reconsideration therefrom.
The NLRC-
UNITY FISHING
DEVELOPMENT CORP.
and/or ANTONIO
DEE, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and
DOMINADOR
LAGUIN, respondents.
RESOLUTION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The present petition arose from the
Resolution dated January 31, 2000 issued by
the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition
for certiorari for being out of time. A
Motion for Reconsideration thereto was
likewise denied in the Resolution of July 12,
2000. The Court of Appeals applied the
earlier amendment which considered only
the remaining period from receipt of the
order denying the motion for reconsideration
in reckoning the reglementary period to file
the petition.
It appears that a complaint for illegal
dismissal, underpayment of wages, overtime
pay, premium pay for holidays and rest
days, 13th month pay, service incentive leave
pay, separation pay and for moral damages
was filed by respondent Dominador Laguin
against petitioners Unity Fishing
Development Corporation and/or Antonio
Dee before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor
Arbiter rendered judgment on August 3,
1998 declaring the dismissal of respondent
as illegal and ordering herein petitioners to
pay the former backwages, separation pay
and salary differential. Respondents other
claims were dismissed, for lack of merit. On
appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) affirmed the
judgment. Petitioners filed a motion for
resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration was received by petitioners
on October 6, 1999. Thus, on December 6,
1999, petitioners filed, by registered mail, a
petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. In its Resolution dated January 31,
2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for having been filed eleven (11)
days past its due date. The Court of Appeals
did not rule on the merits of the case. The
motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied in the Resolution dated July 12,
2000, which resolution was received by
petitioners on August 1, 2000.[1]
Hence, the present petition
for certiorari. Petitioners invoke the recent
amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 where the
period of sixty (60) days is reckoned from
receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration. Petitioners argue that this
amendment must be applied retroactively.
In the instant petition, petitioners
invoke A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which took
effect on September 1, 2000, particularly
amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure wherein the sixty-
day (60) period is reckoned from receipt of
the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration. Thus, applying said
amendment, considering that petitioners
received on October 6, 1999 the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration, the
filing of the petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals on December 6, 1999
would have been within the reglementary
period.
Petitioners argue that the new rule gives
a party whose motion for reconsideration
has been denied a fresh 60-day period to file
a petition for certiorari. This rule, according
to petitioners, must apply
retroactively. Petitioners further allege that
the Court of Appeals Resolution dated July
12, 2000 denying their motion for
reconsideration was received on August 1,
2000 but the present petition was filed with
this Court on October 2, 2000, because
September 29, 2000, although the 60th day, is
a Saturday.
On November 20, 2000, this Court
issued a Resolution requiring respondents to
comment on the petition.
Respondent Dominador Laguin filed his
Comment alleging that the amendment in
Section 4, Rule 65 took effect on September
1, 2000 and thus cannot be applied
retroactively.
A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC amending
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure (as amended by the
Resolution of July 21, 1998) took effect on
September 1, 2000 and provides, to wit:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed.
--- The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty
(60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the
Supreme Court or, if it relates to the
acts or omissions of a lower court or of
a corporation, board, officer or person,
in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the
acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition
shall be granted except for compelling
reason and in no case exceeding fifteen
(15) days.
As we have ruled in the case
of Systems Factors Corporation and
Modesto Dean vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
143789 (promulgated on November 27,
2000), the amendment under A.M. No. 00-2-
03-SC wherein the sixty-day period to file a
petition for certiorari is reckoned from
receipt of the resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration should be deemed
applicable. We reiterate that remedial
statutes or statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create
new or take away vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing, do
not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against
retroactive operation of statutes.[2] Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will
be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right
of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected.[3] The reason is that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to
nor arise from procedural laws.[4]
The above conclusion is consonant with
the provision in Section 6, Rule 1 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that (T)hese
Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.
