Cyber Jihad

A Brief on Current Activities

Cyber jihadis make significant use of the Internet as a resource for communication and
for community building. They are using the Internet as a platform to quickly and
effortlessly export their brand of extremist propaganda that radicalizes Islam in their view
using the Internet as a virtual training camp. The Internet is used as both a transport and
tool by these groups and can also be used as a weapon. Virtual dead drops are marked by
online code words embedded in propaganda found in online communities or hidden in
images. This strategy follows early use by jihadis in using Western infrastructure as
weapons against us.

Current activities on the Internet include the publishing of many documents relative to
their efforts. Some of these documents include:
The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook
The Technical Mujahid
The alQaeda Training Manual

Over the past several years, what was once easy to find on the Internet has been driven to
online communities requiring userid and password verification for access. Proper vetting
takes unknown twists and turns and you never know if you may be allowed access into
these sites or not. Regardless, there effort has become of war of images and ideas being
waged on the Internet in online communities, chat rooms, blogs, and publications that are
easily accessible, easily transmitted and shared, and easily created. Jihadis are recruited
in chat rooms and have access to a multitude of videos (actually scores of hundreds) and
MP3s that help persuade young men to commit acts of terror or commit suicide.

Figure 1 - Jihadi Chat Room

 Extremist jihadis (EJ) worldwide are exploiting the
Internet to pursue a massive and far-reaching media
campaign. Their media arms such as As-Sahab are
forming perceptions of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan among the best-educated and most
influential segment of the Arab population. This is
evidenced by the contributors to the Arabic
language publication Technical Mujahid.
Respected authors with doctoral degrees are
publishing matter of fact articles detailing how to
use global positioning systems to triangulate; how
to use cell phones to remotely detonate improvised
explosive device (IEDs) or how to secretly and with
the utmost stealth steal documents or hide them
using steganography. The EJ propaganda network
does not have a headquarters, bureaucracy, or
brick-and-mortar infrastructure. It is decentralized,
fast-moving, and technologically adaptive. There is
little to counter this torrent of daily press releases,
weekly and monthly magazines, ebooks, video
clips, podcasts, full-length films, and even
television channels.

The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook is quite

detailed in how to create poisons from plants, and
over the counter chemicals. This book explains how
to make homemade poisons. Here is the table of
contents:

Figure 2 Jihadi Media

Introduction Phosphorus
Homemade Poisons Poisonous Gases
Nicotine (from Tobacco)
Alkaloid of Potato Hydrogen Sulphide Gas
Ricin Chlorine
Betaluminum Poison Hydrogen Cyanide Gas
Poisonous Toadstools Fusogen (Nerve Gas)
Chemical Poisons Nitrous Oxide: NO (Laughing Gas)
Arsenic Oxide Carbon Monoxide
Sodium Nitrite On Using Gases
Cyanides Poisonous / Useful Drugs
Sodium Azide Anaesthesia
Mercuric Nitrate Chloroform
Poisonous Elements Di-phenyl Ether
Thallium Halothane
Dust of Diamond Methoxythurane
M.Ahter Poisons Hydrogen Sulphide (HS) Gas
Cyanides Cobalt Chloride (CoCl)
Analene (CHNH) Alcolite Poison
Touching Poisons Castor Beans (Ricin) Poison

Careful examination of the electronic document shows that has errors, authored by
someone without any major training in chemistry nature of
simple compounds and procedures.

The al Qaeda Training Manual was

discovered in a search of an al Qae-da
member's home in England and entered
into the public record in the January
2001 trial of the embassy bombings in
Africa, the manual includes a page
devoted to explaining how to purify
ricin from castor beans to blowing up bridges. An excerp is
below:

The overthrow of the godless regimes and their replacement with an Islamic regime.
Other missions consist of the following:
1. Gathering information about the enemy, the land, the installations, and the
neighbors.
2. Kidnaping enemy personnel, documents, secrets, and arms.
3. Assassinating enemy personnel as well as foreign tourists.
4. Freeing the brothers who are captured by the enemy.
5. Spreading rumors and writing statements that instigate people against the
enemy.
6. Blasting and destroying the places of amusement, immorality, and sin; not a
vital target.
7. Blasting and destroying the embassies and attacking vital economic centers.
8. Blasting and destroying bridges leading into and out of the cities.

