G.R. No.

L-1812 August 27, 1948

EREMES KOOKOORITCHKIN, petitioner,

vs.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, oppositor.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for appellant.
L. D. Lockwood and Manuel O. Chan for appellee.

PERFECTO, J.:

In August, 1941, appellee filed with the lower court a petition for naturalization, accompanied with
supporting affidavits of two citizens, copy of a declaration of intention sworn in July, 1940, and proper
notice of the hearing. The petition was finally set for hearing on December 18, 1941, but it was held on
that date because the province was invaded by the Japanese forces on December 14, and the case
remained pending until the records were destroyed during the military operations for liberation in March,
1945. The case was declared reconstituted on May 10, 1947, and the evidence was presented on August
28 and September 30, 1947. On the same day resolution was issued granting the petition.

Although appellant was represented at the hearing and cross-examined the witnesses for the petitioner,
he did not file an opposition or presented any evidence.

The lower court made the findings of fact in the following paragraphs of its resolution:

Eremes Kookooritchkin applies for Philippine citizenship naturalization under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 473, as amended by Act 535.

The records shows that in August, 1941, he filed his petition for naturalization supported by the
affidavits of ex-Judge Jaime M. Reyes and Dr. Salvador Mariano, both residents of Camarines
Sur. In the preceding year, in July, 1940 to be precise, he filed his declaration of intention to
become a citizen of this country. Notice of the hearing was published as required by law.

It was established at the hearing that the petitioner is a native-born Russian, having first seen the
light of day on November 4, 1897 in the old City of St. Petersburg, Russia. He grew up as a
citizen of the defunct Imperial Russian Government under the Czars. World War I found him in
the military service of this Government. In 1915 he volunteered for the Imperial Russian navy and
was sent to the Navy Aviation School. He fought with the Allies in the Baltic Sea, was later
transferred to the eastern front in Poland, and much later was sent as a navy flier to Asia Minor.
In the latter part of the war, but before the Russian capitulation, he was transferred to the British
Air Force under which he served for fourteen months. When the revolution broke out in Russia in
1917, he joined the White Russian Army at Vladivostok and fought against the Bolsheviks until
1922 when the White Russian Army was overwhelmed by the Bolsheviks. As he refused to join
the Bolshevik regime, he fled by sea from Vladivostok to Shanghai and from this Chinese port he
found his way to Manila, arriving at this port as a member of a group of White Russians under
Admiral Stark in March, 1923. He stayed in Manila for about seven months, then moved to
Olongapo, Zambales, where he resided for about a year, and from this place he went to Iriga,
Camarines Sur, where he established his permanent residence since May, 1925. He has
remained a resident of this municipality, except for a brief period from 1942 to July, 1945, when
by reason of his underground activities he roamed mountains of Caramoan as a guerrilla officer.
After liberation he returned to Iriga where again he resides up to the present time.

The applicant is married to a Filipino by the name of Concepcion Segovia, with whom he has one
son named Ronald Kookooritchkin. He is at present studying in Saint Agnes Academy, at
Legaspi, Albay, a school duly recognized by the Government.

The applicant is shop superintendent of A. L. Ammen Transportation Company, with about eighty
Filipino employees working under him. He receives an annual salary of P13,200 with free
quarters and house allowance. He also owns stocks and bonds of this and other companies.

The applicant speaks and writes English and the Bicol dialect. Socially he intermingles with the
Filipinos, attending parties, dances and other social functions with his wife. He has a good moral
character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. He has never been
accused of any crime. On the other hand, he has always conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire period of residence in Camarines Sur, in his relations
with the constituted authorities as well as with the community.

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 Although he could have lived in ease by maintaining good relations with the enemy by reason of
his being Russian-born during the years preceding the declaration of war by Russia against
Japan, the applicant of his own volition chose to cast his lot with the guerrilla movement and
fought the enemy in several encounters in the Province of Camarines Sur. He belonged to the
guerrilla outfit of Colonel Padua with rank of major. Upon the arrival of the forces of liberation he
was attached to the American Army from April to June, 1945.

Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of Soviet Russia. He disclaims allegiance to the
present Communist Government of Russia. He is, therefore, a stateless refugee in this country,
belonging to no State, much less to the present Government of the land of his birth to which he is
uncompromisingly opposed. He is not against organized government or affiliated with any
association which upholds and teaches doctrine opposing all organized governments. He does
not believe in the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the
success or predominance of his ideas. Neither is he a polygamist or a believer in the practice of
polygamy. He is not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable contagious disease.

Appellant assigns four errors in the appealed resolution. We will consider them separately.

Appellant claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the declaration of intention to become a
Filipino citizen filed by appellee is invalid and insufficient as a basis for the petition of naturalization. The
question calls for the application of the following provision of section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law:

No declaration shall be valid until entry for permanent residence has been established and a
certificate showing the date, place and manner of his arrival has been issued.

Appellant alleges that no documentary or testimonial evidence was introduced to establish the fact that
appellee had lawfully been admitted into the Philippines for permanent residence.

In the reconstituted declaration (page 11, record on appeal) the following can be read:

I arrived at the Port of Manila on or about the first day of March, 1923, as shown by the attached
certificate of arrival or landing certificate of residence.

The records of the Bureau of Justice, where the declarations of intention to become a Filipino citizen were
filed, had been lost or destroyed during the battle for the liberation of Manila, and the certificate alluded to
has not been reconstituted.

Appellant's contention that attachment of the certificate of arrival is essential to the validity of a
declaration finds no support in the wordings of the law, as the above-quoted section 5 of Commonwealth
Act no. 473 uses the words "has been issued.

Appellee suggests that we would not consider the question here raised by appellant, the latter having
failed to raise it in lower court and points out that there is testimonial evidence showing appellee's arrival
March, 1923, and that he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and the testimony of petitioner
has not been refuted. Appellee's alleges that the office of the President has certified that it is a matter of
record that petitioner was one of the Russian refugees who entered the Philippines under the command
of Admiral Stark, the facts regarding arrival of the latter fleet being a matter of common knowledge, widely
publicized in the newspapers at the time, of which this Court may properly take judicial notice under
section 5 of Rule 123. When the fleet entered the Philippine waters, it was met by a Governor General
Wood who, later, took the matter up with the authorities in Washington in lengthy correspondence, and
the 1,200 persons manning the fleet were allowed to land and to remain in the Philippines or proceed to
other countries, except about 800 who were allowed to go to the United States and given free
transportation on the naval transport "Merritt." The ships of the fleet were sold in the Philippines.

The undisputed fact that the petitioner has been continuously residing in the Philippines for about 25
years, without having been molested by the authorities, who are presumed to have been regularly
performing their duties and would have arrested petitioner if his residence is illegal, as rightly contended
by appellee, can be taken as evidence that he is enjoying permanent residence legally. That a certificate
of arrival has been issued is a fact that should be accepted upon the petitioner's undisputed statement in
his declaration of July, 1940, that the certificate cannot be supposed that the receiving official would have
accepted the declaration without the certificate mentioned therein as attached thereto.

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We conclude that petitioner's declaration is valid under section 5 of the Naturalization Law, failure to
reconstitute the certificate of arrival notwithstanding. What an unreconstituted document intended to
prove may be shown by other competent evidence.

II

The second assignment of error touches upon two questions, that the lower court erred (1) in not finding
that appellee has not established a legal residence in the Philippines, and (2) in not finding that he cannot
speak and write any of the principal Philippine languages.

The first question has already been disposed of in the above discussion. Perusal of the testimonies on
record leads to the conclusion that petitioner has shown legal residence in the Philippines for a
continuous period of not less than ten years as required by section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.

As to the next question, appellant alleges that in the oral test at the hearing, it was demonstrated that
petitioner has only a smattering of Bicol, the Filipino language that petitioner alleges to know, and he
cannot speak it as he was not able to translate from English to Bicol questions asked by the court and the
provincial fiscal, although, in the continuation of the hearing on September 30, 1947, "surprisingly
enough, he succeeded answering correctly in Bicol the questions propounded by his counsel, however,
he fumbled and failed to give the translation of such a common word as 'love' which the fiscal asked of
him.

The lower court made the finding of fact that applicant speaks and writes English and Bicol and there
seems to be no question about the competency of the judge who made the pronouncement, because he
has shown by the appealed resolution and by his questions propounded to appellee, that he has
command of both English and Bicol.

The law has not set a specific standard of the principal Philippine languages. A great number of
standards can be set. There are experts in English who say that Shakespeare has used in his works
15,000 different English words, and the King's Bible about 10,000, while about 5,000 are used by the
better educated persons and about 3,000 by the average individual. While there may be persons
ambitious enough to have a command of the about 600,000 words recorded in the Webster's International
Dictionary, there are authorities who would reduce basic English to a few hundred words. Perhaps less
than one hundred well selected words will be enough for the ordinary purposes of daily life.

There is a reason to believe that the lower court's pronouncement is well taken considering the fact that,
after he was liberated in 1942 from the Japanese in the Naga prison, petitioner joined the guerrilla in the
Bicol region, took part in encounters and skirmishes against the Japanese, and remained with the
guerrilla until the Americans liberated the Bicol provinces. If appellee with his smattering of Bicol was able
to get along with his Bicol comrades in the hazardous life of the resistance movement, we believe that his
knowledge of the language satisfies the requirement of the law.

But appellant contends that there is no piece of positive evidence to support petitioner's allegation that he
can write too in the Bicol language. There, is, however, on record circumstantial evidence from which it
can be concluded that petitioner ought to know also how to write Bicol. We know that Bicol, as all the
important Philippine languages, uses the same alphabet used in English, and it is much easier to write
Bicol than English, because it is phonetic. Vowels and consonants have in them single and not
interchangeable phonetic values, while English words deviate very often from the basic sounds of the
alphabet. The ability to write cannot be denied to a person like petitioner, who has undergone the
exacting technical training to be able to render services as flier in the Russian Naval Squadron in the
Baltic Sea and in the British Air Forces during the first World War. The difference between the Cyrillic
alphabet, as now used by Russians, and our Roman alphabet, cannot weigh much to deny petitioner the
ability to use the latter. A person who has shown the command of English which can be seen in his
testimony on record can easily make use of an alphabet of twenty or more letters universally used in this
country where he has been residing continuously for 25 years.

III

Appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding appellee stateless and not a Russian citizen and
in not finding that he has failed to establish that he is not disqualified for Philippine citizenship under
section 4 (h) of the Revised Naturalization Law.

It is contended that petitioner failed to show that under the laws of Russia, appellee has lost his Russian
citizenship and failed to show that Russia grants to Filipinos the right to become a naturalized citizens or
subjects thereof. The controversy centers on the question as to whether petitioner is a Russian citizen or
is stateless.

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Petitioner testified categorically that he is not a Russian citizen and that he has no citizenship. His
testimony supports the lower court's pronouncement that petitioner is a stateless refugee in this country.

Appellant points out that petitioner stated in his petition for naturalization that he is citizen or subject of the
Empire of Russia, but the Empire of Russia has ceased to exist since the Czars were overthrown in 1917
by the Bolshevists, and the petitioner disclaims allegiance or connection with the Soviet Government
established after the overthrow of the Czarist Government.

We do not believe that the lower court erred in pronouncing appellee stateless. Appellee's testimony,
besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the well-known fact that the ruthlessness of modern
dictatorship has scattered throughout the world a large number of stateless refugees or displaced
persons, without country and without flag. The tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships toward all
opposition induced them to resort to beastly oppression, concentration camps and blood purges, and it is
only natural that the not-so-fortunate ones who were able to escape to foreign countries should feel the
loss of all bonds of attachment to the hells which were formerly their fatherland's. Petitioner belongs to
that group of stateless refugees.

Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the world ought to know, the history, nature and character of the
Soviet dictatorship, presently the greatest menace to humanity and civilization, it would be technically
fastidious to require further evidence of petitioner's claim that he is stateless than his testimony that he
owes no allegiance to the Russian Communist Government and, is because he has been at war with it,
he fled from Russia to permanently reside in the Philippines. After finding in this country economic
security in a remunerative job, establishing a family by marrying a Filipina with whom he has a son, and
enjoying for 25 years the freedoms and blessings of our democratic way of life, and after showing his
resolution to retain the happiness he found in our political system to the extent of refusing to claim
Russian citizenship even to secure his release from the Japanese and of casting his lot with that of our
people by joining the fortunes and misfortunes of our guerrillas, it would be beyond comprehension to
support that the petitioner could feel any bond of attachment to the Soviet dictatorship.

IV

The fourth and last assignment of error need not be discussed, it being only a sequel of the other
assignments and has necessarily been disposed of in their discussion.

The appealed resolution is affirmed.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. L-16922. April 30, 1963.]

IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE, MARVIN G. ELLIS and
GLORIA C. ELLIS, Petitioners-Appellees, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-
Appellant.

Leonardo F. Lansagan for Petitioner-Appellee.

Solicitor General for Oppositor-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. ADOPTION; NON-RESIDENT ALIENS CANNOT ADOPT IN THE PHILIPPINES. Petitioners, who

are husband and wife, had been in the Philippines for three (3) years at the time of the hearing of the
petition for adoption, the husband being assigned as staff sergeant in the U.S. Air Force Base in Angeles,
Pampanga. Not being permanent residents, they cannot adopt in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 335
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that non-residents cannot adopt.

2. ID.; ID.; NATURE OF ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS. Adoption proceedings being in rem, no court
may entertain them unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the
parties, but, also, over the res, which is the personal status not only of the person to be adopted, but also
of the adopting parents. The Civil Code of the Philippines (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction
over the status of a natural person is determined by his nationality. Pursuant thereto, the Philippine courts
have no jurisdiction over the status of an alien petitioner in adoption proceedings. The political law of
system, which adopts the view that personal status, in general is determine by and/or subject to the
jurisdiction of the domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of laws, p. 86; The Conflict of Laws

4
by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II pp. 713-714). Hence, under either the nationality theory or the domiciliary
theory, the Philippine courts cannot assume an exercise jurisdiction over the status of petitioners, who are
not domiciled in the Philippines, and, hence, non-resident aliens.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal taken by the Government from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga granting the
petition of Marvin G. Ellis and Gloria C. Ellis for the adoption of a Filipino baby girl named Rose.

Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Francisco, California, is 28 years of age. On September 3,
1949, he married Gloria C. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens of the United States.
Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959 at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later,
the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary Villa an institution for unwed mothers and their
babies stating that she (the mother) could not take care of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her
(the mothers family.)

Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the
petition on January 14, 1960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in the Philippines for three
(3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles,
Pampanga, where both lived at that time. They had been in the Philippines before, or, to be exact, in
1953.

The only issue in this appeal is whether not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are
qualified to adopt Baby Rose. Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The following cannot adopt:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

"(4) Non-resident aliens;"

x x x

This legal provision is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we may sympathize with
the plight of Baby Rose and with the good intentions of petitioners herein, the law leaves us no choice but
to apply its explicit terms, which unqualifiedly deny to petitioners the power to adopt anybody in the
Philippines.

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain,
unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but, also, over
the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code
(Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the
latters nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a
citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners. Under our political
law, which is patterned after the Anglo-American legal system, we have, likewise, adopted the latters
view to the effect that personal status, in general, is determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the
domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I,
p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714). This, perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code does not permit adoption by
non-resident aliens, and we have consistently refused to recognize the validity of foreign decrees of
divorce regardless of the grounds upon which the same are based involving citizens of the
Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the forum, even when our laws authorized absolute divorce
in the Philippines (Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Gonayeb v. Hashim, 30 Phil. 22; Cousine Hix v.
Fleumer, 55 Phil. 851; Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; Recto v. Harden, L-6897, Nov. 29,
1955)."

Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines and, hence, non-resident aliens
we cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over their status, under either the nationality theory or the
domiciliary theory. In any event, whether the above- quoted provision of said Art. 335 is predicated upon
lack of jurisdiction over the res, or merely affects the cause of action, we have no authority to grant the

5
relief prayed for by petitioners herein, and it has been so held in Caraballo v. Republic, L-15080 (April 25,
1962) and Katancik v. Republic, L-15472 (June 30, 1962).

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered denying
the petition in this case.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Padilla and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., did not take part.

G.R. No. L-24530 October 31, 1968

BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONERS and COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, petitioners,

vs.
BEATO GO CALLANO, MANUEL GO CALLANO, GONZALO GO CALLANO, JULIO GO CALLANO
and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero and Solicitor
Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem for respondents.

DIZON, J.:

On July 13, 1962, the Department of Foreign Affairs informed the Commissioner of Immigration that, on
the basis of the findings made by the National Bureau of Investigation, the signatures of former Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto M. Serrano, on certain documents, amongst them cable authorization No.
2230-V (File No. 23617) authorizing the documentation of Beato Go Callano and others, were not
authentic. Thereupon, the Department declared several documents among them the cable authorization
just mentioned to be null, void and of no effect, and the documentation made by the Philippine Consulate
General at Hongkong pursuant to said cable authorization consisting of the certificates of registration and
identity issued to Beato Go Callano and his brothers Manuel, Gonzalo and Julio for travel to the
Philippines were cancelled. All this was done without previous notice served nor hearing granted to said
parties.

On August 21 of the same year, the Board of Immigration Commissioners, exercising its power of review
under Section 27 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, issued, also without any previous
notice and hearing, an order reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry dated January 4, 1962,
admitting Beato and his three brothers for entry as citizens; ordering their exclusion as aliens not properly
documented for admission pursuant to Section 27 (a) (17) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, and ordering that they be returned to the port whence they came or to the country of which
they were nationals, upon the ground that they had been able "to enter this country and gain admission
as Filipino citizens by the fraudulently secured authorization." On the same date (August 21, 1962) the
Commissioner of Immigration issued a warrant of exclusion commanding the deportation officer "to carry
out the exclusion of the above-named applicants (the Go Callano brothers) on the first available
transportation and on the same class of accommodation in which they arrived to the port whence they
came or to the country of which they are nationals."

The warrant of exclusion, for one reason or another, was not served immediately upon the parties
ordered deported, who, on November 16, 1962, filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for
injunction to restrain the Board of Immigration Commissioners and the Commissioner of Immigration from
executing the order of exclusion or deportation already mentioned. They based their action on the
following grounds: (1) that the Board had no jurisdiction to exclude them from the Philippines because
they were not aliens but Filipino citizens, and (2) that the order of exclusion was issued by the Board
without due process and in violation of the Constitution. Months later, the Court of First Instance issued a
writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondents in the case from deporting the petitioners. After
trial, the Court rendered judgment finding that, according to petitioners' undisputed evidence, "the
petitioners herein are the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, with her common-law
husband a Chinese citizen," and concluding that "until the petitioners left for China in 1947, they must
be considered as citizens of the Philippines as they were born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
who, however, was not married to their mother."

Notwithstanding the above finding and conclusion, however, the Court dismissed the case holding that
"the petitioners are citizens of the Republic of China and not being properly documented for entry into the
Philippines as found by the Immigration Commissioner, the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued
by this Court shall be deemed dissolved upon finality of this decision." The grounds upon which the Court
based its decision were: (1) because petitioners stayed in China for a period of fifteen years before
returning to the Philippines, they must be considered as citizens of the Chinese Republic; (2) as

6
petitioners were recognized by their alien father as his children, they became Chinese citizens under the
Chinese law of nationality. While the Court also found that the cable authorization mentioned heretofore
was a forgery, it held that, for the purpose of the petition before it, "it was immaterial to determine the
genuineness or falsity of the cable authorization. For if the petitioners are Filipino citizens, they are
entitled to remain within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic in whatever way they might have
entered."

After the denial of herein respondents' motion for re-consideration, they appealed to the Court of Appeals
where they raised the following issues: (a) that being Filipino citizens by birth, they did not lose their
citizenship nor acquire Chinese citizenship, neither by their prolonged stay in China nor by their alleged
recognition by their Chinese father, and (b) that the cablegram authorization was not a forgery.

In due time the Court of Appeals rendered the decision now under review by certiorari, reversing that of
the lower court.

Like the court of origin, the Court of Appeals found that herein respondents were the illegitimate children
of Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, who started living maritally in
Malitbog, Leyte, in 1934; that out of their illegitimate union were born the following: Beato, in Sugod,
Leyte, on September 28, 1936; Manuel, in Libagon, Leyte, on June 17, 1941; Gonzalo, in Malitbog, Leyte,
on April 17, 1943, and Julio in Malitbog, Leyte, on January 31, 1945. The Court of Appeals also found that
in 1946, Go Chiao Lin, Emilia and their four sons went to Amoy, China, on vacation, but Go died there the
same year. In 1948, Emilia had to return to the Philippines as the maid of Consul Eutiquio Sta. Romana
because she was penniless, leaving her children behind. Subsequently the latter were able to go to
Hongkong, where they sought and obtained employment. In 1961, they applied with the Philippine Consul
General in Hongkong for entry into the Philippines as Filipino citizens. On December 12 of that year, the
Consulate received a cablegram from the Department of Foreign Affairs authorizing it to investigate
whether the petitioners for entry were the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano a Filipino citizen, and, if
satisfied, after a thorough screening, to issue the corresponding document certifying that they were
Filipino citizens. The Consulate made thereafter the appropriate investigation, and on the basis of
evidence presented consisting of the sworn statements of the applicants, their birth certificates and blood
test reports, said office issued late that month a certificate of registration and identity to the effect that the
applicant had submitted sufficient evidence of their citizenship and identity and had been allowed to
register in the Consulate as Filipino citizens and to travel directly to the Philippines.

On December 26 of the same year 1961, they arrived in Manila by plane from Hongkong. As the
Immigration Inspector at the airport was of the opinion that their travel documents did not constitute
conclusive proof of citizenship, he referred their case to the Board of Special Inquiry No. 2. Thereupon the
latter conducted an investigation at which the respondents presented oral and documentary evidence to
sustain their right to admission as Filipinos (Exhs. B, D, E and H; pp. 93-98; 99-100; 101-102; 104 of the
Record). Upon these evidence, the Board on January 4, 1962, promulgated a decision finding the Go
Callano brothers to be the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, and entitled to
admission, as they were in fact admitted, as Filipino citizens.

That Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano a Filipino, lived maritally in several
municipalities of Leyte since 1934 and that out of their union the four private respondents were born, are
facts found, after appropriate proceedings, first, by the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong;
second, by the Board of Special Inquiry who investigated their case in Manila upon their arrival thereat in
1961; third, by the Court of First Instance of Manila, and lastly, by the Court of Appeals. These facts,
according to well settled jurisprudence, are not reviewable by Us in this appeal by certiorari.

In this appeal, the Board of Immigration Commissioners and the Commissioner of Immigration maintain
the following propositions: (1) that, in view of the fact that the cable authorization referred to heretofore is
a forgery, all the proceedings had in connection therewith are void and, as a result, the private
respondents must be deported as aliens not properly documented; (2) that, granting that they were
Filipino citizens when they left the Philippines in 1946, they lost that citizenship, firstly, by staying in China
for a period of fifteen years, and secondly, because they were recognized by their common-law father,
they became citizens of the Republic of China in accordance with the Chinese Nationality Law.

The Court of First Instance of Manila declared the cablegram authorization a forgery on the strength of
the testimony of Mr. Logan a handwriting expert. This finding, however, was reversed by the Court of
Appeals, the pertinent portion of its decision being the following:

The next question raised by the petitioners-appellants is whether the Government has
satisfactorily proved that the signature of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs on the cable
authorization, Exhibit 1, is a forgery. Felipe P. Logan, chief of the questioned documents division
of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that he made a comparative examination of the
signature of the Department Secretary on Exhibit 1 and the signatures of the same official on the

7
 detail orders, Exhibits 3-G to 3-L, and from the significant differences in the writing characteristics
which he observed and concluded that the signature on Exhibit 1 was not written by the
Department Secretary.

Before it can be said that the questioned signature is a forgery there must be competent proof
that the specimens are the genuine signature of the Secretary. According to witness, Logan, he
knows that the signatures on the detail orders are genuine "because they were submitted to me
by an agent who took them from the files of the Department of Foreign Affairs" (p. 52, transcript).
The foregoing testimony of the witness does not prove the genuineness of the specimen
signatures, more so because the agent who allegedly took the detail others from the files of the
Foreign Affairs Department was not presented as a witness. The NBI expert concluded, from his
observation that there are significant differences between the questioned signature and the
specimen signatures on the detail orders, that the former is a forgery. But the conclusion is
stultified by the admission of the same witness that even between the specimen signatures there
are variations in the handwriting characteristics of the signatory (p. 24, transcript). Our
appreciation of the evidence showed that there are variations indeed between the specimen
signatures (Exhibits S-1 to S-5); there are distinct similarities even between the questioned
signature and the specimen signatures (cf. Q-5, S-4 and S-5). Upon the evidence presented by
the Government, it cannot be said that the forgery of the questioned signature has been
satisfactorily proven.

Even if the competent proofs were presented showing that the questioned signature is a forgery,
the forgery of the signature on the cable authorization would not have nullified the documentation
of the petitioners by the consulate in Hongkong. We were not cited to any specific rule or
regulation of the Department of Foreign Affairs stating that the prior authorization of this
Department is necessary before the consular official abroad can act in documentation cases. On
the other hand, as per resolution of the Cabinet of August 24, 1948, the President suggested and
the Cabinet "resolved to restore the prewar practice of entrusting to our respective consular
officials abroad the duty of receiving all visa applications and investigating the qualifications of the
applicants." (cited in Espina, Immigration Laws, 1956 Ed., p. 142.) It is evident from the
aforequoted resolution that the Executive branch of the Government intended that the right to
screen applicants for entry into this country should be lodged in the consular officials abroad.
Giving effect to this intention, the Supreme Court stated in Ng Gioc Lin vs. The Secretary of the
Department of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. L-2175, March 31, 1950, "that although the foreign
service has been placed under the over-all direction and supervision of the Department of
Foreign Affairs by Executive Order No. 18 (42 Off. Gaz., 2064), this does not necessarily mean
that the Department Secretary takes the place of the consular officers abroad in the matter of the
issuance of passport visas, for the Secretary cannot relieve those officers of their responsibility
under the law. ... The reason of the law in conferring upon the consuls themselves the duty and
power to grant passports and visas is obvious. The applicant for visa is in a foreign country and
the Philippine consular officer there is naturally in a better position than the home office to
determine through investigation conducted on the spot whether or not the said applicant is
qualified to enter the Philippines." It can be deduced from the foregoing that the documentation of
the petitioners in Hongkong was not vitiated by a substantial defect even assuming that it was
done without prior authorization from the Foreign Affairs Department.

It must be stated in this connection that the petitioners became Philippine citizens because of
their relation with their mother who is a Filipino. Their status was conferred on them neither by the
documentation by the consulate in Hongkong nor by the finding of the Board of Special Inquiry in
Manila. Consequently, whatever defects there are in the proceedings before the consulate and
the board of inquiry cannot affect their status. Therefore, even assuming that the petitioners were
not properly documented, there is no basis for the finding of the respondent Board that they are
aliens who can be excluded.

Due, therefore, to the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals regarding the insufficiency of the
evidence presented by herein petitioners to prove the alleged forgery again, a matter not now within
our power to review the questioned cablegram must be deemed to be authentic. But be that as it may,
we agree with both the Court of First Instance of origin and the Court of Appeals that, even assuming that
said document was forged, this would not automatically render void all the proceedings had before the
Philippine Consulate in Hongkong and the Board of Special Inquiry, both of which ended with a definite
finding that the Callanos were Filipino citizens. That these proceedings and finding can not be nullified by
the Department of Foreign Affairs summarily and without giving the parties concerned an opportunity to
be heard is too evident to require any demonstration.

To the other questions relied upon by herein petitioners, the following portions of the decision of the Court
of Appeals would seem to be sufficient answer:

8
 The question, whether petitioners who are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth
subsequently acquired Chinese citizenship under the Chinese Law of Nationality by reason of
recognition or a prolonged stay in China, is a fit subject for the Chinese law and the Chinese court
to determine, which cannot be resolved by a Philippine court without encroaching on the legal
system of China. For, the settled rule of international law, affirmed by the Hague Convention on
Conflict of Nationality Laws of April 12, 1930 and by the International Court of Justice, is that "Any
question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular state should be
determined in accordance with laws of that state ." (quoted in Salonga, Private International Law,
1957 Ed., p. 112.) There was no necessity of deciding that question because so far as concerns
the petitioners' status, the only question in this proceeding is: Did the petitioners lose their
Philippine citizenship upon the performance of certain acts or the happening of certain events in
China? In deciding this question no foreign law can be applied. The petitioners are admittedly
Filipino citizens at birth, and their status must be governed by Philippine law wherever they may
be, in conformity with Article 15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code which provides as follows:
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, conditions and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." Under Article IV,
Section 2, of the Philippine Constitution, "Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law," which implies that the question of whether a Filipino has lost his
Philippine citizenship shall be determined by no other than the Philippine law.

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic Act No. 106, provides that a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation
of citizenship; subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign
country; rendering service to, or accepting a commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country; cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; declaration by competent authority that he
is a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war; in the case of a woman by marriage to
a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires his
nationality. Recognition of the petitioners by their alien father is not among the ground for losing
Philippine citizenship under Philippine law, and it cannot be said that the petitioners lost their
former status by reason of such recognition. About the only mode of losing Philippine citizenship
which closely bears on the petitioners is renunciation. But even renunciation cannot be cited in
support of the conclusion that petition lost their Philippine citizenship because the law requires an
express renunciationwhich means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and
not left to inference or implication; a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language,
as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct. (Opinion No. 69 of the Secretary of
Justice, Series of 1940.) Indeed, as the Supreme Court held in U.S. v. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332,
a case for deportation, where Ong, a natural child of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, born
in the Philippines, was brought by his parents to China when he was 4 years old, where he
remained for 18 or 19 years, returning to the Philippines at 25 years of age, "The fact that a minor
child in those conditions was taken to China and remained there for several years is not sufficient
ground upon which to hold that he has changed his nationality, when, after reaching his majority,
he did not express his desire to choose the nationality of his father." The import of the foregoing
pronouncement is that of itself a protracted stay in a foreign country does not amount to
renunciation. Moreover, herein petitioners were all minors when they where brought to China in
1446. They were without legal capacity to renounce their status. Upon their return to the
Philippines only Beato Go Callano had attained the age of majority, but even as to him there
could not have been renunciation because he did not manifest by direct and appropriate
language that he was disclaiming Philippine citizenship. On the contrary, after he has attained the
age of majority, he applied for registration as a Philippine citizen and sought entry into this
country, which are clear indicia of his intent to continue his former status. The foregoing shows
that the petitioners have not lost their Philippine citizenship.

Lasty, petitioners claim that the private respondents are barred from questioning the decision of the Board
of Immigration Commissioners dated August 21, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration on the same date, because they did not appeal from either to the Secretary
of Justice.

We find this to be without merit for the reason that, as stated before, both orders were issued without
previous notice and hearing and were, therefore, in violation of due process. As a matter of fact, even in
the case of an alien,decisions of the Board of Immigration Commissioners, like that of any other
administrative body, do not constitute res judicata so as to bar a re-examination of the alien's right to
enter or stay (Ong Se Lun, et al. vs. Board of Immigration, G.R. No. L-6017, September 16, 1954), and
the courts can grant relief if said Board abused its powers, or committed serious legal errors, or denied
the alien a fair hearing (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682).

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby affirmed, with costs. It is so ordered.

9
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar and Angeles, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. L-2007 January 31, 1949

WILLIAM CHIONGBIAN, petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO DE LEON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, JOSE GALLOFIN, in his
capacity as Collector of Customs of the Port of Cebu, and VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity
as General Manager of the Philippine Shipping Administration, respondents: PHILIPPINE
SHIPOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, intervenor.

Taada, Pelaez & Teehankee, Pandatun, Arches & Sayo, and De Santos, Herrera & Delfino for
petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Lucas Lacson for respondents.
Roxas, Picazo & Mejia for intervenor.
Mariano Jesus Cuenco, Miguel Cuenco and Nicolas Belmonte as amici curiae.

MORAN, C.J.:

This is a petition seeking to permanently prohibit respondent Customs Officials from cancelling the
registration certificates of petitioner's vessels, and respondent Philippine Shipping Administration from
rescinding the sale of three vessels to petitioner. The primary basis for respondents' and intervenor's acts
is the allegation that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified by law to operate and
own vessels of Philippine registry. The Philippine Shipping Administration also alleges that petitioner
violated the contract of sale of three vessels executed between them, on the ground of misrepresentation,
petitioner having alleged in said contract that his father was a naturalized Filipino citizen. The Philippine
Shipowners' Association was later allowed to intervene and it filed its answer against the petitioner.

The entire case hinges on whether or not petitioner William Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen, and this Court
holds that he is one.

Article IV of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SEC. 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

In 1925, Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and father of the herein petitioner William Chiongbian,
was elected to and held the office of municipal councilor of the town of Plaridel, Occidental Misamis. This
fact is sufficiently established by the evidence submitted to this Court; by the findings of the National
Bureau of Investigation cited in Opinion No. 27, s. 1948, of the Secretary of Justice; and as admitted by
respondents in their pleadings. It is also shown and admitted that at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, petitioner William Chiongbian was still a minor.

it is conclusive that upon the adoption of the Constitution, Victoriano Chiongbian, father of herein
petitioner, having been elected to a public office in the Philippines before the adoption of the Constitution,
became a Filipino citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of the Constitution. William
Chiongbian, the herein petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a Filipino citizen by reason of
subsection 3 (Article IV) of the Constitution, his father having become a Filipino citizen upon the adoption
of said Constitution. This is also in conformity with the settled rule of our jurisprudence that a legitimate
minor child follows the citizenship of his father.

10
It is argued by respondent that this privilege of citizenship granted by subsection 2 (Article IV,
Constitution) is strictly personal and does not extend to the children of the grantee. In support of this
contention they offer two principal arguments. Firstly, that this subsection was adopted by the
Constitutional Convention merely to grant Filipino citizenship to Delegate Caram and thus obviate the
possibility of a non-Filipino signing the Constitution as one of its framers. Secondly, it is argued that the
original draft of said subsection 2 contained the phrase "and their descendants," which was deleted
from the final draft, thus showing that this privilege of citizenship was intended to be strictly personal to
the one who had been elected to public office and did not extend to his descendants.

With regard to the first argument, it may be said that the members of the Constitutional Convention could
not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed,
that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but
in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. They adopted said provision fully cognizant
of the transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in subsection 3. Had it been their intention to
curtail the transmission of citizenship in such a particular case, they would have so clearly stated.

The second argument of respondents is similarly untenable. The mere deletion of the phrase "and their
descendants," is not determinative of any conclusion. It could have been done because the learned
framers of our Constitution considered it superfluous, knowing full well that the meaning of such a phrase
was adequately covered by subsection 3. Deletion in the preliminary drafts of the Convention are, at best,
negative guides, which cannot prevail over the positive provisions of the finally adopted Constitution.

Respondents' allegation that the petitioner violated the contract of sale with the Philippine Shipping
Administration on the ground of misrepresentation, petitioner having alleged in said contract that his
father was a naturalized Filipino, is without merit. Such was not a deliberate misrepresentation but an
error. which any person not versed in the law is prone to commit. It is clear that petitioner merely meant
that his father was a Filipino citizen by operation of law and not by birth.

In view of all the foregoing, the petition for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is hereby granted and
respondent Customs officials are hereby enjoined from cancelling the registration certificates of
petitioner's vessels and respondent Philippine Administration is hereby enjoined from rescinding the sale
of the three vessels made to petitioner. No costs. It is ordered.

Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., I certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted for the issuance of the writ.

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, respondents.

[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR., respondent.

[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.

