2004 Feb 23 G.R. No.
146006
Testate Estate of the Late Adriana Maloto, Aldina MALOTO CASIANO, et al.,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Panfilo MALOTO and Felino MALOTO,
G.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988
FACTS:
Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs the parties (Aldina, Constantcio, Panfilo and
Felino) in this case who are her niece and nephews. Believing that the deceased did
not leave behind a last will and testament, the four (4) heirs commenced an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of their aunts estate which was instituted in the then CFI.
However, while the case was still in progress, the heirs executed an agreement of
extrajudicial settlement of Adrianas estate which provides for the division of the estate
into four equal parts among themselves. When presented before the court, said
agreement was approved. However, three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former
associate of Adrianas counsel, discovered a document entitled KATAPUSAN NGA
PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento) and purporting to be the last will and testament of
Adriana. Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and
Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate that
what they have received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement. The will
likewise give devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners.
Thus, Aldino and Constancio joined by other devisees and legatees filed a motion for
reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the
will. Upon denial of the trial court, the petitioners came before the Supreme Court by
way or petition for certiorari and mandamus which were dismissed because they were
not the proper remedies. The appellate court found out that the will was burned by the
househelper of Adriana and was at the possession of the lawyer in because Adriana
was seeking the services of the lawyer in order to have a new will draw up.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will of Adriana Maloto had been efficiently revoked.
RULING: Article 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases: 1. By
implication of law; or 2. By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in
case of wills; or 3. By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the
intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some other
person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established,
and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution,
and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established
according to the Rules of Court. In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to
revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not
suffice. Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective
revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied
by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried
out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.
There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the
document or papers burned by Adrianas maid was not satisfactorily established to be
a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not
proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana and was not done in
her presence.
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and
Corporate Secretary, respectively, of Philippines International Life Insurance
Company, and FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE
PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY
SHERIFFS ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be
Special Administratrix, and other persons/ public officers acting for and in their
behalf, respondents.
CORONA, J.:
FACTS
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortaez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortaez),
three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortaez) and five illegitimate
children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and
her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortaez).
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortaez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch (now Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortaez, docketed as SP Proc. Q-30884
(which petition to date remains pending at Branch 85 thereof).
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to
the petition for letters of administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that
the intestate court appoint a special administrator.
On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Pao, then presiding judge of Branch 85,
appointed Rafael and Jose Ortaez joint special administrators of their fathers estate.
As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez
submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which included, among other
properties, 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company
(hereafter Philinterlife), representing 50.725% of the companys outstanding capital
stock.
On April 15, 1989, the decedents wife, Juliana S. Ortaez, claiming that she owned
1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares
with right to repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group
(FLAG), represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortaez
failed to repurchase the shares of stock within the stipulated period, thus ownership
thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name.
On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortaez, acting in his personal
capacity and claiming that he owned the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares of stocks
as his inheritance share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in
favor of herein petitioner FLAG, represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C.
Lee. After one year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the ownership of the
Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose Ortaez failed to repurchase the same.
On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina OrtaezEnderes and her
siblings (hereafter referred to as private respondents Enderes et al.) filed a motion for
appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. This move was
opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.
On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of private respondents
Enderes et al. and appointed private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the
Philinterlife shares of stock.
On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to
declare void ab initio the memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982. On March
22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio
the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which move was again opposed by
Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.
On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the approval of the
deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock and (2) the release of Ma. Divina
Ortaez-Enderes as special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock on the
ground that there were no longer any shares of stock for her to administer.
On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion of Special
Administrator Jose Ortaez for the approval of the deeds of sale.
Aggrieved by the orders of the intestate court, Jose Ortaez filed, on December 22,
1997, a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the sale made by
Jose Ortaez and his mother Juliana Ortaez to FLAG of the shares of stock they
invalidly appropriated for themselves, without approval of the intestate court, was void.
