Public Corp Notes

10/19/2017 Public Corp Notes
Public Corp Notes

UpdatedOct18,2017
I.LocalGovernment:Background,NatureandBasic
Concepts
A.BackgroundofLocGovinPhil
Decentralization-entailsthetransferofpolitical,fiscal,andadminpowerstosubnational
unitofgovernment.Govthasnotdecentralizedunlesscountrycontainsautonomouselected
subnationalgovernmentscapableoftakingbindingdecisionsinatleastsomepolicyareas.It
mayalsoconsistofexpandingtheresourcesandresponsibilitiesofexistingsubnational
governments.
Mendozav.DeLeon-MunicipalCouncilofVillasis,Pangasinanrevokedtheleaseofan
executiveferryprivelegeawardedtotheplaintiffundertheprovisionsofAct1634offhe
PhilippineCommission.Thedefendantcouncilorsregularlyleasedanexclusiveferryprivilege
totheplaintifffortwoyears.aftercontinuoususeofalittlemorethanoneyear,theyforcibly
evictedhimonthepretextthathewasnotoperatingtheferryleasedtohim.HELD:Inthe
administrationofpatrimonialproperty,itistoberegardedasaprivatecorporationor
individualsofarasitsliabilitytothirdpersonsoncontractortortisconcerned.Itscontracts,
validenteredinto,maybeenforcedanddamagesmaybecollectedfromitforthetortsofits
officersoragentswithinthescopeoftheiremploymentinpreciselythesamemannerandto
thesameextentasthoseofprivatecorporationsorindividuals.Astosuchmatters,the
principlesrespondeatsuperiorapplies.Itisforthesepurposesthatthemunicipalityismade
liabletosuitsinthecourts.Officialsinthiscasecannotbeheldliableifitcannotbeshown
thattheyactedwillfullyandmaliciously,withtheexpresspurposeofinflictinginjuryupon
theplaintiff.
Vilasv.CityofManila-Amunicipalcorpisnottotallydisolvedasamereconsequenceof
https://www.evernote.com/shard/s217/sh/860641ae-87b3-41aa-ace5-484e7101fbe8/b6798488a0b70dc5a27ad49087d6e5e9 1/51
militaryoccupationorterritorialcession.PublicpropertybelongstotheCityofManilaasa
muncorpcannotberegardedashavingpassedtoUSunderthecessionbySpainofthePhil
islands.ThepresentCityofManila,reincorporatedbyPHCommissionwithsubstantiallythe
samename,isliableuponmunicipalobligationsincurredpriortothecessionofthe
PhilippineIslandsbythetreatyofParis.Dualcharacterofmunicipalcorporations:they
exercisepowerswhicharegovernmentalandpowerswhichareofprivateorbusiness
character.
MunicipalityofCatbaloganv.DirectorofLands-Therightsoftheoldmunicipalitiesto
acquirerealandpersonalproperty,inaccordancewiththeirformerorganizationare
recognized,anditisdeclaredthatthesaidpropertyandrightsshallcontinuetopertainto
themunicipalitiescreatedinharmonywiththeprovisionsoftheMunicipalCode,onaccount
ofsuchpropertybeingthepatrimonialpropertyofthemunicipalities.Ifamunicipalitycan
acquireallkindsofproperty,itundoubtedlymeritsthedesignationofownerwithrespectto
thepropertywhichmayhavebeenawardedtoitasitsown.
Mondanov.Silvosa-Supervisionmeansoverseeingthepowerorauthorityofanofficerto
seethatsubordinateofficersperformtheirduties.Ifthesubordinatefailorneglecttofulfill
them,theformermaytakesuchactionorstepasprescribedbylawtomakethemperform
theirduties.Controlontheotherhand,meansthepowerofanofficertoalterormodifyor
nullifyorsetasidewhatasubordinateofficerhaddoneintheperformanceofhisdutiesand
tosubstitutethejudgmentoftheformerforthatofthelatter.
Presidentshallhavecontrolofalltheexecutivedepartments,bureaus,orofficers,exercise
generalsupervisionoveralllocalgovernmentsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,andtakecarethat
thelawsbefaithfullyexecuted.UnderthisconstitutionalprovisionthePresidenthasbeen
investedwiththepowerofcontrolofalltheexecutivedepartments,bureaus,oroffices,but
notofalllocalgovernmentsoverwhichhehasbeengrantedonlythepowerofgeneral
supervisionasmaybeprovidedbylaw.
B.NatureandStatus
1.MunicipalCorpandLocalGovernmentdefined
Municipal GOCC
1.Legalcreation-by
1.Stockornon-stock
speciallaw/charter;
1.Stockornon-stock
speciallaw/charter;
2.Functionsforcommon
2.Corporatename;
good
3.Populationinvestedwith
Elements(Sec.15,LGC) 3.Ownedbythe
powersthroughofficersand
governmentdirectlyor
agents;
throughinstrumentalities
4.Territoryoverwhichthe
4.Economicallyviable
LGUscanfunction
Localgovernanceforlocal Agenciesofstateforlimited
Purpose
&internalaffairs publicworks
Separateanddistinctfrom
Person Politicalsubdivisionofstate
state
Independentagencyfor
Constitutedbylawbut
Nature administrativepurposesand
exerciseslocalautonomy
hascorporatepowers
Governmentaland Proprietarybutfor
Function
proprietary governmentworks
Sec.6LGC-LGUsmaybecreated,divided,merged,abolished,oritsboundaries
substantiallyalteredeitherby:
1.LawbyCongress-forcreationofprovince,city,municipality,anyother;or
2.OrdinancebySangguniangPanlalawiganandSangguniangPanlungsod-forcreationof
barangay
Bascov.PhilippineAmusement&GamingCorp.
Thetermlocalgovernmentisusedinterchangeablywithmunicipalcorporationascanbe
gleanedfromthiscase.TheCityofManila,beingameremunicipalcorporationhasno
inherentpowertoimposetaxes.Itscharterwascreatedbycongress,thereforesubjecttoits
control.Also,localgovernmentshavenopowertotaxinstrumentalitiesoftheNational
Government
Alvarezv.Guingona-Abillconvertingamunicipalitytoacitymustoriginatefromthe
House;InternalRevenueAllotments(IRA)shouldbeincludedinthecomputationofthe
averageannualincomeofthemunicipality.Ifyoulookatthecriterion"income",ithastobe
basedonincomethataccruestothegeneralfundthatisthereforeregularlyreceivedbythe
LGUsothisexcludesspecialfunds,trustfunds,transfersandnon-recurringincome.
LGUsothisexcludesspecialfunds,trustfunds,transfersandnon-recurringincome.
AlthoughabillofapplicationshouldoriginateexclusivelyintheHOR,theclaimof
petitionersthatRA7720didnotoriginateexclusivelyintheHORbecauseabillofthesame
import,SB1243waspassedintheSenate,isuntenablebecauseitcannotbedeniedthatHB
8817wasfiledintheHORfirstbeforeSB1243wasfiledintheSenate.ThefilingintheSenate
ofasubstitutebillinanticipationofitsreceiptofthebilloflocalapplicationshouldoriginate
intheHOR,foraslongastheSenatedoesnotactthereuponuntilitreceivestheHousebill.
2.NatureandStatusofMunicipalCorporations
Art.37:
Juridicalcapacity-fitnesstobethesubjectoflegalrelations,inherentineverynatural
person,andislostonlythroughdeath
Capacitytoact-powertodoactswithlegaleffect,isacquiredandmaybelost
Art.44-Theffarejuridicalpersons
(1)TheStateanditspoliticalsubdivisions...
Art.45-Stateanditspoliticalsubdivisions,andotherpubliccorporations-aregovernedby
thelawscreatingorrecognizingthem
Art.46-Juridicalpersonsmay:
(1)acquireandpossesproperty
(2)incurobligations;and
(3)bringcivilorcriminalactionsinconformitywiththelawsandregulationsoftheir
organization
Art.47-Upondissolutionofpubliccorporations,theirpropertyandotherassetsshallbe:
disposedofinpursuanceoflaworthechartercreatingthem;or
ifnothinghasbeenspecified,appliedtosimilarpurposesforthebenefitoftheregion,
province,cityormunicipality
Sec.15LGC-PoliticalandCorporateNatureofLGUs-everyLGUshallexercisepowers
1.Asapoliticalsubdivisionofthenationalgovernment;and
2.Asacorporateentityrepresentingtheinhabitantsofitsterritory
3.Dualnature
1.Dualnatureandfunctionsofmunicipalcorporations(Sec.15)
1.Bodypolitic-exercisespowersofthestateforpromotionofpublicwelfare;and
10/19/2017 1.Bodypolitic-exercisespowersofthestateforpromotionofpublicwelfare;and
Public Corp Notes
2.Corporate-powersofacorporationforthespecialbenefitandadvantageofthe
community
Lindasanv.COMELEC-Municipalcorporationsperformtwinfunctions:(1)serveasan
instrumentalityofthestateincarryingoutthefunctionsofgovernment;and(2)theyactas
anagencyofthecommunityintheadministrationoflocalaffairs.Itisinthelattercharacter
thattheyareseparateentityactingfortheirownpurposesandnotasubdivisionofthe
state.
InamunicipalityinMindanao,itwascreatedbyastatue,RA4790.However,whensuchlaw
waspassed,itenumeratedbarangaysorbarriosbelongingtoanotherprovince.Several
factorscomeintoforceintheconsiderationofwhetheragroupofbarriosiscapableof
maintainingitselfasanindependentmunicipality.Amongsttherearepopulation,territory
andincome.RA4790isthusindivisible,anditisaccordinglynullandvoidinitstotality.The
ideathatitmustbeself-sufficientthereforeisrelevanttothesecondfunctionthatitmustbe
acorporateentityrepresentingtheinhabitantsofthecommunity.
RepublicofthePhilippinesv.CityofDavao-Sec.15LGCdefinesalocalgovernmentunitas
abodypoliticandcorporateendowedwithpowerstobeexercisedbyitinconformitywith
law.Assuch,itperformsdualfunctions,GOVERNMENTALandPROPRIETARY.Governmental
functionsarethosethatconcernthehealth,safety,andtheadvancementofthepublicgood
orwelfareasaffectingthepublicgenerally.Proprietaryfunctionsarethosethatseekto
obtainspecialcorporatebenefitsorearnpecuniaryprofitandintendedforprivate
advantageandbenefit.Whenexercisinggovernmentalpowersandperforming
governmentalduties,anLGUisanagencyofthenationalgovernment.Whenengagedin
corporateactivities,itactsasanagentofthecommunityintheadministrationoflocal
affairs.
2.Purposes
3.Generalpowersandattributes,Sec.6-24,LGC
Sec.6-LegislativeActrequired:
Law-forcreationofprovince,city,municipality,anyother;or
OrdinancebySangguPanlalawiganandPanlungsod-barangay
BASICREQUIREMENTS
BASICREQUIREMENTS
Sec.7-CreationandConversion
Income-sufficienttoestablishandmaintainfacilities,servicesandspecialfunctions
attestedbyDOF
Population-totalnumberofinhabitantswithjurisdiction-attestedbyNSO
Landarea-contiguousunless1)comprisedof2ormoreislands2)separatedbyanlGU
independentofother-attestedbyLMB-DENR
Properlyidentifiedbymetesandbounds
sufficienttoprovideforbasicservices
Navarrov.Ermita
3ConsiderationsincreatingLGU:
1.economicviability-income,population,andland;
2.efficientadministration;
3.capabilitytodeliverybasicservices
Sec.8-DivisionandMerger
SamewithSec.7
Shallnotreducetolessthantheminimumtheincome,population,orlandareaofLGU
Incomeshallnotfallbelowcurrentincomeclassification(updatedwithin6months)prior
todivision
Sec.9-Abolition
Whenincome,population,orlandareaisreducedtolessthanminimum
Laworordinancemustbeenactedtothateffect
Sec.10-PlebisciteRequirementforCreation,Conversion,Division,Merger,orDissolutionof
LGUstotakeeffect.
1.Mustbeapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebiscitecalledforthepurposein
thepoliticalunit/saffected,
2.ConductedbytheCOMELECwithin120daysfromthedateofeffectivityofthelawor
ordinanceeffectingsuchaction,unlesssaidlaworordinancefixesanotherdate
Sec.13-NamingofLGUandPublicPlaces,StreetsandStructures
Sec.14-BeginningofCorporateExistence-commenceupontheelectionandqualification
ofitschiefexecutiveandamajorityofthemembersofitssanggu
Sec.16-GeneralWelfare-LGUshallexerciseitspowerstothepromotionofthegeneral
welfare.LGUshallensureandsupportthepreservationandenrichmentofculture,promote
welfare.LGUshallensureandsupportthepreservationandenrichmentofculture,promote
publicsafety,enhancetherightofthepeopletoabalancedecology,encourageandsupport
developmentofscientificandtechnologicalcapabilities,improvepublicmorals,enhance
economicprosperityandsocialjustice,promotefullemploymentamongtheirresidents,
maintainpeaceandorder,andpreservethecomfortandconvenienceoftheirinhabitants
Sec.17-BasicServicesandFacilities-mahaba
Sec.18-PowertoGenerateandApplyResources-LGUshallhavepowertoestablish
organizationthatshallberesponsibleforimplementationofdevelopmentplans,programs,
createsourceofrevenueandlevytaxes,tohaveshareinnationaltaxes,manageproperty,
andapplyresourcesandassetsforwelfarepurposes
Sec.19-EminentDomain-maybeexercisedforpublicuse,orpurposeorwelfareforthe
benefitofthepoorandthelandless,uponpaymentofjustcompensation
Sec.20-ReclassificationofLands-mahaba
Sec.21-ClosureandOpeningofRoads-regulationandmaintenanceofroads
Sec.22-CorporatePowers
LGUsasacorporationshallhavetheffpowers:
1.Havecontinuoussuccessioninitscorporatename;
2.Tosueandbesued
3.Tohaveanduseacorporateseal;
4.Toacquireandconveyrealorpersonalproperty;
5.Toenterintocontracts;and
6.Toexercisesuchotherpowersasaregrantedtocorporations,subjecttothelimitations
providedinthisCodeandotherlaws
LGUsmaycontinuetouse,modifyorchangecorporateseal;
UnlessotherwiseprovidedintheCode,nocontractmaybeenteredintobythelocal
chiefexecutiveinbehalfoftheLGUwithoutpriorauthorizationbytheSanggu
concerned;
LGUshallenjoyfullautonomyintheexerciseoftheirproprietaryfunctions
Sec.23-AuthoritytoNegotiateandSecureGrants-localchiefexecutivemaynegotiateand
securegrantsordonationsinkindinsupportofbasicservicesorfacilities
Sec.24-Liabilityfordamages-LGUandtheirofficialsarenotexemptfromliabilityfor
deathorinjurytopersonsordamagetoproperty
C.GeneralPrinciplesandPolicies(Sec.1,3,11,12,Art.X;ConstitutionSec.1-5,LGC)
Sec.1,Art.X-TerritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionofthePhilippinesare:
1.Provinces,cities,municipalitiesandbarangays
2.AutonomousregionsinMuslimMindanaoandtheCordilleras.
Sec.3,Art.X-Congressshallenactalocalgovernmentcodewhichshallprovidefor:
1.Amoreresponsiveandaccountablelocalgovernmentstructureinstitutedthrougha
systemofdecentralizationwitheffectivemechanismforrecall,initiative,andreferendum;
2.Allocateamongthedifferentlocalgovernmentunitstheirpowers,responsibilities,and
resources,andprovideforthequalifications,election,appointmentandremoval,term,
salaries,powersandfunctionsanddutiesoflocalofficials,and;
3.Allothermattersrelatingtotheorganizationandoperationofthelocalunits
Meansofdecentralization:
1.Ownmechanismsofrecall,initiative,referendum;
2.Allocatepowers,responsibilitiesandresources;
3.Provideforqualifications,election,appointment,removal,term,salaries,powersand
functionsoflocalofficials;
4.Enjoylocalautonomy;(Art.X,Sec.2)
5.Haveownpowertocreateownsourcesofrevenuesandtolevytaxes,fees,charges
withintheirlocaljurisdiction(Art.X,Sec.5)
Sec.11,Art.X-Congressmaycreatespecialmetropolitanpoliticalsubdivisionssubjecttoa
plebiscite.Componentcitiesandmunicipalitiesshallretaintheirbasicautonomyandshallbe
entitledtotheirownlocalexecutivesandlegislativeassemblies.Thejurisdictionofthe
metropolitanauthoritythatwilltherebybecreatedshallbelimitedtobasicservices
requiringcoordination.
1.Createdbylaw;
2.Plebiscite;
3.Doesnotinterferewithlocalautonomyfunctionsofcitiesandmunicipalities;
4.Limitedtobasicservices
Sec.12,Art.X-Citiesthatarehighlyurbanizedandcomponentcitieswhosecharters
prohibittheirvotersfromvotingforprovincialelectiveofficials,shallbeindependentofthe
province.
LGC,Sec.2-Declarationofpolicy
LGC,Sec.2-Declarationofpolicy
1.Policyofthestatethatterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionsenjoygenuineand
meaningfullocalautonomy,toenablethemtoattaintheirfullestdevelopmentasself-
reliantcommunitiesandmakethemmoreeffectivepartnersintheattainmentofnational
goals.Stateshallprovidemorepowers,authority,responsibilitiesandresourcesas
providedundersystemofdecentralizationtomakethemmoreresponsiveand
accountable;
2.Ensureaccountabilityoflocalgovernmentthroughinstitutionofeffectivemechanismsof
recall,initiativeandreferendum;
3.Requireallnationalagenciesandofficestoconductperiodicconsultationswith
appropriatelocalgovernmentunits,nongovernmentalandpeople'sorganizationsand
otherconcernedsectors
Sec.3-5:Read
1.LocalAutonomy
Art.II,Sec.25-Stateshallensureautonomyoflocalgovernments
Art.X,Sec.2-Territorialandpoliticalsubdivisionsshallenjoylocalautonomy
Art.X,Sec.4-PresidentofthePhilippinesshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverlocal
governments.Provinceswithrespecttocomponentcitiesandmunicipalities,andcitiesand
municipalitieswithrespecttocomponentbarangaysshallensurethattheactsoftheir
componentunitsarewithinthescopeoftheirprescribedpowersandfunctions
Sec.11-12:Readabove
CASE:
1.SanJuanv.CSC
WONtheheadoftheDepartmentofBudgetandManagementisvestedwiththe
(primary)authoritytoappointthePBOandisfreetoappointanyonehefanciesinthe
eventthattheGovernorrecommendsanunqualifiedperson:No.UnderSec.1ofEONo.112,
thepetitioneristheonevestedwiththeauthoritytoappointthePBOsubjecttothe
qualificationsprescribedbyexistinglawsfortheposition.Theclearmandateonlocal
autonomymustbeobeyed.Wherealawiscapableoftwointerpretations,oneinfavorof
centralizedpowerinMalacaangandtheotherbeneficialtolocalautonomy,thescalesmust
beweighedinfavorofautonomy.Theexerciseofgreaterlocalautonomyismarkedinthe
presentConstitution.Art.II,Sec.25onStatePoliciesprovides:"Sec.25.TheStateshall
ensuretheautonomyoflocalgovernments"
WhentheCivilServiceCommissioninterpretedtherecommendingpowerofthe
ProvincialGovernoraspurelydirectory,itwentagainsttheletterandspiritofthe
constitutionalprovisionsonlocalautonomy.IftheDBMSecretaryjealouslyhoardsthe
entiretyofbudgetarypowersandignorestherightoflocalgovernmentstodevelopself-
relianceandresolutenessinthehandlingoftheirownfunds,thegoalofmeaningfullocal
autonomyisfrustratedandsetback.
WONprivaterespondentislawfullyentitledtodischargethefunctionsofPBOof
RizalpursuanttotheappointmentmadebypublicrespondentDBM'sUndersecretaryupon
therecommendationofthenDirectorAbellaofDBMRegionIV:No.SincetheDBMheaddid
nothavetheauthoritytoappointprivaterespondent,herappointmentwasnullified.The
DepartmentofBudgetandManagementwasorderedtoappointtheProvincialBudget
OfficerofRizalfromamongqualifiednomineessubmittedbytheProvincialGovernor.
2.PIMENTELv.AGUIRRE
LGUexercisefiscalautonomy.
AO372ismerelydirectoryandhasbeenissuedbythePresidentconsistentwithhispowers
ofsupervisionoverlocalgovernments.Adirectoryordercannotbecharacterizedasan
exerciseofthepowerofcontrol.TheAOisintendedonlytoadviseallgovernmentagencies
andinstrumentalitiestoundertakecost-reductionmeasuresthatwillhelpmaintaineconomic
stabilityinthecountry.Itdoesnotcontainanysanctionincaseofnoncompliance.
FiscalautonomymeansthatLGUshavethepowertocreatetheirownsourcesofrevenuein
additiontotheirequitableshareinthenationaltaxesreleasedbythegovt,aswellasthe
powertoallocatetheirresources.
TheLocalGovernmentCodealsoallowsthePresidenttointerfereinlocalfiscalmatters,
providedthatcertainrequisitesaremet:
1.anunmanagedpublicsectordeficitofthenationalgovernment;
2.consultationswiththepresidingofficersoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives
andthepresidentsofthevariouslocalleagues;
3.thecorrespondingrecommendationofthesecretariesoftheDepartmentofFinance,
InteriorandLocalGovernment,andBudgetandManagement;and
4.anyadjustmentintheallotmentshallinnocasebelessthan30%ofthecollectionof
nationalinternalrevenuetaxesofthethirdfiscalyearprecedingthecurrentone.
Sec.4ofAO372cannotbeupheld.Abasicfeatureoflocalfiscalautonomyistheautomatic
