THANKS TO THE BEST AND THE MOST BEAUTIFUL
902-A, all actions for claims against a
BLOCKMATE, JULIANNE FOR COMPILING THE CASE
DIGESTS!
ALSO READ THE BOOK OF AGPALO CHAPTER IV -
PAGES 206 255 TO FULLY UNDERSTAND THE
CONCEPTS (READ ONLY THE TOPICS ACCORDING TO
THE SYLLABUS.)
GOOD LUCK!
STATCON
(#AYAWKONANGBUMAGSAKPUCHA)
I. BLACK LETTER V. SPIRIT OF THE LAW
(MALAMANG SPIRIT OF THE LAW PREVAILS)
A. LITERAL INTERPRETATION (OR PLAIN-
MEANING RULE)
General Rule: If a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. (VERBA
LEGIS)
INDEX ANIMI SERMO: Speech is the index of
intention.
ESPIRITU V. CIPRIANO
The rule rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly
express its intent or will and preclude the court from
construing differently.
VERBA LEGIS NON EST RECEDENDUM: From the
words of a statute there should be no departure.
CASE: BARANDA V. GUSTILO
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It
shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property
which complies with all the requisites for registration
STATCON: The elementary rule in statutory
construction is that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must
be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In
the case at bar, the statute concerning the function of
the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a
torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room
for construction.
CASE: RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT
The Court held that whenever a distressed corporation
asks the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of
payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert
such preference, but stand on equal footing with other
creditors. Once a management committee,
rehabilitation receiver, board or body is appointed
pursuant to P.D.
distressed corporation pending before any court,
tribunal, board or body shall be suspended
accordingly.
STATCON: Where the law is clear and unambiguous,
it must be taken to mean exactly what says and the
court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is
obeyed. Where the law is clear and free from doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction. Thus
where what is not clearly provided in the law is read
into the law by construction because it is more logical
and wise, it would be to encroach upon legislative
prerogative to define the wisdom of the law, which is
judicial legislation.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. ABAYA: Whether a statute
is wise or expedient is not for the courts to determine.
Courts must administer the law, not as they it ought to
be but as they find it and without regard to
consequence.
CASE: NATIONAL MARKETING CORP. V. TECSON
The Supreme Court declared that, pursuant to Art. 7 of
said Code, "whenever months ... are referred to in the
law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30
days," not the "natural," or "solar" or "calendar" months,
unless they are "designated by name," in which case
"they shall be computed by the actual number of days
they have.
This concept was later, modified in the Philippines, by
Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code,
Pursuant to which, "month shall be understood to refer
to a calendar month."
However, the court has reverted to the provisions of the
Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month
is to be considered as the regular 30-day month ... and
not the solar or civil month," with the particularity that,
whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned
"months, days or nights," ours has added thereto the
term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five
days."
CASE: AGUILA V. CFI OF BATANGAS
AEQUETAS NUNQUAM CONTRAVENIT LEGIS -
Equity is described as justice outside legality, which
simply means that it cannot supplant although it may,
as often happens, supplement the law. All abstract
arguments based only on equity should yield to positive
rules, which pre-empt and prevail over such
persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice, while they
may wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify
disregard of the mandate of the law as long as it
remains in force.
Page 1|9
B. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
GENERAL RULE: The intent of the legislature is the
law, and the key to and the controlling factor in, its
construction or interpretation.
The fundamental rule that the legislative intent must be
determined from the language of the statute itself must
be adhered to even though the court is convinced by
extraneous circumstances that the legislature intended
to enact something very different from that which it
intended.
TANADA V. YULO: The court may not speculate as to
the probable intent of the legislature different from that
expressed in the words of the statute. To attempt to do
so is a perilous undertaking and is apt to lead to an
amendment of a law by judicial construction. To depart
from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter
the statute, to legislate and not to interpret.
MALEDICTA EST EXPOSITIO QUAE CORRUMPIT
TEXTUM: It is dangerous construction which is against
the text.
DURA LEX SED LEX: The law may be harsh but it is
still the law. (my paborito maxim)
ABSOLUTA SENTENTIA EXPOSITORE NON
INDIGET: When the language of the law is clear, no
explanation of it is required.
HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST. SED ITA
LEX SCRIPTA EST: It is exceedingly hard but so the
law is written.
The principle requires that the statute should be
applied REGARDLESS OF WHETHER IT IS
UNWISHE, HARD OR HARSH.
CASE: KRIVENKO V. REGISTER OF DEEDS
Whether or not the phrase pubic agricultural land in
Section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution
may be interpreted to include residential lands for
purposes of their disposition.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional embraces all
lands of any kind of the public. Therefore this provision
means that all lands of the public domain are classified
into three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and
mineral. With respect to residential lands, it has been
held that since they are neither mineral nor timber
lands, of necessity they must be classified as
agricultural.
If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in
legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to
have been employed in that sense in a written
Constitution. Under section 1 of Article XIII of the
Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with
respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. Filipino citizens who alienate
their agricultural lands in favor of aliens is prevented
under section 5, Article XIII.
Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they
have the same purpose and the same subject matter
namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to