DECISION

11
VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of
the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition, [1] that cannot be taken
lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound
importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a
presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the
Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders
for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and
reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of
laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of
the Philippinesunder the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus
Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission
on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to
be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen,
he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan
F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley
and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support
of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a
certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed
a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified
photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records
Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives
that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification
from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available
information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant
ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry
of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-
2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of
Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of
the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando
Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946
were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or
on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February
2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC
before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a

12
writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the
COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled
"Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634,
entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on
the case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to
or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a
natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively
on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election
Code -

Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring
free, orderly and honest elections -

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to
file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule
64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article
IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could
well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their
fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to
occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions
of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions
they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:

13
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution
to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained
this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes involving
contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional
lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an
Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the
President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the
Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of
government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory
set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election
contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would
have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology
in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -

Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.

Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for
quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition
for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.

Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the
President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates"
for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against
a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.[5] In such context, the
election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who
would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest.This
rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections
et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando
Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept
of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384
to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the
holding of an office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which
he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-
sufficient existence.[7] The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which
qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with
rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. [8] In its ideal
setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the
general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept
was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom,
such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to
include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political

14
power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis
on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained
expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage
of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of
citizenship.[12]

The Local Setting - from Spanish

Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or
"Spanish subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the
inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century
but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws
of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by
Royal Decrees.[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on
16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of
differing views among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to
Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23
August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, [17] and finally,
the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by
the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express
mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was
included, would be governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which
came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -

(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,

(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy.[20]

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a
superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the
United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while
resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would
remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United
States.[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress -

"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present
treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom,
retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or
of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions,
being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record,
within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to
have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.

Thus

"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United
States shall be determined by the Congress."[22]

15
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject,
the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become
American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued
passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902,
also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the
Congress of the United States on the Philippines -

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects
on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."[23]

Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a
Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July
1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view,
articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also
known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in
the Philippine Archipelago within that period.[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine
Bill of 1902 -

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing
in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United
States, if residing therein."[26]

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time
crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the
Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916,
the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other
country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorizedto provide for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within
the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."

Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines
on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring
citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once
and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -

Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution

(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

16
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at
the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of
their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from
transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino
mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly,
as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the
1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five.

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her
act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection
(3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the
1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res
judicataand jus sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of

17
Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal
of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now
become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct
ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F.
Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate,
however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time
of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that
he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta
Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage
of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F.
Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-
two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was
born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an
American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be
drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that -

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the
COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two
documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to
the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of
Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September
1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements
in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -

Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:

xxxxxxxxx

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule
130, of the Rules of Court provides:

Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer
of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be
grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is

18
usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and
4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have
occurred.[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of
84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in
the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou
was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no
existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however,
likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death
certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence
of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if
the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the
Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to
the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate
child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law
must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until
the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was
required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or
voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the
putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.[32] Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in
Section 5 thereof, that -

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of
the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state
or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein
any information by which such father could be identified.

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or
paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement
rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition. [33] In Mendoza vs.
Mella,[34] the Court ruled -

"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether
or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied
upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may
be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the
original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have
happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil
register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein
voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True
enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes
the child as his or her own."

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the
signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been
executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some
other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could constitute such a document
as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private
individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials
by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which
recognition may be made belongs to the first class."

Let us leave it at that for the moment.

19
 The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into
voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took
place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially
declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child
had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during
the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an
authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of
the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or
other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of
the parties.

x x x x x x x x x.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,
evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.

The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:

"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article
278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition
of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity
of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate
and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The
provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any,
to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights
or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the
Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law;
particularly -

20
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the
regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate
the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those which exist
among members of a society for the protection of private interests."[37]

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a
foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the
validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between
them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of
conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the
authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and
properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband
and wife."

The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, stating that -

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on
citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil
Code,[39] such as on successional rights and family relations. [40] In adoption, for instance, an adopted child
would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child
but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be
traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of
members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the
monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according
to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and
the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own
Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not
unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be
deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil
Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive
effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and
should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable
by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to
testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person
whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e)
the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children
(including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -

"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A.,
after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:

21
 1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly
known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.

4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena
Street, Manila.

xxxxxxxxx

7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students
at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr.,
by my sister that same year.

8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.

9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan
and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on
Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except
for some months between 1943-1944.

10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after
Ronald Allan Poe.

xxxxxxxxx

18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a
natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.

Ruby Kelley Mangahas

Declarant

DNA Testing

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and
any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation
or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing
-

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific
ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child
are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate
to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress."

Petitioners Argument For

Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

22
 Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted
his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his
marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez,
making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child.The
veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most
doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting
of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on
20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later,
or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner
contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an
American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs.
de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most
convincing; he states -

"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of
the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting
doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the
pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I
therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.

First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a
stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue
was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus
sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.

Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was
about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935
Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.

Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a
Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about
invidious jus sanguinis.

Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin
Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the
illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his
citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that
Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not
Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a
natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.

The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court
said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because
Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was
absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the
obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.

xxxxxxxxx

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it
would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make
an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make
an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a
Filipino mother.

The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat.[47] I
would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real
differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify
distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.

x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state
interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the
fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights
for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to

23
punish him for the indiscretion of his parents.There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is
neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection
clause and must be reprobated.

The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor
Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of
petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did
so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father
in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty
to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more
explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the
citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent
justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

In Sum

(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in
G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R.
No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for
lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ
from running for the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ
has committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434
and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal
to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary
jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been
a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him
from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that
San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The
1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough
to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has
utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the
parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be material,
but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and
Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections
and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.

24
 SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,

vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.

G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991

SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,

vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.

Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that
determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong,
Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:

1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however,
denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.

ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION

The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.

The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)

25
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.

The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987
Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred
(Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by the Electoral
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of
power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete;
(Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended
1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the Electoral
Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)

The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not
be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and
excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it
or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)

When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?

In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments
of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of
due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting
such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)

In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the
Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not
venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the
Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of
discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.

The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak,
to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or
not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)

Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view.
In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter
which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.

As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in
the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs
independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])

In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must
permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has place it.
(See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])

It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as
it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals.
There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less
independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The degree of judicial

26
intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this
party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.

In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of
the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.

ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP

The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land
which he bought from the fruits of hard work.

As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish
colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by
Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.

Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an
enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino
cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan
met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932
according to Catholic faith and practice.

The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.

The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store
and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.

The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo,
Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an
unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar
an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.

On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28,
1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.

At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to
differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were
concerned.

Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the
ground.

Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of their
ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to
Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.

In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second
house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a 16-door
apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.

The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations.

27
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a
job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware
business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the
Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship
on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full
brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of
natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.

The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his
childhood days.

In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.

For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and
correspondingly, voted there during those elections.

The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family business
decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity
came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern Samar.

Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in Congress.
Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than
7,000 votes.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date.

The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against
Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:

Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who
elected it under the 1973 Constitution?

Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision
of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or after January 17, 1973.
(Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and
Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born
citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons who have elected
Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding
Officer?

28
 Fr. Bernas: yes.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book, he
said that the decision was designed merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and
that the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that the Reverend
Father Bernas is going against this intention by supporting the amendment?

Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of Philippine
citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to
run for Congress. . .

Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the body to
approve that provision of section 4.

Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair that the
Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a
natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable

situation.1avvphi1 Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those
born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of
Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino
citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)

The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from
February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be
retroactive.

It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal
meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where
adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279
[1970])

A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter
thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)

In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:

To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not to be
construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice
Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are organic living
institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)

The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino
father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of
a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he
was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an
alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.

Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident
of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members.

29
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental
anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.

The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to
correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which
would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])

There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage.
Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status
to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask
for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his
mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would
be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been
an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.

In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right
of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life
here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship
as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no
racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for
naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive
government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license.
He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino
citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values,
nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland.
The mass of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him
better than any member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have
him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a
Filipino.

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice
which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical
acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a
Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only
have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect
Philippine citizenship?

30
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that
"when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino.
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor
residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for
protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship.

The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his
death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.

The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done.
In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its
nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])

To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would
run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be
given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET
"Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not use
beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue in
this case."

The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to
determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover,
the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his
father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to
be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were
Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced
Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of
election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.

There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of
discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by
that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural
born citizen by both bodies.

Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang
Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There
would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion.

What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?

Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th
day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto were
conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.

Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?

Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:

ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:

1. Persons born in Spanish territory.

2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.

3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.

4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy.
(Emphasis supplied)

31
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC;
Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])

As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895.
Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of
Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)

The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn
of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real property.

As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.

Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact
that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the
fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he
had become a Spanish subject.

If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the
Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has
been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place.
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong
Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.

The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a natural-
born Filipino.

The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in
compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to
present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the
proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
predicated.

On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the best
evidence rule.

It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12,
the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot
be found.

This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty.
Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of
the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no
governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
(TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44;
TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)

The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the
1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12,
1989, pp. 11-24)

The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty.
Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not require
the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent
search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])

Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the
contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of
witnesses.

Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the Committee
Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented
as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent, categorically stated that he saw

32
the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election protest against the brother of the
private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)

In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention, states
that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the report on the election protest
against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief
Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have presented any one of the long list
of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did
they demur to the contents of the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on
the procedural objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.

The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that
body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose
Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over which
they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all relevant factors which
the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare
their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line
between error and grave abuse.

ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE

The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.

The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence" has
been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under
the 1987 Constitution.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the
qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile
or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is,
in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the
1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has
raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather
than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision
in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted
by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical
and actual residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p.
110)

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which
regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.

The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure,
one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from
said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that

33
person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147
[1966])

The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang,
Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained
fixed therein even up to the present.

The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that
gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.

Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was
built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr.,
November 18,1988, p. 8)

The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he
cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.

The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the
demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became
the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his
parents.

Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in
the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should
have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the
municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)

To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be
tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the
candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412
[1965])

It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.
(Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])

As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and
later to practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On
the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had
the animus revertendi.

The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial evolution.
Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese,
Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our country.

Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none.
To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was
part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some
Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private respondent.

Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one
must forever cherish.

However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an
interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.

Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent
backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes
humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how
to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for
the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of
an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to
citizenship problems is essential.

34
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part.

[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen."[1]
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac,
on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.[2]
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and,
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:

Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following
ways and/or events:

xxx

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed
forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following
circumstances is present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign
country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said
service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that
he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any
Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country
under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor
vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in,
the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall
be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630.[3] He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner
Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

35
 Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution.[4]
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision[5] dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its
resolution dated April 27, 2000.[6]
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following
grounds:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he
had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not
validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET
committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore
his natural-born status.[7]

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he
lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire
the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that
natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when
he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and
inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. [8]
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized
citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof.[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." [10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization
Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.[11] To be
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications [12] and none of the
disqualifications[13] provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship
becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the
intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling
or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or
(4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.[14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which

36
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and
(3) by direct act of Congress.[15]
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.[16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
citizenship must possess certain qualifications[17] and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4
of C.A. 473.[18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II;[20] (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time;[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry
of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to
reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to
do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the
civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the
original.][25]

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.[26] This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship,
he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines.The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz
is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father.[27] It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover,
or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform
an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term
"natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino
citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not
considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,[28] of
Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized
citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to
perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to
perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-
born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect

37
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent
from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen
who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration
of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The
reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on
the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings
in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. [29] The Court's jurisdiction
over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.[30] In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for
the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's
judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire
into the correctness of the assailed decision. [31]There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ, concur.
Melo, and Vitug JJ., no part, Chairman and member, respectively, of HRET which rendered the
appealed judgement.
Mendoza, J., no part, being ponente of decision under review.
Panganiban, J., has separate concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, Buena, and de Leon, JJ., on leave.
Pardo, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., joins the concurring opinion of J. Panganiban.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., dissents.

G.R. No. L-27429 August 27, 1969

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.

OH HEK HOW, petitioner appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Eliezer M. Echavez for petitioner-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete and
Solicitor Santiago M. Kapunan for oppositor-appellant.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

A decision granting his petition for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines having been rendered on
January 16, 1964, petitioner Oh Hek How filed, on January 17, 1966, a motion alleging that he had
complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 530 and praying that he be allowed to take his oath of
allegiance as such citizen and issued the corresponding certificate of naturalization. Upon petitioner's
testimony, taken on February 9, 1966, the date set for the hearing of said motion, the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing the taking of said oath. On that
same date, petitioner took it and the certificate of naturalization was issued to him.

The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said order of February 9, 1966
and filed its record on appeal. Before the same was approved, it also moved to cancel petitioner's
certificate of naturalization, upon the ground, among others, that it was issued and the oath taken before
said order of February 9, 1966, had become final and executory. Acting upon this motion and petitioner's
opposition thereto, the court issued, on October 3, 1966, an order granting the motion, but, at the same
time, authorizing the taking of a new oath by the petitioner and the issuance in his favor of another
certificate of naturalization, after thirty (30) days from notice to the Solicitor General. Thereafter, or on
November 26, 1966, the court approved the record on appeal and, once more, authorized the petitioner to
"take a new or proper oath to validate the first one made on February 9, 1966." The case is now before us
on said record on appeal filed by the Government.

At the outset, it is obvious that the oath of allegiance taken by petitioner on November 28, 1966, and the
certificate of naturalization issued to him in pursuance thereof, as well as the authority given therefor by
the lower court, are null and void. Indeed, the order of February 9, had not and up to the present has

38
not become final and executory in view of the appeal duly taken by the Government. What is more,
petitioner's second oath was taken, not only after the filing of the notice of appeal 1 and the submission of
the record on appeal, but also after the approval thereof. In other words, the lower court had already lost
its jurisdiction over the case. 2

Again, petitioner's net income in 1960 and 1961 was P3,945.65 and P5,105.79, respectively, or from
about P330 to P425 a month. His income tax return for 1962, filed subsequently to the institution of this
case, showed a net income of P6,485.50 for that year, or about P540 a month. Considering that petitioner
has a wife and three (3) children, one of them of school age, at the time of the filing of his application for
naturalization, his aforementioned income is not a lucrative one. Indeed, it has been held that the
following incomes are not lucrative, from the viewpoint of our naturalization laws, namely: (1) P4,200 3 or
P5,000 a year 4 for one married, with five (5) children; 5 (2) P6,000 a year for one married, with two (2)
minor children; 5 and (3) P6,000 6 or P6,300 a year 7 for one married, with only one (1) child.

Lastly, it is conceded that petitioner has not required from the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist China
the permission required by the laws thereof for a valid renunciation of his Chinese citizenship. In Go A.
Leng v. Republic, 8 a decision granting the application for naturalization of a Chinese national was
reversed by this Court, upon the ground, among others, of "his failure to secure" the aforementioned
permission.

It is argued that the same is not required by our laws and that the naturalization of an alien, as a citizen of
the Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot be controlled by any foreign law.
Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 provides, however, that before the naturalization certificate is
issued, the petitioner shall "solemnly swear," inter alia, that he renounces "absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate" and particularly to the state "of which" he is "a
subject or citizen." The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his former nationality,
before acquiring Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise, he would have two nationalities and owe
allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except that, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 2639, "the acquisition of citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen from one of the
Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his
Philippine citizenship, if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been
agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is
acquired." The question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily governed
pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code by the laws of China, not by those of the
Philippines. 9 As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines,
unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous permission of its Minister of
the Interior for the renunciation of nationality.

The view to the contrary, adhered to in Parado v. Republic, 10 Chausintek v. Republic, 11 and Lim So v.
Republic 12has been superseded by our ruling in the subsequent case of Go A. Leng v. Republic 13 which
we hereby reiterate.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the oath of allegiance taken, on November 28,
1966, by petitioner Oh Hek How, as well as the certificate of naturalization issued in pursuance thereto,
are hereby declared null and void, with costs against said petitioner, who is, moreover, directed to
surrender the aforementioned certificate of naturalization to the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte, within ten (10) days after this decision shall have become final. It is so ordered.

[G.R. No. 61565. August 20, 1990.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. SOFRONIO SAYO, Presiding Judge of the
CFI of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch I, and RAMON TAN BIANA, JR., Respondents.

The Solicitor General for Petitioner.

Rogelio P. Corpus for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY; SUBSTANTIAL

ERRORS MAY BE CORRECTED THROUGH AN APPROPRIATE ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioner alleges that the trial court should not have ordered the correction of the relevant entries in the
Local Civil Registry since they involved substantial matters which should not have been decided in "a
merely summary proceeding but rather in "an appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected

39
by the entries are notified or represented." Private respondent, on the other hand, counters that he does
not seek a judicial declaration of his citizenship but rather merely a correction of an entry in the Local Civil
Registrars Office as to his citizenship and that of his parents, considering that the citizenship of his
parents had already been passed upon by the Bureau of Immigration. Private respondent further
contends that the proceedings taken before the trial court were not summary in nature, and that the
decision was rendered only after the required notices had been given and after a hearing. The basic issue
presented in this case was passed upon and settled by this Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Leonor
Valencia. There the Court held: "It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted
in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a
wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle
that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of
fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article
412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits that the entries sought
to be corrected should be threshed out in an appropriate proceeding. . . . What is meant by appropriate
adversary proceeding? Blacks Law Dictionary defines adversary proceeding as follows: One having
opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking
relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
Excludes an adoption proceeding. Platt v. Magagnini, 187 p. 716, 718, 110 Was. 39). . . . Thus, the
persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register are (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to (1) issue
an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition; (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any
person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought. If all
these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries
in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no
longer be described as summary. There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed
either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be
cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN CASE AT BAR, ADVERSARIAL IN NATURE. Both in
the motion for reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General of the decision of the trial court and in the
Petition for Review filed before this Court, the Solicitor General did not question the genuineness,
authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency of the evidence submitted before the trial court relating to petitioners
citizenship and that of his parents. The Office of the Solicitor General, both before the trial court and
before us, has limited itself to contending that substantial changes of entries in the Local Civil Registry
are not to be made pursuant to "a summary proceeding." The Court considers that the procedure followed
in the case at bar satisfied the requirements of "appropriate adversary proceedings."cralaw virtua1aw
library

3. ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT TO FILE AN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION FOR
CORRECTION OF ENTRY DID NOT CHANGE THE ADVERSARIAL CHARACTER OF THE
PROCEEDINGS. Notwithstanding the resetting of the hearing, and despite having received notice of
the rescheduled hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General entered no appearance and filed no pleading
before the trial court. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal appeared on behalf of the Government and was
present when the court proceeded to receive evidence for the petitioner on the rescheduled hearing. The
Assistant Provincial Fiscal did not file any opposition to the petition. It must be assumed that the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal did not do so because he saw no need to file such an opposition. We do not believe that
his failure to file an opposition changed the adversarial character of the proceedings. It certainly was not
private respondents fault that neither the Assistant Provincial Fiscal nor anyone else saw fit to oppose
the petition for correction.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

Private respondent Ramon Tan Biana, Jr. was born on 9 January 1952 in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, as the
fifth legitimate child of the spouses Ramon Tan Biana and Tiu Muy. His birth was registered on the same
day in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, by the nurse who attended the
parturition of Ramons mother. Private respondent claims that, in the process, the attending nurse

40
erroneously reported to the Local Civil Registrar that Ramons citizenship, and the citizenship of his
parents, as "Chinese" instead of "Filipino." Private respondent claims that his "true and real citizenship",
and that of his parents, is Philippine citizenship.

On 2 February 1982, private respondent filed a petition before the then Court of First Instance of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 1, entitled "In the Matter of the Correction of the Birth Certificate of
Ramon Tan Biana, Jr., Ramon Tan Biana, Jr., Petitioner v. The Civil Registrar of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya,
Respondent", docketed as Special Proceedings No. 847. In this petition, private respondent sought the
correction of entries in the Civil Registry of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, relating to his citizenship and the
citizenship of his legitimate parents, as appearing in his Certificate of Birth.

Copies of the petition were furnished to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya,
the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati, Metropolitan Manila and the Local Civil Registrar of Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya. On 2 February 1982, notice of hearing was issued by the trial court, setting the petition
for hearing on 15 April 1982. A copy of the notice of hearing served upon the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya and the Local Civil Registrar, Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya. A copy of the notice of hearing was also posted by the Sheriff in the bulletin board of the town
hall of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya on 26 February 1982. The notice of hearing was also published in the
"Vizcaya Advocate", a newspaper of general circulation published in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks. 1

At the initial hearing of the petition on 15 April 1982, no appearance was entered by the Office of the
Solicitor General, notwithstanding its receipt of a copy of the petition and of the notice of hearing.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Leo G. Rosario, however, appeared on behalf of the Government. In view of
the failure of a representative of the Office of the Solicitor General to appear, the trial court reset the
hearing of the petition to 14 May 1982 and in an Order of the court, requested the Solicitor General to file
either an opposition, comment or any other responsive pleading to the petition since "the court believe[d]
that the petition [was] significant, involving, as it does, a change of citizenship of petitioner." 2
Notwithstanding this order of the court of 15 April 1982, no pleading was received by the trial court from
the Solicitor Generals Office. Accordingly, the trial court proceeded to receive evidence for the petitioner
on 14 May 1982, with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal representing the Government.

The evidence submitted at the hearing by private respondent in respect of his claim of Filipino citizenship
was summarized by the trial court in the following manner:chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

"To support the claim of petitioner that his parents are filipinos and that his citizenship is, likewise, filipino,
petitioner presented to the Court a decision of the Bureau of Immigration in I.C. No. 2480 dated June 18,
1947, (Exh.F) the dispositive part of which reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

IN VIEW THEREOF, this Board is of the opinion, and so holds that the herein applicant, RAMON TAN
BIANA, being a natural son of Marciana Goco, a Filipino woman, is entitled to re admission into this
country as a Filipino citizen.

The Petitioner also submitted to the Court as Exh.H another decision of the Bureau of Immigration in I.C.
No. 12890-C dated April 4, 1956, a portion of which is quoted as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

However, with respect to Tiu Muy, who claims to be the wife of Ramon Tan Biana by virtue of an alleged
legal union in February, 1928, in Amoy, China, the doubt may be resolved favorably in view of their
marriage in Arayat, Pampanga, on September 14, 1953, as evidenced by their corresponding marriage
certificate. As a consequence of this marriage, which is in full force and effect, it cannot be denied that
TIU MUY is the legal wife of Ramon Tan Biana, and therefore, imbued with the latters Philippine
nationality. (Paragraph 1 of Sec. 15, C.A. 473)." 3

By a decision dated 13 July 1982, the trial court ordered the Local Civil Registrar of Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya, to make in the entries and records of this office "with particular reference to Register No. 41,
Book No. III, of the Register of Births of that municipality", the corrections sought by private respondent so
as to reflect a change in the citizenship of Ramon Tan Biana, Jr. as well as his parents Ramon Tan Biana
and Tiu Muy from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and to furnish copies of the corrected Certificate of Birth to "all
other offices concerned."cralaw virtua1aw library

On 4 August 1982, the Office of the Solicitor General finally appeared and filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the trial court, arguing that the entries ordered corrected by the court
were "not merely clerical of a harmless or innocuous nature but [were] substantial in as much as they
involved the citizenship of petitioner and his parents." The Office of the Solicitor General prayed that the
trial court reconsider its decision and render a new one dismissing the petition. The motion for
reconsideration was denied.

41
In the instant Petition for Review, petitioner alleges that the trial court should not have ordered the
correction of the relevant entries in the Local Civil Registry since they involved substantial matters which
should not have been decided in "a merely summary proceeding but rather in "an appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Private respondent, on the other hand, counters that he does not seek a judicial declaration of his
citizenship but rather merely a correction of an entry in the Local Civil Registrars Office as to his
citizenship and that of his parents, considering that the citizenship of his parents had already been
passed upon by the Bureau of Immigration. Private respondent further contends that the proceedings
taken before the trial court were not summary in nature, and that the decision was rendered only after the
required notices had been given and after a hearing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The basic issue presented in this case was passed upon and settled by this Court in Republic of the
Philippines v. Leonor Valencia. 4 There the Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably
substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in
nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long
as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the
Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in
relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits that the entries sought to be corrected should
be threshed out in an appropriate proceeding.

What is meant by appropriate adversary proceeding? Blacks Law Dictionary defines adversary
proceeding as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding. Platt v. Magagnini, 187 p. 716, 718, 110 Was. 39).

x x x5

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register are (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to (1)
issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing
to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition; (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any
person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can
no longer be described as summary. There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is
filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be
cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings." 6

Tested by the standards projected in Valencia, the proceedings taken in the instant case appear to us to
be appropriate adversary proceedings. As indicated earlier, a copy of the petition was sent both to the
Office of the Nueva Vizcaya Provincial Fiscal and the Office of the Solicitor General. The petition was set
for hearing on 15 April 1982, and a notice of hearing dated 2 February 1982 was served upon the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya, the Local Civil Registrar of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya and the
Office of the Solicitor General, Makati, Metro Manila; posted by the Sheriff in the bulletin board of the
municipal town hall of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, and published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. 7 Upon failure of the Solicitor
Generals Office to appear at the first hearing set by the trial court, the latter reset the hearing for the
succeeding month and expressly requested the Solicitor General to appear and to file a responsive
pleading considering that the changes in the Local Civil Registry requested by petitioner were "significant"
involving the citizenship of the petitioner. Notwithstanding the resetting of the hearing, and despite having
received notice of the rescheduled hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General entered no appearance and
filed no pleading before the trial court. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal appeared on behalf of the
Government and was present when the court proceeded to receive evidence for the petitioner on the
rescheduled hearing. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal did not file any opposition to the petition. It must be
assumed that the Assistant Provincial Fiscal did not do so because he saw no need to file such an

42
opposition. We do not believe that his failure to file an opposition changed the adversarial character of the
proceedings. It certainly was not private respondents fault that neither the Assistant Provincial Fiscal nor
anyone else saw fit to oppose the petition for correction.chanrobles law library

Both in the motion for reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General of the decision of the trial court and in
the Petition for Review filed before this Court, the Solicitor General did not question the genuineness,
authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency of the evidence submitted before the trial court relating to petitioners
citizenship and that of his parents. The Office of the Solicitor General, both before the trial court and
before us, has limited itself to contending that substantial changes of entries in the Local Civil Registry
are not to be made pursuant to "a summary proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court considers that the procedure followed in the case at bar satisfied the requirements of
"appropriate adversary proceedings."cralaw virtua1aw library

It remains only to note that the evidence submitted by private respondent before the trial court consisted
of the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The Voters Identification Card (Exhibit "E") of his father, Ramon Tan Biana, Sr. y Goco, showing his
father to be a registered voter;

2. A decision of the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration in I.C. No. 2480, dated 18 June
1947 (Exhibit "F") stating that private respondents father being a natural son of Marciana Goco, a Filipino
citizen, was entitled to re-admission into the country as a Philippine citizen;

3. A certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Exhibit "G") stating that Ramon Tan Biana, Sr. is a
Philippine citizen;

4. The decision of the Bureau of Immigration in I.C. No. 12890-C dated 4 April 1956 (Exhibit "H") stating
the private respondents mother, Tiu Muy, being the legal wife of Ramon Tan Biana, was also a Philippine
citizen;

5. The Birth Certificate of Alfred Tan (Exhibit "I"), a brother of private respondent, stating that he is the
sixth child of Ramon Tan Biana, Sr. and Tiu Muy, who are both Philippine citizens; and

6. The Voters Identification Card (Exhibit "J") of private respondent showing him to be a registered voter
in the Philippines. 8

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for lack of merit. The Decision of the trial court
dated 13 June 1982 is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-24252. January 30, 1967.]

IN RE petition to declare ZITA NGO to possess all qualifications and none of the disqualifications
for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of cancelling her alien registry
with the Bureau of Immigration, ZITA NGO BURCA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

Solicitor General for oppositor and Appellant.

Imperio & Tinio and Artemio Derecho for petitioner and appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CITIZENSHIP; ALIEN WOMAN WHO MARRIES A FILIPINO DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY BECOME
FILIPINO CITIZEN. By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a Filipino
citizen, does not by the mere act of marriage - automatically become a Filipino citizen.

2. ID.; ID.; REQUISITE FOR ADMISSION TO CITIZENSHIP. Jurisprudence has since stabilized the
import of the constitutional and statutory precepts with a uniform pronouncement that an alien wife of a
Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a citizen of the Philippines, unless there is proof that she
herself may be lawfully naturalized (Cua v. Board, etc., 101 Phil. 521; Ly Giok Ha, Et Al., v. Galang, Et Al.,
101 Phil. 459; Lee Giok Ha, et al v. Galang, etc. Et. Al., G.R. No. L-21332, March 18, 1966; Lee Suan Ay,
Et. Al. v. Galang, etc., Et Al., 106 Phil., 706). Which means that, in line with the national policy of selective
admission to Philippine citizenship, the wife must possess the qualifications under Section 2, and must

43
not be laboring under any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization
Law (Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G. R. No. L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, etc., Et Al., G. R.
No. L-21136. Dec. 27, 1963; Lao Chay, Et Al., v. Galang, G. R. No. L- 19977, Oct. 30, 1964; Choy King
Tee v. Galang, G. R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965; Austria, Et. Al. v. Conchu, G. R. No. L-20716, June
22, 1965; Co. Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, July 30, 1966).

3. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR RULE. Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications
prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its Section 4,
are not mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not
disqualified under Section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in
violation of the policy of the statute.

4. ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGE OF CITIZENSHIP SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN BLINDLY TO ALIEN WOMAN;
SCOPE OF RULE. The political privilege of citizenship should not be handed out blindly to any alien
woman on the sole basis of her marriage to a Filipino - "irrespective of moral character, ideological
beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions" (Choy King Tee v. Galang, supra;
Brito, et al v. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965). The rule heretofore
adverted to is to be observed whether the husband be a natural born Filipino (Austria, et al v. Conchu,
supra), a naturalized Filipino (Ly Hiok Ha, Et. Al. v. Galang, Et Al., 101 Phil. 459; Lo San Tuang v.
Galang, supra; Lao Chay, Et. Al. v. Galang, supra) or a Filipino by election.

5. ID.; CITIZENSHIP NOT PROPER FOR DECLARATORY PROCEEDINGS. There is no law or rule
which authorizes a declaration of Filipino citizenship (Channie Tan v. Republic, 107 Phil. 632; Tan Yu
Chin v. Republic, G. R. No. L-15775, April 29, 1961; Palaran v. Republic, G. R. No. L- 15047, January 30,
1962). Citizenship is not an appropriate subject for declaratory judgment proceedings (Obiles v. Republic,
92 Phil. 864; Delumen, Et. Al. v. Republic, 94 Phil. 287; Tan v. Republic, G. R. No. L-16108, Oct. 31,
1961; Santiago v. Commissioner, G. R. No. L- 14653, Jan. 31, 1963; Board of Commissioners v.
Domingo G. R. No. L- 21274, July 31, 1963). In one case, we held that citizenship of an alien woman
married to a Filipino must be determined in an "appropriate proceeding" (Brito, Et. Al. v. Commissioner of
Immigration, supra).

6. ID.; ID.; ALIEN WOMAN MUST FILE PETITION FOR CITIZENSHIP TO ACQUIRE STATUS OF
FILIPINO CITIZEN. If an alien woman married to a Filipino does not become ipso facto a citizen, then
she must have to file a "petition for citizenship" in order that she may acquire the status of a Filipino
citizen. Authority for this view is Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law in which the plain language
is: "Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship, shall file with the competent court" a petition for
the purpose. And this, because such alien woman is not a citizen, and she desires to acquire it. The
proper forum, Section 8 of the same law points out, is the Court of First Instance of the province where
the petitioner has resided "at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition."

7. ID.; RESOLUTION OF CITIZENSHIP OF ALIEN WOMAN RESTS EXCLUSIVELY WITH COMPETENT

COURTS. The determination of whether said alien wife should be given the status of a citizen should
fall within the area allocated to competent courts. That this is so, is exemplified by the fact that this Court
has taken jurisdiction in one such case originating from the Court of First Instance, where an alien woman
had directly sought naturalization in her favor (Co Im Ty v. Republic, supra). And, as nothing in the
Revised Naturalization Law empowers any other office agency, board or official, to determine such a
question, we are persuaded to say that resolution thereof rests exclusively with the competent Courts.

8. ID.; RULES TO FOLLOW RE ALIEN WOMAN. We accordingly rule that (1) an alien woman married
to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a petition for
citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the
disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) said petition must be filed in
the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing
of the petition; and (3) any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise
other than the judgment of a competent court of justice certifying or declaring that an alien wife of a
Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.

9. NATURALIZATION; APPLICANT MUST ALLEGE ALL PLACES OF RESIDENCE; REASON FOR

REQUIREMENT. Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a petition for naturalization should
state petitioners "present and former places of residence." Residence encompasses all places where
petitioner actually and physically resided (Tan v. Republic, G. R. No. L-22207, May 30, 1966). The reason
for exacting recital in the petition of present and former places of residence is that information regarding
petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical
surrounding" (Tan v. Republic, supra, citing Qua v. Republic, G. R. No. L-19834, Oct. 27, 1964). And the
State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to petitioners fitness to become a citizen, if all
the places of residence do not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of
residence is fatal (Tan v. Republic, supra, citing Chang v. Republic, G. R. No. L-20713, April 29, 1966;
Chan Kiat Huat v. Republic, G. R. No. L-19579, Feb. 28, 1966; Republic v. Reyes, Et Al., G. R, No. L-

44
20602, Dec. 24, 1965).

10. ID.; APPLICANT MUST SUBMIT AFFIDAVIT OF TWO CREDIBLE PERSONS; REASONS FOR
REQUIREMENT. The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be overlooked. It is important
to know who those witnesses are. The State should not be denied the opportunity to check on their
background to ascertain whether they are of good standing in the community, whose word may be taken
on its face value, and who could serve as "good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner." These
witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short
of this, the petition must fail (Ong Kim Kong v. Republic, G. R. No. L-20505, Feb. 28, 1966, citing Ong v.
Republic, 55 Off. Gaz. No. 18, p. 3290).

DECISION

SANCHEZ, J.:

On petition to declare Zita Ngo also known as Zita Ngo Burca "as possessing all qualifications and
none of the disqualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of cancelling
her Alien Registry with the Bureau of Immigration." 1 She avers that she is of legal age, married to
Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc City; that before her marriage, she
was a Chinese citizen, subject of Nationalist China, with ACR No. A-148054; that she was born on March
30, 1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao, and holder of Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 46333. After
making a number of other allegations and setting forth certain denials, she manifests that "she has all the
qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473" aforesaid.

Notice of hearing was sent to the Solicitor General and duly published.

The Solicitor General opposed and moved to dismiss the petition on two main grounds, viz: (1) that "there
is no proceeding established by law, or the rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual" ; and (2) that as an application for Philippine citizenship, "the petition is fatally defective for
failure to contain or mention the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the Naturalization Law",
such as, among others, petitioners former places of residence, and the absence of the affidavits of at
least two supporting witnesses.

Trial was held on December 18, 1964. Sole witness was petitioner. With the documentary evidence
admitted, the case was submitted for decision.

The judgment appealed from, dated December 18, 1964, reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the opposition, and declaring that ZITA NGO
BURCA, Petitioner, has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino Citizen
and that she being married to a Filipino Citizen, is hereby declared a citizen of the Philippines, after taking
the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes final and executory."cralaw virtua1aw
library

The controlling facts are not controverted. Petitioner Zita Ngo was born in Gigaquit, Surigao (now Surigao
del Norte), on March 30, 1933. Her father was Ngo Tay Suy, and her mother was Dee See alias Lee Co,
now both deceased and citizens of Nationalist Republic of China. She holds native born Certificate of
Residence 46333 and Alien Certificate of Registration A-148054. She married Florencio Burca, a native-
born Filipino, on May 14, 1961.

1. By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen, does not by the
mere fact of marriage automatically become a Filipino citizen.

Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited to:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority elect
Philippine citizenship.

