Supremacy of Eu Law 2016-17 PDF

SUPREMACY
OF EU LAW
Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar
1 Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Essay Question
Ques%on Type
2 Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

3
Introduction
When-states come together to make trea;es,

even where the interna;onal law made by
those trea;es binds the states that agree to
them, states remain sovereign. As a maBer on
interna;onal law, they may have to exercise
their sovereignty subject to the interna;onal
obliga;ons they have created, but the
domes;c legal eects of any such obliga;ons
will be a maBer for the na;onal legal orders of
each state to determine.
4
At the incep;on of the EU Trea;es, it was widely assumed

that this, the tradi;onal model of interna;onal law, would
apply to the European Union. However, over the years,
through their judgments star;ng from early 1960s, the Court
of Jus;ce has moved drama;cally to overturn these
assump;ons. It considered the EU treaty to be dierent from
other trea;es, the prac;cal consequence of which is that
wherever there is a conict between the na%onal law of
Member State and EU law, it is the EU Law that must be
applied. This is known as the principle of supremacy of EU
law - one of the main pillars of the uniform opera;on of
European Union.

The Reason for EU to
5 Develop the Principle
of Supremacy
1. The EU Trea;es are silent on the issue of which law should in the
case of conict take priority, and always has been. Was this a
diploma%c omission?
2. Now, given the dierences from State to State it is clear that if the
na;onal courts were to apply their own cons;tu;onal rules to the
ques;on of priori;es between domes;c law and EU law, there
would be not uniformity of applica%on and the primacy of EU law
could not be guaranteed throughout the Union.
3. Not only would this weaken the eect of EU law, it would
undermine solidarity among the Member States, and in the end
threaten the Union itself. Therefore, there is no doubt that a fear
of such a predicament led the Court of Jus;ce to develop its own
cons;tu;onal rules to deal with the problem, in par;cular the
principle of supremacy, or primacy, of EU law.
6 How this supremacy can be
achieved?
The answer would be by legisla;on.

Thus EU made a sheer volume of
legisla;on to compel MSs to follow
them irrespec;ve of their na;onal
law.

7 primary trea;es
regula;on
Sources of EU law
direc;ve
secondary
decision
Recommenda;on
& opinion
8 Methods of applying EU
law?
vDIRECT APPLICABILITY
vDIRECT EFFECT
vINDIRECT EFFECT

vSTATE LIABILITY

9 The Development of the
Doctrine of Supremacy
The rst cau;ous indica;on of the supremacy of EU law
can be found in two judgments in the early 1960s by Court
of Jus;ce.
First, it ruled in Van Gend en Loos (1963) that the EU law
did not merely regulate mutual obliga;ons between
Member States, but established what the Court called a
'new legal order of interna%onal law for the benet of
which the states have limited their sovereign rights'.
By referring to the 'new legal order', the Court of Jus;ce
indicated that the EU law was not just a 'normal'
interna;onal law organiza;on. It has a far greater impact
on the na%onal legal systems of the Member States.
10 Further Development
The Court of Jus;ce had to wait only two years to produce a

more complete deni;on and more extensive explana;on.
This ;me the explana;on came from an Italian court in the
case Costa v ENEL (1964).
Three clear proposi%ons emerge from Costa,
a) rstly, the Member States, by joining the EU, had given up
certain of their sovereign powers to make law in certain issues.
b) Both the Member States themselves as well as their ci%zens are
bound by EU law and
c) nally, the Member States, as a result, cannot unilaterally
introduce new na%onal laws that would then contradict EU law.

11
According to Paul Craig what comes across most

strongly in these two judgments is the
teleological rather than textual (literal) approach
of the Court. The courts ruling was clearly a
bold step to support its own concep%on of the
EU legal order by asser%ng that the States had
permanently limited their powers and had
transferred sovereignty to the Community
ins%tu%ons.

