PART II
TITLE FACTS
1. Montano v. The Isabelo Montano presented a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription
Insular Government of a piece of land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery having
a superficial area of 10,805 square meters, and bounded as set out in the petition; its
value according to the last assessment being $505.05, United States currency. This
petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands, and by
the entity known asObras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the former on the ground that the
land in question belonged to the Government of the United States, and the latter, that it
was the absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said fishery.
The Court of Land Registration in its decision of December 1, 1906, dismissed the said
oppositions without costs and decreed, after a general entry by default, the adjudication
and registration of the property described in the petition, in favor of Isabelo Montano y
Marcial. From this decision only counsel for the Director of Public Lands appealed to this
court. and precisely Isabelo Montano sought title thereon on the strength of 10 years'
occupation pursuant to paragraph 6, section 5 of Act 926 of the Philippine Commission
2. DE LOS ANGELES v. An application for registration of title on 12 parcels of land in Ampid, San Mateo, Rizal,
SANTOS was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Leonor De Los Angeles and 7 co-
applicants. They alleged that they are owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the
aforesaid land.
The Director of Lands opposed, stating that the land is a portion of the public domain.
The Province of Rizal also interposed an opposition, asserting the required 3.00 meters
strips of public easement on lots along Ampid River and the creek.
The private oppositors, Julio HIidalgo one among them, filed their written opposition
claiming that they are the lawful owners of the parcels of land in question, having
acquired homestead patents over said lots.
The Land Registration Commissioner in its report stated that (1) Lot 11 was under patent
No. 95856 in the name of Julio Hidalgo; and (2) That the land registration case filed by
herein applicants-appellants was set for hearing but no decision has as yet been received.
3. HEIRS OF MARIO Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-
MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square
OF THE PHILIPPINES meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,
and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous
adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco
testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property
owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio,
Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his
four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans
wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the
Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son
Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which
originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by
Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11
June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the
ISSUE & RULING
Whether or not the land in question can be acquired by Montano
Held:
Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are not synonymous items. The first includes not
only the second, but also other lands of the Government already reserved or devoted to public use or
subject to private right. In other words, the Government owns real estate which is part of the "public
lands" and other real estate which is not part thereof. Government property was of two kinds first,
that of public use or service, said to be of public ownership, and second, that of having a private
character or use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.) Lands of the first class, while they retain their public
character are inalienable. Those of the second are not. Therefore, there is much real property
belonging to the Government which is not affected by statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale
of public lands. Examples in point are properties occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal
or other governmental uses.
It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect to public lands does not extend to tide
lands. It provided that the scrip might be located on the unoccupied and unappropriated public lands.
As said inNewhall vs. Sanger(92 U.S. 761, 763.) A marshland which is inundated by the rise of tides
belong to the State and is not susceptible to appropriation by occupation, has no application in the
present case inasmuch as in said case the land subject matter of the litigation was not yet titled
ISSUE: WON a land registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over a parcel
of land for registration of title thereto could be divested of said jurisdiction by a
subsequent administrative act consisting in the issuance by the Director of Lands of a
homestead patent covering the same parcel of land.
HELD: NEGATIVE. It is well-settled that the Director of Lands jurisdiction, administrative supervision
and executive control extend only over lands of the public domain and not to lands already or private
ownership. Accordingly, a homestead patent issued by him over land NOT of the PUBLIC DOMAIN is a
nullity, devoid of force and effect against the owner.
As contended by the applicants, as of Nov. 21, 1957 date of application for registration, they are
already owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple. If this is the case, then Julio Hidalgos homestead
patent over Lot 11 makes said lot no longer public. Since proceedings for land registration in rem
(enforcement is upon the property not against the person), as against a homestead patent which is
NOT, the latter does not therefore finally dispose of the public or private character of the land. Hence,
applicants should be given opportunity to prove registrable title to Lot 11.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June
12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of
the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible
to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or
because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the
subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.
Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands
based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor
is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title.
Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can
date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in
particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree.

4 OLGA
5. REPUBLIC v. CA and
BERNABE
6. Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corp vs.
Court of Appeals
7. The Director of Forestry
vs. Villareal
Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision rendered
before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097. On July 6,
1965 such lot was segregated from the forest zone and released and certified by the
Bureau of Forestry as an Agricultural Land for disposition under the Public Land Act. On
April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the CFI of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case
No. 19 to perfect their rights and register their titles to said lots. They alleged that they
acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of land by purchase from the original
owners thereof, whose possession of the same including that of the herein respondents,
has always been continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse and in the concept of
owners for more than 30 years. The Director of Forestry filed an opposition to the above
petition but later withdrew the same upon verification of findings that this portion of the
timberland had already been released from the mass of thepublic forests. Subsequently,
the Acting Prov. Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands filed his
opposition alleging that the land is STILL Public Land and as such cannot be the subject
of a land registration proceeding under Act 496.The lower court adjudicated in favor or
respondent Bernabes, finding that the latter have complied with all the terms and
conditions entitling them to a grant. This decision having become final, the Commissioner
of Land Registration issued the corresponding decrees of registration. On the other hand,
petitioner DL through the Solicitor Gen. filed a petition for review of the decrees.