Sec.4ofAO372cannotbeupheld.Abasicfeatureoflocalfiscalautonomyistheautomatic
releaseofthesharesofLGUsinthenationalinternalrevenue.Thisismandatedbythe
ConstitutionandtheLocalGovernmentCode.Section4whichordersthewithholdingofa
portionoftheLGUsIRAclearlycontravenestheConstitutionandthelaw.
3.CordilleraBroadCoalitionv.COA
Creationofadministrativeregiondoesnotpre-emptthecreationofOrganicActforan
autonomousregion.Infact,itpreparesforsuchcreationbecauseoftheprocedurefor
creationofanautonomousregionareasfollows:
1.Regionalconsultativecommissioniscreated;
2.Presidentappointsmembersofsuchcommission;
3.CommissionassistscongressincreatingtheOrganicAct;
4.OrganicActpassedintolaw;
5.Approvalthroughplebiscite
E.O.No.220didnotestablishanautonomousregionalgovernment.Itmerelycreateda
region,coveringaspecifiedarea,foradministrativepurposeswiththemainobjectiveof
coordinatingtheplanningandimplementationofprogramsandservices[secs.2and5].The
bodiescreatedbyE.O.No.220donotsupplanttheexistinglocalgovernmentalstructure,
noraretheyautonomousgovernmentagencies.Theymerelyconstitutethemechanismfor
an"umbrella"thatbringstogethertheexistinglocalgovernments,theagenciesofthe
NationalGovernment,theethno-linguisticgroupsortribes,andnon-governmental
organizationsinaconcertedefforttospurdevelopmentintheCordilleras.
E.O.220didnotcreateanewterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionormergeexistingonesinto
alargersubdivision.Firstly,theCARisnotapubliccorporationoraterritorialandpolitical
subdivision.Itdoesnothaveaseparatejuridicalpersonality,unlikeprovinces,citiesand
municipalities.Neitherisitvestedwiththepowersthatarenormallygrantedtopublic
corporations,e.g.thepowertosueandbesued,thepowertoownanddisposeofproperty,
thepowertocreateitsownsourcesofrevenue,etc.CARwascreatedprimarilytocoordinate
theplanningandimplementationofprogramsandservicesinthecoveredareas.CARisin
thesamegenreastheadministrativeregionscreatedundertheReorganizationPlan.The
CARmaybeconsideredasaregionalcoordinatingagencyoftheNationalGovernment,
similartotheregionaldevelopmentcouncilswhichthePresidentmaycreate.
CARisameretransitorycoordinatingagencythatwouldpreparethestageforpolitical
autonomyfortheCordilleras.Itfillsintheresultinggapintheprocessoftransforminga
groupofadjacentterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionsalreadyenjoyinglocalor
administrativeautonomyintoanautonomousregionvestedwithpoliticalautonomy.
administrativeautonomyintoanautonomousregionvestedwithpoliticalautonomy.
GuaranteeoflocalautonomyintheConstitutonreferstoadministrativeautonomyofLGUs
anddecentralizationofgovernmentauthority.Ontheotherhandcreationofautonomous
regionscontemplatesthegrantofpoliticalautonomyandnotjustadministrative
autonomy.PetitionersfailedtoshowhowthecreationofCARhasactuallydiminishedthe
localautonomyofthecoveredprovincesandcity.
2.Decentralization
Art.X,Sec.3-decentralizepowersoftheNationalGovernment.CongressshallenactaLGC
forsaidpurpose.
Art.X,Sec.14-ThePresidentshallprovideforregionaldevelopmentcouncilsorother
similarbodiescomposedoflocalgovernmentofficials,regionalheadsofdepartmentsand
othergovernmentoffices,andrepresentativesformnon-governmentalorgswithinthe
regionsforpurposesofadministrativedecentralizationtostrengthentheautonomyofthe
unitsthereinandtoacceleratetheeconomicandsocialgrowthanddevelopmentofthe
unitsintheregion
Twoformsofdecentralization:
1.Deconcentration-centralgovernmentdelegatesadministrativepowerstopolitical
government;relievescentralgovernmenttheburdenofmanaginglocalaffairs;
2.Devolution-abdicationofpoliticalpowerinfavorofLGUdeclaredtobeautonomous
CASE:
4.Limbonav.Mangellin
Whatistheextentofself-governmentgiventothetwoautonomousgovernmentsofRegion
IXandXII?
Astolimitofdecentralization:
Itrequirestheautonomousregionalgovernmentsto"undertakeallinternaladministrative
mattersfortherespectiveregions,"exceptto"actonmatterswhicharewithinthe
jurisdictionandcompetenceoftheNationalGovernment,""whichinclude,butarenot
limitedto,thefollowing:
1.Nationaldefenseandsecurity;
2.Foreignrelations;
3.Foreigntrade;
4.Currency,monetaryaffairs,foreignexchange,bankingandquasi-banking,andexternal
borrowing,
5.Disposition,exploration,development,exploitationorutilizationofallnaturalresources;
6.Airandseatransport;
6.Airandseatransport;
7.Postalmattersandtelecommunications;
8.Customsandquarantine;
9.Immigrationanddeportation;
10.Citizenshipandnaturalization;
11.Nationaleconomic,socialandeducationalplanning;and
12.Generalauditing."
EvenifARMMisautonomous,itisonlysowithregardtointernalaffairs.Itisstillsubjectto
generalsupervisionandcontrolofthePresidentinthenationalscope.
Autonomyiseitherdecentralizationofadministrationordecentralizationofpower.Thereis
decentralizationofadministrationwhenthecentralgovernmentdelegatesadministrative
powerstopoliticalsubdivisionsinordertobroadenthebaseofgovernmentpowerandin
theprocesstomakelocalgovernments"moreresponsiveandaccountable,"and"ensure
theirfullestdevelopmentasself-reliantcommunitiesandmakethemmoreeffectivepartners
inthepursuitofnationaldevelopmentandsocialprogress."Atthesametime,itrelievesthe
centralgovernmentoftheburdenofmanaginglocalaffairsandenablesittoconcentrateon
nationalconcerns.ThePresidentexercises"generalsupervision"overthem,butonlyto
"ensurethatlocalaffairsareadministeredaccordingtolaw."Hehasnocontrolovertheir
actsinthesensethathecansubstitutetheirjudgmentswithhisown.
Decentralizationofpower,ontheotherhand,involvesanabdicationofpoliticalpowerinthe
favoroflocalgovernmentsunitsdeclaredtobeautonomous.Inthatcase,theautonomous
governmentisfreetochartitsowndestinyandshapeitsfuturewithminimumintervention
fromcentralauthorities.Accordingtoaconstitutionalauthor,decentralizationofpower
amountsto"self-immolation,"sinceinthatevent,theautonomousgovernmentbecomes
accountablenottothecentralauthoritiesbuttoitsconstituency.
3.President'sPowerofGeneralSupervision
Sec.2
Sec.4
LGC,Sec.25-NationalsupervisionoverLGUstoensurethattheyactwithinthescopeof
theirprescribedpowersandfunctions.ThePresidentshallexercisesupervisoryauthority
directlyoverprovinces,highlyurbanizedcities,andindependentcomponentcities.National
agenciesandofficeswithprojectfunctionsshallcoordinatewithoneanotherandwiththe
LGUconcerned--theyshallensurethatLGUisparticipating.Presidentmayuponrequestof
theLGU,directtheappropriatenationalagencytoprovidefinancial,technical,orother
formsofassistancetotheLGU.\
formsofassistancetotheLGU.\
Case:
5.Mondanov.Silvosa
TheConstitutionprovidesthatthePresidenthasbeeninvestedwiththepowerofcontrolof
alltheexecutivedepartments,bureausorofficesbutnotofalllocalgovernmentsoverwhich
hehasbeengrantedonlythepowerofgeneralsupervisionasmaybeprovidedbylaw.The
departmentheadasagentofthepresident,hasdirectcontrolandsupervisionoverall
bureausandofficesunderhisjurisdiction,buthedoesnothavethesamecontroloflocal
governmentsasthatexercisedbyhimoverbureausandofficesunderhisjurisdiction.His
authoritytoordertheinvestigationofanyactorconductofanypersonunderhis
departmentisconfinedtobureausandofficesunderhisjurisdictionandDOESNOTextend
tolocalgovernmentsoverwhichthepresidentexercisesonlygeneralsupervisionasmaybe
providedbylaw.
Supervisionoverseeingorthepowerorauthorityofanofficertoseethatsubordinate
officersperformtheirduties
Controlpowerofanofficertoalterormodifyornullifyorsetasidewhatasubordinate
hasdoneintheperformanceofhisduties
TheCongresshasexpresslyandspecificallylodgedtheprovincialsupervisionovermunicipal
officialsintheprovincialgovernorwhoisauthorizedtoreceiveandinvestigatecomplaints
madeunderoathagainstmunicipalofficersforneglectofduty,oppression,corruptionor
otherformofmaladministration.Rapeandconcubinagehavenothingtodowiththe
performanceofhisdutiesasmayornordotheyconstituteneglectofduty,oppression,
corruptionoranyotherformofmaladministrationofoffice.Beforeaprovincialgovernorand
boardmayactandproceedinaccordancewiththeRACreferredto,aconvictionbyfinal
judgmentmustprecedethefilingbytheprovincialgovernorofchargesandtrialbythe
provincialboard.
6.Hebronv.Reyes(seeonlinedigest)
Presidenthasnoinherentpowertoremoveorsuspendlocalelectiveofficers.Removaland
suspensionofpublicofficersarealwayscontrolledbyaparticularlawandsubjectto
constitutionallimitation.President'spowertoremoveorsuspendmustgothroughthe
processasprovidedinSec.2188-2191oftheRAC.Thereisneitherstatutorynor
constitutionalprovisiongrantingthePresidentsweepingauthoritytoremovemunicipal
officials.Theconstitutionmerelyprovidespowerofgeneralsupervision,but"supervision"
doesnotcontemplatecontrolorpowertoremovethePresident'ssupervisoryauthorityover
municipalaffairs.Powertocontrolmustbeconferredbylegislativeact.RACprovision
municipalaffairs.Powertocontrolmustbeconferredbylegislativeact.RACprovision
statingthatPresidentmayremovemustbeexercisedinconformitywiththelaw,meaning,it
mustbeaccomplishedonlyforthecausesprovidedunderthelaw.
7.Ganzonv.Kayanan
WhetherthePresidenthasauthorityundertheConstitutionoranylawtoorderthe
investigation,andtakedisciplinaryactionagainstamayorofacity.YES.
Adulyelectedmayorcanberemovedfromoffice.UnderthecharterofIloiloCity,aduly
electedmayorshallholdofficeforsixyearsunlessremoved.Thecharterdoesnotsaythat
amayorshallholdofficeatthepleasureofthePresident.Theideaistogivethemayora
definitetenureofofficenotdependentuponthepleasureofthePresident.Theimplication
ofhavingadefinitetenureisthathecanonlyberemovedforacause.
Answeringtheissueathand,theCourttooknoteofSec.64(b)and(c)oftheRevised
AdministrativeCode,inconnectionwiththeprovisionsofSec.10,paragraph1,ArticleVIIof
theConstitution.FromtheseprovisionsitcanbeinferredthatthePresidentmayremoveany
officialinthegovernmentserviceconformablytolawandtodeclarevacanttheofficeheld
bytheremovedofficial.ThePresidentmayorderaninvestigationofanyactionorthe
conductofanypersoningovernmentservice,andmaydesignateapersontoconductsuch
investigation.Hence,GanzoncannotcontendtheinvestigationorderedbyPresident
Magsayay.
AstoPresidentsPowerofGeneralSupervision
Inadminlaw,supervisionmeansoverseeing/power/authorityofanofficertoseethat
subordinateofficersperformtheirduties.Iftheyfailorneglecttofulfillthem,theofficermay
takesuchactionorstepasprescribedbylawtomakethemperformtheirduties.Controlon
theotherhand,meansthepowerofanofficertoalter/modify/nullify/setasidewhata
subordinateofficerhaddoneintheperformanceofhisdutiesandtosubstitutethe
judgmentoftheformerforthatofthelatter.TheCourtruledthatitcannotbeinferredfrom
thisrulingthatthepowerofsupervisionthePresidenthasoverlocalgovernmentofficials
doesnotincludethepowerofinvestigation.InmorerecentrulingsoftheCourt,ithasbeen
declaredthatthePresidentcanconductinvestigationsoverlocalgovernmentofficialsas
partofhispowertosupervisethelatter."
8.Drilonv.Lim
WONSection187oftheLGCisunconstitutional?
Yes.Section187authorizestheSecretaryofJusticetoreviewonlytheconstitutionalityor
Yes.Section187authorizestheSecretaryofJusticetoreviewonlytheconstitutionalityor
legalityofthetaxordinanceand,ifwarranted,torevokeitoneitherorbothofthese
grounds.Whenhealtersormodifiesorsetsasideataxordinance,heisnotalsopermitted
tosubstitutehisownjudgmentforthejudgmentofthelocalgovernmentthatenactedthe
measure.SecretaryDrilondidsetasidetheManilaRevenueCode,buthedidnotreplaceit
withhisownversionofwhattheCodeshouldbe.Whathefoundonlywasthatitwasillegal.
Allhedidinreviewingthesaidmeasurewasdetermineifthepetitionerswereperforming
theirfunctionsinaccordancewithlaw,thatis,withtheprescribedprocedureforthe
enactmentoftaxordinancesandthegrantofpowerstothecitygovernmentunderthe
LocalGovernmentCode.Asweseeit,thatwasanactnotofcontrolbutofmeresupervision.
Anofficerincontrollaysdowntherulesinthedoingofanact.Iftheyarenotfollowed,he
may,inhisdiscretion,ordertheactundoneorre-donebyhissubordinateorhemayeven
decidetodoithimself.Supervisiondoesnotcoversuchauthority.Thesupervisoror
superintendentmerelyseestoitthattherulesarefollowed,buthehimselfdoesnotlay
downsuchrules,nordoeshehavethediscretiontomodifyorreplacethem.
Significantly,arulesimilartoSection187appearedintheLocalAutonomyAct.Thatsection
allowedtheSecretaryofFinancetosuspendtheeffectivityofataxordinanceif,inhis
opinion,thetaxorfeeleviedwasunjust,excessive,oppressiveorconfiscatory.
Determinationoftheseflawswouldinvolvetheexerciseofjudgmentordiscretionandnot
merelyanexaminationofwhetherornottherequirementsorlimitationsofthelawhadbeen
observed;hence,itwouldsmackofcontrolratherthanmeresupervision.Allheispermitted
todoisascertaintheconstitutionalityorlegalityofthetaxmeasure,withouttherightto
declarethat,inhisopinion,itisunjust,excessive,oppressiveorconfiscatory.Hehasno
discretiononthismatter.
9.Bito-Ononv.Fernandez
WhetherornotthequestionedprovisioninMemorandumCircular97-193wasissuedbythe
DILGsecretaryinexcessofhisauthority.
YES.MemorandumCircularNo.97-193wasissuedbytheDILGSecretarypursuanttothe
powerofgeneralsupervisionofthePresidentoveralllocalgovernmentunitswhichwas
delegatedtotheDILGSecretarybyvirtueofAdministrativeOrderNo.267.ThePresident's
powerofgeneralsupervisionoverlocalgovernmentunitsisconferreduponhimbythe
Constitution.Thepowerofsupervisionisdefinedas"thepowerofasuperiorofficertosee
toitthatlowerofficersperformtheirfunctionsinaccordancewithlaw.".Thisisdistinguished
fromthepowerofcontrolor"thepowerofanofficertoalterormodifyorsetasidewhata
subordinateofficerhaddoneintheperformanceofhisdutiesandtosubstitutethe
judgmentoftheformerforthelatter."
Thus,doesthePresident'spowerofgeneralsupervisionextendtotheligangmgabarangay,
whichisnotalocalgovernmentunit?Weruleintheaffirmative.Buthehasnopowerof
control.TheDepartmentofJusticeruledthattheligangmgabarangayisagovernment
organization,beinganassociation,federation,leagueorunioncreatedbylaworby
authorityoflaw,whosemembersareeitherappointedorelectedgovernmentofficials.The
ligasareprimarilygovernedbytheprovisionsoftheLocalGovernmentCode,however,their
respectiveconstitutionandby-lawsshallgovernallothermattersaffectingtheinternal
organizationoftheliganototherwiseprovidedforintheLocalGovernmentCodeprovided
thattheconstitutionandby-lawsshallbesuppletorytotheprovisionsofBookIII,TitleVIof
theLocalGovernmentCodeandshallalwaysconformtotheprovisionsoftheConstitution
andexistinglaws.
D.CreationofMunicipalCorporations
DeFactoMunicipalCorporations
Sec.442(d)
Occurwhenthereisdefectinthecreationbutthelegalexistencehasbeenrecognized
andacquiescedpubliclyandofficially
1.NatureandPowerstoCreateMunicipalCorporations
Pelaezv.AuditorGeneral-Courtheldthatpowertocreatemunicipalitiesisessentiallyand
eminentlylegislativeincharacter,notadministrative.
MunicipalityofKapolongv.Moya-Pres.GarciacreatedtheMunicipalityofSto.Tomasfrom
aportionoftheMunicipalityofKapolong.Boundarydisputesledtothequestioningofthe
existenceoftheMunicipalityofSto.Tomas.SCcitedtherulinginPelaezv.AuditorGeneral
forthenon-existenceoftheMunicipalityofSto.Tomas.
MunicipalityofSanNarcisov.Mendez-Pres.GarciaissuedEO353forthecreationofthe
MunicipalityofSanAndresfromSanNarciso.Pres.Macapagalrecognizedthemunicipalityof
SanAndresthroughanEO.ContentionwasthatSanAndresshouldnotexistbecauseitwas
createdthroughanEO.SCheldthatthepeculiarcircumstancesobtaininginthiscasehardly
couldofferachoiceotherthantoconsiderSanAndrestohaveatleastattainedthestatusof
adefactomunicipalcorporation.
SanAndresconsideredamunicipalcorporationbasedontheff.facts:
1.Existingformorethan6yearswhenthedecisionnullifyingcertainmunicipalitieswas
promulgated;
2.Alreadyclassifiedasafifthclassmunicipality;
3.Establishedfamilycourts;
4.OrdinanceapportioningseatsinCongress
SultanCamidv.OfficeofthePresident-Mun.ofAndongcreatedthroughEO.Cannotbe
giventhesamestatusasSanAndres.Therearefactsinthepreviouscasethatisnotfound
here:
1.EOcreatingSanAndreswasnotinvalidated;
2.Municipalityexistedfor30yearsbeforeitwasquestioned;
3.Municipalitywasclassifiedasafifthclassmunicipalityandhasalegislativedistrict
apportioned;
Mun.ofAndongwasalsonotabletomeettherequisitesetbyLGC,whereinitwasstated
thatmunicipalitiesexistingatthetimeoftheadoptionoftheCodeshallcontinuetoexist.
2.CreationofMunicipalCorporations(Sec.1,10,11,15,18,19,Art.X)
A.ConstitutionalProvisions
Sec.1
Sec.10-Requirementforcreation,division,merger,abolitionoralteration:complywith
criteriainLGCandsubjecttoapprovalbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebisciteinthe
unitaffected
Sec.11-specialmetropolitanpoliticalsubdivision
Sec.15-creationofARMM,andtheCARconsistingofprovinces,cities,municipalities,and
geographicalareaswithcommonanddistinctivehistoricalandculturalheritage,socialand
economicstructures
Sec.18-Congressshallenactanorganicactforeachautonomousregion,itshalldefine
basicstructureofgovernmentfortheregionconsistingoftheexecutivedeptandlegislative
assembly,bothofwhichshallbeelectiveandrepresentativeoftheconstituentpolitical
units.Thereshallalsobespecialcourts.Creationshallbeeffectivewhenapprovedby
majorityofthevotescastbytheconstituentunitsinaplebiscitecalledforthepurpose.
Sec.19-CongressshallpassorganicactsforARMMandCordilleras
Alvarezv.Guingona-IRAshouldbeincludedintheincomeofLGUs,andinthecomputation
https://www.evernote.com/shard/s217/sh/860641ae-87b3-41aa-ace5-484e7101fbe8/b6798488a0b70dc5a27ad49087d6e5e9
18/51
Alvarezv.Guingona-IRAshouldbeincludedintheincomeofLGUs,andinthecomputation
(thus,theincomerequirementwasmet).Theyformpartofthegrossaccretionofthefunds
ofthelGU.Theyautomaticallyaccruetothelocaltreasurywithoutneedforfurtheraction.
B.StatutoryProvisions(Sec.6,7,385,441,442,449,450,460,461,LGC)
Sec.6-Legislativeactrequired:lawforcreationofcity,province,muni,anyother;ordinance
bySangguofprovinceandcity
Sec.7-CreationandConversion
Income-sufficienttoestablishandmaintainfacilities,servicesandspecialfunctions
attestedbyDOF
Population-totalnumberofinhabitantswithinjurisd-attestedbyNSO
LandArea-contiguousunlessislandorseparatedbyLGUattestedbyLMB-DENR
Properlyidentifiedbymetesandbounds
Sufficiencytoprovidebasicservices
SPECIFICREQUIREMENTS
INCOME POPULATION LANDAREA
2,000;5,000forMM
Barangay(384-386) x Contiguousterritory
andHUCs
P2.5Mforthelast2
Municipality(440- consecutiveyears Contiguousterritory
25,000
442) basedon1991 of50sq.km.
constantprice
P20Mforthelast2
consecutiveyears
basedon1991
constantprice; 150,000;200,000 Contiguousof100
City(448-452)
P50MforHUCsof forHUCs sq.km.
latestannualincome
(amendment:
P100M)
Provinces(459- P20Mbasedon1991 Contiguousof

