Some Aporias in Heideggers Analysis of the World in Being and Time

Roberto Rubio

Heideggers analysis about the world in Being and Time can be understood in terms of a
unitary concept of the world, namely, the world as a horizon of the understanding of being. Thus
understood, the world has the following peculiarity: it is both a structural moment of the Dasein
(an existential), and also is in a twofold relation: on the one hand, with regard to Dasein itself;
on the other hand, with respect to the innerworldly entities.

In the attempt to describe this peculiar structure of twofold relationship, Heidegger

sometimes loses the balance and, consequently, the analysis incurs in serious aporias. In the
present paper I will analyze some of them.

1. The relationship with the world as a criterion of ontological differentiation.

Heidegger describes this twofold relationship, constitutive of the world, in terms of

worldliness and innerworldliness. The entity called Dasein is primarily worldly, while
beings that are not Dasein are innerworldly. Heidegger characterizes Dasein as worldy to
indicate that its mode of being (which also is called Dasein) consists in a relation with the
world in terms of a world-configurator (Weltbildung). This relationship is called being-in. On
the other hand, innerworldly entities are not world-configurators, but rather they appear inside
the world. 1

As it can be seen, this relationship with the world functions as a criterion for
distinguishing between different modes of being: that is, that of beings that are Dasein, on the
one hand, and that of innerworldly entities, on the other.

Now, the relation with the world operates also as a criterion of distinction in a second
sense. It is criterion for the distinction between ontological approaches. Here the key is the

1
For Heidegger, the entity which mode of being is Dasein can also appear in the world. The difference
with the innerworldy entities (tools and things at hand) is that these can only appear in the world and
hence, its appearing is relative to the Dasein.
opposition between two alternatives: the process of world-configuring, on one side, and the one
of de-worldling, on the other. Lets look at this in more detail.

Heidegger characterizes the field of metaphysical (or, more precisely, ontological)

debate through the opposition between two fundamental perspectives: on the one hand, the
ontology directed towards the mode of being called Dasein; on the other, the ontology directed
towards a certain conception of presence, which Heidegger calls Vorhandenheit. As
paradigmatic exemplars of such conception Heidegger points to Cartesian philosophy, modern
science, and even Husserl.

Notwithstanding the above, it is not that Dasein and Vorhandenheit are the only modes of
being. Heidegger also describes others, such as the Zuhandenheit. However, in his attempt to
reconstruct the metaphysical debate, Dasein and Vorhandenheit are two specific modes of being
that function as reference points for opposing philosophical perspectives.

Heideggers approach to this can be reconstructed in the following way: First, what is at
hand (Vorhandenes) appears as something ascertainable, as a center of properties, disconnected
from any relation with the environment. However, this is only possible by a process of un-
worldliness. For instance, the objects that appear in everyday experience, as well as the objects
of scientific study, are possible due to this process.

Second, when Dasein takes the Vorhandenes as a reference point for its self-
understanding, both in everyday life and in scientific and philosophical conceptions, it takes
itself as an isolated object, without context, primarily accessible only in an experience of
ascertainment. By doing this, the Dasein ignores its configuration-of-horizon structure. The
process of unworldliness that occurs initially in the experience of everyday objects is then
continued in scientific-philosophical self-understanding. If, on the other hand, Dasein takes as a
reference point for its self-interpretation its own world-configuring relationship with the world, it
can properly hold itself as such, both in practical life as well as in the philosophical experience.
This is, at least, Heideggers aim.

According to the above, the opposition between Dasein and Vorhandenheit corresponds
to two modes of self-understanding: one, which makes transparent the process of worldliness (or,
as we said, the world-configuring process), and another, which disguises and conceals it.
2. Aporias in the conception of the world

As we have just seen, this twofold constitutive relation of the world (worldliness and
innerworldliness, specially the innerworldliness of the Vorhandenes) is of great importance, both
for the development of the analytic of Dasein and for the positioning of Heideggers proposal in
the field of the ontological debate.

