8/17/2015 G.R.No.

193459

TodayisMonday,August17,2015

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.193459March8,2011

MA.MERCEDITASN.GUTIERREZPetitioner,
vs.
THEHOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVESCOMMITTEEONJUSTICE,RISAHONTIVEROSBARAQUEL,DANILO
D.LIM,FELIPEPESTAO,EVELYNPESTAO,RENATOM.REYES,JR.,SECRETARYGENERALOF
BAGONGALYANSANGMAKABAYAN(BAYAN)MOTHERMARYJOHNMANANZAN,COCHAIRPERSONOF
PAGBABAGODANILORAMOS,SECRETARYGENERALOFKILUSANGMAGBUBUKIDNGPILIPINAS
(KMP)ATTY.EDREOLALIA,ACTINGSECRETARYGENERALOFTHENATIONALUNIONOFPEOPLE'S
LAWYERS(NUPL)FERDINANDR.GAITE,CHAIRPERSON,CONFEDERATIONFORUNITY,RECOGNITION
ANDADVANCEMENTOFGOVERNMENTEMPLOYEES(COURAGE)andJAMESTERRYRIDONOFTHE
LEAGUEOFFILIPINOSTUDENTS(LFS),Respondents.
FELICIANOBELMONTE,JR.,RespondentIntervenor.

RESOLUTION

CARPIOMORALES,J.:

For resolution is petitioners "Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011)" dated
February25,2011(Motion).

Upon examination of the averments in the Motion, the Court finds neither substantial nor cogent reason to
reconsider its Decision. A plain reading of the Decision could very well dispose of petitioners previous
contentions, raised anew in the Motion, but the Court finds it proper, in writing finis to the issue, to draw
petitionersattentiontocertainmarkersintheDecision.

ContrarytopetitionersassertionthattheCourtsharplydeviatedfromtherulinginFrancisco,Jr.v.TheHouseof
Representatives,1theDecisionofFebruary15,2011reaffirmedandilluminatedtheFranciscodoctrineinlightof
theparticularfactsofthepresentcase.

To argue, as petitioner does, that there never was a simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints as
they were actually referred to the committee "separately, one after the other"2 is to dismantle her own
interpretationofFranciscothattheoneyearbaristobereckonedfromthefilingoftheimpeachmentcomplaint.
PetitionersMotionconcedes3thattheFranciscodoctrineontheinitiationofanimpeachmentproceedingincludes
theHousesinitialactiononthecomplaint.Byrecognizingthelegalimportofareferral,petitionerabandonsher
earlier claim that per Francisco an impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an impeachment
complaint.

HavinguprootedherrelianceontheFranciscocaseinproppingherpositionthattheinitiationofanimpeachment
proceeding must be reckoned from the filing of the complaint, petitioner insists on actual initiation and not
"constructiveinitiationbylegalfiction"asaverredbyJusticeAdolfoAzcunainhisseparateopinioninFrancisco.

In Justice Azcunas opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly found untenable was the
stretching of the reckoning point of initiation to the time that the Committee on Justice (the Committee) report
reaches the floor of the House.4 Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress that
were successfully challenged in Francisco provided that an impeachment proceeding was to be "deemed
initiated"upontheCommitteesfindingofsufficiencyofsubstanceorupontheHousesaffirmanceoroverturning
oftheCommitteesfinding,5whichwasclearlyreferredtoastheinstances"presumablyforinternalpurposesof
the House, as to the timing of some of its internal action on certain relevant matters."6 Definitely, "constructive
initiationbylegalfiction"didnotrefertotheaspectsoffilingandreferralintheregularcourseofimpeachment,for
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thiswaspreciselythegistofFranciscoinpronouncingwhatinitiationmeans.

TheCourtadheredtotheFranciscoordainedbalanceinthetugofwarbetweenthosewhowanttostretch and
those who want to shrink the term "initiate," either of which could disrupt the provisions congruency to the
rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioners imputation that the Courts Decision presents a sharp
deviationfromFranciscoasitdeferstheoperabilityoftheoneyearbarruleringshollow.

