G.R. Nos.
83843-44 April 5, 1990 Petitioners now assign the following errors committed by respondent court, to wit:
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO
LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL
LABRADOR, petitioners-appellants, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 1 GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS
LABRADOR, respondents-appellees.
PARAS, J.:
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged holographic will of one Melecio Labrador
is dated, as provided for in Article 8102 of the New Civil Code.
The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the
Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was residing, leaving behind a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 1916 under Original Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs,
namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed
Labrador, and a holographic will.
On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and
Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a petition for the probate docketed as Special Proceeding No.
922-I of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.
Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), and
Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished
or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's
death, for the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No.
1916 and that as a matter of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled by T.C.T. No. T-21178. Earlier
however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos.
(Rollo, p. 37)
Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the
annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had
already acquired by devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed on
March 17, 1968, the complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I, being premised on the
fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.
After both parties had rested and submitted their respective evidence, the trial court rendered a joint
decision dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate of the holographic will and declaring null and
void the Deed of Absolute sale. The court a quo had also directed the respondents (the defendants in
Civil Case No. 934-I) to reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00 representing the redemption
price for the property paid by the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with legal interest thereon from December
20, 1976, when it was paid to vendee a retro.
Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals, which on March 10, 1988 modified said
joint decision of the court a quo by denying the allowance of the probate of the will for being undated
and reversing the order of reimbursement. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
decision was denied by the Court of Appeals, in the resolution of June 13, 1988. Hence, this petition.
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING AND APPROVING THE PROBATE OF
THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE TESTATOR MELECIO LABRADOR; and
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT
DIRECTING THE REIMBURSEMENT OF THE FIVE THOUSAND PESOS REPRESENTING THE
REDEMPTION PRICE WAS ERRONEOUS.
The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano translated into English, is quoted as follows:
ENGLISH INTERPRETATION OF THE WILL OF THE
LATE MELECIO LABRADOR WRITTEN IN ILOCANO
BY ATTY. FIDENCIO L. FERNANDEZ
I First Page
This is also where it appears in writing of the place which is assigned and shared or the partition in favor
of SAGRADO LABRADOR which is the fishpond located and known place as Tagale.
And this place that is given as the share to him, there is a measurement of more or less one hectare, and
the boundary at the South is the property and assignment share of ENRICA LABRADOR, also their sister,
and the boundary in the West is the sea, known as the SEA as it is, and the boundary on the NORTH is
assignment belonging to CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, who likewise is also their brother. That because it is
now the time for me being now ninety three (93) years, then I feel it is the right time for me to partition
the fishponds which were and had been bought or acquired by us, meaning with their two mothers,
hence there shall be no differences among themselves, those among brothers and sisters, for it is I
myself their father who am making the apportionment and delivering to each and everyone of them the
said portion and assignment so that there shall not be any cause of troubles or differences among the
brothers and sisters.
II Second Page
And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective
assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and
this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing
is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.
Now, this is the final disposition that I am making in writing and it is this that should be followed and
complied with in order that any differences or troubles may be forestalled and nothing will happen along
these troubles among my children, and that they will be in good relations among themselves, brothers
and sisters;
And those improvements and fruits of the land; mangoes, bamboos and all coconut trees and all others
like the other kind of bamboo by name of Bayog, it is their right to get if they so need, in order that there
shall be nothing that anyone of them shall complain against the other, and against anyone of the
brothers and sisters.
III THIRD PAGE
And that referring to the other places of property, where the said property is located, the same being the PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 10, 1988 is hereby REVERSED.
fruits of our earnings of the two mothers of my children, there shall be equal portion of each share The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED and ALLOWED probate. The private respondents
among themselves, and or to be benefitted with all those property, which property we have been able to are directed to REIMBURSE the petitioners the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). SO ORDERED.
acquire.

That in order that there shall be basis of the truth of this writing (WILL) which I am here hereof
manifesting of the truth and of the fruits of our labor which their two mothers, I am signing my signature
below hereof, and that this is what should be complied with, by all the brothers and sisters, the children
of their two mothers JULIANA QUINTERO PILARISA and CASIANA AQUINO VILLANUEVA Your father
who made this writing (WILL), and he is, MELECIO LABRADOR y RALUTIN (p. 46, Rollo)

The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated, although the date is not in
its usual place, is impressed with merit.