Special Administrator Jose Ortaez filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals decision but it was denied. He elevated the case to the Supreme Court via
petition for review under Rule 45 which the Supreme Court dismissed on October 5,
1998, on a technicality. Thereafter, various cases were filed by Jose Lee as president
of Philinterlife and Juliana Ortaez and her sons against private respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes in the SEC and civil courts. Somehow, all these cases were
connected to the core dispute on the legality of the sale of decedent Dr. Ortaezs
Philinterlife shares of stock to petitioner FLAG, represented by its president, herein
petitioner Jose Lee who later became the president of Philinterlife after the
controversial sale.
On May 2, 2000, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes and her siblings
filed a motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate court dated August 11 and
August 29, 1997 because the orders of the intestate court nullifying the sale (upheld by
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court) had long became final. Respondent-
Special Administratrix Enderes served a copy of the motion to petitioners Jose Lee and
Alma Aggabao as president and secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife, but petitioners
ignored the same.
On July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion for execution. Petitioners Lee
and Aggabao subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736. On July 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition outright.
On October 30, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion, ruling that there was no
prohibition for the intestate court to execute its orders inasmuch as the appellate court
did not issue any TRO or writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 3, 2000, petitioners Lee and Aggabao filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62461, questioning this time the
October 30, 2000 order of the intestate court directing the branch clerk of court to issue
the stock certificates. They also questioned in the Court of Appeals the order of the
intestate court nullifying the sale made in their favor by Juliana Ortaez and Jose
Ortaez. On November 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied their petition and upheld
the power of the intestate court to execute its order. Petitioners Lee and Aggabao then
filed motion for reconsideration which at present is still pending resolution by the Court
of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the decedents heir could dispose off the decedents estate without
approval of the intestate court.
HELD
NO. It is clear that Juliana Ortaez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all
surnamed Ortaez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially
partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that there
were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by
the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortaez
and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortaez) was invalid, the subsequent sale
thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise
void.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration
under Art. In the present case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific
properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of
petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the
estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other
claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate, without court
approval. It is well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any
disposition of the decedents estate. In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano, [the Court]
laid down the rule that the sale of the property of the estate by an administrator without
the order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.
More emphatic is the declaration made in Estate of Olave vs. Reyes where [the Court]
stated that when the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate
or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it
without prior approval of the probate court.
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an
administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and
(2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate
court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an
unauthorized sale of estate property; otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or
fraudulent disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other words,
enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate courts power to annul
unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property
before final adjudication.
Moreover, in this case, the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale was affirmed
by the appellate courts (the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342 dated June 23,
1998 and subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135177 dated October 9,
1998). Considering the finality of the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale, as
affirmed by the appellate courts, it was correct for private respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes to thereafter move for a writ of execution and for the intestate
court to grant it.
 A.M. No. 190 October 18, 1977
RE: CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MARIO V.
CHANLIONGCO, FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO, MARIO B. CHANLIONGCO II, MA.
ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA and MARIO C. CHANLIONGCO, JR., claimants.
This matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits filed by the heirs of the late ATTY.
MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO an attorney in this Court, under the provisions of R.A. No.
1616, as amended by R.A. No. 4986, which was approved by this Court in its resolution
from the records that at the time of his death. Atty. Chanliongco was more than 63
years of age, with more than 38 years of service in the government.
FACTS:
The above named flied the appellants for benefits with the accruing and with the
Government Service System. Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an
only Intimate Mario it appears that there are other deceased to namely, Mrs. Angelina
C., Jr., both born out of wedlock to Angelina R Crespo, and duly recognized by the
deceased. Except Mario, Jr., who is only 17 years of age, all the claimants are of legal
age. According to law, the benefits accruing to the deceased consist of: (1) retirement
benefits; (2) money value of terminal leave; (3) life insurance and (4) refund of
retirement premium. The record also shows that the late Atty. Chanliongco died ab
intestato and that he filed or over to state in his application for membership with the
GSIS the beneficiary or benefits of his retirement benefits, should he die before
retirement. Hence, the retirement benefits shall accrue to his estate and will be
distributed among his Legal heirs in with the benefits on intestates. It further appears
that at the time of his death the late Atty. Chanliongco had an outstanding account with
the Supreme Court Savings & Loans Association. Deduction plus another sum
representing withhold tax due from him, and the net sum, available for distribute to the
claimant.
ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be distributed when the
estate is not sufficient to cover the legitime of all compulsory heirs?
HELD:
In this case, to divide the estate between the surviving spouse and the legitimate child
that deprive the illegitimate children of their legitimes. So, the decendent's estate is
distributed in the proportion of 1/2 for the legitimate child, 1/4 for the widow and 1/8
each for the two illegitimate children.
Also not of possible application to this case is the rule that the legal rights of an
acknowledged natural child is 1/2 of the legitime of the legitimate child of that of the
spurious child is 2/5 of that of the intimate child or 4/5 of that of that of the acknowledged
natural child. The rule be applied because the estate is not sufficient to cover the
legitime of all compulsory heirs. That is one of the flaws of the law of succession. A
situation as in the instant case may arise where the illegitimate children get less than
their legitime.
BAGUNU VS PIEDAD
G.R. NO. 140975. DECEMBER 8, 2000
FACTS: Augusto H. Piedad died intestate without any direct descendants or
ascendants. The trial court awarded the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad.
Pastora Piedad is the maternal aunt of Augusto. Petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu
moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of the
Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad. She contends that she has
a right to succession given that she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H.
Piedad. She contends that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities,
including an incomplete publication of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to
the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and
withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The RTC denied the motion, prompting
petitioner to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal
of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involved pure
questions of law. Finding merit in that argument, the CA dismissed the appeal, citing
Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would
require all appeals involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof
and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court. Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested
the resolution of the appellate court in the instant petition for review on certiorari. The
Supreme Court set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude there was none - and
took on the basic substantive issue.
ISSUE: Can petitioner Ofelia Bagunu, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit
alongside respondent Pastora Piedad, a collateral relative of the third civil degree?
HELD: NO.The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree
to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that
the right of representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. Right of
representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending line. In the
collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or
aunts. The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the
fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth
in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants,
secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and
descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and
sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only
in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or
aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an
absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the
decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
"Article 966. x x x "In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and
then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a
person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the
brother of his father, four from his first cousin and so forth." Respondent Pastora
Piedad, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad
excludes petitioner Ofelia Baguna, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab
intestato to the estate of the decedent. The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010
of the Civil Code "Article 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children
of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of relationship by the whole blood."
"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree
of relationship in the collateral line." invoked by petitioner do not at all support her
cause. The law means only that among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the
line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of
relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a
paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin
of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the
cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn,
would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative. The Supreme Court denied
the instant petition.
SALAO VS SALAO
L-26699
Facts: The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon,
Rizal begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel
Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child.
Valentin Salao.
After Valentinas death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.
The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio
her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT
No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names
The property in question is the forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran,
Lubao, Pampanga, wherein Benita Salao-Marcelo daughter of Valentin Salao claimed
1/3 interest on the said fishpond.
The defendant Juan Y. Salao Jr. inherited from his father Juan Y. Salao, Sr. of the
fishpond and the other half from the donation of his auntie Ambrosia Salao.
It was alleged in the said case that Juan Y. Salao, Sr and Ambrosia Salao had engaged
in the fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital and that Valentin Salao and
Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the funds used were the
earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those
earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no
documentary evidence to support that theory.
The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated January
26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two
fishponds and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, in which he refused to
give Benita and Victorinas children their one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly
amounted to P200,000. However, there was no mention on the deeds as to the share
of Valentin and Alejandra.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that
Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners
thereof his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in
1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of Ambrosias one-half share.
Benita Salao and her nephews and niece asked for the annulment of the donation to
Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as
Valentin Salaos supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered
in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
Issue :
Whether or not the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Y.
Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
Held:
1. There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on
the part of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust.
There was no constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the
names of Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case
where to satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran
fishpond being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin
Salao.
Ratio:
A Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred
to therein. (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles were
regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance,
proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and convincing.
The plaintiffs utterly failed to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. It
cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite
declarations.
Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence; certainty of proof. Where
a trust is to be established by oral proof, the testimony supporting it must be sufficiently
strong to prove the right of the alleged beneficiary with as much certainty as if a
document proving the trust were shown. A trust cannot be established, contrary to the
recitals of a Torrens title, upon vague and inconclusive proof.
Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony. In order to establish
a trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if
the act giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. Such
a trust cannot be established upon testimony consisting in large part of insecure
surmises based on ancient hearsay. (Syllabus, Santa Juana vs. Del Rosario 50 Phil.
110).
The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which, as already
noted, allows an implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. Trustworthy oral evidence
is required to prove an implied trust because, oral evidence can be easily fabricated.
On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive of the ownership of the land
referred to therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists. that Torrens titles
were regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for
reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and
convincing.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is, to quiet title to land. Once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
(Salao v. Salao, G.R. No. L-26699, [March 16, 1976], 162 PHIL 89-120)
The question of ownership over the Calunuran fishpond, with an area of 47 hectares,
located in that part of Lubao which later became a part of Bataan, and one of the several
properties left by the parties predecessors, has given rise to the present controversy.
Plaintiffs' version is that Juan Y. Salao, Jr., his sister Alejandra and Ambrosia and their
nephew Valentin Salao were engaged by joint venture in the fishpond business; that
the funds used by them were earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from their
father, and that these earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond.
On the other hand, the defendants contend that the fishpond in question consisted of
lands purchased by Juan Y. Salao, Sr., and Ambrosia Salao who had secured a
Torrens Title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911 and who exercised dominical rights
over it to the exclusion of their nephew Valentin Salao.
The property was sold a retro and later redeemed. Since then, several of the parties
have died and their estates partitioned and thereafter, interest over the fishpond has
been the bone of contention whether or not the same was held in trust for Valentin
Salao by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao and whether the property can still be
subject to an action for reconveyance.
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in the CFI of Bataan against defendants, asking
for the annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao of a share in the fishpond and for
reconveyance to them of the property as Valentin Salao's supposed 1/3 share in the
145 hectares of the fishpond registered in the name of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia
Salao.
Juan S. Salao, Jr., in his answer with counterclaim, pleaded as a defense the
indefeasibility of the Torrens title secured by his father and aunt. He also invoked the
Statute of Frauds, prescription and laches. Upon his death, he was substituted by his
widow, children and the administrator of his estate, the now defendants.
The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Salao, Sr.,
Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran lands were acquired; that a
co-ownership over the real properties of Valentina Ignacio existed among her heirs after
her death in 1914; that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and that
it subsisted up to 1918, when her estate was partitioned among her 3 children and
grandson, Valentin Salao. If further held that the donation was validly executed.
Both parties appealed, the plaintiffs, because their action for reconveyance was
dismissed, and the defendants, because their counterclaim for damages was likewise
dismissed. The Court of Appeals elevated the case to the Supreme Court as the
amount involved exceeded P200,000.00.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, ruling that
there was no resulting trust over the questioned property as the plaintiffs failed to
measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence and even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintiffs'
action for reconveyance is barred by prescription or laches, as a result of which, they
have no right and personality to question the validity of the donation made to Juan S.
Salao, Jr. The Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of defendants' claim for damages
since the circumstances of the case do not show that plaintiffs' action was manisfestly
frivolous or primarily intended to harass the defendants.
Judgment affirmed.
[ G.R. No. L-17759, December 17, 1962 ]
ISABEL V. SAGUINSIN, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. DIONISIO
LINDAYAG, ET AL., OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES.
DIZON, J.:
On November 10, 1959 Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo, Zambales. On
May 27, 1960 her sister, Isabel V. Saguinsin, filed with the Court of First Instance of
said province a verified petition for the Issuance in her favor of letters of administration
over the estate of said deceased, alleging, among other things, that the latter left real
and personal properties situated in the provinces of Zambales and Bulacan worth
approximately P100,000; that the names, ages and residence of her surviving heirs
were: (1) Dionisio Lindayag, 60 years of age, surviving husband, residing at Olongapo,
Zambales, (2) Isabel V. Saguinsin, 54 years Of age, sister of the deceased, residing at
Hagonoy, Bulacan, (3) Aurora V. Sacdalan, 46 years of age, sister of the deceased,
and (4) Ines V. Calayag 70 years of age, sister of the deceased, both residing at
Paombong, Bulacan; and that, as far as petitioner knew, the decedent left no debts at
the time of her death.
