Bail, Where Filed

Sec. 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional
trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge in the province, city or municipality. If the accused is
arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail
may also be filed with any regional trial court
of said place, of if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

(b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on
recognizance, the application may only be
filed in the court where the case is pending, whether on preliminary investigation,
trial, or appeal.

Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in
the province, city, or municipality where he is held.

AS A GENERAL RULE, WHERE

SHOULD BAIL BE FILED?
> It may be filed with the court where the case is pending. In the
absence of the judge thereof, bail may be filed with any RTC or MTC judge in the province,
city or municipality.
> If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other
than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with the RTC of said place, or if no
judge is available, with any MTC judge therein
> But where bail is a matter of discretion or where the accused seeks to be released on
recognizance, bail may only be filed in the court where the case is pending
> Any person in custody not yet charged may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or
municipality where he is held

WHERE SHOULD ONE POST BAIL

IF HE HASN'T BEEN CHARGED
YET?
> In the RTC of the place where he is in custody. In the absence of RTC, in the MTC.
WHAT SITUATIONS ARE
CONTEMPLATED UNDER THIS
SECTION?
> First, the accused is arrested in the same province, city or municipality where his case is
pending
> Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city or municipality other than where
his case is pending

MAY A JUDGE ISSUE A BAIL BON

D FOR CASES NOT PENDING IN
HIS SALE OR ARE OUTSIDE HIS
JURISDICTION CONTENDING THAT
IT WAS DONE MAINLY IN GOOD
FAITH INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF THE RULES?
> No, a judge cannot shield himself from the consequence of his persistent deviant activities
by the simple invocation of good fatih and the supplication that he was only moved by pity for the
poor
and forsaken accused
> A judges jurisdiction is confined to that over which he presides
> Therefore to approve bail applications and issue corresponding
release order in cases pending in courts outside his territorial
jurisdiction, particularly so where the accused are detained thereat and not in his jurisdiction and
therefore cannot personally appear before him as required, constitute ignorance of the law so gross
as to amount to incompetence and even corruption

Bail, Where Filed

Sec. 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional
trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge in the province, city or municipality. If the accused is
arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail
may also be filed with any regional trial court
of said place, of if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

(b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on
recognizance, the application may only be
filed in the court where the case is pending, whether on preliminary investigation,
trial, or appeal.

Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in
the province, city, or municipality where he is held.

AS A GENERAL RULE, WHERE

SHOULD BAIL BE FILED?
> It may be filed with the court where the case is pending. In the
absence of the judge thereof, bail may be filed with any RTC or MTC judge in the province,
city or municipality.
> If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other
than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with the RTC of said place, or if no
judge is available, with any MTC judge therein
> But where bail is a matter of discretion or where the accused seeks to be released on
recognizance, bail may only be filed in the court where the case is pending
> Any person in custody not yet charged may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or
municipality where he is held

WHERE SHOULD ONE POST BAIL

IF HE HASN'T BEEN CHARGED
YET?
> In the RTC of the place where he is in custody. In the absence of RTC, in the MTC.

WHAT SITUATIONS ARE

CONTEMPLATED UNDER THIS
SECTION?
> First, the accused is arrested in the same province, city or municipality where his case is
pending
> Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city or municipality other than where
his case is pending

MAY A JUDGE ISSUE A BAIL BON

D FOR CASES NOT PENDING IN
HIS SALE OR ARE OUTSIDE HIS
JURISDICTION CONTENDING THAT
IT WAS DONE MAINLY IN GOOD
FAITH INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF THE RULES?
> No, a judge cannot shield himself from the consequence of his persistent deviant activities
by the simple invocation of good fatih and the supplication that he was only moved by pity for the
poor
and forsaken accused
> A judges jurisdiction is confined to that over which he presides
> Therefore to approve bail applications and issue corresponding
release order in cases pending in courts outside his territorial
jurisdiction, particularly so where the accused are detained thereat and not in his jurisdiction and
therefore cannot personally appear before him as required, constitute ignorance of the law so gross
as to amount to incompetence and even corruption

[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1522. January 20, 2000]

ROMULO SJ TOLENTINO, State Prosecutor, complainant, vs. JUDGE

POLICARPIO S. CAMANO, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Tigaon,
Camarines Sur, respondent.

The court applying Sec. 17(c) of Rule 114 as Amended by

Administrative Circular No. 12-94 and adhering to applicable doctrine,
resolves the issue in the affirmative.

Sec. 17(c) Rule 114 provides, thus:

"Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court

may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or
municipality where he is held."
 EXPLANATIONS: (Taken from the Book, entitled
"Remedial Law" by O. Herrera, vol. 4, 1994 ed.)

In the case of Go vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, Feb. 11, 1992,
the court ruled, thus:

"Where the accused was charged for murder without the

benefit of a preliminary investigation and trial had already
began over his objections, the accused remains entitled to
be released on bail as a matter of right pending the
preliminary investigation."

We find the complaint in this case to be without any basis.

First. Art. III, 13 of the Constitution provides that, before conviction, all persons shall
be allowed bail, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua (or higher) when the evidence of guilt is strong. On the other hand, Rule
114, 4 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure, provides that "all persons in
custody shall, before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a
matter of right." Thus, when the charge against an accused is for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, there must be a hearing
with the participation of the prosecution and the defense, in order to determine
whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, and ultimately to
determine whether he should be granted bail. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum. For this purpose,
the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present within a reasonable time all
evidence that it may want to adduce before the court. The State has a right to due
process as much as the accused. And even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce
evidence in opposition to the motion for bail, the court must nevertheless endeavor to
ascertain the strength of the States evidence in order to determine whether bail should
be granted.[1]

In this case, however, it was not necessary to hold a hearing so that the prosecution
could show that evidence of the guilt of the accused was strong, because a
preliminary investigation had been ordered by the court. At that point, bail was
still a matter of right. Thus, in Go v. Court of Appeals, it was held that an accused,
[2]

who was charged in court with murder without the benefit of a preliminary
investigation, was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right pending the
preliminary investigation, reserving to the prosecutor, after the preliminary
investigation, the right to ask the trial court for the cancellation of the bail should
he believe the evidence of guilt of the accused to be strong. It would then be up to
the trial court to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail after considering
the evidence on record. Indeed, if the propriety of charging the accused was yet to be
resolved in the preliminary investigation, it cannot be claimed that the evidence of guilt
of the accused was strong so as to justify the denial of bail to him.

Be that as it may, respondent judge set the hearing on the bail petition at least four
times: on January 9, 1996, January 16, 1996, January 24, 1996, and March 4, 1996, in
order to allow complainant prosecutor present his evidence, because the accused was
charged with having "sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse." Under 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the
penalty for such an offense is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua. But complainant failed to present his evidence. It thus appears that it was
the complainant prosecutor who was remiss in the performance of his duties.
Respondent judge should not have granted bail based simply on the failure of the
prosecution to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong but
should have endeavored to determine the existence of such evidence.
Considering, however, the fact that the case was referred to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, the accused could be
considered entitled to bail as a matter of right.

.R. No. 141529. June 6, 2001]

FRANCISCO YAP, JR., a.k.a. EDWIN YAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set
aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed
conditions on change of residence and travel abroad.

The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution.[8] The
obvious rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage,[9] is that imposing
bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseor vs.
Abao,[10] this Court made the pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory
powers over lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively
deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions.

xxx There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at
the same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum.What aggravates the
situation is that the lower court judge would apparently yield to the command of
the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a
 mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to
believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the
circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced
as he must have been to a state of desperation. In the same breath as he was told
he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could only mean that
provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would have been more forthright
if he were informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There
would have been no disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind
these words of Justice Jackson, a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a
teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a paupers will. xxx [11]

At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises
courts to consider the following factors in the setting of the amount of bail:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused
may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the
same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person
to report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his movements.[12] In the present
case, where petitioner was found to have left the country several times while the case was pending,
the Court of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a hold-departure
order against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed
in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-
departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence
and of his whereabouts
xxxxxxxxx
Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing
considerations and the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner bail, the
setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor factual
basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against
petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.
Petitioner also contests the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals that he secure a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area
and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court, claiming that the same violates his
liberty of abode and travel.
Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents him from
leaving the Philippines unless expressly permitted by the court which issued the order.[21] In fact,
the petition submits that the hold-departure order against petitioner is already sufficient guarantee
that he will not escape. Thus, to require him to inform the court every time he changed his
residence is already unnecessary.[22]
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner,
are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.Neither shall
the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful
order as contemplated by the above provision.[23] The condition imposed by the Court of
Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure
that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his
presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not
prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does
so.