250,000
462) constantprices 2,000sq.km.
SpecialActsorCharters;PresidentialDecrees
RepublicAct9009-amendmentonincomerequirements
Cawalingv.COMELEC-mergingoftwomunicipalitiesisallowed

i.Income
Alvarezv.Guingona
LeagueofCitiesv.COMELEC-CongressenactedRA9009whichamendedSec.450ofLGC
prescribinganincreaseintheincomerequirementofcitiesfrom
20Mto100M.CourtheldthatCityhoodlawsareconstitutional,theincreaseofincome
requirementisallowed.

ii.Population
AquinoIIIv.COMELEC-Whetherapopulationof250,000isanindispensableconstitutional
requirementforthecreationofanewlegislativedistrictinaprovince?NO.Sec.5(3)ofthe
Constitutionrequiresaminimumof250konlyforacitytobeentitledtoarepresentativebut
notsofortheprovince.Requirementismerelyanalternativeadditionalrequirementtothe
indispensableincomerequirement:
Requisitesforcreation:
Province-annualincomeofnotlessthan20Mwiththeffrequisites:
(a)acontiguousterritoryofatleast2ksq.km.OR
(b)apopulationofnotlessthan250k
iii.LandArea
C.Sec.68,RevisedAdmin.Code
SECTION 68. General authority of (Governor-General) President of the Philippines to fix
boundaries and make new subdivisions. The (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province,
subprovince, municipality,[township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and
increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or
moresubprovinces,separateanypoliticaldivisionotherthanaprovince,intosuchportions
asmayberequired,mergeanyofsuchsubdivisionsorportionswithanother,nameanynew
subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to
suchplacethereinasthepublicwelfaremayrequire:Provided,Thattheauthorizationofthe
(Philippine Legislature) National Assembly of the Philippines shall first be obtained