45
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."cralaw virtua1aw library

And, on the specific legal status of an alien woman married to a citizen of the Philippines, Congress in
paragraph 1, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law legislated the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself
be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library

Jurisprudence has since stabilized the import of the constitutional and statutory precepts just quoted with
a uniform pronouncement that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a citizen of
the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized. 2 Which means that, in
line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, the wife must possess the
qualifications under Section 2, and must not be laboring under any of the disqualifications enumerated in
Section 4, of the Revised Naturalization Law. 3

This Court, in Ly Giok Ha, Et Al., v. Galang, Et Al., L-21332, March 18, 1966, explains the reasons for the
rule in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the
Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4, are not mutually exclusive; and if
all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might
well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For
example, section 4 disqualifies only

(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and

(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of
gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by a competent court, would not be thereby
disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such a person to be admitted as a citizen in view
of the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship must be of good moral character.

Similarly, the citizens wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government by certain
selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain herrenvolk, and thus disbelieve in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as
long as she is not opposed to organized government, nor affiliated to groups upholding or teaching
doctrines opposing all organized government, nor defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas. Et sic de
caeteris."

Indeed, the political privilege of citizenship should not be handed out blindly to any alien woman on the
sole basis of her marriage to a Filipino "irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and
identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions." 4

The rule heretofore adverted to is to be observed whether the husband be a natural born Filipino, 5 a
naturalized Filipino, 6 or a Filipino by election.

2. We next go to the mechanics of implementation of the constitutional and legal provisions, as applied to
an alien woman married to a Filipino. We part from the premise that such alien woman does not, by the
fact of marriage, acquire Philippine citizenship. The statute heretofore quoted (Sec. 15, Revised
Naturalization Law), we repeat, recites that she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized."

How then shall she be "deemed" a citizen of the Philippines? An examination of the Revised
Naturalization Law is quite revealing. For instance, minor children of persons naturalized under the law
who were born in the Philippines "shall be considered citizens thereof." Similarly, a foreign-born minor
child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parents, "shall automatically
become a Filipino citizen." 7 No conditions are exacted; citizenship of said minor children is conferred by
the law itself, without further proceedings and as a matter of course. An alien wife of a Filipino does not fit
into either of the categories just mentioned. Legal action has to be taken to make her a citizen.

There is no law or rule which authorizes a declaration of Filipino citizenship. 8 Citizenship is not an
appropriate subject for declaratory judgment proceedings. 9 And in one case, we held that citizenship of
an alien woman married to a Filipino must be determined in an "appropriate proceeding." 10

Speculations arise as to the import of the term "appropriate proceeding." The record of this case discloses
that, in some quarters, opinion is advanced that the determination of whether an alien woman married to

46
a Filipino shall be deemed a Filipino citizen, may be made by the Commissioner of Immigration. 11
Conceivably, absence of clear legal direction on the matter could have given rise to divergence of views.
We should aim at drying up sources of doubt. Parties interested should not be enmeshed in jurisdictional
entanglements. Public policy and sound practice, therefore, suggest that a clear-cut ruling be made on
this subject.

If an alien woman married to a Filipino does not become ipso facto a citizen, then she must have to file a
"petition for citizenship" in order that she may acquire the status of a Filipino citizen. Authority for this view
is Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law in which the plain language is: "Any person desiring to
acquire Philippine citizenship, shall file with the competent court" a petition for the purpose. And this,
because such alien woman is not a citizen, and she desires to acquire it. The proper forum, Section 8 of
the same law points out, is the Court of First Instance of the province where the petitioner has resided "at
least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition."

It is quite plain that the determination of whether said alien wife should be given the status of a citizen
should fall within the area allocated to competent courts. That this is so, is exemplified by the fact that this
Court has taken jurisdiction in one such case originating from the court of first instance, where an alien
woman had directly sought naturalization in her favor. 12

And, as nothing in the Revised Naturalization Law empowers any other office, agency, board or official, to
determine such question, we are persuaded to say that resolution thereof rests exclusively with the
competent courts.

We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this
country must apply therefor by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the
qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised
Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has
resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other
office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise other than the judgment of a competent
court of justice certifying or declaring that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is
hereby declared null and void.

3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of the law, a "petition for
citizenship." This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that efforts were
made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as one for naturalization, and,
in fact, declared petitioner "a citizen of the Philippines."

We go to the merits of the petition.

We note that the petition avers that petitioner was born in Gigaquit, Surigao; that her former residence
was Surigao, Surigao, and that presently she is residing at Regal St., Ormoc City. In court, however, she
testified that she also resided in Junguera St., Cebu, where she took up a course in home economics, for
one year. Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a petition for naturalization should state
petitioners "present and former places of residence." Residence encompasses all places where petitioner
actually and physically resided. 13 Cebu, where she studied for one year, perforce comes within the term
residence. The reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and former places of residence is that
"information regarding petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his
actual, physical surrounding." 14 And the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to
petitioners fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence do not appear in the petition. So it is,
that failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal. 15

Viewed from another direction, we find one other flaw in petitioners petition. Said petition is not supported
by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, "stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and
personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act
and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all
the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified
under the provisions of this Act." Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth the names and post-office
addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case." 16

The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be overlooked. It is important to know who those
witnesses are. The State should not be denied the opportunity to check on their background to ascertain
whether they are of good standing in the community, whose word may be taken on its face value, and
who could serve as "good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner." These witnesses should indeed
prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short of this, the petition must
fail. 17

Here, the case was submitted solely on the testimony of the petitioner. No other witnesses were

47
presented. This does not meet with the legal requirement.

Upon the view we take of this case, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the petition
dismissed, without costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.

Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' C. Zaballero and
Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for respondent-appellee.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705
entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently
depicts the factual setting of and the fundamental issues involved in this case thus:

In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the
Commissioner of Immigration, "restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative
from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest
and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to do so."

The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been denied, the
case was heard on the merits and the parties submitted their respective evidence.

The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General are
these:

On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to

enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in
connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the
Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines
to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month
(Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She was permitted to come into the
Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of
one month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On the date of her
arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually
depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized
period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might
properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung
was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit
"4"). On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim
Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of
the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order
her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary
injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her
arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write
either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak
either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor,
with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of
her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.

48
Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that
the instant petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same reason as set forth in
the Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which read:

First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:

Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman who is

now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.

The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be
held to mean what it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably implies that an alien woman may
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if
she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the law,
because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized.
(Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855).
However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:

3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be
lawfully naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become
such by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage on
January 25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO
AGUINALDO LIM, under the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines.

it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to be
disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to be
naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on
March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the requisite length of
residence in the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3,
Case No. 3).

Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines by virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need
only be not disqualified under the Naturalization Law, it would have been
worded "and who herself is not disqualified to become a citizen of the
Philippines."

Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized stay in
the Philippines, after repeated extensions thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962,
having married her co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one month
before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage was effected merely for
convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending compulsory departure, not to say
deportation. This cannot be permitted.

Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:

5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary

alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation
that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby
secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay
permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had
promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.
R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of
Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017, September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last
par., Phil. Immigration Law).

The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed not only by the
decided cases of the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but also on the very
provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
which reads:

An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the

Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-
immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and

49
 procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa and
thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This
paragraph is added by Republic Act 503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).

And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the administration

of all laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of
his duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law gives the Commissioner of Immigration
a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in determining cases presented to him (Pedro
Uy So vs. Commissioner of Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that
his decision thereon may not be disturbed unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in
excess of his jurisdiction.

It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and
insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and English, she admitted that she cannot write
either language.

The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some bearing in the
resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in the
governments brief, that "in the hearing ..., it was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung
that she does not possess any of the disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an additional
somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized by said appellants that during the hearing in the
lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was
already carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her husband."

Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE "WHO MIGHT
HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF SECTION 15, REVISED
NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY
BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A
FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND
NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO

DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND
WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER
SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-
PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.

III

THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A

FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME
WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER
AUTHORIZED STAY.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF

IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE
COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO
DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE
DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A
FILIPINO CITIZEN.

50
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS'
COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER
FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A
TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.

VI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS'

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN
ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL) .

We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision upheld the two main
grounds of objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the court below, viz:

That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the
strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for
a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation
to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised.
(Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September
29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16, 1954,
Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);

That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on
the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the qualifications required
by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications.
(Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 25,
1959)

It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper resolution would necessarily cover all the
points raised in appellants' assignments of error, hence, We will base our discussions, more or less, on
said objections.

The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in appellants' second and
fourth assignments of error does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seem evident
that the Solicitor General's pose that an alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-
immigrant cannot remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to a
foreign country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter
undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for
determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is
not a Filipino citizen. We note the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo.
Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said
petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino husband, they would
have held her as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident without having to depart as
required of aliens by Section 9 (g) of the law.

In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act
providing:

An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines

permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart
voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the
proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of this Act.

does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become
Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon their the
right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here,
the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it is that this Court
has vehemently expressed disapproval of convenient ruses employed by alien to convert their status from
temporary visitors to permanent residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal
provision already mentioned, such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil.

51
1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of
Immigration Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:

... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate
and voluntary representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures
the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go back on his
representation and stay permanently, without first departing from the Philippines as he
had promised. No officer can relieve him of the departure requirements of section 9 of the
Immigration Act, under the guise of "change" or "correction", for the law makes no
distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our
previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien
so permitted to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission,
however flimsy such claim should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time,
money and effort to examining and verifying whether or not every such alien really has a
right to take up permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to
prolong his stay and evade his return to the port whence he came, contrary to what he
promised to do when he entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident.

On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a temporary
visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for
a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is
entitled to come back, when after all, such right has become incontestible as a necessary concomitant of
his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this has been conferred upon him. Consider for
example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that they
become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can be allowed
permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine
whether or not they have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which
such a requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd
construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice Concepcion,
our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:

... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a
citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in
consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence the
decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth
Act 613 provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the
alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum
deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative." (At. pp. 462-463)

In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a
Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship
including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the
Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions,
the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense
thus discussed therefore, appellants' second and fourth assignments of error are well taken.

II

Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is that appellant Lau
Yuen Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is
not denied did not have the effect of making her a Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record that she does not possess all the
qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by the Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth
Act 473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications thereunder. In
other words, the Solicitor General implicitly concedes that had it been established in the proceedings
below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications required by the law of applicants for
naturalization, she would have been recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case,
without requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization.

To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the view of this Court
since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated December 23,
1959, 106 Phil., 706,713,1 for it was only in Zita Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. NO. L-24252 which was
promulgated on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this
Court held that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for
naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law and prove
in said naturalization proceeding not only that she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the law but also that she has complied with all the formalities required

52
thereby like any other applicant for naturalization,2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence
inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is still pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging
Us, however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to reconsider Burca but to even
reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having been reiterated in all
subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty.3

Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, underwent
judicial construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case,4 one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha,
a woman of Chinese nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose authority to stay was to expire on
March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before
the expiration of her authority to stay, she married a Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March
9, 1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage and, contending that his
wife had become a Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded for the cancellation of her bond, but
instead of acceding to such request, the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure to do
so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of the
bond; the lower court sustained her contention that she had no obligation to leave, because she had
become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be returned. The Commissioner appealed to this
Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court,
thus:

The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a
Filipino justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from
the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative view,
petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a
citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in
consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the
decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth
Act No. 613 provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of
the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the
sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative." Thus the
issue boils down to whether an alien female who marries a male citizen of the Philippines
follows ipso facto his political status.

The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which petitioners
rely, reads:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the

Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his
foreign wife, unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized." As correctly held in an
opinion of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this limitation of section
15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No.
473, namely:

(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any

association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized governments;

(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,

personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of
their ideas;

(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;

(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious

diseases;

(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines,
have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a
sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals
of the Filipinos;

53
 (g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the ... Philippines are at
war, during the period of such war;

(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States,
whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized
citizens or subjects thereof.

In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha
does not fall under any of the classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who
claim that, despite her failure to depart from the Philippines within the period specified in
the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of
proving her alleged change of political status, from alien to citizen. Strictly speaking,
petitioners have not made out, therefore a case against the respondents-appellants.

Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the lower
court, had the parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may
"be lawfully naturalized," and this being a case of first impression in our courts, we are of
the opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the parties herein should be given an
opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) .

As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the above decision as
regards the following propositions: .

1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, the marriage of an
alien woman to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully naturalized";

2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the limitation of Section
15 of the Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, only those
disqualified from being naturalized under Section 4 of the law qouted in the decision;

3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action to recover her
bond confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration;

4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and

5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law, the Court somehow left the impression
that no inquiry need be made as to qualifications,5 specially considering that the decision cited and
footnotes several opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the Commissioner of
Immigration, the most important of which are the following:

Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15, Commonwealth
Act No. 473), provided that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed
a citizen of the Philippines." A similar provision in the naturalization law of the United
States has been construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of
residence, good character, etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial proceedings,
but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen
[Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449,
27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)

In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might herself
be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the
qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial
proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Op.
No. 79, s. 1940)

Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization Law,
it results that any woman who married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June
17, 1939, and the marriage not having been dissolved, and on the assumption that she
possesses none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473, follows the citizenship of her husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec.
Jose Abad Santos.)

From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of inquiry
is as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of the
Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen of the

54
 Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473, which
reads in part as follows:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the

Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as contained in the above
provision, means that the woman who is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to
any of the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law (Ops.,
Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940).
Under the facts stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear to be among
the disqualified classes mentioned in the law.

It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an illegitimate
of a Filipino mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the Philippines in
consonance with the well-settled rule that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of
his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s.
1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must necessarily be
deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No.
52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)

The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so appealed to this Court
that five days later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the same ruling on the basis of the following facts:

Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned out that her passport
was forged. On December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her arrest for purpose of deportation. Later,
on December 20, 1953, she married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of
Special Inquiry considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however, the Board of Immigration
Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation proceedings and so, the husband filed
prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court denied the petition. Although this Court affirmed
said decision, it held, on the other hand, that:

Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok Ha v.
Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice
to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization Law requires that
the alien woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized" as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the decision cited, this last
condition requires proof that the woman who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified
under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.

No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship by

Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The lower court, therefore,
committed no error in refusing to interfere with the deportation proceedings, where she
can anyway establish the requisites indispensable for her acquisition of Filipino
citizenship, as well as the alleged validity of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua v.
The Board of Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil.
521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied] .

For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave the parties concerned
opportunity to prove the fact that they were not suffering from any of the disqualifications of the law
without the need of undergoing any judicial naturalization proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that
according to the above decisions, the law in this country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of an
alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of
such marriage, she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any naturalization proceedings under said law.

It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications, that is, as to
whether or not they need also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice
understood them to mean that such qualifications need not be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of
Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a distinguished member of this Court, 6 so ruled in opinions
rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative of which held: .

At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen needs
only to show that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" in order to acquire Philippine

55
 citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the statute, such as those relating to the
qualifications of an applicant for naturalization through judicial proceedings, is not
necessary. (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of
Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.

This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L-
10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, where the Supreme Court, construing the
abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino
does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife," unless she "herself may be
lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the
Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words,
disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive
factor that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine
citizenship.

xxx xxx xxx

Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups The Commissioner of
Immigration does not say so but merely predicates his negative action on the ground that
a warrant of deportation for "overstaying" is pending against the petitioner.

We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for disqualification for
naturalization are expressly enumerated in the law, a warrant of deportation not based on
a finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any of those specified causes may not be
invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine
citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius)
(Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen
in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of
Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her
alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a
Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship
pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said
petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner
and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the
groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please
see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and
thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition. (Op. No. 38,
s. 19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-
10760, promulgated May 17, 1957), where the Supreme Court, construing the above-
quoted section in the Revised Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino
does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she herself may be lawfully
naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the
Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words,
disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the decisive
factor that defeats the right of an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire
Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a new
one. In that case, the Supreme Court held that under paragraph I of Section 15 Of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine
citizenship to his foreign wife unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized"', and,
quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No.
168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28. s. 1950, "this limitation of section
15 excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No.
473." (Op. 134, s. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)

It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction of the law was
importantly modified by this Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts were as follows:

56
 Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of temporary stay in the
Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration asked
the bondsman to present her to the Bureau of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of
notice, otherwise the bond will be confiscated(Annex 1). For failure of the bondsman to
comply with the foregoing order, on 1 April 1955. the Commissioner of Immigration
ordered the cash bond confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was an order issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike in
forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court must enter an order
forfeiting the bail bond and the bondsman must be given an opportunity to present his
principal or give a satisfactory reason for his inability to do so, before final judgment may
be entered against the bondsman,(section 15, Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in
forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an alien in the Philippines, no court
proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in
the bond is committed, the Commissioner of Immigration may, under the terms and
conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the Government. (In the meanwhile, on
April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in marriage by the
Justice of the Peace of Las Pias, Rizal.)

Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices Concepcion and
Reyes who had penned Ly Giok Ha, and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:

The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not relieve
the bondsman from his liability on the bond. The marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and
the violation of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond failure to
depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized period of temporary stay in
the Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to report to the Commissioner of Immigration
within 24 hours from receipt of notice were committed before the marriage. Moreover,
the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine
citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the qualifications required by law to
become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.* There is no showing that the appellant Lee
Suan Ay possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by
law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.

Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in the appealed
decision now before Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement therein that the alien wife "must
possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference
to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be
recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court in
Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly held that "(I)n a
previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence,
good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings but merely that she is of the
race by persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)

Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of the construction of
the law, it could be said that there was need for clarification of the seemingly new posture of the Court.
The occasion for such clarification should have been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of
Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had
rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua, supra, which followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently
seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the particular point in issue now, since it was
not squarely raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on the said matter would at
best be no more than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of the
Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized," so that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship,
as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board of
Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no evidence of record as to the
qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without explaining the apparent
departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a
separate concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee
Suan Ay and opined that both qualifications and non-disqualifications have to be shown without
elucidating on what seemed to be departure from the said first two decisions.

It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of rationalizing the
Court's position. In Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the
facts were simply these: Lo San Tuang, a Chinese woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a
temporary visitor with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a Filipino on January 7, 1961,
almost six months before the expiry date of her permit, and when she was requested to leave after her

57
authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had become a Filipina by marriage, and
to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that she does not possess any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached
the court, the trial judge held for the government that in addition to not having any of the disqualifications
referred to, there was need that Lo San Tuang should have also possessed all the qualifications of
residence, moral character, knowledge of a native principal dialect, etc., provided by the law. Recognizing
that the issue squarely to be passed upon was whether or not the possession of all the qualifications were
indeed needed to be shown apart from non-disqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively for the
Court, reasoning out thus: .

It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the basis of
the decision laid down in the case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the
Circuit Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the woman "should be a
person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws, and that in
respect of the qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions, being the wife of a
citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a
citizen." (In explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: "If, whenever during the life of
the woman or afterwards, the question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding, the
party asserting her citizenship by reason of her marriage with a citizen must not only
prove such marriage, but also that the woman then possessed all the further
qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized under existing laws, the statute will
be practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a share. The proof of the facts may have
existed at the time of the marriage, but years after, when a controversy arises upon the
subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.")

In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white woman
or a woman of African descent or nativity, in order to be deemed an American citizen,
because, with respect to the rest of the qualifications on residence, moral character, etc.,
she was presumed to be qualified.

Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as
amended by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of persons who alone might become
citizens of the Philippines, even as it provided who were disqualified. Thus, the pertinent
provisions of that law provided:

Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens Philippine citizenship

may be acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens
thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the Insular possessions of
the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who
under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said country
if residing therein.

Section 2. Who are disqualified. The following cannot be naturalized

as Philippine citizens: (a) Persons opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized government; (b) persons defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas; (c)
polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) persons
convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from
mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f) citizens or
subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are
at war, during the period of such war.

Section 3. Qualifications. The persons comprised in subsection (a) of

section one of this Act, in order to be able to acquire Philippine
citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of
the hearing of their petition.

The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one
shall, in addition to being not less than twenty-one years of age on the
day of the hearing of the petition, have all and each of the following
qualifications:

First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not

less than five years, except as provided in the next following section;

58
 Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of their residence in the Philippine
Islands, in their relation with the constituted government as well as with
the community in which they are living;

Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than
one thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or have some known trade or
profession; and

Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.

In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in

writing and under oath his intention of renouncing absolutely and
perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or
sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or subject.

Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant supra, to our law as it then stood,
alien women married to citizens of the Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of
the Philippines, be either (1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof
under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of the United States, or
(3) citizens of the United States or foreigners who under the laws of the United States
might become citizens of that country if residing therein. With respect to the qualifications
set forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have the same for all intents
and purposes.

But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on
June 17, 1939, Congress has since discarded class or racial consideration from the
qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according to its proponent, the purpose in
eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove the features of the existing
naturalization act which discriminated in favor of the Caucasians and against Asiatics
who are our neighbors, and are related to us by racial affinity and, second, to foster amity
with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 11 ed.]), even as it retained in Section
15 the phrase in question. The result is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" must be understood in the context in which it is now found, in a setting so
different from that in which it was found by the Court in Leonard v. Grant.

The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is that, as
the Solicitor General points out, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are
qualified to become citizens of the Philippines.

There is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not
belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization
Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who
is not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to become a citizen of the Philippines,
because the law treats "qualifications" and "disqualifications" in separate sections. And
then it must not be lost sight of that even under the interpretation given to the former law,
it was to be understood that the alien woman was not disqualified under Section 2 of that
law. Leonard v. Grant did not rule that it was enough if the alien woman does not belong
to the class of disqualified persons in order that she may be deemed to follow the
citizenship of her husband: What that case held was that the phrase "who might herself
be lawfully naturalized, merely means that she belongs to the class or race of persons
qualified to become citizens by naturalization the assumption being always that she is
not otherwise disqualified.

We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law,
an alien woman, who is married to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of
her husband only if she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has all the
qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino citizen does not
automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in any
way disqualified to become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the trial
court, the same being self-serving.

59
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-20784,
December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous resolution
of the preceding administration to allow Sun Peck Yong and her minor son to await the taking of the oath
of Filipino citizenship of her husband two years after the decision granting him nationalization and
required her to leave and this order was contested in court, Justice Barrera held:

In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775,

promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790,
promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact that the husband became a
naturalized citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of the Philippines. It
must also be shown that she herself possesses all the qualifications, and none of the
disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this case, there is no allegation, much less
showing, that petitioner-wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore,
the fact that a decision was favorably made on the naturalization petition of her husband
is no assurance that he (the husband) would become a citizen, as to make a basis for the
extension of her temporary stay.

On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice
Barrera reiterated the same ruling and citing particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the
marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on November 12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of
Filipino citizenship before the Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make
her a Filipino citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and obviously, she had not had the necessary
ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the law.

Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion when Justice
Makalintal sought a reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26,
1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's husband was granted Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959
and took the oath on January 31 of the same year. Choy King Tee first came to the Philippines in 1955
and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong since then, her last visa before the case being due to
expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband asked the Commissioner of Immigration
to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as well as their child's, for the reason that they were Filipinos,
and when the request was denied as to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted.
Discussing anew the issue of the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not only reiterated the
arguments of Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in line
with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship. 7

No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336,
Justice J.P. Bengzon readily reversed the decision of the lower court granting the writs of mandamus and
prohibition against the Commissioner of Immigration, considering that Austria's wife, while admitting she
did not possess all the qualifications for naturalization, had submitted only an affidavit that she had none
of the disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold eight days later in Brito v.
Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.

Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion to expand on the
reasoning of Choy King Tee by illustrating with examples "the danger of relying exclusively on the
absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law." 9

Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar held for
the Court that an alien woman who is widowed during the dependency of the naturalization proceedings
of her husband, in order that she may be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving
compliance with the requirements of Republic Act 530, show that she possesses all the qualifications and
does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under the Naturalization Law, citing in the process the
decision to such effect discussed above, 11even as he impliedly reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v.
Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.

Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that the point now under
discussion is settled law.

In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue. Under Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:

SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman, who is now or
may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

60
 Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of
the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who
is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine
citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines
when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after
becoming of age.

A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be
considered a Philippine citizen unless within one year after reaching the age of majority
he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the
country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.

is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married to a man who
subsequently becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering
from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the law, she must also possess all the qualifications
required by said law? if nothing but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted
above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer to the question would be inevitable,
specially, if it is noted that the present case was actually submitted for decision on January 21, 1964 yet,
shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even before Choy King
Tee, supra, were decided. There are other circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if not
necessary, that the Court take up the matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the
membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and of those who were in the Court already when Burca was
decided, two members, Justice Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely, according to
them, because (they wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so far as they are
concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views and arguments discussed at length with copious relevant authorities,
in the motion for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amici curae 13 in the Burca case
cannot just be taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful manner, not
only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical aspects thereof in the light
of the actual situation of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who have so long, even decades,
considered themselves as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as such, officially or otherwise,
relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their status as such by the administrative
authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by the courts. Under these circumstances, and if only to
afford the Court an opportunity to consider the views of the five justices who took no part in Go Im Ty
(including the writer of this opinion), the Court decided to further reexamine the matter. After all, the ruling
first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee stand the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha,
did not categorically repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly
Giok Ha. Besides, some points brought to light during the deliberations in this case would seem to
indicate that the premises of the later cases can still bear further consideration.

Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are construing, Section 15,
aforequoted, of the Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its American
counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American
provision. A brief review of its history proves this beyond per adventure of doubt.

The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature under American
sovereignty was that of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence of the Treaty of
Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the
United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was
enacted pursuant to express authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the Philippines
gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only after the effectivity of the Philippine
Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for our laws on said subject to have any
perspective or orientation of our own; everything was American.

The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: .

SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside herein who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine,
and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight.

61
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of March 23, 1912, by
adding a provision as follows:

Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would
become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein.

The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: .

SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other
country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives
of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of
the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States under the laws of the United
States if residing therein.

For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the effect of marriage
to a Filipino upon the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code provisions on
citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which were, however, abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was
unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always followed that of the husband. Not even Act 2927
contained any provision regarding the effect of naturalization of an alien, upon the citizenship of his alien
wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a native born Filipino or one who had become a
Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided thus: .

SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. In case a petitioner
should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children
may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the
widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been
rendered during the life of the petitioner.

It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act 2977, that the following
provisions were added to the above Section 13:

SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections thirteen
and fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:

SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a

citizen of the Philippine Islands and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands.

SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under
this law, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of the
naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the Philippine Islands,
be considered citizens thereof.

SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have
been born in the Philippine Islands after the naturalization of their
parents shall be considered citizens thereof.

When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17, 1939, the above
Section 13 became its Section 15 which has already been quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen,
Section 13 (a) abovequoted was re-enacted practically word for word in the first paragraph of this Section
15 except for the change of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it could not have been on any other
basis than this legislative history of our naturalization law that each and everyone of the decisions of this
Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were rendered.

62
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite clear that
for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need for any
naturalization proceeding because she becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage,
provided she does not suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act
473, with no mention being made of whether or not the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 thereof
need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of qualifications were specifically
required, but it was not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why the
possession of the qualifications provided by the law should also be shown to be possessed by the alien
wife of a Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by marriage.

As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as follows: That "like the
law in the United States, our Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons who alone might
become citizens, even as it provided who were disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473,
our Naturalization Law since 1939 did not reenact the section providing who might become citizens,
allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination in favor of Caucasians and against Asiatics, "the only
logical deduction ... is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood
as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines"
and "there is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of
disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." 14

A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference may be qouted:

The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of cases.
The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first prove that she has all the qualifications
required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang,
L-190977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun
Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy
v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted the
question anew to the court for a possible reexamination of the said ruling in the light of
the interpretation of a similar law in the United States after which Section 15 of our
Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855
(Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was
passed on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the former Philippine Naturalization
Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26, 1920. Under this Naturalization
Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was limited to three classes of persons, (a)
Natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other insular
possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who,
under the laws of the United States, may become citizens of the latter country if residing
therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become American
Citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were
qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far as racial restrictions were concerned there
was at the time a similarity between the naturalization laws of the two countries and
hence there was reason to accord here persuasive force to the interpretation given in the
United States to the statutory provision concerning the citizenship of alien women
marrying American citizens.

This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the enactment
of the Revised Naturalization Law, (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The
racial restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision found in Act No.
3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that when Congress chose to retain
the said provision that to be deemed a Philippine citizen upon marriage the alien wife
must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized," the reference is no longer to the
class or race to which the woman belongs, for class or race has become immaterial, but
to the qualifications and disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2
and 4 of the statute. Otherwise the requirement that the woman "might herself be lawfully
naturalized" would be meaningless surplusage, contrary to settled norms of statutory
construction.

The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is believed
to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, which
after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found worthy thereof, and not
indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen
of the Philippines, irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification
with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions.

63
 Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for naturalization,
even, indeed, that she has none of the disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition
as a Philippine citizen.

In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the same conclusion thus:

On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been residing
in the Philippines for a continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she
has a lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13, t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can
speak and write English, or any of the principal Philippine languages (pp. 12, 13,
t.s.n., id.).

While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words emphasized
indicate that the present Naturalization Law requires that an alien woman who marries a
Filipino husband must possess the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition to not
being disqualified under any of the eight ("a" to "h") subheadings of section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by marriage, both the
appellee and the court below (in its second decision) sustain the view that all that the law
demands is that the woman be not disqualified under section 4.

At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the question at
issue could be regarded as not conclusively settled, there being only the concise
pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to
the effect that:

The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically

confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the
qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization.

Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly established the
rule that the requirement of section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act),
that an alien woman married to a citizen should be one who "might herself be lawfully
naturalized," means not only woman free from the disqualifications enumerated in section
4 of the Act but also one who possesses the qualifications prescribed by section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong
v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784, Dee. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27,
1963; Austria v. Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351,
March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965).

Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2
of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not
mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not
disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred
upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies
only

(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and

(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,

so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously

convicted by a competent court would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that
the law did not intend such person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement
of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship "must be of good moral character."

Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in

government by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain
"herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution;
yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not "opposed to
organized government," nor affiliated to groups "upholding or teaching doctrines
opposing all organized governments", nor "defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance
of their ideas." Et sic de caeteris.

64
 The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying exclusively on
the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative
requirements of the law, which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly
does not possess.

As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be lawfully naturalized" was derived
from the U.S. Revised Statutes (section 1994) and should be given the same territorial
and racial significance given to it by American courts, this Court has rejected the same
in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee v.
Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965.

It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a closer study thereof
cannot bat reveal certain relevant considerations which adversely affect the premises on which they are
predicated, thus rendering the conclusions arrived thereby not entirely unassailable.

1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927 providing who are eligible
for Philippine citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to
remove the racial requirements for naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino nationality to
Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of Caucasians only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy.
It is important to note, to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the whole Section 1 of Act
2927 which reads, thus:

SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. Philippine citizenship may be

acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones
Law; (b) natives of the other Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the
United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become
citizens of said country if residing therein.

and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any mention of race or
color of the persons who were then eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more evident from said
provision is that it reflected the inevitable subordination of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth
American regime to the understandable stations flowing from our staffs as a territory of the United States
by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was precisely approved pursuant to express
authority without which it could not have been done, granted by an amendment to Section 4 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and which
was reenacted as part of the Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have already been
footed earlier. In truth, therefore, it was because of the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth
and in the exercise of our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence
Act that Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial discrimination
contained in our Naturalization Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our Naturalization
Law from the impositions of American legislation. In other words, the fact that such discrimination was
removed was one of the effects rather than the intended purpose of the amendment.

2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in subdivision (c) (of Section 1
of Act 2927) to foreigners who may become American citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons
of certain specified races were qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the said
subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision was to confine the grant under it of Philippine
citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein mentioned, the third of which were citizens of the
United States and, corollarily, persons who could be American citizens under her laws. The words used in
the provision do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any particular race or color and of excluding
others, but more accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for American citizenship
under the laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long before 1920, when our Act
2927 became a law, the naturalization, laws of the United States already provided for the following
disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29, 1906:

SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized government,

or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such
disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty,
necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either
of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the Government of the United States, or
of any other organized government, because of his or their official character, or who is a
polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States.

and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of
Act 2927 even if they happened to be Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of fact, said American
law, which was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and to provide for a
Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the United States" contained no racial disqualification

65
requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6, 1882 not being among the expressly repealed by
this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was enacted, subdivision (e) of its Section 1 could not have
had any connotation of racial exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced back to its origin in the Act of
the United States Congress of 1912 already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem that the
rationalization in the qouted decisions predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act
2927 by Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial discrimination
in our naturalization law has no clear factual basis. 17

3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason why the construction adopted in
the opinions of the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice
should not prevail. It is beyond dispute that the first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is
a reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing but an
exact copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Raised Statutes of the United States as it stood
before its repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
found in said Section 15 had a definite unmistakable construction uniformly foIlowed in all courts of the
United States that had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must be considered, as if it were
written in the statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said section, they
knew of its unvarying construction in the United States and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the
American statute, they have in effect incorporated into the provision, as thus enacted, the construction
given to it by the American courts as well as the Attorney General of the United States and all
administrative authorities, charged with the implementation of the naturalization and immigration laws of
that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952];
Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [19353; Helvering v. Winmill, 305
U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed.
536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]).

A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and administrative
authorities is contained in United States of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod,
Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 295 Fed. 523, decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as
follows:

Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p.
117) provides as follows: "Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be
deemed a citizen."

Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of February
10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in its second section provided "that any
woman, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall
be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen."

And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British Statute 7 &
8 Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844, which provided that "any woman married, or who shall be
married, to a natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and taken to be
herself naturalized, and have all the rights and privileges of a natural born subject."

The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp. Stat.
4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255), being "An Act Relative to the Naturalization
and Citizenship of Married Women," in 2, provides "that any woman who marries a citizen
of the United States after the passage of this Act, ... shall not become a citizen of the
United States by reason of such marriage ..."

Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised Statutes ... are repealed."

Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or
retained under either of such sections, ..." meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of
September 22, 1922, has no application to the facts of the present case, as the marriage
of the relator took place prior to its passage. This case, therefore, depends upon the
meaning to be attached to 1994 of the Revised Statutes.

In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284,
construed this provision as found in the Act of 1855 as follows: "The term, "who might
lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limits the application of the law to
free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, only required that
the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white person," and not an alien
enemy."

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This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to the
class or race which might be lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other
provisions of the naturalization laws as to residence or moral character, or to any of the
provisions of the immigration laws relating to the exclusion or deportation of aliens.

In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also construed the
Act of 1855, declaring that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the United States, and might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen." He held that "upon the authorities, and the reason, if not the necessity, of the
case," the statute must be construed as in effect declaring that an alien woman, who is of
the class or race that may be lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and who
marries a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also, and it was not necessary that
it should appear affirmatively that she possessed the other qualifications at the time of
her marriage to entitle her to naturalization.

In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit court,
in United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to the
United States and married here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the
concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage she became ipso facto a citizen
of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all of the provisions of the
statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He added: "There can be no doubt of this, in
view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United, States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall.
496, 19 L. ed. 283." The alien "belonged to the class of persons" who might be lawfully
naturalized.

In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to the
United States from France and entered the country contrary to the immigration laws. The
immigration authorities took her into custody at the port of New York, with the view of
deporting her. She applied for her release under a writ of habeas corpus, and pending
the disposition of the matter she married a naturalized American citizen. The circuit court
of appeals for the ninth Circuit held, affirming the court below, that she was entitled to be
discharged from custody. The court declared: "The rule is well settled that her marriage to
a naturalized citizen of the United States entitled her to be discharged. The status of the
wife follows that of her husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicil
became her domicil." .