MANILA, PhilippinesThe Supreme Courts new guidelines aimed at decongesting

the countrys jails by enforcing the right of accused persons to bail and to a speedy
trial went into effect Thursday.
The guidelines, adopted by the full court on March 18, shall also apply to persons
currently under detention and awaiting trial.
The high court justices said they recognized the need to effectively implement
existing policies laid down by the Constitution, the laws and the rules respecting an
accuseds rights to bail and to a speedy trial in the context of decongesting our
detention jails and humanizing the condition of detained persons pending the hearing
of their cases.
ADVERTISEMENT

The guidelines also authorize the service of subpoenas and other judicial notices
through electronic mail or mobile phone, the mechanisms for which were launched
on Wednesday by the high tribunal and the Departments of the Interior and Local
Government and of Justice.
Under the guidelines, an accused may move to have his or her bail amount set
immediately and the executive judge must swiftly raffle off the case to a regular court.
A motion by an accused seeking reduced bail shall be prioritized. A court order
fixing the amount of bail would not be subject to appeal.
For serious crimes, judges have 48 hours to set bail after hearing witnesses for
both the prosecution and defense.
The Supreme Court also added new time limits to the provisions of Republic Act No.
8493, or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998.
The guidelines require that a case be raffled off to a trial court three days after the
filing of the criminal information. The arraignment must take place within 10 days
from the date of raffle. The trial must take place within 30 days after the pretrial
conference.
Regular trials must be completed in 180 days, while trials on judicial affidavits
must be resolved after 60 days.
The case against an accused may be dismissed for denial of the right to a speedy trial
in the event the time limits are not observed.

G.R. No. 129670. February 1, 2000]

MANOLET O. LAVIDES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS;

HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC,
Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred __[7]

1.......In ruling that the condition imposed by respondent Judge that the
approval of petitioners bail bonds "shall be made only after his
arraignment" is of no moment and has been rendered moot and academic
by the fact that he had already posted the bail bonds and had pleaded not
guilty to all the offenses;

2.......In not resolving the submission that the arraignment was void not
only because it was made under compelling circumstance which left
petitioner no option to question the respondent Judges arbitrary action
but also because it emanated from a void Order;
 3.......In ruling that the denial of petitioners motion to quash may not be
impugned in a petition for certiorari; and

4.......In not resolving the legal issue of whether or not petitioner may be
validly charged for violation of Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 under
several informations corresponding to the number of alleged acts of child
abuse allegedly committed against each private complainant by the
petitioner.

We will deal with each of these contentions although not in the order in which they
are stated by petitioner.

First. As already stated, the trial courts order, dated May 16, 1997, imposed four
conditions for the grant of bail to petitioner:

a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during

the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the
hearings of these cases;

b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall
be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest
shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in
absentia;

c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands;
and Edpmis

d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to
enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;

The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon
the validity of condition (d) on the ground that the issue had become moot and
academic. Petitioner takes issue with the Court of Appeals with respect to its
treatment of condition (d) of the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which makes
petitioners arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of his bail bonds. His contention
is that this condition is void and that his arraignment was also invalid because it was
held pursuant to such invalid condition.

We agree with petitioner that the appellate court should have determined the validity
of the conditions imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 for the grant of
bail because petitioners contention is that his arraignment was held in pursuance of
these conditions for bail.
In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail,
the trial court apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by
being absent, prevent his early arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the
complainants got tired and lost interest in their cases. Hence, to ensure his
presence at the arraignment, approval of petitioners bail bonds should be deferred
until he could be arraigned. After that, even if petitioner does not appear, trial can
proceed as long as he is notified of the date of hearing and his failure to appear is
unjustified, since under Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution, trial in absentia is
authorized. This seems to be the theory of the trial court in its May 16, 1997 order
conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on his arraignment.

This theory is mistaken. In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged,
in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the
information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the
arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the
presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering
his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule
114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that
"the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the
court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at
the arraignment is required.

On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment
would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a
motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to
quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the
filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be
released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accuseds constitutional right
not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge
him with a crime and his right to bail.[8]

It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail
bonds shall be made only after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should
instead have declared void. The condition imposed in the trial courts order of May 16,
1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be
present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For
another condition of bail under Rule 114, 2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to
appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall
be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the
notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia." Jjsc
Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to
be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at
arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenever
[9]

necessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless
[10]

it is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear by counsel or
representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot
[11]

be waived. As pointed out in Borja v. Mendoza, in an opinion by Justice, later Chief

[12]

Justice, Enrique Fernando, there can be no trial in absentia unless the accused has
been arraigned.

Undoubtedly, the trial court knew this. Petitioner could delay the proceedings by
absenting himself from the arraignment. But once he is arraigned, trial could proceed
even in his absence. So it thought that to ensure petitioners presence at the
arraignment, petitioner should be denied bail in the meantime. The fly in the ointment,
however, is that such court strategy violates petitioners constitutional rights.

Second. Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of
petitioner on May 23, 1997 was also invalid. Contrary to petitioners contention, the
arraignment did not emanate from the invalid condition that "approval of the bail
bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without such a condition, the
arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the condition for the
grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings
against him are valid.

Third. Petitioner concedes that the rule is that the remedy of an accused whose motion
to quash is denied is not to file a petition for certiorari but to proceed to trial without
prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash during
trial on the merits or on appeal if an adverse judgment is rendered against him.
However, he argues that this case should be treated as an exception. He contends that
the Court of Appeals should not have evaded the issue of whether he should be
charged under several informations corresponding to the number of acts of child abuse
allegedly committed by him against each of the complainants.

In Tano v. Salvador, the Court, while holding that certiorari will not lie from a denial
[13]

of a motion to quash, nevertheless recognized that there may be cases where there are
special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal. In such
cases, the accused may resort to the appellate court to raise the issue decided against
him. This is such a case. Whether petitioner is liable for just one crime regardless of
the number of sexual acts allegedly committed by him and the number of children
with whom he had sexual intercourse, or whether each act of intercourse constitutes
one crime is a question that bears on the presentation of evidence by either party. It is
important to petitioner as well as to the prosecution how many crimes there are. For
instance, if there is only one offense of sexual abuse regardless of the number of
children involved, it will not matter much to the prosecution whether it is able to
present only one of the complainants. On the other hand, if each act of sexual
intercourse with a child constitutes a separate offense, it will matter whether the other
children are presented during the trial. Scjj

The issue then should have been decided by the Court of Appeals. However, instead
of remanding this case to the appellate court for a determination of this issue, we will
decide the issue now so that the trial in the court below can proceed without further
delay.

Petitioners contention is that the 12 informations filed against him allege only
one offense of child abuse, regardless of the number of alleged victims (four) and
the number of acts of sexual intercourse committed with them (twelve). He
argues that the act of sexual intercourse is only a means of committing the
offense so that the acts of sexual intercourse/lasciviousness with minors
attributed to him should not be subject of separate informations. He cites the
affidavits of the alleged victims which show that their involvement with him
constitutes an "unbroken chain of events," i.e., the first victim was the one who
introduced the second to petitioner and so on. Petitioner says that child abuse is
similar to the crime of large-scale illegal recruitment where there is only a single
offense regardless of the number of workers illegally recruited on different occasions.
In the alternative, he contends that, at the most, only four informations, corresponding
to the number of alleged child victims, can be filed against him.

Art. III, 5 of R.A. No. 7160 under which petitioner is being prosecuted, provides:

Sec. 5 Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. __ Children, whether

male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due
to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion

perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

....

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) that said act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the
child, whether male or female, is or is deemed under 18 years of age.
[14]

Exploitation in prostitution or other sexual abuse occurs when the child indulges
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate, or
group.

Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act with a child under the
circumstances mentioned in Art. III, 5 of R.A. No. 7160 is thus a separate and
distinct offense. The offense is similar to rape or act of lasciviousness under the
Revised Penal Code in which each act of rape or lascivious conduct should be the
subject of a separate information. This conclusion is confirmed by Art. III, 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7160, which provides:

[t]hat when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one
is RENDERED declaring the orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City to be valid, with the exception of
condition (d) in the second paragraph of the order of May 16, 1997 (making
arraignment a prerequisite to the grant of bail to petitioner), which is hereby declared
void.

SO ORDERED. Sjcj

[G.R. No. 139599. February 23, 2000]

ANICETO SABBUN MAGUDDATU and LAUREANA SABBUN

MAGUDDATU, petitioners, vs. Honorable COURT OF APPEALS
(FOURTH DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:
For a human being who has been inside a prison cell, a bail bond
represents his only ticket to liberty, albeit provisional. But the right to
bail is not always a demandable right. In certain instances, it is a matter
of discretion. This discretion, however, is not full and unfettered
because the law and the rules set the parameters for its proper exercise.
Discretion is, of course, a delicate thing and its abuse of such grave
nature would warrant intervention of this Court by way of the special
civil action for certiorari.

The primary issue in this case is whether or not under the facts thereof
petitioners are entitled to bail as a matter of right or on the discretion of the
trial court. Assuming it is a matter of discretion, whether or not the trial court in
denying bail committed grave abuse of discretion.

The facts are well established:

Petitioners Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu,

Atty. Teodoro Rubino, Antonio Sabbun Maguddatu and several other "John
Does" were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 64, for the killing of Jose S. Pascual.

On October 23, 1985, petitioners filed a motion to be admitted to bail on the

ground that the prosecution's evidence is not strong.

After partial trial on the merits, the trial court issued an order, dated December
20, 1985, granting petitioners' motion for bail and fixing the amount at
P30,000.00 each. On the same day, petitioners posted bail through AFISCO
Insurance Corporation.

On January 6, 1987, the AFISCO Insurance Corporation filed a motion before

the trial court praying for the cancellation of petitioner's bail bond because of
the latter's failure to renew the same upon its expiration on December 20,
1986. There is no showing, however, of any action by the court on said
[1]

motion.

On January 2, 1998, the trial court convicted petitioners Aniceto Sabbun

Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu, together with Atty. Teodoro
Rubino, of the crime of Homicide and sentenced them to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS of PRISION MAYOR medium,
as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) months
of RECLUSION TEMPORAL medium, as maximum. The judgment of
conviction was promulgated in absentia. Accordingly, on February 19, 1998,
the trial court issued an order for the immediate arrest of petitioners and their
commitment to the custody of proper authorities.

While remaining at large, petitioners, on February 27, 1998, filed a Notice of

Appeal from the order of conviction for homicide with a motion to be granted
provisional liberty under the same bail bond pending appeal. [2]

The trial court does not appear to have resolved the motion for bail pending
appeal. Instead, it forwarded the records to the Court of Appeals.

On January 8, 1999, public respondent Court of Appeals issued a

Resolution which states, viz:
[3]

xxx

2. the accused-appellants to show cause within ten (10) days from

notice why their appeal should not be deemed abandoned and
accordingly dismissed for their failure to submit themselves to the
proper authorities and to the jurisdiction of the court from which
they seek relief in the meantime that no bail has yet been
approved for their temporary liberty and, further considering that
the approval of the same is discretionary and not to be presumed
(Herrera, Remedial Law, v. VI-Criminal Procedure [1996], p. 611,
citing, People v. Patajo, G.R. No. 57718, November 20, 1998, En
Banc, Minute Resolution); and

3. in the meanwhile, the Station Commanders of the Manila Police

Station, Manila and the Makati Police Station, Makati City to file a
return of the Order of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 64, Makati City on February 19, 1998 in Criminal Case
No. 12010.

A Compliance and Motion, dated February 8, 1999, filed by petitioners

[4]

explained their failure to submit to the proper authorities, thus:

xxx

5. By way of comment and compliance therewith, the undersigned

counsel hereby manifests that accused-appellants are willing to
submit themselves to the proper authorities and to the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court. Further, it is manifested herein that the
failure of accused-appellants to submit themselves to the proper
 authorities and to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court was due
only to the fact that, all the while, they were of the belief that
the Motion accompanying the above-mentioned Notice of
Appeal was already approved and granted by the court of origin.

xxx

Despite the compliance and motion filed by petitioners, they remained at

large. On June 23, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the resolution under
question denying petitioners' application for bail and ordering their arrest. The
dispositive portion of said resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves, as it is hereby resolved, to: (1)

DENY accused-appellants application for bail and prayer for recall
of the Order of Arrest issued by the trial court below; (2) ORDER
the Station Commander of the Manila Police Station to file a
return of the order of arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 64, Makati City on February 19, 1998 in Criminal Case
No. 12010; and (3) ORDER the accused-appellants for the last
time to submit to the jurisdiction of the court with WARNING that
failure to comply herewith within ten (10) days from notice shall
compel the Court to DISMISS the appeal for failure to prosecute.

SO ORDERED. [5]

Aggrieved by the foregoing resolution, petitioners brought the instant petition

for certiorari with this Court on August 30, 1999, contending that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their application for
bail and their prayer to recall the order of arrest issued by the trial court.

Pending resolution of the petition, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution,

dated September 08, 1999, which states:

For failure to submit to this court's jurisdiction pending appeal and

conformable with this Court's resolution of June 23, 1999 the
appeal filed in this case is deemed ABANDONED and
DISMISSED pursuant to Section 8, Rule 128 (sic, should be 124),
New Rules on Criminal Procedure.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City is hereby

ORDERED to issue warrants of arrest for the immediate
apprehension and service of sentence of accused ANICETO
 SABBUN MAGUDDATU and LAUREANA SABBUN
MAGUDDATU.

SO ORDERED. [6]

The Court of Appeals committed no error in denying petitioners' plea to be

granted bail.

The Constitution guarantees the right to bail of all the accused except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of
guilt is strong.
[7]

Sections 4, 5 and 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provide:

SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right.- All persons in custody shall: (a)

before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of
right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule.

SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary.- Upon conviction by the

Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on

provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to
appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)

years but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon
a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual

delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
 (b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from
legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation,

parole, or under conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the
appeal, the accused may commit another crime.

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional

Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party.

xxx

SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.- No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.

Despite an order of arrest from the trial court and two warnings from the Court
of Appeals, petitioners had remained at large. It is axiomatic that for one to be
entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise, deprived
of liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Petitioners' Compliance and
[8]

Motion, dated February 08, 1999, came short of an unconditional submission

to respondent court's lawful order and to its jurisdiction.

The trial court correctly denied petitioners' motion that they be allowed
provisional liberty after their conviction, under their respective bail
bonds. Apart from the fact that they were at large, Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 12-94,
provides that:

xxx
 The Court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on
provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to
appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman. [9]

The bail bond that the accused previously posted can only be used during the
15-day period to appeal (Rule 122) and not during the entire period of
appeal. This is consistent with Section 2(a) of Rule 114 which provides that
the bail "shall be effective upon approval and remain in force at all stages of
the case, unless sooner cancelled, until the promulgation of the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally
filed in or appealed to it." This amendment, introduced by SC Administrative
[10]

Circular 12-94 is a departure from the old rules which then provided that bail
shall be effective and remain in force at all stages of the case until its full
determination, and thus even during the period of appeal. Moreover, under the
present rule, for the accused to continue his provisional liberty on the same
bail bond during the period to appeal, consent of the bondsman is necessary.
From the record, it appears that the bondsman, AFISCO Insurance
Corporation, filed a motion in the trial court on January 06, 1987 for the
cancellation of petitioners' bail bond for the latter's failure to renew the same
upon its expiration. Obtaining the consent of the bondsman was, thus,
[11]

foreclosed.