However, this twofold relation of the world (with respect to Dasein and entities that are
not Dasein) is not always properly conceived in Being and Time. As I said, Heidegger sometimes
loses balance and falls into extreme positions.

2.1. First aporia: World and inauthenticity.

After emphasizing the common character of the world in everyday life (SZ 26),
Heideggers analysis focuses on the phenomenon that the relations between coexistent beings of
the everyday world are leveled in terms of instrumental relations. In earlier passages, this was
stated in terms of the understanding of the world as ontologically reflected back upon the
interpretation of Da-sein (BT 14; SZ 16). In 26, Heidegger states: Da-sein understands itself,
initially and for the most part, in terms of its world, and the Mitda-sein of others is frequently
encountered from innerworldly things at hand. (BT; SZ 120). One's own Da-sein, like the
Mitda-sein of others, is encountered, initially and for the most part, in terms of the world-
together in the surrounding world taken care of. In being absorbed in the world of taking care of
things, that is, at the same time in being-with toward others, Da-sein is not itself. (BT; SZ 125).
As it can be seen, the analysis suggests that the significance is eo ipso the place of the improper
existence.

Regarding the relation between impropriety and worldliness of Dasein, one could say the
following: improper experience of oneself and others, guided by instrumental criteria and not in
relation with the peculiarity of the who in every case, presupposes, in fact, the complex of
instrumental remissions of the surrounding world, together with the structure of the common
world, that is, the community of ends and possibilities of action. However, the character of the
world of the Dasein does not lead directly and necessarily to impropriety. The self-concealment
can not be immediately derived from being-in-the-World, distinctive of the Dasein.
 Against the interpretation that equates significance and impropriety, it is necessary to
emphasize the very structure of being-in-the-World. If the world were simply the place of
impropriety, Dasein itself would be a self without a world. Then, the formula being-in-the-
World would lose its sense and would fall into a flagrant contradiction. In a later passage of
Being and Time, Heidegger explicitly rejects this possibility: As authentic being a self,
resoluteness does not detach Da-sein from its world, nor does it isolate it as free floating ego.
How could it, if resoluteness as authentic disclosedness is, after all, nothing other than
authentically being-inthe-world? (BT 274; SZ 298)

The passages of Being and Time in which the world appears as the context of Daseins
improper experience can be explained, in the first place, as a terminological misunderstanding. In
them, world means the being of innerworldly entities (whether in Zuhandheit or Vorhandenheit
terms). According to the conceptual framework of Being and Time, the word world should be
written here between quotation marks, such as in this fragment: As an authentic potentiality for
being a self, Da-sein has initially always already fallen away from itself and fallen prey to the
world. (BT 164; SZ 175)

However, these difficulties cannot be completely dissipated by referring to the careless

use of the term world. Recall that Heidegger contrasts both being itself and world, as
alternative reference points for the experience of itself:

Understanding can turn primarily to the disclosedness of the world, that is, Da-sein can
understand itself initially and for the most part in terms of the world. Or else understanding
throws itself primarily into the for-the-sake-of-which, which means Da-sein exists as itself. (BT
137; SZ 146)

In this passage, not only is the term world used inappropriately it should have been
written between quotation marks-, but also the term itself is used in a way that leads to
confusion. The quote suggests a false alternative. Actually, it is not a choice between
understanding oneself in terms of the itself or in terms of the world. The alternatives should have
been offered in the following way: Dasein can be understood either in terms of the being of the
innerworldliness, or from itself, in terms of being-in-the-World. Therefore, the issue is not about
the contrast between itself and world, but rather about the difference between the modes of being
of the Dasein and of the innerworldly entities, respectively.
 As it is seen, the impropriety does not consist in the character of the world of the Dasein,
but rather in a specific configuration of the itself and the world. From this, the following question
arises: Why does Heidegger mistakenly transfer the contrast between Dasein and the innerworldy
to the difference between itself and world? What is the reason for all this confusion?