12 Conflicting national law and
judges role
Even if the principle of primacy of EU law were accepted in theory,
what was a na%onal judge to do in prac%ce when faced with a
conict?
Must the na;onal judge wait for the oending na;onal law to be
repealed or legally called o before he can give precedence to EU
law? The Court of Jus;ce suggested a solu;on to this problem in
Simmenthal (1977).
In Simmemthal, the Court of Jus;ce has subsequently made it
abundantly clear that in the event of any conict or inconsistency
between na%onal law and EU law, the domes%c court has an
absolute requirement to give eect to EU law over any conic%ng
domes%c law, whatever the date of passing the law.
Na%onal law, whatever its nature, must be ignored and the court
must not wait for the law to be changed. Any incompa%ble na%onal
law would be automa%cally inapplicable.
13 Conflict with the
International Obligations
The principle of supremacy of EU law applies not only to internal domes;c laws, but
also to obliga;ons entered into with third par;es, that is, countries outside the EU
[ERTA 1970].
The principle of supremacy of EU law applies not only to domes;c member state law,
but also to obliga;ons undertaken by states towards third countries. The European
Road Transport Authority case concerned a challenge to an interna;onal road
transport agreement to which the EU was a party. The Court held that once the EU,
in implemen;ng a common policy, lays down common rules, member states no
longer have the right, individually or collec;vely, to enter into contracts with non-
member states which impose obliga;ons aec;ng these common rules. Where the
EU concludes a treaty in pursuance of a common policy, this excludes the possibility
of a concurrent authority on the part of the member states.
This means that where a state aBempts to exercise concurrent authority it will be
overridden to the extent that it conicts with EU law. The only excep;on to this rule
is where a member state is under an obliga;on stemming from an interna;onal
agreement which the member state has entered into before it became a party to the
relevant Community Treaty.

14 What if there is a conflict
with MSs constitution?
The message from the Court of Jus;ce was very clear; EU

law takes precedence over even the cons%tu%on of the
Member States-Interna:onale Handelsgesellscha> 1970.
However, the Court's ruling seems harsh in the light of the
importance of the rights protected in a State's cons;tu;on,
many of which are regarded as fundamental human rights,
it is worth adding that the Court went on to say that
respect for such rights was one of the principal aims of the
EU and as such it was part of its own law.

15 Putative right
Even if it is not clear whether a person actually has a right

which they claim under EC law, the doctrine of supremacy
requires a na;onal court to set aside any na;onal
procedural rules which might prevent them from gecng
the full benet of EC right if it is eventually found that they
have it. R v SOS for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd
(1991)

16
Spanish shermen claimed that the UKs Merchant Shipping Act 1998
breached a number of TFEU ar;cles and wrongly prevented them from
shing in Bri;sh waters. They asked for interim relief (an injunc;on
secng aside the oending clauses of the Act pending the full hearing of
the case). The problem was that under English law, courts could not
grant an injunc;on against the Crown, that is, they could not order the
suspension of an Act of Parliament. On the other hand, if the Act
con;nued to be applied, the Spanish shermen would probably be
driven out of business and any subsequent judgment in their favour in
the main proceedings would be useless their Community law right
would be rendered ineec;ve. The Court of Jus;ce ruled that, in order
to ensure the full eec;veness of EU law, the English rule preven;ng
suspension of the Act must be set aside. The House of Lords went on to
grant the injunc;on.

17 EU law from the MSs
perspective
MONIST APPROACH- e.g. France
DULAIST APPROACH- e.g. UK

18
There are two approaches to this incorpora;on, in that the legal systems
of States are generally either monist or dualist in their approach to
interna;onal law.
In monist states, such as France, all law is treated equally, in the sense
that na;onal courts can apply interna;onal trea;es, as long as the
appropriate cons;tu;onal procedures have been followed. In cases of
conict with na;onal law, monist countries usually recognize the
supremacy of treaty provisions.
However, in dualist States, such as the UK, interna;onal law and na;onal
law are considered to be fundamentally dierent. As such interna;onal
trea;es can never be applied by na;onal courts, but only domes;c
legisla;on brought about by the interna;onal treaty. Thus, the EC Treaty
has to be specically incorporated into domes;c law. In the UK, this was
achieved by the European Communi;es Act 1972, specically ss 2 and 3.
However, whatever the method of incorpora;on used by the Member
State, this does not in itself seBle the ques;on of priori;es.

