C.

Judicial Department
Judicial Independence
Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (1), 5, 2, 6, 11, 12, 10, 3
Art. XI, Sec. 2
Art. VI, Sec. 30
1. The Supreme Court
a. Composition
Art. VIII, Sec. 4
Art. VIII, Sec. 1
U.S. vs. Limsiongco, GR No. L-16217, Oct 9, 1920

Facts:
The second division of the Supreme Court rendered a decision in a gambling case. Within the time allowed by the
Rules of the Court, counsel for appellants have raised a most interesting question unconnected with the merits of the
particular case but assailing the very structure of the court itself. Appellant's motion is based "on the ground that the
instant decision was rendered by a division of the court and not by the body constituted by law for the purpose, and hence
the decision as rendered, was rendered by a body outside the law and having no power, authority or jurisdiction to render
a final decision in the controversy." In answer, the Attorney-General submits "that section 138 of the Administrative Code
permitting and authorizing the Supreme Court to sit in division only touches and affects the matter of practice and method
of procedure of said court, which the acts of Congress . . . clearly authorized the Legislature to do."

Issue:
Whether a division of the Supreme Court has a diminished authority and jurisdiction as compared to one en banc.

Held:
No. There is but one Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. It is the jurisdiction of this Supreme Court which
cannot be diminished. The Supreme Court remains a unit notwithstanding it works in divisions. Although it may have two
divisions, it is but a single court. Actions considered in any one of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in
effect, by the same Tribunal. The two divisions of this court are not to be Considered as two separate and distinct courts
but as divisions of one and the same court. In the exact words of the law which is questioned, "the Supreme court shall, as
a body, sit in banc, but it may sit in divisions.
The Legislature has merely attempted to regulate the organization of the court in a way not prohibited by any
constitutional provision. The constitution of divisions has been permitted for convenience and the prompt dispatch of
business. The provision in no way involves the question of jurisdiction.

Vargas vs. Rilloraza, GR No. L-1612, Feb 26, 1948

FACTS:
Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act, Commonwealth Act 682, which provided that the
President could designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judges to sit as
substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in treason cases without them necessarily having to possess the required
constitutional qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice.

SC: Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.

Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme Court other than the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the infringement is enhanced and
aggravated where a majority of the members of the Court as in this case are replaced by judges of first instance. It
is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And the constitution provides for only one Supreme Court.
Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those already existing at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution and continued by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the
organic law.

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 Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members of the Supreme Court should be appointed by the
President with the consent of the CoA, "Unless provided by law" in Sec 4 cannot be construed to authorize any
legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution.

However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge designated under Sec. 14 of PCA, there is no escaping
the fact the he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the SC, as the appellate tribunal, and his vote
would count as much as that any regular Justice of the Court. "A temporary member" therefore would be a misnomer, as
that position is not contemplated by the Constitution, where Sec.4 of Art. VIII only provides A Chief Justice and Associate
Justices who have to be thus appointed and confirmed (Sec5).

b. Appointment and Qualifications

Art. VIII, Sec. 7 (1)
Art. VIII, Sec. 8 (5)
Art. VIII, Sec. 9
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Estacion, Jr., AM No. RTJ-87-104, Jan 11, 1990, Aug 23, 1995
The Court in its January 11, 1990 Per Curiam Decision dismissed respondent Dumaguete City Regional Trial Court
Judge Jose M. Estacion, Jr. from the service for gross misrepresentation. He concealed from the appointing authority,
at the time he applied for the judicial post until his appointment, information regarding the criminal charges for
homicide and attempted homicide filed against him.

Gutierrez vs. Belan, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1059, Aug 7, 1998

Facts: Concerned citizens of Binan Laguna charged respondent MTC judge with conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. They claim he committed perjury for failure to disclose a previous charge for two criminal
offenses in his written application to the JBC.

Held: Judge is dismissed. Every prospective appointee to the judiciary must apprise the appointing authority of every
matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and
probity. These are qualifications specifically required of appointees to the judiciary by Article VIII, Sec. 7(3) of the
Constitution. The act of concealing the two criminal cases against him is a clear proof of his lack of the said
qualification and renders him unworthy to sit as a judge- even if he was ultimately acquitted. He is not being
chastened for having had a pending criminal case at the time of his application for a judicial position but for his
dishonesty and misrepresentation in the process of seeking that office.

In re: Appointments of Mateo Valenzuela, AM No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998

Valenzuela and Vallarta were appointed by Pres. Ramos as RTC judges within the two-month period provided in Sec. 15,
Art. VII. Were their appointments valid? NO. The Court held that Sec. 4 (1) and Sec. 9, Art. VIII, requiring the filling-up of a
vacancy in 90 days is the general rule, while the two-month ban is the exception which applies once every six years. In
other words, the President is mandated to fill a vacancy in the judiciary within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy
except when the vacancy occurs during the two-month period. [Yu note: Overturned by De Castro v. JBC.]

De Castro vs. JBC, GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010 and April 20, 2010
CJ Puno was set to retire on May 17, 2010. The national elections would be held on May 10. JBC commenced the
acceptance of nominations to the post of CJ. Petitioners seek to enjoin the JBC from continuing with the screening
of nominees for CJ. Is the position of Chief Justice covered by the Constitutional ban on midnight appointments?

NO. The use of the word shall in Section 4(1), Art. VIII imposes a duty on the President to fill the vacancy within 90
days. The Court here relied on the opinion of former Justice and Commissioner Regalado that Section 15, Art. VII

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 applies only to appointments in the Executive Department. Justice Carpio-Morales dissented saying that the position
of a provision in a law is a weak device for statutory construction. She likewise claims that it was hasty for the SC to
overrule Valenzuela solely on the basis of the opinion of J. Regalado, when the Valenzuela case was unanimously
decided. There is no imperative need to fill the vacancy because the SC is a collegiate court which can function
temporarily even without a CJ. [Yu note: This is good law as of today.]

J del Castillos Cases (Plagiarism), AM No. 10-7-17-SC, Oct 12, 2010, Feb 8, 2011
On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition issued by the Malaya Lolas Organization
in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision. He
raised, among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the
honorable Justice twisted the true intents of the following books to support the assailed decision:

a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
(2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).

As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.

The court ruled in favor of Justice Castillo and held that he was not guilty of plagiarism, misconduct and inexcusable
negligence.

This cannot be a case of plagiarism because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed decision, there was
attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillos researcher, the attributions were
inadvertently deleted. According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as
background facts in establishing the state on international law at various stages of its development. The Supreme Court
went on to state that the foreign authors works can support conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also stated that since
the attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the
advocacies that the works espouse.

Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud or corruption.

The error of Justice del Castillos researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a highly competent
one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable educational institutions. The researcher
finished third in her class and 4th in the bar examinations. Her error was merely due to the fact that the software she used,
Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise her that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted
inadvertently. Such error on her part cannot be said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice
del Castillo was grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her.

Justice Serenos Dissent: In her dissent, she presented the portions of Castillos work and those of the original authors
work --- something that the majority did not even look at or considered in the ruling of their decision. Evidently from these
factual data, Castillo should have been guilty of plagiarism. Further, it was said that there exists a judicial plagiarism
because courts are bound by precedents and stare decisis.

Jardeleza vs. Sereno, GR No. 213181, Aug 19, 2014, Jan 21, 2015
Facts:

Following Justice Abads compulsory retirement, the JBC announced the application or recommendations for the position
left by the Associate Justice. Jardeleza, the incumbent Sol-Gen at the time, was included in the list of
candidates. However, he was informed through telephone call from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself CJ
Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the so-called unanimity rule against him. Generally, the rule is
that an applicant is included in the shortlist when s/he obtains affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members

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of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is invoked because an applicants integrity is challenged, a
unanimous vote is required. Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available on June 30, 2014 before the JBC
during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.

Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to exercise its supervisory power and direct the JBC to, among others, give
Jardeleza a written notice and sworn written statements of his oppositors or any documents in the JBC hearings, and to
disallow CJ Sereno from participating in the voting process for nominees on June 30, 2014.

During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio appeared and disclosed a confidential information which, to
CJ Sereno, characterized Jardelezas integrity as dubious. Jardeleza demanded that CJ Sereno execute a sworn statement
specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He also requested
deferment of the JBC proceedings, as the SC en banc has yet to decide in his letter-petition.

However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist.
Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist of 4 nominees. It was revealed later that there were actually 5 nominees who
made it to the JBC shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be included because of the invocation of the unanimity rule..

Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65 with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list of
nominees on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite
having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

Political Law

Issue: W/N the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in JBC proceedings

Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not mean that an applicants access to the rights
afforded under the due process clause is discretionary on the part of JBC.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being a class of its
own, the right to be heard and to explain ones self is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicants
qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBCs duty to
recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to
the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently
denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of
the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of information
brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against
an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the
only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the
President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets
of due process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the unanimity rule as it reflects the JBCs policy and,
therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable defects in
its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested
right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements
of due process. ##

Remedial Law

Issue 1: W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case

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 Yes. Jardelezas allegations in his petitions merits the exercise of the Courts supervisory authority over the JBC. Under
Sec 8, Art VIII of the Constitution, the JBC shall function under the supervision of the SC. It follows that such supervisory
authority covers the overseeing of whether the JBC complies with its own rules or not.

Issue 2: W/N a writ of mandamus is available against the JBC

No. The JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do something.

Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the
law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.

Issue 3: W/N a writ of certiorari under Sec 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is available against the JBC (which is not
exercising quasi-judicial functions)

Yes. Under the expanded jurisdiction or expanded power of judicial review vested to the SC by the 1987 Constitution, a
petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

Kilosbayan vs. Ermita & Gregory Ong, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007
FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition to set aside the appointment of Gregory Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
Petitioner alleged that Ong is not a natural-born citizen and thus, is disqualified to become a member of the Supreme
Court. Respondent Ermita, on the other hand, contended that Ong was appointed from a list of candidates given by the
JBC and they have referred the matter back to the latter for the determination of the issue regarding Ongs citizenship.
Respondent Ong contended that he is truly a natural-born citizen, following a series of changes in nationalities and
whatnot with respect to his ancestors. He also contended that the petitioner has no standing to file the said petition.

HELD: the Court took judicial notice of Ongs petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar. In his petition to be admitted
to the Philippine bar, respondent alleged that he is qualified to be admitted because among others he is a Filipino citizen,
and that he became a citizenbecause his father became a naturalized Filipino citizen and being a minor then, thus he too
became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, he submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his
father.
It was on basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of no less than Ong that the Court allowed
him to take his oath as a lawyer. It is clear therefore, that from the records of this Court, Ong is a naturalized
Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ
cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
Furthermore, as the petitioner correctly submitted, no substantial change in an entry in the civil register can be made
without a judicial order. Change in the citizenship status is a substantial change. The long string of events that Ong
alleged leading to him being a natural-born citizen, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper
judicial proceedings.
NOTE: In this case, there has been no ouster from an appointment. There may be approval of the appointment but it
lacks other acts that will complete the appointment.
The last act in an appointment is the delivery of the commission. It is now up to the appointeehe must accept the
appointment, take an oath of office, assume office, etc. It doesnt end here. The CSC can either reject or approve of the
appointment. When the appointee doesnt pursue all the acts to assume office, the question is whether or not he can be
held liable. The law doesnt provide really that there is a period to accept or reject an appointment.

Topacio vs. Ong, GR No. 179895, Dec 18, 2008

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 Facts:

Petitioner Ferdinand Topacio implored the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate a quo warranto
proceeding against Gregory Santos Ong. He points out that natural-born citizenship is also a qualification for
appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet the citizenship requirement.

Topacio bases his petition on the decision in kilosbayan foundation v. ermita where the court enjoined Ong
from accepting an appointment to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court until he shall have completed all
necessary steps, through appropriate adversarial proceedings, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen
and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.

Petitioner contends that Ong must desist form holding a position as Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan
because his birth certificate still indicate him to be a Chinese citizen.

Ong contends that the kilosbayan case did not annul his appointment as Justice of the Supreme Court but
enjoined him from accepting his appointment, that there is no pronouncement that he is not a natural born
Filipino.

Issue: Whether or not Ong must be disqualified from being an associate justice of the Sandiganbayan

Ruling:

No. The case is different from kilosbayan v. ermita , given Ongs actual physical possession and exercise of the
functions of the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, which is a factor that sets into motion the
de facto doctrine.

A de facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and is discharging its duties under color of authority,
meaning that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal. If a person appointed
to an office is subsequently declared ineligible for it, his presumably valid appointment will give him the color
of title that will confer on him the status of a de facto officer.
Petition is dismissed

*Acosta vs. Flor, GR No. 2122, Sept 13, 1905

Acosta v. Flor
STATUTE: specifically designates the persons who may bring actions for quo warranto, excludes others from bringing such
actions.