The case is a petition regarding Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Boards
(DARAB) order of compulsory acquisition of petitioners property under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Sta. Rosa was the registered owner of
two parcels of land in Cabuyao Laguna. According to them, these lands are watersheds
which provide clean and potable (drinkable) water to the Canlubang community and that
90 light industries are located in that area. They were alleging respondents usurped its
rights over their property thereby destroying the ecosystem. Since the said land provides
water to the residents, respondents sought an easement of a right of a way to and from
Barangay Castile, to which, by counterclaim, Sta. Rosa sought ejectment against
respondents. Respondents went to the DAR and filed a case for compulsory acquisition of
the Sta. Rosa Property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Compulsory
acquisition is the power of the government to acquire private rights in land without the
willing consent of its owner or occupant in order to benefit the society. The said land was
inspected by the Municipal and Agrarian Reform Officer, and upon consensus of the
authorities concerned, they decided that the said land must be placed under compulsory
acquisition. Petitioners filed an objection on the ground that: The area is not appropriate
for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes 18% and above.
(which falls under the exception in compulsory acquisition of CARP) The occupants of the
land were illegal settlers or (squatters) who by no means are entitled to the land as
beneficiaries. Another issue raised by the petitioners was that the DAR failed to follow the
due process because instead of paying just compensation, a trust account was made in
favour of the petitioners.
Facts: The petitioner, Director of Forestry was one of the several persons who opposed
the application for registration of a parcel land classified as mangrove swamps in the
municipality of Sapian, Capiz with an area of 178,113 square meters of mangrove
swamps, to the applicant Ruperto Villareal. He alleged that he and his predecessors-in-
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably
with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
ISSUE:
WON THE LOTS CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS COULD LEGALLY BE THE SUBJECT OF
AJUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF TITLE UNDER SEC. 48 (b) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT 141
AS AMENDEDBY R.A. 1942.
HELD:
NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively
topublic lands. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded. Thus, possession of forest
lands, howeverlong cannot ripen into private ownership. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of theBureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to
register under the TorrensSystem.Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all
possible, private respondents havenot qualified for a grant under Section 48 (b) of CA 141. They can
only be credited with 1 year, 9 mos. and 20days of possession and occupation of the lots involved,
counted from July 6, 1965 when the lots involved had been segregated from the forest zone and
released by the BOF as an agricultural land for disposition under thePublic Land Act. As such,
respondents and their predecessors in interest could not have possessed the lots forthe required
period of 30 years as disposable agricultural land.
Issues:
1. Whether these parcels of land fall within the coverage of the Compulsory Acquisition
Program of the CARP?
2. Whether the petition of land conversion of the parcels of land may be granted?
Court Ruling:
1. Art. 67 of the Water Code: Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or
overlying any ground water may be declared by DENR as a protected area. In this case, the DENR did
not declare the land as a protected area, In the past the municipality issued a resolution that the said
land is an agricultural land.
2. Although evidence of petitioners is strong, the Supreme Court opines that the area must be
maintained for watershed purposes for ecological and environmental considerations despite the 88
families who are beneficiaries of the CARP. It is important that a larger view of the situation be taken
because of the thousands of residents downstream if the watershed will not be protected and
maintained for its natural purpose.
3. Despite Supreme Courts strong opinion of protection of watersheds as an intergenerational
responsibility, they however ordered to DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the case since the said
land falls under exception.
Issue: Whether or not, mangrove swamps are agricultural land or forest land.
Held: The Supreme Court held that mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Furthermore the
 interests had been in possession of the said parcel of land for more than forty years (40).
Both parties agreed in one point that the disputed land was a mangrove swamp. The
respondent argued that mangrove swamp are agricultural land but the petitioner
contended that it is a forestall land therefore not disposable.The Court of the First
Instance of Capiz however grants the application of the respondent. The decision of the
lower court was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence the Director of Forestry
elevated the case to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.
8. WILSON PO CHAM v. The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
ATTY. EDILBERTO PIZARRO moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to thus render him unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with disbarment or suspension.
Upon Atty. Edilberto Pizarros representations to complainant Wilson Po Cham (Po Cham) that a
certain parcel of land being offered for sale to him was alienable and disposable, Po Cham gave Atty. Pizarro
two checks representing the purchase price of the said property. Po Cham subsequently took possession of the
property and installed a barbed wire fence at its front portion. Soon after, however, a forest guard approached
him and informed him that the property could not be fenced for the reason that it was part of the Bataan National
Park. Upon investigation, Po Cham discovered that the property is not an alienable or disposable land
susceptible of private ownership.
Po Cham demanded the return of the purchase price but Atty. Pizarro did not heed to the demand. Po Cham
thereafter charged Atty. Pizarro of violation of his oath as a member of the Bar.
The Supreme Court (SC) referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation or decision. The IBP, in its Report and Recommendation, found Atty. Pizarro to have
violated his oath as a member of the Bar. It recommended his suspension from the practice of law for 3 months,
subject to the approval of the members of the Board of Governors. The case was forwarded to the SC for final
action
9 REPUBLIC OF THE The subject matter of these proceedings for declaration of nullity of title are parcels of
PHILIPPINES VS. land with a total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as the JUSMAG housing
SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS area in Fort Bonifacio where, military officers, both in the active and retired services, and
ASSOCIATION INC. their respective families, have been occupying housing units and facilities originally
constructed by the AFP.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP
military officers. Records show that SHAI was able to secure from the Registry of Deeds
of the Province of Rizal a title Transfer Certificate of Title in its name to the bulk of, if
not the entire, JUSMAG area.