aliens.
CASE: ABOITIZ SHIPPING V. CITY OF CEBU
The SC held that the right to collect the wharfage
belongs to the National Government. It is unreasonable
to conclude that the legislature, simply because it
employed the term "public wharves" in section 17 (w)
of the charter of the City of Cebu, thereby authorized
the latter to collect wharfage irrespective of the
ownership of the wharves involved.
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an
isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a
cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the
abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a
meaning quite different from the one actually intended
and evident when the word or phrase is considered
with those with which it is associated.
Thus an apparently general provision may have a
limited application if viewed together with other
provisions. Hence, Ordinance No. 207 of the City of
Cebu is declared null and void, and appellees are
ordered to refund to appellants all amounts collected
thereunder and to refrain from making such collection.
CASE: PEOPLE V. CHAVEZ
The word "debt", as used in subdivision (2) of Article
243, "is not qualified and must, therefore, be taken in
its generic sense" (Montoya vs. Ignacio, 54 Off. Gaz.
978-979). The duty of Chaves to reimburse the amount
of the veteran's benefits improperly retained by him
certainly arose and came into existence from the date
of his misappropriation (January, 1948), and the
judgment of 1961 merely established the fact of the
misappropriation beyond controversy and reasonable
doubt. The judgment sentencing Chaves to indemnify
complainant was not the source of his duty to return.
CASE: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
V. TMX SALES
Section 292 of the Tax Code should be computed from
the time of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual
Income Tax Return and final payment of income tax.
The Court states that statutes should receive a
sensible construction, such as will give effect to the
legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an
absurd conclusion. Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and
absurdity is to be adopted. The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of
the law and every part of the act is to be taken into
view. Section 292 should be interpreted in relation to
the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give
effect to legislative intent and to avoid an application of
Page 2|9
the law which may lead to inconvenience and
absurdity.
C. EMPASIS ON THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW
Once the intent or meaning of the law is ascertained by
the application of the rules of statcon, the law must be
enforced and obeyed.
PNB V. BITULOK SAWMILL: It has been held that
there may be discretion as to what a particular
provision requires; there can be none whatsoever as to
the enforcement and application thereof once its
meaning has been ascertained. What it decrees must
be followed what commands must be obeyed.
WHAT IS WITHIN THE SPIRIT IS WITHIN THE LAW.
The principle states that a thing which is within the
intention of the statute is as much within the statute as
if it were within the letter, and a thing which is within the
letter of its statute is not within the statute unless it be
within the intention of the lawmaker, and the statute
should be so construed as to effectuate its intent or
purpose, advance the remedy and suppress the
mischief contemplated by the framers. (ano daw?
Hahahaha)
RATIO LEGIS: Interpretation according to the spirit or
reason of the law. (Ito yung meaning ng principle haha)
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines
the construction thereof, and the court looks less to its
words and more to its context, subject matter,
consequence and effect.
Clear explanation: A statute must be read according to
its spirit and intent, and where legislative intent
apparently conflicts with the letter of the law, the former
prevails over the latter.
TORRES V. LIMJAP: The Court held that in construing
statutes, the proper course is to start and follow the true
intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which
harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the
fullest manner the apparent policy and object of the
legislature.
The principle applies when the literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice or would
defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
CASE: MANILA JOCKEY CLUB V. GAMES AND
AMUSEMENT BOARD
Whether or not legislative debates and explanatory
statements by members of the legislature may be
resorted to in the interpretation of statutes.
No. Legislative debates are expressive of the views
and motives of individual members and are not safe
guides and, hence, may not be resorted to in
ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the
lawmaking body. It is impossible to determine with
certainty what construction was put upon an act by the
members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by
resorting to the speeches of the members thereof.
Those who did not speak, may not have agreed with
those who did; and those who spoke, might differ from
each other. The legal act, so to speak, is made up of
two elements an internal and an external one; it
originates in intention and is perfected by expression.
Failure of the latter may defeat the former.
CASE: SANTIAGO V. COMELEC
RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative
on amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately
inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of
the Constitution provides: Amendments to this
constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least there per centum of the
registered voters therein. The Congress shall provide
for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is obviously not self-executory as it
needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress.
Although this mode of amending the constitution is a
mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional
action in the last analysis, it is still dependent on
Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative would
remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation. The
people cannot exercise such right, though
constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever
reason does not provide for its implementation.
CASE: TANADA V. CUENCO
Whether or not Section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution is mandatory.
No. The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and
by respondent herein is that, while, it relies upon the
compulsory nature of the word "shall". The language of
a statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed
directory whenever legislative purpose can best be