Chavez vs. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012, Apr 16 2013
Dulay vs. JBC, GR No. 202143, July 3, 2012
*Umali vs. JBC, GR No. 228628, July 25, 2017
Villanueva vs. JBC, GR No. 211833, April 7, 2015
PS Bank vs. Senate Impeachment Court, GR No. 200238, Feb 9, 2012, Nov 20, 2012
Aguinaldo vs. Aquino III, GR No. 224302, Nov 29, 2016, Feb 21, 2017, Aug 8, 2017
c. Salary
Art. VIII, Sec. 10
Art. XVIII, Sec. 17
Art. VIII, Sec. 9 of the 1935 Constitution
Perfecto vs. Meer, GR No. L-2348, Feb 27, 1950

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 In April 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as
member of the Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount, he instituted an action in Manila Court of First
Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes
thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. It provides in its Article VIII, Section 9 that the members of the
Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office.

ISSUE
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution.

HELD
Yes, the imposition of the income tax upon the salary of Justice Perfecto amount to a diminution thereof. The prohibition
is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to be directed against all diminution, whether for one purpose or
another. The fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that they
regarded the independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their
salaries. Thus, taxing the salary of a judge as a part of his income is a violation of the Constitution.

R.A. 590, Sec. 13

Endencia and Jugo vs. David, GR No. L-6355-56, Aug 31, 1953
FACTS:
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugos salaries. A case was filed.
However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from paying
tax from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of salaries from the said judges as a violation from the
compensation received by judicial officers.

SC: Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial officers is considered as against
the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the Constitution. The compensation shall not be diminished during their
continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received by any public officer of the republic shall
be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided.

Art. XV, Sec. 6, The 1973 Constitution

Section 6. No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.

Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, GR No. 78780, July 23, 1987
Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR, all with stations in Manila, seek to
prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court,
from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or
diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that
during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an
independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."

ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

HELD:
No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such
intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of
the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept
of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been

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 reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all
other employees.

d. Security of Tenure and Reorganization

Art. VIII, Sec. 11,
Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing held on Sept 26, 2013
Against Associate Justice Gregory Ong, Sandiganbayan, AM No. SB-14-21-J, Sept 23, 2014
FACTS: When the Pork Barrel Scam broke the news in 2013, incriminating evidence surfaced implicating Associate Justice
of the Sandiganbayan Gregory Ong. Multiple sworn statements and verbal testimonies of Marina Sula pointed out that
Ong had visited the office of key Pork Barrel Scam player Janet Lim Napoles. A photo published by Rappler showed
Senator Jinggoy Estrada, Napoles and Ong together in a party. Ong explained himself in a letter to CJ Sereno, saying that
the photo was taken in one of Sen. Estradas birthday parties and it would have been rude of him not to pose with other
guests. He categorically stated that he did not attend any event hosted by Napoles during or after she had a case (the
Kevlar cases) in the Sandiganbayan in which she was acquitted.

Sereno then requested the court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio under this Court's power of
administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the legal profession.

Upon the court finding possible transgressions to the New Code of Judicial Conduct, they Re-docketed the case and
assigned it to retired SC Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation. She examined the statements made by
Benhur Luy during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigations pointing out that because he is Napoles second
cousin, she divulged to him, prior to the release of the Kevlar case decision, that her contact in the Sandiganbayan was
Ong.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez evaluated and concluded that the testimonies of Benhur Luy and Marina Sula, because they
were only denied and in no way challenged or refuted by Ong via adverse testimony, were not lies. Ong did not present
Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula and he failed to consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay.
.His act of visitng Napoles office is unquestionably disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a member of the
Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him. Dishonesty violates Canon 2 ( 1 and 2) on Integrity of
the same Code providing in part that judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the
people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary and further constitutes gross misconduct in violation of Canon 4 on
Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of their activities.

In the end of her investigation report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez recommended that Ong be found guilty of gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits.

DOCTRINE: Court can discipline its own members.

Art. VIII, Sec. 2

Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, GR No. L-7910, Jan 18, 1955

De la Llana vs. Alba, GR No. L-57883, Mar 12, 1982

FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the
Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP
129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered

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 separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character,
it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violates the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the
Constitution.

RULING:
NO. What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their services. What is
important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the
principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment
of security of tenure does not arise.

e. Removal
Art. VIII, Sec. 11
Art. XI, Sec. 2
In re: Raul Gonzales, AM No. 88-4-5433, Apr 15, 1988
Facts: Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded a letter-complaint to Justice Fernan. The
letter was said to be from concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous letter).

The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel
Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking him (Gonzales) to do something about it.

The Supreme Court furnished a copy to Gonzales, the per curiam Resolution of the SC, dismissing the charges made
by Cuenco against Justice Fernan for lack of merit. In that resolution, Cuenco was asked to show cause why he
should not be held administratively liable for making serious accusations against Fernan.

Issue: Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term of office

Held: A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the
Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such
public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other court,
with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office.

Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under the Constitution,
members of the SC may be removed only by impeachment. The above provision proscribes removal from office by
any other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to
be charged criminally while holding his office with an office that carries the penalty of removal from office, would
be violative of the clear mandate of the Constitution.

The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or
profit under the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be held liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.

The court is not saying that the members and other constitutional officer are entitled to immunity from liability.

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 What the court is merely saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed
before such liability ma be determined. A member of the SC must first be removed from office, via the
constitutional route of impeachment, and then only may he be held liable either criminally or administratively (that
is, disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior in appropriate proceedings.

Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment against Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio Filed by
Mr. Lauro G. Vizconde, AM No. 12-8-4-SC, Min. Res., August 10, 2012
Vizconde is the father of Carmela and Anne Marie Jennifer Vizconde, and husband of Estrellita N. Vizconde, who
were murdered in 1991. The case gained public prominence after Hubert Webb, son of former Senator Freddie
Webb, was implicated as one of the suspects.

In December 2010, the high court acquitted the younger Webb and six other people in the Vizconde massacre case,
effectively reversing two lower courts guilty verdict after two decades.

Vizconde accused Carpio of having a hand in influencing other members of the Supreme Court in acquitting
Hubert Webb.

Lauro Vizconde of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC) filed a disbarment complaint against acting
Chief Justice Antonio Carpio for alleged corruption and influence in the impeachment of then-Chief Justice Renato
Corona.

He also claimed that Carpio had a hand in the impeachment of former Chief Justice Corona.

SC: the Court En Banc held that it found no basis to proceed with the disbarment complaint against Senior Associate
Justice Carpio in light of Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution with provides that members of the Supreme Court
may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.