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991on the basis of a notarized
Deed of Sale purportedly executed on the same date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad,
Jr. of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI.The total purchase price as
written in the conveying deed was P11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by the Department of Justice
on reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of the aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of
sale surfaced and eventually referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
examination. The results of the examination undertaken by NBI Document Examiner
Eliodoro Constantino reveals that the puported signatures in the document are forgeries.
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V.Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173
directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to institute action towards the
cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officers Village
Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the reservation. A month later, the OSG, in
behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding
legislative definition embodied in section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which
declares that mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines hence
they are not alienable. The evidence presented by the respondent in its claim were not sufficient to
prove its possession and ownership of the land, he only presented tax declaration. Wherefore the
decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the application for registration of title by the
respondent is dismissed by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Pizarro violated his solemn oath as a lawyer
HELD:
The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor to thus render him unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him, may be sanctioned with disbarment or suspension.
Atty. Pizarro has utterly failed to substantiate his documented claim of having irrevocable rights and interests over the property
which he could have conveyed to Po Cham. Atty. Pizarro must thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing Po Cham to purchase
non-existent irrevocable rights, interest and participation over an inalienable property.
ISSUE: Was the JUSMAG area, during the period material, alienable or inalienable, as the
case may be, and, therefore, can or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?
Petitioner Republic, correctly asserts the inalienable character of the JUSMAG area, the same having
not effectively been separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the
use of the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes. Such tract or tracts of
land thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until
again declared alienable. Consistent with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a
military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition
and, therefore, not registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared as disposable
and alienable public land. And until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of
the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and
alienable, its status as part of a military reservation remains,even if incidentally it is devoted for a
purpose other than as a military camp or for defense. The same is true in this case.
There is no doubt that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned October 30, 1991sale formed part
of the FBMR as originally established under Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent SHAI
would categorically say that the petitioner Republic had not presented evidence that subject land is
within military reservation,and even dared to state that the JUSMAG area is the private property of
the government and therefore removed from the concept of public domain per se its own evidence
themselves belie its posture as their evidence both the TCT and the Deed of Sale technically described

10 IGNACIO MESINA, vs
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE
SONZA, ET AL.,
defendants.EULALIA
PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA,
11. Director of Lands v. IAC
(1986)
nullification and cancellation of title suit against the private respondent SHAI, purported
signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no records with the LMB of (i) the
application to purchase and (ii) the alleged payment of the purchase price; and c) the
property in question is inalienable, being part of a military reservation established under
Proclamation No. 423.
Plaintiff Mesina claimed to be the owner of a parcel of land located in San Antonio, Nueva,
Ecija. He has been in possession of the subject land openly, publicly and peacefully since
1914. The said lot was subject of registration proceedings. Surprisingly, the defendant
Pineda without knowledge of the Plaintiff was able to procure a homestead patent in the
same court were the registration of property was pending of the same land by the
plaintiff, despite of the fact that defendant had not complied with the requirements of CA
141. That the said title was procured by defendants through frauds, deception and
misrepresentation since they knew that the lot belong to the plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff
sought to annulled and cancelled the patent issued to defendant and prayed that this
registration case pending in the same court be given due course.
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario,
acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
o possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan
o land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting
absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or
their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the
public domain
o Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of
improvements
o ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
the property as situated in Jusmag area located at Fort Bonifacio which is now renamed Fort Mckinley
a declared a military reservation.
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the
process, it has invariably invited attention to the proclamations specific area coverage to prove the
nullity of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and
hence, beyond the commerce of man.
The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming its authenticity, could
not plausibly be the requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into a disposable
parcel. And private respondent SHAIs unyielding stance that would have the Republic in estoppel to
question the transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is unavailing. It should have
realized that the Republic is not usually estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or
agents.
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at least at the
time of the supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab
initio.
Moreover, Article XII, Section 3[of the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain, except through lease for a limited period.
ISSUE: WON the homestead patent given to defendant Pineda be declared null and void
.RULING: In view of the fact that plaintiff was able to proved his open, continuous, exclusive
possession of the disputed land for more than thirty years or since 1914 and that lot is at present
subject of registration proceeding. Plaintiff is deemed to have acquired the lot by grant of the state, it
follows that the same had ceased to part of the public and had become private property and therefore
beyond the control of the Director of Land. The homestead patent issued to defendant therefore is
null and void and for having it issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation. The case was
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant
may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient
o it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least
by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon
the strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations applies- NO
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had
a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.
12. RUMARATE v. Sps. Rumarate filed an action for reconveyance of real property and/ quieting of title
HERNANDEZ against the heirs of sps. Hernandez. Rumarate averred that Santiago Guerrero orally
bequeathed his rights over lot 379 to him in 1929. Thereafterm their family cleared the
land, built a house, and planted on it. A quitclaim was also executed by Santiago in their
favor in 1960.
In 1970, Rumarate discovered that sps. Hernandez were able to obtain title over lot 379
but he did not file a case immediately.
Respondent heirs of sps. Hernandez claimed that Santaigo sold the lot to them in 1964
but they were not able to possess the land.
13. HEIRS OF MARIA On April 24, 1975, a civil case entitled Maria Marron v. Felicisimo Bazar and Fe S. Bazar
MARASIGAN v. IAC was filed before the then CFI of Manila, Br. XIII. This action sought to compel defendants
Bazar to execute a registrable Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot No. 2-A covered by T.C.T No.
100612 in favor of Maria Marron.
On January 27, 1976, while the above case was still pending, private respondent
Marron caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of T.C.T. No. 100612.