carried out by such construction, and the legislative
intent does not require a mandatory construction; The
adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution,
reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the
majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals,
and that the structure thereof is founded upon the
equilibrium between the majority and the minority
parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court,
who are members of said Tribunals, holding the
resulting balance of power.
The Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been
nominated by the political parties specified in the
Constitution. Senators and Delgado, having been
elected by the Committee on Rules of the Senate and
not by the party having the second largest votes in the
Senate for which Senator Taada has the exclusive
Page 3|9
right, have not been duly elected as Members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal.
CASE: TORRES V. LIMJAP
The last paragraph of section 7 Act No. 1508 states
that:
A chattel mortgage shall be deemed to cover only the
property described therein and not like or substituted
property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and
placed in the same depository as the property originally
mortgaged, anything in the mortgage to the contrary
notwithstanding.
In order to give a correct construction to the above-
quoted provision of our Chattel Mortgage Law, the
spirit and intent of the law must first be ascertained.
The primary aim of that law-making body was
undoubtedly to promote business and trade in these
Islands and to give impetus to the economic
development of the country. In the interpretation and
construction of a statute the intent of the law-maker
should always be ascertained and given effect, and
courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads
away from the true intent and purpose of the
Legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the
spirit of the Act. A stipulation in the mortgage,
extending its scope and effect to after-acquired
property, is valid and binding.
CASE: SARCOS V. CASTILLO
Under the former law then in force which stands
repealed by virtue of the Decentralization Act, the
provincial governor, if the charge against a municipal
official was one affecting his official integrity could
order his preventive suspension. At present, no such
authority is vested in the provincial governor. Instead,
the statutory scheme, complete on its face, would
locate such power in the provincial board. There would
be no support for the view, then, that the action taken
by the provincial governor in issuing the order of
preventive suspension in this case was in accordance
with law.
"The purpose of Congress is a dominant factor in
determining meaning." The purpose of the
Decentralization Act of 1967 is to grant to local
governments greater freedom and ampler means to
respond to the needs of their people and promote their
prosperity and happiness and to effect a more
equitable and systematic distribution of governmental
powers and resources. The absence of power on the
part of provincial governors to suspend preventively a
municipal mayor is buttressed by the avoidance of
undesirable consequences flowing from a different
doctrine.
D. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF
INTERPRETATION
I. CESSANTE RATIONE LEGIS WHEN
THE REASON OF LAW CEASES, LAW
ITSELF CEASES.
The reason of the law plays a decisive role in
its construction.
Its cessation or nullification renders the law
inoperative.
RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA The reason of the law is
its soul. Hence, the reason of the law is the life of the
law, a lifeless law is a dead law.
EXPLANATION: A subsequent statute may render a
prior law devoid of reason. In such a case, the latter
law will operate to repeal the prior law, even though the
two laws contain no conflicting provisions. Thus, where
a later law has a purpose in conflict with that of a prior
statute on the same subject, the latter has lost all
meaning and function and has ceased to exist.
CASE: PEOPLE V. ALMUETE
The question raised in a case is whether a tenant who
prereaped or prethreseshed palay without the consent
of the landlords in violation of the Agricultural Tenancy
Act may be held criminally liable.
The Agricultural Tenancy Act punishes that prereaping
or prethreshing of palay on a date other that previously
set without the mutual consent of the landlord and the
tenant, which prohibition is predicated on a share-
tenancy relationship between the tenant and the
landlord. Subsequently the Agricultural Land Reform
Code was enacted, abolishing share tenancy and
replacing it with leasehold tenancy.
The court ruled that since under the leasehold system
the prohibition against prereaping or prethreshing has
no more raison detre because the lessee is obligated
to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in the Code, the
tenant who prereaped or prethreshold palay could no
longer be prosecuted for such offense after the
enactment of said Code.
II. LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS AND
CLERICAL ERRORS
SUPPLYING LEGISLATIVE OMISSION
Where a literal import of the language of a statute
shows that words have been omitted that should have
been in the statute in order to carry out its intent and
spirit, clearly ascertainable from the context, the court
may supply the omission to make the statute conform
to the obvious of the legislature or to prevent the act
from absurd.
CORRECTING CLERICAL ERRORS
The court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the
legislature may correct clerical errors, mistake or
misprints which if uncorrected, would render the statute
meaningless, empty or nonsensical or would defeat or
impair its intended operation, so long as the meaning
intended is apparent on the face of the whole
enactment and no specific provision is abrogated.
CASE: MATABUEVA V. CERVANTES
Page 4|9
Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
donation between the spouses during marriage, policy
consideration of the most exigent character as well as
the dictates of morality requires that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction
that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part
of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the
ban on donations between spouses during the
marriage is too prevent the possibility of undue
influence and improper pressure being exerted by one
spouse on the other, there is no reasn why this
prohibition shall not apply also to common-law
relationships.
CASE: FARINAS V. BARBA
Whether or not the power to fill a vacancy in the
Sangguniang Bayan, which is created as a result of the
cessation from office of a member who does not belong
to a political party, is vested in the provincial governor
upon recommendation of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