Pursuant to the same Section 5 of Rule 114, the accused may be

admitted to bail upon the court's discretion after conviction by the RTC
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. However, such bail shall be denied or bail previously
granted shall be cancelled if the penalty imposed is imprisonment
exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years if any one of the
circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5 is
present. [12]

From the records of the case, petitioners are not entitled to bail. Firstly,
petitioners violated the conditions of their bail. Bail is defined as a
security for the release of a person conditioned upon his appearance
before any court. The accused shall also appear before the proper
[13]

court whenever so required by the court or these Rules. Petitioners'

[14]

non-appearance during the promulgation of the trial court's decision

despite due notice and without justifiable reason, and their continued
non-submission to the proper authorities as ordered by the Court of
Appeals, constitute violations of the conditions of their bail. Moreover, it
appears that petitioners failed to renew their expired bail bond, as shown by
[15]

a Motion, dated January 06, 1987, filed by AFISCO Insurance Corporation,

praying for the cancellation of petitioners' bail bond because of the latter's
failure to renew the same upon its expiration. [16]

The petitioners complain that they were not informed of the date of
promulgation of the decision of conviction in the trial court and that their
counsel of record abandoned them. Even if we are to concede that these
allegations are true, petitioners still failed to surrender to the authorities
despite two orders to that effect by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, petitioners
had no cause to expect that their application for bail would be granted as a
matter of course precisely because it is a matter of discretion. In fact, the filing
of a notice of appeal effectively deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to
entertain the motion for bail pending appeal because appeal is perfected by
the mere filing of such notice. It has been held that trial courts would be well
advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the
capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion. [17]

In any event, the instant petition has become moot. During the pendency of
the petition in this Court, the Court of Appeals in a Resolution, dated
September 08, 1999 dismissed accused-appellant's appeal, thus:

For failure to submit to this Court's jurisdiction pending

appeal and conformable with this Court's resolution of June 23,
1999, the appeal filed in this case is deemed ABANDONED and
DISMISSED pursuant to Section 8, Rule 128, New Rules on
[18]

Criminal Procedure.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City is

hereby ORDERED to issue warrants of arrest for the immediate
apprehension and service of sentence of accused ANICETO
SABBUN MAGUDDATU and LAUREANA SABBUN
MAGUDDATU.

SO ORDERED. [19]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is DISMISSED for

lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. RTJ-94-1209. February 13, 1994]

REYMUALDO BUZON, JR., complainant, vs. JUDGE TIRSO D.C.
VELASCO, respondent.

RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In a letter dated May 6, 1994, Reymualdo Buzon, Jr. charged respondent

[1]

Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
with gross ignorance of the law and alleged illegal acts and/or irregularity in
granting bail to the accused
amounting to gross partiality in Criminal Case No. Q-89-1707
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Fernando Tan, alias Ding for murder,
which was pending in the said court.
After receipt of the respondents Comment, the Court on June 6, 1995,
referred this case to Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. of the Court of
Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his report dated December 11, 1995, Justice Vasquez narrated the facts
as follows:

After a preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
filed the Information (Exhibits 1 and 2, Formal Offer) for Murder in Criminal Case
No. Q-89-1707 against accused Fernando Tan @ Ding for the death of Reymualdo
Buzon, Sr. Apparently, the corresponding warrant of arrest was issued against the
accused but could not be served. On May 31, 1989, the case was ordered archived
(Exhibit 3, supra) and an alias warrant of arrest (Annex 2, complaint) issued.
Notably, no bail was recommended in the warrant.

Sometime in February of 1991, accused Tan surfaced and filed a motion that he be
granted bail on the ground that the City Prosecutor recommended in the criminal
charge sheet against him a P50,000.00 bail for his provincial (sic) liberty. Acting on
the motion, on February 20, 1991, the respondent judge granted bail to the accused in
the amount of P50,000.00 (Exhibit 4, Formal Offer) and accordingly recalled the
warrant of arrest (Exhibit 5) on February 25, 1991 after the accused had posted the
required bond. It is worthwhile stating that the Motion for Bail was granted without a
hearing nor comment from the prosecution.

Accused was subsequently arraigned on March 8, 1991 (Exhibit 6, supra) and trial
was set for several postponed hearings at the instance of both the prosecution and the
accused (Exhibits 7, 7-a, 8, and 8-a, supra).
On February 10, 1992, the prosecution submitted a Motion to Cancel Bail Bond
(Exhibit 10, supra) alleging, inter alia, that the Information filed was tampered
because the Information originally stated No Bail Recommended. However, the word
No was snowpaked and the figures P50,000.00 added after the word recommended, to
read: BAIL RECOMMENDED: P50,000.00. The prosecution went further asserting
that the offense of Murder is punishable by Reclusion Perpetua where bail is not a
matter of right.

Accused initially filed his opposition through his lawyer H. J. Pablo, III (Exhibit
11, supra). Later, Atty. Moises A. Samson posted a Notice of Appearance (Exhibit
12, supra) as co-defense counsel simultaneously requesting for time to submit
supplemental opposition to the Motion To Cancel Bail and the postponement of the
scheduled hearings of the case.

The supplemental opposition was not at all filed (,) neither was the Motion to Cancel
Bail Bond resolved by the respondent even until after the prosecution had rested its
case on September 23, 1992 (Exhibit 24, supra).

Alongside with (sic) the prosecutions resting its case, in open court the accused was
granted leave of court to file a Demurrer to Evidence. Nonetheless, on
October 5, 1992, what the accused filed was a formal Motion For Leave to File
Motion to Dismiss By Way of Demurrer To Evidence (Exhibit 25, supra) which
surprisingly was met by the prosecution with an Opposition to Demurrer to
Evidence. Adding to the miscommunication, the respondent denied the Demurrer to
Evidence in its Order of October 15, 1992 (Exhibit 27, supra).

Anyway, on November 12, 1992, the accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(Exhibit 29, supra) stating that: 1) he has not yet filed a Demurrer to Evidence as what
he had submitted was only a simple Motion For Leave to file one (Demurrer to
Evidence); and 2) that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to
convict the accused. The prosecution opposed the motion claiming that the accused
tried to put one over the court when he stated that he has not yet filed a Demurrer to
Evidence and that the defense allegation that the prosecutions evidence is insufficient
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt is contrary to the facts on
record. On December 2, 1992, (Exhibit 32, supra) the Motion for Reconsideration was
granted in such a way that the accused was given ten (10) days to file a Demurrer to
Evidence which was ultimately filed on December 19, 1992 (Exhibit 33, supra).

Eventually, the Demurrer to Evidence together (with) its Motion for Reconsideration
were respectively denied on January 21, 1993 (Exhibit 36, supra) and on
March 5, 1993, (Exhibit 43, supra). In the meantime, previous settings for defense
evidence were cancelled for failure of receipt of the denial of the Demurrer to
Evidence.

On May 11, 1993, the reception of defense evidence was held in abeyance (Exhibit
46, supra) pending final resolution by the Court of Appeals on the Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus filed by the accused in CA-G.R. SP No. 30667, assailing
the denial of the Demurrer to Evidence. On August 23, 1993, CA-G.R. SP No. 30667
was dismissed (Exhibit 50, supra) and its Motion for Reconsideration denied on
January 5, 1994 (Exhibit 57).

The accused did not stop there. The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court under
G.R. No. 11355 (Exhibit 58, supra). On September 26, 1994 (Exhibit 67, supra) the
Supreme Court denied with finality the Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution
dated August 3, 1994 denying the Petition for Review.

In the meanwhile, on November 23, 1993, prior to the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 30677 and the filing of G.R. No. 11355 before
the Supreme Court, the prosecution submitted before the respondent Judge a Motion
to Cancel Bail (To Reiterate Motion dated February 7, 1992) (Exhibit 52, supra) duly
opposed by the accused (Exhibit 54, supra) and met with a Reply (Exhibit 55,
supra) by the prosecution. On December 20, 1993, the Motion to Cancel Bail
was denied (Exhibit 56, supra) by the respondent, ruling:

For resolution before this Court is the MOTION TO CANCEL BOND filed (by)
plaintiff thru the Assistant City Prosecutor, the Opposition (To Motion to Cancel Bail)
filed by accused thru counsel, the REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
CANCEL BAIL and the reasons relied upon by the parties which this Court DENIES
for lack of merit.