On February 24, 1976, judgment was rendered in favor of Maria Marron and the
judgment having become final and executory, she filed a motion for execution which was
granted. To this, a writ of execution was granted but the Bazars refused to surrender
their title and to execute the required deed of sale.
On November 29, 1978, the lower court ordered the Clerk of Court to execute
the deed of sale. But upon presentation of the said deed to the Register of Deeds of
Manila for registration, the Deputy Clerk of Court was advised to secure a court order in
order to cancel the new title issued in favor of one Maria Marasigan. This is due to a prior
deed of absolute sale in favor of such person executed on December 18, 1974. However,
it was only on July 5, 1977 that such deed was registered; hence, Marasigans title bears
with it the above notice of lis pendens.
The Bazars filed a petition for relief of the February 24 judgment and while this
was pending, the moved to set aside the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
their persons. Meanwhile, Marrons Land Registration Court case was dismissed by CFI
Manila, Br. XIII for said court acting as an L.R.C. cannot act under summary proceedings
for having only limited and special jurisdiction. Then, Marron filed another civil case to
cancel Marasigans TCT. This was denied for being premature. But, on appeal, the IAC
ruled in favor of Marron by virtue of the notice of lis pendens. Hence, this petition by the
heirs of Marasigan, the latter having died in the course of the proceedings.
14. YBAEZ, petitioners, Records show that private respondent Valentin Ouano, a claimant-occupant of Lot No.
vs. 986, Pls-599-D situated at sitio Bagsac, barrio of Manikling, Governor Generoso (now San
IAC and VALENTIN O. Isidro), Davao del Norte, containing an area of three (3) hectares, 48 ares and 78
OUANO, respondents, centares which was surveyed on March 13, 1958 as evidenced by the "Survey Notification
Card" issued in his name, a homestead application 1 with the Bureau of Lands. The said
application was approved in an order dated March 3, 1959 issued by the District Land
Officer and by authority of the Director of Lands.
Three (3) years thereafter, a "Notice of Intention to Make Final Proof was made by
Valentin Ouano to establish his claim to the lot applied for and to prove his residence and
cultivation before Land Inspector.
On April 15, 1963, an "Original Certificate of Title No. P-15353" was issued to private
respondent Valentin Ouano over Homestead Patent No. 181261 which was transcribed in
the "Registration Book" for the province of Davao on October 28, 1963. 3
After 19 years of possession, cultivation and income derived from coconuts planted on Lot
No. 986, private respondent Valentin Ouano was interrupted in his peaceful occupation
ISSUE: To whom should lot 379 be awarded?
To Rumarates. Rumarates open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of lot
379 for more than 30 years vested them title over the lot. Action for quieting of title is aimed to
determine the respective rights of the parties and to prevent future disturbances thereon; it is merely
a confirmation proceeding and; is
imprescriptible.
The requisites for an action for quieting of title are:
1. Plaintiff has legal or equitable title to or interest in the subject property.
2. The deed, claim, incumberance, or proceeding casts cloud on his title even if it appears to be valid
or legally efficient but was really invalid.
ISSUE: WON THE PARTY WHO BOUGHT IT WITH A NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED
AT THE BACK OF HER TITLE HAS THE BETTER RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION AS
AGAINST THE PARTY IN WHOSE FAVOR THE NOTICE WAS MADE.
HELD: NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, stating that this question is
resolved in favor of the party who had the notice annotated and who won the litigation over the
property, Maria Marron in this case.
A notice of lis pendens means that a certain property is involved in a litigation and serves as a notice
to the whole world that one who buys the same does it at his own risk. It was also a clear notice to
Maria Marasigan that there was a court case affecting her rights to the property she had purchased.
In the case at bar, although Marasigan acquired the property in question on December 18, 1974 or a
little over four (4) months before the filing of Marrons civil action against the Bazars, the transaction
became effective as against third persons only on July 5, 1977, when it was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Manila. It is the act of registration which creates constructive notice to the whole
world. Section 51 of Act 496, as amended by Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D.
1529) provides: Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance x x x affecting
registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the
province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the
time of such registering, filing or entering.
#
WON Valentine Ouano is the rightful owner of the questioned parcel of land.
Affirmative;
The public land certificate of title issued to private respondent attained the status of indefeasibility
one (1) year after the issuance of patent on April 15, 1963, hence, it is no longer open to review on
the ground of actual fraud. Consequently, the filing of the protest before the Bureau of Lands against
the Homestead Application of private respondent on January 3, 1975, or 12 years after, can no longer
re-open or revise the public land certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud. No reasonable and
plausible excuse has been shown for such an unusual delay. The law serves those who are vigilant
and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act.
The trial court merely applied the rule and jurisprudence that a person whose property has been
wrongly or erroneously registered in another's name is not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the
decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary
court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, for damages. 18
 thereof when a certain Arcadio Ybanez and his sons, Melquiades, Abdula, Eugenia
Numeriano, Apolonio and Victoriano, forcibly and unlawfully entered the land armed with
spears, canes and bolos.
Because of the unwarranted refusal of Arcadio Ybanez, et al. to vacate the premises since
the time he was dispossessed in 1975, private respondent Valentin Ouano filed a
complaint for recovery of possession, damages and attorney's fees before the then Court
of First Instance (now RTC) of Davao Oriental. Seeking to enjoin the Ybanezes from
further the coconuts therefrom and restore to him the peaceful possession and
occupation of the premises. In his complaint, Valentin Ouano, then plaintiff therein,
alleged that he has been in lawful and peaceful possession since 1956 to which an
Original Certificate of Title No. P-(l5353)-P-3932 was issued in his name; that petitioners,
then defendants therein, unlawfully entered his land on January 4, 1975 and started
cultivating and gathering the coconuts, bananas and other fruits therein, thereby illegally
depriving him of the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the premises.