In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165. Fed. 980,
had before it the application of a husband for his final decree of naturalization. It
appeared that at that time his wife was held by the immigration authorities at New York
on the ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease. Counsel
on both sides agreed that the effect of the husband's naturalization would be to confer
citizenship upon the wife. In view of that contingency District Judge Brown declined to
pass upon the husband's application for naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it
was determined whether the wife's disease was curable. He placed his failure to act on
the express ground that the effect of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At the
same time he express his opinion that the husband's naturalization would not effect her
naturalization, as she was not one who could become lawfully naturalized. "Her own
capacity (to become naturalized)," the court stated "is a prerequisite to her attaining
citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the married status cannot confer it upon
her." Nothing, however, was actually decided in that case, and the views expressed
therein are really nothing more than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as
something more than that, we find ourselves, with all due respect for the learned judge,
unable to accept them.

In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626, District Judge Learned
Hand held that an alien woman, a subject of the Turkish Empire, who married an
American citizen while visiting Turkey, and then came to the United States, could not be
excluded, although she had, at the time of her entry, a disease which under the
immigration laws would have been sufficient ground for her exclusion, if she bad not had
the status of a citizen. The case was brought into this court on appeal, and in 1911 was
affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the relators
married, they might have been lawfully naturalized, and we said: "Even if we assume the
contention of the district attorney to be correct that marriage will not make a citizen of a
woman who would be excluded under our immigration laws, it does not affect these
relators."

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We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was also said to
be inconsistent with the policy of our law that the husband should be a citizen and the
wife an alien. The distinction between that case and the one now before the court is that,
in the former case, the marriage took place before any order of exclusion had been
made, while in this the marriage was celebrated after such an order was made. But such
an order is a mere administrative provision, and has not the force of a judgment of a
court, and works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on the circumstances
that existed at the time the order of exclusion was made. If the circumstances change
prior to the order being carried into effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order
of exclusion should be based on the ground that the alien was at the time afflicted with a
contagious disease, and it should be made satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual
deportation, that the alien had entirely recovered from the disease, we think it plain that
the order could not be carried into effect. So, in this case, if, after the making of the order
of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily to remain, she in good faith marries
an American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she thereby
acquired, under international law and under 1994 of the Revised Statutes, American
citizenship, and ceased to be an alien. There upon, the immigration authorities lost their
jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and not to citizens.

In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the right of
the officials to deport a woman under the following circumstances: She entered this
country in July, 1910, being an alien and having been born in Turkey. She was taken into
custody by the immigration authorities in the following September, and in October a
warrant for her deportation was issued. Pending hearings as to the validity of that order,
she was paroled in the custody of her counsel. The ground alleged for her deportation
was that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at the time of her
entry. One of the reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that the woman had
married a citizen of the United States pending the proceedings for her deportation. Judge
Dodge declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under such circumstances "is
capable of having the effect claimed, in view of the facts shown." He held that it was no
part of the intended policy of 1994 to annul or override the immigration laws, so as to
authorize the admission into the country of the wife of a naturalized alien not otherwise
entitled to enter, and that an alien woman, who is of a class of persons excluded by law
from admission to the United States does not come within the provisions of that section.
The court relied wholly upon the dicta contained in the Rustigian Case. No other
authorities were cited.

In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994 and
held that where, pending proceedings to deport an alien native of France as an alien
prostitute, she was married to a citizen of the United States, she thereby became a
citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her citizenship was revoked by due
process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was contended, her marriage was conceived
in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws and
preventing her deportation, such fact should be established in a court of competent
jurisdiction in an action commenced for the purpose. The case was appealed and the
appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed. 1022.

It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the statute
by the Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen.
402, passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence within the United
States for the period required by the naturalization laws was riot necessary in order to
constitute an alien woman a citizen, she having married a citizen of the United States
abroad, although she never resided in the United States, she and her husband having
continued to reside abroad after the marriage.

In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an
opinion rendered by Attorney General Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman,
twenty-eight years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in New York and went at once
to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About fifteen months after her
arrival she was taken before a United States commissioner by way of instituting
proceedings under the Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. 4242,
3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had entered
this country for the purpose of prostitution, and had been found an inmate of a house of
prostitution and practicing the same within three years after landing. It appeared,
however, that after she was taken before the United States commissioner, but prior to her
arrest under a warrant by the Department of Justice, she was lawfully married to a native-
born citizen of the United States. The woman professed at the time of her marriage an
intention to abandon her previous mode of life and to remove with her husband to his

68
 home in Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life had been, but professed to believe
in her good intentions. The question was raised as to the right to deport her, the claim
being advance that by her marriage she bad become an American citizen and therefore
could not be deported. The Attorney General ruled against the right to deport her as she
had become an American citizen. He held that the words, "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized," refer to a class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that
compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws was not required. 27 Ops.
Atty. Gen. 507.

Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our observation that
Congress, in enacting the Immigration Act of 1917, so as to provide, in 19, "that the
marriage to an American citizen of a female of the sexually immoral classes ... shall not
invest such female with United States citizenship if the marriage of such alien female
shall be solemnized after her arrest or after the commission of acts which make her liable
to deportation under this act."

Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law:

(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral class
avoiding deportation through the device of marrying an American citizen.

(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an alien woman of
any other of the excluded classes, either before or after her detention, should not confer
upon her American citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the country, its intention
would have been expressed, and 19 would not have been confined solely to women of
the immoral class.

Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject and We have found no
warrant for the proposition that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994 of
the Revised Statutes was meant solely as a racial bar, even if loose statements in some decisions and
other treaties and other writings on the subject would seem to give such impression. The case of Kelley v.
Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited among the first of the decisions 19 simply held:

As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to
citizens of the United States, if they are of the class of persons for whose naturalization
the previous Acts of Congress provide. The terms "married" or "who shall be married," do
not refer in our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to
a state of marriage. They mean that, whenever a woman, who under previous Acts might
be naturalized, is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship existed at the
passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she becomes, by that
fact, a citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the Act, citizenship
upon her. The construction which would restrict the Act to women whose husbands, at
the time of marriage, are citizens, would exclude far the greater number, for whose
benefit, as we think, the Act was intended. Its object, in our opinion, was to allow her
citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any application for
naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there is no reason for the restriction
suggested.

The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limit the
application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at
the time only required that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white
person," and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.

A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York,
in Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one which gives the widest extension to its
provisions.

Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws"
only limit the application to free white women" 20 it hastened to add that "the previous Naturalization Act,
existing at the time, ... required that the person applying for its benefits should be (not only) a "free white
person" (but also) ... not an alien enemy." This is simply because under the Naturalization Law of the
United States at the time the case was decided, the disqualification of enemy aliens had already been
removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the corresponding footnote hereof anon. In other
words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was mentioned, the reason was that
there was no other non-racial requirement or no more alien enemy disqualification at the time; and this is
demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the previous naturalization

69
law, there was also such requirement in addition to race. This is impotent, since as stated in re Rustigian,
165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression used by Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms "who might
lawfully be naturalized under existing laws" only limit the application of the law to free white women, must
be interpreted in the application to the special facts and to the incapacities under the then existing laws,"
(at p. 982) meaning that whether or not an alien wife marrying a citizen would be a citizen was
dependent, not only on her race and nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not there were other
disqualifications under the law in force at the time of her marriage or the naturalization of her husband.

4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew the
evidence that because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth Act 473, it follows that in
place of the said eliminated section particularly its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or not an
alien wife "may be lawfully naturalized," what should be required is not only that she must not be
disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2,
such as those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying principles of the
Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate,
capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of
children in certain schools, etc., thereby implying that, in effect, sails Section 2 has been purposely
intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927. Upon further consideration of the proper premises,
We have come, to the conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently justified.

To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already explained above of the
mentioned provisions has been shown or can be shown to indicate that such was the clear intent of the
legislature. Rather, what is definite is that Section 15 is, an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States, which, at the time of the approval of Commonwealth Act 473 had already a
settled construction by American courts and administrative authorities.

Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions quoted above, there can
be no doubt that in the construction of the identically worded provision in the Revised Statutes of the
United States, (Section 1994, which was taken, from the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in the
United States are unanimously agreed that the qualifications of residence, good moral character,
adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be considered, and that the only eligibility to be
taken into account is that of the race or class to which the subject belongs, the conceptual scope of
which, We have just discussed. 21 In the very case of Leonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice
Regala in Lo San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the American authorities was made thus:

The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in the Act
of 1855, supra, "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen" while it may imply that the
person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by ordinary means or in the
usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application and proof,
yet it does not follow that such person is on that account practically any the less a citizen.
The word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged"; and, therefore,
whatever an act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or
thing, must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or established
concerning "such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When,
therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain circumstances, be
"deemed' an American citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to
her being naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the usual mode thereby
prescribed.

Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in a situation like this
wherein our legislature has copied an American statute word for word, it is understood that the
construction already given to such statute before its being copied constitute part of our own law, there
seems to be no reason how We can give a different connotation or meaning to the provision in question.
At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining the contrary conclusion appear to be based on
in accurate factual premises related to the real legislative background of the framing of our naturalization
law in its present form.

Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 with
the eligibility requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view.
There is no question that Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less substantially the same as
Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-existed already with practically the same
provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the phrase "who may be lawfully
naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, referred to the so-called racial
requirement in Section 1 of the same Act, without regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, how could
the elimination of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely,
according to the American jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was
approved, such qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3, which had their counterpart in the

70
corresponding American statutes, are not supposed to be taken into account and that what should be
considered only are the requirements similar to those provided for in said Section 1 together with the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?

Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully naturalized" in Section 15 could
have been intended to convey a meaning different than that given to it by the American courts and
administrative authorities. As already stated, Act 3448 which contained said phrase and from which it was
taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By that, time, Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States was no longer in force because it had been repealed expressly the Act of
September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic naturalization of alien wives of American citizens
and required, instead, that they submit to regular naturalization proceedings, albeit under more liberal
terms than those of other applicants. In other words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in question,
which, as already demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the Americans had already
abandoned said phraseology in favor of a categorical compulsion for alien wives to be natural judicially.
Simple logic would seem to dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the time of the approval of Act 3448, had
two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with its settled construction and the other to
follow the new posture of the Americans of requiring judicial naturalization and it appears that they have
opted for the first, We have no alternative but to conclude that our law still follows the old or previous
American Law On the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in 1939, the
Philippine Legislature, already autonomous then from the American Congress, had a clearer chance to
disregard the old American law and make one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the
U.S. Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose to maintain the language of the old law. What then
is significantly important is not that the legislature maintained said phraseology after Section 1 of Act
2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the Americans had amended
their law in order to provide for what is now contended to be the construction that should be given to the
phrase in question. Stated differently, had our legislature adopted a phrase from an American statute
before the American courts had given it a construction which was acquiesced to by those given upon to
apply the same, it would be possible for Us to adopt a construction here different from that of the
Americans, but as things stand, the fact is that our legislature borrowed the phrase when there was
already a settled construction thereof, and what is more, it appears that our legislators even ignored the
modification of the American law and persisted in maintaining the old phraseology. Under these
circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory construction to say that
Section 15 has a nationalistic and selective orientation and that it should be construed independently of
the previous American posture because of the difference of circumstances here and in the United States.
It is always safe to say that in the construction of a statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or
perspective when the demonstrated legislative point of view seems to indicate otherwise.

5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality and in effect, the so
called racial requirements, whether under the American laws or the Philippine laws, have hardly been
considered as qualifications in the same sense as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they have always been considered as
disqualifications, in the sense that those who did not possess them were the ones who could not "be
lawfully naturalized," just as if they were suffering from any of the disqualifications under Section 2 of Act
2927 and later those under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are practically
identical to those in the former law, except those in paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is
the clear impression anyone will surely get after going over all the American decisions and opinions
quoted and/or cited in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions
of this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing with approval the opinions of the
secretary of Justice. 23 Such being the case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements were always
treated as disqualifications in the same light as the other disqualifications under the law, why should their
elimination not be viewed or understood as a subtraction from or a lessening of the disqualifications? Why
should such elimination have instead the meaning that what were previously considered as irrelevant
qualifications have become disqualifications, as seems to be the import of the holding in Choy King Tee
to the effect that the retention in Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same language of what
used to be Section 13 (a) of Act 2927 (as amended by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination of
Section 1 of the latter, necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making the phrase in question
"who may be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial disqualification but to the qualification
under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two groups of
persons that could not be naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those falling under
Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could not have had,
by any process of reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, the disqualifications that
used to be before such elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of logic such elimination could have
convicted qualifications into disqualifications specially in the light of the fact that, after all, these are
disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law distinctly and separately from qualifications and, as
already demonstrated, in American jurisprudence, qualifications had never been considered to be of any
relevance in determining "who might be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used in the statute
governing the status of alien wives of American citizens, and our law on the matter was merely copied
verbatim from the American statutes.

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6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and judicial opinions, whether
here or in the United States, there are practical considerations that militate towards the same
conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated
February 23, 1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra:

Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove "qualifications"

There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction that
Section 15 of the law requires that an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that
she possesses the qualifications prescribed under Section 2, before she may be deemed
a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife, becomes unreasonably onerous
and compliance therewith manifestly difficult. The unreasonableness of such requirement
is shown by the following:

1. One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for naturalization

under Section 2 of the law is that the applicant "must have resided in the
Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years." If this
requirement is applied to an alien wife married to a Filipino citizen, this
means that for a period of ten years at least, she cannot hope to acquire
the citizenship of her husband. If the wife happens to be a citizen of a
country whose law declares that upon her marriage to a foreigner she
automatically loses her citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her
husband, this could mean that for a period of ten years at least, she
would be stateless. And even after having acquired continuous residence
in the Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee that her petition for
naturalization will be granted, in which case she would remain stateless
for an indefinite period of time.

2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization

that he "must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation." Considering the constitutional
prohibition against acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases
of hereditary succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife
desiring to acquire the citizenship of her husband must have to prove
that she has a lucrative income derived from a lawful trade, profession or
occupation. The income requirement has been interpreted to mean that
the petitioner herself must be the one to possess the said income. (Uy v.
Republic, L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs. Republic, L-20605,
June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L-20912, November 29, 1965).
In other words, the wife must prove that she has a lucrative income
derived from sources other than her husband's trade, profession or
calling. It is of common knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken of
the fact that most wives in the Philippines do not have gainful
occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the
dependence of the wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the
duty of supporting the former. (Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be borne in
mind that universally, it is an accepted concept that when a woman
marries, her primary duty is to be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an
alien wife is not to be remiss in this duty, how can she hope to acquire a
lucrative income of her own to qualify her for citizenship?

3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization "must have
enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or
private schools recognized by the Office of the Private Education of the
Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught
or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire period of
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his
petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen." If an alien woman has
minor children by a previous marriage to another alien before she
marries a Filipino, and such minor children had not been enrolled in
Philippine schools during her period of residence in the country, she
cannot qualify for naturalization under the interpretation of this Court.
The reason behind the requirement that children should be enrolled in
recognized educational institutions is that they follow the citizenship of
their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi
v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668

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 [1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953; Lim Lian Hong v.
Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950). Considering that said minor children
by her first husband generally follow the citizenship of their alien father,
the basis for such requirement as applied to her does not exist. Cessante
ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.

4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence

prescribed by Section 2 "shall be understood as reduced to five years for
any petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino woman." It is absurd that an
alien male married to a Filipino wife should be required to reside only for
five years in the Philippines to qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien
woman married to a Filipino husband must reside for ten years.

Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife
related by marriage to a Filipino citizen to become such citizen, than for a foreigner who
is not so related. And yet, it seems more than clear that the general purpose of the first
paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by reason of her
marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens. It will be recalled
that prior to the enactment of Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old
Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special privilege to alien wives of
Filipinos. They were treated as any other foreigner. It was precisely to remedy this
situation that the Philippine legislature enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the
observation made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is enlightening:

It is true that under, Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife
follows the nationality of the husband; but the Department of State of the
United States on October 31, 1921, ruled that the alien wife of a Filipino
citizen is not a Filipino citizen, pointing out that our Supreme Court in the
leading case of Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315) held that
Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code being political have been abrogated
upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States.
Accordingly, the stated taken by the Attorney-General prior to the
envictment of Act No. 3448, was that marriage of alien women to
Philippine citizens did not make the former citizens of this counting. (Op.
Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928) .

To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was enacted in 1928
adding section 13(a) to Act No. 2927 which provides that "any woman
who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine
Islands, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22, s. 1941; emphasis ours).

If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court did,
in such a way as to require that the alien wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in
Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives would become illusory. It is submitted that
such a construction, being contrary to the manifested object of the statute must be
rejected.

A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if

the language is susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out
and the other defeat such manifest object, it should receive the former
construction. (In re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051; Singer v.
United States, 323 U.S. 338, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19
Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910).

... A construction which will cause objectionable results should be

avoided and the court will, if possible, place on the statute a construction
which will not result in injustice, and in accordance with the decisions
construing statutes, a construction which will result in oppression,
hardship, or inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a construction
which will prejudice public interest, or construction resulting in
unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will result in absurd
consequences.

So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an

apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as has been determined by
the judicial decisions, or which would result in futility, redundancy, or a

73
 conclusion not contemplated by the legislature; and the court should
adopt that construction which will be the least likely to produce mischief.
Unless plainly shown to have been the intention of the legislature, an
interpretation which would render the requirements of the statute
uncertain and vague is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the
legislature an intent to confer an illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes,
sec. 326, pp. 623-632).

7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for aligning the
construction of Section 15 with "the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship." But
the question may be asked, is it reasonable to suppose that in the pursuit of such policy, the legislature
contemplated to make it more difficult if not practically impossible in some instances, for an alien woman
marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has just been
demonstrated above? It seems but natural and logical to assume that Section 15 was intended to extend
special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver themselves, their
possessions, their fate and fortunes and all that marriage implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or
for worse." Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and benefits arising
from Philippine citizenship may motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are bound
to be, serve as the criterion for the construction of law? Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe that in
joining a Filipino family the alien woman is somehow disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs and
ideals of Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to live and associate, but surely, no one should expect
her to do so even before marriage. Besides, it may be considered that in reality the extension of
citizenship to her is made by the law not so much for her sake as for the husband. Indeed, We find the
following observations anent the national policy rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the
second) to be quite persuasive:

We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the question. The
avowed policy of "selectives admission" more particularly refers to a case where
citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a
case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who are
worthy to become citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or rejecting the
application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application in cases where citizenship
is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or
reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operation of law proves in legal
proceedings that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise
than to declare that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an individual who is able to
prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a citizen of the Philippines, "irrespective of
his moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs,
and traditions." A minor child of a person naturalized under the law, who is able to prove
the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has
lucrative income, or he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with an alien
wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required to prove only that she may herself be lawfully
naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4
of the law, in order to establish her citizenship status as a fact.

A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in this

regard, for it explains and justifies the obviously deliberate choice of words. It is
universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife
of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of
allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N.
W. 640 [1925]; see also "Convention on the Nationality of Married Women: Historical
Background and Commentary." UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be satisfactorily achieved by
allowing the wife to acquire citizenship derivatively through the husband. This is
particularly true in the Philippines where tradition and law has placed the husband as
head of the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of the family
group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the unity and solidarity of the family
(Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose preservation of State as a vital and enduring interest.
(See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our country, there is
a theoretic identity of person and interest between husband and wife, and from the nature
of the relation, the home of one is that of the other. (See De la Via v. Villareal, 41 Phil.
13). It should likewise be said that because of the theoretic identity of husband and wife,
and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of husband should be the nationality of
the wife, and the laws upon one should be the law upon the other. For as the court,
in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held: "The status of the
wife follows that of the husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicile
became her domicile." And the presumption under Philippine law being that the property

74
 relations of husband and wife are under the regime of conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil
Code), the income of one is also that of the other.

It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that
a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of
one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband's
interests in property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form
part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot,
through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only
in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and we
submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the
wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization
Law. (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)

With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that
Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and construed
when the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized," found in the American statute from which it was
borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative authorities. There
is merit, of course in the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in the light of Philippine
circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization laws. We should realize the disparity in
the circumstances between the United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of peoples from all over the
world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the come.
Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our
jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American authorities, to be sure, entitled to
admiration, and respect, should not be regarded as source of pride and indisputable authority. Still, We
cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of law now under scrutiny has no local
origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily from American law when the Philippines
was under the dominating influence of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad
commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity to
break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed, even after America
made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying
Americans cannot be citizens of the United States without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our
legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, Which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly
understood as conferring American citizenship to alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without
having to submit to any naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the
special qualifications of residence, moral character, adherence to American ideals and American
constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the
American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating
otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a
citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien
who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under
said Section 4.

As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be instances where
unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by entering into fake and
fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because of
these possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated inexorably by
more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical. There can always be means of
discovering such undesirable practice and every case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.

III.

The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of this Court in
Burca, supra, regarding the need of judicial naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a Filipino
may herself be considered or deemed a Filipino. If this case which, as already noted, was submitted for
decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the foregoing discussions would
have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could have held that despite her apparent lack of
qualifications, her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her undergoing any
naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain, her claim that she is not disqualified under
Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with the Burca ruling, the question We have still to decide
is, may she be deemed a Filipina without submitting to a naturalization proceeding?

Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must necessarily be in the
affirmative. As already stated, however, the decision in Burca has not yet become final because there is

75
still pending with Us a motion for its reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious
consideration by this Court. On this account, and for the reasons expounded earlier in this opinion, this
case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine the issue.

In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:

We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a
citizen of this country must apply therefore by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that
she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in
the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board
or official, administrative or otherwise other than the judgment of a competent court of
justice certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino
citizen, is hereby declared null and void.

3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a
"petition for citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will
reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards,
compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization law. The trial court itself
apparently considered the petition as one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared
petitioner "a citizen of the Philippines."

In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be vested with
Filipino citizenship, it is not enough that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the
law and none of the disqualifications enumerated in its Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to
pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization apparently from declaration of intention to
oathtaking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no
consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband; she remains to be the national of the
country to which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and if she desires to be of one nationality with
her husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other applicant for naturalization needs to
complete, the required period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and one of
the principle local languages, make her children study in Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage
in some lawful occupation of her own independently of her husband, file her declaration of intention and
after one year her application for naturalization, with the affidavits of two credible witnesses of her good
moral character and other qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is ordered in her favor, after which, she
has to undergo the two years of probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will
she begin to be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly, she can become a
Filipino citizen only by judicial declaration.

Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other hand, upon a cursory
reading of the provision, in question, that the law intends by it to spell out what is the "effect of
naturalization on (the) wife and children" of an alien, as plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the
language of the provision itself clearly conveys the thought that some effect beneficial to the wife is
intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner to be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take a
second hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court might have overlooked any relevant
consideration warranting a conclusion different from that complained therein. It is undeniable that the
issue before Us is of grave importance, considering its consequences upon tens of thousands of persons
affected by the ruling therein made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever possible, that
Our decision in any case should produce any adverse effect upon them not contemplated either by the
law or by the national policy it seeks to endorse.

AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and standing in the Bar
and well known for their reputation for intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive and comprehensive
resourcefulness in research, truly evident in the quality of the memorandum they have submitted in said
case, invite Our attention to the impact of the decision therein thus:

The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present case --
that an alien woman who marries a Philippine citizen not only does not ipso facto herself
become a citizen but can acquire such citizenship only through ordinary naturalization
proceedings under the Revised Naturalization Law, and that all administrative actions
"certifying or declaring such woman to be a Philippine citizen are null and void" has
consequences that reach far beyond the confines of the present case. Considerably more
people are affected, and affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca. The
newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand women married to Philippine citizens
are affected by this decision of the Court. These are women of many and diverse
nationalities, including Chinese, Spanish, British, American, Columbian, Finnish,

76
 Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members of the community, some of whom have
been married to citizens for two or three decades, have all exercised rights and privileges
reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They will have acquired, separately or in conjugal
partnership with their citizen husbands, real property, and they will have sold and
transferred such property. Many of these women may be in professions membership in
which is limited to citizens. Others are doubtless stockholders or officers or employees in
companies engaged in business activities for which a certain percentage of Filipino equity
content is prescribed by law. All these married women are now faced with possible
divestment of personal status and of rights acquired and privileges exercised in reliance,
in complete good faith, upon a reading of the law that has been accepted as correct for
more than two decades by the very agencies of government charged with the
administration of that law. We must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which
would visit such comprehensive and far-reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of
Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and reexamination.

To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R.
No. L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401 when Chief Justice Concepcion observed:

The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases
although referring to situations the equities of which are not identical to those obtaining in
the case at bar may have contributed materially to the irregularities committed therein
and in other analogous cases, and induced the parties concerned to believe, although
erroneously, that the procedure followed was valid under the law.

Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the Solicitor
General was required, not only, to comment thereon, but, also, to state "how many cases
there are, like the one at bar, in which certificates of naturalization have been issued after
notice of the filing of the petition for naturalization had been published in the Official
Gazette only once, within the periods (a) from January 28, 1950" (when the decision in
Delgado v. Republic was promulgated) "to May 29, 1957" (when the Ong Son Cui was
decided) "and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29, 1965" (when the decision in the
present case was rendered).

After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's motion for
reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well as of the data
contained in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui
case shall apply and affect the validity of certificates of naturalization issued after, not on
or before May 29, 1957.

Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to expressly enjoin the
prospective application of its construction of the law made in a previous decision, 24 which had already
become final, to serve the ends of justice and equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go that far. As
already observed, the decision in Burca still under reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo
San Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that followed them have at the most become the law of the case
only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds therefor, all We have to do now is to reexamine the
said rulings and clarify or modify them.

For ready reference, We requote Section 15:

Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman who is now or
may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of naturalization of the
parents, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child,
who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a
Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the
Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen
even after becoming of age.

A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be
considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority,

77
 he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the
country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.

It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised Naturalization Law or
Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole, is to establish a complete procedure for the judicial conferment of
the status of citizenship upon qualified aliens. After laying out such a procedure, remarkable for its
elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards against the possibility of any undesirable persons
becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the consequence of the naturalization
of an alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon the members of his immediate family, his wife
and children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it ordains that: (a) all his minor children who have
been born in the Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also; (b) all such minor children, if born outside
the Philippines but dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically become" Filipinos
also, but those not born in the Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such naturalization, are
also redeemed citizens of this country provided that they shall lose said status if they transfer their
permanent residence to a foreign country before becoming of age; (c) all such minor children, if born
outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be "considered" Filipino citizens, unless they
expatriate themselves by failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American) Consulate of the
country where they reside and take the necessary oath of allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized". 26

No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that the minor children,
falling within the conditions of place and time of birth and residence prescribed in the provision, are
vested with Philippine citizenship directly by legislative fiat or by force of the law itself and without the
need for any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA). Indeed, the language of the
provision, is not susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is claimed that the same expression "shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the wife, does not necessarily connote the vesting
of citizenship status upon her by legislative fiat because the antecedent phrase requiring that she must be
one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" implies that such status is intended to attach only after she
has undergone the whole process of judicial naturalization required of any person desiring to become a
Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages and intends legislative
naturalization as to the minor children, the same section deliberately treats the wife differently and leaves
her out for the ordinary judicial naturalization.

Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority of the Congress of
the Philippines to confer or vest citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,
42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Taada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it
has done so for particular individuals, like two foreign religious prelates, 27 hence there is no reason it
cannot do it for classes or groups of persons under general conditions applicable to all of the members of
such class or group, like women who marry Filipinos, whether native-born or naturalized. The issue
before Us in this case is whether or not the legislature hag done so in the disputed provisions of Section
15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respect authorities on political law
in the Philippines 28 observes in this connection thus: "A special form of naturalization is often observed
by some states with respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman married to a Filipino
citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of the classes who may apply for
naturalization under the Philippine Laws." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law 498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis
ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo
Cua, supra.)

More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the provision of the United States
statutes from which our law has been copied, 28a the American courts have held that the alien wife does
not acquire American citizenship by choice but by operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes the words
"and taken" are omitted. The effect of this statute is that every alien woman who marries a citizen of the
United States becomes perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization, and regardless of
her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601 [1970 ed.], citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165
Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.) .

We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as paragraph (a) of
Section 13, by way of an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and that, in turn, and
paragraph was copied verbatim from Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which by
that time already had a long accepted construction among the courts and administrative authorities in that
country holding that under such provision an alien woman who married a citizen became, upon such
marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and as a consequence of the marriage itself without having to
undergo any naturalization proceedings, provided that, it could be shown that at the time of such
marriage, she was not disqualified to be naturalized under the laws then in force. To repeat the
discussion We already made of these undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this decision doubly
extensive. The only point which might be reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the
United States, the American Congress, recognizing the construction, of Section 1994 of the Revised

78
Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable to avoid the effects of such construction, approved
the Act of September 22, 1922 Explicitly requiring all such alien wives to submit to judicial naturalization
albeit under more liberal terms than those for other applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the
Philippine Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting such a requirement, enacted Act 3448 on
November 30, 1928 which copied verbatim the aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes,
thereby indicating its preference to adopt the latter law and its settled construction rather than the reform
introduced by the Act of 1922.

Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that as the United
States herself has evidently found it to be an improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis the alien wives
of her citizens to discontinue their automatic incorporation into the body of her citizenry without passing
through the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it used to be before 1922, it seems but
proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a developing country, the Philippines
adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which our own legislature has enacted our laws on the
subject, as recounted above, provides no basis for Us to construe said law along the line of the 1922
modification of the American Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge in judicial legislation which it is not
institutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this court would be going precisely against the grain
of the implicit Legislative intent.

There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite clearly implied that
this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow and children of an
applicant for naturalization who dies during the proceedings do not have to submit themselves to another
naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the proceedings involving the husband.
Section 16 provides: .

SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. In case a petitioner
should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children
may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the
widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been
rendered during the life of the petitioner.

In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this Court held:

Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that under
said Sec. 16, the widow and minor children are allowed to continue the same
proceedings and are not substituted for the original petitioner; (2) that the qualifications of
the original petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the widow and minor
children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies whether the petitioner dies before or after
final decision is rendered, but before the judgment becomes executory.

There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of said
Section 16 contemplate the fact that the qualifications of the original petitioner remains
the subject of inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that "The decision rendered in
the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same
legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner." This phraseology
emphasizes the intent of the law to continue the proceedings with the deceased as the
theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to consider
the decision rendered, as far as it affected the widow and the minor children.

xxx xxx xxx

The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person can not
be bound to do things stipulated in the oath of allegiance, because an oath is a personal
matter. Therein, the widow prayed that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance for
the deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked that she be allowed to
take the oath of allegiance and the proper certificate of naturalization, once the
naturalization proceedings of her deceased husband, shall have been completed, not on
behalf of the deceased but on her own behalf and of her children, as recipients of the
benefits of his naturalization. In other words, the herein petitioner proposed to take the
oath of allegiance, as a citizen of the Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that "any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor
children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall
be considered citizens thereof." (Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473). The decision
granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the record of the case at bar, do not show that the
petitioning widow could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed his
petition, apart from the fact that his 9 minor children were all born in the Philippines.

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 (Decision, In the Matter of the Petition of Lee Pa to be admitted a citizen of the
Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11).
The reference to Chua Chian case is, therefore, premature.

Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
preceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living
Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no
evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.

Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for reconsideration in
Burca, and We see no reason to disagree with the following views of counsel: .

It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be considered
citizens of the Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed that Congress has
the power not only to prescribe the mode or manner under which foreigners may acquire
citizenship, but also the very power of conferring citizenship by legislative fiat. (U. S. v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898] ; see 1 Taada and Carreon, Political
Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine
citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1[5], Article IV,
Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not only
those who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of
citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by
operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife through the
naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a citizen. (See
Taada & Carreon, op. cit. supra, at 152, 172; Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and
Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil Code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth,
Digest of International Law 3).

The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" found in Section 14 of the
Revised Naturalization Law clearly manifests an intent to confer citizenship. Construing a
similar phrase found in the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised Statutes, 1994),
American courts have uniformly taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the alien
woman becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had
complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. (U.S. v.
Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the US Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op.
4021, July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op.
2091 and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398]).

The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in Section 1994 Revised Statute

(U.S. Comp. Stat. 1091, 1268) or as it was in the Act of 1855 (10 Stat. at
L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizens"
while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually
become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the
judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet
it does not follow that such person is on that account practically any the
less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or
"judged," and therefore, whatever an Act of Congress requires to be
"deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing must, in law, be
considered as having been duly adjudged or established concerning
such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When,
therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed" an American citizen, the effect when the
contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an
Act of Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed. (Van Dyne,
Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in Velayo, Philippine
Citizenship and Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.]; emphasis ours).

That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the first
paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law is shown by a textual analysis
of the entire statutory provision. In its entirety, Section 15 reads:

(See supra).

The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and "shall automatically become"
as used in the above provision, are undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or
purpose of the provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon

80
certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by
affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of
relationship of the persons enumerated in the provision concurs with the fact of
citizenship of the person to whom they are related, the effect is for said persons to
become ipso factocitizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not mean
that all alien wives and all minor children of Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of
relationship, necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory
requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must apply for naturalization in
order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect of those
persons enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the
operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them.
Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such citizenship commences.
Thus, under the second paragraph of Section 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized
under the law, who was born in the Philippines, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the
Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs with the fact of citizenship of his
parent, and the time when the child became a citizen does not depend upon the time that
he is able to prove that he was born in the Philippines. The child may prove some 25
years after the naturalization of his father that he was born in the Philippines and should,
therefore, be "considered" a citizen thereof. It does not mean that he became a Philippine
citizen only at that later time. Similarly, an alien woman who married a Philippine citizen
may be able to prove only some 25 years after her marriage (perhaps, because it was
only 25 years after the marriage that her citizenship status became in question), that she
is one who might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she
acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had proven that she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine
citizenship only after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized."

The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of
the law, the legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be
deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully
naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of
the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that
she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent
to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact
necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established
and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely replies that
at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to
become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191
[1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L ed 283 [1869). That she establishes such
power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that at her marriage, she became a
citizen.

(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of
a citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully
naturalized" (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view, the "acquisition" of citizenship by the
alien wife depends on her having proven her qualifications for citizenship, that is, she is
not a citizen unless and until she proves that she may herself be lawfully naturalized. It is
clear from the words of the law that the proviso does not mean that she must first
prove that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" before she shall be deemed (by
Congress, not by the courts) a citizen. Even the "uniform" decisions cited by this Court (at
fn. 2) to support its holding did not rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen
only after she has proven her qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions ruled
was that the alien wives in those cases failed to prove their qualifications and
therefore they failed to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang,
101 Phil. 459 [l957], the case was remanded to the lower court for determination of
whether petitioner, whose claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was disputed by
the Government, "might herself be lawfully naturalized," for the purpose of " proving her
alleged change of political status from alien to citizen" (at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil.
521 [1957], the alien wife who was being deported, claimed she was a Philippine citizen
by marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding that there was no proof that she was not
disqualified under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that: "No such
evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe
Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable." (at 523) It will be observed that
in these decisions cited by this Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives "might
(themselves) be lawfully naturalized" did not necessarily imply that they did not become,
in truth and in fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos. What the decisions merely
held was that these wives failed to establish their claim to that status as a proven fact.

81
 In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when
citizenship is conferred should not be confused with the time when citizenship status is
established as a proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose
citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would be required to prove, for
instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in order to factually establish his
claim to citizenship.* His citizenship status commences from the time of birth, although
his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an alien
woman who might herself be lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the time
of her marriage to a Filipino husband, not at the time she is able to establish that status
as a proven fact by showing that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there
is no difference between a statutory declaration that a person is deemed a citizen of the
Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself be lawfully
naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former becomes a citizen ipso
facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.