The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article
810.1wphi1 It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic
will, viz:

And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective
assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and
this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing
is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father. (emphasis supplied) (p. 46, Rollo)

The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only
requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These
requirements are present in the subject will.

Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator and his beneficiaries
entered into an agreement among themselves about "the partitioning and assigning the respective
assignments of the said fishpond," and was not the date of execution of the holographic will; hence, the
will is more of an "agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice of
other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply with Article 783 which
defines a will as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control
to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death."

Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is
plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was
not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing
was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the testator's instruction
or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate
property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a means to control the
disposition of his estate.

Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of the P5,000 representing the redemption price as
erroneous, respondent court's conclusion is incorrect. When private respondents sold the property
(fishpond) with right to repurchase to Navat for P5,000, they were actually selling property belonging to
another and which they had no authority to sell, rendering such sale null and void. Petitioners, thus
"redeemed" the property from Navat for P5,000, to immediately regain possession of the property for its
disposition in accordance with the will. Petitioners therefore deserve to be reimbursed the P5,000.
G.R. No. 145545 June 30, 2008
PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA, petitioner, vs. LUCIA D. ABENA, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking to reverse the Decision1dated October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 41756, which affirmed the Decision2 dated March 2, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66, Makati City. The RTC had declared the last will
and testament of Margarita S. Mayores probated and designated respondent Lucia
D. Abena as the executor of her will. It also ordered the issuance of letters
testamentary in favor of respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita S.
Mayores (Margarita) while respondent was the decedents lifelong companion since
1929.
On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending
heirs as her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her. She was survived
by her first cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia,
Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner.
Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament 3 on February 2,
1987 where she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property
located at Singalong Manila, consisting of 209.8 square meters, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1343 to respondent, Norma A. Pahingalo, and
Florentino M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. She likewise
bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property located at San
Antonio Village, Makati, consisting of 225 square meters, and covered by TCT No.
68920 to respondent, Isabelo M. Abena, and Amanda M. Abena in equal shares or
one-third portion each. Margarita also left all her personal properties to respondent
whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her will.
On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as SP Proc.
No. M-1531.
On October 27, 1987, respondent filed a petition for probate of the will of
Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1607
and consolidated with SP Proc. No. M-1531.
On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament
of Margarita probated and respondent as the executor of the will. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) declaring the will as probated;
2) declaring Lucia Abena as the executor of the will who will serve as such without a
bond as stated in paragraph VI of the probated will;
3) ordering the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of Lucia Abena.
So ordered.4
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of
Appeals, in a decision dated October 13, 2000, affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal having no merit in fact and
in law, is herebyORDERED DISMISSED and the appealed Decision of the trial
court AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with cost to oppositors-appellants.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, the instant petition citing the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT INVALIDATING THE WILL SINCE IT DID NOT
CONFORM TO THE FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY LAW;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR IN
NOT INVALIDATING THE WILL BECAUSE IT WAS PROCURED THROUGH
UNDUE INFLUENCE AND PRESSURE[;] AND
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING PETITIONER, HER SIBLINGS AND COUSIN AS THE LEGAL
HEIRS OF MARGARITA S. MAYORES AND IN NOT ISSUING LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION TO HER.6
Briefly stated, the issues are (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring
the will invalid for failure to comply with the formalities required by law, (2)
whether said court erred in not declaring the will invalid because it was procured
through undue influence and pressure, and (3) whether it erred in not declaring
petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita, and in not issuing letters
of administration to petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum,7 argues that Margaritas will failed to comply with
the formalities required under Article 8058 of the Civil Code because the will was
not signed by the testator in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and in the
presence of one another. She also argues that the signatures of the testator on
pages A, B, and C of the will are not the same or similar, indicating that they were
not signed on the same day. She further argues that the will was procured through
undue influence and pressure because at the time of execution of the will,
Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless and entirely dependent upon respondent and