The al Qaeda training manual was translated in its entirety and made into an Adobe
Acrobat file prior to September 11. With some searching copies can still be found on the
Internet now making it fully available to anyone with a bit of patience.
Islamophobia

Much has been made about Islamophobia in the press as Muslims speak out against the
discrimination perceived and actual that is carried out against Islam. There are many
sides to this discussion but suffice to say this article focuses on EJ groups and their vocal
minority that paints a negative picture of Islam as a whole. Recent examples of various
phobias can be seen with the Rachel Ray incident where she an ad for Dunkin Donuts
was shelved since she was wearing a kafiyeh. Other instances of phobias even concern
Christians as evidenced by a series of events where three Christians were killed in Turkey
or the wearing of crucifixes was banned in schools in Northern Ireland. Regardless, anti-
Islam fervor increased
significantly after 9/11 and it
does exist. I do not condone
nor support discrimination of
this type in any shape or form
but only focus on the
distortions provided by the
EJs.

The Bombing of the USS Cole

Most in the United States see
the bombing of the USS Cole
as an act of terrorism, plain
and simple. In the eyes of the
EJs, this was simply an act of
asymmetrical
adversarialism/warfare.
Asymmetric warfare

Figure 3 Islamophobia originally referred to war

between two or more actors or
groups whose relative military power differs significantly. Contemporary military
thinkers tend to broaden this to include asymmetry of strategy or tactics; today
"asymmetric warfare" can describe a conflict in which the resources of two belligerents
differ in essence and in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each other's
characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of
unconventional warfare, the "weaker"
combatants attempting to use strategy to offset
deficiencies in quantity or quality while using the
strongers infrastructure as a weapon against
them.

Figure 4 Cole Bombing If the inferior power is in an aggressive position,

however, and/or turns to tactics prohibited by the
laws of war (jus in bello), its success depends on the superior power's refraining from like
tactics. For example, the law of land warfare prohibits the use of a flag of truce or
clearly-marked medical vehicles as cover for an attack or ambush, but an asymmetric
combatant using this prohibited tactic to its advantage depends on the superior power's
obedience to the corresponding law. Similarly, laws of warfare prohibit combatants from
using civilian settlements, populations or facilities as military bases, but when an inferior
power uses this tactic, it depends on the premise that the superior power will respect the
law that the other is violating, and will not attack that civilian target, or if they do the
propaganda advantage will outweigh the material loss. As seen in most conflicts of the
20th and 21st centuries, this is highly unlikely as the propaganda advantage has always
outweighed adherence to international law, especially by dominating sides of any
conflict.

But in the case of the EJs, Christian made laws of war are not valid. They are not laws
made from the same religious beliefs as the final, true religion, that being Islam. It begs
the question of those in the West, Why would we believe our laws to govern those with
different beliefs?

In the modern context, asymmetric warfare is increasingly considered a component of

fourth generation warfare (The simplest definition includes any war in which one of the
major participants is not a state but rather a violent ideological network). When practiced
outside the laws of war, it is often defined as terrorism, though rarely by its practitioners
or their supporters.

The other view is that asymmetric warfare is not synonymous with terrorism. It is typical,
in an asymmetric conflict, for the stronger side to accuse the weaker side of being
bandits, pillagers or terrorists. These accusations are usually part of propaganda
campaigns, although they are sometimes true. Some argue that asymmetric warfare is
called "terrorism" by those wishing to deny the political aims of their weaker opponents
and to exploit the negative connotations of the word. There are those who hold the view
that "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." An example of this is over
Kashmir: the Pakistanis claim that a war of freedom for the Kashmiris is being fought
with the Indians, who in turn, label them as terrorists. The Iraqi insurgency is similarly
labeled as terrorism by its opponents and resistance by its supporters. Some would also
say that the freedom fighter Mujahideen of Afghanistan of the 80s who the United States
fully supported (Charlie Wilsons War), are now the insurgents and terrorists we fight
there today.

As described by Bryce Lane in On Fifth Generation Warfare?, technology gives to

ever smaller groups down even to individuals, ever larger potential for creating physical,
political and masspsychological disturbances far out of proportion to their numbers. The
battle for hearts and minds has moved to the virtual airwaves. The targeted population or
organization is used as the weapon itself, not simply a target. The goal is to create mass
reactions gratifying to the inside psychology of the initiating group, to play a script.
The primary weapon is the initiating attack, the larger secondary weapon-the reaction.
This reaction is where the potential for greater trouble lies. The event is simply a
blasting cap; the real explosion is the reaction and what spins from it.
 Types of Jihad

There are many types of Jihad that focus on struggle the root of the word. Jihad is
essential throughout all cultures; we just tend to call it different things. We struggle in
our daily lives to get ahead economically or to elect someone that fits our views. We
struggle at work to gain knowledge or get the inside track. The EJs use different forms of
Jihad for personal and organizational gains to the
end goal that being the expansion of their
extremist brand of Islam and the removal of
Western influences in Muslim lands.