It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be lawfully
naturalized, it cannot be said that she has established her status as a proven fact. But
neither can it be said that on that account, she did not become a citizen of the
Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned in any legal proceeding, she
obviously has no obligation to establish her status as a fact. In such a case, the
presumption of law should be that she is what she claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil.
375 [1905]; Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There is a presumption that a
representation shown to have been made is true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A.
Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321).

The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what substitute is
them for naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of
her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it
everytime she has to perform an act or enter in to a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved
only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws of our country, both substantive
and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure, but such paucity is no proof that the citizenship
under discussion is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as
the case may be, for the truth is that the same situation objections even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate
proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of those
subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort easier or simpler for the persons concerned by
relying somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if these are not really binding.

It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point and so that the most
immediate relevant public records may be kept in order, the following observations in Opinion No. 38,
series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the most
appropriate initial step by the interested parties:

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen
in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of
Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her
alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a
Filipino, citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship
pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said
petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner
and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the
groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please
see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and
thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.

Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien, there will probably
be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding, depending naturally on
the substance and vigor of the opposition.

Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon was not touched by
the trial court, but as the point is decisive in this case, the Court prefers that the matter be settled once
and for all now.

82
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants' petition for
injunction is hereby reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized representative
is permanently enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of
appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue
of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on
January 25, 1962. No costs.

Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995

DJUMANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO
R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
AND DEPORTATION, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with preliminary injunction, to
reverse and set aside the Decision dated September 27, 1990 of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID), ordering the deportation of petitioner and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991,
denying the motion for reconsideration.

Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.

On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in
accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.

On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old Marina and nine-month
old Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend
of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in
Indonesia.

When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13,
1979, Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.

Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests," stating inter alia, that:

That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs. Djumantan, 42 years old,
and her two minor children, MARINA, 2 years old, and NIKULAS, 9 months old, all
Indonesian citizens, who are coming as temporary visitors.

That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their family for the hospitality they
have accorded me during the few years that I have stayed in Indonesia in connection with
my employment thereat.

That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty their behavior while they are
in the Philippines; I also guaranty their support and that they will not become a public
charge.

That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination of the authorized stay
granted them by the Government (Rollo, p. 41).

As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.

Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of
the Immigration Act of 1940.

83
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a
complaint for "concubinage" with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two. This
case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.

On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of
permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an
alien certificate of registration.

Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman,
who subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at
the CID detention cell. She later released pending the deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90-400)
after posting a cash bond (Rollo, pp. 15-16). Thereafter, she manifested to the CID that she be allowed to
depart voluntarily from the Philippines and asked for time to purchase her airline ticket (Rollo, p. 10).
However, she a change of heart and moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that
she was validly married to a Filipino citizen (Rollo, pp. 11-12).

In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through public respondents, disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of Commissioners finds the

second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines. We revoke the Section 13(a) visa previously
granted to her (Rollo, p. 23).

Public respondents denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in their Resolution dated January 29,
1991 (Rollo, pp. 31-33).

Hence, this petition.

We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public respondents to cease and desist from executing
or implementing the Decision dated September 27, 1990 and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991
(Rollo, pp. 34-36).

On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father died on August 14, 1994 and that
he and his mother were withdrawing their objection to the granting of a permanent resident visa to
petitioner (Rollo, pp. 173-175).

II

Petitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under Article 27 of P.D. No. 1085, the Muslim
Code, which recognizes the practice of polyandry by Muslim males. From that premise, she argues that
under Articles 109 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 68 of the Family Code and Article 34 of the
Muslim Code, the husband and wife are obliged to live together and under Article 110 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, the husband is given the right to fix the conjugal residence. She claims that public
respondents have no right to order the couple to live separately (Rollo, pp. 5-7).

When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General took the position that the CID could not
order petitioner's deportation because its power to do so had prescribed under Section 37 (b) of the
Immigration Act of 1940 (Rollo, pp. 57-74).

III

We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID can validly
deport petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Therefore, to be
first resolved is the question on petitioner's immigration status, particularly the legality of her admission
into the country and the change of her status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. Upon a finding
that she was not lawfully admitted into the country and she did not lawfully acquire permanent residency,
the next question is whether the power to deport her has prescribed.

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner's entry into the country and the
change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were
obtained through misinterpretation.

Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications
for temporary visitor's visa and for permanent residency.

84
The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influence
the exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration authorities would be
less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino
citizen, who is married to another woman (Cf. Shiu Shin Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the
public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the
country (Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). this right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the
nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates
no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).

The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to reside in the country, is
protected only so far as Congress may choose to protect it (United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shauhnessy
180 F. 2d. 489).

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be
given permanent residency, in the Philippines.

The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration
laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shauhnessy, 338
US 537 94 L. Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S.
Ct. 734 [1912]; Annotations, 71 ALR 1213). Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does
not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the
country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362
[1970]).

Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who
applies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay.
Under Section 13 of the law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and
"may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent
residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of
aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally
married to Filipino citizens.

IV

We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the right of public respondents to deport
petitioner has prescribed, citing Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.

Said Section 37(b) provides:

Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of this

section at any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any clause unless the
arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for
deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the court, or
judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner of
Immigration that the alien be not deported (As amended by Rep. Act No. 503).

Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof provides:

The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon
the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien:

1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of
false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration
authorities at a designating port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of
entry.

2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not
lawfully admissible at the time of entry;

85
 3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in the Philippines and
sentenced for a term of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude committed
within five years after his entry, is so convicted and sentenced more than once;

4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing
prohibited drugs;

5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of prostitution or is

connected with the management of a house of prostitution, or is a procurer;

6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after entry from causes not
affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent to entry;

7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under
which he was admitted a non-immigrant;

8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and
violence of the Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who
disbelieves in or is opposed to organized government, or who advises, advocates, or
teaches the assault or assassination of public officials because of their office, or who
advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is a member
of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines,
or who on any manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or otherwise, to the
dissemination of such doctrines;

9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections forty-five and forty-six of
this Act, independent of criminal action which may be brought against him: Provided,
That in the case of an alien who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer
both imprisonment and deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire period of his
imprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided, however, That the imprisonment
may be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of the Department
Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner
may fix and approved by the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien
concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by the
Department Head (as amended by R.A. No. 144);

10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have been convicted of
violating the provisions of the Philippine Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred and
fifty-three, otherwise known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941 (now
Republic Act No. 562), or who, at any time after entry, shall have been convicted more
than once of violating the provisions of the same Act;

11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing, independent of

any criminal action which may be brought against him;

12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under Commonwealth Act
Numbered Four hundred and seventy-three, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or any law relating to acquisition of Philippine
citizenship;

13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating properties, to prevent
them from being attached or executed.

Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by
means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration
authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject
to deportation.

The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and "shall not be
effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for
deportation arises" (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 37[b]).

Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the country (Costanzo v.
Tillinghast, 287 US 341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152 [1932]; Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR
1282).

86
In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), we held that under Section 37(b)
of the Immigration Act of 1940, the deportation of an alien may be barred after the lapse of five years after
the cause of deportation arises. Justice Feliciano, in his dissenting opinion, qualified the broad statement
of the law as follows:

Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five (5) year limitation is
applicable only where deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Section 37
(a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that where deportation or exclusion is sought to
be effected under clauses of Section 37(a), no period of limitation is applicable; and that
to the contrary, deportation or exclusion may be effected "at any time after entry."

Justice Davide, in his dissenting opinion, clarified:

Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of
paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12, the limitation does
not apply.

In Lam Shee v. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953), the alien admitted that she had gained entrance into the
Philippines fraudulently by making use of the name of a Chinese resident-merchant other than that of her
lawful husband. The Court, however, held that she could no longer be deported "for the simple reason
that more than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her admission."

The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.

Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13, 1979 on the basis of false
and misleading statements in her application and in the other supporting documents submitted to the
immigration authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about
the manner petitioner was admitted into the country and asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After
the EDSA Revolution, he sent a follow-up letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980 letter-complaint
(Rollo, p. 78).

Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of
the illegal entry of petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the
order of her deportation on September 27, 1990.

In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred under Section 37(b) is the deportation of
an alien and claimed that what they ordered was not the deportation of petitioner but merely the
revocation of Section 13(a) which refers to the visa previously granted her (Rollo, p. 102).

The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying out an order for
deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings to determine the right of the alien to stay in the
country. When public respondents revoked the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in
effect, ordered her arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary restraining order issued on June 4, 1991 is
MADE PERMANENT.

The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990 revoking the issuance of the
permanent resident visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989

IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner,

vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO
HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.

Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.

Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner.

Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.

87
PADILLA, J.:

The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988
seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After manifestation and motion of the Solicitor
General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent
Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. 2Counsel for the parties were heard in oral argument on 20
July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. 3 An internal
resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988
resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the pending issues of (1)
jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention
of the same person.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24 November
1988. 4 On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid motion for
reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order dated
28 November 1988. 5

Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5 December 1988.

Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7 December
1988. 6 Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of which is
a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of Commissioners on 2
December 1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral argument on 8 December 1988.

In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention 8 was filed by petitioner on 13
December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988 was
filed on 15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO.

The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently
sought by respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from immediately deporting
petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. To finally
dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's motion for clarification with prayer for
restraining order dated 5 December 1988, 9 urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention dated 13
December 1988, 10 the memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December
1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December 1988. 12

Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9
December 1988, 13and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15 December 1988, 14 the
Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice within which to
explain and prove why he should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and
use of a Portuguese passport.15

Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20 December 1988 16 followed
by an earnest request for temporary release on 22 December 1988. Respondent filed on 2 January 1989
her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply
thereto on 6 January 1989.

Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid
for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese
consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981,
petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular
Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport
expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his
naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," 19 he
declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies
registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.

To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of
petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners
us, Go Gallano, 21express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly
and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity,
after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or
reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese

88
passport 23 and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID.
However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have unequivocally
shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not only
established by the pleadings they are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID
would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was
given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.

While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship should
be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court,
no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not
petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.

Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and
suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his motion for clarification and
other motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED.
Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aq

[G.R. No. 151914. July 31, 2002]

TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M.
ALVAREZ, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution,[1] dated July 19, 2001, of the Second Division
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), ordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of
petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001
elections and the order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew
up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized
as a U.S. citizen.[2] From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S.
Navy.[3] Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although
he continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and
lasted until August 5, 2000.[4] Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 [5] to the
Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of
Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No.
115123 on November 13, 2000.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar.
His application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001. [6] On February 27,
2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar
for two (2) years.[7]
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who was
running for reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the

89
latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a
resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since
November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001.
Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and received the highest number of votes (6,131) against private
respondents 5,752 votes, or a margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed mayor of
Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.[8] He subsequently took his oath of office.
On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondents petition and
ordered the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the basis of the following findings:

Respondents frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern Samar after his
retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be considered as a waiver of his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant . . . of the U.S.A. prior to November 10, 2000 as would qualify him to acquire the
status of residency for purposes of compliance with the one-year residency requirement of Section 39(a)
of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Sections 65 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The one (1) year residency requirement contemplates of the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in
the constituency where he seeks to be elected.

All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have resided or stayed in Oras, Eastern Samar
since 1985 as an American citizen and permanent resident of the U.S.A. before November 10, 2000
when he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by [repatriation] cannot be added to his actual residence
thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001 to cure his deficiency in days, months, and year to
allow or render him eligible to run for an elective office in the Philippines. Under such circumstances, by
whatever formula of computation used, respondent is short of the one-year residence requirement before
the May 14, 2001 elections.[9]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on
January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.
I.
Two questions must first be resolved before considering the merits of this case: (a) whether the 30-
day period for appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration by petitioner and (b) whether the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case
notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner.
A. With respect to the first question, private respondent contends that the petition in this case should
be dismissed because it was filed late; that the COMELEC en banc had denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for being pro forma; and that, pursuant to Rule 19, 4 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the said motion did not suspend the running of the 30-day period for filing this petition. He points
out that petitioner received a copy of the resolution, dated July 19, 2001, of the COMELECs Second Division
on July 28, 2001, so that he had only until August 27, 2001 within which to file this petition. Since the petition
in this case was filed on February 11, 2002, the same should be considered as having been filed late and
should be dismissed.
Private respondents contention has no merit.
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides in pertinent parts:

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order,
or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-
forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling.

Sec. 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal. A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling, when not pro-forma, suspends the running of the period to elevate the matter
to the Supreme Court.

The five-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration under Rule 19, 2 should be counted from the
receipt of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling of the COMELEC Division. [10] In this case, petitioner
received a copy of the resolution of July 19, 2001 of the COMELECs Second Division on July 28, 2001.
Five days later, on August 2, 2001, he filed his motion for reconsideration. On February 6, 2002, he received
a copy of the order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying his motion for
reconsideration. Five days later, on February 11, 2002, he filed this petition for certiorari. There is no
question, therefore, that petitioners motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division, as well as his petition for certiorari to set aside of the order of the COMELEC en banc, was filed
within the period provided for in Rule 19, 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and in Art. IX(A), 7 of the
Constitution.

90
 It is contended, however, that petitioners motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc did
not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition because the motion was pro forma and,
consequently, this petition should have been filed on or before August 27, 2001. It was actually filed,
however, only on February 11, 2002. Private respondent cites the finding of the COMELEC en banc that

An incisive examination of the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration shows that the same [are] a
mere rehash of his averments contained in his Verified Answer and Memorandum. Neither did
respondent raise new matters that would sufficiently warrant a reversal of the assailed resolution of the
Second Division. This makes the said Motion pro forma.[11]

We do not think this contention is correct. The motion for reconsideration was not pro forma and its
filing did suspend the period for filing the petition for certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration in a motion
for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion
pro forma; otherwise, the movants remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or
some other remedy.[12] But, as we have held in another case:[13]

Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to convince the
court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the evidence; and in doing so, the
movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. If a motion for
reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the consequence would be that after a decision is
rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial.

Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so
held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration,[14] or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the
motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the
evidence,[15] or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, [16] or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in
question was contrary to law,[17] or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof.[18] The 16-page
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the foregoing
defects, and it was error for the COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioners motion for reconsideration was
pro forma because the allegations raised therein are a mere rehash of his earlier pleadings or did not raise
new matters. Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition
in this case, which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by law.
B. As stated before, the COMELEC failed to resolve private respondents petition for cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy before the elections on May 14, 2001. In the meantime, the votes were
canvassed and petitioner was proclaimed elected with a margin of 379 votes over private respondent. Did
the COMELEC thereby lose authority to act on the petition filed by private respondent?
R.A. No. 6646 provides:

SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)

SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure
hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as
provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be
voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom no final judgment of
disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant,
the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation
of their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates
or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections,
should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners. In Abella v.
COMELEC[19] and Salcedo II v. COMELEC,[20] the candidates whose certificates of candidacy were the
subject of petitions for cancellation were voted for and, having received the highest number of votes, were
duly proclaimed winners. This Court, in the first case, affirmed and, in the second, reversed the decisions
of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of candidates, not on the ground that the latter had been
divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates proclamation but on the merits.
II.

91
 On the merits, the question is whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least
one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.We
find that he had not.
First, 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:

Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (Emphasis added)

The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or
habitation,[21] but rather to domicile or legal residence,[22] that is, the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).[23] A domicile of origin is acquired by every
person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). [24]
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting
in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration
laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.
Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8,
1427(a) of the United States Code provides:

Requirements of naturalization . Residence

(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such
applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his application for naturalization has resided
continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at least
five years and during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his petition has been
physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the
State or within the district of the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed the application for
at least three months, (2) has resided continuously within the United States from the date of the
application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the period referred to in this
subsection has been and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United
States. (Emphasis added)

In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a
greencard, which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile
in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment
of domicile in the Philippines.
Nor can petitioner contend that he was compelled to adopt American citizenship only by reason of his
service in the U.S. armed forces.[26] It is noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630,
which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in
the Armed Forces of the United States, but under R.A. No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned, provides for
the repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine
citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on
November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.
Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998
when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate
in that year and by constantly declaring to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for
mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.[27] The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived
either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship,
or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an
immigrant visa under 13[28] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR)[29] and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire
Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine
national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress,[30] in which case
he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when he entered the country on October 15,
1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement Philippine Immigration []
Balikbayan in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added

92
inscription good for one year stay.[31] Under 2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program),
the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and
comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a visa-free entry to the
Philippines for a period of one (1) year (3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country
on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one
year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident
only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. [32] He
lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections[33] in support of his contention that
the residency requirement in 39(a) of the Local Government Code includes the residency of one who is not
a citizen of the Philippines. Residency, however, was not an issue in that case and this Court did not make
any ruling on the issue now at bar. The question in Frivaldo was whether petitioner, who took his oath of
repatriation on the same day that his term as governor of Sorsogon began on June 30, 1995, complied with
the citizenship requirement under 39(a). It was held that he had, because citizenship may be possessed
even on the day the candidate assumes office. But in the case of residency, as already noted, 39(a) of the
Local Government Code requires that the candidate must have been a resident of the municipality for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Nor can petitioner invoke this Courts ruling in Bengzon III v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal.[34] What the Court held in that case was that, upon repatriation, a former natural-born Filipino is
deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen.
Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in
January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality
wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval v.
Guray,[35] however, registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a
candidates lack of residency.
Petitioners invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws cannot avail him any. As held
in Aquino v. Commission on Elections:[36]

A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws

are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications
necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential
qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority
or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated
by the fundamental law itself.

Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his motion to
be allowed to present evidence. Under 5(d), in relation to 7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of
1987), proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in nature. The
holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to
be heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001,
before the COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to
petitioners claim, are complete and intact in the records.
III.
The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar for two years at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC
was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. We hold that it was.
Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such
certificate liable to cancellation. The Omnibus Election Code provides:

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing
it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date
of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that
the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is

93
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.

Indeed, it has been held that a candidates statement in her certificate of candidacy for the position of
governor of Leyte that she was a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was not so[37] or that the candidate
was a natural-born Filipino when in fact he had become an Australian citizen[38] constitutes a ground for the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, we held in Salcedo II v. COMELEC[39] that a
candidate who used her husbands family name even though their marriage was void was not guilty of
misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement
concerning a candidates qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a
misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission
on Elections en banc are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER,
HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.

J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.

Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22,
1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his
personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election
and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized
in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought
American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was
"merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial
Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be
dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within ten days from his
proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League, moreover, was
not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section.

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on
Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His
motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this
Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that
they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a
temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time
required comments from the respondents.

In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized
American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18,
1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their
petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his
candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to
be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten days from Frivaldo's
proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they received proof of his naturalization. And

94
assuming that the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing not only for the
League but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone.

Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a
citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen.
As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect
because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and
the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not
only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for
the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a
Filipino.

In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an
American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955
I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not
recognized because it had been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could not have
repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the Special Committee on Naturalization created
for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had not yet been organized then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy
that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active
participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws
of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the
rejection of the move to disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code.

Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has decided to resolve it
directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually end with this Court,
albeit only after a, long delay. We cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public
interest and the vital principles of public office to be here applied.

It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this question as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress
and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been
made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo
is a foreigner. We assume this stance was taken by him after consultation with the public respondent and
with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that we may now review.
Exercising our discretion to interpret the Rules of Court and the Constitution, we shall consider the
present petition as having been filed in accordance with Article IX-A Section 7, of the Constitution, to
challenge the aforementioned Orders of the COMELEC.

The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at
the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues
raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question.

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public
officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must
be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running.
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-
born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by
Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

September 23, 1988

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

95
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October 20, 1915, was
naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and issued Certificate of Naturalization No.
11690178.

Petition No. 280225.

Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER

Clerk

by:

(Sgd.)

ARACELI V. BAREN

Deputy Clerk

This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his
answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of
protection from the persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the
United States.

The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the
Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was
coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his
naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally
unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and
some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they
claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did
not take the oath of allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly
declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have
heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines.
The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who,
unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their
resistance to the Marcos regime.

The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of
effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is
expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality
Laws as follows:

Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality
shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the
application of its law in matters of personal status and of any convention
in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any such person
possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of
the country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the
nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to
be in fact most closely connected.

Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he
applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of
World War II. Many members of his family and his business interests were in Germany.

96
In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and
confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein
thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International
Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was
more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.

That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between
the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in
the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its
national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the
Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this
question alone as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said
Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law who are its
nationals."

It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein
whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine

citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.

While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he
has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by
actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The
alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country. It should
be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture
did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result
of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.

Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because
the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to
suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-
fetched if not specious Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It would
allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their abandoned
citizenship without formally rejecting their adoptedstate and reaffirming their allegiance to
the Philippines.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by
simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively
recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law
envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply
recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply
was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative
or judicial proceedings.

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be
dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to
prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is
disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator
were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his
nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge to her
title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been
established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was
discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly
thereafter.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this
country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected
by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule

97
 limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If
a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to
this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored
by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured
like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and
cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like
a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with
eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an
express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby

declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and
surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this
decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated March 9,
1989, is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
28, MANILA and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

G.R. No. 105715 June 6, 1994

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

G.R. No. 105735 June 6, 1994

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner in G.R. No. 104654.

Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this Court declared private respondent,
Juan G. Frivaldo, an alien and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon.

Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue in

these petitions docketed as G.R. No.104654 and G.R. No. 105715 and G.R. No. 105735. The petitions
were consolidated since they principally involve the same issues and parties.

G.R. No. 104654

98
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440
and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision
dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which
re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as
amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on
February 27, 1992.

On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of
Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63"
(Rollo, pp. 17-23).

In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and
directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general
circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before
the said date of hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a
conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-
26).

On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he
manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline for
filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the
hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28).

The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was
moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof posted.

On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He submitted the
following documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October 7, 1991 issued by
the publisher of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2) Certificate of Publication of the order issued
by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a
Citation issued by the National Press Club with private respondents picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5)
Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a
Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the
Records Management and Archives Office that the record of birth of private respondent was not on file
(Exh. "G"); and (8) Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States District Court (Exh. "H").

Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted

as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him,
all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo, p. 33).

On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge
(Rollo, p. 34).

On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration" was
filed by Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects, and
prayed for a new trial to conform with the requirements of the Naturalization Law.

After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal
directly with the Supreme Court.

G.R. No. 105715

This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in
relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution with prayer for temporary restraining order filed by
Raul R. Lee against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the en
banc Resolution of the COMELEC, which dismissed his petition docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273. The
said petition sought to annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of
Sorsogon.

Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of
governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private respondent was the official
candidate of the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.

99
Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.

On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private respondent
as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition
of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an
alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3)
that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in favor
of private respondent be considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes
cast, be proclaimed winner.

On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution which dismissed the petition for
having been filed out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said section provides that the period to
appeal a ruling of the board of canvassers on questions affecting its composition or proceedings was
three days.

In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ignored
the fundamental issue of private respondents disqualification in the guise of technicality.

Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondents name in the list of registered voters in Sta.
Magdalena, Sorsogon was invalid because at the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he was as
American citizen.

Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet conclusive
because the case is still on appeal before us.

Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondents proclamation as Governor of the Province
of Sorsogon; (2) the deletion of private respondents name from the list of candidates for the position of
governor; (3) the proclamation of the governor-elect based on the remaining votes, after the exclusion of
the votes for private respondent; (4) the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin private
respondent from taking his oath and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel the COMELEC to resolve the pending disqualification case docketed as SPA Case No. 92-016,
against private respondent.

G.R. No. 105735

This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of
Article VIII of the Constitution, with prayer for temporary restraining order. The parties herein are identical
with the parties in G.R. No. 105715.

In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELECs immediate resolution of SPA Case No. 92-016, which
is a petition for the cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy filed on March 23, 1992 by
Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18).

The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an American citizen, and therefore
ineligible to run as candidate for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) that the trial
courts decision
re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null and
void; (3) that assuming the decision to be valid, private respondents oath of allegiance, which was taken
on the same day the questioned decision was promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which
provides for a two-year waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by the applicant; and (4)
that the hearing of the petition on February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from the date of the
last publication of the order and petition. The petition prayed for the cancellation of private respondents
certificate of candidacy and the deletion of his name from the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena,
Sorsogon.

In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied the allegations therein and
averred: (1) that Quiterio H. Hermo, not being a candidate for the same office for which private
respondent was aspiring, had no standing to file the petition; (2) that the decision re-admitting him to
Philippine citizenship was presumed to be valid; and (3) that no case had been filed to exclude his name
as a registered voter.

Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy
(Rollo, p. 37.).

On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition for cancellation, citing
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that all petitions on matters involving the

100
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be decided "not later than fifteen days before election," and
the case of Alonto v. Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which ruled that all pre-proclamation
controversies should be summarily decided (Rollo,
p. 50).

The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino citizenship because
the decision granting him the same is not yet final and executory (Rollo, p. 63). However, it submits that
the issue of disqualification of a candidate is not among the grounds allowed in a
pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. Moreover, the said petition was filed out of
time.

The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its time, thus its failure
to immediately resolve SPA Case No. 92-016. It argues that under Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, it is excused from deciding a disqualification case within the period provided by law
for reasons beyond its control. It also assumed that the same action was subsequently abandoned by
petitioner when he filed before it a petition for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 92-35. The quo
warranto proceedings sought private respondents disqualification because of his American citizenship.

II

G.R. No. 104654

We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondents citizenship.

In his comment to the States appeal of the decision granting him Philippine citizenship in G.R. No.
104654, private respondent alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the country during Martial
Law compelled him to seek political asylum in the United States, and eventually to renounce his
Philippine citizenship.

He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and direct act of
Congress. However, he was later informed that repatriation proceedings were limited to army deserters or
Filipino women who had lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50).
His request to Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed
to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives in
his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers of his political rivals.

He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date, without publication,
was made without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes mention that on the date
of the hearing, the court was jam-packed.

It is private respondents posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and that the public
was well-informed of his petition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the media.

Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath of allegiance,
private respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period is to grant the public
an opportunity to investigate the background of the applicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine
citizenship if there is basis to do so. In his case, private respondent alleges that such requirement may be
dispensed with, claiming that his life, both private and public, was well-known. Private respondent cites
his achievement as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is meritorious. The
naturalization proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision
an anomaly.

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an
applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are
applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value.
The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was
never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by
reason of her marriage to an alien.

101
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The
proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void
for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing
must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon for six terms.

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of

the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc.
No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an
applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are
applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value.
The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was
never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by
reason of her marriage to an alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The
proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void
for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing
must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).
Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and the order must be in its full test for the court to
acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).

The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided
continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and
any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the
filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of
intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor.

The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).

Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for the
good moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law.
Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by
Section 7 of the said law.

The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition
was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of
hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the
petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and,
insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the
copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).

Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings
shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the
applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or
profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government
promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or
contrary to government announced policies.

Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the
petition for naturalization before its finality.

102
 G.R. No. 105715

In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet a Filipino citizen, we have to
grant the petition in G.R. No. 105715 after treating it as a petition for certiorari instead of a petition
for mandamus. Said petition assails the en banc resolution of the COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No.
92-273, which in turn is a petition to annul private respondents proclamation on three grounds: 1) that the
proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; 2)
that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Filipino citizenship is being questioned by the State in
G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed
the petition on the grounds that it was filed outside the three-day period for questioning the proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166.

The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue the disqualification of private respondent to be
proclaimed Governor on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this aspect, the petition is one for quo
warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quo
warranto, questioning the respondents title and seeking to prevent him from holding office as Governor
for alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Furthermore, we explained that "qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during
the officers entire tenure; once any of the required qualification is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged."

Petitioners argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is untenable. Both the
Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run and be elected to
public office. We can only surmise that the electorate, at the time they voted for private respondent, was
of the mistaken belief that he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be considered stray
and that he, being the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes, be declared winner.
In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified to hold the office to which he was elected, the
candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner (See
also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985]; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]).

G.R. No. 105735

In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715, we find the petition in G.R. No.
105735 moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both GRANTED while the
petition in G.R. No. 105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of
Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015

RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, v. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for certiorari filed
by Renato M. David (petitioner). Petitioner assailed the Order 2 dated March 22, 2011 of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his motion for redetermination of probable cause.

The factual antecedents:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their
retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-
square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a

103
residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their
house is public land and part of the salvage zone.

On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application 3 (MLA) over the subject land with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen.

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No.
9225,4(R.A. 9225) as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate
General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as
a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that
the subject property was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute
had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private respondents family.

On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution7 finding probable cause
to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding
information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).

On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioners MLA. It ruled that petitioners
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab
initio.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by the DOJ which
held that the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant
indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure
a third person in committing the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of
Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued
against the petitioner.

On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law relied
upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between
those who became foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine citizenship
before its enactment when the governing law was Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime
for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed on April 12, 2007
before he had re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time
still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for lack of merit, the motion
is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order denying him relief on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He argued that since his
application had yet to receive final evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila, it is
academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six
months after he applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the motion for
reconsideration.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an
accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the court that issues a
warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-
born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A.
9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization.

In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of falsification was already
consummated as petitioner has not yet re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to
re-acquire Philippine citizenship will only affect his citizenship status and not his criminal act which was
long consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.

104
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition for certiorari after finding no
grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not left without any remedy or
recourse because he can proceed to trial where he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as
his defense to be adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction.

SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that

A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the lower court has
disregarded the undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that
by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction deemed not
to have lost it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the time when he
was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.

B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in Canada and to
surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a warrant for his alleged false claim to
Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the right of petitioner through his
wife and counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of arrest against him before
the same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of due process. 18

In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioners argument regarding the retroactivity of
R.A. 9225 is without merit. It is contended that this Courts rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on Elections20 on the retroactivity of ones re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his application therefor cannot be applied to the case of herein
petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such doctrine applies in the present situation, it
will still not work for petitioners cause for the simple reason that he had not alleged, much less proved,
that he had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he made the declaration in
the Public Land Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in falsification of public
document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person be present. As to
petitioners defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense which may be properly raised and proved
in a full-blown trial.

On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General opines that in
seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of
Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the said courts jurisdiction by his
voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the lower court committed no grave
abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners motion after a judicious, thorough and personal evaluation
of the parties arguments contained in their respective pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the
court.

In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for falsification for
representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied petitioners
motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused (petitioner).

R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, was signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-
born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)

105
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, such is qualified by the phrase under the
conditions of this Act. Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos
referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph
covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required
for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the
terminology used is different, re-acquired for the first group, and retain for the second group.

The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is Retention of Philippine
Citizenship, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms re-acquire and retain to describe
the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from
the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.

In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired
their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign
country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225
amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship
from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual
citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In
the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine
citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the
new law.

Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts
that in criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which favors the accused is preferred because it is
consistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case it becomes more relevant
when a seemingly difficult question of law is expected to have been understood by the accused, who is a
non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the letter-reply dated
January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that his status as a natural-born
Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.

These contentions have no merit.

That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship was made clear
in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No.
4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was responding
to the query of Representative Exequiel Javier:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of the Senate version, Any
provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, shall and so forth, ano, shall retain their Philippine citizenship.

Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship by reason of their
naturalization after the effectivity of this Act are deemed to have reacquired

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.

REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born citizens who acquired
foreign citizenship after the effectivity of this act are considered to have retained their citizenship. But
natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of this act are considered to
have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born citizens who became,
lets say, American citizens after the effectivity of this act are considered natural-born?

Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship before the effectivity
of this act are no longer natural born citizens because they have just reacquired their citizenship. I just
want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely retention and
reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this, upon the effectivity of
this new measure amending Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is deemed to
have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of the act.

The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future instances. So thats
the distinction.

106
REP. JAVIER. Well, Im just asking this question because we are here making distinctions between
natural-born citizens. Because this is very important for certain government positions, no, because
natural-born citizens are only qualified for a specific

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.

REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. Its one of the provisions, yes. But
just for purposes of the explanation, Congressman Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired
for those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and
retention for those in the future. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he
belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he
was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary
to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A.
9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to
those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words,
Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which
clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new laws effectivity.

As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any reference to Section 3 on
the particular application of reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens before
and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.

Petitioners plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is likewise misplaced. Courts
adopt an interpretation more favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle that penal
statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. 23 R.A. 9225,
however, is not a penal law.

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to
falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of falsification of documents
under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of
his official position;

(2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and

(3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document. 26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the
time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the
governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was
among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act,
the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC
therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172,
paragraph 1.

The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for denying
petitioners motion for re-determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest.
However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for
bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the
distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except
in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the
above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
in Santiago v. Vasquez:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by

107
filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused,
as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.cralawred
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the
person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not
required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law
but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by
virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as
when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law
signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to
become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the
accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.

xxxx

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a
general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

xxxx

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can
invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of
the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first
submit himself to the custody of the law.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of probable
cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such
erroneous ground stated in the MTCs order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is
hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 221697

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221698-700

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D.
VALDEZ Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

108
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo
ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC),
SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Facts

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care
and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his
wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of
Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1

When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe,
Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that
petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate
reflecting the court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the
second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo
a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive
parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which
she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the
name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.4

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local
COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's
Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5

On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F927287 6 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her
Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7

Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the
Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.)
in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she
earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies. 9

On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of
both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of
being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after
the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11

While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992.12 Her
two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on
10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13

On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport
No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15

On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's
candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her
youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16

After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon
learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually
expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral
arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate. 18

According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire family. In
her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and

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reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005. 19 The couple began preparing
for their resettlement including notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to
Philippine schools for the next semester;20coordination with property movers for the relocation of their
household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and inquiry with Philippine
authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country. 22 As early
as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.23

Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a Tax
Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately
followed25 while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to
arrange the sale of their family home there.26

The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband purchased
a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second
half of 2005.27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot
were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February
2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age began attending Philippine private schools.

On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of the
family's remaining household belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30

In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change
and abandonment of their address in the U.S. 31 The family home was eventually sold on 27 April
2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4
May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in July 2006. 33

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon
City where they built their family home34 and to this day, is where the couple and their children have been
residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the couple's name by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the
same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship
together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July
2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions
and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are
considered as citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in
petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39

Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She
also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999. 41 This passport was
renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA. 42

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). 43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an
"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal
requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted
the said affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on,
petitioner stopped using her American passport.48

On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."49 On that day, she accomplished a
sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as
MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American
citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S.,
specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.51

On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
United States" effective 21 October 2010.52

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of
residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and
was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54

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On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In her
COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up
to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May
2005.57 The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship"
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several
COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697

A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny
due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the
COMELEC Second Division.59She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her
petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed material misrepresentation when
she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016
Elections.61

On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born
Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling. 62 Elamparo claimed that international law does
not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning,
petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is
not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with.64Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-
born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized American
citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth. 66

On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn
declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the
country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted
that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225,
she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be
counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act.
Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of
the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines. 67

Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:

(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition
for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that
the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;

(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which, if
hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to
misrepresent on her part;

(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and
residency qualifications for:

a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were

considered citizens;

b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the
place where they are found;

c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No.
9225;

d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing of her
COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and
effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;

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 e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born status;

f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;

g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225;

h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an
honest mistake, not binding and should give way to evidence on her true date of
reacquisition of domicile;

i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino
people to decide a purely political question, that is, should she serve as the country's
next leader.68

After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for resolution.

On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's
COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May
2016 National and Local Elections, contained material representations which are false. The fallo of the
aforesaid Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by
respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69

Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the
COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same. 70

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700

This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P.
Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which
were consolidated and raffled to its First Division.

