the provisions of this chapter.

There was no satisfactory evidence to support the claim that the land is a forest land
Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the
citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry
 116 is excusable and may be the basis of GF.
The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced
Case Digest of Kasilag vs. Rodriguez by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to
KASILAG V. RODRIGUEZ [ 69 P 217] - F: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market
and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to recover from the value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.
petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of homestead to
Emiliana Ambrosio (EA).
The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as
homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In clause V, the
parties stipulated that EA was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 yrs, the debt w/ interest thereon, in w/c event
the mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax on the
land and its improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner
of the land; in clause VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30 days from the date of the contract,
the owner of the land would file a motion in the CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325
be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of RA 496; in
clause VIII the parties agreed that should EA fail to redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated
period of 4 1/2 yrs, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the
mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including unpaid interest; and in
clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be presented under clause VII should be
disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the contract of sale of sale would automatically become void
and the mortgage would subsist in all its force.
One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that EA was unable to pay
the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she
and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the
possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan,
would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would
introduce improvements thereon.

HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of the land, considered as
integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements, bec. the such
contract is a lien and as such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.
The CA held that petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the land bec. he knew that the
contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale, and further, that the latter could not sell the land
bec. it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act 2874.
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in BF when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or
in the manner of its acquisition, by w/c it is invalidated.

The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in GF bec. he
was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated.
Ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can
neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner
of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the
question is w/n GF may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of GF but excusable
ignorance may be such basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the
petitioner is not conversant w/ the laws bec. he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of
the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the
prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting
to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and
enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien,
was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of sec.
 MWSS V. CA

143 SCRA 20

FACTS:

MWSS had an account from PNB. Its treasurer, auditor, and General Manager are the
ones authorized to sign checks. During a period of time, 23 checks were drawn and
debited against the account of petitioner. Bearing the same check numbers, the amounts
stated therein were again
debited from the account of petitioner. The amounts drawn were deposited in the accounts of
the payees in PCIB. It was found out though that the names stated in the drawn checks were
all fictitious. Petitioner demanded the return of the amounts debited but the bank refused to do
so. Thus, it filed a complaint.

HELD:

There was no categorical finding that the 23 checks were signed by persons other than
those authorized to sign. On the contrary, the NBI reports shows that the fraud was an
inside job and that the delay in the reconciliation of the bank statements and the laxity
and loss of records
control in the printing of the personalized checks facilitated the fraud. It further doesnt
provide that the signatures were forgeries.

Forgery cannot be presumed. It should be proven by clear, convincing and positive evidence.
This wasnt done in the present case.

The petitioner cannot invoke Section 23 because it was guilty of negligence not only before
the questioned checks but even after the same had already been negotiated.