19 FRANCE
France's legal order has two court systems:

the judicial and
the administra;ve courts.
The Cour de Cassa%on (highest civil court) accepted the primacy of
directly eec;ve EU law, on the basis of Ar%cle 55 of the French
Cons%tu%on [Cafe Jacques Vabre (Cour de Cassa:on) (1975)].
Under Ar;cle 55, when a conict existed between an internal law
and a properly ra%ed interna%onal law which had thus entered
the internal legal order, the Cons%tu%on itself accorded priority to
the la[er.

20
The Conseil dEtat, the supreme administra%ve court,

however, has shown reluctance to accept the primacy of
EU law. In Semoules de France (1970)], the Conseil d'Etat
ruled that since it had no jurisdic%on to review the validity
of French legisla%on, it could not nd such legisla%on to
be incompa%ble with EU law, nor could it accord priority
to the la[er, it also has refused to accept that Direc%ves
can have direct eect [Minister of the Interior v Cohn-
Bendit (1980)].

21

22
However, in Raoul Georges Nicolo the Conseil d'Etat nally

abandoned its so-called 'splendid isola;on' and adopted
the same posi;on as the Conseil Cons;tu;onnel (highest
cons;tu;onal authority in France) and the Court de
Cassa;on.
Nicolo did not represent an unqualied acceptance by the
Conseil DEtat of the supremacy of EU law as the Court of
Jus;ce would have it instead the ruling rests on the
interpreta;on of Ar;cle 55 of the French cons;tu;on,
which provides for the superiority of interna;onal trea;es
over na;onal law. (Sarran and Levacher)
23
The Consiel of dEtat has also, since Nicolo recognized the

primacy of both EU Regula;ons and Direc;ves over French
statutes [Boisder (1991)].
In Rothmans and Arizona Tobacco (1993), it awarded

damages under the Factortame principle, for loss caused by
a Ministerial order which conicted with and EC Direc;ve.

24 Supremacy and Germany
German cons;tu;onal Court adhering to their own tradi;onal

view, refused to acknowledge the absolute supremacy of EU
law. In InternaRonal HandelsgesellschaT(1970), the ECJ
stated that the validity of EU measures could only be judged
according to Community criteria, not according to principles
enshrined in the German Cons%tu%on. This ruling was not
accepted by the German Federal Cons;tu;on Court, however.
It noted that the Community did not have a codied catalogue
of human rights, and held that Community measures would,
therefore, be subject to the fundamental human rights
contained in the German Cons;tu;on [Interna:onale
Handelsgesellscha>, also known as Solange 1].
25
In Stauder (1969) the Court of Jus;ce responded posi;vely

to an argument based on the Fundamental right to human
dignity, which the applicant argued had been violated by
the domes;c Implementa;on of an EU provision. Stauder
thus represented a dis;nct change of approach,
introducing the idea of general principles of EU law which
include protec;on for fundamental human rights.

26
The ECJ emphasized in Hauer (1979) that fundamental

rights form an integral part of the general principles of the
law, and in viola;ng those rights, the Court is bound to
draw inspira;on from cons;tu;onal tradi;ons common to
the Member states. However, it is dicult to avoid the fact
that the dierences between specic na;onal concep;ons
of par;cular human rights are oqen great and in the
content of a given case may well dier from the way it
would be applied in a na;onal context and may disappoint
the applicant, as seen in Hauer.