her nephews for support, and these alleged handicaps allegedly affected her
freedom and willpower to decide on her own. Petitioner thus concludes that
Margaritas total dependence on respondent and her nephews compelled her to
sign the will. Petitioner likewise argues that the Court of Appeals should have
declared her and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita since they are her only
living collateral relatives in accordance with Articles 1009 9 and 101010 of the Civil
Code.
Respondent, for her part, argues in her Memorandum 11 that the petition for review
raises questions of fact, not of law and as a rule, findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme
Court. She also points out that although the Court of Appeals at the outset opined
there was no compelling reason to review the petition, the Court of Appeals
proceeded to tackle the assigned errors and rule that the will was validly executed,
sustaining the findings of the trial court that the formalities required by law were
duly complied with. The Court of Appeals also concurred with the findings of the
trial court that the testator, Margarita, was of sound mind when she executed the
will.
After careful consideration of the parties contentions, we rule in favor of
respondent.
We find that the issues raised by petitioner concern pure questions of fact, which
may not be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The issues that petitioner is raising now i.e., whether or not the will was signed by
the testator in the presence of the witnesses and of one another, whether or not
the signatures of the witnesses on the pages of the will were signed on the same
day, and whether or not undue influence was exerted upon the testator which
compelled her to sign the will, are all questions of fact.
This Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for review under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 112 of Rule 45 limits this Courts review
to questions of law only.
Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. When
supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless
the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 13
We find that this case does not involve any of the abovementioned exceptions.
Nonetheless, a review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by the Court of Appeals,
reveal that petitioners arguments lack basis. The RTC correctly held:
With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors [Paz Samaniego-Celada, et al.]
that the testator [Margarita Mayores] was not mentally capable of making a will at
the time of the execution thereof, the same is without merit. The oppositors failed
to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict the
presumption that the testator was of sound mind (See Article 800 of the Civil Code).
In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions,
attended to the testator months before her death, testified that Margarita Mayores
could engage in a normal conversation and he even stated that the illness of the
testator does not warrant hospitalization. Not one of the oppositors witnesses
has mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the testator during her
lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation of mental incapacity. The
testator may be admitted to be physically weak but it does not necessarily follow
that she was not of sound mind. [The] testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure
aforethought.
Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason
that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3) pages while
in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because the attestation is
not a part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the
attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of
the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as
stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must
be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and
C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the
pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is
the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation
clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with
the "doctrine of liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code
which reads:
"In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure
and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the
language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will
was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of Article 805."
The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the signatures of the
testator were affixed on different occasions based on their observation that the
signature on the first page is allegedly different in size, texture and appearance as
compared with the signatures in the succeeding pages. After examination of the
signatures, the court does not share the same observation as the oppositors. The
picture (Exhibit "H-3") shows that the testator was affixing her signature in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to
show that the first signature was procured earlier than February 2, 1987.
Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was exerted on the
testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture reveals that the testator was
in a good mood and smiling with the other witnesses while executing the subject
will (See Exhibit "H").
In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at
the time of its execution, that the notarial will presented to the court is the same
notarial will that was executed and that all the formal requirements (See Article 805
of the Civil Code) in the execution of a will have been substantially complied with in
the subject notarial will.14 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, we find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC. Since,
petitioner and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article
88715 of the Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her properties in a
will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of
the decedents estate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 13, 2000
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41756 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006 28, Block 24 at nakapangalan sa Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng karapatan
sa bahay na nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block 24 na pag-aari ng Pechaten Corporation.
FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot
CASTILLO, Respondents. 42, Block 24, Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang pasubalit at
kondiciones;
DECISION
Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at
TINGA, J.: kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya.