The bail bond which the accused has posted was pursuant to the recommendation of
the prosecution which the Rules of Court allows to be posted as long as it is in accord
with the amount fixed by the court or recommended by the fiscal who investigated or
filed the case. The amount recommended was P50,000.00 which this Court finds as
appropriate for purposes of the motion in question and under the present
circumstances, and since the foregoing is in accord with Section 11, Rule 114, Rules
of Court, ACCORDINGLY this Court finds no merit in the aforesaid MOTION TO
CANCEL BOND and must perforce DENY the same.

SO ORDERED.

On June 23, 1994, the private complainant filed a Motion for Inhibition (Exhibit
62, supra) of the respondent Judge because of this Administrative case.
In the Order of August 9, 1994 (Exhibit 65, supra) the Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order denying the Motion to Cancel Bail Bond was denied while the Motion for
Inhibition was granted. Said the respondent:

In the instant case, the posting of the bail bond was approved pursuant to the
recommendation of the filing Prosecutor. Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
provides for the conditions imposed on the bailbond which upon approval remains in
force at all stages of the case until its final determination, unless the proper court
directs otherwise. Considering that the accused has not violated any condition
imposed therein and has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by regularly
appearing at the hearings of the case, this Court finds no cogent reason to reconsider
the questioned order.

With regards the Motion for Inhibition, likewise filed by the private complainant,
finding that he has clearly lost his trust and confidence in the Presiding Judge of this
Court in the impartial disposition of this case, for the peace of mind of the
complainant, this Court grants the motion and the Presiding Judge hereby voluntarily
inhibits himself from hearing this case.

To complete the picture, the case was re-raffled to Judge Agustin S. Sison of Branch
80 of the same court but who likewise inhibited himself due to close family relations
with a member of the law firm appearing as private prosecutor.

Re-raffled to Judge Godofredo L. Legaspi of Branch 79 the Motion To Cancel Bail

was granted in an Order dated March 20, 1995 (Exhibit 68-a, supra). Then again, after
issuing the Order, Judge Legaspi voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the case
without acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused to the Order
cancelling his bail bond.

The case was reassigned to Judge Lucas P. Bersamin of Branch 96 who, on April 20,
1995 (Exhibit 68-b, supra), who (sic) reconsidered Judge Legaspis Order cancelling
the bail bond of the accused increasing, however, the bail to P100,000.00 for the
provisional liberty of the accused.

Ultimately, on June 1, 1995, complainant Romualdo (sic) Buzon, Jr. showed his
disgust by filing a motion to inhibit Judge Bersamin (Exhibit 68-c, supra). After
favorably acting on the motion, Judge Bersamin sent the records of the case to the
Office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for re-raffle
to another branch.

Under the aforementioned environmental facts, respondent Judge is now

administratively charged with gross partiality and gross ignorance of the law.
 Justice Vasquez found no basis for the charge of gross partiality, reasoning
out that:

The procedural facts of the case as earlier chronologically listed down in this report
betrays the accusation of partiality. All proceedings were apparently conducted in the
most usual and regular manner. While there maybe some delays, the same are equally
attributable to both the accused and to the prosecution and, more importantly in the
observance of due process of law. When specifically the respondent ordered for the
suspension of the defense evidence in deference to whatever resolution the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court will issue on the pending certiorari proceedings, it was
only cordially exercising judicial courtesy to a higher court. And that is not partiality.

On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, Justice Vasquez stated that respondent
judge committed an error in granting bail to the accused without a hearing and
recommended the imposition of a fine of one (1) months salary. Said Justice Vasquez:

The law on bail mandates that all persons in custody are entitled to bail as a matter of
right except those charged with capital offense or an offense which under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application to bail is punishable
by Reclusion Perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong (Section 3 Rule 114, Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure). And in the event of an application for admission to
bail, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong
(Section 5, supra).

xxx xxx xxx

Ironically, in the administrative case at bench, the respondent judge not only
committed the mistake of granting bail to the accused without hearing. He likewise
practically reversed the original and alias warrants of arrest issued by him against the
accused where no bail was recommended. Furthermore, despite his denial of the
Demurrer to Evidence submitted by the accused, respondent judge insistingly refused
to cancel the bail of the (accused,) taking refuge and shelter from a mere
recommendatory statement (of) the Office of the City Prosecutor that accused maybe
admitted to a P50,000.00 bail. It is therefore imperative to find guilty (sic) against the
respondent in this respect.

We agree with the foregoing findings. It is basic that in indictments for

capital offenses like murder, bail shall not be granted when the evidence of guilt
is strong. When admission to bail is a matter of discretion, the judge is required
to conduct a hearing and to give notice of such hearing to the fiscal or require
him to submit his recommendation.
 In concerned Citizens vs. Elma, we emphasized the extreme necessity of
[2]

conducting hearings in applications for bail, especially in capital offenses:

x x x It is a rule of long standing that bail is not a matter of right in cases involving
capital offenses or where the offense for which the accused stands charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. It is true that the
weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. However, such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to
ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of determining whether or
not he should be granted provisional liberty. At the hearing, the court should assure
that the prosecution is afforded the opportunity to adduce evidence relevant to the
factual issue, with the applicant having the right of cross-examination and to introduce
his own evidence in rebuttal. In the case at bench, however, no formal hearing was
conducted by respondent judge. He could not have assessed the weight of the evidence
against accused Gatus before granting the latters application for bail.

The necessity of hearing an application for bail has been stressed by this Court in
the early case of People vs. San Diego, (No. L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26
SCRA 522) thus:

The courts discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light
of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be
uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the courts order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong. x x x

Truly, a judge would not be in a position to determine whether the

prosecutions evidence is weak or strong unless a hearing is first conducted: [3]

To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt the prosecution must
also be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process. People
vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489). Further, the courts discretion to grant bail in capital
offenses might (sic) be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented
by the prosecution, otherwise, it could be uncontrolled and might be capricious or
whimsical. Hence, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong. (Resolution issued in A.M. No. 92-10-884-RTC - Re:
Report of Pasig RTC Judges about the case of Judge Armie Elma, RTC, Branch 153,
Pasig, M. M.).

xxx xxx xxx

It is indeed regrettable how respondent Judge Francisco ignored the clear import
in People vs. Dacudao where we clearly stated that a hearing is absolutely
indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecutions
evidence is weak or strong. Hence, a denial of the prosecutions request to adduce
evidence, deprives it of procedural due process, a right to which it is equally entitled
as the defense. A hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for determining the
existence of those factors set forth under Rule 114, Sec. 6.

And failure to conduct such hearing is inexcusable:

Respondent cannot grant an application for admission to bail in a capital offense

without hearing, on the ground that the opposition thereto was based merely on the
affidavit of the defense witnesses (See Medina vs. De Guia, 219 SCRA 153 [1993], in
connection with A.M. No RTJ-89-306). The hearing is precisely to give the
prosecution the opportunity to present these witnesses in court to affirm the contents
of their affidavits.By granting the bail application on such a flimsy reason, respondent
effectively denied the prosecution the opportunity to be heard and to establish that the
evidence of the accuseds guilt was strong.

His failure to conduct the hearing required is inexcusable and reflects either gross
ignorance of the law or a cavalier disregard of its requirements (Pico vs. Combong,
Jr., 215 SCRA 421 [1992]), thus, warranting severe sanction. [4]

In the face of this established rule on bail hearings, respondent judge,

citing Lim, Sr. vs. Felix, averred that a judge may rely upon the fiscals
[5]

certification of the existence of a probable cause and on the basis thereof issue
a warrant of arrest. This argument is misplaced and totally unacceptable. The
cited case involves the issuance of warrants of arrest, NOT the grant of bail.
We held in Aurillo, Jr. vs. Francisco that:
[6]

Verily, it was patent error for him [trial judge] to base his order granting bail merely
on the supporting affidavits attached to the information since those were merely
intended to establish probable cause as basis for the issuance of an arrest
warrant, and not to control his discretion to deny or grant bail in all situations -i.e.,
with or without a motion from the accused and even without conducting a hearing on
the matter. Such error cannot be characterized as mere deficiency in prudence,
discretion and judgment, but a patent disregard of well-known rules and, therefore,
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.