Marcoleta vs. Borra, AC No. 7732, March 30, 2009

An impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached

Rodante D. Marcoleta filed a complaint for disbarment against respondents Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra
and Romeo A. Brawner of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) charging them with violating Canons 1 and 3 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Canons 4, 5, 6 and 17 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The complaint arose from
the resolution of the Comelecs First Division in favor of one Diogenes S. Osabel, the head of one of the factions in
the party-list group Alagad. The ponencia was written by Commissioner Borra while Commissioner Brawner
concurred. The dispute was elevated to the Comelec En Banc. The latter affirmed the decision of the Comelecs First
Division.

Brawner, in his answer asserted that the complainant should have filed an appeal via petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court, and that being members of a constitutional body he and Borra are supposed to be insulated from
a disbarment complaint for being impeachable officer. For his part, Borra contends that the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Canons of Judicial Ethics cannot be made to apply to him and Brawner because they are not members of the
judiciary.

Marcoleta argues that Brawner and Borra cannot take refuge in their being impeachable public officers to insulate
them from any disbarment complaint. For him the insulation from disbarment complaint of impeachable public
officers when referring particularly to the members of the Comelec applies only to the majority of its members who
should all be members of the Philippine bar, citing Section 1 (1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

10
 Whether or not Borra and Brawner are supposed to be insulated from a disbarment case for being impeachable
officers

HELD:

At the outset, the Court, guided by its pronouncements in Jarque v. Ombudsman, In Re: Raul M. Gonzales and Cuenco
v. Fernan, has laid down the rule that an impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without
first being impeached. Marcoletas availment of Section 1 (1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution to skirt this rule is
false.

At the time the present complaint was filed, Brawner and Borra and three other commissioners were all lawyers. As
an impeachable officer who is at the same time a member of the Bar, Borra must first be removed from office via
the constitutional route of impeachment before he may be held to answer administratively for his supposed errant
resolutions and actions.

The Court thus finds respondent Borras contention that the grounds-bases of the disbarment complaint, fastened
on supposed errors of judgment or grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts, are proper for an appeal,
hence, complainants remedy is judicial, not administrative.

As for complainants invocation of Section 58 of Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code the same relates to the
quasi-judicial function of the Comelec, which function rests on judgment or discretion, so that while it is of judicial
nature or character, it does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge.

The same provision thus directs that in the exercise of the Comelecs quasi-judicial power, the chairman and
members should be guided by the canons of judicial ethics. It bears emphasis that the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary applies only to courts of law, of which the Comelec is not, hence, sanctions pertaining to
violations thereof are made exclusively applicable to judges and justices in the judiciary, not to quasi-judicial officers
like the Comelec chairman and members, who have their own codes of conduct to steer them.

Even if the Court were to gauge the assailed actions of respondent Borra under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, no specific incidents and sufficient evidence can be gathered to show that respondent did engage
in dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in his capacity as a lawyer. It bears reiteration that the acts particularized
in the complaint pertain to respondent Borras duties as a Comelec commissioner.

f. Fiscal Autonomy
Art. VIII, Sec. 3
Bengzon vs. Drilon, GR. No. 103524, April 15, 1992
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were repealed during the time
of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges,
justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to
standardize retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill
(House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select
government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust
their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of
those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed
due to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress
allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following
manner: Congress made an item entitled: General Fund Adjustment; included therein are allotments to
11
 unavoidable obligations in different brances of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the
pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the
judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B.
16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the constitutionality of the
veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to
Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of
the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
as envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require."
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove
any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and
retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the
Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire
line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the
justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other departments of the government.

Maritime Industry Authority vs. Commission on Audit, GR No. 185812, January 13, 2015
Re: COA opinion on the computation of the appraised value of the properties purchased by the Retired
Chief/Associate Justices of the SC, AM No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012
FACTS:

In June 8, 2010, the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA) issued an
opinion which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court
justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the
Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong
formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles.

HELD:
The COAs authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided
under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the
Courts fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing
jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.

One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. While, as a
general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of
interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a
co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able
to command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative
power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion
of legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence and is expressly provided for by the Constitution
through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII.

In Bengzon v. Drilon, we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the following manner:
"as envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the

12
 Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require."

GSIS vs. Heirs of Caballero, GR No. 158090, Oct 4, 2010

*In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees,
AM No. 08-2-01-0, Feb 11, 2010
FACTS:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs under Sec 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of
the ROC. The said provision states:

SEC. 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from
paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local government corporations and government-owned or controlled
corporations with or without independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees. xx

The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997):
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the
actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times and that contribution
rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the
members of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its
funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding
any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be
exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless
expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby
considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to
or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without
legal force and effect. xx

Required to comment on the GSIS petition, the OSG maintains that the petition should be denied. On this Courts
order, the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation on the petition of the GSIS
and the comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption from the
payment of legal fees has no legal basis.

ISSUE: May the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on GOCCs and local government
units?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition of the GSIS for recognition of its exemption from the payment of legal fees
imposed under Sec 22 of Rule 141 of the ROC on GOCCs and LGUs is hereby DENIED .
NO
Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the ROC was promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers under
Sec 5(5), Art VIII of the Constitution:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged.
xxxxxxxx

Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the ROC is an integral part of the rules promulgated
by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is
part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is
a jurisdictional requirement.
13
 Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards
of this Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
now the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much
less with the Executive.

g. Jurisdiction
Various Issues Involving the Courts and Their Jurisdictions
Rectification of Errors of Judgment
Tocao vs CA, GR No. 127405, Oct 4, 2000, Sept 20, 2001
The inherent powers of a Court to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to
law and justice includes the right to reverse itself, especially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error or
mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant.[1]
On November 14, 2001, petitioners Marjorie Tocao and William T. Belo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our
Decision dated October 4, 2000. They maintain that there was no partnership bettween petitioner Belo, on the one hand,
and respondent Nenita A. Anay, on the other hand; and that the latter being merely an employee of petitioner Tocao.
After a careful review of the evidence presented, we are convinced that, indeed, petitioner Belo acted merely as
guarantor of Geminesse Enterprise. This was categorically affirmed by respondents own witness, Elizabeth Bantilan, during
her cross-examination. Furthermore, Bantilan testified that it was Peter Lo who was the companys financier. Thus:

De Leon vs CA, GR No. 127182, Jan 22, 2001, Dec 5, 2001

In the Decision sought to be reconsidered, we ruled that private respondents appointment on August 28, 1986, as
Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV of the Ministry of Local Government, was temporary. Applying the case of Achacoso v.
Macaraig,[1] we held that since private respondent was not a Career Executive Service (CES) eligible, his appointment did
not attain permanency because he did not possess the required CES eligibility for the CES position to which he was
appointed. Hence, he can be transferred or reassigned without violating his right to security of tenure.
It appears, however, that in Jacob Montesa v. Santos, et al., decided on September 26, 1990,[2] where the nature of
private respondents appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government, was first
contested, this Court issued a Minute Resolution dated March 17, 1992, holding that Achacoso v. Macaraig is not
applicable to the case of private respondent. The pertinent portion thereof reads -

The holding of this Court in the Achacoso case is not applicable to petitioner Montesa. Petitioner was appointed on
August 28, 1996 by virtue of Article III of the Freedom Constitution. He was extended a permanent appointment by then
Minister Pimentel and subsequently confirmed as permanent by the Civil Service Commission. He is a first grade civil
service eligible (RA 1080) the appropriate eligibility for the position at that time and a member of the Philippine bar.

There was no Career Executive Service Board during the Freedom Constitution or at the time of appointment of
petitioner. The CESO was only reconstituted by the appointment of its Board of six (6) members sometime in August
1988. There was no CESO eligibility examination during petitioner's incumbency in the Department, as there was no
CESO board. The first CESO examination was given on August 5 and 12, 1990. The CESO eligibility was not a requirement
at the time of the appointment of petitioner.The only eligibility required is that of a first grader and petitioner is a first
grade eligible. Therefore, having met all the requirements for the position to which he was appointed, he cannot be
removed in violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure and due process.

14
 Invoking res judicata, private respondent contends that the nature of his appointment can no longer be passed upon
and controverted in the present case considering that said issue had already been settled in the foregoing Minute
Resolution of the Court.
Concededly, if we follow the conventional procedural path, i.e., the principle on conclusiveness of judgment set forth
in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court,[3] would bar a re-litigation of the nature of private respondents
appointment.Indeed, once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, it can no longer
be contoverted anew and should be finally laid to rest.[4]
Yet, the Court is not precluded from re-examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and
stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. It must be stressed that this is not
the first time in Philippine and American jurisprudence that the principle of res judicata has been set aside in favor of
substantial justice, which is after all the avowed purpose of all law and jurisprudence

Control Enforcement of Courts Decisions

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, GR No. 132601, Oct 12, 1998, Jan 19, 1999
Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same
day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only
violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case

Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment,
what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the SC
retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.

The power to control the execution of the SCs decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of
substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may
be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions
where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the
rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have
been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them comform to law
and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondents contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve
which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by
final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a
death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension
of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of
reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same
vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to
life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress
of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final
sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict
do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only
the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and
coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.

Impairment of Judicial Power due to Prescription for Dispute Settlement

The inherent powers of a Court to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice includes the right to reverse itself, especially when in its honest
opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will
cause injustice to a party litigant.[1]

