People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76.

February 3, 2000]
08OCT

FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress
who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory
rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge
the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense.
ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons
validly confined under law by reason of the mandate of the sovereign will.
RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of laws., this simply means that all persons similarly situated
shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The
duties imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The Court
cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to
the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
Ormoc Sugar Central vs. Ormoc City (G.R. No. L-23794)

Facts:
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing on any and
all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in
Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to
USA and other foreign countries. Payments for said tax were made, under
protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before
the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well
as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of
uniformity of taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the
constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the
equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed?

Held:
Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated
and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2)
these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only
to present conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those
present; and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same
class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not
meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time the ordinance was
enacted, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Was the only sugar central in the City of
Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it
cannot be subject to a tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc
City Sugar Company, Inc. As the entity to be levied upon.

Wherefore, the decision appealed was reversed.

Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel

G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008

Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement

as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift
one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement.
Justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense
applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos.

FACTS:

Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup detat in relation to the Oakwood

Incident. In the 2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term
commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court that he be
allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate, alleging mainly that his case
is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution whereas that
in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists

RULING:

The petition is bereft of merit.

In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos,

petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was
already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a
motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere
detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights
since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.

Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving
moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of
lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a
"political offense."

Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in

expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized
practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.

xxx

A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in

Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.

It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for
purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied)

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being
punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction
as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and
for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of
guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or
imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an
accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates
the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the
stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its
underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners
like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

xxx

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he
is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and
such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his
place of detention.

Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured
well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some
reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain
statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident," proves
that petitioner's argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to
be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor

in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary
grant of bail. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established
that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.
The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
(173 SCRA 211)
DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General
Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its
area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an
effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro

Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP)
sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere
as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De
Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of
the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents
blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court
order in violation of the Constitution.

II. THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are
not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula
but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or
flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other

areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue
its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and
order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures
to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In
this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers
and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA sparrow units, not
to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in
media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which
all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal
times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search
which is however reasonablyconducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the

men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation
to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted
within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community.
Microsoft Corporation vs Maxicorp, Inc.

438 SCRA 224 Mercantile Law Intellectual Property Law on Copyright

Probable Cause in Issuing Search Warrant
In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that Microsoft
Softwares (Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged
within the premises of Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John
Benedict Sacriz) then bought a computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-
installed with a pirated copy of Windows. For their purchase, they were issued a
receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz.
Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC. He brought
with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as
evidence as well as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto
Pante), a computer technician, who showed the judge that the software in the
computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated. The RTC judge,
convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and
unfair competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding warrant.
Maxicorp assailed the legality of the warrant before the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision it highlighted the
fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos or Sacriz name hence the
proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and
documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of
probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that
Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the
prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and
insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within
Maxicorps premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases,
installed there.
The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos name nor was it in Sacriz
name does not render the issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states that
probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for
its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions
obtaining in a given situation.Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to
reverse the RTCs findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent
Samianos purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.
People v. Evaristo, G.R. No. 93828, 216 SCRA 431, December 11, 1992

People v. Evaristo, G.R. No. 93828, 216 SCRA 431, December 11, 1992

"Heard gunshots therefore an offense is being committed"

Waiver of right is the consent given in entering the house, resulting to seizure of
evidence in plain view.
The peace officers, while on patrol, heard bursts of gunfire and they proceeded to
investigate the matter. This incident is considered an offense and "an offense is
committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of
the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY
AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF."