In the Code of Judicial Conduct (Rule 1.01), a judge should be the

embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Respondent judge fell
short of this basic canon and, by his conduct, did not inspire confidence on the
part of the litigants in his competence and knowledge of the law. In fine, we are
of the firm conviction that respondent is guilty as found by Justice Vasquez.
In Bay/on vs. Sison, where the judge therein granted bail with neither
[7]

notice to the prosecution nor hearing on the application for bail, this Court
imposed a FINE of P20,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that the commission
of the same or similar offense in the future will definitely be dealt with more
severely.
Similarly, in Aurillo, Jr. vs. Francisco, this Court imposed on the respondent
[8]

judge a fine of P20,000.00 with stern warning, etc.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Judge GUILTY of
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and hereby imposes upon him a FINE of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00), with the STERN WARNING that commission of
the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo

RELIANCE SURETY & G.R. No. 150994

INSURANCE CO., INC.,
Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
HON. ANDRES R. AMANTE, JR.,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
Cabanatuan City, the
HON. CITY PROSECUTOR,
Cabanatuan City and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondents.
June 30, 2005
x------------------------------------------------------------------x
 DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This Petition for Review is the culmination of a wrong-headed

approach by a bonding company to acquit itself of liability on
purportedly spurious bail bonds issued in its name. Even if we
concede the basic premise the questioned bail bonds are indeed false,
there are prescribed remedies under our procedural rules which the
surety simply failed to avail of despite ample opportunity. Hence,
although the lower court decisions under review are not free of flaws
the Court is impelled to deny the petition.

Petitioner Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. (Reliance) is a duly

organized insurance firm. On 5 October 1998, it filed a Special
Appearance And Motion to Set Aside Orders/Writs of Execution with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23,
presided over by Hon. Andres R. Amante, Jr. Reliance pertinently
alleged therein, thus:

1. On June 18, 1997, movant Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.
was surprised to receive a letter from the Insurance Commission
dated June 11, 1997 enclosing copies of the Orders/Judgments and
Writs of Execution against the bailbonds allegedly issued by movant
as follows:

Name of Date of Writs Amount of Name of

Accused & Orders Liability Court
Crim. Case
No.

Rogelio Jan. 19, 1995 P10,000.00 RTC,

Andres, 3rdJudicial
et al./3012 Region
(A.F.) Branch 23
 Cabanatuan
City

Adelina Sept. 25, 1996 P20,000.00 - do -

Vidal/5822
(A.F.)

Naldy Aug. 6, 1996 P10,000.00 - do -

Jimenez &
Geminiano
Roxas/6035
(A.F.)

2. . . ;Movant replied to the aforesaid letter dated June 11, 1997 of

the Insurance Commission stating that the bailbonds are false and
spurious. . .;

3. Again, on July 22, 1997 and May 14, 1998, movant was surprised
to receive letters from the Insurance Commission dated July 11,
1997 and May 7, 1998 enclosing copies of the Orders against the
bailbonds allegedly issued by the movant as follows:

Name of Date of Writs/ Amount of Name of

Accused & Orders Liability Court
Crim. Case
No.

Dolores P. June 25, 1997 P13, 000.00 RTC,

Posadas/6320 3rdJudicial
AF Region
Branch 23
Cabanatuan
City

Melania Jan. 19, 1998 P8,000.00 - do -

Dagdagan

4. . . ; Movant replied to said letter dated July 11, 1997 and May 7,
1998 of the Insurance Commission stating that the bonds
mentioned therein are false and spurious. . . ;[1]
Reliance entered its special appearance in each of the above-cited
criminal cases, at the same time seeking to set aside the cited writs
of execution. Reliance alleged that the bonds in question were issued
by one Evelyn Tinio, against whom it had since lodged a criminal
case.[2]

Each of the criminal cases were prosecuted in behalf of

the People of the Philippines by the City Prosecutor, who did not
interpose any objection to Reliances motion. Respondent judge
conducted a hearing on the matter, and Reliance submitted
documentary evidence in support of its motion.

On 21 April 1999, respondent judge issued an Order denying

Reliances motion. On the premise that the controversy revolved on
the tri-sided (sic) relationship of movant Reliance Surety; Alfredo Wy
and Evelyn Tinio and the Insurance Commission, the Order stressed
that the controversy could only be resolved with authority and finality
by the Insurance Commission under its Administrative and
Adjudicatory Powers.[3]

As Reliance failed in its motion to reconsider the said Order, on 15

June 1999, it seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal. However, on 15 July
1999, respondent judge issued an Order disallowing the Notice of
Appeal on the ground that Reliance failed to pay the corresponding
appeal fee, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 1 (c), Rule 50, in relation
to Sec. 4, Rule 41.[4]

Reliance sought the reconsideration of the disallowance of the

appeal, stressing among others, that the rules cited by the RTC were
inapplicable, as they pertained to civil actions and not to criminal
cases, and that there was nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure
that requires the payment of appeal fees in criminal cases.[5] However,
Reliances Motion for Reconsideration was denied in an Order[6] dated
24 August 1999. Therein, the RTC characterized the pending incident
as having a civil nature, which has not been subsumed by the
criminal nature of the cases under which Reliances motion was
captioned.[7]

Reliance then filed a Petition for Mandamus with the Court of Appeals,
praying that the orders disallowing the Notice of Appeal be declared
null and void, and that respondent Judge be ordered to immediately
transmit the complete records, together with the Notice of Appeal in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court.[8]

Before the appellate court, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in
representation of the People filed a Manifestation expressing
concurrence with Reliances position.[9] Nonetheless, the Court of
Appeals Twelfth Division issued a Decision[10] dated 22 December
2000 dismissing the petition.

Casting the issue as whether docket fees should be paid in

appealing the order dismissing petitioners motion to set aside
order/writ of execution, the appellate court cited Section 7, Rule 5 of
the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which
provides that appeals from orders of confiscation or forfeiture of bail
bonds shall be treated as appeals in civil cases, and Section 3, Rule
5 of the same Rules which ordains that no payment of docketing and
other legal fees shall be required in criminal cases except in petitions
for review of criminal cases and appeals from confiscation or forfeiture
of bail bond.[11] With these rules as anchor, the Court of Appeals
concluded that Reliance was obligated to pay the corresponding
docket fees, and failure to do so was ground to dismiss the appeal, as
the RTC properly did.

Before this Court, Reliance points out that nothing in the Rules
of Criminal Procedure requires the payment of appeal fees in criminal
cases. It notes as obvious that respondent judge, petitioner, and the
OSG were aware of the provisions of the RIRCA cited by the Court of
Appeals, and that the RTC Clerk of Court had accepted the Notice of
Appeal without being required to pay the appeal fee. Moreover,
arguing that the RIRCA could not supplant, amend or modify the
Rules of Court, Reliance asserts that the cited provisions of the
RIRCA, which operate towards that result, are clearly null and void.
Finally, Reliance submits that should the Court rule that an appeal
fee is required even in cases of the sort, it be allowed instead to pay
such appeal fee.[12]

Interestingly, the OSG has reversed its earlier concurrence with

Reliances stance, seeking this time the dismissal of the present
petition. Holding forth that the Court of Appeals was within the
bounds of its discretion when it dismissed the petition, the
government counsel endorses the validity and enforceability of the
challenged provisions of the RIRCA, as they were approved by this
Court.[13]

The facts as presented by Reliance manifest disconcerting

aspects of the dismissal of the appeal as decreed by the trial court.
No disputation has been made of Reliances claim that when it filed
the Notice of Appeal, it inquired with the Office of the Clerk of Court
and Cashiers Office in the RTC whether an appeal or docket fee
should be paid and was informed that none was required.[14]Moreover,
the provisions cited by the RTC in its dismissal of the Notice of Appeal,
Sec. 1 (c), Rule 50, in relation to Sec. 4, Rule 41, plainly apply only to
civil cases since appeals in criminal cases are governed by Rules 122
to 125 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. There is no provision in
the Rules of Court equivalent to that of the RIRCA providing that an
appeal from an order for the confiscation or forfeiture of bail bonds
should be treated as an appeal in a civil case.