Petitionerurgesthattheword"initiate"mustbereadinitsplain,ordinaryandtechnicalmeaning,foritiscontrary
to reason, logic and common sense to reckon the beginning or start of the initiation process from its end or
conclusion.

Petitionerwouldhavebeencorrecthadthesubjectconstitutionalprovisionbeenwordedas"noinitiationprocess
oftheimpeachmentproceedingshallbecommencedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithinaperiodof
oneyear,"inwhichcasethereckoningwouldliterallypointtothe"startofthebeginning."Toimmediatelyreckon
theinitiationtowhatpetitionerherselfconcedesasthestartoftheinitiationprocessistocountenancearawor
halfbakedinitiation.

Inreaffirmingwhatthephrase"noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiated"means,theCourtcloselyapplied
Franciscoonwhatcomprisesorcompletestheinitiationphase.Nothingcanbemoreunequivocalorwelldefined
thantheelucidationoffilingandreferralinFrancisco.Petitionermustcometotermswithherdenialoftheexact
termsofFrancisco.

Petitionerpositsthatreferralisnotanintegralorindispensablepartoftheinitiationofimpeachmentproceedings,
in case of a direct filing of a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment by at least onethird of all the
MembersoftheHouse.7

The facts of the case do not call for the resolution of this issue however. Suffice it to restate a footnote in the
CourtsDecisionthatinsuchcaseof"anabbreviatedmodeofinitiation[,xxx]thefilingofthecomplaintandthe
taking of initial action [House directive to automatically transmit] are merged into a single act."8 Moreover, it is
highlyimpossibleinsuchsituationtocoincidentallyinitiateasecondimpeachmentproceedingintheinterregnum,
ifany,giventheperiodbetweenfilingandreferral.

Petitionersdiscussiononthesingulartenseoftheword"complaint"istootenuoustorequireconsideration.The
phraseology of the oneyear bar rule does not concern itself with a numerical limitation of impeachment
complaints.IfitweretheintentionoftheframersoftheConstitutiontolimitthenumberofcomplaints,theywould
haveeasilysostatedinclearandunequivocallanguage.

Petitioner further avers that the demonstrated concerns against reckoning the period from the filing of the
complaintaremerepossibilitiesbasedonageneralmistrustoftheFilipinopeopleandtheirRepresentatives.To
her, mere possibility of abuse is not a conclusive argument against the existence of power nor a reason to
invalidatealaw.

The present case does not involve an invalidation of a legal provision on a grant of power. Since the issue
precisely involves upholding an express limitation of a power, it behooves the Court to look into the rationale
behind the constitutional proscription which guards against an explicit instance of abuse of power. The Courts
duty entails an examination of the same possible scenarios considered by the framers of the Constitution (i.e.,
incidentsthatmayprovetodisruptthelawmakingfunctionofCongressandundulyortoofrequentlyharassthe
impeachable officer), which are basically the same grounds being invoked by petitioner to arrive at her desired
conclusion.

Ironically, petitioner also offers the Court with various possibilities and vivid scenarios to grimly illustrate her
perceived oppression. And her own mistrust leads her to find inadequate the existence of the pertinent
constitutional provisions, and to entertain doubt on "the respect for and adherence of the House and the
respondentcommitteetothesame."9

WhilepetitionerconcedesthatthereisaframeworkofsafeguardsforimpeachableofficerslaiddowninArticleXI
of the Constitution, she downplays these layers of protection as illusory or inutile without implementation and
enforcement,asifthesecanbedisregardedatwill. 1 a v v p h i1

Contrary to petitioners position that the Court left in the hands of the House the question as to when an
impeachmentproceedingisinitiated,theCourtmerelyunderscoredtheHousesconsciousroleintheinitiationof
animpeachmentproceeding.TheCourtaddednothingnewinpinpointingtheobviousreckoningpointofinitiation
inlightoftheFranciscodoctrine.Moreover,referralofanimpeachmentcomplainttotheappropriatecommitteeis
alreadyapowerorfunctiongrantedbytheConstitutiontotheHouse.