whenevertheboundaryofanyprovinceorsubprovinceistobedefinedoranyprovinceis
to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When any action by the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the
territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the
(Governor-General)PresidentofthePhilippines,withtherecommendationandadviceofthe
headoftheDepartmenthavingexecutivecontrolofsuchofficer,shallredistricttheterritory
oftheseveralofficersaffectedandassignsuchofficerstothenewdistrictssoformed.
Uponthechangingofthelimitsofpoliticaldivisionsinpursuanceoftheforegoingauthority,
anequitabledistributionofthefundsandobligationsofthedivisionstherebyaffectedshall
bemadeinsuchmannerasmayberecommendedbythe(InsularAuditor)AuditorGeneral
andapprovedbythe(Governor-General)PresidentofthePhilippines.
Pelaezv.AuditorGeneralSUPRA#17
MunicipalityofCandijay,Boholv.CourtofAppeals251SCRA530[1995]-Municipalityof
AliciassituationisstrikinglysimilartothatofthemunicipalityofSanAndres.Respondent
mun.ofAliciawascreatedbyvirtueofEONo.265in1949,or10yearsaheadofthe
municipalityofSanAndres,andthereforehadbeeninexistenceforallofsixteenyears
whenPelaezvs.AuditorGeneralwaspromulgated.Andvariousgovernmentalacts
throughouttheyearsallindicatetheStatesrecognitionandacknowledgmentofthe
existencethereof.Forinstance,underAdministrativeOrderNo.33above-mentioned,the
MunicipalityofAliciawascoveredbythe7thMunicipalCircuitCourtofAlicia-Mabiniforthe
provinceofBohol.Likewise,undertheOrdinanceappendedtothe1987Constitution,the
MunicipalityofAliciaisoneoftwentymunicipalitiescomprisingtheThirdDistrictofBohol.
InasmuchasrespondentmunicipalityofAliciaissimilarlysituatedasthemunicipalityofSan
Andres,itshouldlikewisebenefitfromtheeffectsofSection442(d)LGC,andshould
henceforthbeconsideredasaregular,dejuremunicipality.
Camidvs.OfficeofthePresidentSUPRA#20
D.MUNICIPALCORPORATIONBYPRESCRIPTION
Exercises corporate functions w/ knowledge and acquiescence of legislature and w/o
interruptionorobjectionforalongperiodoftime.
E.DEFACTOMUNICIPALCORPORATIONS
Sec.442(d)
Occurswhenthereisdefectinthecreationbutthelegalexistencehasbeen
recognizedandacquiescedpubliclyandofficially.
Municipalcorporationexistingasofeffectivitydate(January1,1992)shallcontinue
toexistandoperateassuch.REGULARMUNICIPALITIES:Existingmunicipaldistricts
organizedpursuanttoPDsandEOsANDhaverespectivesetofelectiveofficials
holdingofficeattimeofeffectivitydateofLGC.
Elements
1.Validlawauthorizingincorporation;
2.Goodfaithtoorganize;
3.Colorablecompliance;
4.Assumptionofcorporatepowers.
Principles
1.Validlawenactedbylegislatureoranunconstitutionallawwhichisvalidonitsface
orhadnotyetbeendeclaredunconstitutional;
2.Theremustbeapotentialdejurecorporation;
3.IfthelawisunconstitutionalorinvalidONitsface,therecanbenodefacto
F.BeginningofCorporateexistence
Section14.BeginningofCorporateExistence.-Whenanewlocalgovernmentunitis
created,itscorporateexistenceshallcommenceupontheelectionandqualificationofits
chiefexecutiveandamajorityofthemembersofitssanggunian,unlesssomeothertimeis
fixedthereforbythelaworordinancecreatingit.
3.AlterationandDissolutionofMunicipalCorporations
A.MannerorMode,LocalGovernmentCode
LGC,Sec.7.CreationofConversion-GeneralRule,creationofalocalgovernmentunitorits
conversionfromoneleveltoanothershallbebasedonverifiableindicatorsofviabilityand
projectedcapacitytoprovideservices:
1.Income-mustbesufficientbasedonacceptedstandards,toprovideallessential
facilitiesandservices,andspecialfunctions
2.Population-totalnumberofinhabitantswithintheterritorialjurisdiction
3.LandArea-mustbecontiguous,unlessitcomprisestwoormoreislandsorseparatedby
alocalgovernmentunit.Mustbeidentifiedbymetesandboundswithtechnical
descriptions;sufficienttoprovidebasicservicesandfacilities
ComplianceshallbeattestedbyDOF,NSO,LMB,andDENR.
LGC,Sec.8.DivisionandMerger-thisshallcomplywithsamerequirementsascreation,
Providedhoweverthatsuchdivisionshallnotreducetheincome,population,orlandareaof
thelocalgovernmentunitorunitsconcernedtolessthantheminimumrequirements
prescribedinthisCode:Providedfurther,thattheincomeclassificationoftheoriginalgovt
unitshallnotfallbelowitscurrentincomeclassification
unitshallnotfallbelowitscurrentincomeclassification
LGC,Sec.9.AbolitionofLocalGovernmentUnits-anLGUmaybeabolishedwhenits
income,populationorlandareahasbeenirreversiblyreducedtolessthantheminimum
standardsprescribedforitscreation.ThelaworordinanceabolishinganLGUshallspecify
theprovince,city,municipality,orbarangaywithwhichtheabolishedLGUwillbemerged.
LGC,Sec.10.PlebisciteRequirement-Nocreation,division,merger,abolition,orsibstantial
alterationofboundariesofLGUshalltakeeffectunlessapprovedbyamajorityofthevotes
castinaplebiscitecalledforthepurpose.Saidplebisciteshallbeconductedbythe
COMELECwithin120daysfromthedateofeffectivityofthelaworordinance.
ArticleX,Constitution
Sec.10-Noprovince,city,municipalityorbarangaymaybecreated,divided,merged,
abolished,oritsboundarysubstantiallyaltered,exceptinaccordancewiththecriteria
establishedinthelocalgovernmentcodeandsubjecttotheapprovalbyamajorityofthe
votescastinaplebisciteinthepoliticalunitsdirectlyaffected
B.PlebisciteRequirement(Sec.10,ArticleX;Sec.10LGC)
TANv.COMELEC
WONtheplebiscitewaslegalandcompliedwiththeconstitutionalrequisitesofthe
Consititution,whichstatesthatSec.3.Noprovince,city,municipalityorbarriomaybe
created,divided,merged,abolished,oritsboundarysubstantiallyalteredexceptin
accordancewiththecriteriaestablishedintheLocalGovernmentCode,andsubjecttothe
approvalbyamajorityofthevotesinaplebisciteintheunitorunitsaffected?NO.
ResidentsofNegrosOccidentalwereexcluded.UndertheConstitution,thosebelongingto
theunit/saffectedshouldbethesubjectvoters.
PADILLAv.COMELEC
WastheplebisciteconductedintheareascomprisingtheproposedMunicipalityofTulay-
Na-LupaandtheremainingareasofthemotherMunicipalityofLabovalid?
Yes.Whenthelawstatesthattheplebisciteshallbeconducted"inthepoliticalunitsdirectly
affected,"itmeansthatresidentsofthepoliticalentitywhowouldbeeconomically
dislocatedbytheseparationofaportionthereofhavearighttovoteinsaidplebiscite.
Evidently,whatiscontemplatedbythephase"politicalunitsdirectlyaffected,"isthe
pluralityofpoliticalunitswhichwouldparticipateintheplebiscite.Logically,thosetobe
includedinsuchpoliticalareasaretheinhabitantsofthe12barangaysoftheproposed
MunicipalityofTulay-Na-LupaaswellasthoselivingintheparentMunicipalityofLabo,
CamarinesNorte.Thus,itwasconcludedthatrespondentCOMELECdidnotcommitgrave
CamarinesNorte.Thus,itwasconcludedthatrespondentCOMELECdidnotcommitgrave
abuseofdiscretioninpromulgatingtheresolution.
MIRANDAv.AGUIRRE
Plebiscitemustbeconductedinthepoliticalunitsdirectlyaffected,i.e.thosewhowill
suffermaterialchangeintheirpoliticalandeconomicrights.Sec.10setsouttwoconditions:
(1)creation,division,merger...mustmeettherequirementsundertheCode(population,
income,landarea);and(2)thelawmustbeapprovedbythepeoplebyamajorityofthe
votescastinaplebisciteinthepoliticalunitdirectlyaffected.
TOBIASv.ABALOS
Before RA 7675 converted Municipality of Mandaluyong into a HUC, Mandaluyong & San
Juan belonged only to one legislative district. Whether the plebiscite requirement was
properly held? HELD: Yes, San Juan was not directly affected thus, the increase in
congressional representation is not unconstitutional. The subject of the bill was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into an HUC, thus the citizens of San Juan was properly
excluded.
II.TYPESOFLGU(read)
A.Barangay
B.Municipality
C.TheCity
D.TheProvince
III.OFFICIALSOFLOCALGOVERNMENTANDSYSTEMOF
ACCOUNTABILITY
A.ElectiveLocalOfficials,Sec.39-75
1.Qualification
Sec.39-
1.MustbeacitizenofthePhilippines;registeredvoterinthebarangay,municipality,cityor
province(incaseofamemberofSanggu,inthedistrict);residentthereinforatleastfor
atleast1yearimmediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection;andabletoreadandwrite
2.Governor,Vice-Gov,memberofSangguPanlalawigan,orMayor,Vice-Mayor,memberof
SangguPanlugsod--mustbe23yearsofageonelectionday
3.Candidatesforthepositionofmayororvice-mayorofindependentcomponentcities,
componentcities,ormunicipalities--mustbeatleast21yearsofageonelectionday
4.CandidatesforthepositionofmemberoftheSangguPanlungsodorSanggubayan--
mustbeatleast18yearsofageonelectionday
5.CandidatesforthepositionofpunongbarangayormemberoftheSanggubrgy--must
5.CandidatesforthepositionofpunongbarangayormemberoftheSanggubrgy--must
beatleast18yearsofageonelectionday
6.CandidatesfortheSangguKabataanmustatleastbe15butnotmorethan21yearsof
age
CASES:
FRIVALDOv.COMELEC(1989)
Sec.117oftheOmnibuselectioncodeprovidesthataqualifiedvotermustbeaFilipino
citizen.Thelawdoesnotspecifyanyparticulardateortimewhenthecandidatemust
possesscitizenshipunlikethatforresidence.
FRIVALDOv.COMELEC(1996)
The qualifications in the LGC refer to that of Elective officials (and not of Candidates),
hence,thesequalificationsneedtobepossessedbytheofficialnotatthetimehefiledhis
certificateofcandidacybutatthetimehetakeshisoathofofficeandassumeshispost.The
citizenshiprequirementintheLGCistobepossessedbyanelectiveofficialatthelatestas
of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been
elected.RegistrationunderPD725(Repatriation)isvalidandeffectiveandretroactstothe
dateoftheapplication.Thus,Frivaldosrepatriationistobegiveneffectasofthedateofhis
applicationtherefor.
LABOv.COMELEC(1989)
LaboisnotaFilipinocitizen.HehadlosthisPhilippinecitizenshipbyall3modesspecifiedin
theConstitution:(1)naturalizationinaforeigncountry,(2)expressrenunciationof
citizenship,and(3)subscribingtoanoathofallegiancetosupporttheConstitutionorlaws
ofaforeigncountry.HehasnotreacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipbyanyofthe3methods
prescribedintheConstitution:(1)directactofCongress,(2)naturalization,and(3)
repatriation.
ContrarytoLabo'sclaim,hisnaturalizationinAustraliadidnotconferhimwithdual
citizenship.TheConstitutionexplicitlystatesthatdualcitizenshipisinimicaltonational
interest.
ThecontentionthathismarriagetoanAustraliannationaldidnotautomaticallydivest
himofFilipinocitizenshipisirrelevant.TherewasnoclaimthatLabohadautomatically
ceasedtobeaFilipinobecauseofthatmarriage.Also,hisFilipinocitizenshiphasnot
beenautomaticallyrestoredupontheannulmentofhisAustraliancitizenship,whenhis
marriagewasdeclaredvoidonthegroundsofbigamy.
TheCommissiononImmigrationandDeportationheldinin1988thatLabowasnota
Filipinocitizen.TheearliercontrarydecisionbytheCOMELECin1982istotallybaseless,
andisevenallegedtohavebeenpoliticallymotivated.Thelattercanbereversed
becausethedoctrineofresjudicatadoesnotapplytoquestionsofcitizenship.
LaboisnoteligibletoholdpublicofficeinthePhilippines.Hewasnotevenaqualifiedvoter
LaboisnoteligibletoholdpublicofficeinthePhilippines.Hewasnotevenaqualifiedvoter
whenhewaselected.
LABO,JR.v.COMELEC(1992)
1)WhetherornotLaboisaFilipinocitizenandthereforequalifiedtorunforMayor:
No.Labowasdisqualifiedasacandidateforbeinganalien.Hiselectiondoesnotautomaticallyrestorehis
Philippinecitizenship,thepossessionofwhichisanindispensablerequirementforholdingpublic
office.Labomerelyappliedforrepatriationandsuchapplicationunlessofficiallyapproveddoesnot
amounttorepatriation.Oneofthequalificationsofanelectiveofficialisthathemustbeacitizenofthe
Philippines.Thefactthathewaselectedbythemajorityoftheelectorateisofnomoment.
COQUILLAv.COMELEC
39(a)oftheLocalGovernmentCode(R.ANo.7160)provides:Anelectivelocalofficial
mustbeacitizenofthePhilippines;aregisteredvoterinthebarangay,municipality,city,or
provinceor,inthecaseofamemberofthesangguniangpanlalawigan,sangguniang
panlungsod,orsangguniangbayan,thedistrictwhereheintendstobeelected;aresident
thereinforatleast1yearimmediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection;andabletoread
andwriteFilipinooranyotherlocallanguageordialect.
Residence"istobeunderstoodasreferringto"domicile"orlegalresidencetheplace
whereapartyactuallyorconstructivelyhashispermanenthome,wherehe,nomatterwhere
hemaybefoundatanygiventime,eventuallyintendstoreturnandremain(animus
manendi).Adomicileoforiginisacquiredbyeverypersonatbirth.Itisusuallytheplace
wherethechildsparentsresideandcontinuesuntilthesameisabandonedbyacquisitionof
newdomicile(domicileofchoice).
Petitionerfailedtoprovethathehadre-establishedresidenceinthePhilippines,warranting
thedismissalofthecase.
2.Disqualification
Sec.40-Theffpersonsaredisqualifiedfromrunningforanyelectivelocalposition:
1.Thosesentencedbyfinaljudgmentforanoffenseinvolvingmoralturpitudeorforan
offensepunishableby1yearormoreofimprisonment,within2yearsafterserving
sentence
2.Thoseremovedfromofficeasaresultofanadministrativecase
3.ThoseconvictedbyfinaljudgmentforviolatingtheoathofallegiancetotheRepublic
4.Thosewithdualcitizenship
5.Fugitivefromjusticeincriminalornonpoliticalcaseshereorabroad
6.Permanentresidentsinaforeigncountryorthosewhohaveacquiredtherighttoreside
abroadandcontinuetoavailofthesamerightaftertheeffectivityofthisCode;and
7.Theinsaneorfeeble-minded
7.Theinsaneorfeeble-minded
CASES:
1.MENDOZAv.MANZANO
Dualcitizenshipisdifferentfromdualallegiance.Dualcitizenshipisinvoluntary;itarisesout
ofcircumstancesofbirthormarriage,whereapersonisrecognizedtobeanationalbytwo
ormorestates.Dualallegianceisaresultofapersonsvolition;itisasituationwhereina
personsimultaneouslyowes,bysomepositiveact,loyaltytotwoormorestates.Dual
citizenshipisanissuebecauseapersonwhohasthisraisesaquestionofwhichstateslaw
mustapplytohim/her,thereforepostingathreattoacountryssovereignty.InSec.5Article
IVoftheConstitutiononCitizenship,theconcernwasnotwithdualcitizenshipperse,but
withnaturalizedcitizenswhomaintainallegiancetotheircountriesoforiginevenafter
naturalization.Hence,dualcitizenshipintheaforementioneddisqualificationclausemust
meandualallegiance.Therefore,personswithmeredualcitizenshipdonotfallunderthis
disqualification.
Itshouldsufficethatuponfilingofcertificatesforcandidacy,suchpersonswithdual
citizenshipshaveelectedtheirPhilippinecitizenshiptoterminatetheirdualcitizenship.In
privaterespondentscertificateofcandidacy,hemadethesestatementsunderoathon
March27,1998:IamaFilipinocitizenNatural-born.Iamnotapermanentresidentof,or
immigrantto,aforeigncountry.IameligiblefortheofficeIseektobeelected.Iwill
supportanddefendtheConstitutionofthePhilippinesandwillmaintaintruefaithand
allegiancetheretoThefilingofsuchcertificateofcandidacysufficedtorenouncehis
Americancitizenship,effectivelyremovinganydisqualificationhemighthaveasadual-
citizen.InFrivaldov.COMELEC,itwasheldthatBylawsoftheUnitedStatesFrivaldolost
hisAmericancitizenshipwhenhetookhisoathofallegiancetothePhilippineGovernment
whenheranforGovernorin1988,in1992,andin1995.Everycertificateofcandidacy
containsanoathofallegiancetothePhilippineGovernment.Therefore,petitioner
Mercadoscontentionthattheoathofallegiancecontainedinprivaterespondents
certificateofcandidacyisinsufficienttoconstitutehisrenunciationofhisAmerican
citizenship.
2.CAASIv.CA
WhetheragreencardisproofthattheholderthereofisapermanentresidentoftheUnited
Statessuchthatitwoulddisqualifyhimtorunforanyelectivelocalposition?Yes.Miguel's
applicationforimmigrantstatusandpermanentresidenceintheU.S.andhispossessionofa
greencardattestingtosuchstatusareconclusiveproofthatheisapermanentresidentof
theU.S.Despitehisvigorousdisclaimer,Miguel'simmigrationtotheUnitedStatesin1984
theU.S.Despitehisvigorousdisclaimer,Miguel'simmigrationtotheUnitedStatesin1984
constitutedanabandonmentofhisdomicileandresidenceinthePhilippines.Hedidnotgo
totheUnitedStatesmerelytovisithischildrenorhisdoctorthere.HeenteredtheUSwith
theintentiontolivetherepermanentlyasevidencedbyhisapplicationforanimmigrant's
(notavisitor'sortourist's)visa.
WhetherMeritoMiguel,byreturningtothePhilippinesinNovember1987andpresenting
himselfasacandidateformayorofBolinaointheJanuary18,1988localelections,waivehis
statusasapermanentresidentorimmigrantoftheUnitedStates?No.Thewaiverofsuch
immigrantstatusshouldbeasindubitableashisapplicationforit.Absentclearevidence
thathemadeanirrevocablewaiverofthatstatusorthathesurrenderedhisgreencardto
theappropriateU.S.authoritiesbeforeheranformayorofBolinaointhelocalelectionson
January18,1988,theconclusionisthathewasdisqualifiedtorunforsaidpublicoffice.
Hence,hiselectionwasnullandvoid.
3.RODRIGUEZv.COMELEC
IsRodriguezafugitivefromjusticeasdefinedbytheCourtintheMARQUEZDecision?
No.Afugitivefromjusticeisdefinedasnotonlythosewhofleeafterconvictiontoavoid
punishmentbutlikewisewho,afterbeingcharged,fleetoavoidprosecution.Thisindicates
thattheintenttoevadeisthecompellingfactorthatmakesapersonleaveaparticular
jurisdiction,andtherecanonlybeintenttoevadeprosecutionorpunishmentwhenthe
fleeingpersonknowsofanalreadyinstitutedindictment,orofapromulgatedjudgmentof
conviction.Intenttoevadeonthepartofacandidatemustthereforebeestablishedbyproof
thattherehasalreadybeenaconvictionoratleast,achargehasalreadybeenfiled,atthe
timeofflight.ThiscannotbeappliedinthecaseofRodriguez.Rodriguezarrivedinthe
PhilippinesonJune25,1985,fivemonthsbeforethefilingofthefelonycomplaintintheLos
AngelesCourtonNovember12,1985andoftheissuanceofthearrestwarrantbythatsame
foreigncourt.ItwasclearlyimpossibleforRodrigueztohaveknownaboutsuchfelony
complaintandarrestwarrantatthetimehelefttheUS,astherewasinfactnocomplaint
andarrestwarrantmuchlessconvictiontospeakofyetatsuchtime.
4.DELATORREv.COMELEC
Sec.40ofLGCprovides:
Disqualifications.
Thefollowingpersonsaredisqualifiedfromrunningforanyelectivelocalposition:
(a)Thosesentencedbyfinaljudgmentforanoffenseinvolvingmoralturpitudeorforan
offensepunishablebyone(1)yearormoreofimprisonmentwithintwo(2)yearsafter
servingsentence;
Moralturpitudeisconsideredasanactofbaseness,vileness,ordepravityintheprivate
dutieswhichamanoweshisfellowmen,ortosocietyingeneral,contrarytotheaccepted
andcustomaryruleofrightanddutybetweenmanandwomanorconductcontraryto
justice,honesty,modesty,orgoodmorals.
Inthiscaseoffencing,actualknowledgebythe"fence"ofthefactthatpropertyreceivedis
stolendisplaysthesamedegreeofmaliciousdeprivationofone'srightfulpropertyasthat
whichanimatedtherobberyortheftwhich,bytheirverynature,arecrimesofmoral
turpitude.HenceDelaTorreisdisqualifiedfromseekingpublicoffice.
Withregardtohisargumentthatheisunderprobation,thecourtruledthatthelegaleffect
ofprobationisonlytosuspendtheexecutionofthesentence.DelaTorre'sconviction
subsistsandremainstotallyunaffectednotwithstandingthegrantofprobation.Infact,a
judgmentofconvictioninacriminalcaseipsofactoattainsfinalitywhentheaccusedapplies
forprobation,althoughitisnotexecutorypendingresolutionoftheapplicationfor
probation.
5.MAGNOv.COMELEC
PetitionerNestorMagnoranforMAYORofSanIsidro,NuevaEcijain2001.Private
RespondentfiledapetitionfordisqualificationofMagnobecausehewasconvictedbythe
Sandiganbayanof4countsofDirectBriberyandsentenced.Magnoappliedforprobation
andwasdischargedonMarchof1998.
COMELECdisqualifiedpetitionerbasedonaprovisionofBP881(OmnibusElectionCode)
disqualifyingacandidateconvictedofacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitudeuntilafterthelapse
of5yearsfromtheserviceofsentence.
MagnoclaimsSec40(a)RA7160(LocalGovernmentCode)shouldapplyinsteadofBP881:
Apersonconvictedofacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitudemayrunafterthelapseof2years
aftertheserviceofsentence.SoniaIsidrowasdeclaredMayorwhilethecasewaspending.
Directbriberyisacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude.Noteverycriminalactinvolvesmoral
turpitude.BlacksLawDictionarydefinesitasanactofbaseness,vilenessordepravityinthe
privatedutieswhichamanoweshisfellowmenorsocietyingeneralDirectbribery
contemplatestakingadvantageofhispositionandisabetrayalofthetrustreposedtohim
bythepublic.Second,heisnotqualified.RA7160shouldapply.First,RA7160isthemore
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bythepublic.Second,heisnotqualified.RA7160shouldapply.First,RA7160isthemore
recentlaw.ItimpliedlyrepealsBP881shouldtherebeanyinconsistencies.Second,RA7160
isaspeciallawapplyingspecificallytolocalgovernmentunits.BP881appliesfortheelection
ofanypublicoffice.Speciallawprevails.SincehewasdischargedonMarch1998,Magnos
disqualificationceasedonMarch2000.*CourtdeclaredthatitcouldnotruleonMagnos
prayerforhisproclamationaswinnerofthemayoraltyrace,itbeingoutsideitsjurisdiction.
3.TermofOffice;Three-TermLimitRule
Sec.8,Art.X,Constitution
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials (which shall be
determinedbylaw),shallbe3years.
THREE-TERMLIMITRULEAPPLIES:
1.Ifelectiveofficialismerelysuspendedfromoffice;
2.Ifelectiveofficeisabolishedduetoconversionofmunicipalitytoacity
THREE-TERMLIMITRULEDOESNOTAPPLY:
1.Iftermofofficialisinterruptedbysuccessiontoahigheroffice;
2.Ifaproclaimedcandidatelosesinanelectioncontest,exceptifthedecisionbecamefinal
afterTHEofficialhadfullyservedtheterm;
3.Ifalosingcandidatewinsanelectionprotest.
Section43LGC
TermofOfficeofalllocalelectiveofficials
3years,startingfromnoonofJune30,1992orsuchdateasmaybe
providedforbylaw,exceptthatofelectivebarangayofficials:
Provided,Thatalllocalofficialsfirstelectedduringthelocalelections
immediatelyfollowingtheratificationofthe1987Constitutionshall
serveuntilnoonofJune30,1992.
Nolocalelectiveofficialshallserveformorethan3consecutiveterms
inthesameposition.Voluntaryrenunciationoftheofficeforany
lengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptioninthe
continuityofserviceforthefulltermforwhichtheelectiveofficial
concernedwaselected.
Thetermofofficeofbarangayofficialsandmembersofthe
sangguniangkabataanshallbefor3,whichshallbeginafterthe
regularelectionofbarangayofficialsonthesecondMondayofMay
1994.
1.Borjav.COMELEC,295SCRA157[1998]
1.Borjav.COMELEC,295SCRA157[1998]
1993:X,theVMsucceededY,theMwhodied,byoperationoflaw.
XservedasMayoruntil1995.
1995-1998:XwaselectedandservedasMayor
1998-2001:Xwasre-electedandagainservedasMayor
2001Elections:WasXbarredtorunasMayor?
Answer:NO,for2reasons:
1.In1993,hewaselectedbecausehesucceededbyoperationoflaw
2.In1993,hewaselectednotinthesameofficebecauseduringthe1stterm,hewaselected
forthepositionofVM,andnotforMPrivaterespondentwasfirstelectedasvice-mayor,butupon
thedeathoftheincumbentmayor,heoccupiedthelatterspostfortheunexpiredterm.Hewas,
thereafter,electedfortwomoreterms.TheCourtheldthatwhenprivaterespondentoccupiedthe
postofthemayorupontheincumbentsdeathandservedfortheremainderoftheterm,hecannot
beconstruedashavingservedafulltermascontemplatedunderthesubjectconstitutionalprovision.
Thetermservedmustbeoneforwhichtheofficialconcernedwaselected.
1.Lonzanidav.COMELEC,311SCRA602[1991]
1988-1995:XwaselectedandservedasMayorfor2consecutiveterms
1995:Xwasre-electedandstartedservingasMayor
1997: Comelec ruled that X was not validly proclaimed and X stepped down as ordered by
theComelec.
1998elections:WasXbarredtorunasMayor?
Answer:NO
Petitioner was elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor from 1988 to 1995. He
then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his
duties as mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation before the RTC, which
ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared the position of mayor vacant. The
COMELECaffirmedthisrulingandpetitioneraccededtotheordertovacatethepost.During
theMay1998elections,petitionerthereinagainfiledhiscertificateofcandidacyformayor.A
petition to disqualify him was filed on the ground that he had already served three
consecutiveterms.TheCourtruled,however,thatpetitionercannotbeconsideredashaving
been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and that petitioner did not fully
servethe1995-1998mayoraltytermbyreasonofinvoluntaryrelinquishmentofoffice.