While on routine patrol duty, the Philippine Constabulary officer patrolling heard
gunfire within the vicinity. When they came upon the source, Rosillo was firing a
gun into the air.
Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant Evaristo prompting
the lawmen to pursue him. Upon approaching the house, the patrol saw
appellants, Evaristo and Carillo, who were drunk. Inquiring as to the whereabouts
of Rosillo, the police patrol were told that he had already escaped.
Vallarta noticed a bulge on Carillos waist and subsequently frisked him revealing
.38 caliber revolver. After ascertaining that Carillo was neither a member of the
military nor had a valid license to possess the said firearm, the gun was
confiscated and Carillo invited for questioning.
Romeroso sought the consent of Evaristo for entry into the latters house to
search for Rosillo and Evaristo consented.
Upon entry they found various firearms, paraphernalia, and other effects, which
became the basis for the charge of illegal possession of firearms.
For their part, the appellants alleged that they were forcibly taken into custody.
They denied ownership or knowledge of any of the firearms, contending that
these were planted in their possession by the prosecution witnesses and other
police authorities.
Whether the firearms are considered illegally seized evidence? NO.
The Court ruled that doctrine of seizure of evidence in plain view, objects
inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a the right to be in the
position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced as
evidence.
In this case, Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter
his house. The officer's purpose was to catch Rosillo whom he saw had sought
refuge inside. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was not
Romerosa's purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering his discovery of the
firearms as accidental. The plain view doctrine will apply to the seizure of the
firearms and effects because their discovery was unintentional.
The Court sustains the validly of the firearm's seizure and admissibility in
evidence, based on the rule on authorized warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Valid warrantless arrests
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In this case, the second circumstance an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it is applicable. The peace officers, while on patrol, heard bursts
of gunfire and this proceeded to investigate the matter. This incident is
considered an offense and "an offense is committed in the presence or within the
view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a
warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or HEARS THE
DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE
THEREOF."
As for the existence of personal knowledge, the gunfire, the bulge in Carillos
waist, and the peace officers professional instinct are more than sufficient to
grant him personal knowledge of the facts of the crime that has just been
committed. Consequently, the firearm taken from Carillo can be said to have been
seized incidental to a lawful and valid arrest.
Manalili v CA (GR 113447) Oct. 9, 1997

Facts:
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City
conducted surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City
Cemetery. This was done after receiving information that drug addicts were
roaming around said area.
Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the
petitioner, in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner
had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner.
Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to
introduce themselves and asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner
resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what the petitioner had in
his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine it.
Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the
wallet and its marijuana contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be
further investigated.
The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for
analysis.

Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is
unreasonable, and hence inadmissible as evidence.

Held:
The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured
judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and
subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained in violation of this constitutionally
guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any proceeding.
The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search
of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by
the accused of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases,
the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause. Probable cause
being at best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or
the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by is in the place to be searched.
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the
general rule against a search without a warrant.
In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the
evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto
during the trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the respondent court.
People of the Philippines vs Rosa Aruta y Menguin
In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information
from an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving
for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same
day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14
Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as
the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; NARCOM officers
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by
Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to
him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was
then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are
being freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime.
Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta
was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would
engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude
that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was
singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended
Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly
illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them
to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing
finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear
violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure.
Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements
of probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis
for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of Arutas bag, there being
no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested.
Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the
subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest.
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must
perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could
not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a
poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2)
of the Constitution.
Read full text here.

NOTES:
When is a warrantless search allowed?
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
Pacis vs. Pamaran

56 SCRA 16 (1974)

Power of Acting Commissioner of Customs to issue a warrant of seizure and

detention

FACTS:

Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a Mercury automobile, model 1957,

brought into the country without payment of customs duty and taxes because its
original owner, Donald James Hatch, was tax-exempt. Santos later on paid
P311.00 for customs duty and taxes.

On July 22, 1964, Acting Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis was informed by the
General Affairs Administration of the Department of National Defense that the
automobile was a hot car. By virtue thereof, Pacis, through his subordinates,
looked into the records of his office and found that although the amount of
P311.00 was already paid for customs duty, the amount collectible on the said car
should be P2,500.00, more or less.

Based on such discrepancy, he instituted seizure proceedings and issued a

warrant of seizure and detention. The automobile was also taken by the
Department of National Defense agents and brought to the General Affairs
Administration for compound.

In answer, Santos filed a criminal complaint against Pacis for usurpation of judicial
functions with the City Fiscal of Manila, Manuel Pamaran, alleging that Pacis did
not have authority to issue such warrant of seizure and detention.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner, in the discharge of his official function, lay himself open to a
criminal prosecution for usurpation of judicial functions
HELD:

It is undeniable that petitioner, as Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of

Manila, had the requisite authority for the issuance of the contested warrant of
seizure and detention for the automobile owned by respondent Ricardo Santos.
What was done by him certainly could not be the basis of a prosecution for the
usurpation of judicial functions. The remedy of prohibition lies.
A Case of a Warrantless Arrest: MALACAT vs. Court of Appeals
MALACAT vs. CA

Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand grenade after he was
searched by a group of policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously
when he was hanging around Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together
with other Muslim-looking men. When the policemen approached the group of
men, they scattered in all directions which prompted the police to give chase and
petitioner was then apprehended and a search was made on his person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the present
petition wherein petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that
the search made on him and the seizure of the hand grenade from him was an
appropriate incident to his arrest and that it erred in admitting the hand grenade
as evidence since it was admissible because it was a product of an unreasonable
and illegal search.

Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.

Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is
needed in order to validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid
warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)
has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b)
has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1)
customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;34 and (6)
a "stop and frisk.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-
frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless
searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be
validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large
majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for
conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be
reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which
was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which
may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk"
as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down
in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk"
serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause;
and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit
the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he
deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer.
Board of Commissioners vs Joselito Dela Rosa
Facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following
the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian,
then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter
and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity
issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the
signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought
admission as Filipino citizens.

On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino
citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The boarf of
commissioners waws directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases
where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen
such included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of
special inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board
of Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered
the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus
on the 29thof the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.

Issue:
Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen

Held:
William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the assailed
marriage as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his
father, a Filipino as legitimate child. Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos
who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO [234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994]
Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession
of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly
methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which
authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of
methamphetamine and its paraphernalias, an entrapment was planned that led
to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalias
and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.

Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search
warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only
objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and
the paraphernalias therein. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional.

Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.

Chavez v. COMELEC

Chavez v. COMELEC
Bidin, J.

Facts:

Petition for the issuance of a TRO enjoining COMELEC from proclaiming

the 24th highest senatorial candidate.

May 5, 1992 - Court issued a Resolution of the case Francisco Chavez v. Comelec
, et al., disqualifying Melchor Chavez from running for Senator in the May 11,
1992 elections. The petitioner then filed an urgent motion with the Comelec
praying that it (1) disseminate to all its agents and the general public the
resolution; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor
Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates, tally sheets, election returns
and to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of
Francisco I. Chavez . . . .

May 8, 1992 - Comelec issued a resolution which resolved to delete the name of
Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order
the crediting of all Chavez votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation
of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates. On Election Day,
Melchor Chavez remained undeleted in the list of qualified candidates.
Commissioner Rama issued a directive over the radio and TV ordering that all
Chavez votes be credited to the petitioner however it did not reach all the
precincts.

Petitioner claims that the Comelec failed to perform its mandatory function under
Sec. 7, RA 7166 which states that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be
the duty of the Commission to instruct without delay the deletion of the name of
said candidate.

Confusion arose as the Chavez votes were either declared stray or invalidated
by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs).As a result, Chavez votes were not
credited in favor of petitioner.
May 12, 1992 - Comelec issued another Resolution directing all municipal and city
election registrars throughout the country to examine the minutes of voting
submitted by the BEIs and to credit all the Chavez votes, which have been
declared stray or invalidated by the BEIs, in favor of petitioner.

Petitioner maintains that the said resolution proved futile because it did not reach
all the various BEIs throughout the country on time for implementation and that
the minutes of voting did not indicate the number of Chavez votes which were
declared stray or invalidated.

May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent Comelec
praying the latter to (1) implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with costs de
officio; (2) to re-open the ballot boxes to scan for the Chavez votes for purposes
of crediting the same in his favor; (3) make the appropriate entries in the election
returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to suspend the proclamation of the 24
winning candidates.

Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to act on his petition,

petitioner filed this urgent petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for
the issuance of a TRO, enjoining the Comelec from proclaiming the 24th highest
senatorial candidate, without first implementing Comelecs resolution of May 12,
1992 and acting upon petitioner s letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and
urgent petition dated May 22, 1992. Petitioner alleges that respondent Comelec
acted capriciously and whimsically and with grave abuse of discretion.

June 8, 1992, Sen. Agapito Aquino prayed for the dismissal of the instant petition
on the ground that the law does not allow pre-proclamation controversy involving
the election of members of the Senate.

Issue:

whether or not SC has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

Jurisdiction - The alleged inaction of Comelec in ordering the deletion of

Melchor Chavezs name in the list of qualified candidates does not call for the
exercise of the Courts function of judicial review. The Court can review the
decisions or orders of the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion
committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising
from the exercise of its administrative functions.