These inaccuracies and difficulties in Heideggers exposition can be interpreted as signs

of the fact that he did not always live up to his own project, which aim to make explicit the
difference between Dasein and the modes of being of innerworldliness, in connection with the
difference internal to Dasein- between itself and world. Sometimes, Heidegger loses the balance
required to analyze the world in its twofold relation towards Dasein and towards the
innerworldy entities- and falls into the tendency to regard the world mainly as a horizon for the
experience of innerworldliness. From this tendency, the general formula, according to which
Dasein understands itself from its world, is used in a very particular sense, namely: regarding the
case in which the horizon of self-understanding is structured towards the mode of being of
Zuhandenes or Vorhandenes. And as soon as it is suggested that the world without quotation
marks- is equivalent as a general title for the modes of being of the innerworldliness, then the
structure of the itself, understood as an index of the mode of being called Dasein, is also wrongly
opposed.

The phenomenon of everyday instrumentalization of relations between subjects in

coexistence leads the analysis into confusion, given that confronts it with the following: first,
with the structure of Dasein in relation towards itself in- and from-the-World; and second, with
the structure of Dasein as typically self-understood from the mode of being of the entity that
appears within the world: the quotidian Dasein is oriented, not according with its own mode of
being, but according the mode of being of the things in the world. This conveys the false
impression that the world is tantamount to the modes of being of Zuhandenheit and
Vorhanderheit.

Now, this confusion is only a marginal tendency in the analytic of Dasein. On the
contrary, the driving tendency holds that the itself and the world must be analyzed from the
unitary structure of being-in-the-World. This can be seen in the formal structure of the analysis:
to the initial topics regarding the world and the itself, follows the analysis of the being-in. This
analysis, elaborated by means of the doctrine of the disclosedness (Erschlossnheit), offers a more
fine-grained conceptual framework for the study of the question of the world.

2.2. Second Aporia: World and Insignificance

In his analysis of angst, Heidegger states that the world appears as such in the experience
of insignificance and inhospitality. At a first glance, this is a contradictory statement, given the
characterization of the world as significance in 18. Several interpreters, with E. Tugendhat
among them, have stressed this point.2

Does the analysis of angst lead to a description of the world that contradicts the
characterization of 18? No. On the contrary, the analysis about angst sheds light on the structure
of the world, and especially on its constitutive twofold relation. For Heidegger, angst provokes
the break of the self-understanding towards the innerworldly, and at the same time, it makes
possible an appropriate determination of the relation between the itself and the world. Lets look
at this in more detail.

In everyday perspective, that which one is angst about is neither nothing nor
nowhere. In nothing and nowhere, is expressed the complete insignificance (BT 175; SZ
187). By saying this, Heidegger does not argue that things simply disappear during angst. They
are still there. The point is that one cannot do anything with them in order to remove the angst.
The wide spectrum of possible ways of conducting oneself is irrelevant. The configuration of
self-understanding and the relationship with others towards instrumental referrals clashes against
the indeterminate character of angst. In this loss of meaning and orientation Heidegger sees the
experience of the difference between being-in-the-world and innerworldliness.

For Heidegger, in this experience of difference it appears to the Dasein his non-
innerworldliness. It is the experience that I am in the world, but not as innerworldly. What angst
affects is not the relation to the innerworldly entity, but rather the habitual orientation towards
the innerworldly in our relationship to oneself and others.3 Dasein experiences that it is not an

2
Tugendhat states that Heidegger abruptly introduces a concept of world that is substantially different
from 18. (Tugendhat (1970) 313). Against this view, see Figal (2000) 196, and Kalariparambil (2001)
260, 263.
3
The insignificance of the world disclosed in Angst reveals the nullity of what can be taken care of, that
is, the impossibility of projecting oneself upon a potentiality-of-being primarily based upon what is taken
care of. (BT 315; SZ 343)
innerworldly entity, but not because the innerworldliness disappears. The non-innerworldliness
comes to light when Dasein understands that it is not possible to eliminate the threat of angst by
a certain behavior. In this sense, Heidegger states that on the basis of this insignificance of what
is innerworldly, the world is all that obtrudes itself in its worldliness. (BT 175, SZ 187)