27
FACTS of Hauer
-Council regula;on re: wine surplus. 3 year prohibi;on on
new cul;va;on of vines.
Dealt with communi;es wine surplus.
ISSUE -Did regula;on violate Ps fundamental rights to
property and the free pursuit of commerce?
HOLDING No, in safeguarding fundamental rights, the
court is bound to draw inspira;on from cons;tu;onal
tradi;ons common to the member states. -

28
In Wijnsche HandesgesellschaT (Solange II) (1987),

however, the Federal Cons;tu;onal Court acknowledged
that EU law now had its own equivalent standard of human
rights protec;on. As a result, the Federal Cons;tu;onal
Court will not exercise jurisdic;on over the applicability of
secondary Community law as long as the present
condi;ons as to the protec;on of fundamental rights by
the European Court of Jus;ce prevail.

29
Nonetheless, in Brunner v The European Union Treaty

(1994), the Federal Cons%tu%onal Court again re-armed
German cons%tu%onal sovereignty and its right to review
the scope of Community competence. It asserted its
jurisdic;on to review the ac;ons of European ins;tu;ons
and agencies -including the Court to ensure rst that they
remain within the limits of their powers (ultra vires control)
and secondly, not to disobey the basic cons;tu;onal rights
of German inhabitants.

30
Consider the impact of Charter of Fundamental Rights of

the European Union 2009.

31 Supremacy and Italy
Art, 11 of The Italian Cons%tu%on permit such limita%ons of

sovereignty as are necessary to an organiza%on which
ensures peace and jus%ce between na%onals.
In FronRni, the Italian Cons;tu;onal court while accep;ng the
direct eect of Community law and conrming Italy's
competence to ra;fy the EC trea;es, the Cons;tu;onal court
expressed similar reserva;ons to those of the German court.
In par;cular, although it accepted the eec;veness of
Community law within its proper eld of applica;on, the
Italian court conrmed that it would con%nue to review the
exercise of power by the 'organs of the EEC' to ensure that
there was no infringement of fundamental rights or of the
basic principles of the Italian cons%tu%onal order.

32
In the case of Fragd in which the Italian Cons;tu;onal

court stated that even where the ECJ had upheld the
validity under EC law of a Community measure, that
measure would not be applied in Italy if it contravened a
fundamental principle of the Italian Cons%tu%on
concerning human rights protec%on.

33
Unlike Fron:ni, the Fragd decision shows that the

Cons;tu;onal court is willing to test the consistency of
individual rules of Community law with the fundamental
principles for the protec;on of human rights that are
contained in the Italian Cons;tu;on. This signicantly
widens the way for the exercise by the Cons;tu;onal court
of a control which has hitherto been only theore;cal.

34
Nonetheless, the Italian jurisprudence suggests a rela;vely

smooth rela;onship, certainly in prac;ce, between the two
legal orders, while ul;mate or residual cons;tu;onal
control over the domes;c applicability of EC law is in
theory retained by the Italian judiciary.

35 UK and EU supremacy
In United Kingdom, there was considerable hesita;on in

the early years on the ques;on of primacy, but in 1979 the
Court of Appeal in Macarthys Ltd. Vs Smith were prepared
on the basis of the European CommuniRes Act 1972, s.
2(4), to give European law priority. Lord Denning MR stated
that we are en%tled to look to the Treaty as an aid to its
construc%on: and even more, not only as an aid but as an
overriding force. He went on to say that if our legisla%on
is decient or is inconsistent with Community law, then it
is our bounden duty to give priority to Community law.

36
The current Bri;sh posi;on is found in the ruling of the

House of Lords in Factortame Ltd. Vs Secretary of State for
Transport. Lord Bridge suggested that if it were found that
the BriRsh Act was in breach of the claimants directly
eecRve Community rights, la_er rights would prevail
over the contrary provisions of the domesRc Act.
Subsequently, aqer the ruling of the ECJ, the HL
unanimously granted interim remedy which was not at the
;me available under na;onal law for ensuring eec;ve
protec;on for individuals' Community rights.