The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981.
(decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give legal recognition to the
due execution of this document, the Court is provided the opportunity to assert a few important (Sgd.)
doctrinal rules in the execution of notarial wills, all self-evident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
Code. (Tagapagmana)

A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally
defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni
merejurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will Eugenia E. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan
with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat
dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing
There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive catalog of tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang
imperatives for the proper execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful compliance with all the detailed panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng kasulatan ito.
requisites under Article 805 of the Code leave little room for doubt as to the validity in the due execution
of the notarial will. Article 806 likewise imposes another safeguard to the validity of notarial wills that EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
they be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. A notarial will executed address: 500 San Diego St.
with indifference to these two codal provisions opens itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy. Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of QUIRINO AGRAVA
Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
decedent. Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in full:
LAMBERTO C. LEAO
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN: Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981

AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na JUANITO ESTRERA
gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin address: City Court Compound,
at testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o testamento: City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-ayong sa kaugalian at
patakaran ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.
bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan;
(Sgd.)
Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking pamangkin na si Felix PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
Azuela, na siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang panahon, yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero
Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO
Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila
Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-81
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of
the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.
The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely:
petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed
that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart
Prague.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the
attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent.2 Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a
forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several
court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real
property, all centering on petitioners right to occupy the properties of the decedent. 3 It also asserted
that contrary to the representations of petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate
heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per records, it was subsequently
alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965, 4 and the mother of a
legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by three (3) months.5
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with
law. She pointed out that decedents signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the
will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this
petition.
After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1992.6 The RTC
favorably took into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava,
Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called to fore "the modern tendency in respect to the
formalities in the execution of a will x x x with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in
expressing his last wishes;"7 and from this perspective, rebutted oppositors arguments that the will was
not properly executed and attested to in accordance with law.
After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of the subscribing and
attesting witnesses, and having in mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the
execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of a
will with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, this Court is
persuaded to rule that the will in question is authentic and had been executed by the testatrix in
accordance with law.
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at the end of the will after the
signature of the testatrix, the following statement is made under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga Saksi":
"Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni
Eugenia N. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayong ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay
nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at
bawat dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng
nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng kasulatan ito."
The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgement and is
considered by this Court as a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
On the oppositors contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing witnesses at
the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left
margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of
at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and attestation of the will.
With regard to the oppositors argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters placed
on upper part of each page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it is
worthy to note that the will is composed of only two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the
testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause and
acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate the will. For the
same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of the second page,
which contains only the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
As regards the oppositors assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a forgery, the
testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to establish the
genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due execution of the will.8
The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his since
deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. 9 The Court of Appeals
noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the
will void and undeserving of probate.10
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that "the number of pages
used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and
thus susceptible to what he termed as "the substantial compliance rule."11
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, which we
replicate in full.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the
will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all
the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under
his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk
of Court.
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation clause to
state the number of pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself reveals several more
deficiencies.
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the
will.12 There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for
the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence,
the requisite was left uncomplied with.
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the process Uy Coque v.
Navas L. Sioca13 and In re: Will of Andrada.14 In Uy Coque, the Court noted that among the defects of the
will in question was the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in the
will.15 In ruling that the will could not be admitted to probate, the Court made the following
consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: "The purpose of requiring the number of sheets
to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the document might easily be so prepared that the
removal of a sheet would completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the
absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the
sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the
total number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve
the inserting of new pages and the forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin,
a matter attended with much greater difficulty."16
The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which failed to state the
number of sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the Court to declare
"unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal."17 It was further
observed that "it cannot be denied that the x x x requirement affords additional security against the
danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this
requirement, it must be considered material."18
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino19 and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,20 wherein
the Court allowed probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact that the attestation clause did
not state the number of pages of the will. Yet the appellate court itself considered the import of these
two cases, and made the following distinction which petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we adopt
with approval:
Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show that the attestation does not state
the number of pages used upon which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and undeserving of
probate.
We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in "Manuel Singson versus Emilia
Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195,"
to the effect that a will may still be valid even if the attestation does not contain the number of pages
used upon which the Will is written. However, the Decisions of the Supreme Court are not applicable in
the aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case of "Manuel Singson versus Emilia
Florentino, et al., supra," although the attestation in the subject Will did not state the number of pages
used in the will, however, the same was found in the last part of the body of the Will:
"x x x
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which
requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is
written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the
possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to
whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas
L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs. Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs.
Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must
contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is
omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by
evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is
different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will
is written, however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight
pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it
within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the
will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations." (page 165-165, supra)
(Underscoring supplied)
In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the notarial acknowledgement in the Will
states the number of pages used in the:
"x x x
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number
of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this