15
 On November 14, 2001, petitioners Marjorie Tocao and William T. Belo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of our Decision dated October 4, 2000. They maintain that there was no
partnership bettween petitioner Belo, on the one hand, and respondent Nenita A. Anay, on the
other hand; and that the latter being merely an employee of petitioner Tocao.
After a careful review of the evidence presented, we are convinced that, indeed, petitioner Belo
acted merely as guarantor of Geminesse Enterprise. This was categorically affirmed by
respondents own witness, Elizabeth Bantilan, during her cross-examination. Furthermore,
Bantilan testified that it was Peter Lo who was the companys financier. Thus:
Phil. Veterans Investment Devt Corp vs. Velez, GR No. 84295, July 18, 1991
Investigation of Unjust Decisions of Court
In re: Laureta, GR No. L-68635, Mar 12, 1987, May 14, 1987
Performance of Non-Judicial Functions
In re: Designation of Judge Manzano as Member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Comm. on Justice,
AM No. 88-7-1861-RTC, Oct 5, 1988
Unconstitutionality of Bills
Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections, GR No. 152295, July 9, 2002
In The Matter of Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement vs.
Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) And Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy,
UDK-15143, January 21, 2015
Reversal of Legal Doctrine
Republic vs. Garcia, GR No. 167741, July 12, 2007
Jurisdiction of the Courts
Mantruste Systems, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 86540-41, Nov 6, 1989
Jurisdiction of Sharia Courts
Municipality of Tangkal vs. Balindong, GR No. 193340, Jan 11, 2017
Principle of Hierarchy of Courts
Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Presbitero, Jr. GR No. 174202, April 7, 2015
Assoc. of Medical Clinics vs. GCC Approved Medical Centers, GR No. 207132, Dec 6, 2016
Aala vs. Uy, GR No. 202781, Jan 10, 2017
Principle of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Doctrine of Non-Interference or Judicial Stability
Tan vs. Cinco, GR No. 213054, June 15, 2016
Adlawan vs. Joaquino, GR No. 203152, June 20, 2016
Del Rosario vs. Ocampo-Ferrer, GR No. 215348, June 20, 2016
CIR vs. Secretary of Justice, GR No. 177387, Nov 9, 2016
Disciplinary Authority over Lawyers in Government
Buffe vs. Gonzalez, AC No. 8168, Oct 12, 2016
Facturan vs. Barcelona, Jr., AC No. 11069, June 8, 2016
Flores-Salado vs. Villanueva, Jr., AC No. 11099, Sep 27, 2016
(1) Power of Judicial Review
Art. VIII, Sec. 5
Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Scope of the Judicial Power
*Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna vs. IAC, GR No. 72424, Feb 13, 1989
*Angara vs. Electoral Commission, GR No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
16
 *Estrada vs. Desierto, GR No. 146710-15, Mar 2, 2001, Apr 3, 2001
Francisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, GR No. 160261, Nov 10, 2003
Fabian vs. Desierto, GR No. 129742, Sept 16, 1998
Santiago, Jr. vs. Bautista, GR No. L-25024, Mar 30, 1970
Felipe, Sr. vs. Leuterio, GR No. L-4606, May 30, 1952
Daabay vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., GR No. 199890, August 19, 2013
Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review
*People vs. Vera, GR No. L-45685, Nov 16, 1937, Dec 22, 1937
In The Matter of Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement vs.
Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) And Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy,
UDK-15143, January 21, 2015
First Requisite: Actual Controversy
Abbas vs. Commission on Elections, GR No. 89651, Nov 10, 1989
*Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, GR No. 107921, July 1, 1993
*Senate vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, Apr 20, 2006, July 14, 2006
*The Province of North Cotabato vs. The Govt of the Rep of the Phil Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain,
GR No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008
Candari, Jr. vs. Donasco, GR No. 185053, Feb 15, 2012
Deutsche Bank vs. CA, GR No. 193065, Feb 27, 2012
Quino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 197466, Nov 13, 2012
Radaza vs. CA, GR No. 177135, October 15, 2008
Gunsi, Sr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 168792, Feb 23, 2009
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Stradcom Corp vs. Laqui, GR No. 172712, Mar 21, 2012
Suplico vs. NEDA, GR No. 178830, July 14, 2008
John Hay vs. Lim, GR No. 119775, October 24, 2003
Guingona vs. CA, GR No. 125532, July 10, 1998
Director of Prisons vs. Ang Cho Kio, GR No. L-30001, June 23, 1970
Corales vs. Republic, GR No. 186613, August 27, 2013
Republic of the Philippines vs. Roque, GR No. 204603, September 24, 2013
Bankers Association of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR No. 206794, November 26, 2013
Jacomille vs. Abaya, GR No. 212381, April 22, 2015
Republic vs. Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Inc., GR No. 198426, Sep 2, 2015
De Leon vs. Esperon, Jr. GR No. 176394, October 21, 2015
ISAAA vs. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), GR No. 209271, December 8, 2015, July 26, 2016
Abayon vs. HRET, GR No. 222236, May 3, 2016
Republic vs. Harp, GR No. 188829, June 13, 2016
GMA vs. People, GR No. 220598, July 19, 2016, April 18, 2017
Second Requisite: Proper Standing
(1) Existence of Standing
Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 1937
Minoza vs. Lopez, GR No. 170914, Apr 13, 2011
LAMP vs. Sec of Budget, GR No. 164987, Apr 24 2012
Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003
*Republic vs. Nolasco, GR No. 155108, Apr 27, 2005
17
 Executive Secretary vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 131719, May 25, 2004
*Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez, GR No. 113105, Aug 19, 1994
Del Mar vs. PAGCOR, GR No. 138298, Nov 29, 2000, June 19, 2001, Aug 24, 2001
Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr., GR No. 114222, Apr 6, 1995
*Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, GR No. 135385, Dec 6, 2000
*Francisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, GR No. 160261, Nov 10, 2003
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Assn. inc., vs. Energy Regulatory Commission, GR No. 174697,
July 8, 2010
Garcillano vs. House of Representatives, GR No. 170338, Dec 23, 2008
Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, GR No. 148334, Jan 21, 2004
*Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, GR No. 152774, May 27, 2004
White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila, GR No. 122846, Jan 20, 2009
Purisima vs. Lazatin, GR No. 210588, Nov 29, 2016
Bayan Muna vs. Mendoza, GR No. 190431, Jan 31, 2017
(2) Absence of Standing
*Joya vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, GR No. 96541, Aug 24, 1993
*Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato, GR No. 118910, July 17, 1995, Nov 16, 1995
Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. and Olaguer vs. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, GR No. 192986,
Jan 15, 2013
Telecommunications & Broadcast Attys of the Phils. Inc. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 132922, Apr 21, 1998