The person who has the power to appoint under such
circumstance is the Governor upon the
recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned which
is the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas where the
vacancy occurs. Where the vacancy is caused by a
Sanggunian Member not belonging to a Political Party,
the Governor, upon recommendation of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan, has
the power to appoint. Where there is no political party
to make a nomination, the Sanggunian, where the
vacancy occurs, must be considered the appropriate
authority for making the recommendation.
CASE: LARGADO V. MASAGANDA
The court a quo answered the question in the negative
relying on Section 10 of Republic Act No. 2613, which
provides that the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
courts shall not extend, among others, to the
appointment of guardians even if the Secretary of
Justice has ruled otherwise in an opinion rendered in
1959. The provisions of said Act are clear.
The contention that the insertion of the term "guardian"
in said Section 10 was only due to an oversight as
opined by the Secretary of Justice may have some
basis, considering the intent of Congress in approving
Republic Act 2613; nevertheless, the court is of the
opinion that the mistake cannot be corrected by
executive fiat, but by legislation. This is what Congress
in effect did when on June 17, 1961 it approved
Republic Act No. 3090 rectifying the mistake
committed. However, since said Act does not contain
any saving clause, its provisions cannot be given
retroactive effect.
CASE: DEMAFILES V. COMELEC
The canvass and proclamation should be annulled
because two of the four members of the board of
canvassers were disqualified from sitting in it, they
being candidates for reelection. The statement of
respondent Galido that reelectionist members of the
provincial board are disqualified under section 28 only
when the board acts as a provincial board of
canvassers, to prevent them from canvassing their own
votes, and not when they sit as a municipal board of
canvassers, is branded as obiter dictum
UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT, NEC NOS
DISTINGUERE DEBEMOS - The statute draws no
distinction between the provincial board acting as a
provincial board of canvassers and the same board
acting as a municipal canvassing body new
municipalities, and so we make none.
A canvassing board performs a purely ministerial
function that of compiling and adding the results
they appear in the returns, transmitted to it. However,
they cannot pass upon the validity of an election return,
much less exclude it from the canvass on the ground
that the votes cast in the precinct from whence it came
are illegal. But the exclusion of the return in this case
is sought to be justified on the ground that it is
"obviously manufactured" because, contrary to the
statement therein that there were 195 registered
voters, of whom 188 voted, the certificate of the local
election registrar states that only 182 voters had
registered on October 30, 1967.
III. AVOIDING ABSURDITY (mej komplikado
to haha)
It is well-settled that courts are not to give a statute a
meaning that would lead to absurdities. It is their duty
to construe the statute in such a way as to avoid such
consequences.
If the words of a statute of a statute are susceptible of
more than one meaning, the absurdity of the result of
one construction is a strong argument against its
adoption and in favor such sensible interpretation as
will avoid such result.
Statutes may be extended to cover cases not within the
literal meaning of the terms if their exact and literal
import would lead to absurd or mischievous results.
INTERPRATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER
FIENDA EST UT EVITETUR INCONVENIENS ET
ABSURDUM Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and
absurdity is to be adopted.
Where a literal adherence to the language of a statute
would produce absurd result unless the appropriate
word or words are written or omitted therein, the court
has the power to supply or omit the words from a
statute in order to prevent an absurd result.
It is presumed that the legislature intended exceptions
to its language which would avoid absurd
consequence.
Page 5|9
CASE: US. V. PAGUIRIGAN
The threats referred to in article 494 consist in formally
threatening a private person with some injury to himself
or his family which would amount to a crime. A threat
made in jest or in the heat of anger is a misdemeanor
only under article 589.
The fact that the threat was made in the heat of anger,
and that the subsequent actions of the party show that
he did not seriously intend to carry the threat into
execution, reduce the offense from a crime to a
misdemeanor, and is punishable under article 589,
instead of article 494, of the Penal Code. A literal
adherence to this language of the law in question
would produce the absurd result of making persistence
in an illegal purpose operate in mitigation of the
offense. The power of the court to supply or omit words
from a statute in order to prevent an absurd result
which the legislature will not be supposed to have
intended, is well established.
CASE: PEOPLE V. DUQUE
A statute providing for prescription of defined criminal
offenses is more than a statute of repose and
constitutes an act of grace by which the State, after the
lapse of a certain period of time, surrenders its
sovereign power to prosecute the criminal act. A
statute on prescription of crimes is an act of liberality
on the part of the State in favor of the offender. The
applicable well-known principles of statutory
interpretation are that statutes must be construed in
such a way as to give effect to the intention of the
legislative authority, and so as to give a sensible
meaning to the language of the statute and thus avoid
nonsensical or absurd results, departing to the extent
unavoidable from the literal language of the statute.
Appellant's literal reading would make nonsense of
Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
IV. AVOID INJUSTICE
It is presumed that undesirable consequences were
never intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is
favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences.
The presumption is that the legislature, in enacting a
law, did not intend to work a hardship or an oppressive
result, a possible abuse of authority or act of
oppression, arming one person with a weapon to
impose hardship on another.
EA EST ACCIPIENDA INTERPRATIO QUAE VITIO
CARET That interpretation is to be adopted which is
free from evil or injustice.
CASE: AMATAN V. AUJERO
Sec. 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the accused
in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser offense