case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly
signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains
the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while
the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos"
comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "this
Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page" (pages 200-201, supra) (Underscoring
supplied).
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not stated in any part of the
Will. The will does not even contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the number of pages of the
will should be stated.21
Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, at a time
when the statutory provision governing the formal requirement of wills was Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.22 Reliance on these cases remains apropos, considering that the
requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of the will is extant from Section
618.23 However, the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation of the
requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from the
philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states: "In the absence of bad
faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the
form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the
will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805."
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission, which stated that "the
underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this project
consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator
more [freedom] in [expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in accord with the [modern tendency] in
respect to the formalities in the execution of wills."24 However, petitioner conveniently omits the
qualification offered by the Code Commission in the very same paragraph he cites from their report, that
such liberalization be "but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud
and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator."25
Caneda v. Court of Appeals26 features an extensive discussion made by Justice Regalado, speaking for the
Court on the conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal formalities required in the
execution of the attestation clause in wills.27 Uy Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with several
other cases, as examples of the application of the rule of strict construction. 28 However, the Code
Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction through the "substantial compliance rule"
under Article 809. A cautionary note was struck though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809
should be applied:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of
the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each
and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts
that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause
can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did
so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only
check against perjury in the probate proceedings.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its assailed decision, considering
that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause is one of the defects
which cannot be simply disregarded. In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow the probate of a will
whose attestation clause failed to state that the witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other,30 the other omission cited by Justice J.B.L. Reyes
which to his estimation cannot be lightly disregarded.
Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be
supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not
be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed.
However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the
invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself." 31 Thus, a failure by the attestation
clause to state that the testator signed every page can be liberally construed, since that fact can be
checked by a visual examination; while a failure by the attestation clause to state that the witnesses
signed in one anothers presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the only
textual guarantee of compliance.32
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains
a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of
pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or
some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.33 The failure to state the number
of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how
many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed
to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in
it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation inSingson and Taboada. However, in this case,
there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is
no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which
comprise the will.
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal requirements
as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of the Code Commission in
incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal
requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, convinced that these remained
effective safeguards against the forgery or intercalation of notarial wills.34 Compliance with these
requirements, however picayune in impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort that the
testator himself or herself had decided to convey property post mortem in the manner established in the
will.35 The transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited comments of the Code
Commission, is for the fruition of the testators incontestable desires, and not for the indulgent
admission of wills to probate.
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an examination of the will
itself reveals a couple of even more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its rejection.
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of
the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom
of the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the notary public.
Cagro v. Cagro36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the signatures of the three witnesses to the
will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is
signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin."37 While three (3) Justices38 considered the signature
requirement had been substantially complied with, a majority of six (6), speaking through Chief Justice
Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering the will fatally defective.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of
the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand
margin.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is "a
memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the
attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot
be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof
negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin
conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is
untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on
the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the
bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent
occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.39
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly segregates the
requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will
be "attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]." The respective intents behind these two
classes of signature are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page
signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will.
On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to
the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and
apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if
the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation
clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses undertakings in the clause, since the
signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed the attestation clause
itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page containing such clause. Without diminishing the value of
the instrumental witnesses signatures on each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is the
attestation clause which contains the utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses
themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the
number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and
every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence
of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these
elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental
witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause.
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge. The
requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The importance of this requirement is
highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and
entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this case is equally
as critical as the other cited flaws in compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent
import.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario
ko ngayong10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no manner of contemplation
can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed.41 It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the
executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual
language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the
document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.42 Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should
avow that the document was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the
notary public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the document. Possibly though, the word
"ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of and swearing in of the executors of the document,
which in this case would involve the decedent and the instrumental witnesses.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless
remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not
merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath,
that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or
deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against
spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an
empty meaningless act.43 The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to
declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free
act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal
prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the
free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain
mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under Article 806. A
notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is
fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.
There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by the will in question.
We need not discuss them at length, as they are no longer material to the
disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses sign each
and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last; and that all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the
witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her only signature appearing at the so-
called "logical end"44 of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not numbered correlatively in
letters on each page, but instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought that has
disabused the notion that these two requirements be construed as mandatory.45 Taken in isolation,
these omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these
omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt on, though indicative
as they may be of a general lack of due regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever
executed the will.
All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the probate denial
inexorable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.