37
The cases Thoburn, Hunt, Harman and Dove and Collins are also
interes;ng on this issue. They concerned the so-called metric
martyrs who refused to use metric weights as well as imperial
weights as required under EU law. They were convicted under the
Weights and Measures Act 1985 and a number of other statutory
instruments and appealed to the High Court. The case was heard
by Sir John Laws, who dismissed the appeals. He reiterated the
tradi%onal view about the basis of the supremacy of EU law in
the UK, basing it on the cons%tu%onal law of the UK rather than
on principles of EU law. He stated that the European
Communi%es Act 1972 is a cons%tu%onal statute which means
that it cannot be impliedly repealed by a later inconsistent
statute. Hence it would prevail over later statutes which were
inconsistent. However, he went on to comment that:


38
In the event, which no doubt would never happen in the

real world, that European measure was seen to be
repugnant to a fundamental or consRtuRonal right
guaranteed by the law of England, a quesRon would arise
whether the general words of the ECA were sucient to
incorporate the measure and give it overriding eect in
domesRc law. It is instrucRve to compare the abtude
towards EU law in other Member States.

39
Thus the Bri;sh courts have been willing to accord

supremacy to directly eec;ve EU law, by applying EU law
directly, in priority over na;onal law.
However, both Lord Denning in Macarthys Ltd. Vs Smith
and Lord Diplock in Garland have made it clear that if
Parliament expressly a_empt to repudiate its EU
obligaRons the courts would be obliged to give eect to
its wishes.

40
In Duke Vs GEC Reliance Ltd. the HL stated that ECA 1972,

s. 2(1) and (4), applied and only applied, to EU law which
was directly eec%ve.
However, in Lister the HL stated that where legislaRon had
been introduced specically in order to implement an EC
direcRve, UK courts must interpret domesRc law to
comply with the direcRve, if necessary 'supplying the
necessary words by implicaRon' in order to achieve a
result compaRble with EC law. (i.e. indirect eect)

41
On the other hand, in R Vs. BriRsh Coal CorporaRon ex

parte Vardy it was not possible to follow Litster.
Thus in the absence of ambiguity or evidence that,
Parliament intended UK law to have the meaning
contended for or where there is clear conict between
domes;c and EU law, it seems that the Bri;sh courts will
be reluctant to apply the VolColson principle, par;cularly as
extended by the ECJ in Marleasing. This appears to have
been acknowledged by the ECJ in Wagner Miret.

42
Where it is not possible for na;onal courts

to give indirect eect to EU direc;ves,
enforcement of EU law should be leq to
the European Commission under Art. 226,
or, now, to an ac;on against the State
under Francovich, as suggested by the
Court in Dori and Wagner Miret.

43 Treaty Establishing the
Constitution for Europe
Supremacy of EU law was explicitly stated in the proposed

Treaty Establishing the Cons%tu%on for Europe but,
following its rejec;on in the referenda in France in May
and the Netherlands in June 2005, this Treaty has not been
ra;ed by the Member States.

44 Academic opinion
The rela;onship between the European Conven;on on Human Rights

and EC law provides an interes;ng view as might be observed from
the ar;cle `KOMPETENZ, KOMPETENZ' by Richard Gordon QC
(Counsel, March 2007). The ra;onale for the European Conven;on on
Human Rights is, as might be expected, rather dierent from that in
EC law. The Conven;on was largely designed to guarantee rights that
had been trampled on during the holocaust. It is a moral as opposed
to an economic founda;on that is required to provide con;nuing and
eec;ve protec;on for fundamental rights. Historically, the ECJ was
resistant to the idea that human rights were either intrinsic to the
Treaty or part of the general principles of EC law. This posi;on
reected the tension, as between domes;c law and EC law, inherent
in the then developing concept of EC law supremacy. If a Member
State were to free to depart from uniform provisions of EC law then,
axioma;cally, EC law could not be supreme