Tichangco vs. Enriquez, GR No. 150629, June 30, 2004
Domingo vs. Carague, GR No. 161065, Apr 15, 2005
*Planters Products Inc. vs. Fertiphil Corp., GR No. 166006, Mar 14, 2008
Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Liggayu, GR No. 174297, June 20, 2012
Southern Hemisphere vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, GR No. 178552, Oct 5, 2010
*Chavez vs. PCGG, GR No. 130716, Dec 9, 1998, May 19, 1999
Holder vs. Humanitarian Law Project, No. 08-1498, June 21, 2010
Anti-Graft League of the Philippines vs. San Juan, GR No. 97787, Aug 1, 1996
Cruz vs. DENR, GR No. 135385, Dec 6, 2000
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 148560, Nov 19, 2001
Hontiveros-Baraquel vs. TRB, GR No. 181293, February 23, 2015
(3) Recent Cases
ITF vs. COMELEC, GR No. 159139, January 13, 2004, June 15, 2005
Jumamil vs. Cafe, GR No. 144570, September 21, 2005
Almario vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 189028, July 16, 2013
PAL vs. CIR, GR No. 198759, July 1, 2013
Remulla vs. Maliksi, GR No. 171633, September 18, 2013
West Tower Condominium Corporation vs. First Philippine Industrial Corporation, GR No. 194239,
June 16, 2015
Osmena III vs. PSALM Corporation, GR No. 212686, September 28, 2015
Kabataan Party-List vs. COMELEC, GR No. 221318, December 16, 2015
Third Requisite: Pleading at the Earliest Opportunity
*People vs. Leachon, GR No. 108725-26, Sept 25, 1998
*Matibag vs. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, Apr 2, 2002
18
 La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos, GR No. 127882, Jan 27, 2004, Dec 1, 2004
Estarija vs. Ranada, GR No. 159314, June 26, 2006
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Phil. Multi-media System Inc., GR Nos. 175769-70, Jan 19, 2009
*PNB vs. Palma, GR No. 157279, Aug 9, 2005
Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., GR No. 167614, Mar 24, 2009
Moldex Realty, Inc. vs. HLURB, GR No. 149719, June 21, 2007
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. CA, GR No. 173946, June 19, 2013
Applied Food Ingredients Company, Inc. vs. CIR, GR No. 184266, November 11, 2013
Fourth Requisite: Lis Mota
Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 128448, Feb 1, 2001
*Francisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, GR No. 160261, Nov 10, 2003
*David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Arceta vs. Mangrobang, GR No. 152895, June 15, 2004
Laude vs. Hon. Ginez-Jabalde, GR No. 217456, November 24, 2015
Political Questions Doctrine
*Tanada vs. Cuenco, GR No. L-10520, Feb 28, 1957
International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, GR No. 85750, September 28, 1990
*PBA vs. COMELEC, GR No. L-72915, Dec 19, 1985
*Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. L-36142, Mar 31, 1973
*Romulo vs. Yniguez, GR No. 71908, Feb 4, 1986
*Dumlao vs. COMELEC, GR No. L-52245, Jan 22, 1980
Gutierrez vs. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, GR No. 193459, Feb 15 2011,
Mar 8, 2011
Presl Ad Hoc fact-finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, GR No. 135715, Apr 13, 2011
Carpio-Morales vs. CA, GR No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
Baker vs. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, Mar 26, 1962
Torrecampo vs. MWSS, GR No. 188296, May 30, 2011
Severino vs. Governor-General, GR No. L-6250, Aug 3, 1910
(1) All Courts Can Exercise Judicial Review
*J.M.Tuason & Co. vs. CA, GR No. L-18128, Dec 26, 1961
Ynot vs. IAC, GR No. 74457, Mar 20, 1987
(2) Judicial Review and Political Questions
*Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, GR No. L-61388, Apr 20, 1983, July 19, 1985
Art. VII, Sec. 18
Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. Aquino, GR No. 73748, May 22, 1986
In re: Saturnino Bermudez, GR No. 76180, Oct 24, 1986
Marcos vs. Manglapus, GR No. 88211, Sept 15, 1989, Oct 27, 1989
*Garcia vs. BOI, GR No. 92024, Nov 9, 1990
Judicial Restraint
PPA vs. CA, GR No. 115786-87, Feb 5, 1996
Chavez vs. COMELEC, GR No. 105323, July 3, 1992
Sinaca vs. Mula, GR No. 135691, Sep 27, 1999
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 148560, Nov 19, 2001
Jurisdiction Over Criminal Cases where Penalty Imposed is Reclusion Perpetua
Art. VIII, Sec. 5
19
 Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality
CIR vs. San Roque Power Corp., GR No. 187485, Feb 12, 2013, Oct 8, 2013
Mirallosa vs. Carmel Development, GR No. 194538, Nov 27, 2013
Go vs. Bureau of Immigration, GR No. 191810, June 22, 2015
Film Development Council vs. Colon Heritage Realty Corp. GR No. 203754, June 16, 2015
CIR vs. Puregold Duty Free, GR No. 202789, June 22, 2015
Theory of Relative Unconstitutionality
Central Bank Employees vs. Bangko Sentral, GR No. 148208, Dec 15, 2004
h. Congressional Power over Jurisdiction of the SC
Art. VIII, Sec. 2
Art. VIII, Sec. 5
Art. VI, Sec. 30
*Mantruste Systems, Inc. vs. CA, GR No. 86540-41, Nov 6, 1989
Applied Food Ingredients Company, Inc. vs. CIR, GR No. 184266, November 11, 2013
CE Casecnan Water and Energy Company, Inc. vs. Province of Nueva Ecija, GR No. 196278,
June 17, 2015
Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation vs. Bureau of Customs, GR No. 209830, June 17, 2015
CIR vs. Court of Tax Appeals, GR No. 207843, July 15, 2015
Cawad vs. Abad, GR No. 207145, July 28, 2015
Bureau of Customs vs. Devanadera, GR No. 193253, September 8, 2015
Carpio-Morales vs. CA, GR No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
Gonzales vs. GJH Land, Inc., GR No. 202664, November 10, 2015
The Supreme Courts Jurisdiction
Art. VIII, Sec. 5
Judiciary Act of 1948, Sec. 17
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP129), Sec. 5 (3)
Art. VIII, Sec. 14
i. Administrative Powers/Rule-Making Power/Quasi-Judicial Work
(i) Supervision of Courts
In re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo vs. Nograles and Limkaichong,
GR. No. 179120, AM No. 09-2-19-SC, Feb 24, 2009
Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing held on Sept 26, 2013
Against Associate Justice Gregory Ong, Sandiganbayan, AM No. SB-14-21-J, Sept 23, 2014
Art. VIII, Sec. 6
Noblejas vs. Teehankee, GR No. L-28790, April 29, 1968
Lorenzo vs. Lopez, AM No. 2006-02-SC, Oct. 15, 2007
Ampong vs. CSC, GR No. 167916, August 26, 2008
Leave Division vs. Heusdens, AM No. P-11-2927, Dec 13 2011
(ii) Temporary Assignment of Judges
Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (3)
(iii)Order a Change of Venue
Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (4)
People vs. Pilotin, GR No. L-35377-78, July 31, 1975
People vs. Sola, GR No. L-56158-64, Mar 17, 1981
(iv) Discipline of Lower Court Judges
20
 Art. VIII, Sec. 11
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ruiz, AM No. RTJ-13-2361, Feb 2, 2016
Gamboa-Roces vs. Perez, AM No. MTJ-16-1887, Jan 9, 2017
(v) Appointment of Officials & Employees of the Entire Judiciary
Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (6)
j. Rule-Making
Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5)
In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees,
AM No. 08-2-01-0, Feb 11, 2010
Baguio Market Vendors vs. Cabato-Cortes, GR No. 165922, Feb 26, 2010
Art. XVIII, Sec. 10
Re: Letter dated April 18, 2011 of Chief Public Attorney Persida Rueda-Acosta Requesting Exemption