1.Adormeov.COMELEC,G.R.No.147927,Feb.4,2002
1998:XranasMayorbutlosttoY
2000:YfacedarecallelectionandXwaselectedintherecallelectionandservedasMayor
2001: Was X barred to run as Mayor? Whether an assumption to office through a recall
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2001: Was X barred to run as Mayor? Whether an assumption to office through a recall
electionshouldbeconsideredasoneterminapplyingthethree-termlimitrule.
Answer:NO
Privaterespondentwaselectedandservedfortwoconsecutivetermsasmayor.Hethenran
for his third term in the May 1998 elections, but lost to his opponent. In June 1998, his
opponent faced recall proceedings and in the recall elections of May 2000, private
respondent won and served for the unexpired term. For the May 2001 elections, private
respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor. This was questioned.
The Court held that private respondent cannot be construed as having been elected and
served for three consecutive terms. His loss in the May 1998 elections was considered by
theCourtasaninterruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceasmayor.Fornearlytwoyears,
privaterespondentthereinlivedasaprivatecitizen.
1.Socratesv.COMELEC
2001elections:Xdidnotrun;YwaselectedMayor
2002:YfacedrecallelectionandXfiledcertificateofcandidacyfortherecallelections
CanXparticipateintherecallelections?
Answer:YES
The principal issue was whether private respondent Hagedorn was qualified to run during
therecallelections.Hagedornhadalreadyservedforthreeconsecutivetermsasmayorfrom
1992 until 2001 and did not run in the immediately following regular elections. On July 2,
2002, the barangay officials of Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory
RecallAssemblytoinitiatetherecalloftheincumbentmayor,Socrates.OnAugust23,2002,
Hagedornfiledhiscertificateofcandidacyformayorintherecallelection.Apetitionforhis
disqualificationwasfiledonthegroundthathecannotrunforthesaidpostduringtherecall
electionsforhewasdisqualifiedfromrunningforafourthconsecutiveterm.TheCourtruled
in favor of Hagedorn, holding that the principle behind the three-term limit rule is to
preventconsecutivenessoftheserviceofterms,andthattherewasinhiscaseabreakin
suchconsecutivenessaftertheendofhisthirdtermandbeforetherecallelection.
1.Mendozav.COMELEC
RespondentRomanheldthepostofGovernorofBataanprovinceanumberoftimes:
a)19861988AppointedOICGovernorofBataanbyformerPres.Aquino
andservedupto1988
b)19881992ElectedGovernorandservedupto1992
c)19941995ElectedGovernorduringtherecallelectionin1993,assumed
officeon28June1994andservedupto1995
d)19951998ElectedGovernorandservedupto1998
e)19982001ElectedGovernorandservedupto2001.
2001: Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in the May 1432/51
https://www.evernote.com/shard/s217/sh/860641ae-87b3-41aa-ace5-484e7101fbe8/b6798488a0b70dc5a27ad49087d6e5e9 2001
2001: Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in the May 14 2001
regularelections.OnMay162001,hewasproclaimedbytheProvincialBoardofCanvassers
ofBataan.
Opposition: Romans election as governor of Bataan as null and void for allegedly being
contrarytoArt.X,8ofConstitution
HELD: Romans incumbency to the post of Governor following the recall elections is not
includedindeterminingthethree-consecutivetermlimitfixedbylaw.
The law contemplates a continuous full three-year term before the proscription can apply,
providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office.
Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three
consecutivetermsbecause,infact,itexcludesfromthethree-termlimitinterruptionsinthe
continuityofservice,solongassuchinterruptionsarenotduetothevoluntaryrenunciation
of the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995,
duringwhichRomanservedasgovernorofBataanbyvirtueofarecallelectionheldin1993,
should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as
governorofBataanforonlytwoconsecutiveterms(1995-1998and1998-2001),hiselection
onthatdaywasactuallyonlyhisthirdtermforthesameposition.
Arecalltermshouldnotbeconsideredasonefullterm,becauseacontraryinterpretation
would in effect cut short the elected officials service to less than nine years and
shortchangehisconstituents.Thedesiretopreventmonopolyofpoliticalpowershouldbe
balancedagainsttheneedtoupholdthevotersobviouspreference.
1.TenureofOffice
1.Osmenav.COMELEC
ConstitutionhasmandatedasynchronizednationalandlocalelectionpriortoJune30,1992
or more specifically as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5on the second Monday of May,
1992. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, is fixed by the
Constitution at three years (Sec. 8. Art. X). The incumbent local officials were elected in
January 1988. Therefore, their term would have expired on February 2, 1991. But their term
wasadjustedtoexpireatnoonofJune30,1992.Thereasonforthesaidadjustment,aswell
as those of the Senators, members of the House of Representatives, President and Vice-
President,isthesametosynchronizethenationalandlocalelections.Upontheotherhand,
and contrary to the express mandate of the 1987 Constitution, RA 7056 provides for 2
separate elections in 1992. x x x With the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold
synchronized(simultaneous)nationalandlocalelectionsinthesecondMondayofMay,1992,
thusRA7056isclearlyviolativeoftheConstitutionbecauseitprovidesfortheholdingofa
desynchronizedelection.Sections1and2thereofcontravenesArticleXVIII,Sections2and5
ofthe1987Constitution.
ThereareotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionviolatedbyRA7056.Forone,thereisSection
2, Article XVIII of the Constitution which provides that the local official first elected under
theConstitutionshallserveuntilnoonofJune30,1992.ButunderSec.3ofRA7056,these
incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their
successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. It has been held that: It is not
competentforthelegislaturetoextendthetermofofficersbyprovidingthattheyshallhold
over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or
over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or
byclearimplicationprescribedtheterm and when the Constitution fixes the day on which
the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond
thatperiod,eventhoughthesuccessorsfailtoqualifywithinthetime.(Sec.67CJS,p.379,
Italics supplied) In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows: It has been
broadlystatedthatthelegislaturecannot,byanactpostponingtheelectiontofillanoffice
thetermofwhichislimitedbytheConstitution,extendthetermoftheincumbentbeyond
theperiodaslimitedbytheConstitution.
1.VacanciesandSuccession,Secs.44-47,LGC
Section44.PermanentVacanciesintheOfficesoftheGovernor,Vice-Governor,Mayor,and
Vice-Mayor.-Ifapermanentvacancyoccursintheofficeofthegovernorormayor,thevice-
governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or
vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined
herein.
Ifapermanentvacancyoccursintheofficeofthepunongbarangay,thehighestranking
sanggunianbarangaymemberor,incaseofhispermanentinability,thesecondhighest
rankingsanggunianmember,shallbecomethepunongbarangay.
Atiebetweenoramongthehighestrankingsanggunianmembersshallberesolvedby
thedrawingoflots.
Thesuccessorsasdefinedhereinshallserveonlytheunexpiredtermsoftheir
predecessors.
ForpurposesofthisChapter,apermanentvacancyariseswhenanelectivelocalofficialfills
ahighervacantoffice,refusestoassumeoffice,failstoqualify,dies,isremovedfromoffice,
voluntarilyresigns,orisotherwisepermanentlyincapacitatedtodischargethefunctionsof
hisoffice.
For purposes of succession as provided in the Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determinedonthebasisoftheproportionofvotesobtainedbyeachwinningcandidateto
the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local
election.
Section45.PermanentVacanciesintheSanggunian.-
Permanentvacanciesinthesanggunianwhereautomaticsuccession
providedabovedonotapplyshallbefilledbyappointmentinthe
followingmanner:
ThePresident,throughtheExecutiveSecretary,inthecaseofthesangguniang
panlalawiganandthesangguniangpanlungsodofhighlyurbanizedcitiesand
independentcomponentcities;
Thegovernor,inthecaseofthesangguniangpanlungsodofcomponentcitiesand
thesangguniangbayan;
thesangguniangbayan;
Thecityormunicipalmayor,inthecaseofsangguniangbarangay,upon
recommendationofthesangguniangbarangayconcerned.
Exceptforthesangguniangbarangay,onlythenomineeofthe
politicalpartyunderwhichthesanggunianmemberconcernedhad
beenelectedandwhoseelevationtothepositionnexthigherinrank
createdthelastvacancyinthesanggunianshallbeappointedinthe
mannerhereinaboveprovided.Theappointeeshallcomefromthe
samepoliticalpartyasthatofthesanggunianmemberwhocaused
thevacancyandshallservetheunexpiredtermofthevacantoffice.In
theappointmenthereinmentioned,anominationandacertificateof
membershipoftheappointeefromthehighestofficialofthepolitical
partyconcernedareconditionssinequanon,andanyappointment
withoutsuchnominationandcertificationshallbenullandvoidab
initioandshallbeagroundforadministrativeactionagainstthe
officialresponsibletherefore.
Incaseorpermanentvacancyiscausedbyasanggunianmember
whodoesnotbelongtoanypoliticalparty,thelocalchiefexecutive
shall,uponrecommendationofthesanggunianconcerned,appointa
qualifiedpersontofillthevacancy.
Incaseofvacancyintherepresentationoftheyouthandthe
barangayinthesanggunian,saidvacancyshallbefilledautomatically
bytheofficialnextinrankoftheorganizationconcerned.
Section46.TemporaryVacancyintheOfficeoftheLocalChiefExecutive.-
Whenthegovernor,cityormunicipalmayor,orpunongbarangayistemporarily
incapacitatedtoperformhisdutiesforphysicalorlegalreasonssuchas,butnotlimited
to,leaveofabsence,travelabroad,andsuspensionfromoffice,thevice-governor,cityor
municipalvice-mayor,orthehighestrankingsangguniangbarangaymembershall
automaticallyexercisethepowersandperformthedutiesandfunctionsofthelocalchief
executiveconcerned,exceptthepowertoappoint,suspend,ordismissemployeeswhich
canonlybeexercisediftheperiodoftemporaryincapacityexceedsthirty(30)working
days.
Saidtemporaryincapacityshallterminateuponsubmissiontotheappropriate
sanggunianofawrittendeclarationbythelocalchiefexecutiveconcernedthathehas
reportedbacktooffice.Incaseswherethetemporaryincapacityisduetolegalcauses,
thelocalchiefexecutiveconcernedshallalsosubmitnecessarydocumentsshowingthat
saidlegalcausesnolongerexist.
Whentheincumbentlocalchiefexecutiveistravelingwithinthecountrybutoutsidehis
35/51
Whentheincumbentlocalchiefexecutiveistravelingwithinthecountrybutoutsidehis
territorialjurisdictionforaperiodnotexceedingthree(3)consecutivedays,hemay
designateinwritingtheofficer-in-chargeofthesaidoffice.Suchauthorizationshall
specifythepowersandfunctionsthatthelocalofficialconcernedshallexerciseinthe
absenceofthelocalchiefexecutiveexceptthepowertoappoint,suspend,ordismiss
employees.
Intheevent,however,thatthelocalchiefexecutiveconcernedfailsorrefusestoissue
suchauthorization,thevice-governor,thecityormunicipalvice-mayor,orthehighest
rankingsangguniangbarangaymember,asthecasemaybe,shallhavetherightto
assumethepowers,duties,andfunctionsofthesaidofficeonthefourth(4th)dayof
absenceofthesaidlocalchiefexecutive,subjecttothelimitationsprovidedin
subsection(c)hereof.
Exceptasprovidedabove,thelocalchiefexecutiveshallinnocaseauthorizeanylocal
officialtoassumethepowers,duties,andfunctionsoftheoffice,otherthanthevice-
governor,thecityormunicipalvice-mayor,orthehighestrankingsangguniangbarangay
member,asthecasemaybe.
Section47.ApprovalofLeavesofAbsence.-
(a)Leavesofabsenceoflocalelectiveofficialsshallbeapprovedasfollows:
1.Leavesofabsenceofthegovernorandthemayorofahighlyurbanizedcityoran
independentcomponentcityshallbeapprovedbythePresidentorhisdulyauthorized
representative;
2.Leavesofabsenceofvice-governororacityormunicipalvice-mayorshallbeapproved
bythelocalchiefexecutiveconcerned:Provided,Thattheleavesofabsenceofthe
membersofthesangguniananditsemployeesshallbeapprovedbythevice-governor
orcityormunicipalvice-mayorconcerned;
3.Leavesofabsenceofthecomponentcityormunicipalmayorshallbeapprovedbythe
governor;and
4.Leavesofabsenceofapunongbarangayshallbeapprovedbythecityormunicipal
mayor:Provided,Thatleavesofabsenceofsangguniangbarangaymembersshallbe
approvedbythepunongbarangay.
Whenevertheapplicationforleaveofabsencehereinabovespecifiedisnot
acteduponwithinfive(5)workingdaysafterreceiptthereof,theapplicationfor
leaveofabsenceshallbedeemedapproved.
Labo,Jr.v.COMELECsupra#32
1.PowersofLocalElectiveOfficials
1.Munezv.Arino
Mayors no longer have the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less 36/51
issue
Mayors no longer have the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue
ordersofarrest.Section143LGC,conferringthispoweronthemayorhasbeenabrogated,
renderedfunctusofficiobythe1987Constitution.
1.GreaterBalangaDev.Corp.v.MunicipalityofBalanga,Bataan
TheSangguniangBayanhasthedutyintheexerciseofitspolicepowers(i.e.expropriation)
toregulateanybusinesssubjecttomunicipallicensefeesandprescribetheconditionsunder
whichamunicipallicensealreadyissuedmayberevoked.However,SangguniangBayandid
not establish or maintain any public market on the subject lot. The resolution merely
mentioned the plan to acquire the lot for expansion of the public market adjacent thereto.
Untilexpropriationproceedingsareinstitutedincourt,thelandownercannotbedeprivedof
itsrightovertheland.
1.LimandGarayblasv.CourtofAppeals
The power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the
corollarypowertosuspend,revokeorevenrefusetoissuethesame.However,thepowerto
suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the
conditionsofthesepermitsandlicenses.Thelawsspecificallyrefertotheviolationofthe
condition(s)onwhichthelicensesandpermitswereissued.Similarly,thepowertorefuseto
issuesuchlicensesandpermitsispremisedonnon-compliancewiththeprereuisitesforthe
issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due process in exercising
these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and
opportunitytobeheard.
Amayorhasthepowertoinspectandinvestigateprivatecommercialestablishmentsforany
violationoftheconditionsoftheirlicensesandpermits.However,amayorhasnopowerto
orderapoliceraidontheseestablishmentsintheguiseofinspectingorinvestigatingthese
commercialestablishments.
A mayor has no authority to close down a business establishment without due process of
lawthereisnoprovisioninLGCorintheRevisedCharteroftheCityofManilaexpresslyor
impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments
withoutnoticeandhearing,andevenifthereis,suchprovisionwouldbevoid.
AppointiveLocalOfficials,Secs.469-490,LGC
ARTICLE I. Secretary to the Sanggunian; ARTICLE II. The Treasurer; ARTICLE III. The
Assessor; ARTICLE IV. The Accountant; ARTICLE V. The Budget Officer; ARTICLE VI. The
Planning and Development Coordinator; ARTICLE VII. The Engineer; ARTICLE VIII. The
HealthOfficer;ARTICLEIX.TheCivilRegistrar;ARTICLEX.TheAdministrator;ARTICLEXI.
The Legal Officer; ARTICLE XII. The Agriculturist; ARTICLE XIII. The Social Welfare and
Development Officer; ARTICLE XIV. The Environment and Natural Resources Officer;
ARTICLE XV. The Architect; ARTICLE XVI. The Information Officer; ARTICLE XVII. The
CooperativesOfficer;ARTICLEXVIII.ThePopulationOffice;ARTICLEXIX.TheVeterinarian;
ARTICLEXX.TheGeneralServicesOfficer.
1.Ramav.CourtofAppeals
TheprohibitiononMidnightAppointmentunderArt.VII,Sec.15oftheConstitutionapplies
only to President. Ban does not extend to appointments made by local elective officials.
There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the
last days of his or her tenure. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
makingappointmentsduringthelastdaysofhisorhertenure.
LocalBoardsSecs.98-116,LGC
TITLE IV. LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS (98-101); TITLE VL OCAL HEALTH BOARDS (102-105)
TITLEVILOCALDEVELOPMENTCOUNCILS(106-115);TITLEVIILOCALPEACEANDORDER
COUNCIL
1.Oseav.Malaya
Power to appoint persons to career executive service positions was transferred from DECS
tothePresident.
SystemofAccountability
1.DisciplinaryActions,Secs.60-68,LGC
Section60.GroundsforDisciplinaryActions.-Anelectivelocalofficialmaybedisciplined,
suspended,orremovedfromofficeonanyofthefollowinggrounds:
DisloyaltytotheRepublicofthePhilippines;
CulpableviolationoftheConstitution;
Dishonesty,oppression,misconductinoffice,grossnegligence,orderelictionofduty;
Commissionofanyoffenseinvolvingmoralturpitudeoranoffensepunishablebyatleast
prisionmayor;
Abuseofauthority;
Unauthorizedabsenceforfifteen(15)consecutiveworkingdays,exceptinthecaseof
membersofthesangguniangpanlalawigan,sangguniangpanlungsod,sangguniang
bayan,andsangguniangbarangay;
Applicationfor,oracquisitionof,foreigncitizenshiporresidenceorthestatusofan
immigrantofanothercountry;and
SuchothergroundsasmaybeprovidedinthisCodeandotherlaws.
Anelectivelocalofficialmayberemovedfromofficeonthegroundsenumeratedaboveby
orderofthePROPERCOURT.
Section61.FormandFilingofAdministrativeComplaints.-Averifiedcomplaintagainstany
erringlocalelectiveofficialshallbepreparedasfollows:
Acomplaintagainstanyelectiveofficialofaprovince,ahighlyurbanizedcity,an
independentcomponentcityorcomponentcityshallbefiledbeforetheOfficeofthe
President;
Acomplaintagainstanyelectiveofficialofamunicipalityshallbefiledbeforethe
sangguniangpanlalawiganwhosedecisionmaybeappealedtotheOfficeofthe
President;and
Acomplaintagainstanyelectivebarangayofficialshallbefiledbeforethesangguniang
panlungsodorsangguniangbayanconcernedwhosedecisionshallbefinaland
executory.
Section62.Noticeofhearing.-
Withinseven(7)daysaftertheadministrativecomplaintisfiled,theOfficeofthe
Presidentorthesanggunianconcerned,asthecasemaybe,shallrequiretherespondent
tosubmithisverifiedanswerwithinfifteen(15)daysfromreceiptthereof,andcommence
theinvestigationofthecasewithinten(10)daysafterreceiptofsuchanswerofthe
respondent.
Whentherespondentisanelectiveofficialofaprovinceorhighlyurbanizedcity,such
hearingandinvestigationshallbeconductedintheplacewhereherendersorholds
office.Forallotherlocalelectiveofficials,thevenueshallbetheplacewherethe
sanggunianconcernedislocated.
However,noinvestigationshallbeheldwithinninety(90)daysimmediatelypriortoany
localelection,andnopreventivesuspensionshallbeimposedwithinthesaidperiod.If
preventivesuspensionhasbeenimposedpriortothe90-dayperiodimmediately
precedinglocalelection,itshallbedeemedautomaticallylifteduponthestartof
aforesaidperiod.
Section63.PreventiveSuspension.-
Preventivesuspensionmaybeimposed:
BythePresident,iftherespondentisanelectiveofficialofaprovince,ahighly
urbanizedoranindependentcomponentcity;
Bythegovernor,iftherespondentisanelectiveofficialofacomponentcityor
municipality;or
Bythemayor,iftherespondentisanelectiveofficialofthebarangay.
Preventivesuspensionmaybeimposedatanytimeaftertheissuesarejoined,
whentheevidenceofguiltisstrong,andgiventhegravityoftheoffense,thereis
greatprobabilitythatthecontinuanceinofficeoftherespondentcouldinfluence
thewitnessesorposeathreattothesafetyandintegrityoftherecordsand
otherevidence:Provided,That,anysinglepreventivesuspensionoflocalelective
officialsshallnotextendbeyondsixty(60)days:Provided,further,Thatinthe
eventthatseveraladministrativecasesarefiledagainstanelectiveofficial,he
cannotbepreventivelysuspendedformorethanninety(90)dayswithinasingle
yearonthesamegroundorgroundsexistingandknownatthetimeofthefirst
suspension.
Uponexpirationofthepreventivesuspension,thesuspendedelectiveofficial
shallbedeemedreinstatedinofficewithoutprejudicetothecontinuationofthe
proceedingsagainsthim,whichshallbeterminatedwithinonehundredtwenty
(120)daysfromthetimehewasformallynotifiedofthecaseagainsthim.
10/19/2017 (120)daysfromthetimehewasformallynotifiedofthecaseagainsthim.
Public Corp Notes
However,ifthedelayintheproceedingsofthecaseisduetohisfault,neglect,or
request,otherthantheappealdulyfiled,thedurationofsuchdelayshallnotbe
countedincomputingthetimeofterminationofthecase.
Anyabuseoftheexerciseofthepowerofpreventivesuspensionshallbe
penalizedasabuseofauthority.
Section64.SalaryofRespondentPendingSuspension.-Therespondentofficialpreventively
suspendedfromofficeshallreceivenosalaryorcompensationduringsuchsuspension;but
uponsubsequentexonerationandreinstatement,heshallbepaidfullsalaryorcompensation
includingsuchemolumentsaccruingduringsuchsuspension.
Section 65. Rights of Respondent. - The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity to
appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him, and to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documentaryprocessofsubpoenaorsubpoenaducestecum.
Section66.FormandNoticeofDecision.-
Theinvestigationofthecaseshallbeterminatedwithinninety(90)daysfromthe
startthereof.Withinthirty(30)daysaftertheendoftheinvestigation,theOfficeof
thePresidentorthesanggunianconcernedshallrenderadecisioninwritingstating
clearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthereasonsforsuchdecision.Copiesofsaid
decisionshallimmediatelybefurnishedtherespondentandallinterestedparties.
Thepenaltyofsuspensionshallnotexceedtheunexpiredtermoftherespondentor
aperiodofsix(6)monthsforeveryadministrativeoffense,norshallsaidpenaltybe
abartothecandidacyoftherespondentsosuspendedaslongashemeetsthe
qualificationsrequiredfortheoffice.
Thepenaltyofremovalfromofficeasaresultofanadministrativeinvestigationshall
beconsideredabartothecandidacyoftherespondentforanyelectiveposition.
Section 67. Administrative Appeals. - Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty
(30)daysfromreceiptthereof,beappealedtothefollowing:
Thesangguniangpanlalawigan,inthecaseofdecisionsofthesangguniangpanlungsod
ofcomponentcitiesandthesangguniangbayan;and
TheOfficeofthePresident,inthecaseofdecisionsofthesangguniangpanlalawigan
andthesangguniangpanlungsodofhighlyurbanizedcitiesandindependentcomponent
cities.
DecisionsoftheOfficeofthePresidentshallbefinalandexecutory.
Section 68. Execution Pending Appeal. - An appeal shall not prevent a decision from
becoming final or executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed
under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such
appeal.Intheeventtheappealresultsinanexoneration,heshallbepaidhissalaryandsuch
otheremolumentsduringthependencyoftheappeal.
1.Ganzonv.CourtofAppeals
OLD LGC was the governing law here. Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, x x x
becauseitisoutoftheordinarytohaveavacancyinlocalgovernment.Thesoleobjectiveof
a suspension, x x x is simply to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of
theinvestigationwithhisinfluenceandauthorityoverpossiblewitnessesortokeephimoff
therecordsandotherevidence.Itisameans,andnomore,toassistprosecutorsinfirming
upacase,ifany,againstanerringlocalofficial.UndertheLGC,itcannotexceedsixtydays,
itneednotbeexactly60dayslongifashorterperiodisotherwisesufficient,andwhichis
alsotosaythatitoughttobeliftedifprosecutorshaveachievedtheirpurposeinashorter
span.
NOTE: This was the ruling before where the president still has the power to remove local
officialsunderthepreviousLGC.However,underSec.60ofpresentLGC,thepresidentcan
nolongerremovelocalofficials.Suchpowerisalreadylodgedtotheregularcourts.
1.Reyesv.COMELEC
Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was
committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no
longerberemovedifheisthereafterreelectedforanotherterm.
1.Josonv.ExecutiveSecretaryTorres
Jurisdictionover administrative disciplinary actions against electivelocalofficialsislodged