Petitioner goes on to argue that the House has no discretion on the matter of referral of an impeachment
complaint and that once filed, an impeachment complaint should, as a matter of course, be referred to the
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Committee.

TheHousecannotindeedrefusetoreferanimpeachmentcomplaintthatisfiledwithoutasubsistingbar.Torefer
animpeachmentcomplaintwithinanexistingoneyearbar,however,istocommittheapparentlyunconstitutional
actofinitiatingasecondimpeachmentproceeding,whichmaybestruckdownunderRule65forgraveabuseof
discretion.ItbearsrecallingthattheoneyearbarruleitselfisaconstitutionallimitationontheHousespoweror
functiontoreferacomplaint.

Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a clearly constitutionallyprohibited second impeachment
complaint on the matter of whether to make the appropriate referral goes precisely into the propriety of the
referralandnotonthemeritsofthecomplaint.TheHouseneedsonlytoascertaintheexistenceorexpiryofthe
constitutionalbanofoneyear,withoutanyregardtotheclaimssetforthinthecomplaint.

To petitioner, the intervening days from the filing of the complaint to whatever completes the initiation of an
impeachment proceeding is immaterial in mitigating the influx of successive complaints since allowing multiple
impeachmentchargeswouldresulttothesameharassmentandoppression.SheparticularlycitesConstitutional
CommissionerRicardoRomulosconcernsontheamountoftimespentif"multipleimpeachmentcharges"10are
allowed.Shefails,however,toestablishwhetherCommissionerRomulolimitedorquantifiedhisreferencetonot
morethanonecomplaintorcharge.

INSUM,theCourtdidnotdeviatefrom,asitdidapplythetwinruleoffilingandreferralinthepresentcase,with
Franciscoastheguidinglight.Petitionerrefusestoseetheotherhalfofthatlight,however.

II

Petitioner, meanwhile, reiterates her argument that promulgation means publication. She again cites her thesis
thatCommonwealthActNo.638,Article2oftheCivilCode,andthetwoTaadav.Tuvera11casesmandatethat
theImpeachmentRulesbepublishedforeffectivity.PetitionerraisesnothingnewtochangetheCourtsstanceon
thematter.

To reiterate, when the Constitution uses the word "promulgate," it does not necessarily mean to publish in the
OfficialGazetteorinanewspaperofgeneralcirculation.Promulgation,asusedinSection3(8),ArticleXIofthe
Constitution,suitablytakesthemeaningof"tomakeknown"asitshouldbegenerallyunderstood.

Petitioner continues to misapply Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations12 where the Court noted that the Constitution unmistakably requires the publication of rules of
procedurepertainingtoinquiriesinaidoflegislation.IftheConstitutionwarrantedthepublicationofImpeachment
Rules,thenitcouldhaveexpedientlyindicatedsuchrequirementasitdidinthecaseoflegislativeinquiries.

The Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively promulgate its Impeachment
Rules.ItisnotforthisCourttotellacoequalbranchofgovernmentonhowtodosowhensuchprerogativeis
lodgedexclusivelywithit.

Still, petitioner argues that the Court erred when it ruled that "to require publication of the House Impeachment
Rules would only delay the impeachment proceedings and cause the House of Representatives to violate
constitutionally mandated periods" She insists that the Committee, after publishing the Impeachment Rules,
wouldstillhavearemainderof45daysoutofthe60dayperiodwithinwhichtofinishitsbusiness.

Petitioner is mistaken in her assertion. Note that the Court discussed the abovementioned scenario only "in
cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress." Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitutioncontainsrelevantselfexecutingprovisionswhichmustbeobservedatthestartoftheimpeachment
process,thepromulgationoftheImpeachmentRulesnotwithstanding.