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included
in the crime charged", the fact of death of the victim for
which the accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally
liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense
be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense
of attempted homicide.
In instances where a literal application of a provision of
law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in
opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday
common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil
Code admonishes judges to take principles of right and
justice at heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote
right and justice. The fact of the victim's death, a clear
negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to
have alerted the judge not only to a possibly
inconsistent result but to an injustice. The failure to
recognize such principles so cardinal to our body of
laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects
respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not
competence, in the performance of his duties.
CASE: SALVACION V. CENTRAL BANK
The foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a
tourist is not the kind of deposit encourage by PD Nos.
1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by
said laws because such depositor stays only for a few
days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his
deposit in the bank only for a short time. This would
negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides
that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application
of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizerzmente
con damo de otro. Simply stated, when the statute
is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental
solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of
conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377)
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section
113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device
by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so
doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the
innocent. The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular
No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section
8 of R.A. 6426 are inapplicable to this case because of
its peculiar circumstances.
(LOOOOOOL BIGLA NAGKA SPANISH-LATIN
MAXIM; MINDBLOWN)
CASE: PEOPLE V. GUTIERREZ
The rigorous application of the general principle of Rule
110, Section 14 (a), would result here in preventing a
fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of the
case, it must be admitted that the exigencies of justice
demand that the general rule relied upon by accused
respondents should yield to occasional exceptions
wherever there are weighty reasons therefor.
Otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the
highest injustice. (SUMMUM JUS, SUMMA INJURIA)
Page 6|9
 V. THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THE
IMPOSSIBLE
NEMO TENETUR AD IMPOSSIBLE - It is well-settled
that the law does not require that the impossible be
done. The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility.
IMPOSSIBILIUM NULLA OBLIGATIO EST a statute
may not be so construed as to require compliance with
what it prescribes cannot at the time, be legally
accomplished.
It should instead be construed in such a way that
substantial compliance what the law requires is
sufficient.
(EXAMPLE: Yung isang statute or law hindi na-publish
sa Official Gazette = Legal impossibility)
CASE: AKBAYAN V. COMELEC
Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the
Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New
Voters Only is submitted but was then denied by the
COMELEC under Resolution No. 3584 on 8 February
2001.
It is well-settled that the law does not require that the
impossible be done. A two-day special registration for
new voters would give rise to time constraints due to
additional pre-election matters. Accordingly,
COMELEC acted within the bounds and confines of the
applicable law on the matter. In issuing the assailed
Resolution, respondent simply performed its
constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
VI. DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY
IMPLICATIONS
The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is
as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
Every statute is understood by implication, to contain
all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate
its object and purpose or to make effective rights, and
powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants
including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred
from its terms.
EX NECESSITATE LEGIS From the necessity of the
law.
IN EO QUOD PLUS SIT, SEMPER INEST ET MINUS
Every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is
deemed to include all incidental power, right or
privilege. This is so because the greater includes the
lesser, expressed in the maxim.
The terms necessary implication is one of that is so
strong in its probability that the contrary thereof cannot
reasonably supposed. It is one which under the
circumstances, is compelled by a reasonable view of
the statute and the contrary of which would be
improbable and absurd.
What may be necessarily implied from a statute should,
in any event, be consistent with and not contrary to the
Constitution or to existing laws. An implication which is
violative of the law is unjustified or unwarranted.
CASE: MACALINTAL V PET
Whether or not the constitution of the PET, composed
of the Members of this Court, is unconstitutional, and
violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article
VIII of the Constitution.
The contentious constitutional provision does not
specify the establishment of the PET. But neither does
it preclude, much less prohibit, otherwise. Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution should be read with other
related provisions of the Constitution such as the
parallel provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of the
Senate and the House of Representatives.
The Supreme Courts constitutional mandate to act as
sole judge of election contests involving our countrys
highest public officials, and its rule-making authority in
connection therewith, is not restricted; it includes all
necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof.
Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of
the courts power to judge presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, as well as the rule-
making power adjunct thereto, is plenary. The court
reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply
constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987
Constitution.
CASE: CHUA V. CSC
Republic Act No. 6683, Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act
shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the
National Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, as well
as the personnel of all local government units. The
benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all
regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees,
regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total
of two (2) consecutive years of government service as
of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the
PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary
Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence,
vacated positions are deemed abolished upon
early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Co-
terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who
have rendered years of continuous service should be
included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law,
as long as they file their application prior to the
expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with
CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose.
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In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial
by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's
application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act
No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive,
as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary
retirement within a reasonable period and she is
entitled to the benefits of said law.
CASE: COA V. PROVINCE OF CEBU
Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related
benefits of public school teachers appointed by local
chief executives in connection with the establishment
and maintenance of extension classes; as well as the
expenses for college scholarship grants, may be
charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the
local government unit concerned.
The legislature intended the SEF to answer for the
compensation of teachers handling extension classes.
Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the
allocation of the SEF for the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes logically implies the
hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be
compensated for their services.
Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain
all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate
its object and purpose, or to make effective rights,
powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,
including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred
from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the
services and the corresponding compensation of these
teachers are necessary and indispensable to the
establishment and maintenance of extension classes.
CASE: SHIOJI V. HARVEY
Whether or not the Judge of First Instance may assume
the jurisdiction to interpret and review judgment and
order of the Supreme Court, and to obstruct the
enforcement of the decisions of the appellate court.
No. The only function of a lower court, when the
judgment of a high court is returned, is the ministerial
one, the issuing of the order of execution, and that
lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction to
interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher court
as it would seem to be superfluous. A judge of a lower
court cannot enforce different decrees than those
rendered by the superior court.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Island is
expressly authorized by statute to make rules for
regulation of its practice and the conduct of its
business. Section 28 of the Judiciary Act (No. 136),
grants to the members of the Supreme Court the power
to "make all necessary rules for orderly procedure in
Supreme Court . . . in accordance with the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure, which rules shall be . .
. binding upon the several courts."
CASE: LUCIANO V PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR
Who should exercise the mandatory act of suspension
under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act?
Nothing in Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act grants with specifity upon the Court of
First Instance the power to suspend an official charged
with a violation thereof. The plain import of the last
sentence of Section 13, which says that if acquitted, is
that a defendant in an Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
case "shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him." And so,
there is in this legal provision a recognition that once a
case is filed in court, all other acts connected with the
discharge of court functions which here include
suspension should be left to the Court of First
Instance. Section 13 requires as a pre-condition of the
power to suspend that there be a valid information.
Therefore, since suspension is incident to
removal and should proceed from one who should
logically do so, and considering that in the operation of
a given statute fairness must have in the mind of the
legislators, we brush aside needless refinements, and
rule that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, once a valid information upon the
provisions thereof is lodged with the Court of First
Instance, that court has the inescapable duty to
suspend the public official indicted there under.
CASE: AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. V DIRECTOR OF
PATENTS
The petitioners, challenged the validity of rule 168 of
the Revised Rules of Practice before the Patent Office
in Trademark Cases which was eventually amended,
authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any
ranking official of said office to hear inter-parties
proceedings. The proceedings referred to the hearing
of opposition to the registration of trademark, service
mark, trade name, and such. Hence, the petitioners
argued that the amendment of the Rule that, inter-
parties cases should be heard and decided personally
by the Director of Patents and not his assigned hearing
officers.
The SC ruled the Director of Patents did not violate due
process because it is in the nature of the power and
authority entrusted to the DOP by the laws and it
should be construed as to give the official the
administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and
expeditious discharge of his duties in the
administration of said law. In the case at bar, The rule
that requires an administrative officer to exercise his
own judgment and discretion does not preclude him
from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative
procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and
report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer
makes his decision. It is sufficient that the judgment
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and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer
authorized by law.