On June 21, 1960 Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, in his behalf and in
representation of the minors Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed
Lindayag, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of petitioner's lack of
interest in the estate, she being neither heir nor a creditor thereof. The motion alleged
that the late Maria V. Lindayag was survived by her husband the movant and legally
adopted minor Children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed
Lindayag, the decendent having left no legitimate, natural or illegitimate child. A
certified true copy of the decision of the Justice of the Peace of Olongapo, Zambales,
dated July 6, 1953 decreeing the adoption of said minors by the decendent and her
husband was attached to the motion.
In opposing the motion to dismiss petitioner argued that only the facts alleged in the
petition should be considered in determining its sufficiency.
On July 28, 1960, after due hearing in the motion aforesaid, the Court issued the
following order of dismissal:
"It appearing that the herein petitioner is only a sister of the deceased Maria V.
Lindayag; that the deceased ia survived by her husband and her three (3) adopted
children named: Jesus, Concepcion and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag who were
adopted by the deceased on July 6, 1953; that the herein petitioner is obviously not an
heir and has no interest in the estate; and that the surviving heirs oppose the instant
petition on the ground that they want to settle the estate extra-judicially among them to
avoid unnesessary expenses in prosecuting this case, the Court finds the oppositors'
opposition to be well taken".
"WHEREFORE, let this case be dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs."
Petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the above order having been denied, she
took the present appeal.
The question to be resolved in this appeal is whether petitioner is "an interested person"
in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag.
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an "interested person". An interested party has been
defined in this connection as one who would be benefited; by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of
Julio Magbanwa 40 Off. Gaz. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil
actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may
be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
(Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil., 710); Espinosa vs. Barrios, 70 Phil. 311).
Petitioner's interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was disputed,
through a motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on the ground that
said deceased was survived by him and by three legally adopted children thus
excluding petitioner as an heir. In the course of the hearing held in connection with said
motion, evidence was introduced in support thereof which according to the lower court,
established that said deceased was survived not only by her husband but three legally
adopted children named Jesus, Conception, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag.
Upon these facts which petitioner does not dispute it is manifest that she is not an heir
of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate.
Petitioner's view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint or a petition is filed, only
the facts alleged in the complaint or petition may be taken into account is not entirely
correct. To the contrary, the rule is that at said hearing said motion may be proved or
disproved in accordance with the rules of evidence, and it has been held that, for that
purpose, the hearing should be conducted as an ordinary hearing; and the parties
should be allowed to present evidence, except when the motion is based on the failure
of the complaint or of the petition to state a cause of action (Asejo vs. Leonoso, 78 Phil.
467; 44 Off. Gaz. No. 10, p. 3807). In the present case, the motion to dismiss the
petition was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings
which, as already stated heretofore, was fully substantiated by the evidence presented
during the hearing.
In view of all the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
BANAWA vs. MIRANO
DIVISION G.R. No. L-24750 May 16, 1980 FERNANDEZ, J.
FACTS
Spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana took care of Maria Mirano Julianas niece, since
Maria is 9 years old and treated her the same way as they treated the co-appellant
Gliceria Abrenica, their legally adopted child. In 1921, the spouses bought a parcel of
land and registered the certain parcels of land in the name of Maria, because they
wanted something for Maria after their death. But in 1949, Maria died. At the time of
her death she left only as her nearest relatives the herein plaintiffs-appellees, Primitiva
(surviving sister) and Gregoria, Juana and Marciano Mirano (children of the deceaseds
brother). The Miranos filed a case in court against the Banawas with regards to the
possession of the said Iba and Carsuche properties as legal heirs of Maria. The lower
court ruled in favor of the Miranos. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the lower
court. Hence, this petition. The defendant spouses died during the pendency of the
case at the CA and were substituted by their legally adopted child Gliceria Abrenica
and her husband.