from the Payment of Sheriffs Expenses, AM No. 11-10-03-0, July 30, 2013
Carpio-Morales vs. CA, GR No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
Estipona vs. Lobrigo, GR No. 226679, Aug 15, 2017
Prior to 1987 Constitutions
In re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534, Resolution, Mar 18, 1954
A. Scope
*Lim vs. CA, GR No. 149748, Nov 16, 2006
*Javellana vs. DILG, GR No. 102549, Aug 10, 1992
B. Prohibitions Against Diminution of Substantive Rights
*Philippine National Bank vs. Asuncion, GR No. L-46095, Nov 23, 1977
*Philippine National Bank vs. Independent Planters Assn., Inc., GR No. L-28046, May 16, 1983
*Santero vs. Court of First Instance of Cavite, GR No. L-61700, Sept 14, 1987
*Damasco vs. Laqui, GR No. 81381, Sept 30, 1988
*Magat vs. People, GR No. 92201, Aug 21, 1991
*Fabian vs. Desierto, GR No. 129742, Sept 16, 1998
*Tan vs. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., GR No. 148420, Dec 15, 2005
*People vs. Mateo, GR No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004
*People vs. Lacson, GR No. 149453, May 28, 2002, Apr 1, 2003, Oct 7, 2003
*Republic vs. Gingoyon, GR No. 166429, Dec 19, 2005 & Feb 1, 2006
C. Special Courts
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. De Leon, GR No. 143275, Sept 10, 2002, Mar 20, 2003
D. Quasi-Judicial Bodies
Tan vs. Commission on Elections, GR No. 166143-47, Nov 20, 2006
E. Regulation of Demonstrations
In re: Valmonte, GR No. 134621, Sept 29, 1998
F. Requirements of International Agreements
*Taada vs. Angara, GR No. 118295, May 2, 1997
G. Administrative Supervision over the Judiciary
Maceda vs. Vasquez, GR No. 102781, Apr 22, 1993
Sinsuat vs. Hidalgo, AM No. RTJ-08-2133, Aug 6, 2008
Caoibes, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 132177, July 19, 2001
Fuentes vs. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, GR No. 124295, Oct 23, 2001
Garcia vs. Miro, GR No. 167409, Mar 20, 2009
21
 Adlawan vs. Capilitan, AM No. P-12-3080, Aug 29, 2012
People vs. Gacott, Jr., GR No. 116049, Mar 20, 1995 and July 13, 1995
Re: Request for Guidance/Clarification on Section 7, Rule III of Republic Act No. 10154 Requiring
Retiring Government Employees to Secure a Clearance of Pendency/Non-pendency of Case/s from the
CSC, AM No. 13-09-08-SC, October 1, 2013
Mamiscal vs. Clerk of Court, AM No. SCC-13-18-J, July 1, 2015
Contempt Powers over Constitutional Commissions
In re: EM No.03-010- Order of the First Division of the Commission on Elections dated August 15,
2003, AM No. 03-8-22 SC, September 16, 2003
Practice of Professions
Art. XII, Sec. 14
Rule re Martial Law/Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ
Art. VII, Sec. 18
k. Contempt Power
Inonog vs. Judge Ibay, AM No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009
Zarate vs. Balderian, AM No. MTJ-00-1261, Mar 31, 2000
l. No Quasi-Judicial & Administrative Work of Judges
Art. VIII, Sec. 12
Meralco vs. Pasay Transportation Co., GR No. L-37878, Nov 25, 1932
Garcia vs. Macaraig, Jr., AM No. 198-J, May 31, 1971
*In re: Rodolfo Manzano, AM No. 88-7-1861-RTC, Oct 5, 1988
Presidential Electoral Tribunal
Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7
*Lopez vs. Roxas, GR No. L-25716, July 28, 1966
R.A. 1793
Macalintal vs. P.E.T., GR No. 191618, Nov 23, 2010 & June 7, 2011
Chief Justice as Presiding Officer in Presidential Impeachment Trial
Art. XI, Sec. 3 (6)
Chief Justice as Chair of the JBC
m. Report on the Judiciary
Art. VIII, Sec. 16
n. Manner of Sitting and Votes Required
Art. VIII, Sec. 4
Art. VIII, Sec. 11
Art. VII, Sec. 18
Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7
Secretary of the DPWH vs. Sps. Tecson, GR No. 179334, July 1, 2013, April 21, 2015
Limketkai Sons Milling vs. CA, GR No. 118509, Dec 1, 1995, Mar 29, 1996, Sept 5, 1996
Firestone Ceramics vs. CA, GR No. 127022, Sept 2, 1999, June 28, 2000
Rule 56, Sec. 7, Rules of Court
Rule 125, Sec. 3, Rules of Court
o. Requirements as to Decisions
Art. VIII, Sec. 13
Consing vs. CA, GR No. 78272, Aug 29, 1989
Art. VIII, Sec. 14
22
 Art. VIII, Sec. 4, 11
Fortich vs. Corona, GR No. 131457, Apr 24, 1998, Nov 17 1998 and Aug 19, 1999
Writing of the Decision
Valladolid vs. Inciong, GR No. 52364, Mar 25, 1983
Section 14, Chapter 3, Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987
Air Manila, Inc. vs. Balatbat, GR No. L-29064, Apr 29, 1971
Bacolod Murcia Milling Co. vs. Henares, GR No. L-13505, Mar 30, 1960
Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. CA, GR No. 114323, July 23, 1998, Sept 28, 1999
Francisco vs. Permskul, GR No. 81006, May 12, 1989
People vs. Ordoo, GR No. 129593 & 143533-35, July 10, 2000
Nicos Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 88709, Feb 11, 1992
People vs. Viernes, GR No. 118091, Oct 3, 1996
Salazar vs. Marigomen, AM No. RTJ-06-2004, Oct 19, 2007
De Leon vs. People, GR No. 212623, Jan 11, 2016
South Cotabato Communications Corp. vs. Sto. Tomas, GR No. 217575, June 15, 2016
Minute Resolution
Borromeo vs. CA, GR No. L-82273, June 1, 1990
Tayamura vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. 76355, May 21, 1987
Komatsu Industries, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 127682, Apr 24, 1998
Legal Basis for Resolutions
Nunal vs. Commission on Audit, GR No. 78648, Jan 24, 1989
San Luis vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-80160, June 26, 1989
Prudential Bank vs. Castro, AM No. 2756, June 5, 1986, Nov 12, 1987, Mar 15, 1988
*People vs. Baring, Jr., GR No. 137933, January 28, 2002
Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2
Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, GR No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973
Art. VIII, Sec. 13
p. Mandatory Period for Deciding Cases
Art. VIII, Sec. 15
In re: Problem of Delays in Cases before the Sandiganbayan, AM No. 00-8-05-SC, Nov 28, 2001 and
Jan 31, 2002
Art. VII, Sec. 18
Art. XVIII, Sec. 12 14
Marcelino vs. Cruz, Jr., GR No. L-42428, Mar 18, 1983
De Roma vs. CA, GR No. L-46903, July 23, 1987
People vs. Mendoza, GR No. 143702, Sept 13, 2001
Malacora vs. CA, GR No. L-51042, Sept 30, 1982
Flora vs. Pajarillaga, GR No. L-24806, Jan 22, 1980
Sesbreno vs. CA, GR No. 161390, April 16, 2008
Art. X, Sec. 11 (2) of the 1973 Constitution
Re: Complaint dated January 28, 2014 of Wenefredo Parreno, OCA IPI No. 14-220-CA-J,
March 17, 2015
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Tandinco, AM No. MTJ-10-1760, November 16, 2015
Court Administrator vs. Casalan, AM No. RTJ-14-2385, Apr 20, 2016
Bancil vs. Reyes, AM No. MTJ-16-1869, July 27, 2016
23
 Cases Illustrating the Changing Decisions of the SC
2. Lower Courts
a. Qualifications and Appointment
Art. VIII, Sec. 7, 8 (5), 9
Composition
Judiciary Act of 1948
BP 129
Qualifications
Art. VIII, Sec. 7
Art. VIII, Sec. 13
Judicial Privilege
In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and
Employees as Witnesses under the Subpoenas of Feb 10, 2012 and the Various Letters of the
Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated Jan 19 and 25, 2012, - Feb 14, 2012
Rule 7, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC)
Senate vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, Apr 20, 2006, July 14, 2006

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