15 Jacinto v. Director of During the period from 1911 to 1913, sales certificates were issued by the Bureau of
Lands [G.R. No. 26374. Lands to Frank W. Carpenter for more than 100 lots of the Tala and Piedad Friar Lands
December 31, 1926.] states located in Novaliches, Caloocan, Rizal including the lots 670, 690, 691, 695, 696,
697 698, 699, 700, 701, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, and 1050. The total area
of the land covered by the sales certificates being over 1,490 hectares and the purchase
price amounting to about P56,600, of which amount Carpenter up to the year 1923, had
paid in installments the sum of P16,272. Under a judgment rendered against Carpenter in
the CFI of Manila (Civil Case 24607), execution was levied upon all of his right, title and
interest in the lots purchased together with the improvements thereon, and on 16
November 1923, the sheriff of Rizal sold the property to Nicanor Jacinto. The sheriffs sale
was registered in the Bureau of Lands, assignments of the Bureau of Lands sales
certificates were duly recorded, and certificates of assignment were issued and delivered
to Nicanor Jacinto in September 1924.
On 31 March 1925, the Metropolitan Water District instituted proceedings in the CFI Rizal
for the condemnation of certain parcels of land situated in the municipality of Caloocan
for the construction of an earth dam and a first-class highway 3 kilometers long, in
connection with the so-called Angat Water Works Project, and on the same date the CFI
Rizal issued an order authorizing the Metropolitan Water District to take possession of
said parcels of land upon deposit with the provincial treasurer of the sum of P3,000 as the
provisional value, fixed by the court, of the parcels so to be condemned. By virtue of this
order, the Metropolitan Water District entered into occupation of the land and began the
construction of permanent improvements thereon. Copies of the complaint as well as of
the order of 31 March 1925, were filed with the register of deeds of the Province of Rizal
on 11 February 1926, to be recorded as notices of lis pendens. The lots enumerated
above were included in the land sought to be expropriated and Nicanor Jacinto was made
a party defendant in the proceedings. He admitted the existence of the right of
condemnation and the necessity for the expropriation, but demanded the sum of
P64,839.33 as indemnity for the expropriation. As the actual purchase price to be paid by
The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. 19
private respondent Ouano has a better right of possession over Lot No. 986 than petitioners who
claimed to own and possess a total of 12 hectares of land including that of Lot No. 986. Records
indicate that petitioners have not taken any positive step to legitimize before the Bureau of Lands
their self-serving claim of possession and cultivation of a total of 12 hectares of public agricultural
land by either applying for homestead settlement, sale patent, lease, or confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title by judicial legalization under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, as amended by
R.A. No. 1942 and P.D. 1073, or by administrative legalization (free patent) under Section 11 of Public
Land Law, as amended.1wphi1 What was clearly shown during the trial of the case was that
petitioners wrested control and possession of Lot No. 986 on January 4, 1975, or one (1) day after
they filed their belated protest on January 3, 1975 before the Bureau of Lands against the homestead
application of private respondent, thus casting serious doubt on their claim of prior possession and
productive cultivation.
DOCTRINE: The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the
one (1) year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based,
it becomes incontrovertible. 12 The settled rule is that a decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the ground of actual fraud
within one (1) year from the date of its entry and such an attack must be direct and not
by a collateral proceeding. 13 The validity of the certificate of title in this regard can be
threshed out only in an action expressly filed for the purpose. 14
1. Proprietary rights, except that of occupation, not affected by condemnation
proceedings
The proprietary rights, except the right of occupation, are not affected by the condemnation
proceedings until the title has passed to the plaintiff and that does not occur until the award of
compensation or damages has been satisfied.
2. Petition for a writ of mandamus not proper remedy to compel a conveyance
Mandamus is not the proper remedy to enforce purely contract rights, such as that in the present
case sought to be enforced. (18 R. C. L., 121; Quiogue vs. Romualdez, 46 Phil., 337.)
3. Land is patrimonial property of the Government; Duty to execute deeds of conveyance
devolved upon the Governor-General
The writ cannot issue in the present case unless it appears that the Director of Lands unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station. (Section 222, Code of Civil Procedure.) The land in question is private or patrimonial
property of the Philippine Government and we can find no law specially enjoining upon the Director of
Lands the duty to execute deeds of conveyance to purchasers of such lands; on the contrary, that
duty, under section 567 of the Administrative Code, appears to devolve upon the Governor-General.
4. Director of Land has duty to receive purchase money payable under Act 1120
By section 14 of Act No. 1120 the Director of Lands is charged with the duty of receiving the purchase
money payable under that Act and may therefore be compelled by mandamus to receive, as a purely
ministerial act, such purchase money when tendered.
 the purchaser from the Government only amounts to P13,725, including interest, the
Metropolitan Water District considered Jacintos demand excessive and declined to pay
the claim.
16. Manotok vs. Barque Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd.,
(2010) La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the
Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands. (It is a Friar Land.)
On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government
pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. The Estate was placed under the administration of the
Director of Lands.
Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after a fire gutted portions
of the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988 which destroyed records stored in the Office of
the Register of Deeds.