ISSUE
1. WON Maria is the owner of the Iba property
2. WON the spouses are entitled to the Carsuche propery
HELD
On Issue No. 1 Yes. The spouses Doroteo and Juliana donated the money to Maria
which the latter used in the purchase of the lands in question. The spouses intention
to make Maria the owner of the said parcels of land was clearly shown by their conduct
at the time of the execution of the deeds of sale which influenced the vendors to believe
that Maria was indeed the vendee in their agreement. Article 632 of the old CC
provides: "Donations of personal property may be made verbally or in writing. Verbal
donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the gift. In the absence of this requisite
the donation shall produce no effect, unless made in writing and accepted in the same
form." The the execution of the deed of sale of the Iba property in favor of Maria was
the constructive transfer of possession of the incorporeal rights of the spouses over
said property. On Issue No. 2 Yes. The Court of Appeals found that there was a sale
embodied in a public document of the Carsuche property in 1935 in favor of Maria.
However, in 1940 it was sold to the Banawas. The sale was duly registered. They then
immediately entered into the possession of the land as owners. The spouses acquired
the Carsuche property by acquisitive prescription (Section 40 of the CC) the Carsuche
since the action was filed 17 years later and not within 10 years from the time the cause
of action accrued in 1940. Hence, the possession of the Banawas over the Carsuche
property ripened into full ownership in 1950 when the possession of the petitioner-
spouses which was actual, open, public and continuous, under a claims of title
exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claim commenced. WHEREFORE,
the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed as to the Iba property (Lot No.
1) but reversed as to the Carsuche property (Lot No. 2) which was acquired by the
spouses Doroteo and Juliana who could validly donate the said property to Casiano
Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica The petitioners are ordered to pay the private
respondents the total amount of P6,975 as actual damages and the amount of P1,000
as attorney's fees, without pronouncement as to costs.

(DIAZ V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
G.R. NO. L-66574, [JUNE 17, 1987], 234 PHIL 636-644)
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First
Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of
the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things, that the
corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed
as special administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of
the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon
Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during
infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and
the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his
parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero
died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo
Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his
six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor
children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9, 1976 2
declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero. LLphil
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
"a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate
Estate of Pablo Santero;
"b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate
Estate of Pascual Santero;
"c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an
Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
"e) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was
allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by
Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and
Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti-Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part
or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation
of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed
by Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin
"from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero
and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated
November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court
in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate
Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive
portion of which reads
"WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and law
applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining the Orders
of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding
for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
"Costs against the oppositors-appellees."
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was
denied by the same respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the
present petition for Review with the following: LexLib
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of petitioners
grandchildren Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978) and/or natural/"illegitimate
children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a collateral relative (Art. 1003);
II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural grandchildren
Santero to represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate estate
of their grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art. 982);
III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the grandmother Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero,
her son and father of the petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece
and therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes the
natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who are her direct descendants and/or grand
children;
V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the
applicable provisions of law on intestate succession; and
VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and December 9, 1976
which are provisional and interlocutory as final and executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows who are the legal heirs
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her
grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right
of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their
pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They
contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old
Civil Code) and recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970) to descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied
illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased parents and inherit from their
deceased grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art.
990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children the right to
represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their grandmother
(Simona Pamuti)" 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of
Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which
reads as follows: Cdpr
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a).
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand,
the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child;
the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it
is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession
of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil
Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith
the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full
support from other civilists, to wit:
"In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within
the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an
illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this
principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but
with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the
hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art, 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a
legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent,
the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to
make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right
of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain
said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord
with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform
of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First
Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record
shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the
legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin
and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners
herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. cdll
Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling
that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are
final and executory. Such contention is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in
his order dated December 1, 1976 held that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not
entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the
declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976, which
declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said
Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a
perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long became final and executory are
already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The
only power retained by the lower court, after a judgment has become final and
executory is to order its execution. The respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling
that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin
as intestate heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total
reversal of an Order which has become final and executory, hence null and void."
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.