in 2 authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority A.O. No. 23.
Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines,
whetheractingbyhimselforthroughtheExecutiveSecretary.TheSecretaryoftheInterior
and Local Government is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute
an Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive
Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may
designateaSpecialInvestigatingCommittee.
AcomplaintagainstanelectiveprovincialorcityofficialmustbefiledwiththeOfficeofthe
President. A complaint against an elective municipal official must be filed with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan while that of a barangay official must be filed before the
SangguniangPanlungsodorSangguniangBayan.
1.Pablicov.Villapando,G.R.No.147870,July31,2002
The power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with
thecourts.Hence,Article124(b),RuleXIX,oftheRulesandRegulationsImplementingLGC,
insofarasitvestspoweronthediscipliningauthoritytoremovefromofficeerringelective
localofficials,isvoidforbeingrepugnanttothelastparagraphofSec.60ofLGC1991.The
law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and
applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must
exerciseitwithutmostgoodfaith,forwhatisinvolvedisnotjustanordinarypublicofficial
butonechosenbythepeoplethroughtheexerciseoftheirconstitutionalrightofsuffrage.
Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to
remove,itshouldnotbepermittedtomanipulatethelawbyusurpingthepowertoremove.
1.Removal
Pablicovs.VillapandoSUPRA#54
1.Aguinaldovs.Santos
Theruleisthatapublicofficialcannotberemovedforadministrativemisconductcommitted
duringapriorterm,sincehisreelectiontoofficeoperatesasacondonationoftheofficers
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore. The
foregoingrule,however,findsnoapplicationtocriminalcasespendingpetitionerforactshe
may have committed during the failed coup. An administrative, not criminal, case for
disloyalty to the Republic only requires substantial evidence and not proof beyond
reasonabledoubt.
NOTE:
1.AGUINALDODOCTRINEDOESNOTAPPLYTOANAPPOINTEDOFFICIALWHO
COMMITTEDMISCONDUCTWHILEINHISAPPOINTIVEOFFICEANDWHOWASLATER
ONELECTEDINTOOFFICE(becauseitshouldbeREELECTION)
2.Aguinaldodoctrineappliesonlytoadministrativecaseformisconduct,sotheofficial
maystillbeheldcriminallyorcivillyliableforthesameact.
1.Moralesvs.CA
SCabandonedthecondonationdoctrinebecausenorealjustificationwasgivenforit.
NOTE: BEFORE: Administrative cases are condoned prior to election; PRESENT:

CondonationdoctrineabandonedbyMoralesv.CA,notcondonedanymore.
1.DisciplineoverLocalAppointiveOfficials,Secs.84-89,LGC
Section 84. Administrative Discipline. - Investigation and adjudication of administrative

complaintsagainstappointivelocalofficialsandemployeesaswellastheirsuspensionand
removalshallbeinaccordancewiththecivilservicelawandrulesandotherpertinentlaws.
The results of such administrative investigations shall be reported to the Civil Service
Commission.
Section85.PreventiveSuspensionofAppointiveLocalOfficialsandEmployees.-
(a) The local chief executives may preventively suspend for a period not exceeding sixty
(60)daysandsubordinateofficialoremployeeunderhisauthoritypendinginvestigationif
the charge against such official or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there is reason to believe that the
respondentisguiltyofthechargeswhichwouldwarranthisremovalfromtheservice.
(b) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended official or employee shall
be automatically reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
administrativeproceedingsagainsthimuntilitstermination.Ifthedelayintheproceedings
of the case is due to the fault, neglect or request of the respondent, the time of the delay
shallnotbecountedincomputingtheperiodofsuspensionhereinprovided.
Section 86. Administrative Investigation. - In any local government unit, administrative

investigation may be conducted by a person or a committee duly authorized by the local
chief executive. Said person or committee shall conduct hearings on the cases brought
against appointive local officials and employees and submit their findings and
recommendations to the local chief executive concerned within fifteen (15) days from the
conclusion of the hearings. The administrative cases herein mentioned shall be decided
withinninety(90)daysfromthetimetherespondentisformallynotifiedofthecharges.
Section87. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - Except as otherwise provided by law, the local chief
executivemayimposethepenaltyofremovalfromservice,demotioninrank,suspensionfor
not more than one (1) year without pay, fine in an amount not exceeding six (6) months
salary,orreprimandandotherwisedisciplinesubordinateofficialsandemployeesunderhis
jurisdiction.Ifthepenaltyimposedissuspensionwithoutpayfornotmorethanthirty(30)
days, his decision shall be final. If the penalty imposed is heavier than suspension of thirty
(30) days, the decision shall be appealable to the Civil Service Commission, which shall
decidetheappealwithinthirty(30)daysfromreceiptthereof.
Section 88. Execution Pending Appeal. - An appeal shall not prevent the execution of a
decision of removal or suspension of a respondent-appellant. In case the respondent-
appellant is exonerated, he shall be reinstated to his position with all the rights and
privilegesappurtenanttheretofromthetimehehadbeendeprivedthereof.
Section89.ProhibitedBusinessandPecuniaryInterest.-
(a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly,
to:
(1) Engage in any business transaction with the local government unit in which he is an
official or employee or over which he has the power of supervision, or with any of its
authorizedboards,officials,agents,orattorneys,wherebymoneyistobepaid,orproperty
oranyotherthingofvalueistobetransferred,directlyorindirectly,outoftheresourcesof
thelocalgovernmentunittosuchpersonorfirm;
(2)Holdsuchinterestsinanycockpitorothergameslicensedbyalocalgovernmentunit;
(3) Purchase any real estate or other property forfeited in favor of such local government
unitforunpaidtaxesorassessment,orbyvirtueofalegalprocessattheinstanceofthesaid
localgovernmentunit;
(4)Beasuretyforanypersoncontractingordoingbusinesswiththelocalgovernmentunit
forwhichasuretyisrequired;and
(5)Possessoruseanypublicpropertyofthelocalgovernmentunitforprivatepurposes.
(b) All other prohibitions governing the conduct of national public officers relating to
prohibited business and pecuniary interest so provided for under Republic Act Numbered
Sixty-seven thirteen (R.A. No. 6713) otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
StandardsforPublicOfficialsandEmployees"andotherlawsshallalsobeapplicabletolocal
governmentofficialsandemployees.
1.Mendezv.CivilServiceCommission
PursuanttoSection37(b)ofP.D.807(CSC),thecitymayor,asheadofthecitygovernment,
is empowered to enforce judgment with finality on lesser penalties like suspension from
work for one month and forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month against erring
employees.
1.MacalingcagandCarlosv.Chang
1.MacalingcagandCarlosv.Chang
TheOfficeoftheMunicipalTreasurerisundertheDepartmentofFinanceasprovidedforin
Sec. 3, P.D. No. 477. Hence, the Secretary of Finance is the proper disciplining authority to
issue the preventive suspension order. More specifically acting Secretary of Finance,
Macalincag,actedwithinhisjurisdictioninissuingtheaforesaidorder.
1.OtherMatters
HumanResourcesandDevelopmentSecs.76-97,LGC
Section 76. Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern. - Every local government unit
shalldesignandimplementitsownorganizationalstructureandstaffingpatterntakinginto
consideration its service requirements and financial capability, subject to the minimum
standardsandguidelinesprescribedbytheCivilServiceCommission.
Section77.Responsibility for Human Resources and Development. - The chief executive of