Comelec can administratively undo what it has administratively left

undone. Comelec has ordered the deletion of Melchor Chavezs name not only on
the official list of candidates, but also on the election returns, tally sheet and
certificate of canvass. Hence, petitioner s allegation that respondent Comelec
failed to implement the resolutions does not hold water.

Petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy being in the nature of

a pre-proclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-
proclamation controversies involving local elective officials, such are not allowed
in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives.

Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:

Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-
President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. - For purposes
of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House
of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters
relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the
election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this
does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu
propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest
errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.

xxx xxx xxx

Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of
canvassers, or on the municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial
boards of canvassers or district board of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
What is allowed is the correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass
or election returns. To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the
certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or
objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.

The petitioners prayer does not call for the correction of manifest errors in the
certificates of canvass or election returns before the Comelec but for the
reopening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained therein.
He has not even pointed to any manifest error in the certificates of canvass or
election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, the proper recourse
is to file a regular

- Sanchez v. Commission on Elections: (1) Errors in the appreciation of ballots

by the board of inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not for
recount or re-appreciation of ballots. (2) The appreciation of ballots is not part of
the proceedings of the board of canvassers. The function of ballots appreciation is
performed by the board election inspectors at the precinct level. (3) The scope of
pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under Sec. 243
OEC. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be
prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and
proclamation of the winning candidates.

The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues
that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation
of Sanchez votes intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and
authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor
statute has granted the Comelec or the board of canvassers the power in the
canvass of election returns to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their
authenticity (Abes v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256).

Petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest error in the certificates of canvas s
or election returns before the Comelec which would warrant their correction.

Note:
 Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as any question pertaining to
or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by
any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns. [Sec. 241, Omnibus
Election Code).
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC [201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5 MAR
1992]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media

which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political
advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national
and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and
taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue
and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by
petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain
that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it
selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions,
only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or
political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the
prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election
Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of
speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or
political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the
newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring
about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning
candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of
voters to information and opinion.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.

Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights
which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the
press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to
be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during
the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself
for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may
have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state
policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the
egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The
essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative
provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or
regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises
during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible
supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional
repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers
that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or
regulation of media operations during election periods.

Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By

virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is
limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not
purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television
stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their
qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section
11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by
reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of
candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as
such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular
candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching
any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid
for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid
political advertisements of particular candidates.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the
candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
People v Tee GR No. 140546-47 (January 20, 2003)
"rights of the accused to speedy trial"

Facts
The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was
convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced to death. The defense
assailed the decision of the court for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana
seized from the accused by virtue of allegedly general search warrant. They
further contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by
failure of the prosecution to produce their witness who failed to appear during
the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial procedure.

Issue
Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced
during the hearing of the case.
Held
The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial
was not violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial
period for the criminal cases should be in general 180 days. However, in
determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case.The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1)
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
(2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.

It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a
warrant to compel the witness to testify. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily
relative where several factors are weighed such as the length of time of delay, the
reason of such delay, and conduct of prosecution and the accused and the
prejudice and damaged caused to the accused of such delay. The court did not
find the 20 days of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute
deprivation of the constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in
addition to the fact that court trial may be always subjected to postponement for
reasonable cause of delay. In the absence of showing that the reason for delay
was capricious or oppressive, the State must not be deprived of reasonable
opportunity in prosecuting the accused.
CASE DIGEST (Commercial Law): PNB vs. Gancayco
G.R. No. L-18343 September 30, 1965

FACTS:
Defendants Emilio Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the
Department of Justice, required the plaintiff Philippine National Bank to produce
at a hearing the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto Jimenez, former
administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration, who was
then under investigation for unexplained wealth. In declining to reveal its records,
the plaintiff bank invoked Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405.

On the other hand, the defendants cited Section 8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) in support of their claim of authority,which
allegedly provides an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits.

ISSUE:
Whether Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides an additional ground for the
examination of bank deposits.