The positive side of the experience of difference with the innerworldly is the return to the
demand and task of being, which are at the basis of each concrete action. It is a break with the
usual experience of the world, which in turn allows for a clarifying access to the world. This is
what Heidegger refers to with his statement that the in the face of which one is anxious is
"nothing, that is, the world as such" (BT 175; SZ 187). Nothing here indicates the nothing of
the innerworldly, in the sense of the rupture of the instrumentalization of relations between
Dasein. This occurs when Dasein is confronted with the ultimate facticity of what is and must
be. The requirement of having to be brings Dasein to the nothingness of the innerworldly,
insofar as this requirement does not predetermine any concrete behavior, that is, the requirement
is not fulfilled by any concrete realization of the Dasein.

Now, this does not yet explain to what extent this nothing is the world. In order to
account for this, it is necessary to consider that the requirement of being (simply being, without
indications regarding certain ways of acting) is at the same time the requirement of being in the
world, with the innerworldly and with the others. The facticity of that it is and has to be 4 refers
Dasein to the already articulated world. While it does not prefigure any particular behavior, it
can only be corresponded to it through some concrete behavior. 5

According to Heidegger, angst does not only open the facticity of Dasein, but also its
character of being-possible (Mglichsein). While the in the face of which (wovor) one is
anxious is the being thrown into the world from the requirement of the being unavailable, the
about which (worum) of angst is the projecting being of Dasein. At the center of this
consideration is the phenomenon that to the Dasein its being is given to it as a task (aufgegeben).
Heidegger finds the giving of the own being as a task in the angst of death. In it, Dasein is

4
BT 127; SZ 134
5
In this sense, Figal says: The being in the opening of the entity is being towards the behave, and this is
shown when no behavior results; the indeterminate and imminent being is determinable in the behave, and
this is shown when one is unable to reach a determination(Figal (2000) 202).
confronted with the imminence of its death, and this means for Heidegger that in the angst
appears for the Dasein its own projecting being.

The opening of the about which in the angst is also characterized as the bringing before
the "being free for" the own Dasein (BT 176; SZ 188). This means that angst does not introduce
any particular lifestyle, but opens the possibility of a change of perspective during the
breakdown of everyday relationships. Such a modification of the reference point opens the way
for an appropriate configuration of the correlation between the itself and the world. Daseins
freedom must then be developed in correlation with the horizon of the world. In this sense, it can
be said that angst prepares the being for being free for the world. 6

As it can be seen, transparent access to the world, as outlined by the analytic of Dasein,
accounts for the twofold relationship of the world with respect both to the innerworldly and to
Dasein. The angst of death is the experience of the non-innerworldliness of Dasein as well as of
its status in the world and of its being free for the world.

3. Conclusions

A central feature of the notion of the world of Being and Time is that it is an existential
that is developed in a twofold relation, that is, in relation to Dasein and in relation to
innerworldly entities. Now, the tendency to consider the world only in relation to the experience
of the innerworldly entity has led Heidegger himself to mistakenly equate the world with the
modes of being of the innerworldly entity and consequently to understand the world as the place
and reference point for improper existence.

The influence of this twofold relationship, constitutive of the world, in the self-
understanding of Dasein has been especially developed in the analysis of angst. In emphasizing
the experience of insignificance, Heidegger does not deny that the world is the horizon of
meaning for Dasein's self-understanding. Rather, he tries to point out that a clarifying access to
the world takes place with the breakdown of everyday perspective. The belonging to the sense
horizon can only be shown when the perspective of being absorbed in the everyday world is
deactivated.

6
See BT 274; SZ 298: In the light of the for-the-sake-of-which of the potentiality-of-being which it has
chosen, resolute Da-sein frees itself for its world.