45 Who is the ultimate arbiter? The battle over
judicial supremacy in EU law.
AsteriosPliakos; Georgios Anagnostaras
European Law Review 2011
The eminent Lisbon ruling of the German Federal Cons:tu:onal Court brought the
legal debate over the competence of na:onal courts to review the legality of EU law
and to assert on their own mo:on the invalidity of the acts of the EU ins:tu:ons once
more to the proscenium. Less than two years later, the Court of Jus:ce appears
resolute to preserve its preroga:ves over the interpreta:on and applica:on of EU law
at all costs and to rule out any concessions that could be interpreted as a back door
to its subordina:on to the authority of the na:onal cons:tu:onal courts. The German
Cons:tu:onal Court, for its part, seems to reserve the exercise of its proclaimed
capacity to scru:nise respect for the principle of conferral by the EU ins:tu:on to
very excep:onal situa:ons in prac:ce, otherwise accep:ng the interpreta:ve
authority of the Court of Jus:ce and the importance of the preliminary reference
procedure. It thus appears to move towards a posi:on similar to that adopted under
its human rights case law, in that it accepts in principle the current validity review
mechanism prescribed by the trea:es, so long as this does not prove manifestly
inopera:ve in the context of a given case.

46 Conclusion
So aqer a unstable start, the courts of the Member States

have now broadly accepted the principle of supremacy of
EC law provided they regard it as directly eec;ve. The
point to note here is that in each system it seems that the
na;onal courts have accepted supremacy on the terms of
their cons;tu;onal system. That is, they argued for the
supremacy of Community law on the basis of na;onal legal
provisions, not the provisions of Community law itself.
Their acceptance of supremacy is thus, to a certain extent,
condi;onal,

47 Alternative conclusion
In summary, a provision of Community law always prevails

over na;onal law. This rule cannot be found in any of the
Trea;es but has been proclaimed with great emphasis by the
European Court. It applies irrespec;ve of the nature of the
Community provision, whether founding Treaty, Community
act or agreement with a non-member State, and the nature of
the na;onal provision, be it the cons;tu;on, a statute or
subordinate legisla;on. It also applies irrespec;ve of whether
the Community provision came into force before or aqer the
na;onal provision: in all cases the na;onal provision must give
way to Community law.

48 Article
hBp://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/IntTBLawRw/
2004/8.html
hBp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1886022

Supremacy of Eu Law 2016-17 PDF

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Supremacy of Eu Law 2016-17 PDF

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

SUPREMACY

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

1 Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

2 Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

When-states come together to make trea;es,

At the incep;on of the EU Trea;es, it was widely assumed

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

The answer would be by legisla;on.

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

The Court of Jus;ce had to wait only two years to produce a

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

According to Paul Craig what comes across most

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

The message from the Court of Jus;ce was very clear; EU

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Even if it is not clear whether a person actually has a right

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

MONIST APPROACH- e.g. France

DULAIST APPROACH- e.g. UK

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

France's legal order has two court systems:

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

The Conseil dEtat, the supreme administra%ve court,

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

However, in Raoul Georges Nicolo the Conseil d'Etat nally

The Consiel of dEtat has also, since Nicolo recognized the

In Rothmans and Arizona Tobacco (1993), it awarded

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

German cons;tu;onal Court adhering to their own tradi;onal

In Stauder (1969) the Court of Jus;ce responded posi;vely

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

The ECJ emphasized in Hauer (1979) that fundamental

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

In Wijnsche HandesgesellschaT (Solange II) (1987),

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Nonetheless, in Brunner v The European Union Treaty

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Consider the impact of Charter of Fundamental Rights of

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Art, 11 of The Italian Cons%tu%on permit such limita%ons of

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

In the case of Fragd in which the Italian Cons;tu;onal

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Unlike Fron:ni, the Fragd decision shows that the

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Nonetheless, the Italian jurisprudence suggests a rela;vely

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

In United Kingdom, there was considerable hesita;on in

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

The current Bri;sh posi;on is found in the ruling of the

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

In the event, which no doubt would never happen in the

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

Thus the Bri;sh courts have been willing to accord

Barrister Sayed-Ul-Haque Dinar

In Duke Vs GEC Reliance Ltd. the HL stated that ECA 1972,