PetitionerrehashesherallegationsofbiasandvindictivenessonthepartoftheCommitteeChairperson,Rep.Niel
Tupas,Jr.Yetagain,thesupposedactuationsofRep.Tupaspartakeofakeenperformanceofhisavowedduties
and responsibilities as the designated manager of that phase in the impeachment proceeding. Besides, the
actionstakenbytheCommitteewereneveritsChairpersonssoleactbutratherthecollectiveundertakingofits
whole55personmembership.TheCommitteememberseventooktovotingamongthemselvestovalidatewhat
actionstotakeonthemotionspresentedtotheCommittee.

Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise. Petitioner thus cannot
demandthattheCourtapplythestringentstandardsitasksofjusticesandjudgeswhenitcomestoinhibitionfrom
hearingcases.Incidentally,theImpeachmentRulesdonotprovideforanyprovisionregardingtheinhibitionofthe
Committee chairperson or any member from participating in an impeachment proceeding. The Committee may
thus direct any question of partiality towards the concerned member only. And any decision on the matter of
inhibitionmustberespected,anditisnotforthisCourttointerferewiththatdecision.

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Except for the constitutionally mandated periods, the pacing or alleged precipitate haste with which the
impeachmentproceedingagainstpetitionerisconductedisbeyondtheCourtscontrol.Again,impeachmentisa
highly politicized intramural that gives the House ample leg room to operate, subject only to the constitutionally
imposedlimits.13 And beyond these, the Court is dutybound to respect the discretion of a coequal branch of
governmentonmatterswhichwouldeffectivelycarryoutitsconstitutionalmandate.

FINALLY,theCourthas,initsFebruary15,2011Decision,alreadylifteditsSeptember14,2010StatusQuoAnte
Order14 which, as said Order clearly stated, was "effective immediately and continuing until further orders from
thisCourt."15 Such "further order" points to that part of the disposition in the February 15, 2011 Decision that
directstheliftingoftheStatusQuoAnteOrder.

The lifting of the Status Quo Ante Order is effective immediately, the filing of petitioners motion for
reconsideration notwithstanding, in the same way that the Status Quo Ante Order was made effective
immediately, respondents moves to reconsider or recall it notwithstanding. There is thus no faulting the
Committee if it decides to, as it did proceed with the impeachment proceeding after the Court released its
February15,2011Decision.

WHEREFORE,theMotionforReconsiderationisDENIEDforlackofmerit.

SOORDERED.

CONCHITACARPIOMORALES
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice

(NOPART)
ANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJustice PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.*
AssociateJustice

ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA ARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO DIOSDADOM.PERALTA
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

LUCASP.BERSAMIN ROBERTOA.ABAD
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

MARIANOC.DELCASTILLO MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

JOSEPORTUGALPEREZ JOSECATRALMENDOZA
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,IherebycertifythattheconclusionsintheaboveResolution
hadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice

Footnotes

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*Nopart.

1460Phil.830(2003).

2MotionforReconsideration,p.8.

3 Motion for Reconsideration, p. 9: "From these entries, it is clear that each impeachment complaint was
the subject of separate and distinct referrals. Following Francisco, upon the referral of the First
Impeachment Complaint to the respondent Committee, an impeachment proceeding against petitioner
Ombudsmanhasalreadybeeninitiated."(underscoringsupplied)

4VideFrancisco,Jr.v.TheHouseofRepresentatives,460Phil.830,10541055.

5Id.at865.

6Id.at1055.

7Constitution,Art.XI,Sec.3,par.(4).

8DecisionofFebruary15,2011,footnote61.

9MotionforReconsideration,p.36.

10VideIIRecordoftheConstitutionalCommission,p.282(July26,1986).

11220Phil.422(1985)230Phil.528(1986).

12G.R.No.180643,March25,2008,549SCRA77andSeptember4,2008,564SCRA152.

13Francisco,Jr.v.TheHouseofRepresentatives,supra.

14Rollo,pp.264267.

15Id.at266,emphasisandunderscoringsupplied.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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