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L-39999
EN BANC
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla,
Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby
imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One
(1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory
damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of
P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and
severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the
proportionate costs of this proceedings.
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Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
II
III
IV
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent
court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil
indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in
the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal
act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability
arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal
charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effect that
the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may
not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil
action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748;
following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo
Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v.
Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio
116 Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not
because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them.
There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its
demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting away of the
merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were
denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense
such as threat or malicious mischief.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in
accordance with law.
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case
refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA
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472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon
acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in
a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action
may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by
law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the
thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case
would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the
same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum
for and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery
School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the
fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist.
The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability
arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. (Section 1, Rule III, Rules of
Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed
against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case
if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal
considerations other than the commission of the offense
charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as
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The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence
adduced by both the prosecution and the defense:
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P9,600.00
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the
destruction of the complainant's market stall and had its contents carted
away. They state:
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code,
earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted."
According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a
separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even
in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic
and common sense.
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil
action but inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal
action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on
reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An
affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with the
doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions, and win
(a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action, or
one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and
of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party
unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or
enable him to take advantage of the free services of the fiscal;
and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of
permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether
based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other independent civil
actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here
suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code should be amended
because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil action
based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a
separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved
in the same criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon
acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of any
other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the
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We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at
the intent of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make
it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by
making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court
as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did
not err in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
SO ORDERED.
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