As alleged in the petition, the NLRC-
Resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration was received by petitioners
on October 6, 1999 and the petition
for certiorari was filed on December 6,
1999, a Monday.[5] Applying the amendment
to Section 4, Rule 65, the last day for filing
the petition for certiorari should have been
December 5, 1999. December 5 being a
Sunday, the time shall not run until the next
working day pursuant to Rule 22.[6] Hence,
when petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals the petition for certiorari on
December 6, 1999, the same was still within
the reglementary period.
WHEREFORE, the assailed
Resolutions dated January 31, 2000 and July
12, 2000 are hereby SET ASIDE and the
case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
PATES v. COMELEC, GR. No. 184915, June
30, 2009
Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition
shall be filed within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration
of said judgment or final order or
resolution, if allowed under the procedural
rules of the Commission concerned, shall
interrupt the period herein fixed. If the
motion is denied, the aggrieved party may
file the petition within the remaining
period, but which shall not be less than five
(5) days in any event, reckoned from notice
of denial.
FACTS:
The following material antecedents:
a. February 1, 2008 The COMELEC
First Division issued its Resolution
(assailed in the petition);
b. February 4, 2008 The counsel
for petitioner Nilo T. Pates
(petitioner) received a copy of the
February 1, 2008 Resolution;
c. February 8, 2008 The petitioner
filed his motion for reconsideration
(MR) of the February 1, 2008
Resolution (4 days from receipt of
the February 1, 2008 Resolution)
d. September 18, 2008 The
COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution denying the petitioners
MR (also assailed in the petition).
e. September 22, 2008 The
petitioner received the COMELEC en
banc Resolution of September 18,
2008
Petitioner filed his petition for certiorari on
the final COMELEC Resolution on October
22, 2008 or two days late which must be
filed 30 days from such notice however it
fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the
petitioner only had the remaining period of
26 days to file his petition, after using up 4
days in preparing and filing his Motion for
Reconsideration. His petition was
dismissed. He insists that the fresh period
rule applicable to a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 should likewise apply to
petitions for certiorari of COMELEC rulings
filed under Rule 64. He asks for Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for
reconsideration should be granted.
RULING:
As a Matter of Law
No. Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution provides that unless otherwise
provided by the Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For
this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a
separate rule (Rule 64) specifically
applicable only to decisions of the
COMELEC and the Commission on
Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the
application of Rule 65 in the filing of a
petition for certiorari, subject to the
exception clause except as hereinafter
provided. Rule 64, however, cannot simply
be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly
refers to the latter rule.
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be
equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly
refers to the latter rule. Procedurally, the
most patent difference between the two
i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64
refers to is Section 3 which provides for a
special period for the filing of petitions
for certiorari from decisions or rulings of
the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30
days from notice of the decision or ruling
(instead of the 60 days that Rule 65
provides), with the intervening period used
for the filing of any motion for
reconsideration deductible from the
originally-granted 30 days (instead of the
fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65
provides).
Significantly, the petitioner presented no
exceptional circumstance or any compelling
reason to warrant the non-application of
Section 3, Rule 64 to his petition. He failed
to explain why his filing was late. Other
than his appeal to history, uniformity, and
convenience, he did not explain why we
should adopt and apply the fresh period
rule to an election case.
As a Matter of Policy
The reason, as made clear above, is
constitutionally-based and is no less than
the importance our Constitution accords to
the prompt determination of election
results. This reason far outweighs
convenience and uniformity.
Our Liberal Approach
Largely for the same reason and as
discussed below, we are not inclined to
suspend the rules to come to the rescue of
a litigant whose counsel has blundered by
reading the wrong applicable provision. The
Rules of Court are with us for the prompt
and orderly administration of justice;
litigants cannot, after resorting to a wrong
remedy, simply cry for the liberal
construction of these rules.
We add that even for this Court, liberality
does not signify an unbridled exercise of
discretion. It has its limits; to serve its
purpose and to preserve its true worth, it
must be exercised only in the most
appropriate cases.