HELD:
Yes. The truth is that these laws are so repugnant to each other than no
reconciliation is possible. x x x. The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of
the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by
providing additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.

x x x [W]hile section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares bank deposits to be

"absolutely confidential," it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following
instances:
(1) Upon written permission of the depositor;
(2) In cases of impeachment;
(3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials;
(4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation.
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty x
x x.
MARQUEZ V. DESIERTO (G.R. NO. 135882)
Facts:
Petitioner Lourdes Marquez received an Order from respondent Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in
camera relative to various accounts maintained at the bank where petitioner is
the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected are involved in a case pending
with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v.
Amado Lagdameo. It appears that a certain George Trivinio purchased trail
managers check and deposited some of it to an account maintained at
petitioners branch. Petitioner after meeting with the FFIB Panel to ensure the
veracity of the checks agreed to the in camera inspection. Petitioner being unable
to readily identify the accounts in question, the Ombudsman issued an order
directing petitioner to produce the bank documents. Thus, petitioner sought a
declaration of her rights from the court due to the clear conflict between RA 6770
and RA 1405. Meanwhile, FFIB moved to cite petitioner in contempt before the
Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the
accounts is an allowable exception of R.A. No. 1405.
Ruling: NO.
The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject
accounts with the Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on
a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado
Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the
Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must
be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending
case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the
account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent
authority. What is existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In
short, what the office of the ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional
evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan.
Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of
the bank account for inspection.
*In contrast to Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan. Interestingly, time is of the essence. A
different ruling in Ejercito was enunciated because there was already a pending
investigation months before the ruling made in this case as to the exemption in
the power of the Ombudsman.
Adiong Vs Comelec

ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347
pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the
resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful election
propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals Provided, That decals and stickers may be
posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of
Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election
propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except
in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections
assails the COMELECs Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him
such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and
stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limit their location or
publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution
No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that decals and stickers may be posted only
in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21
hereof is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELECs prohibition on posting of
decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in
designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on
constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizens
fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III).
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is
not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at
the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his
car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as
couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the
decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the
citizens private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The
provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting
of decals or stickers in the privacy of ones living room or bedroom.) In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. (The
right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this
right is joined by a liberty interest, the burden of justification on the part of the
Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not
met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor
candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies,
mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX
(c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on
cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and
stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the
consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes
crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the
candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places
whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
Chavez v. COMELEC

Chavez v. COMELEC
Bidin, J.

Facts:

Petition for the issuance of a TRO enjoining COMELEC from proclaiming

the 24th highest senatorial candidate.

May 5, 1992 - Court issued a Resolution of the case Francisco Chavez v. Comelec
, et al., disqualifying Melchor Chavez from running for Senator in the May 11,
1992 elections. The petitioner then filed an urgent motion with the Comelec
praying that it (1) disseminate to all its agents and the general public the
resolution; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor
Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates, tally sheets, election returns
and to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of
Francisco I. Chavez . . . .

May 8, 1992 - Comelec issued a resolution which resolved to delete the name of
Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order
the crediting of all Chavez votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation
of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates. On Election Day,
Melchor Chavez remained undeleted in the list of qualified candidates.
Commissioner Rama issued a directive over the radio and TV ordering that all
Chavez votes be credited to the petitioner however it did not reach all the
precincts.

Petitioner claims that the Comelec failed to perform its mandatory function under
Sec. 7, RA 7166 which states that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be
the duty of the Commission to instruct without delay the deletion of the name of
said candidate.

Confusion arose as the Chavez votes were either declared stray or invalidated
by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs).As a result, Chavez votes were not
credited in favor of petitioner.
May 12, 1992 - Comelec issued another Resolution directing all municipal and city
election registrars throughout the country to examine the minutes of voting
submitted by the BEIs and to credit all the Chavez votes, which have been
declared stray or invalidated by the BEIs, in favor of petitioner.

Petitioner maintains that the said resolution proved futile because it did not reach
all the various BEIs throughout the country on time for implementation and that
the minutes of voting did not indicate the number of Chavez votes which were
declared stray or invalidated.

May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent Comelec
praying the latter to (1) implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with costs de
officio; (2) to re-open the ballot boxes to scan for the Chavez votes for purposes
of crediting the same in his favor; (3) make the appropriate entries in the election
returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to suspend the proclamation of the 24
winning candidates.

Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to act on his petition,

petitioner filed this urgent petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for
the issuance of a TRO, enjoining the Comelec from proclaiming the 24th highest
senatorial candidate, without first implementing Comelecs resolution of May 12,
1992 and acting upon petitioner s letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and
urgent petition dated May 22, 1992. Petitioner alleges that respondent Comelec
acted capriciously and whimsically and with grave abuse of discretion.

June 8, 1992, Sen. Agapito Aquino prayed for the dismissal of the instant petition
on the ground that the law does not allow pre-proclamation controversy involving
the election of members of the Senate.

Issue:

whether or not SC has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

Jurisdiction - The alleged inaction of Comelec in ordering the deletion of

Melchor Chavezs name in the list of qualified candidates does not call for the
exercise of the Courts function of judicial review. The Court can review the
decisions or orders of the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion
committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising
from the exercise of its administrative functions.

Comelec can administratively undo what it has administratively left

undone. Comelec has ordered the deletion of Melchor Chavezs name not only on
the official list of candidates, but also on the election returns, tally sheet and
certificate of canvass. Hence, petitioner s allegation that respondent Comelec
failed to implement the resolutions does not hold water.

Petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy being in the nature of

a pre-proclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-
proclamation controversies involving local elective officials, such are not allowed
in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives.

Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:

Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-
President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. - For purposes
of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House
of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters
relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the
election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this
does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu
propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest
errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.

xxx xxx xxx

Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of
canvassers, or on the municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial
boards of canvassers or district board of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
What is allowed is the correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass
or election returns. To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the
certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or
objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.

The petitioners prayer does not call for the correction of manifest errors in the
certificates of canvass or election returns before the Comelec but for the
reopening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained therein.
He has not even pointed to any manifest error in the certificates of canvass or
election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, the proper recourse
is to file a regular

- Sanchez v. Commission on Elections: (1) Errors in the appreciation of ballots

by the board of inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not for
recount or re-appreciation of ballots. (2) The appreciation of ballots is not part of
the proceedings of the board of canvassers. The function of ballots appreciation is
performed by the board election inspectors at the precinct level. (3) The scope of
pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under Sec. 243
OEC. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be
prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and
proclamation of the winning candidates.

The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues
that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation
of Sanchez votes intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and
authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor
statute has granted the Comelec or the board of canvassers the power in the
canvass of election returns to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their
authenticity (Abes v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256).

Petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest error in the certificates of canvas s
or election returns before the Comelec which would warrant their correction.

Note:
 Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as any question pertaining to
or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by
any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns. [Sec. 241, Omnibus
Election Code).
Ramon Gonzales vs COMELEC

21 SCRA 774 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Political Question

vs Justiciable Question
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC
to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was
provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the
general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned
by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was
unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people
who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election
rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when
they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this
regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense that said act
of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political
question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general
election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to
amend as well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not
included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are
not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are
inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That
being, when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not
actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent
assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is
reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether
or not such act of the constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on
a special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935]
Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a
general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections
merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances
then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments
for ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. Plebiscite should be
scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate Fair submission, intelligent consent
or rejection. They should be able to compare the original proposition with the
amended proposition.
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC [201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5 MAR
1992]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media

which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political
advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national
and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and
taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue
and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by
petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain
that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it
selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions,
only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or
political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the
prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election
Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of
speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or
political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the
newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring
about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning
candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of
voters to information and opinion.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.

Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights
which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the
press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to
be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during
the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself
for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may
have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state
policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the
egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The
essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative
provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or
regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises
during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible
supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional
repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers
that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or
regulation of media operations during election periods.

Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By

virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is
limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not
purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television
stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their
qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section
11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by
reporters orbroadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of
candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as
such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular
candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching
any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid
for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid
political advertisements of particular candidates.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the
candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Padua (G.R. No. L-72873. May
28, 1987)
16APR
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
Ponente: CRUZ
FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in the name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his
undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a
Con Pacto de Retro Sale. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners
occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot,
representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the
same with a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built
a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was
dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed
her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial
court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not
having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there
was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-
heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed the
decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the
New Civil Code.
HELD:
YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.
RATIO:
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no
notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day
period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and
the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising
their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts]
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing
so, [courts] defer not to the letter that killeth but to the spirit that vivifieth, to
give effect to the law makers will.
Pita V CA G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989
J. Sarmiento