In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT
No. 372302 covering Lot No. 823 with an area of 342,945 square meters GRANTED
TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) was issued in 1991.
In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer Barque also covering Lot 823.
CAs findings - None of the parties were able to prove a valid alienation of Lot 823 from
the government in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1120 otherwise known as
the Friar Lands Act. Notably lacking in the deed of conveyance of the Manotoks
is the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce as required by
Section 18 of the said law.
BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:
Manotoks - Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in 1919. They have
since occupied the land, built their houses and buildings on it. The subject land is now
known as Manotok Compound.
Barques - Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from Emiliano Setosta who had
a TCT in his name.
Manahans - The lot originally belonged to his parents but was subsequently bought by his
wife. They had a caretaker on the property but she was ousted by armed men in 1950s
so they just declared the property for taxation to protect their rights.
17. CAUSAPIN vs CA Petitioners are the heirs of Agapito Causapin who died in October 1954 leaving a
473-square meter lot in Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna. On 25 June 1963, they partitioned
the land between them and the corresponding tax declarations were issued in their
individual names. Erlinda resided in the land until 1963 when she went to work in
Manila. When she got married she settled in Mandaluyong. Meanwhile, the land was
left to the care of her cousin, respondent Lorenza Manalo.
In 1986, Erlinda returned to Niugan and discovered that a building was being
constructed on the land. Upon inquiry from the Register of Deeds of Calamba,
Laguna, she learned that it was already titled in the name of respondent-spouses
Dominador de Guzman and Anastacia Batas under Original Certificate of Title No. P-
1796.
On 17 July 1986, Erlinda and Alberto lodged a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court of Laguna for rescission of deeds of sale and cancellation of OCT No. P-1796
against respondent-spouses Dominador de Guzman and Anastacia, Eusebio Calugay,
Renato Manalo, Lorenza Manalo and Benjamin C. Nadurate, Jr.
Then on 17 August 1967, the de Guzmans bought the share of petitioner Alberto for
P2,500.00. 4 Upon acquisition of the two parcels of land, the de Guzmans applied for
a free patent. On 28 April 1977, OCT No. P-1796 was issued in their name. 5 Since
then they have been paying the land taxes up to the present.
ISSUE: Who has the better right over Lot No. 823? NO ONE! It belongs to the National
Government.
Sale Certificate No. 1054 was not signed by the Director of Lands nor approved by the
Secretary of the Interior. The Certificates of Assignment of Sale contained only the signature of the
Director of Lands. The Manotoks belatedly secured from the National Archives a certified copy of
Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 dated December 7, 1932, which likewise lacks the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it was signed only by the Director of Lands.
It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the sale of friar lands shall
be valid only if approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce).
The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of real property taxes
and construction of buildings, are of no moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed
to prove the existence of the title allegedly issued in the name of Severino Mantotok after the latter
had paid in full the purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to why the only
copy of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record of documents leading to its issuance can be
found in the registry of deeds. As to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it
simply described the copy presented as DILAPIDATED without stating if the original copy of TCT No.
22813 actually existed in their records, nor any information on the year of issuance and name of
registered owner.
APPROVAL of DENR SECRETARY is indispensable for the validity of sale of friar lands.
Piedad QC Public Domain
WON Petitioners' CAUSAPIN action for the cancellation of OCT No. P-1796 was not
properly instituted? NO.
Furthermore, petitioners' action for the cancellation of OCT No. P-1796 was not properly instituted. It
should be remembered that the questioned property was a public land. We have held in a multitude
of cases, among which are Lopez v. Padilla 16 and Maximo v. CFI of Capiz, 17 that Sec. 101 of the
Public Land Act vests only in the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead the
authority to institute the action on behalf of the Republic for cancellation of title and for
reversion of the homestead to the Government. A recognized exception is that situation where
plaintiff-claimant seeks direct reconveyance from defendant public land unlawfully and in breach of
trust titled by him, on the principle of enforcement of a constructive trust, but such principle is in no
way applicable nor even invoked in this case.
In addition, an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent is equivalent
to a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible after one
(1) year from the date of issuance thereof; 18 in this case, one year from 28 April 1977. The
exception is where an action for the cancellation of a patent and the certificate of title pursuant
thereto is instituted on the ground that they are void because the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction
to issue them at all, the land in question having been withdrawn from the public domain prior to the
subsequent award of the patent and the grant of a certificate of title to another person, which does
not obtain in this case.

1 REPUBLIC VS. AGUNOY Gregorio Agunoy filed his application for free patent over Lots 1341 and 1342, an 18-ha.
parcel of land. This application was granted. The free patent led to the issuance of OCT P-
4522. Shortly after, the heirs of Perez caused an annotation of an adverse claim in their
favor over 15.1 hectares of the land covered by OCT P-4522. The heirs of Perez later filed
a formal protest. The investigation of the Bureau of Lands show that the free patent in
favor of Agunoy was indeed fraudulently obtained. Despite the protest, numerous
transactions regarding the land were made on the Agunoy side (subdivision of the lots,
sales, mortgages) causing the heirs of Perez to file a supplemental protest. On
investigation by the Bureau of Lands, it was found that an OCT for the lot covered by the
free patent already existed at the time of the granting of the free patent. These facts
brought the Republic, through the OSG, to file a case against several defendants who are
successors-in-interest of Agunoy.