Nonetheless, a review of the available record reveals a more

complex factual milieu. Reliance proceeds from the premise that the
twin denials of Reliances Motion to Set Aside Orders/Writs of
Execution and the succeeding Notice of Appeal serve as the linchpin
on which its attempt to acquit itself of liability from the bonds should
hinge. However, it is evident from the record that Reliance, long before
it filed its motion in October of 1998, was already afforded the
opportunity to timely challenge liability on these bonds, yet failed to
do so.

To best appreciate this case, it is essential to elaborate on the

procedure surrounding the confiscation or forfeiture of a bail bond by
the trial court, and the proper remedies which may be undertaken by
the bondsmen adversely affected.

Any domestic or foreign corporation, licensed as a surety in

accordance with law and currently authorized to act as such, may
provide bail by a bond subscribed jointly by the accused and an
officer of the corporation duly authorized by its board of
directors.[15] Once the obligation of bail is assumed, the bondsman or
surety becomes in law the jailer of the accused and is subrogated to
all the rights and means which the government possesses to make
his control of him effective.[16]

Section 21, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal

Procedure, in force at the time of the subject incidents, provides
for the procedure to be followed before a bail bond may be
forfeited, and judgment on the bond rendered against the surety:

SEC. 21. Forfeiture of bailbond. When the presence of the

accused is required by the court, or these Rules, his bondsman
shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given
date. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, the
bond shall be declared forfeited and the bondsman are given
thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to
show cause why judgment should not be rendered against them
for the amount of their bond. Within the said period, the
bondsmen:

(a) must produce the body of their principal or give the reason
for his non-production; and

(b) must explain satisfactorily why the accused did not appear
before the court when first required to do so.

Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be

rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the
amount of the bond, and the court shall not reduce or otherwise
mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, except when the accused
has been surrendered or is acquitted.[17]
 As evident in the provision, there are two occasions upon
which the trial court judge may rule adversely against the
bondsmen in cases when the accused fails to appear in court.
First, the non-appearance by the accused is cause for the judge
to summarily declare the bond as forfeited. Second, the
bondsmen, after the summary forfeiture of the bond, are given
thirty (30) days within which to produce the principal and to
show cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them
for the amount of the bond. It is only after this thirty (30)-day
period, during which the bondsmen are afforded the opportunity
to be heard by the trial court, that the trial court may render a
judgment on the bond against the bondsmen. Judgment against
the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such judgment is
preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to
the bondsmen to produce the accused or to adduce satisfactory
reason for their inability to do so.[18]

The judgment against the bondsmen on the bond may be

construed as a final order, hence subject to appeal. There is no
reason to disturb the doctrine of long standing that characterizes
such judgment as a final judgment or order[19] or that such judgment
may be subject to appeal.[20] A final order has been defined as one
which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been
determined.[21] Indeed, from a judgment on the bond, a writ of
execution may immediately issue,[22]and need not be effected through
a separate action.[23] Indeed, an appeal from a judgment on the bond
is subsumed under Section 1, Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides that appeals in criminal cases avail only
from a judgment or final order,[24] and Section 6 of the same Rule
which requires that the appeal be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the final order appealed from.[25]

Moreover, the special civil action of certiorari to assail a

judgment of forfeiture may be available under exceptional
circumstances,[26] although the availability of appeal as a remedy to
such judgment greatly raises the bar for the allowance of the
certiorari action. The writ of execution itself may, in theory, be
assailed through the special civil action for certiorari, though
qualified again by the limited circumstances under which certiorari
may avail.

Clearly then, under the procedure just elaborated, the surety

has ample opportunities to defend itself before the trial court against
the execution against a bond in its name which it might not have
actually issued. Assuming that the provisions of Rule 122 were
actually followed in this case, the matter of the spuriousness of the
subject bonds could have very well been raised even before judgment
on the bond was rendered. But was such procedure actually observed
before the trial court?

Admittedly, the record is bereft of details as to the particular

proceedings in the five criminal cases wherein the subject bonds were
issued. However, Reliance itself attached to its motion copies of the
five writs of execution issued against it respective to the five bonds
issued in its name. Presumably, these writs of execution were issued
only after a judgment of forfeiture had been rendered, which in turn
was promulgated only after the bondsmen had been afforded the
opportunity to explain why it should not be held liable on the bail
bond on account of its failure to present the accused in court.
 It is plainly stated on all of these writs of execution that copies
thereof were furnished to the Manager of Reliance Surety and
Insurance Company, 8th Floor Equitable Bank Bldg., 262 Juan Luna
St., Manila,[27] which pertinently, is the same business address used
by Luisa Agat, the Manager of the Marine and Bonds Department of
Reliance, in her affidavit attached to Reliances motion.[28] Such
notices were served separately on those given to Evelyn Tinio, whose
authority to represent Reliance the latter had subsequently disputed.
Indeed, while Reliance purported to be surprised to have learned of
these writs of execution from the Insurance Commission,[29] there is
no express disavowal of receipt of the copies of the writs of execution
directly furnished to its Manila office by the Cabanatuan City RTC.
The presumption is that official duty has been regularly
performed,[30] and that these writs of execution were indeed sent to
the Manila office of Reliance, as stated therein.

Crucially, these writs of execution were issued between 19

January 1995 and 19 January 1998. Reliances motion itself was filed
only on 5 October 1998, or nine (9) months after the last of the writs
of execution had been issued.

The first assumption of course is that Reliance, in each of the

subject criminal cases, had been served notice of the summary
forfeiture of the bail bond and required to show cause why it should
not be held liable on the bond, and later likewise served notice of the
adverse judgment on the bond. Reliance had the opportunity, prior to
the rendition of judgment on the bond, to argue before the RTC that
the bond was spurious, and such argument could very well have been
deemed meritorious, considering the established rule of liberality in
acceptance of the bondsmens explanation.[31] Even if the trial court
had refused to admit such explanation and rendered judgment
against Reliance, the bonding company still had the opportunity to
file an appeal within fifteen (15) days from the judgment on the bond.
This, Reliance failed to do. We certainly cannot construe the notice of
appeal which Reliance did file as that taken from the five judgments
on the bond, since such appeal was undertaken more than a year
after the last of the five judgments had been rendered and more than
four years after the first, and also since said notice was expressly
made in respect to the writs of execution.

Still, given the paucity of the available record, let us indulge the
presupposition that, Reliance somehow was unaware of the
judgments rendered on the bond. Considering the express statement
on the writs of execution attached by Reliance to its motion and to
this petition, the presumption arises that said writs of execution were
served on Reliance at its Manila office, and such assumption must be
sustained due to the inability of Reliance to dispute such
presumption. Reliance then should have been expected to do
something within a reasonable period of time to challenge the writs
of execution if indeed there were good reasons to assail them. Instead,
upon receipt of these writs of execution, Reliance did nothing, and its
failure to immediately respond to these writs militates against their
ultimate claim for relief.

Finally, Reliance filed the Motion to Set Aside Orders/Writs of

Execution only nine months after receipt of the most recently dated
writ of execution, and four years after the first writ had been issued.
Interestingly, Reliance does not refer at all to the judgments on the
bail bonds that would have preceded the writs of execution, thus
apparently conceding the validity of these judgments.

Certainly, courts have justifiable reason to view with distaste a

judgment obligor who begins to actively participate in litigation only
after the adverse judgment has long become final. The RTC in this
case could not be faulted for its aversion to indulge in Reliances
sudden appearance in the criminal cases, considering that the said
criminal cases have apparently been long terminated.[32] Nonetheless,
Reliances motion, in itself, is not abjectly bereft of merit, especially if
it be construed as a motion to quash a writ of execution. While the
Rules of Court deliberately makes no express reference to a motion to
quash a writ of execution, the jurisdiction of courts to entertain such
motions has long been upheld, on the premise that every court has
the inherent power for the advancement of justice to correct errors of
its ministerial officers and to control its own process.[33]

There are grounds entrenched in jurisprudence for the quashal

of a writ of execution,[34] yet such quashal rests largely in the
discretion of the court, that will be exercised in the furtherance of
justice.[35] In this case, had the RTC been sufficiently convinced that
the questioned bail bonds were indeed spurious, there would be
grounds in equity for the writs of execution to be set aside. After all,
the notion that an entity can be held liable for an obligation it did not
actually contract offends basic principles of justice.