Facts:
In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and the Manila Police,
seized and confiscated from dealers along Manila sidewalks, magazines believed
to be obscene. These were later burned. One of the publications was Pinoy
Playboy published by Leo Pita.
He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila to enjoin him from
confiscating more copies of his magazine and claimed that this was a violation of
freedom of speech. The court ordered him to show cause. He then filed an Urgent
Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate
seizure.
Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of obscence
reading materials but admitted that these were surrendered by the stall owners
and the establishments were not raided.
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no answer.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing
on January 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of
whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized, confiscated
and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence per se or not".
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from
denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case
for lack of merit
The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that freedom of the press
is not without restraint.
In the SC, the petitioner claimed that:
1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without any court warrant
or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their
determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in
effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without any
hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was merely the
application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Was the seizure constitutional?

Held: No. Petition granted

Ratio:
Test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to
deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and
into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall
Also, "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by
the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it."
(Kottinger)
When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said to be
offensive to human sensibilities?
The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn
nor divided.
Katigbak- "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense that
it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of the work, rather than
isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both cases are
agreed that "contemporary community standards" are the final arbiters of what is
"obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the determination of
obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a consequence, to temper the
wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.
The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v. California, which expressly
abandoned Massachusettes, and established "basic guidelines," to wit: "(a)
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' would find the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes
"obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to recognize the
constitutional dimension of the problem.
Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the
guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a climate
of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of
what is acceptable to society.
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate
exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious
reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally
evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep
in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say,
five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present generation.
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of
opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men and women that
have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free
expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has
consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and
present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But the
burden to show this lies with the authorities.
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of
the existence of such clear and present danger."
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political
speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on
the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only
be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required
proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which
mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be
pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way
of a search warrant.
Has petitioner been found guilty for publishing obscene works under Presidential
Decrees Nos. 960 and 969? This not answered, one can conclude that the fact
that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no
license to seize property in disregard of due process. The PDs dont give the
authorities the permission to execute high-handed acts.
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant,
otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge.
There is of course provision for warrantless searches under the Rules of Court but
as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a lawful
arrest and it must be on account fo a crime committed.
The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal
provision which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because
there had been no warrant, and there is no "accused" here to speak of, who
ought to be "punished".
Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as
a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his
opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent
Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one.
Freedom of Expression and Right to Privacy
MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-32066

August 6, 1979

FACTS:
Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, began the
production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story". It was based mainly on
the copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled
"The Long Dark Night in Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story".
The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla
who was then a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality
of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the November, 1951 elections. Governor
Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were
tried and convicted for that murder. In the book, Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a
martyr in contemporary political history."
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there
were portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal
in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent
herein, and of one "Auring" as his girlfriend.
On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, for and in
behalf of her mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for certain
changes, corrections and deletions in the movie.
On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some bargaining, the petitioner
and private respondent executed a Licensing Agreement where the petitioner
agreed to pay the private respondent the sum of P20,000.00 payable without
need of further demand, as follows: P5,000.00 on or before Oct. 10, 1961;
P10,000.00 on or before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00 on or before November 30,
1961. Also the Licensor (private respondent) grants authority and permission to
Licensee (Petitioner) to exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla
for purposes of producing the PICTURE, and in connection with matters incidental
to said production, such as advertising and the like, as well as authority and
permission for the use of LICENSOR's name in the PICTURE and have herself
portrayed therein, the authority and permission hereby granted, to retroact to
the date when LICENSEE first committed any of the acts herein authorized.
After its premier showing on October 16, 1961, the movie was shown in
different theaters all over the country.
Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the
Agreement, on December 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the present suit
against him praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the
amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of the Complaint; 2) to
render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the
corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom; 3) to pay attorney's fees equivalent to
20% of the amounts claimed; and 4) to pay the costs.
Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of Moises
Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and was a public
figure; that private respondent has no property right over those incidents; that
the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration and that he
signed the same only because of the coercion and threat employed upon him. As
a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement
as it constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and of the press.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the private
respondent.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not private respondent have any property right over the life of
Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure.
2. Whether or not the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional
right of freedom of speech and of the press.