2. ANDRES PITARGUE v. On July 30, 1941, plaintiff-appellee filed a miscellaneous sales application for a parcel of
LEANDRO SORILLA + land known as cadastral lot No. 2777 situated at Elang, Kidapawan, Cotabato, and paid a
deposit of P5 therefor (Exhibit F). The Bureau of Lands acknowledged receipt of his
application on November 22, 1941 (Exhibit E), and informed that it had been referred to
the district land office of Cotabato, Cotabato. Upon receipt of his acknowledgment he
started the construction of a small house on the lot, but the same was not finished
because of the outbreak of the war. In 1946 he had another house constructed on the lot,
which he used both as a clinic (he is a dentist) and as a residence. He introduced other
improvements on the land and these, together with the house, he declared for tax
purposes (Exhibit B), paying taxes thereon in 1947 and 1948 (Exhibits C and D). He
placed one Cacayorin in charge of the house, but Cacayorin left it on December 13, 1948.
Thereupon defendant-appellant herein demolished the house and built thereon one of his
own. On December 17, 1948, plaintiff went to defendant and asked the latter why he had
constructed a building on the land, and the latter gave the excuse that there was no sign
of interest on the part of the one who had applied for it.
Pitargue instituted an action of forcible entry in the justice of the peace court, praying
that Sorilla be ordered to vacate the lot usurped and removed the construction he had
made thereon. Sorilla filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, as the same falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Sorilla further contended that the Bureau of Lands
had jurisdiction because the lot is an unawarded public land, which is already under
investigation by the said bureau. On June 4, 1949, the justice of the peace court declared
itself without jurisdiction to try the case for the reason that the subject matter of the
action is the subject of an administrative investigation, prompting Pitargue to appeal.
4. Homena vs Casa Sabas Homena and Iluminad Juaneza filed a complaint against the spouses Dimas Casa
and Maria Castor for alleged unlawful acts of dispossession disturbing plaintiffs peaceful,
continuous, open, uninterrupted adverse and public possession of the property in
question.
Plaintiffs sought the annulment of the original certificate of title issued by the Register of
Deeds Cotabato in favor of defendant spouses pursuant to a Homestead Patent on the
ground that said patent was obtained by defendant spouses through fraud and
misrepresentation by stating in their application that the lot was not claimed and occupied
by another person.
Plaintiffs alleged that on June 15, 1967, they purchased from the defendants two (2)
hectares of the aforementioned parcel of land, it being agreed in the deed of sale that the
IN FAVOR of Respondent Sps. De Guzman
Issue: Whether or not the Republic is a real party-in-interest
Held: The Republic is not the real party-in-interest. To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in
whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right
sought to be enforced. As stated in the facts, the land sought to be reconveyed in the Republic's suit
belongs to a private party by virtue of the OCT previously issued to such party and is no longer a
disposable public land at the time of the fraudulent granting of free patent. The Republic then no
longer has a right to the reconveyance of the land.
Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to entertain an action of forcible entry
instituted by a bona fide applicant of public land; and
Yes, courts have jurisdiction over the controversy. Before the enactment of the first Public Land Act
(Act No. 926) the action of forcible entry was already available in the courts of the country. The Lands
Department does not have the means to police public lands; neither does it have the means to
prevent disorders arising therefrom, or contain breaches of the peace among settlers; or to pass
promptly upon conflicts of possession. Its power is limited to
disposition and alienation, and while it may decide conflicts of possession in order to make proper
award, the settlement of conflicts of possession which is recognized in the court herein has another
ultimate purpose: the protection of actual possessors and occupants with a view to the prevention of
breaches of the peace. The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer dispose,
and alienate public lands, therefore, must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the
Government of the exercise of the respective functions or powers thereon.
Whether or not a public land applicant Pitargue, may be considered as having any right to
the land occupied.
It has been held that entry based upon priority in the initiatory steps, even if not accompanied by
occupation, may be recognized as against as against another applicant. One of the reasons of policies
supporting the recognition of a right in a bona fide applicant who has occupied the land applied for.
Recognition of the right encourages actual settlement; it discourages speculation and land-grabbing.
Even pending the investigating of and resolution on, an application by a bona fide occupant, by the
priority of his application and record of his entry, he acquires a right to the possession of the public
land he applied for against any other public land applicant.
Issue: Whether or not the Doctrine of Implied Trust applies.
Held: No.
Basically, the plaintiffs' supposed cause of action rests upon the deed of sale executed by defendants
in their favor on June 15, 1962 wherein the latter sold a two-hectare portion of the homestead which
they were applying for to the plaintiffs on the understanding that the actual conveyance of the said
portion to plaintiffs would be made only after the lapse of the five-year period during which, under
the Public Land Act, the homestead owner was prohibited from transferring his rights. The agreement
is clearly illegal and void ab initio; it is intended to circumvent and violate the law.
As parties to a void contract, the plaintiffs have no rights which they can enforce and the
court cannot lend itself to its enforcement. Plaintiffs can neither invoke the doctrine of
 said portion would be reconveyed to plaintiffs after the five-year prohibitory period and
that the defendants failed to abide by the said agreement.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, based on the following grounds:
(1) the complaint is barred by prescription, since thirteen years had elapsed from
the issuance of the homestead patent before the action was filed;
(2) plaintiff has no cause of action, since the deed of sale executed on June 15,
1952 or prior to the approval of the application and issuance of the homestead patent
was null and void and inoperative to convey the land in question, which was at that time
still public land; and
(3) plaintiff is not the proper party to institute the action to annul the homestead
patent.