every local government unit shall be responsible for human resources and development in
hisunitandshalltakeallpersonnelactionsinaccordancewiththeConstitutionalprovisions
on civil service, pertinent laws, and rules and regulations thereon, including such policies,
guidelinesandstandardsastheCivilServiceCommissionmayestablish:Provided,Thatthe
localchiefexecutivemayemployemergencyorcasualemployeesorlaborerspaidonadaily
wage or piecework basis and hired through job orders for local projects authorized by the
sanggunian concerned, without need of approval or attestation by the Civil Service
Commission: Provided, further, That the period of employment of emergency or casual
laborersasprovidedinthisSectionshallnotexceedsix(6)months.
TheJointCommissiononLocalGovernmentPersonnelAdministrationorganizedpursuantto
PresidentialDecreeNumberedElevenHundredthirty-six(P.D.No.1136)isherebyabolished
anditspersonnel,records,equipmentandotherassetstransferredtotheappropriateoffice
intheCivilServiceCommission.
Section 78. Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations, and Other Related Issuances. - All
matters pertinent to human resources and development in local government units shall be
governed by the civil service law and such rules and regulations and other issuances
promulgatedpursuantthereto,unlessotherwisespecifiedinthisCode.
Section79.LimitationtoAppointments.-Nopersonshallbeappointedinthecareerservice
of the local government if he is related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinitytotheappointingorrecommendingauthority.
Section80.PublicNoticeofVacancy;PersonnelSelectionBoard.-
(a)Wheneveralocalexecutivedecidestofillavacantcareerposition,thereshallbeposted
notices of the vacancy in at least three (3) conspicuous public places in the local
governmentunitconcernedforaperiodofnotlessthanfifteen(15)days.
(b) There shall be established in every province, city or municipality a personnel selection
boardtoassistthelocalchiefexecutiveinthejudiciousandobjectiveselectionorpersonnel
for employment as well as for promotion, and in the formulation of such policies as would
contributetoemployeewelfare.
(c) The personnel selection board shall be headed by the local chief executive, and its
members shall be determined by resolution of the sanggunian concerned. A representative
members shall be determined by resolution of the sanggunian concerned. A representative
of the Civil Service Commission, if any, and the personnel officer of the local government
unitconcernedshallbeexofficiomembersoftheboard.
Section 81. Compensation of Local Officials and Employees. - The compensation of local
officialsandpersonnelshallbedeterminedbythesanggunianconcerned:Provided,Thatthe
increase in compensation of elective local officials shall take effect only after the terms of
office of those approving such increase shall have expired: Provided, further, That the
increase in compensation of the appointive officials and employees shall take effect as
providedintheordinanceauthorizingsuchincrease:Provided,however,Thatsaidincreases
shall not exceed the limitations on budgetary allocations for personal services provided
under Title Five, Book II of this Code: Provided, finally, That such compensation may be
baseduponthepertinentprovisionsofRepublicActNumberedSixty-sevenfifty-eight(R.A.
No6758),otherwiseknownasthe"CompensationandPositionClassificationActof1989".
The punong barangay, the sangguniang barangay member, the sangguniang kabataan
chairman, the barangay treasurer, and the barangay secretary shall be entitled to such
compensation, allowances, emoluments, and such other privileges as provided under Title
OneBookIIIofthisCode.
Elective local officials shall be entitled to the same leave privileges as those enjoyed by
appointivelocalofficials,includingthecumulationandcommutationthereof.
Section82.ResignationofElectiveLocalOfficials.-
(a) Resignations by elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon acceptance
bythefollowingauthorities:
(1)ThePresident,inthecaseofgovernors,vice-governors,andmayorsandvice-mayorsof
highlyurbanizedcitiesandindependentcomponentcities;
(2) The governor, in the case of municipal mayors, municipal vice-mayors, city mayors and
cityvice-mayorsofcomponentcities;
(3)Thesanggunianconcerned,inthecaseofsanggunianmembers;and
(4)Thecityormunicipalmayor,inthecaseofbarangayofficials.
(b)Copiesoftheresignationlettersofelectivelocalofficials,togetherwiththeactiontaken
by the aforesaid authorities, shall be furnished the Department of the Interior and Local
Government.
(c)Theresignationshallbedeemedacceptedifnotacteduponbytheauthorityconcerned
withinfifteen(15)daysfromreceiptthereof.
(d) Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be deemed accepted upon

presentation before an open session of the sanggunian concerned and duly entered in its
records: Provided, however, That this subsection does not apply to sanggunian members
whoaresubjecttorecallelectionsortocaseswhereexistinglawsprescribedthemannerof
actinguponsuchresignations.
Section83.GrievanceProcedure.-Ineverylocalgovernmentunit,thelocalchiefexecutive
shall establish a procedure to inquire into, act upon, resolve or settle complaints and
grievancespresentedbylocalgovernmentemployees.
Section 84. Administrative Discipline. - Investigation and adjudication of administrative

complaintsagainstappointivelocalofficialsandemployeesaswellastheirsuspensionand
removalshallbeinaccordancewiththecivilservicelawandrulesandotherpertinentlaws.
The results of such administrative investigations shall be reported to the Civil Service
Commission.
Section85.PreventiveSuspensionofAppointiveLocalOfficialsandEmployees.-
(a) The local chief executives may preventively suspend for a period not exceeding sixty
(60)daysandsubordinateofficialoremployeeunderhisauthoritypendinginvestigationif
the charge against such official or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there is reason to believe that the
respondentisguiltyofthechargeswhichwouldwarranthisremovalfromtheservice.
(b) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended official or employee shall
be automatically reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
administrativeproceedingsagainsthimuntilitstermination.Ifthedelayintheproceedings
of the case is due to the fault, neglect or request of the respondent, the time of the delay
shallnotbecountedincomputingtheperiodofsuspensionhereinprovided.
Section 86. Administrative Investigation. - In any local government unit, administrative

investigation may be conducted by a person or a committee duly authorized by the local
chief executive. Said person or committee shall conduct hearings on the cases brought
recommendations to the local chief executive concerned within fifteen (15) days from the
conclusion of the hearings. The administrative cases herein mentioned shall be decided
withinninety(90)daysfromthetimetherespondentisformallynotifiedofthecharges.
Section87. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - Except as otherwise provided by law, the local chief
executivemayimposethepenaltyofremovalfromservice,demotioninrank,suspensionfor
not more than one (1) year without pay, fine in an amount not exceeding six (6) months
salary,orreprimandandotherwisedisciplinesubordinateofficialsandemployeesunderhis
jurisdiction.Ifthepenaltyimposedissuspensionwithoutpayfornotmorethanthirty(30)
days, his decision shall be final. If the penalty imposed is heavier than suspension of thirty
(30) days, the decision shall be appealable to the Civil Service Commission, which shall
decidetheappealwithinthirty(30)daysfromreceiptthereof.
Section 88. Execution Pending Appeal. - An appeal shall not prevent the execution of a
decision of removal or suspension of a respondent-appellant. In case the respondent-
appellant is exonerated, he shall be reinstated to his position with all the rights and
privilegesappurtenanttheretofromthetimehehadbeendeprivedthereof.
Section89.ProhibitedBusinessandPecuniaryInterest.-
(a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly,
to:
(1) Engage in any business transaction with the local government unit in which he is an
official or employee or over which he has the power of supervision, or with any of its
authorizedboards,officials,agents,orattorneys,wherebymoneyistobepaid,orproperty
oranyotherthingofvalueistobetransferred,directlyorindirectly,outoftheresourcesof
(2)Holdsuchinterestsinanycockpitorothergameslicensedbyalocalgovernmentunit;
(3) Purchase any real estate or other property forfeited in favor of such local government
unitforunpaidtaxesorassessment,orbyvirtueofalegalprocessattheinstanceofthesaid
localgovernmentunit;
(4)Beasuretyforanypersoncontractingordoingbusinesswiththelocalgovernmentunit
forwhichasuretyisrequired;and
(5)Possessoruseanypublicpropertyofthelocalgovernmentunitforprivatepurposes.
(b) All other prohibitions governing the conduct of national public officers relating to
prohibited business and pecuniary interest so provided for under Republic Act Numbered
Sixty-seven thirteen (R.A. No. 6713) otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
StandardsforPublicOfficialsandEmployees"andotherlawsshallalsobeapplicabletolocal
governmentofficialsandemployees.
Section 91. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. - (a) Officials and employees of local
government units shall file sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, lists of
relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service,
financialandbusinessinterests,andpersonneldatasheetsasrequiredbylaw.
Section 92. Oath of Office. - (a) All elective and appointive local officials and employees
shall, upon assumption to office, subscribe to an oath or affirmation of office in the
prescribed form. The oath or affirmation of office shall be filed with the office of the local
chief executive concerned. A copy of the oath or affirmation of office of all elective and
appointivelocalofficialsandemployeesshallbepreservedintheindividualpersonalrecords
file under the custody of the personnel office, division, or section of the local government
unitconcerned.
Section 93. Partisan Political Activity. - No local official or employee in the career civil
serviceshallengagedirectlyorindirectlyinanypartisanpoliticalactivityortakepartinany
election, initiative, referendum, plebiscite, or recall, except to vote, nor shall he use his
official authority or influence to cause the performance of any political activity by any
personorbody.Hemay,however,expresshisviewsoncurrentissues,ormentionthenames
of certain candidates for public office whom he supports. Elective local officials may take
part in partisan political and electoral activities, but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit
contributionsfromtheirsubordinatesorsubjectthesesubordinatestoanyoftheprohibited
actsundertheOmnibusElectionCode.
Section94.AppointmentofElectiveandAppointiveLocalOfficials;CandidatesWhoLostin
anElection.-(a)Noelectiveorappointivelocalofficialshallbeeligibleforappointmentor
designationinanycapacitytoanypublicofficeorpositionduringhistenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no elective or
appointivelocalofficialshallholdanyotherofficeoremploymentinthegovernmentorany
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporationsortheirsubsidiaries.
Section95.AdditionalorDoubleCompensation.-Noelectiveorappointivelocalofficialor
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically
authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of Congress, any present, emoluments,
authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of Congress, any present, emoluments,
office, or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions or gratuities shall not be
consideredasadditional,double,orindirectcompensation.
Section96.PermissiontoLeaveStation.-
(a)Provincial,city,municipal,andbarangayappointiveofficialsgoingonofficialtravelshall
apply and secure written permission from their respective local chief executives before
departure.Theapplicationshallspecifythereasonsforsuchtravel,andthepermissionshall
be given or withheld based on considerations of public interest, financial capability of the
localgovernmentunitconcernedandurgencyofthetravel.
Shouldthelocalchiefexecutiveconcernedfalltoactuponsuchapplicationwithinfour(4)
workingdaysfromreceiptthereof,itshallbedeemedapproved.
(b) Mayors of component cities and municipalities shall secure the permission of the
governorconcernedforanytraveloutsidetheprovince.
(c) Local government officials traveling abroad shall notify their respective sanggunian:
Provided, That when the period of travel extends to more than three (3) months, during
periods of emergency or crisis or when the travel involves the use of public funds,
permissionfromtheOfficeofthePresidentshallbesecured.
(d) Field officers of national agencies or offices assigned in provinces, cities, and
municipalitiesshallnotleavetheirofficialstationswithoutgivingpriorwrittennoticetothe
localchiefexecutiveconcerned.Suchnoticeshallstatethedurationoftravelandthename
oftheofficerwhomheshalldesignatetoactforandinhisbehalfduringhisabsence.
Section97.AnnualReport.-OnorbeforeMarch31ofeachyear,everylocalchiefexecutive
shallsubmitanannualreporttothesanggunianconcernedonthesocio-economic,political
and peace and order conditions, and other matters concerning the local government unit,
which shall cover the immediately preceding calendar year. A copy of the report shall be
forwarded to the Department of the Interior and Local Government. Component cities and
municipalitiesshalllikewiseprovidethesangguniangpanlalawigancopiesoftheirrespective
annualreports.
PracticeofProfession,Sec.90,LGC
Section90.PracticeofProfession.-
Allgovernors,cityandmunicipalmayorsareprohibitedfrompracticingtheir
professionorengaginginanyoccupationotherthantheexerciseoftheir
functionsaslocalchiefexecutives.
Sanggunianmembersmaypracticetheirprofessions,engageinanyoccupation,
orteachinschoolsexceptduringsessionhours:Provided,thatsanggunian
memberswhoarealsomembersoftheBarshallnot:
1.Appearascounselbeforeanycourtinanycivilcasewhereinalocal
governmentunitoranyoffice,agency,orinstrumentalityofthegovernment
istheadverseparty;
2.Appearascounselinanycriminalcasewhereinanofficeroremployeeofthe
nationalorlocalgovernmentisaccusedofanoffensecommittedinrelation
nationalorlocalgovernmentisaccusedofanoffensecommittedinrelation
tohisoffice.
3.Collectanyfeefortheirappearanceinadministrativeproceedingsinvolving
thelocalgovernmentunitofwhichheisanofficial;and
4.Usepropertyandpersonnelofthegovernmentexceptwhenthesanggunian
memberconcernedisdefendingtheinterestofthegovernment.
Doctorsofmedicinemaypracticetheirprofessionevenduringofficialhoursof
workonlyonoccasionsofemergency:Provided,Thattheofficialsconcerneddo
notderivemonetarycompensationtherefrom.
1.Javellanav.DILGandSantos,212SCRA475
Byservingascounselforthecomplainingemployeesandassistingthemtoprosecutetheir
claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular
prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if
suchpracticewouldrepresentinterestsadversetothegovernment.Thecomplaintforillegal
dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a
complaintagainsttheCityGovernmentofBagoCity,theirrealemployer,ofwhichpetitioner
Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would
actuallybeajudgmentagainsttheCityGovernment.
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10/19/2017 Public Corp Notes

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