CASE: PEOPLE V CONCEPCION

Whether or not the granting of a credit to the
copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by
Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine
National Bank, an "indirect loan" within the meaning of
section 35 of Act No. 2747 hence violative of said law.

The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of

the familiar maxim that no man may serve two masters
that where personal interest clashes with fidelity to
duty the latter almost always suffers.

If, therefore, it is shown that the husband is financially

interested in the success or failure of his wife's
business venture, a loan to partnership of which the
wife of a director is a member, falls within the
prohibition. A loan, therefore, to a partnership of which
the wife of a director of a bank is a member, is an
indirect loan to such director. The court is of the opinion
that the statute forbade the loan to his co-partnership
firm as well as to himself directly. The loan was made
indirectly to him through his firm.

CASE: TANTUICO JR. V DOMINGO

Respondent Chairman cannot withhold the benefits
due petitioner under the retirement laws. In said case,
where petitioner herein was one of the respondents,
we found that the employee had been cleared by the
National Treasurer from all money and property
responsibility, and held that the retirement pay
accruing to a public officer may not be withheld and
applied to his indebtedness to the government.

Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally

interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention
is to provide for the retiree's sustenance and comfort,
when he is no longer capable of earning his livelihood
(Profeta vs. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 [1992]).

The petition is granted insofar as it seeks to compel

respondent Chairman of the COA to pay petitioner's
retirement benefits in full and his monthly pensions
beginning in March 1991.

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