In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, 71 docketed as
SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify
her for the Presidency.72

Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown
parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood
relationship is determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that
what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in
the categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude
them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.75

Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her claim that
foundlings have a nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not self-
executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by
the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers
natural-born status to foundlings.78

Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-born citizens and
petitioner was not as she was a foundling.79

Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten (10) year
residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the
time she renounced her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad
questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her
husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82

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In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-
139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of
a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under
the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as
natural-born citizens.84

He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only been a
resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections
operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly reestablished her
domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was
that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year residency requirement for President.

Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition, 85 docketed as SPA No.
15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for
President should be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of residency
required for said candidacy and that she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal
resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016. 86 Contreras
contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from
18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI. 87 He
asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid
evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen
and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88

In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:

First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His petition did
not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-
born status of petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a
candidate to an elective office.90

Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on
establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC. 92

Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the respondents.93 Otherwise
stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.

Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are presumed
to be citizens of the country where they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95

Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225
or the right to reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government
enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her
as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of
San Juan RTC.97 She believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines.98

Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her domicile of
choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in the country,
purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian
Hills.99

Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even
before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of
domicile are complied with.100She reasoned out that there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign
citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice. 101

Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator was a
mistake made in good faith.102

In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is
not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that
she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a
resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the

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elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,

to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's
Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions
for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo
ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining orders were
issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of
the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were
held in these cases.

The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET
ASIDE the:

1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001
(DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares.

2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the consolidated
cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139
(DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent.

3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December
2015 Resolution of the Second Division.

4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December
2015 Resolution of the First Division.

The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE
for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or
cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The
exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into
the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet
undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same
cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section
2:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

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 Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and
accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall
not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means,
or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national
affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration
with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including
limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all
forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its
directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section
17 of the same basic law stating that:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.

The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the Vice-
President, Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the
Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for these positions.

Can the COMELEC be such judge?

The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections,104 which

was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation
in Fermin reads:

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Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the
COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 1, the following:

Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere
rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the
COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It
is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases
involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age,
residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, 2(3)]

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their
consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility."
"Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an
individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their
purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility,"
on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes
for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the
incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is
not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa.
We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
qualifications prescribed in 2 of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the]
disqualifications provided in 4.

Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the respective
proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured
in Romualdez-Marcos that:

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before
election the qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a
candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of
prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very
acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for
disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his
favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not
be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case,
his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This
is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where
the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of
May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy.
That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and
its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for
the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the
election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations
made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President,
Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The
purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other
Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of
Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case may be. 106

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To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to the
amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15
February1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:

Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as
provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds
for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107

was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:

Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a
competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided
by law or the Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall
be summarily dismissed.

Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently
required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court
that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from
any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the
other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to
determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a
prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of
qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.

If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled
or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a
prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure
by which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-
evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway,
bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined.

The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as
in this case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the
COMELEC to rule essentially that since foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens
under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments,
when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort
at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood
relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded
to say that "she now has the burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino
parent."

The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted
in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and
Filiation.110 That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is
therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show
that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's
parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such
status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there
is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether
such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:

Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except
when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.

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The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) 111 that from
1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of
Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census
statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos
and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were
1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child producing
ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners
or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970,
there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were
245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these
figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner
was found in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino. 112

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.1wphi1 She also has typical Filipino
features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature
and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features
is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the
province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that
petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the words of
the Solicitor General:

Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they can
get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is
such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a
foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone
born in the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of
anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there were
1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the
Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural
born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.

From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the total number
of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661.
This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines on that decade would be a
natural born Filipino is 99.83%.

We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am confident that
the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be
affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a
Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or
perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking
those infants would have better economic opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise
suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever considered
their child excess baggage that is best left behind.

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a
theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one,
but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense.
Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no
reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental
political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of
common sense are not separate disciplines.

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As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is
a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 114 this Court
held that:

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should
be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were
guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 115

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following
exchange is recorded:

Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The natural
children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father.

xxxx

President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to
natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?

Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or
illegitimate children of unknown parents.

Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I
refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are
considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a
Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the
Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need ...

Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.

Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment.

Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of
unknown parentage."

Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.

Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not unknown.

President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?

Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina with a
foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas
Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.

President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.

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Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature?

Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the constitution
need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children or people born in a country of
unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision on
the subject exhaustively.116

Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to the
notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was not
enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and
constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:

During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as
Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the
Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the
Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children
followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place
where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the
proposed amendment.

This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016 Oral
Arguments:

We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the proposal for
a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional
silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more
need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.

Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a
constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can
even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to
convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as
Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized.

In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the
avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under
Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice
Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118

The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and humane
society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a
discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument
that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on
those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution
really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization."

We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three
Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social
justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which
provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly,
these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate
status.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not
provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the

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first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that
"[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens
of the Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court
will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an
unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain
unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over
the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code
(Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the
latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a
citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners. 120 (Underlining
supplied)

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the
Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on
the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to
"Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a
foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under
Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to
perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the
determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities. 121 Secondly, the object of
the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly,
the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or
the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.

In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as
evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. 122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May
1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively
affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law
can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other hand, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law
include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result
from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by
the existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are
principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to
legal systems generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness
and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine
Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights. 129

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. 130 Article 15 thereof states:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his
nationality.

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The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the
UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:

Article 7

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the
right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her
parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and
their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child
would otherwise be stateless.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or
social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a
minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality
from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it
cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18)
years old.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted
principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of
the country of birth," to wit:

Article 14

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's
parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the
parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in
which it was found. (Underlining supplied)

The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found,
contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:

Article 2

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.

That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is
not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
Article 15(1) ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961
"United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of
the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the
"International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled
that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as
a "generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the
ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention had been ratified by
only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the ratification of a minimum of

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twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was content with the practice of international
and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United
States.

Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v.
Ranada, 134 where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was
decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that nine member countries of the European Common
Market had acceded to the Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on
recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and yet,
there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice.

Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally accepted
principles of international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on "general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the
ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental
principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to legal systems generally," 136 support the
notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were
correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law" under the incorporation clause.

Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe
have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow
the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2
February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%),
foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus
sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume
foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.

Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption,
expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could
be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by
law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA,
considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution.
The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents
are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at
more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings
were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their
own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized
and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is
relevant:

.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and
conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that the situation of foundlings
renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the
international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or
to accord them second-class citizenship.138

The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No.
9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the
applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain
"Philippine citizenship."

The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes
in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the

123
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They
include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process
that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit,142 which
cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow
him to recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if
petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-
born citizenship."

The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying "that
natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No.
9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be
lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it
had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.

More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected
in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A
person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof."
Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court
pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and
naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance
with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the
absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by
the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As
such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.146

The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while we may
always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied.
In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the
condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's
error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the
people's reliance thereupon should be respected."148

Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood
when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names
of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has
been contended that the data required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely
unknown.

This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption
is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological
parent is the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended
birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate
"shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records,
books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department [of Social
Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings
shall be kept strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents
were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the
policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an
adoptee.

Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case
for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process
undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.

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 On Residence

The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner committed false
material representation when she stated in her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a
resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.

Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day
before the 2016 elections, is true.

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines
before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner
must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the
requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she
put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning
date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.

When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines.
There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2.
an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.152 To successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.153

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile
and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport
showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-
mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for
the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the
Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of
her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax
identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in
February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February
2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March
2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the
First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011
filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a
Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner
on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased);
and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the
Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family
home).

The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in
its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.

However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as of 24
May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the
first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained there was no animus
non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on
the basis of the position that the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the
Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this
regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v.
COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v.
COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino
cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a
visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without
any resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to
7 July 2006 cannot be counted.

But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her situation.
In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured by the
candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not
involve a candidate who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With
the Court decreeing that residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the

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candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the
candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he only visited during his frequent
vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had not
even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She
was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month
stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is
not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."

It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the respondents,
the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent
resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is
overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon
her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the
freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating
excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the
U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence here
on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here,
constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting
employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her
family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned
on 24 May 2005 it was for good.

In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-
free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act
Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as
temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been
naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program
"providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become
economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the country"164in line with the
government's "reintegration program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.

Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society,
it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one
year. That visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate
himself into the community before he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of
repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her children
and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly
thereafter.

No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is extensive and
overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is
unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner.
There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the respondents that the
Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue
of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.

To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC
ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her
2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before
May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a
Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true
the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.

As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013
COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she
reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her
husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that
residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.

Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May
2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change
which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did
not acknowledge that the first version was vague.

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That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the
return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence,
to repeat, would include her passport and the school records of her children.

It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive
admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means
conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a
COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put
seven (7) months as her period of residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We
said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was
telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it
would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of
residency.

The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and physically
returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position
that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006.
However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here
to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.

For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a
petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event
from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006
under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.

Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC, petitioner
recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the
United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue immediately, also in the press.
Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep.
Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances
that surrounded the statement were already matters of public record and were not hidden.

Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo
warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake
in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood the question
and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public
record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could
not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which
was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.

The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012
statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this
Court's pronouncement that:

Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material
misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC.
Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a
material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made
with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office. 168

In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of
evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to
the United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much as
dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her
COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that
her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this
declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for President." This conclusion, as already
shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person
that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for
election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency have
been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and
substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we consider as a primary
reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was

127
not even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the
declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6)
months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency
requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was
uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time the declaration for Senator was made,
petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public
was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016.
Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are
facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts of
residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:

[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in the USA
to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.

Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian
in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika
was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to
school.

In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family
home in Corinthian Hills was completed.

Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer who handled
[petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan K.
Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."

In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of some of the
family's remaining household belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March
2006.

In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the family's
abandonment of their address in the US.

The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.

In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the Philippines on 4
May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.

In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually
built their family home.170

In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the
exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in
her COC for Senator.

All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President
of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all,
deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent, stating that:

[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National
and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby
GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated cases
SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace

128
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT

the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with
the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of
the Second Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY

the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is
AFFIRMED.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of
the First Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local
Elections of 9 May 2016.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice
mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The
results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification
filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines
but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of
Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground
that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELECs Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as
candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based
on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of
Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a
foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged
that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was
born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an
American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not
lose his Filipino citizenship.

129
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US
citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed
his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective local position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano
DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[3] The motion remained pending
even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the
board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation
of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. [4] Petitioners motion
was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of
its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in
the May 11, 1998 elections.[5] The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He
acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus
soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father
and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the
Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien
with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a
voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998,
was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for
vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853)
votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred
ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel
Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying
election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex
legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest court
(Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondents certificate of candidacy.

We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position
of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the
parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning
candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of
August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.

130
 This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc
and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner
contends that

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years
old; and,

2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May
1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that
Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano whether
petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case
for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC
in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set
aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:

Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action
or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission,
in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

....

Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission
or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors
rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest
to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be
proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by
final and executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for
the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private
respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner
had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to
intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,[6] reiterated in several cases,[7] only applies to cases in which the
election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the
disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion
for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and
petitioners purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local
position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since
the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention
only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of

131
votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise
known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election
if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was tantamount to
a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en
banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of
petitioners motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private respondents
alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual
citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from running for any elective local position: .
. . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.[8]
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in
this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has command[ed] in
explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered
a national by the said states.[9] For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine
of jus soli. Such a person, ipso factoand without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers
country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be
also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions
on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the
result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was included in the 1987
Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows: [10]

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a
memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance and I reiterate a dual
allegiance is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom
intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of
birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.

132
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual
allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-
Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a
Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community
is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor
might recall, in Mainland China in the Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative
Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries
were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the
Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of
citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance,
either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners
yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of
thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about
minority claims on our natural resources.

Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and
this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned,
owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when
we have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment
and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section,
probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS
INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus:[11]

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense
that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a
freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and
to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in
terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to
the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the
concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of
the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic
of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every
October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign
government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen
Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double
citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national
security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future
legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this country,
arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate
double citizenship?

Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was
not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A.
No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship,
it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive
members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us
because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino
mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond
our control.[12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced

133
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile
and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person with
dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution,
Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is
a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen,
upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or
her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the
person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would
want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the
country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There
are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an
election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under
the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without
any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans example, if
he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really
interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a
Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will
always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution
of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also
acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty[14] of which at the time he is a subject or citizen
before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v.
Republic,[15] it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization
Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a
foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all
means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the
people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4,
1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United
States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the
Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in
Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship
under American law, so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not
sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when
private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he
reached the age of majority.

134
 In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship,
the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which
provided that A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose
his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or
plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this provision was declared
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S.
Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his
present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. Private respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following
statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR NATURALIZED) NATURAL-
BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,
CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND
DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH
AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND
DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON
MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND
CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held:[17]

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his
repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code
would disqualify him from running for any elective local position? We answer this question in the negative,
as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that
he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At
best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but
before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every
certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have
not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are
conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private
respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his American
citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should
have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election
of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American
citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he
used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his
certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be
considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent
in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that
he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he
Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of
both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;

135
truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the
renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express, it stands to reason that there can be
no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or implied.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation,
private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with
the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19] we sustained the denial of entry into
the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the
renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was
a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of
his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
NESTOR A. JACOT,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 179848
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus -
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
DE CASTRO,* and
BRION,** JJ.

ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON

Promulgated:
ELECTIONS,
November 27, 2008
Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

136
 Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution[1] dated 28 September 2007 of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the
COMELEC Second Division[2] disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor
of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to
make a personal renouncement of his United States (US) citizenship.

Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of
the US on 13 December 1989. [3]

Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise
known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los
Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval[4] of petitioners
request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. [5] On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration
issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.[6]

Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of
Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. [7]

On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification[8] before the
COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce
his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, which reads as follows:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

In his Answer[9] dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper[10] dated 8 May 2007, petitioner countered
that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the
oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign
citizenship.

In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.

On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution [11] disqualifying the
petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the
requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division explained that the

137
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 does not automatically bestow upon any
person the privilege to run for any elective public office. It additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of
Candidacy cannot be considered as a renunciation of foreign citizenship.The COMELEC Second Division
did not consider Valles v. COMELEC[12] and Mercado v. Manzano[13] applicable to the instant case,
since Valles and Mercado were dual citizens since birth, unlike the petitioner who lost his Filipino citizenship
by means of naturalization. The COMELEC, thus, decreed in the aforementioned Resolution that:

ACCORDINGLY, NESTOR ARES JACOT is DISQUALIFIED to run for the

position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin for the May 14, 2007 National and Local
Elections. If proclaimed, respondent cannot thus assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said
municipality by virtue of such disqualification.[14]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 29 June 2007 reiterating his position that his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and his oath in his Certificate of
Candidacy sufficed as an effective renunciation of his US citizenship. Attached to the said Motion was an
Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign
Citizenship dated 27 June 2007, wherein petitioner explicitly renounced his US citizenship.[15] The
COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioners Motion in a Resolution[16] dated 28 September 2007 for lack of
merit.

Petitioner sought remedy from this Court via the present Special Civil Action for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, where he presented for the first time an Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship[17] dated 7 February 2007. He avers
that he executed an act of renunciation of his US citizenship, separate from the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines he took before the Los Angeles PCG and his filing of his Certificate of
Candidacy, thereby changing his theory of the case during the appeal.He attributes the delay in the
presentation of the affidavit to his former counsel, Atty. Marciano Aparte, who allegedly advised him that
said piece of evidence was unnecessary but who, nevertheless, made him execute an identical document
entitled Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign
Citizenship on 27 June 2007 after he had already filed his Certificate of Candidacy. [18]

Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution of this Court:

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF R.A. 9225, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CITIZENSHIP RETENTION
AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003, SPECIFICALLY SECTION 5(2) AS TO THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THOSE SEEKING ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE;

II

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE AS REGARDS THE
PAYMENT OF THE NECESSARY MOTION FEES; AND

III

138
 WHETHER OR NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT WOULD
RESULT IN THE FRUSTRATION OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF CATARMAN,
CAMIGUIN.[19]

The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is whether petitioner is
disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.

This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.

Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially
comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are
distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who
are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship:

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:

I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that
I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.

By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but
there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under
Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his
Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship.

The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate
of Candidacy which must be executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine
elections. Such an oath reads:

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that I will
obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of
the Republic of the Philippines; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify that the facts stated
herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge.

139
 Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their
Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the
filing of the certificate of candidacy.[20]

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for
those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said
Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section
3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the
Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No.
2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman
Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon.
Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign
citizenship:

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. I think its very good, ha? No problem?

REP. JAVIER. I think its already covered by the oath.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. Ah but he has taken his oath already.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Nono, renouncing foreign citizenship.

xxxx

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 CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. Whats your problem, Boy? Those seeking
elective office in the Philippines.

REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking that ano

CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?

CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.

REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one citizenship. When he
runs for office, he will have only one. (Emphasis ours.)

There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring
or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for
elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have
one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.

By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is
substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the
personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize
that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in
Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those
who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective
public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
Petitioner erroneously invokes the doctrine in Valles[21] and Mercado,[22] wherein the filing by a
person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, was already
considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship. The ruling of this Court in Valles and Mercado is not
applicable to the present case, which is now specially governed by Republic Act No. 9225, promulgated
on 29 August 2003.

In Mercado, which was cited in Valles, the disqualification of therein private

respondent Manzano was sought under another law, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, which
reads:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:

xxxx

(d) Those with dual citizenship.

The Court in the aforesaid cases sought to define the term dual citizenship vis--vis the concept of dual
allegiance. At the time this Court decided the cases of Valles and Mercado on 26 May 1999 and 9 August
2000, respectively, the more explicitly worded requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 were
not yet enacted by our legislature.[23]

Lopez v. Commission on Elections[24] is the more fitting precedent for this case since they both
share the same factual milieu. In Lopez, therein petitioner Lopez was a natural-born Filipino who lost his

141
Philippine citizenship after he became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine
citizenship by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his candidacy for a local elective
position, but failed to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship. This Court
unequivocally declared that despite having garnered the highest number of votes in the election, Lopez is
nonetheless disqualified as a candidate for a local elective position due to his failure to comply with the
requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.

Petitioner presents before this Court for the first time, in the instant Petition for Certiorari, an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship,[25]which he
supposedly executed on 7 February 2007, even before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March
2007. With the said Affidavit, petitioner puts forward in the Petition at bar a new theory of his casethat he
complied with the requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship before
filing his Certificate of Candidacy. This new theory constitutes a radical change from the earlier position he
took before the COMELECthat he complied with the requirement of renunciation by his oaths of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and in his Certificate of Candidacy,
and that there was no more need for a separate act of renunciation.

As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings
below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court,
administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot
be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this
rule.[26] Courts have neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to trial
haphazardly.[27]

Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence. [28] Petitioner should
have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.

Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that In the absence of any
applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall
be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not formally presented:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no
opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to due
process.[29] Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.[30]

The Court further notes that petitioner had already presented before the COMELEC an identical
document, Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign
Citizenship executed on 27 June 2007, subsequent to his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March
2007. Petitioner attached the said Oath of 27 June 2007 to his Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc eventually refused to reconsider said document for being

142
belatedly executed. What was extremely perplexing, not to mention suspect, was that petitioner did not
submit the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 or mention it at all in the proceedings before the COMELEC,
considering that it could have easily won his case if it was actually executed on and in existence before the
filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, in compliance with law.

The justification offered by petitioner, that his counsel had advised him against presenting this
crucial piece of evidence, is lame and unconvincing. If the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 was in existence all
along, petitioners counsel, and even petitioner himself, could have easily adduced it to be a crucial piece
of evidence to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. There
was no apparent danger for petitioner to submit as much evidence as possible in support of his case, than
the risk of presenting too little for which he could lose.
And even if it were true, petitioners excuse for the late presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February
2007 will not change the outcome of petitioners case.

It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence, and mistakes in
handling the case, and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had
his lawyer proceeded differently.[31] The only exceptions to the general rule -- that a client is bound by the
mistakes of his counsel -- which this Court finds acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright
deprivation of ones property through a technicality. [32] These exceptions are not attendant in this case.

The Court cannot sustain petitioners averment that his counsel was grossly negligent in deciding
against the presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the
COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the sufficiency, relevancy or
irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to
summon witnesses and to argue the case -- unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly
presenting his case -- do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer
be bound by the acts of their counsel.[33]

Also belying petitioners claim that his former counsel was grossly negligent was the fact that
petitioner continuously used his former counsels theory of the case. Even when the COMELEC already
rendered an adverse decision, he persistently argues even to this Court that his oaths of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and in his Certificate of Candidacy amount to the
renunciation of foreign citizenship which the law requires. Having asserted the same defense in the instant
Petition, petitioner only demonstrates his continued reliance on and complete belief in the position taken by
his former counsel, despite the formers incongruous allegations that the latter has been grossly negligent.

Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel was inept,
petitioner should have promptly taken action, such as discharging his counsel earlier and/or insisting on the
submission of his Affidavit of 7 February 2007 to the COMELEC, instead of waiting until a decision was
rendered disqualifying him and a resolution issued dismissing his motion for reconsideration; and,
thereupon, he could have heaped the blame on his former counsel. Petitioner could not be so easily allowed
to escape the consequences of his former counsels acts, because, otherwise, it would render court

143
proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing
counsel. [34]

Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[35] where therein petitioner De Guzman was unable
to present a piece of evidence because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite
the Sandiganbayans denial of his prior leave to do so. The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a
demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of any chance to present documentary evidence in
his defense. This was certainly not the case in the Petition at bar.

Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively defended his suit by
attending the hearings, filing the pleadings, and presenting evidence on petitioners behalf.Moreover,
petitioners cause was not defeated by a mere technicality, but because of a mistaken reliance on a doctrine
which is not applicable to his case. A case lost due to an untenable legal position does not justify a deviation
from the rule that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel. [36]

Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number of votes for the position
of Vice-Mayor of Catarman during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a candidate, who must comply
with the election requirements applicable to dual citizens and failed to do so, received the highest number
of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, such requirement. [37] The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate
must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his loyalty
to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. [38] The application of
the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. [39]

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the
COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC
Second Division, is AFFIRMED. Petitioner is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor
of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, and if proclaimed, cannot assume
the Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such disqualification. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012

TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P.
PAGADUAN,Respondents.

SERENO,*

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ *

DECISION

REYES, J.:

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Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office.

The Case

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify
Resolution2 dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in EAC (AE)
No. A-44-2010. The assailed resolution (a) reversed the Order 3 dated November 30, 2010 of COMELEC
Second Division dismissing petitioners appeal; and (b) affirmed the consolidated Decision 4 dated October
22, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, declaring petitioner Teodora
Sobejana-Condon (petitioner) disqualified and ineligible to her position as Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union.

The Undisputed Facts

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On
December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner
took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in
turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizen.6

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid.
She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-
Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She
took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M.
Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo
warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the
petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that
she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be
an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she
executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for
public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.

Ruling of the RTC

In its consolidated Decision dated October 22, 2010, the trial court held that the petitioners failure to
comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As
admitted by the petitioner herself during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia
was not under oath. The law clearly mandates that the document containing the renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be sworn before any public officer authorized to administer oath. Consequently, the
RTCs decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in FAVOR of [private respondents] and
AGAINST (petitioner):

1) DECLARING [petitioner] TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, disqualified and ineligible to hold the

office of Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union;

2) NULLIFYING her proclamation as the winning candidate for Vice-Mayor of said municipality; and

3) DECLARING the position of Vice-Mayor in said municipality vacant.

SO ORDERED.9

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 Ruling of the COMELEC

The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed by the Second Division in its
Order10 dated November 30, 2010 for failure to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. On
motion for reconsideration, the appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en banc in its Resolution11 dated
September 6, 2011. In the same issuance, the substantive merits of the appeal were given due course.
The COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC; it also granted the
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the private respondents.

The decretal portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES as follows:

1. To DISMISS the instant appeal for lack of merit;

2. To AFFIRM the DECISION dated 22 October 2010 of the court a quo; and

3. To GRANT the Motion for Execution filed on November 12, 2010.

SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc.

The Petitioners Arguments

The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no
longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as
early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her.

She further argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement. In
support thereof, she cites portions of the Journal of the House of Representatives dated June 2 to 5, 2003
containing the sponsorship speech for House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.

She claims that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her eligibility since they failed to
do so when she filed certificates of candidacy for the 2007 and 2010 elections.

Lastly, she disputes the power of the COMELEC en banc to: (a) take cognizance of the substantive
merits of her appeal instead of remanding the same to the COMELEC Second Division for the
continuation of the appeal proceedings; and (b) allow the execution pending appeal of the RTCs
judgment.

The Issues

Posed for resolution are the following issues: I) Whether the COMELEC en banc may resolve the merits
of an appeal after ruling on its reinstatement; II) Whether the COMELEC en banc may order the execution
of a judgment rendered by a trial court in an election case; III) Whether the private respondents are
barred from questioning the qualifications of the petitioner; and IV) For purposes of determining the
petitioners eligibility to run for public office, whether the "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement.

The Courts Ruling

I. An appeal may be simultaneously

reinstated and definitively resolved
by the COMELEC en banc in a
resolution disposing of a motion for
reconsideration.

The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto the COMELEC en
banc by Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, viz:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All

146
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

A complementary provision is present in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit:

Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the
Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the
division which issued the order.

Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the COMELEC en bancs prerogative in
resolving a motion for reconsideration, there is nothing to prevent the body from directly adjudicating the
substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the
division that initially dismissed it.

We thus see no impropriety much more grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc
when it proceeded to decide the substantive merits of the petitioners appeal after ruling for its
reinstatement.

Further, records show that, in her motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, the petitioner
not only proffered arguments on the issue on docket fees but also on the issue of her eligibility. She even
filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration attaching therewith supporting documents 13 to her
contention that she is no longer an Australian citizen. The petitioner, after obtaining an unfavorable
decision, cannot be permitted to disavow the en bancs exercise of discretion on the substantial merits of
her appeal when she herself invoked the same in the first place.

The fact that the COMELEC en banc had remanded similar appeals to the Division that initially dismissed
them cannot serve as a precedent to the disposition of the petitioners appeal. A decision or resolution of
any adjudicating body can be disposed in several ways. To sustain petitioners argument would be
virtually putting a straightjacket on the COMELEC en bancs adjudicatory powers.

More significantly, the remand of the appeal to the COMELEC Second Division would be unnecessarily
circuitous and repugnant to the rule on preferential disposition of quo warranto cases espoused in Rule
36, Section 15 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 14

II. The COMELEC en banc has the

power to order discretionary
execution of judgment.

We cannot subscribe to petitioners submission that the COMELEC en banc has no power to order the
issuance of a writ of execution and that such function belongs only to the court of origin.

There is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to order discretionary execution of judgment in
view of the fact that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1,
Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.15

Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate
court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron, 16 we stressed the import of the provision
vis--vis election cases when we held that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending
appeal includes those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the
exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.

III. Private respondents are not

estopped from questioning
petitioners eligibility to hold public
office.

The fact that the petitioners qualifications were not questioned when she filed certificates of candidacy for
2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate as an estoppel to the petition for quo warranto before the RTC.

Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there are two instances where a
petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate
of candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

147
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election; and

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election. (Emphasis ours)

Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within
the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for whatever
reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the
disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the
proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code.17

The above remedies were both available to the private respondents and their failure to utilize Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code cannot serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo
warranto petition under Section 253.

IV. Petitioner is disqualified from

running for elective office for
failure to renounce her Australian
citizenship in accordance with
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I, _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and
political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5,
viz:

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;

148
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided,
That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised
by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis ours)

Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a
renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not
under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must
be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.

To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner pleads the Court to interpret
the "sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) to be a mere pro forma
requirement in conformity with the intent of the Legislature. She anchors her submission on the statement
made by Representative Javier during the floor deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No.
9225.

At the outset, it bears stressing that the Courts duty to interpret the law according to its true intent is
exercised only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of the
Court is to apply the law. As such, when the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for
construction or interpretation; there is only room for application.19 Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one
such instance.

Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way,
or of referring to two or more things at the same time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must
admit of two or more possible meanings.20

The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC,21 we declared its
categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public
position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at
the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held
that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the
law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is
renouncing all foreign citizenship.

The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal,22 when we held that Filipinos re-acquiring or
retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship
if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines, thus:

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine
citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of
the certificate of candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized
as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the
oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

149
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act
to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3
thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the
Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No.
2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin
Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that
the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship;

xxxx

The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to
explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To
qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine
citizenship.23 (Citation omitted and italics and underlining ours)

Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC,24 we declared petitioner therein to be disqualified from running for
the position of vice-mayor for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his American
citizenship.

We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the above rulings to the phrase "sworn
renunciation". The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite,
and sensible meaning and must thus be read literally.25 The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected
through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.

It is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. 26 Even a resort
to the Journal of the House of Representatives invoked by the petitioner leads to the same inference, viz:

INTERPELLATION OF REP. JAVIER

Rep. Javier initially inquired whether under the Bill, dual citizenship is only limited to natural-born Filipinos
and not to naturalized Filipinos.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative.

Rep. Javier subsequently adverted to Section 5 of the Bill which provides that natural-born Filipinos who
have dual citizenship shall continue to enjoy full civil and political rights. This being the case, he sought
clarification as to whether they can indeed run for public office provided that they renounce their foreign
citizenship.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that these citizens will only have to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship before any authorized public officer.

Rep. Javier sought further clarification on this matter, citing that while the Bill provides them with full civil
and political rights as Filipino citizens, the measure also discriminates against them since they are
required to make a sworn renunciation of their other foreign citizenship if and when they run for public
office. He thereafter proposed to delete this particular provision.

In his rejoinder, Rep. Libanan explained that this serves to erase all doubts regarding any issues
that might be raised pertaining to the citizenship of any candidate. He subsequently cited the case
of Afroyim vs. Rusk, wherein the United States considered a naturalized American still as an
American citizen even when he cast his vote in Israel during one of its elections.

Rep. Javier however pointed out that the matter of voting is different because in voting, one is not
required to renounce his foreign citizenship. He pointed out that under the Bill, Filipinos who run for public
office must renounce their foreign citizenship. He pointed out further that this is a contradiction in the Bill.

Thereafter, Rep. Javier inquired whether Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship and are
now entitled to reacquire their Filipino citizenship will be considered as natural-born citizens. As such, he
likewise inquired whether they will also be considered qualified to run for the highest elective positions in
the country.

150
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that the only requirement is that they make a sworn
renunciation of their foreign citizenship and that they comply with the residency and registration
requirements as provided for in the Constitution.

Whereupon, Rep. Javier noted that under the Constitution, natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens at the time of birth without having to perform an act to complete or perfect his/her citizenship.

Rep. Libanan agreed therewith, citing that this is the reason why the Bill seeks the repeal of CA No. 63.
The repeal, he said, would help Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship to retain their
citizenship. With regard then to Section 5 of the Bill, he explained that the Committee had decided to
include this provision because Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution provides for the accountability of
public officers.

In his rejoinder, Rep. Javier maintained that in this case, the sworn renunciation of a foreign citizenship
will only become a pro forma requirement.

On further queries of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan affirmed that natural-born Filipino citizens who became
foreign citizens and who have reacquired their Filipino citizenship under the Bill will be considered as
natural-born citizens, and therefore qualified to run for the presidency, the vice-presidency or for a seat in
Congress. He also agreed with the observation of Rep. Javier that a natural-born citizen is one who is a
citizen of the country at the time of birth. He also explained that the Bill will, in effect, return to a Filipino
citizen who has acquired foreign citizenship, the status of being a natural-born citizen effective at the time
he lost his Filipino citizenship.

As a rejoinder, Rep. Javier opined that doing so would be discriminating against naturalized Filipino
citizens and Filipino citizens by election who are all disqualified to run for certain public offices. He then
suggested that the Bill be amended by not considering as natural-born citizens those Filipinos who had
renounced their Filipino citizenship and acquired foreign citizenship. He said that they should be
considered as repatriated citizens.

In reply, Rep. Libanan assured Rep. Javier that the Committee will take note of the latters comments on
the matter. He however stressed that after a lengthy deliberation on the subject, the Committees on
Justice, and Foreign Affairs had decided to revert back to the status of being natural-born citizens those
natural-born Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship but now wished to reacquire their
Filipino citizenship.

Rep. Javier then explained that a Filipina who loses her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to a
foreigner can regain her repatriated Filipino citizenship, upon the death of her husband, by simply taking
her oath before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Rep. Javier said that he does not oppose the Bill but only wants to be fair to other Filipino citizens who
are not considered natural-born. He reiterated that natural-born Filipino citizens who had renounced their
citizenship by pledging allegiance to another sovereignty should not be allowed to revert back to their
status of being natural-born citizens once they decide to regain their Filipino citizenship. He underscored
that this will in a way allow such Filipinos to enjoy dual citizenship.

On whether the Sponsors will agree to an amendment incorporating the position of Rep. Javier, Rep.
Libanan stated that this will defeat the purpose of the Bill.

Rep. Javier disagreed therewith, adding that natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign
citizenships and later decided to regain their Filipino citizenship, will be considered as repatriated citizens.

Rep. Libanan cited the case of Bengzon vs. HRET wherein the Supreme Court had ruled that only
naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.

In reaction, Rep. Javier clarified that only citizens by election or those whose mothers are Filipino citizens
under the 1935 Constitution and who elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of maturity, are
not deemed as natural-born citizens.

In response, Rep. Libanan maintained that in the Bengzon case, repatriation results in the recovery of
ones original nationality and only naturalized citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.

On whether the Sponsors would agree to not giving back the status of being natural-born citizens to
natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship, Rep. Libanan remarked that the Body in
plenary session will decide on the matter.27

151
The petitioner obviously espouses an isolated reading of Representative Javiers statement; she
conveniently disregards the preceding and succeeding discussions in the records.

The above-quoted excerpts of the legislative record show that Representative Javiers statement ought to
be understood within the context of the issue then being discussed, that is whether former natural-born
citizens who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship under the proposed law will revert to their original status
as natural-born citizens and thus be qualified to run for government positions reserved only to natural-
born Filipinos, i.e. President, Vice-President and Members of the Congress.

It was Representative Javiers position that they should be considered as repatriated Filipinos and not as
natural-born citizens since they will have to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Natural-born citizens are those who need not perform an act to perfect their citizenship.
Representative Libanan, however, maintained that they will revert to their original status as natural-born
citizens. To reconcile the renunciation imposed by Section 5(2) with the principle that natural-born citizens
are those who need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship, Representative Javier suggested that
the sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship be considered as a mere pro forma requirement.

Petitioners argument, therefore, loses its point. The "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be
deemed a formal requirement only with respect to the re-acquisition of ones status as a natural-born
Filipino so as to override the effect of the principle that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to
perfect their citizenship. Never was it mentioned or even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this Court
to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run for public office has the option
of executing an unsworn affidavit of renunciation.

It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to complement Section 18, Article XI
of the Constitution on public officers primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty, which provides:

Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and
any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant
of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.

An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered person or thing, that
ones statement is true or that one will be bound to a promise. The person making the oath implicitly
invites punishment if the statement is untrue or the promise is broken. The legal effect of an oath is to
subject the person to penalties for perjury if the testimony is false. 28

Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures truthfulness to the
prospective public officers abandonment of his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and
loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.

To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it
would also accommodate a mere qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the
Constitution and the legislature clearly demand otherwise.

Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already deemed to
have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree.

Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven.29 To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section
19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office. (Emphasis ours)

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.

152
The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a foreign law
may also be established through: (1) a testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-
law in the country where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and
states that the same was in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several
naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity
regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be
allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is
"satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to
be a competent proof of that law.30

The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the above methods. As
uniformly observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof of the existence of the
law during trial. Also, the letter issued by the Australian government showing that petitioner already
renounced her Australian citizenship was unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo acted judiciously in
disregarding the same.

