Miranda vs Tuliao
Vasquez, there is a distinction between the
Facts:
On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon,
Isabela which were later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon
and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is
now under the witness protection program.
Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police
officers including SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of Santiago City. The
venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC convicted
the accused and sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua
except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time being
at large. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the accused on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn
confession and identified the petitioners as the ones responsible for
the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for
murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan
issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the
warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge
Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint
order denying the urgent motion on the ground that since the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be
properly heard by the court.
Issues: Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does
not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Held. No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the Jurisdiction of the Court. Adjudication of a motion to
quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person
of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
Citing Santiago v.
custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law
is required before the Court can act upon the application for bail, but
is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the
dependant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of
the defence of lack of jurisdiction over the person accused.
ESTIPONA VS LOBRIGO
FACTS:
Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA
9165.
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to
Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not
guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the same law,
with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession.
Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea
bargaining in all violations of said law violates:
1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;
2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three
equal branches of the government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it
encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
of procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being
violative of the Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.
HELD:
 FIRST ISSUE: YES
The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is now Their exclusive domain and
no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three
co-equal branchesof our government has erected an impregnable wall
that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure within the sole province of this Court. The
other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or
issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous
attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative
power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules
instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27
of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. The Cooperative Code provisions
on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the
Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS
from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors
MultiPurpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge
Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the National Power
Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep.
of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. Despite statutory
provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from
the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) The
first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts
except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes
Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this
Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new
rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and
executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Courts authority
to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive
and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.
SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED
The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal
protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by
the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165.
Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory
provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it
proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on
drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a
rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for
the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or
modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule
takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive
matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right
then the rule deals merely with procedure.
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural
rule violates substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the
provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was
introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of
the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an important,
essential, highly desirable, and legitimate component of the
administration of justice.
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. There is
give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of
the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense
make concessionsto avoid potential losses. Properly administered,
plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the
system speed, economy, and finality can benefit the accused, the
offended party, the prosecution, and the court.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial
courts exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse
thereof.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent
to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the
rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only
basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in
allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more
and nothing less than the evidence on record. The ruling on the
motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecutions
evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand,
the judges acceptance of the defendants change of plea is improper
and irregular.

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the

rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away
a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an
existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic

rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of
guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under
the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a
demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party
and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of
guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of
the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the
evidence on hand can sustain.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or

even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case.