Web 2.0

The use of online tools such as Second Life and

YouTube-like sites exemplifies the technological
prowess of the EJs. Second Life has been used to

Figure 5 Types of Jihad demonstrate:

The bombing ABC headquarters
The flying of a helicopter into Nissan building
Shoot customers in apparel store
The online registration of 3 jihadi terrorists groups including the Second Life
Liberation Army
How to launder money across borders

The use of these tools appeals to the younger masses or those we call Milennials who are
technically astute, somewhat dissillusioned and who represent the future of the
movement.

Virtual Tools of the Trade

There are several tools of the trade including

version two of Mujahideen Secrets, a Gnu-PGP
like encryption tool. Encryption
The Global Islamic Media Front
developed Mujahideen Secrets with
encryption, compression, and file
shredding
256 bit symmetric (AES)
2048 bit asymmetric keys
Software can be used from thumb
drive

What is unique about Mujahideen Secrets is Figure 6 Mujahideen Secrets

not the technology but the demonstration of
a mature software development lifecycle (SDLC) with marketing presentation
discussing new features and functionality. Once readily available on the Internet,
this tool has been driven to limited accessiblity based upon access to online
communities or via access required chat rooms.

Another tool that has a unique flavor is the Electronic Jihad 3.0 program.
Demonstrating again a mature SDLC, version three offers the ability to perform a
denial of service against websites. The ability to add IP addresses, ranges or IP
addresses or strings allows for a fire and forget capability that can be triggered
from their virtual machine image while the perpetrator goes out for dinner or
coffee. The tool:
Handles different Internet speeds (so low and slow is possible)
Use proxies to override website blocking
Sets up accounts in online communities for tracking
Gives awards to those who spend most time attacking targets and have
most successful attacks (the most successful known to date was by a
gentlemen going by the handle George Bush who ran his attacks for 72
straight days)

The tool is not unique by hacker standards but the incorporation of the video
game scoring does add an attraction to the younger set.

Education

Over the past couple of decades, United States and other Western universities
have been innundated with foreign nationals seeking an education in computer
science. The EJs have
purposefully sent small
numbers of students to learn
computer science and
imparticular, computer security
and computer network attacks.
In addition, EJs have actively
recruited these students as they
return to their native countries,
many times without the
prospect of employment. The
skills learned in the Western
universities are being used by
these extremist groups to
support their efforts on the
Internet. One such instance is
the story of Irhabi 007.
Moving from North Africa with Figure 7 Electronic Jihad 3.0
his family in 2000, Younes
Tsouli enrolled in Westminster College in London. His course of study was
computer science.
 In 2007 he was found
guilty of incitement to
commit acts of terrorism
(a crime introduced in
the Terrorism Act 2006)
and sentenced to 16
years in prison. His
crimes were carried out
via the internet, where
he was known by
several pseudonyms
based on variations of
Irhabi 007; "Irhabi"
being the Arabic word
for "terrorist", and
"007" a reference to the
fictional British secret
agent James Bond.
Tsouli's activities
included the setting up
of web sites and web
forums in support of al-
Qaeda, and distributing
video material filmed by
the Iraqi insurgency.
His primary co-
conspirators were
takfiris Waseem
Mughal and Tariq Al-
Daour. Their activities
were funded by Al-
Daour, who was found
to be in possession of
37,000 credit card
details, which were
linked to more than 2.5
million Euros worth of
fraudulent transactions.
Tsouli has been called
the "world's most
Figure 8 AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI wanted cyber-jihadist",
and his conviction was the first under British law for incitement to commit an act
of terrorism through the internet
Summary

Anyone with an internet connection can access EJ media products directly. The
delivery platform and nature of the material offered up by the EJs suggest that the
primary target audience is young, technically savvy, educated, and often middle-
class or abovea generation that will shape the future of the Arab world.
Most of the audiovisual material is packaged in forms that require a high-speed
Internet connection to download files running to several hundred megabytes
(although smaller files are also available for users with dial-up connections). And
because the bulk of audiovisual materials are available for downloading, not
viewing online, they are best accessed at home, rather than from an Internet caf,
where downloading may not be advisable (because of surveillance) or possible
(because of restrictions). Individual users can also reformat downloaded materials
as DVDs or audiocassettes for local distribution.

Current educational efforts at training would-be EJs focus on computer science

with the results seen in hacker tool developments. Much of this education takes
place in Western universities with a shift moving to other global locations as
computer science takes center stage at some educational institutions.

In short, the use of Western infrastructures as a mechanism for communication

and a potential mechanism for violence is key to the EJ strategy in their struggles
to spread their word and their brand of extremist Islam. Their messages and
actions help foment negative perceptions of Islam and contribute to Islamophobia.
Make no mistake; they do present a clear and present danger to law abiding
Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In order to effectively combat and thwart their
efforts we need to fully understand asymmetrical adversarialism and modify our
rules of engagement as required.

JSB