RULING:

1. Yes. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book
entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior
consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said
deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held
in Schuyler v. Curtis, a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a
deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of
the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in
the character and memory of the deceased."
Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's
right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public
information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a
person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while
it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises
Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because
without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
2. No. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would
appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. It would be too much to insist
that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and
of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television
and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle requires a court
to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation."
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by
respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking
into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular
circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the
Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement
will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are
reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v CA 348 SCRA 265 December 15, 2000

Facts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundations
school paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline
Committee after letters of complaint were filed before the Board following the
publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit
contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required
to submit a written statement to answer the complaints against them to the
Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead of doing so wrote to the
Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the
jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the
Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary
sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary
injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of said
Discipline Board over the defendants.

Issue: WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the
defendants.

Held: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS
and the Disciplinary Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants.
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher
learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the
right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how
best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when
the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the
institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate upon them good
values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not
always absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of
expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the
conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act
provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of
the articles they write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of
involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore the
court ruled that the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power
to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and
regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment
conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an
inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning
guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam Collegehas the
authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.
AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR
1988]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production
company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial
viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle
of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day
Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies
consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production.

It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a

"docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real
events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David
Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of
New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a script.

Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction
and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in
any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or
commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of
Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the
projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his
right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and
making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious
character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or
marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.

Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and
produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse
them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of
motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is
not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.

The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to
any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew
what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no
"clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter
is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical
stage in the history of the country.

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public
concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public
figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their
right to privacy.

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the
constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may
be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must
be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.
MTRCB v. ABS-CBN G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005
J. Sandoval Gutierrez

Facts:

Respondent abs-cbn aired Prosti-tuition, an episode of the TV program The

Inside Story produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female
students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees.
PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved and the faade of
the PWU building served as the background of the episode. This caused upsoar in
the PWU community and they filed a letter-complaint to the MTRCB.
MTRCB alleged that respondents
1) Did not submit the inside story to petitioner for review
2) Exhibited the same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of PD 1986 and
some sections of MTRCB rules and regulations
ABS-CBN averred:
1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-
political editorial, its airing is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom
of expression and of the press
2) Petitioners has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior
restraint upon respondents.
After hearing and submission of the parties memoranda, MTRCB investigating
committee ordered the respondents to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the
program
MTRCB affirmed the ruling
Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC. RTC rendered a
decision in favor of respondents, annulling and setting aside the decision and
resolution of the MTRCB and declaring and decreeing that certain sections of PD
1986 & MTRCB do not cover the TV program Inside Story, they being a public
affairs programs which can be equated to a newspaper
Hence, this petition
Issue:
Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the Inside Story prior
its exhibition or broadcast by TV.
Held:
Sec 3 of PD 1986 enumerates the powers, functions and duties of the board:
Xxx
b) to screen, review and examine all motion pictures herein defined, TV programs,
including publicity materials
The court in INC v. CA rules that PD 1986 gives MTRCB the power to screen, review
and examine ALL TV PROGRAMS
*LESSON* where the law does not make any exceptions, courts may not exempt
something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to
justify it.
Thus, when the law says all TV programs, the word all covers all tv programs
whether religious, public affairs, news docu, etc
It then follows that since the Inside Story is a TV Program, MTRCB has the power to
review it
The only exemptions from the MTRCBs power to review are those mentioned in
Sec 7 of PD 1986
1) TV programs imprinted or exhibited by Phil govt and/or departments and
agencies
2) Newsreels
In a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents content that Inside Story falls
under the category of newsreels.
MTRCB rules and reg defines newsreels as straight news reporting, as
distinguished from analyses, commentaries, and opinions. Talk shows on a given
issue are not considered newsreels.
Clearly, Inside Story is not a newsreel but more of a public affairs program and
within petitioners power of review.
Issue related to Consti law:
Petitioners power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No.
1986 does not amount to prior restraint.
Ratio:
It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of
religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental
laws, past and present, designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x x x. Yet
despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still
this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristos religious program from petitioners
review power.
Respondents claim that the showing of The Inside Story is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there
has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of
expression and of the press has a preferred status.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the
jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no
justification to exempt therefrom The Inside Story which, according to
respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression
and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status.
The only exceptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those expressly
mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted
or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies,
and (2) newsreels.