We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as competent evidence the said
letter in view of the photocopy of a Certificate of Authentication issued by Consular Section of the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia attached to the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers
(AASJS) Member v. Datumanong31 that the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law to concern
itself with the actual status of the other citizenship.

This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the legislature must do so
conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans the interference of any foreign law. If we were to read the
Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No. 9225, we would be applying
not what our legislative department has deemed wise to require. To do so would be a brazen
encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic. 32

The petitioners act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her
Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual
citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship,33 such
ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which
provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.34

The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most
number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. 35

In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and
seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships
before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to
qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.36 The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their
Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a
pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office.

Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-
acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to
run for public office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the
law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on
September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she
executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any
elective office in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated
September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010 is AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

153
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review
the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of
the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local
Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being
questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a
Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied
for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in
San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July
2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued
in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of
the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance
and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief.7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. 9

154
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is
a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnados US
citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and
returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24
November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that
the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger
manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order 13 requiring the respondent to personally
file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence
ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the
highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03
April 2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig,
and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of
Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his familys
ancestral house in Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03
June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the
United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of
Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January
1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been
a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Baluas
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed
to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not conclude
that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government Code."17

155
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnados claim that he
is a Filipino citizen.18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
9225, Arnados act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April
2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnados continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run
for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnados unexplained use of a
US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US
citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document
of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely,
one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely
for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnados proclamation as the winning
candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect. 20

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the
evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He
raised the following contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his
Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not
tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear
allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine
passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;

4. Baluas petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the
First Divisions treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the peoples choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the
case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which
should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed
before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnados
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified
Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this
case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes,
should be proclaimed as the winner.

156
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited
after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the
elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even
after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

As to Maquilings intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows
intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been
rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division
allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law, 24 having
been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnados Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine
citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that
the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate
to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Divisions reliance in the case of In Re:
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said
case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of
his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not natural born,
who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State
expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case,
respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by working
abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply
for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.

xxxx

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied
for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of
the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later.
Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in
his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondents submission of a certified true copy
of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010,
April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that
the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to
him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within
his control during that time.25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign
passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through
which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this
case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is
assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily
denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine
citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in

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the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be
resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the
United States. The latters continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US
citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his
declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondents submission with the twin
requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running for the
mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost
during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time
he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such.
Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latters
failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the highest
number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification
was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his
having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does
not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the
sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected
their representatives who enacted the law.27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public
office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner
in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for
ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to
reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Divisions
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local
Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession
of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the
subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones qualifications to run for public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to
this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who

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garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the votes
cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc
correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:

That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against
private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has
already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule
set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of
the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.

Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein
have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the
case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the
issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado
will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary
act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for
an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31

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Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin
requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he
applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again
on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he
likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an
Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the
effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. 32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of
a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering
him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date
he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries
that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only
to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship
and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the
citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into
the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for
the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he
was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of
his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the
very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to
be qualified to run for a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s)
himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America." 38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado
of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen
by using his US passport.

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This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for
public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act
of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who
are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy
already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. 39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on
the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but
also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying
the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a
local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3
April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his
American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the
required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x. 41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at
the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of
renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnados act of consistently using
his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to
comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified
him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of
1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective
public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign
citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.

Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of the
issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his
Philippine passport three (3) months later.43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought
naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That
Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport
less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of representation as
a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad." 44 We
cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his
Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24
November 2009.

Besides, Arnados subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he
renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport.
In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his
subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and
political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain
allegiance to ones flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the

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right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided
allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has
recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to
his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate
in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes 45 which is the jurisprudential spring of
the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine
must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue
that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.

The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of
municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing
candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon
the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the
municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened. 46

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a
second re-election absent the four year interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving
a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the
effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the
elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two
situations, thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities
in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office.
In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the
candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the greater
number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the
returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted
with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In
the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the
ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In
the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving
for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers)
obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must
retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question
is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as
to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal
character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)

Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict
sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."

The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of
the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

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A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the
highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had
been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4
June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to
hold the office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be
proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the
municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings
based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents'
answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional issues, let
judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to
stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and explaining
the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when
the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging another
eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him
that "wreath?"

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal
mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material
time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to
election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a
legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his
ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a
candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor
cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for
public office.

The popular vote does not cure the

ineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is
voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to
trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC 50 when we pronounced:

x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the

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Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC 52 where the Court ruled that
the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x
becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53

We have ruled in the past that a candidates victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to
rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidates
certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory
in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions
requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to
the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say
this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught
with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such
blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election
requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice
about a candidates eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which
specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered
toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise
be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can
render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious,
candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any
defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he
can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its
exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorates voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1wphi1

Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC
cannot produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner
of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole
and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates
form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications
of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be
ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of
the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

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There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC 56 that when the voters are well aware within
the realm of notoriety of a candidates disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate,
then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is
also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to
ineligible ones.

The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification
to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate
ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidates disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer
in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment.
The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnados proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed
to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June
2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not
involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate,
or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both
a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen
disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the
enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered
void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it
impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition
when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which
Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's
disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on
succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En
Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is
hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.

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No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015

ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORANTE

CAPITAN, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
could run for and hold elective public office.

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Per Curiam Resolution2 dated December 9, 2013 of respondent Commission on Elections
(Comelec) En Banc in SPA No. 13-309 (DC), which affirmed the Resolution3 dated September 6, 2013 of
the Comelec Second Division. The Comelec, relying on our ruling in Maquiling v. Commission on
Elections,4 disqualified petitioner Rommel C. Arnado (Arnado) from running in the May 13, 2013 elections,
set aside his proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, and declared respondent
Florante T. Capitan (Capitan) as the duly elected mayor of said municipality.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was
naturalized as citizen of the United States of America (USA). Subsequently, and in preparation for his
plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No.
92255 (RA 9225) before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even date, an Order of Approval of
Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.

Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or
to cancel his CoC on the ground, among others, that Arnado remained a US citizen because he
continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid
Affidavit of Renunciation.

While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded where Arnado garnered
the highest number of votes for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. He was proclaimed the winning
candidate.

On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division issued a Resolution holding that Arnado's continued use
of his US passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he was
disqualified to run for public office for failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The Comelec
First Division accordingly nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on succession should be
followed.

Arnado moved for reconsideration. In the meantime, Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
mayoralty candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened in the case. He
argued that the Comelec First Division erred in applying the rule on succession.

On February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc rendered a Resolution reversing the ruling of the Comelec
First Division. It held that Arnado's use of his US passport did not operate to revert his status to dual
citizenship. The Comelec En Banc found merit in Arnado's explanation that he continued to use his US
passport because he did not yet know that he had been issued a Philippine passport at the time of the
relevant foreign trips. The Comelec En Banc further noted that, after receiving his Philippine passport,
Arnado used the same for his subsequent trips.

Maquiling then sought recourse to this Court by filing a petition docketed as G.R No. 195649.

While G.R No. 195649 was pending, the period for the filing of CoCs for local elective officials for the May
13, 2013 elections officially began. On October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his CoC6 for the same position.

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Respondent Capitan also filed his CoC for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan.

On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its Decision in Maquiling. Voting 10-5, it annulled and set aside the
Comelec En Banc's February 2, 2011 Resolution, disqualified Arnado from running for elective position,
and declared Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in the May 10, 2010
elections. In so ruling, the majority of the Members of the Court opined that in his subsequent use of his
US passport, Arnado effectively disavowed or recalled his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado's act of consistently using
his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation." Tills does not mean that he failed to
comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after complying with the
requirements that he perfonned positive acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an
elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective
public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign
citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.

xxxx

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has
recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to
his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate
in the May 2010 elections.7

The issuance of this Court's April 16, 2013 Decision sets the stage for the present controversy.

On May 9, 2013 or shortly after the Court issued its Decision in Maquiling, Arnado executed an Affidavit
Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation Dated April3, 2009."8cralawrednad

The following day or on May 10, 2013, Capitan, Arnado's lone rival for the mayoralty post, filed a
Petition9 seeking to disqualify him from running for municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his
CoC based on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling. The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and
was raffled to the Comelec's Second Division. The resolution of said petition was, however, overtaken by
the May 13, 2013 elections where Arnado garnered 8,902 votes (84% of the total votes cast) while
Capitan obtained 1,707 (16% of the total votes cast) votes only.

On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate.

Unfazed, Capitan filed another Petition10 this time seeking to nullify Arnado's proclamation. He argued
that with the April 16, 2013 Decision of this Court in Maquiling, there is no doubt that Arnado is
disqualified from running for any local elective office. Hence, Arnado's proclamation is void and without
any legal effect.

Ruling of the Comelec Second Division

On September 6, 2013, the Comelec Second Division promulgated a Resolution granting the petition in
SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and disqualify Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections. Following
Maquiling, it ratiocinated that at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to comply
with the requirement of RA 9225 of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship. While he executed the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same was deemed
withdrawn or recalled when he subsequently traveled abroad using his US passport, as held in Maquiling.

The Comelec Second Division also noted that Arnado failed to execute another Affidavit of Renunciation
for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections. While a May 9, 2013 Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's
"Affidavit of Renunciation dated April 3, 2009" was submitted in evidence, the same would not suffice
because it should have been executed on or before the filing of the CoC on October 1, 2012.

The dispositive portion of the Comelec Second Division's Resolution reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is granted. Respondent Rommel Cagoco
Arnado is disqualified from running in the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections.

SO ORDERED.11

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

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Aggrieved, Arnado filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration.12 He argued that the Comelec Second
Division erred in applying Maquiling claiming that the said case is not on all fours with the present
controversy; that Capitan's Petition was filed beyond the 25-day reglementary period reckoned from the
filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled; and, that the Comelec must uphold the sovereign will of the
people of Kauswagan who expressed, thru the ballots, their overwhelming support for him as their mayor.
Arnado prayed that the Comelec Second Division's September 6, 2013 Resolution be reversed and that
he be declared as eligible to run for mayor ofKauswagan.

On December 9, 2013, the Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Comelec Second Division. It
accordingly annulled the proclamation of Arnado and declared Capitan as the duly elected mayor of
Kauswagan. The dispositive portion of the Comelec En Banc's Resolution
reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DISMISSED. The
Proclamation of Private Respondent Rommel C. Arnado as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. FLORANTE T. CAPITAN is hereby DECLARED the
duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte inthe May 13, 2013 Elections.

SO ORDERED.13

Hence, on December 16, 2013 Arnado filed the instant Petition with ancillary prayer for injunctive relief to
maintain the status quo ante. On December

26, 2013, Arnado filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Ante Order or Temporary Restraining
Order14 in view of the issuance by the Comelec En Banc of a Writ of Execution to implement its
December 9, 2013 Resolution.

On January 14, 2014, this Court issued a Resolution15 requiring the respondents to file their respective
comments on the petition. In the same Resolution, this Court granted Arnado's ancillary relief for
temporary restraining order.

Capitan thus filed an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order dated January
14, 2014,16 contending that the acts sought to be restrained by Arnado are already fait accompli. He
alleged that the Comelec En Banc had already issued a Writ of Execution17 and pursuant thereto a
Special Municipal Board of Canvassers was convened. It proclaimed him to be the duly elected mayor of
Kauswagan and on January 2, 2014 he took his oath of office. Since then, he has assumed and
performed the duties and functions of his office.

In a Resolution18 dated February 25, 2014, this Court ordered the issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order
directing the parties to allow Arnado to continue performing his functions as mayor of Kauswagan
pending resolution of this case.

Issues

In support of his Petition, Arnado raises the following issues:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC AND 2ND DIVISION VIOLATED PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE
PETITIONS OF RESPONDENT CAPITAN ON THE GROUND OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND/OR LATE
FILING, ETC.

II

WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY ALLOWING COM. ELIAS YUSOPH TO REVIEW THE DECISION HE
WROTE FOR THE 2ND DIVISION.

III

WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

DISENFRANCHISING 84% OF THE VOTERS OF KAUSWAGAN IN THE MAY 2013 ELECTIONS.

IV

WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING

168
PETITIONER WHO HAS FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RA 9225 BEFORE THE
FILING OF HIS COC ON OCTOBER 1, 2012.19

Arnado claims that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion and violated his right to procedural
due process in not dismissing Capitan's Petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC). He avers that Capitan is guilty
of forum-shopping because the latter subsequently filed a similar case docketed as SPC No. 13-019. In
addition, SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was filed beyond the 25-day prescriptive period reckoned from the time of
the filing of his CoC on October 1, 2012.

Arnado likewise claims that the proceeding before the Comelec is peppered with procedural infirmities.
He asserts that the Comelec violated its own rules in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving
Capitan's motion to consolidate; that SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was not set for trial and no hearing for the
reception of evidence was ever conducted; and, that the Comelec did not follow its own rules requiring
the issuance of a notice of promulgation of resolutions.

Arnado further claims that the Comelec En Banc not only committed grave abuse of discretion but also
violated his constitutional right to due process when it allowed Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph
(Commissioner Yusoph) to participate in the review of the Decision he penned for the Second Division.
Furthermore, the Comelec En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified him from
running in the May 13, 2013 elections, thereby disenfranchising 84% of the voters of Kauswagan who all
voted for him.

Finally, Arnado avers that further inquiry and examination of the notarial register of his former counsel,
Atty. Thomas Dean M. Quijano, revealed that he executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance20 on November 30, 2009. Hence, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he is a
citizen of the Philippines who does not owe allegiance to any other country and, therefore, is qualified to
run for mayor of Kauswagan in the May 13, 2013 elections.

Our Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Petition for certiorari is limited to the

determination of whether the respondent
tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to
be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution. And as a matter of policy, this Court will not
interfere with the resolutions of the Comelec unless it is shown that it had committed grave abuse of
discretion.21 Thus, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, a Rule 64 petition will not prosper.
Jurisprudence, on the other hand, defines grave abuse of discretion as the "capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."22 "Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it
must be grave."23 Grave abuse of discretion has likewise been defined as an act done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.24cralawrednad

In this case, and as will be discussed below, there is no showing that the Comelec En Banc acted
capriciously or whimsically in issuing its December 9, 2013 Resolution. Neither did it act contrary to law or
jurisprudence.

Arnado's allegations that Capitan

violated the rule against forumshopping
and that the latter's petition in
SPA No.13-309(DC) was filed late,
unsubstantiated and erroneous.

There is forum-shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded on the same cause, are
instituted by a party on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.25cralawred It exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.26 Thus, there is forum-shopping when in both actions
there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interests in both
actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.27cralawrednad

Here, Arnado failed to substantiate his claim of forum-shopping. He merely made a general averment that

169
in resolving the petitions of Capitan in SPA No. 13-309 (OC) and SPC No. 13-019, the Comelec En Banc,
as well as its Second Division, failed to comply with this Court's Revised Circular No. 28-91,28without
demonstrating how forum-shopping was supposed to be present. He has not shown that the petitions in
SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 involved the same parties, issues, and reliefs. In fact, Arnado
did not even bother to submit to this Court a copy of the Petition in SPC No. 13-019 (annulment of
proclamation case). As the party insisting that Capitan committed forum-shopping, Arnado bears the
burden of establishing the same. After all, it is settled that he who alleges has the burden of proving it;
mere allegation is not sufficient.29cralawrednad

Besides, and as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the parties in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC
No. 13-019 are not the same. In the first case, the parties are only Capitan and Arnado. In the second
case, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is impleaded as respondent.
There is also dissimilitude in the reliefs sought. The former case sought to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his CoC while the latter case prayed for the annulment of Arnado's proclamation as mayor of
Kauswagan.

With regard to the alleged tardiness in the filing of Capitan's Petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC), it appears
that Arnado either failed to grasp the import of Capitan's allegations therein or he made a deliberate
partial misrepresentation in stating that the same is one for cancellation of CoC. A copy30 thereof annexed
to Arnado's herein petition states that it is a petition "to disqualify and/or cancel the certificate of
candidacy" of Arnado. The allegations therein state in no uncertain terms that it is one for disqualification
based on Arnado's failure to comply with the requisites of RA 9225 and on the ruling of this Court
in Maquiling. Thus, the Comelec Second Division appropriately treated it as a petition for disqualification
with the alternative prayer to cancel Arnado's CoC. It is elementary that the nature of the action is
determined by the allegations in the petition.31cralawrednad

Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,32 a petition for disqualification should be
filed "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation." Here, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 14, 2013. 33 Thus, the
petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was seasonably filed on May 10, 2013.34cralawrednad

The other procedural lapses allegedly

committed by the Comelec are likewise
unsubstantiated. Assuming the allegations of
Arnado to be true, the Comelec did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

Arnado's claim that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without
first resolving Capitan's motion to consolidate likewise lacks substantiation. In the first place, Arnado has
not attached a copy of said motion to his petition. This alone is sufficient ground for the dismissal of his
Rule 64 Petition, filed in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for not being accompanied by pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.35 Also, it was Capitan who filed the motion for
consolidation. Not being the movant, Arnado is not in a position to question the alleged inaction of the
Comelec on said motion. And even assuming that he has, by filing a Verified Motion for Reconsideration
with the Comelec En Banc and subsequently appealing to this Court despite the still unresolved motion
for consolidation, Arnado effectively abandoned said motion for consolidation. In Cayago v. Hon. Lina,36it
was held that once a party elevates the case before the appellate tribunal, the appellant is deemed to
have abandoned the unresolved motion which remains pending with the tribunal of origin. "[I]t is not right
for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards make a volte face and deny that same jurisdiction."37cralawrednad

In any case, under Section 9, Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, consolidation is only
permissive. It is not mandatory. Section 9 reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 9. Consolidation of Cases.- When an action or proceeding involves a question of law and fact which
is similar to or common with that of another action or proceeding, the same may be consolidated with the
action or proceeding bearing the lower docket number.

In Muoz v. Comelec,38 this Court accentuated "that the term 'may' is indicative of a mere possibility, an
opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the
option to exercise. If he chooses to exercise the right, he must comply with the conditions attached
thereto, which in this case require that the cases to be consolidated must involve similar questions of law
and fact."39 In this case, the consolidation of SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 does not appear
to be necessary. As earlier mentioned, said cases do not even involve the same parties and reliefs
sought. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Comelec in not consolidating them.

Arnado's protestation that the Comelec violated its own rules when it decided SPA No. 13-309 (DC)

170
without setting it for trial likewise deserves scant consideration. The proceedings in a special action for
disqualification of candidates under Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure are summary in nature
where a trial type proceeding may be dispensed with.40 In Diangka v. Comelec,41 this Court held
that:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence should not be rigorously applied in
administrative proceedings specially where the law calls for the proceeding to be summary in character.
Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 25 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualifications
are subject to summary hearings. In relation thereto, Section 3, Rule 17 of the said Rules provides that it
remains in the sound discretion of the COMELEC whether clarification questions are to be asked the
witnesses-affiants, and whether the adverse party is to be granted opportunity to cross-examine said
witnesses affiants. Furthermore, when the COMELEC en banc reviews and evaluates a party's petition, or
as in the case at bar, a party's answer and the supporting papers attached thereto, the same is
tantamount to a fair "hearing" of his case.42

Arnado's claim that the Comelec En Banc

committed grave abuse of discretion and violated
his right to due process in allowing Commissioner
Yusoph to participate in the deliberation of the assailed
Comelec En Banc Resolution is likewise bereft of
substantiation.

Arnado's claim that Commissioner Yusoph penned both the September 6, 2013 Resolution of the
Comelec Second Division and the December 9, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec En Banc is not correct.
While Commissioner Yusoph, together with Commissioners Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca and Luie Tito
F. Guia, signed said Resolution, there is nothing therein which would indicate that Commissioner Yusoph
was the writer or the ponente of said Resolution. The September 6, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec
Second Division does not state who the ponente is. The same goes true with the questioned December 9,
2013 Per Curiam Resolution43 of the Comelec En Banc. As a per curiam resolution, it was arrived at by
the Comelec En Banc as a whole and without any particular ponente. Hence, we need not belabor
Arnado's claim of denial of due process as his basis therefor lacks factual moorings.

Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin

requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at
the time he filed his CoC for the May 13, 2013
elections; subsequent compliance does not suffice.

Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from
running for any elective local position. In Mercado v. anzano,44 it was clarified that the phrase "dual
citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance.'' 45 Subsequent,
Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil
and political rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law. They may now run for public office
in the Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath46 prior to or at the time of
filing of their CoC. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities- Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;

In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, ruled that
Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held
in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,47 his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed
withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed
his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with
said second requirement. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9,
2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been

171
belatedly executed.

The Comelec En Banc did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse of discretion, in upholding the Resolution
of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying Arnado from running for public office. It is worth noting that
the reason for Arnado's disqualification to run for public office during the 2010 elections being a
candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines - still subsisted when
he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1, 2012. The Comelec En Banc merely adhered to the
ruling of this Court in Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of discretion had it departed
therefrom.

Moreover, it cannot be validly argued that Arnado should be given the opportunity to correct the
deficiency in his qualification because at the time this Court promulgated its Decision in Maquiling on April
16, 2013, the period for filing the CoC for local elective office had already lapsed. Or, as Justice Arturo D.
Brion puts it in his Dissenting Opinion, "[t]o the extent that Arnado was denied the chance to submit a
replacement oath of renunciation in 2013, then there was an unfair and abusive denial of opportunity
equivalent to grave abuse of discretion." Besides, shortly after learning of the Court's April 16, 2013 ruling
in Maquiling or on May 9, 2013, Arnado substantially complied therewith by executing an affidavit
affirming his April3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.

The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first case dealing with the effect of the
use of a foreign passport on the qualification to run for public office of a natural-born Filipino citizen who
was naturalized abroad and subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225. It was settled in that
case that the use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation.
Yet, despite the issue being novel and of first impression, plus the fact that Arnado could not have divined
the possible adverse consequences of using his US passport, the Court in Maquiling did not act with
leniency or benevolence towards Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that matters dealing with
qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied with. Otherwise stated, the Court
in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado from strictly complying with the
eligibility requirements to run for public office or to simply allow him to correct the deficiency in his
qualification by submitting another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is with more reason that in this case, we
should similarly require strict compliance with the qualifications to run for local elective office.

The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public office during the May 10, 2010
and May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are the same. Arnado's use of his US passport in
2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in
the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not
cured the defect in his qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and applicable to this case
following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means to adhere to
precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established.48 Under the doctrine, "[w]hen the court has
once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle
and apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the same."49 It enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents and bars relitigation of the same issue.50cralawrednad

It may not be amiss to add that as early as 2010, the year when Balua filed a petition to disqualify him,
Arnado has gotten wind that the use of his US passport might pose a problem to his candidacy. In other
words, when Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he was not totally unaware that the use of his US
passport after he had executed the Affidavit of Renunciation might have an impact on his qualification and
candidacy. In fact, at that time, Maquiling had already reached this Court. But despite the petitions filed
against him questioning his qualification to run for public office in 2010, Arnado filed his CoC on October
1, 2012 unmindful of any possible legal setbacks in his candidacy for the 2013 elections and without
executing another Affidavit of Renunciation. In short, the argument that Arnado should be given the
opportunity to correct the deficiency in his CoC since Maquiling was promulgated after the lapse of the
period for filing a CoC for the 2013 elections, is totally bereft of merit. Consistent with our April 16, 2013
ruling in Maquiling, Arnado should be made to face the consequences of his inaction since he could have
remedied it at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 or even before that. There is no law
prohibiting him from executing an Affidavit of Renunciation every election period if only to avert possible
questions about his qualifications.

The alleged November 30, 2009

Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance cannot be given any
probative weight.

As to the alleged recently discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance, the same is highly suspect. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the original or
certified true copy thereof was not presented. In addition, such crucial evidence sufficient to alter the
outcome of the case was never presented before the Comelec much less in
the Maquiling case. Curiously, it only surfaced for the first time in this petition. In Jacot v. Dal,51 this Court

172
disallowed the belated presentation of similar evidence on due process considerations.
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below.
Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court,
administrative agency or quasi- judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot
be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this
rule. Courts have neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to trial
haphazardly.

Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence. Petitioner should have
offered the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.

Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In the absence of any
applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall
be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect." Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not formally presented:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.- The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no opportunity to
examine and controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to due process. Additionally, the
piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.52

Moreover, in Maquiling it was mentioned that Arnado used his US passport on January 12, 2010 and
March 23, 2010. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 201 0, certifying
that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger
manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel
records:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

DATE OF Arrival:01/12/2010
NATIONALITY :USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT :057782700
DATE OF Arrival:03/23/2010
NATIONALITY :USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT :05778270053
Despite the existence of such statement in Maquiling, We are puzzled why Arnado never bothered to
correct or refute it. He neither alleged nor presented evidence in this petition to prove that he did not
travel abroad on those dates using his US passport.

Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, however, dissents and maintains the same position he had taken
in Maquiling that Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 is an isolated act justified by the circumstances
at that time. At any rate, Arnado started to use his Philippine passport in his travels abroad beginning
December 11, 2009 and thenceforth. This, according to J. Leonen, is borne out by Arnado's Philippine
passport.

With due respect to my esteemed colleague, it appears that J. Leonen is not only reviving an issue that
had already been settled with finality in the Maquiling case, but he is also going beyond the issues raised
in this petition. To reiterate for clarity, Arnado's argument in this case-that he is qualified to run for mayor
as he has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 relative to the May 13, 2013 elections- is
premised only on the alleged newly discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit. Nothing more. He does not
claim in this case that his use of US passport in his travel abroad in 2009 is an isolated act, as J. Leonen
insists. In Vazquez v. De Borja,54 it was held that courts do not have jurisdiction over issues neither raised
in the pleading nor tried with the express or implied consent of the parties. They cannot render judgment
based on issues that have never been raised before them. Equally settled is the rule that "points of law,
theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower [tribunal] need not be, and
ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such
late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule."55 The same goes true with J. Brion's
theory that what was cancelled by virtue of Maquiling was only the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation
where Arnado expressly renounced any foreign citizenship; not the July 10, 2008 Oath of Allegiance
which carried with it an implied abdication of foreign citizenship. For J. Brion, "[t]he requirement of an
express renunciation x x x does not negate the effect of, or make any less real, the prior implicit
renunciation of citizenship and allegiance made upon taking the oath of allegiance." Again, this was never
raised in this petition. At any rate, the execution of an Oath of Allegiance is required by Section 3 56 of RA
9225. For those who avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for public office, Section 5(2) thereof

173
provides the additional requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC. Definitely, the provisions of Section 5(2) are not
useless or meaningless surplusage. When the law expressly requires an explicit renunciation, an implicit
one would be insufficient. Furthermore, even assuming that Arnado's 2008 implied renunciation is
sufficient, the same has also been negated by his use of his US passport in 2009, following the ruling
in Maquiling.

Otherwise, we would give more weight to an implied renunciation than to an express one specifically
required by law.

Besides, the Decision of this Court in Maquiling holding that Arnado's use of his US passport effectively
recanted his Affidavit of Renunciation has already become final and immutable. We can no longer
resurrect in this case the issues that have already been resolved there with fmality.

In maintaining that Arnado used his Philippine passport in travelling abroad in the first quarter of 2010, J.
Leonen relies on the copy thereof attached to the rollo of the Maquiling case. But said copy of Arnado's
Philippine passport57 is a mere "CERTIFIED TRUE COPY FROM THE MACIDNE COPY ON FILE" as
attested to by Rosario P. Palacio, Records Officer Ill of the Comelec. 58 This is clearly stamped on
aforesaid copy of Arnado's Philippine passport. A machine copy or photocopy is a mere secondary
evidence.59 As such, it cannot be admitted in evidence until and unless the offeror has proven the due
execution and the subsequent loss or unavailability of the original. 60 In this case, however, Arnado's
Philippine passport is not missing. Thus, said photocopy of Arnado's Philippine passport cannot sway us
to depart from the uncontroverted certification of the Bureau ofimmigration that Arnado used his US
passport on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010. Consequently, even assuming that the recently
discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance is true and authentic,
Arnado once more performed positive acts on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010, which effectively
negated the alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit resulting in his disqualification to run for an elective
public office.

Landslide election victory cannot

override eligibility requirements.

In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. Thus,
while in this case Arnado won by landslide majority during the 2013 elections, garnering 84% of the total
votes cast, the same "cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications."61 In Velasco v. Comelec,62 this Court pronounced that election victory cannot be used
as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws
pertaining to elections will become toothless. One of which is Section 39 of the Local Government Code
of 1991, which specifies the basic positive qualifications of local government officials. If in Velasco the
Court ruled that popular vote cannot override the required qualifications under Section 39, 63a fortiori,
there is no reason why the Court should not follow the same policy when it comes to disqualifications
enumerated under Section 4064 of the same law. After all, "[t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39] are
roughly half of the requirements for election to local public offices. The other half is contained in the
succeeding section which lays down the circumstances that disqualify local candidates." 65cralawrednad

Finally, this case is strikingly similar to the case of Lopez v. Comelec.66 In that case, petitioner Lopez was
also a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he became a naturalized US citizen.
He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of RA 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his candidacy
for Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007 without first making a personal and sworn renunciation of
his foreign citizenship. In spite of the fact that Lopez won in the elections, this Court still affmned the
Resolution of the Comelec disqualifying Lopez as a candidate for a local elective position for his failure to
comply with the requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of
Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of
votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.67

In fine, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec En Banc in sustaining the
Resolution of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013
elections and in accordingly setting aside his proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and proclaiming Capitan as the duly elected mayor of said municipality.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Comelec Resolutions
are AFFIRMED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

174
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958)

Perez v. Brownell

No. 44

Argued May 1, 1957

Restored to the calendar for reargument June 24, 1957

Reargued October 28, 1957

Decided March 31, 1958*

356 U.S. 44

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

In proceedings to deport a person born in the United States, the Government denied that he was an
American citizen on the ground that, by voting in a Mexican political election and remaining outside of the
United States in wartime to avoid military service, he had lost his citizenship under 401(e) and (j) of the
Nationality Act of 1940, as amended. He sued for a judgment declaring him to be a citizen but was denied
relief.

Held: It was within the authority of Congress, under its power to regulate the relations of the United States
with foreign countries, to provide in 401(e) that anyone who votes in a foreign political election shall lose
his American citizenship, and the judgment is affirmed. Pp. 356 U. S. 45-62.

(a) The power of Congress to regulate foreign relations may reasonably be deemed to include a power to
deal with voting by American citizens in foreign political elections, since Congress could find that such
activities, because they might give rise to serious international embarrassment, relate to the conduct of
foreign relations. Pp. 356 U. S. 57-60.

(b) Since withdrawal of the citizenship of Americans who vote in foreign political elections is reasonably
calculated to effect the avoidance of embarrassment in the conduct of foreign relations, such withdrawal
is within the power of Congress, acting under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Pp. 356 U. S. 60-62.

(c) There is nothing in the language, the context, the history or the manifest purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment to warrant drawing from it a restriction upon the power otherwise possessed by Congress to
withdraw citizenship. P. 356 U. S. 58, n. 3.

Page 356 U. S. 45

(d) No opinion is expressed with respect to the constitutionality of 401(j) relating to persons who remain
outside the United States to avoid military service. P. 356 U. S. 62.

235 F.2d 364, affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner, a national of the United States by birth, has been declared to have lost his American
citizenship by operation of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, as amended by the Act of
September 27, 1944, 58 Stat. 746. Section 401 of that Act [Footnote 1] provided that

"A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his
nationality by:"

"* * * *"

175
"(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine
the sovereignty over foreign territory; or"

"* * * *

Page 356 U. S. 46

"

"(j) Departing from or remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the United States in time of war or during a
period declared by the President to be a period of national emergency for the purpose of evading or
avoiding training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States."

He seeks a reversal of the judgment against him on the ground that these provisions were beyond the
power of Congress to enact.

Petitioner was born in Texas in 1909. He resided in the United States until 1919 or 1920, when he moved
with his parents to Mexico, where he lived, apparently without interruption, until 1943. In 1928, he was
informed that he had been born in Texas. At the outbreak of World War II, petitioner knew of the duty of
male United States citizens to register for the draft, but he failed to do so. In 1943, he applied for
admission to the United States as an alien railroad laborer, stating that he was a native-born citizen of
Mexico, and was granted permission to enter on a temporary basis. He returned to Mexico in 1944, and
shortly thereafter applied for and was granted permission, again as a native-born Mexican citizen, to enter
the United States temporarily to continue his employment as a railroad laborer. Later in 1944, he returned
to Mexico once more. In 1947, petitioner applied for admission to the United States at El Paso, Texas, as
a citizen of the United States. At a Board of Special Inquiry hearing (and in his subsequent appeals to the
Assistant Commissioner and the Board of Immigration Appeals), he admitted having remained outside of
the United States to avoid military service and having voted in political elections in Mexico. He was
ordered excluded on the ground that he had expatriated himself; this order was affirmed on appeal. In
1952, petitioner, claiming to be a native-born citizen of Mexico,

Page 356 U. S. 47

was permitted to enter the United States as an alien agricultural laborer. He surrendered in 1953 to
immigration authorities in San Francisco as an alien unlawfully in the United States, but claimed the right
to remain by virtue of his American citizenship. After a hearing before a Special Inquiry Officer, he was
ordered deported as an alien not in possession of a valid immigration visa; this order was affirmed on
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Petitioner brought suit in 1954 in a United States District Court for a judgment declaring him to be a
national of the United States. [Footnote 2] The court, sitting without a jury, found (in addition to the
undisputed facts set forth above) that petitioner had remained outside of the United States from
November, 1944, to July, 1947, for the purpose of avoiding service in the armed forces of the United
States, and that he had voted in a "political election" in Mexico in 1946. The court, concluding that he had
thereby expatriated himself, denied the relief sought by the petitioner. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 235 F.2d 364. We granted certiorari because of the constitutional questions
raised by the petitioner. 352 U.S. 908.

Page 356 U. S. 48

Statutory expatriation, as a response to problems of international relations, was first introduced just a half
century ago. Long before that, however, serious friction between the United States and other nations had
stirred consideration of modes of dealing with the difficulties that arose out of the conflicting claims to the
allegiance of foreign-born persons naturalized in the United States, particularly when they returned to the
country of their origin.

As a starting point for grappling with this tangle of problems, Congress in 1868 formally announced the
traditional policy of this country that it is the "natural and inherent right of all people" to divest themselves
of their allegiance to any state, 15 Stat. 223, R.S. 1999. Although the impulse for this legislation had
been the refusal by other nations, notably Great Britain, to recognize a right in naturalized Americans who
had been their subjects to shed that former allegiance, the Act of 1868 was held by the Attorney General
to apply to divestment by native-born and naturalized Americans of their United States citizenship. 14
Op.Atty.Gen. 295, 296. In addition, while the debate on the Act of 1868 was proceeding, negotiations
were completed on the first of a series of treaties for the adjustment of some of the disagreements that
were constantly arising between the United States and other nations concerning citizenship. These
instruments typically provided that each of the signatory nations would regard as a citizen of the other

176
such of its own citizens as became naturalized by the other. E.g., Treaty with the North German
Confederation, Feb. 22, 1868, 2 Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, etc. (comp. Malloy, 1910),
1298. This series of treaties initiated this country's policy of automatic divestment of citizenship for
specified conduct affecting our foreign relations.