5. Lee Chuy Realty A valuable piece of land located at Meycauyan, Bulacan, with an area of 24,576 sq. m.
Corporation vs CA and Marc and covered by OCT No. 0-5290 is disputed by Lee Chuy Realty Corporation and Marc
Realty And Development Realty and Development Corp. Such land was originally co-owned by Ruben Jacinto(one-
Corporation sixth), Dominador, Arsenio, Liwayway all surnamed Bascara and Ernesto jacinto
(collectively owned the remaining five-sixths).
On Feb. 4, 1981, Ruben Jacinto sold his one-sixth pro-indiviso share to LEE CHUY
REALTY which was registered 30 April 1981. On 5 May 1989 the Bascaras and Ernesto
Jacinto also sold their share toMARC REALTY which was registered on 16 October 1989.
Lee Chuy Realty claims that it was never informed of the existence of the sale between
Marc Realtyand the Bascaras/Jacinto. Marc Realty insists that Lee Chuy verbally notified of
the sale and was given a copy of the deed of sale.
On 13 November 1989 LEE CHUY REALTY filed a complaint for legal redemption against
MARCREALTY and consigned in court a manager's check for 614,400. MARC REALTY
insisted that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action there being
no allegation of prior valid tender of payment or a prior valid notice of consignation.
5. SALA vs CFI Daniel Junco was granted by the President of the Philippines homestead patentno.
255492 over a parcel of land. The cadastral survey of Basay Negros Oriental, with atotal
area of 72,941 square meters. He received information of the issuance. Heregistered the
patent and was issued by the Register of Deeds of the province, OCT No.7936 covering
the same lots. Private respondent, on the other hand, registered thedeed of sale but he
was never issued any title thereto. His grandfather, however, paidthe real estate taxes.
The entire lots were sold at a public auction held by the provincialsheriff. The latter on
that same day, executed in favor of petitioner Juan Sala as judgment creditor and being
the highest bidder thereat, a certificate of sale andsubsequently, OCT No. 7936 was
cancelled and TCT No. 1300 was issued to petitioner.Since he bought the lots, petitioner
had been in possession thereof except the portionsold to private respondent. Petitioner
made demands from private respondent for thesurrender of the portion sold to him but
he refused. Petitioner then filed with the thenCourt of First Instance of Negros Oriental an
action for recovery of possession docketedas Civil Case No. 5966 against private
respondent.
6. SUSI vs RAZON Plaintiff-Appellee Valentin Susi is third of subsequent owners of the land coming under
dispute. Susis occupation and possession of said land for twenty-five (25) years has been
open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption until defendant Angela
Razon came to commence action to recover the possession of the land. Razon after
implied trust based on an illegal contract. The issue of prescription or laches becomes irrelevant
in a case such as this, where plaintiffs clearly have no cause of action.
Implied Trust: one which comes into being by operation of law (Art. 1441); may be:
1. Resulting Trust- one in which the intention to create a trust is implied or presumed
in law;
2. Constructive Trust one imposed by law irrespective of, and even contrary to, any
such intention for the purpose of promoting justice, frustrating fraud, or
preventing unjust enrichment.
Doctrine of implied trust - [The doctrine] enunciated in Art. 1456 of the Civ. Code [which provides
that] if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
[Armamento v. Guerrero, GR L-34228 Feb. 21, 1980].
Article 1456 (Constructive Trust): If the property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes.
WON a formal offer to redeem accompanied with tender of payment a condition
precedent to the filing of an action for the valid exercise of the right of legal redemption;
is the filing of the action with consignation equivalent to a formal offer to redeem.
HELD: the SC ruled that the five year period for legal redemption starts from the date of the execution of the
deed of sale and not from the date of registration in the office of the Register of Deeds. This is true even if full
payment of the purchase price is not made on the date of conveyance, unless there is a stipulation in the deed
that ownership shall not vest in the vendee until full payment of the price. The redemption of extrajudicially
foreclosed properties, o the other hand , is exercisable within one yr from the date of the auction sale as
provided for in the Act no. 3135
Issue: whether or not a judgment creditor who bought at a public auction, a landcovered
by a free patent, can recover possession thereof from another buyer to whom the same
was conveyed by the grantee and judgment debtor?
Held: In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the sale made by the grantee, DanielJunco to private
respondent, of the 7,500 square meters. The sale produced the effect of annullment and cancellation
of the title issued to Daniel Junco.
Issue: Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the parcel of land.
Yes, Valentin Susi having been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely,
and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-
incurring an unfavorable judgment from the Trial Court, elevated her plea to the Director
of Lands, this time gaining a favorable judgment with the land sold to her. With the
acquisition of a Certificate of Title, Razon resolved to evict Susi from the land, giving rise
to the action instigated by Susi.
five years and so, by legal fiction, had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State. When
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of
law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate
of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874. The land in question
already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property and thus beyond even the
control of the Director of Lands and consequently cannot dispose of it. Thus, the sale transacted with
Razon was void and of no effect, nor did she acquire any right by it. Susi has the right to bring an
action to recover possession thereof and hold it for the land under dispute had already become, by
operation of law, his private property thus lacking only the judicial sanction of his title
the Supreme Court ruled that where all the necessary requirement for a government are complied
with through actual, physical possession, openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to certificate
of title to said land . the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a
right to grant , but a grant to government. For it is necessarythat a certificate of title be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court-an application therefor being sufficient under
the provisions of section 47 of act no. 2874.