Page 356 U. S. 49

On the basis, presumably, of the Act of 1868 and such treaties as were in force, it was the practice of the
Department of State during the last third of the nineteenth century to make rulings as to forfeiture of
United States citizenship by individuals who performed various acts abroad. See Borchard, Diplomatic
Protection of Citizens Abroad, 319, 324. Naturalized citizens who returned to the country of their origin
were held to have abandoned their citizenship by such actions as accepting public office there or
assuming political duties. See Davis to Weile, Apr. 18, 1870, 3 Moore, Digest of International Law, 737;
Davis to Taft, Jan. 18, 1883, 3 id. at 739. Native-born citizens of the United States (as well as naturalized
citizens outside of the country of their origin) were generally deemed to have lost their American
citizenship only if they acquired foreign citizenship. See Bayard to Suzzara-Verdi, Jan. 27, 1887, 3 id. at
714; see also Comitis v. Parkerson, 56 F. 556, 559.

No one seems to have questioned the necessity of having the State Department, in its conduct of the
foreign relations of the Nation, pass on the validity of claims to American citizenship and to such of its
incidents as the right to diplomatic protection. However, it was recognized in the Executive Branch that
the Department had no specific legislative authority for nullifying citizenship, and several of the Presidents
urged Congress to define the acts by which citizens should be held to have expatriated
themselves. E.g., Message of President Grant to Congress, Dec. 7, 1874, 7 Messages and Papers of the
Presidents (Richardson ed. 1899) 284, 291-292. Finally, in 1906, during the consideration of the bill that
became the Naturalization Act of 1906, a Senate resolution and a recommendation of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs called for an examination of the problems relating to American citizenship,
expatriation and protection

Page 356 U. S. 50

abroad. In response to these suggestions, the Secretary of State appointed the Citizenship Board of
1906, composed of the Solicitor of the State Department, the Minister to the Netherlands and the Chief of
the Passport Bureau. The board conducted a study and, late in 1906, made an extensive report with
recommendations for legislation.

Among the recommendations of the board were that expatriation of a citizen "be assumed" when, in time
of peace, he became naturalized in a foreign state, engaged in the service of a foreign state where such
service involved the taking of an oath of allegiance to that state, or domiciled in a foreign state for five
years with no intention to return. Citizenship of the United States, Expatriation, and Protection Abroad,
H.R.Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 23. It also recommended that an American woman who married
a foreigner be regarded as losing her American citizenship during coverture. Id. at 29. As to the first two
recommended acts of expatriation, the report stated that

"no man should be permitted deliberately to place himself in a position where his services may be claimed
by more than one government and his allegiance be due to more than one."

Id. at 23. As to the third, the board stated that more and more Americans were going abroad to live, "and
the question of their protection causes increasing embarrassment to this Government in its relations with
foreign powers." Id. at 25.

Within a month of the submission of this report, a bill was introduced in the House by Representative
Perkins of New York based on the board's recommendations. Perkins' bill provided that a citizen would be
"deemed to have expatriated himself" when, in peacetime, he became naturalized in a foreign country or
took an oath of allegiance to a foreign state; it was presumed that a naturalized citizen who resided for
five years in a foreign state had

Page 356 U. S. 51

ceased to be an American citizen, and an American woman who married a foreigner would take the
nationality of her husband. 41 Cong.Rec. 1463-1464. Perkins stated that the bill was designed to
discourage people from evading responsibilities both to other countries and to the United States, and "to
save our Government [from] becoming involved in any trouble or question with foreign countries where
there is no just reason." Id. at 1464. What little debate there was on the bill centered around the foreign
domicile provision; no constitutional issue was canvassed. The bill passed the House, and, after
substantially no debate and the adoption of a committee amendment adding a presumption of termination

177
of citizenship for a naturalized citizen who resided for two years in the country of his origin, 41 Cong.Rec.
4116, the Senate passed it and it became the Expatriation Act of 1907. 34 Stat. 1228.

The question of the power of Congress to enact legislation depriving individuals of their American
citizenship was first raised in the courts by Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299. The plaintiff in that action,
Mrs. Mackenzie, was a native-born citizen and resident of the United States. In 1909, she married a
subject of Great Britain and continued to reside with him in the United States. When, in 1913, she applied
to the defendants, members of a board of elections in California, to be registered as a voter, her
application was refused on the ground that, by reason of her marriage, she had ceased to be a citizen of
the United States. Her petition for a writ of mandamus was denied in the state courts of California, and
she sued out a writ of error here, claiming that, if the Act of 1907 was intended to apply to her, it was
beyond the power of Congress. The Court, through Mr. Justice McKenna, after finding that merging the
identity of husband and wife, as Congress had done in this instance, had

Page 356 U. S. 52

a "purpose and, it may be, necessity, in international policy," continued:

"As a government, the United States is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it has the
character of nationality, it has the powers of nationality, especially those which concern its relations and
intercourse with other countries. We should hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing such powers. . .
. We concur with counsel that citizenship is of tangible worth, and we sympathize with plaintiff in her
desire to retain it and in her earnest assertion of it. But there is involved more than personal
considerations. As we have seen, the legislation was urged by conditions of national moment. . . . It is the
conception of the legislation under review that such an act may bring the Government into
embarrassments and, it may be, into controversies. . . ."

239 U.S. at 239 U. S. 311-312. The Court observed that voluntary marriage of an American woman with a
foreigner may have the same consequences, and "involve national complications of like kind," as
voluntary expatriation in the traditional sense. It concluded: "This is no arbitrary exercise of government."
239 U.S. at 239 U. S. 312. See also Ex parte Griffin, 237 F. 445; Ex parte Ng Fung Sing, 6 F.2d 670.

By the early 1930's, the American law on nationality, including naturalization and denationalization, was
expressed in a large number of provisions scattered throughout the statute books. Some of the specific
laws enacted at different times seemed inconsistent with others, some problems of growing importance
had emerged that Congress had left unheeded. At the request of the House Committee on Immigration
and Naturalization, see 86 Cong.Rec. 11943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established a Committee
composed of the Secretary of State,

Page 356 U. S. 53

the Attorney General and the Secretary of Labor to review the nationality laws of the United States, to
recommend revisions and to codify the nationality laws into one comprehensive statute for submission to
Congress; he expressed particular concern about "existing discriminations" in the law. Exec.Order No.
6115, Apr. 25, 1933. The necessary research for such a study was entrusted to specialists representing
the three departments. Five years were spent by these officials in the study and formulation of a draft
code. In their letter submitting the draft code to the President after it had been reviewed within the
Executive Branch, the Cabinet Committee noted the special importance of the provisions concerning loss
of nationality, and asserted that none of these provisions was "designed to be punitive or to interfere with
freedom of action"; they were intended to deprive of citizenship those persons who had shown that "their
real attachment is to the foreign country, and not to the United States." Codification of the Nationality
Laws of the United States, H.R. Comm.Print, Pt. 1, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. V-VII.

The draft code of the Executive Branch was an omnibus bill in five chapters. The chapter relating to "Loss
of Nationality" provided that any citizen should "lose his nationality" by becoming naturalized in a foreign
country; taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state; entering or serving in the armed forces of a foreign
state; being employed by a foreign government in a post for which only nationals of that country are
eligible; voting in a foreign political election or plebiscite; using a passport of a foreign state as a national
thereof; formally renouncing American citizenship before a consular officer abroad; deserting the armed
forces of the United States in wartime (upon conviction by court martial); if a naturalized citizen, residing
in the state of his former nationality or birth for two years if he thereby acquires the nationality of that
state; or, if a naturalized citizen,

Page 356 U. S. 54

residing in the state of his former nationality or birth for three years. Id. at 66-76.

178
In support of the recommendation of voting in a foreign political election as an act of expatriation, the
Committee reported:

"Taking an active part in the political affairs of a foreign state by voting in a political election therein is
believed to involve a political attachment and practical allegiance thereto which is inconsistent with
continued allegiance to the United States, whether or not the person in question has or acquires the
nationality of the foreign state. In any event, it is not believed that an American national should be
permitted to participate in the political affairs of a foreign state and at the same time retain his American
nationality. The two facts would seem to be inconsistent with each other."

Id. at 67. As to the reference to plebiscites in the draft language, the report states: "If this provision had
been in effect when the Saar Plebiscite was held, Americans voting in it would have been
expatriated." Ibid. It seems clear that the most immediate impulse for the entire voting provision was the
participation by many naturalized Americans in the plebiscite to determine sovereignty over the Saar in
January, 1935. H.R.Rep. No. 216, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1. Representative Dickstein of New York,
Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, who had called the plebiscite an
"international dispute" in which naturalized American citizens could not properly participate, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 4, 1935, p. 12, col. 3, had introduced a bill in the House in 1935 similar in language to the voting
provisions in the draft code, 79 Cong.Rec. 2050, but, although it was favorably reported, the House did
not pass it.

Page 356 U. S. 55

In June, 1938, the President submitted the Cabinet Committee's draft code and the supporting report to
Congress. In due course, Chairman Dickstein introduced the code as H.R. 6127, and it was referred to
his committee. In early 1940, extensive hearings were held before both a subcommittee and the full
committee at which the interested Executive Branch agencies and others testified. With respect to the
voting provision, Chairman Dickstein spoke of the Americans who had voted in the Saar plebiscite and
said, "If they are American citizens, they had no right to vote, to interfere with foreign matters or political
subdivision." Hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H.R. 6127,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 287. Mr. Flournoy, Assistant Legal Adviser of the State Department, said that the
provision would be "particularly applicable" to persons of dual nationality, id. at 132; however, a
suggestion that the provision be made applicable only to dual nationals, id. at 398, was not adopted.

Upon the conclusion of the hearings in June, 1940 ,a new bill was drawn up and introduced as H.R. 9980.
The only changes from the Executive Branch draft with respect to the acts of expatriation were the
deletion of using a foreign passport and the addition of residence by a naturalized citizen for five years in
any foreign country as acts that would result in loss of nationality. 86 Cong.Rec. 11960-11961. The
House debated the bill for a day in September, 1940. In briefly summarizing the loss of nationality
provisions of the bill, Chairman Dickstein said that

"this bill would put an end to dual citizenship, and relieve this country of the responsibility of those who
reside in foreign lands and only claim citizenship when it serves their purpose."

Id. at 11944. Representative Rees of Kansas, who had served as chairman of the subcommittee that
studied the draft code, said that clarifying

Page 356 U. S. 56

legislation was needed, among other reasons, "because of the duty of the Government to protect citizens
abroad." Id. at 11947. The bill passed the House that same day. Id. at 11965.

In the Senate also, after a favorable report from the Committee on Immigration, the bill was debated very
briefly. Committee amendments were adopted making the provision on foreign military service applicable
only to dual nationals, making treason an act of expatriation, and providing a procedure by which persons
administratively declared to have expatriated themselves might obtain judicial determinations of
citizenship. The bill as amended was passed. Id. at 12817-12818. The House agreed to these and all
other amendments on which the Senate insisted, id. at 13250, and, on October 14, the Nationality Act of
1940 became law. 54 Stat. 1137.

The loss of nationality provisions of the Act constituted but a small portion of a long omnibus nationality
statute. It is not surprising, then, that they received as little attention as they did in debate and hearings,
and that nothing specific was said about the constitutional basis for their enactment. The bill as a whole
was regarded primarily as a codification -- and only secondarily as a revision -- of statutes that had been
in force for many years, some of them, such as the naturalization provisions, having their beginnings in
legislation 150 years old. It is clear that, as is so often the case in matters affecting the conduct of foreign

179
relations, Congress was guided by and relied very heavily upon the advice of the Executive Branch, and
particularly the State Department. See, e.g., 86 Cong.Rec. 11943-11944. In effect, Congress treated the
Cabinet Committee as it normally does its own committees charged with studying a problem and
formulating legislation. These considerations emphasize the importance, in the inquiry into congressional
power in this field, of keeping in mind the historical background

Page 356 U. S. 57

of the challenged legislation, for history will disclose the purpose fairly attributable to Congress in
enacting the statute.

The first step in our inquiry must be to answer the question: what is the source of power on which
Congress must be assumed to have drawn? Although there is in the Constitution no specific grant to
Congress of power to enact legislation for the effective regulation of foreign affairs, there can be no doubt
of the existence of this power in the lawmaking organ of the Nation. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 299 U. S. 318; Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299,239 U. S. 311-312. The
States that joined together to form a single Nation and to create, through the Constitution, a Federal
Government to conduct the affairs of that Nation must be held to have granted that Government the
powers indispensable to its functioning effectively in the company of sovereign nations. The Government
must be able not only to deal affirmatively with foreign nations, as it does through the maintenance of
diplomatic relations with them and the protection of American citizens sojourning within their territories. It
must also be able to reduce to a minimum the frictions that are unavoidable in a world of sovereigns
sensitive in matters touching their dignity and interests.

The inference is fairly to be drawn from the congressional history of the Nationality Act of 1940, read in
light of the historical background of expatriation in this country, that, in making voting in foreign elections
(among other behavior) an act of expatriation, Congress was seeking to effectuate its power to regulate
foreign affairs. The legislators, counseled by those on whom they rightly relied for advice, were concerned
about actions by citizens in foreign countries that create problems of protection and are inconsistent with
American allegiance. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that embarrassments

Page 356 U. S. 58

in the conduct of foreign relations were of primary concern in the consideration of the Act of 1907, of
which the loss of nationality provisions of the 1940 Act are a codification and expansion.

Broad as the power in the National Government to regulate foreign affairs must necessarily be, it is not
without limitation. The restrictions confining Congress in the exercise of any of the powers expressly
delegated to it in the Constitution apply with equal vigor when that body seeks to regulate our relations
with other nations. Since Congress may not act arbitrarily, a rational nexus must exist between the
content of a specific power in Congress and the action of Congress in carrying that power into execution.
More simply stated, the means -- in this case, withdrawal of citizenship -- must be reasonably related to
the end -- here, regulation of foreign affairs. The inquiry -- and, in the case before us, the sole inquiry --
into which this Court must enter is whether or not Congress may have concluded not unreasonably that
there is a relevant connection between this fundamental source of power and the ultimate legislative
action. [Footnote 3]

Page 356 U. S. 59

Our starting point is to ascertain whether the power of Congress to deal with foreign relations may
reasonably be deemed to include a power to deal generally with the active participation, by way of voting,
of American citizens in foreign political elections. Experience amply attests that, in this day of extensive
international travel, rapid communication and widespread use of propaganda, the activities of the citizens
of one nation when in another country can easily cause serious embarrassments to the government of
their own country as well as to their fellow citizens. We cannot deny to Congress the reasonable belief
that these difficulties might well become acute, to the point of jeopardizing the successful conduct of
international relations, when a citizen of one country chooses to participate in the political or
governmental affairs of another country. The citizen may by his action unwittingly promote or encourage a
course of conduct contrary to the interests of his own government; moreover, the people or government
of the foreign country may regard his action to be the action of his government, or at least as a reflection
if not an expression of its policy. Cf. Preuss, International Responsibility for Hostile Propaganda Against
Foreign States, 28 Am.J.Int'l L. 649, 650.

It follows that such activity is regulable by Congress under its power to deal with foreign affairs. And it
must be regulable on more than an ad hoc basis. The subtle influences and repercussions with which the
Government must deal make it reasonable for the generalized, although clearly limited, category of

180
"political election" to be used in defining the area of regulation. That description carries with it the scope
and meaning of its context and purpose; classes of elections -- nonpolitical in the colloquial

Page 356 U. S. 60

sense -- as to which participation by Americans could not possibly have any effect on the relations of the
United States with another country are excluded by any rational construction of the phrase. The
classification that Congress has adopted cannot be said to be inappropriate to the difficulties to be dealt
with. Specific applications are, of course, open to judicial challenge, as are other general categories in the
law, by a "gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion."Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 96
U. S. 104. [Footnote 4]

The question must finally be faced whether, given the power to attach some sort of consequence to
voting in a foreign political election, Congress, acting under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, 8,
cl. 18, could attach loss of nationality to it. Is the means, withdrawal of citizenship, reasonably calculated
to effect the end that is within the power of Congress to achieve, the avoidance of embarrassment in the
conduct of our foreign relations attributable to voting by American citizens in foreign political elections?
The importance and extreme delicacy of the matters here sought to be regulated demand that Congress
be permitted ample scope in selecting appropriate modes for accomplishing its purpose. The critical
connection between this conduct and loss of citizenship is the fact that it is the possession of American
citizenship by a person committing the act that makes the act potentially embarrassing to the American
Government and pregnant with the possibility of embroiling this country in disputes with other nations.
The termination of citizenship terminates the problem. Moreover, the fact is not without significance that
Congress has interpreted

Page 356 U. S. 61

this conduct, not irrationally, as importing not only something less than complete and unswerving
allegiance to the United States, but also elements of an allegiance to another country in some measure,
at least, inconsistent with American citizenship.

Of course, Congress can attach loss of citizenship only as a consequence of conduct engaged in
voluntarily. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, 239 U. S. 311-312. But it would be a mockery of this
Court's decisions to suggest that a person, in order to lose his citizenship, must intend or desire to do so.
The Court only a few years ago said of the person held to have lost her citizenship in Mackenzie v. Hare,
supra: "The woman had not intended to give up her American citizenship."Savorgnan v. United
States, 338 U. S. 491, 338 U. S. 501. And the latter case sustained the denationalization of Mrs.
Savorgnan although it was not disputed that she "had no intention of endangering her American
citizenship or of renouncing her allegiance to the United States." 338 U.S. at 338 U. S. 495. [Footnote 5]
What both women did do voluntarily was to engage in conduct to which Acts of Congress attached the
consequence of denationalization irrespective of -- and, in those cases, absolutely contrary to -- the
intentions and desires of the individuals. Those two cases mean nothing -- indeed, they are deceptive -- if
their essential significance is not rejection of the notion that the power of Congress to terminate
citizenship depends upon the citizen's assent. It is a distortion of those cases to explain them away on a
theory that a citizen's assent to denationalization may be inferred from his having engaged in conduct that
amounts to an "abandonment of citizenship" or a "transfer

Page 356 U. S. 62

of allegiance." Certainly an Act of Congress cannot be invalidated by resting decisive precedents on a

gross fiction -- a fiction baseless in law and contradicted by the facts of the cases.

It cannot be said, then, that Congress acted without warrant when, pursuant to its power to regulate the
relations of the United States with foreign countries, it provided that anyone who votes in a foreign
election of significance politically in the life of another country shall lose his American citizenship. To deny
the power of Congress to enact the legislation challenged here would be to disregard the constitutional
allocation of governmental functions that it is this Court's solemn duty to guard.

Because of our view concerning the power of Congress with respect to 401(e) of the Nationality Act of
1940, we find it unnecessary to consider -- indeed, it would be improper for us to adjudicate -- the
constitutionality of 401(j), and we expressly decline to rule on that important question at this time.

Judgment affirmed.

* [On the same day, an order was entered substituting Attorney General Rogers for former Attorney
General Brownell as the party respondent. See post, p. 915.]

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Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967)

Afroyim v. Rusk

No. 456

Argued February 20, 1967

Decided May 29, 1967

387 U.S. 253

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Syllabus

Petitioner, of Polish birth, became a naturalized American citizen in 1926. He went to Israel in 1950, and
in 1951 voted in an Israeli legislative election. The State Department subsequently refused to renew his
passport, maintaining that petitioner had lost his citizenship by virtue of 401(e) of the Nationality Act of
1940 which provides that a United States citizen shall "lose" his citizenship if he votes in a foreign political
election. Petitioner then brought this declaratory judgment action alleging the unconstitutionality of
401(e). On the basis of Perez v. Brownell, 356 U. S. 44, the District Court and Court of Appeals held that
Congress, under its implied power to regulate foreign affairs, can strip an American citizen of his
citizenship.

Held: Congress has no power under the Constitution to divest a person of his United States citizenship
absent his voluntary renunciation thereof. Perez v. Brownell, supra, overruled. Pp. 387 U. S. 256-268.

(a) Congress has no express power under the Constitution to strip a person of citizenship, and no such
power can be sustained as an implied attribute of sovereignty, as was recognized by Congress before the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a mature and well considered dictum in Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 22 U. S. 827, is to the same effect. Pp. 387 U. S. 257-261.

(b) The Fourteenth Amendment's provision that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . .
are citizens of the United States . . ." completely controls the status of citizenship, and prevents the
cancellation of petitioner's citizenship. Pp. 387 U. S. 262-268.

361 F.2d 102, reversed.

Page 387 U. S. 254

MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner, born in Poland in 1893, immigrated to this country in 1912 and became a naturalized American
citizen in 1926. He went to Israel in 1950, and in 1951, he voluntarily voted in an election for the Israeli
Knesset, the legislative body of Israel. In 1960, when he applied for renewal of his United States
passport, the Department of State refused to grant it on the sole ground that he had lost his American
citizenship by virtue of 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which provides that a United States citizen
shall "lose" his citizenship if he votes "in a political election in a foreign state." [Footnote 1] Petitioner then
brought this declaratory judgment action in federal district court alleging that 401(e) violates both the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and 1, cl. 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment, [Footnote 2]
which grants American citizenship to persons like petitioner. Because neither the Fourteenth Amendment
nor any other provision of the Constitution expressly grants Congress the power to

Page 387 U. S. 255

take away that citizenship once it has been acquired, petitioner contended that the only way he could lose
his citizenship was by his own voluntary renunciation of it. Since the Government took the position that
401(e) empowers it to terminate citizenship without the citizen's voluntary renunciation, petitioner argued
that this section is prohibited by the Constitution. The District Court and the Court of Appeals, rejecting
this argument, held that Congress has constitutional authority forcibly to take away citizenship for voting
in a foreign country based on its implied power to regulate foreign affairs. Consequently, petitioner was

182
held to have lost his American citizenship regardless of his intention not to give it up. This is precisely
what this Court held in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U. S. 44.

Petitioner, relying on the same contentions about voluntary renunciation of citizenship which this Court
rejected in upholding 401(e) in Perez, urges us to reconsider that case, adopt the view of the minority
there, and overrule it. That case, decided by a 5-4 vote almost 10 years ago, has been a source of
controversy and confusion ever since, as was emphatically recognized in the opinions of all the judges
who participated in this case below. [Footnote 3] Moreover, in the other cases decided with [Footnote 4]
and since [Footnote 5] Perez, this Court has consistently invalidated on a case-by-case basis various
other statutory sections providing for involuntary expatriation. It has done so on various grounds, and has
refused to hold that citizens can be expatriated without their voluntary renunciation of

Page 387 U. S. 256

citizenship. These cases, as well as many commentators, [Footnote 6] have cast great doubt upon the
soundness of Perez.Under these circumstances, we granted certiorari to reconsider it, 385 U.S. 917. In
view of the many recent opinions and dissents comprehensively discussing all the issues involved,
[Footnote 7] we deem it unnecessary to treat this subject at great length.

The fundamental issue before this Court here, as it was in Perez, is whether Congress can, consistently
with the Fourteenth Amendment, enact a law stripping an American of his citizenship which he has never
voluntarily renounced or given up. The majority in Perez held that Congress could do this because
withdrawal of citizenship is "reasonably calculated to effect the end that is within the power of Congress to
achieve." 356 U.S. at 356 U. S. 60. That conclusion was reached by this chain of reasoning: Congress
has an implied power to deal with foreign affairs as an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; this implied
power, plus the Necessary and Proper Clause, empowers Congress to regulate voting by American
citizens in foreign elections; involuntary expatriation is within the "ample scope" of "appropriate modes"
Congress can adopt to effectuate its general regulatory power. Id. at

Page 387 U. S. 257

356 U. S. 57-60. Then, upon summarily concluding that

"there is nothing in the . . . Fourteenth Amendment to warrant drawing from it a restriction upon the power
otherwise possessed by Congress to withdraw citizenship,"

id. at 356 U. S. 58, n. 3, the majority specifically rejected the "notion that the power of Congress to
terminate citizenship depends upon the citizen's assent," id. at 356 U. S. 61.

First, we reject the idea expressed in Perez that, aside from the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has
any general power, express or implied, to take away an American citizen's citizenship without his assent.
This power cannot, as Perezindicated, be sustained as an implied attribute of sovereignty possessed by
all nations. Other nations are governed by their own constitutions, if any, and we can draw no support
from theirs. In our country the people are sovereign and the Government cannot sever its relationship to
the people by taking away their citizenship. Our Constitution governs us and we must never forget that
our Constitution limits the Government to those powers specifically granted or those that are necessary
and proper to carry out the specifically granted ones. The Constitution, of course, grants Congress no
express power to strip people of their citizenship, whether, in the exercise of the implied power to regulate
foreign affairs or in the exercise of any specifically granted power. And even before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, views were expressed in Congress and by this Court that, under the Constitution
the Government was granted no power, even under its express power to pass a uniform rule of
naturalization, to determine what conduct should and should not result in the loss of citizenship. On three
occasions, in 1794, 1797, and 1818, Congress considered and rejected proposals to enact laws which
would describe certain conduct as resulting in expatriation. [Footnote 8] On each occasion

Page 387 U. S. 258

Congress was considering bills that were concerned with recognizing the right of voluntary expatriation
and with providing some means of exercising that right. In 1794 and 1797, many members of Congress
still adhered to the English doctrine of perpetual allegiance and doubted whether a citizen could even
voluntarily renounce his citizenship. [Footnote 9] By 1818, however, almost no one doubted the existence
of the right of voluntary expatriation, but several judicial decisions had indicated that the right could not be
exercised by the citizen without the consent of the Federal Government in the form of enabling legislation.
[Footnote 10] Therefore, a bill was introduced to provide that a person could voluntarily relinquish his
citizenship by declaring such relinquishment in writing before a district court and then departing from the
country. [Footnote 11] The opponents of the bill argued that Congress had no constitutional authority,

183
either express or implied, under either the Naturalization Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause, to
provide that a certain act would constitute expatriation. [Footnote 12] They pointed to a proposed
Thirteenth

Page 387 U. S. 259

Amendment, subsequently not ratified, which would have provided that a person would lose his
citizenship by accepting an office or emolument from a foreign government. [Footnote 13] Congressman
Anderson of Kentucky argued:

"The introduction of this article declares the opinion . . . that Congress could not declare the acts which
should amount to a renunciation of citizenship; otherwise there would have been no necessity for this last
resort. When it was settled that Congress could not declare that the acceptance of a pension or an office
from a foreign Emperor amounted to a disfranchisement of the citizen, it must surely be conceded that
they could not declare that any other act did. The cases to which their powers before this amendment
confessedly did not extend are very strong, and induce a belief that Congress could not in any case
declare the acts which should cause 'a person to cease to be a citizen.' The want of power in a case like
this, where the individual has given the strongest evidence of attachment to a foreign potentate and an
entire renunciation of the feelings and principles of an American citizen, certainly establishes the absence
of all power to pass a bill like the present one. Although the intention with which it was introduced, and the
title of the bill declare that it is to insure and foster the right of the citizen, the direct and inevitable effect of
the bill, is an assumption of power by Congress to declare that certain acts when committed shall amount
to a renunciation of citizenship."

31 Annals of Cong. 1038-1039 (1818).

Page 387 U. S. 260

Congressman Pindall of Virginia rejected the notion, later accepted by the majority in Perez, that the
nature of sovereignty gives Congress a right to expatriate citizens:

"[A]llegiance imports an obligation on the citizen or subject, the correlative right to which resides in the
sovereign power: allegiance in this country is not due to Congress, but to the people, with whom the
sovereign power is found; it is, therefore, by the people only that any alteration can be made of the
existing institutions with respect to allegiance."

Id. at 1045. Although he recognized that the bill merely sought to provide a means of voluntary
expatriation, Congressman Lowndes of South Carolina argued:

"But, if the Constitution had intended to give to Congress so delicate a power, it would have been
expressly granted. That it was a delicate power, and ought not to be loosely inferred, . . . appeared in a
strong light, when it was said, and could not be denied, that to determine the manner in which a citizen
may relinquish his right of citizenship, is equivalent to determining how he shall be divested of that right.
The effect of assuming the exercise of these powers will be, that, by acts of Congress a man may not
only be released from all the liabilities, but from all the privileges of a citizen. If you pass this bill, . . . you
have only one step further to go, and say that such and such acts shall be considered as presumption of
the intention of the citizen to expatriate, and thus take from him the privileges of a citizen. . . . [Q]uestions
affecting the right of the citizen were questions to be regulated, not by the laws of the General or State
Governments, but by Constitutional provisions. If there was anything

Page 387 U. S. 261

essential to our notion of a Constitution, . . . it was this: that, while the employment of the physical force of
the country is in the hands of the Legislature, those rules which determine what constitutes the rights of
the citizen, shall be a matter of Constitutional provision."

Id. at 1050-1051. The bill was finally defeated. [Footnote 14] It is in this setting that six years later,
in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 22 U. S. 827, this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Marshall, declared in what appears to be a mature and well considered dictum that Congress,
once a person becomes a citizen, cannot deprive him of that status:

"[The naturalized citizen] becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen,
and standing, in the view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution does not authorize
Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the national Legislature, is to prescribe
a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the
individual."

184
Although these legislative and judicial statements may be regarded as inconclusive and must be
considered in the historical context in which they were made, [Footnote 15] any doubt

Page 387 U. S. 262

as to whether prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment Congress had the power to deprive a
person against his will of citizenship, once obtained, should have been removed by the unequivocal terms
of the Amendment itself. It provides its own constitutional rule in language calculated completely to
control the status of citizenship: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of
the United States. . . ." There is no indication in these words of a fleeting citizenship, good at the moment
it is acquired but subject to destruction by the Government at any time. Rather the Amendment can most
reasonably be read as defining a citizenship which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it.
Once acquired, this Fourteenth Amendment citizenship was not to be shifted, canceled, or diluted at the
will of the Federal Government, the States, or any other governmental unit.

It is true that the chief interest of the people in giving permanence and security to citizenship in the
Fourteenth Amendment was the desire to protect Negroes. The Dred Scott decision, 19 How. 393, had
shortly before greatly disturbed many people about the status of Negro citizenship. But the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, had already attempted to confer citizenship on all persons born or naturalized in
the United States. Nevertheless, when the Fourteenth Amendment passed the House without containing
any definition of citizenship, the sponsors of the Amendment in the Senate insisted on inserting a
constitutional definition and grant of citizenship. They expressed fears that the citizenship so recently
conferred on Negroes by the Civil Rights Act could be just as easily taken away from them by subsequent
Congresses, and it was to provide an insuperable obstacle against every governmental effort to strip
Negroes of their newly acquired citizenship that the first clause was added to the Fourteenth Amendment.
[Footnote 16]

Page 387 U. S. 263

Senator Howard, who sponsored the Amendment in the Senate, thus explained the purpose of the
clause:

"It settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what persons are or are not
citizens of the United States. . . . We desired to put this question of citizenship and the rights of citizens . .
. under the civil rights bill beyond the legislative power. . . ."

Cong.Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2890, 2896 (1866).

This undeniable purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to make citizenship of Negroes permanent and
secure would be frustrated by holding that the Government can rob a citizen of his citizenship without his
consent by simply proceeding to act under an implied general power to regulate foreign affairs or some
other power generally granted. Though the framers of the Amendment were not particularly concerned
with the problem of expatriation, it seems undeniable from the language they used that they wanted to put
citizenship beyond the power of any governmental unit to destroy. In 1868, two years after the Fourteenth
Amendment had been proposed, Congress specifically considered the subject of expatriation. Several
bills were introduced to impose involuntary expatriation on citizens who committed certain acts. [Footnote
17] With little

Page 387 U. S. 264

discussion, these proposals were defeated. Other bills, like the one proposed but defeated in 1818,
provided merely a means by which the citizen could himself voluntarily renounce his citizenship.
[Footnote 18] Representative Van Trump of Ohio, who proposed such a bill, vehemently denied in
supporting it that his measure would make the Government

"a party to the act dissolving the tie between the citizen and his country . . . where the statute simply
prescribes the manner in which the citizen shall proceed to perpetuate the evidence of his intention, or
election, to renounce his citizenship by expatriation."

Cong.Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 1804 (1868). He insisted that "inasmuch as the act of expatriation
depends almost entirely upon a question of intention on the part of the citizen," id. at 1801,

"the true question is, that not only the right of expatriation, but the whole power of its exercise, rests solely
and exclusively in the will of the individual,"

185
id. at 1804. [Footnote 19] In strongest of terms, not contradicted by any during the debates, he concluded:

"To enforce expatriation or exile against a citizen without his consent is not a power anywhere belonging
to this Government. No conservative-minded

Page 387 U. S. 265

statesman, no intelligent legislator, no sound lawyer has ever maintained any such power in any branch
of the Government. The lawless precedents created in the delirium of war . . . of sending men by force
into exile, as a punishment for political opinion, were violations of this great law . . . of the Constitution. . .
. The men who debated the question in 1818 failed to see the true distinction. . . . They failed to
comprehend that it is not the Government, but that it is the individual, who has the right and the only
power of expatriation. . . . [I]t belongs and appertains to the citizen, and not to the Government, and it is
the evidence of his election to exercise his right, and not the power to control either the election or the
right itself, which is the legitimate subject matter of legislation. There has been, and there can be, no
legislation under our Constitution to control in any manner the right itself."

Ibid. But even Van Trump's proposal, which went no further than to provide a means of evidencing a
citizen's intent to renounce his citizenship, was defeated. [Footnote 20] The Act,

Page 387 U. S. 266

as finally passed, merely recognized the "right of expatriation" as an inherent right of all people. [Footnote
21]

The entire legislative history of the 1868 Act makes it abundantly clear that there was a strong feeling in
the Congress that the only way the citizenship it conferred could be lost was by the voluntary renunciation
or abandonment by the citizen himself. And this was the unequivocal statement of the Court in the case
of United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649. The issues in that case were whether a person born in
the United States to Chinese aliens was a citizen of the United States and whether, nevertheless, he
could be excluded under the Chinese Exclusion Act, 22 Stat. 58. The Court first held that, within the terms
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Wong Kim Ark was a citizen of the United States, and then pointed out
that, though he might "renounce this citizenship, and become a citizen of . . . any other country," he had
never done so. Id. at 169 U. S. 704-705. The Court then held [Footnote 22] that Congress could not do
anything to abridge or affect his citizenship conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment. Quoting Chief
Justice Marshall's well considered and oft-repeated dictum in Osborn to the effect that Congress, under
the power of naturalization, has "a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away," the Court
said:

"Congress having no power to abridge the rights conferred by the Constitution upon those who have
become naturalized citizens by virtue of acts of Congress, a fortiori no act . . . of Congress . . .

Page 387 U. S. 267

can affect citizenship acquired as a birthright, by virtue of the Constitution itself. . . . The Fourteenth
Amendment, while it leaves the power where it was before, in Congress, to regulate naturalization, has
conferred no authority upon Congress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the Constitution to
constitute a sufficient and complete right to citizenship."

Id. at 169 U. S. 703.

To uphold Congress' power to take away a man's citizenship because he voted in a foreign election in
violation of 401(e) would be equivalent to holding that Congress has the power to "abridge," "affect,"
"restrict the effect of," and "take . . . away" citizenship. Because the Fourteenth Amendment prevents
Congress from doing any of these things, we agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE's dissent in
the Perez case that the Government is without power to rob a citizen of his citizenship under 401(e).
[Footnote 23]

Because the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and of the expatriation proposals which
preceded and followed it, like most other legislative history, contains many statements from which
conflicting inferences can be drawn, our holding might be unwarranted if it rested entirely or principally
upon that legislative history. But it does not. Our holding, we think, is the only one that can stand in view
of the language and the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, and our construction of that Amendment,
we believe, comports more nearly than Perez with the principles of liberty and equal justice to all that the
entire Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to guarantee. Citizenship is no light trifle

186
Page 387 U. S. 268

to be jeopardized any moment Congress decides to do so under the name of one of its general or implied
grants of power. In some instances, loss of citizenship can mean that a man is left without the protection
of citizenship in any country in the world -- as a man without a country. Citizenship in this Nation is a part
of a cooperative affair. Its citizenry is the country, and the country is its citizenry. The very nature of our
free government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens
temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship. We hold that the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation against a congressional
forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race. Our holding does no more than
to give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country
unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.

Perez v. Brownell is overruled. The judgment is

Reversed.

187