However, the RTC was not sufficiently convinced, preferring

instead to await definitive word from the Insurance Commission on
the revocation of Reliances former agent. One can view the
justification as a measure of prudence, or disagree with it as an
abdication of the judicial duty to decide. Yet concededly, the RTCs
discretion in deciding the matter is entitled to great respect, not only
due to the fact that the matter for consideration is the quashal of
writs of execution, but also because the trial court is normally deemed
as the most capable trier of facts under the circumstances.

Yet ultimately, this case does not pivot on whether the RTC
correctly refused to set aside the writs of execution. At this stage,
despite the numerous errors of procedure already committed by
Reliance, there still was leeway for the allowance of its prayer for
discharge, since the quashal of writs of execution was obtainable as
a remedy against issuances of inequitable nature. However, Reliance
instead again committed another fundamental procedural error, one
that whisks away whatever sympathy it may have acquired owing to
its basic position.

Simply put, appeal does not lie as the remedy from an order
denying a motion to set aside a writ of execution. Appeal avails as a
remedy only against judgments or final orders, a general rule that
holds true whether for civil or criminal procedure.[36] Appeal may have
been properly available from the five judgments on the bail bonds in
the five criminal cases, as such judgments would have constituted as
the final orders on the matter whether Reliance should be held liable
on these bonds. However, appeal cannot be undertaken from the
RTCs Order, arising as it did, at the execution stage.

Reliances motion to set aside the writs of execution cannot be deemed

as having submitted a new incident for resolution to the RTC. The
motion had segued from the earlier final judgments or orders which
in turn were sought to be satisfied through the challenged writs of
execution. Indeed, there can be no two independent final judgments
or orders in the same incident, except in cases where multiple appeals
are allowed.[37]

Instead, from receipt of the Order denying its motion to set aside
the writs of execution, the only permissible mode of review for
Reliance was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 with
the Court of Appeals, wherein it could have alleged that the RTC acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the
said motion.[38] Ultimately, thus, the RTC could not be faulted for
refusing to give cognizance to the Notice of Appeal, as appeal was
unavailing as a remedy to Reliance in this case.

Similarly, the writ of mandamus which Reliance sought from the

Court of Appeals was not accessible from it in the first place. Since
appeal is not the proper remedy, the RTC could not be compelled to
transmit the records to the higher court for review on appeal,
especially considering that the judgment on the bail bonds had long
lapsed into finality.

A brief comment on the remedy which Reliance did pursue

before the Court of Appeals, the special civil action of mandamus. The
writ of mandamus serves to compel a respondent who fails to perform
a legal duty or unlawfully excludes another from the enjoyment of an
entitled right or office to do the act required to be done to protect the
rights of the petitioner.[39] As it was, Reliance resorted to mandamus
not as a direct mode of judicial review by the Court of Appeals in
respect to the assailed RTC Order, but merely to petition the appellate
court to give due course to the appeal. It utilized mandamus on the
erroneous notion that the RTC Order was appealable, or on the
mistaken premise that the RTC had the corresponding duty to elevate
the records to the appellate court. While Reliances availment of
mandamus is consistent with its premise that the RTC Order was
appealable, its ultimate efficacy is questionable. After all, the end
result of Reliances mandamus petition is simply the elevation of the
records to the Court of Appeals, and not reversal of the RTC Order on
the merits.

There lies room for one more assumption in Reliances favor that
we can attempt to indulge in. Assuming for the nonce that despite all
these lapses, that the RTC Order may be considered as a final
judgment or order reviewable by appeal, Reliance still could not be
deemed as having perfected the appeal, as it did not pay the requisite
docket fees.

Reliance invests all its energy in the present petition to dispute

the holding that the Court of Appeals can, as it did, on the basis of
the RIRCA, refuse to take cognizance of its appeal for failure to pay
the docket fee. Sadly for Reliance, its arguments on this point lack
merit.

The Court of Appeals is empowered to promulgate its own rules

or orders pertaining to its operations.[40] The RIRCA is the by-product
of this vested authority. The provisions which Reliance assails,
Sections 3 and 7 of Rule 5, were in place as early as 1994, when the
RIRCA was amended, and retained in the 1999 revision of the RIRCA.

Reliance cannot disavow knowledge of the provisions of the

RIRCA. That these rules are called internal does not mean that they
are secret. In fact, both the 1994 and 1999 editions of the RIRCA have
been widely disseminated, available upon demand from the Court of
Appeals, and even replicated in private collations or annotations of
our laws.[41] Nor can Reliance validly assert that the RIRCA provisions
supplanted the Rules of Court. The RIRCA necessitated the approval,
which was obtained, of the Supreme Court prior to its effectivity, the
very Supreme Court which promulgated or amended our Rules of
Court. Certainly, the Court cannot be precluded from amending its
own issuances, or issuing supplementary or clarificatory procedural
rules such as the RIRCA. Indeed, the RIRCA, vested with the requisite
imprimatur of the Supreme Court, is effectively an issuance of this
Court. Challenge of the RIRCA is akin to challenging one of the Courts
very own issuances.

Moreover, the assailed provisions of the RIRCA are ultimately

correct in characterizing the appeal from a judgment on the bail bond
as inherently civil in nature. The RTC correctly picked up on this
point,[42] and it is a characterization that we can affirm. The liability
of the bondsmen on the bail bond arises not from the violation of, or
an obligation to comply with, a penal provision of law. It emerges
instead from a contract, the bond subscribed jointly by the accused
and the surety or bondsmen. The obligation of the accused on the
bond is different from that of the surety in that the former can be
made to suffer a criminal penalty for failure to comply with the
obligations on the bail bond. However, the surety is not under a
similar pain of punishment, as its liability on the bail bond would
merely be civil in character. Nothing in the Rules of Court authorizes
the imprisonment of the surety for the failure to produce the accused
when called for in court, his obligation being contractual in source
and character. In keeping with the civil nature of the appeal from the
judgment on the bail bonds, the Court of Appeals acted properly in
prescribing the payment of docket fee for such appeal as in appeal in
civil cases.

Reliance apparently failed to show cause to the RTC why it

should not be held liable on the subject bail bonds, to timely appeal
the judgment rendered on the bail bonds, or to move within a
reasonable time to set aside the writs of execution. When Reliance
finally undertook steps to acquit itself of liability on these bail bonds
but faced denial of its relief by the RTC, it failed to lodge the correct
mode of judicial review when it filed a notice of appeal instead of a
special civil action for certiorari. From the disallowance of the Notice
of Appeal, it responded with a woefully insufficient petition for
mandamus. Even its arguments against the validity of the questioned
RIRCA provisions are erroneous.

In a long-distance race, the crowd would be charitably disposed

the first time a runner trips and falls. Neither would the second fall
exhaust the commiseration of the spectators. However, if the runner
stumbles every fifty meters, observers have earned the right to heckle
and jeer, or more kindly, to question whether the racer is qualified to
run in the first place. Indeed, Reliances consecutive procedural
missteps, all of which could have been avoided by easy reference to
the established rules and jurisprudence, have deprived it of the right
to seek relief before this Court.
 Our final disposition is not the product of sheer pique, and we
have duly considered the fact that denial of the petition would
condemn Reliance to an obligation it might not have contracted. Yet
ultimately, it should accept the consequences of its negligence in
failing to timely present its position, or in utilizing the proper modes
of judicial review. Equitable relief is not the supremacy of pity but the
entitlement of due process previously denied the litigant. One who
fails to avail of the prescribed legal steps despite repeated
opportunities has no reason to expect anything other than due
condemnation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA Associate

Justice

WE CONCUR:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 176933

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, * J.
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,**
Acting Chairperson,
PERALTA,***
DEL CASTILLO, and
 ABAD, JJ.
LUIS PLAZA Y BUCALON,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
October 2, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Raising only questions of law, the Peoples petition for review on certiorari assails
the January 31, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
November 12, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Br.
29 in Criminal Case No. 5144 (the case) fixing bail for the temporary liberty of Luis
Bucalon Plaza alias Loloy Plaza (respondent) who was indicted for Murder.
The case was originally raffled to Branch 30 of the Surigao RTC presided by Judge
Floripinas Buyser (Judge Buyser).

After the prosecution rested its case, respondent, with leave of court, filed a
Demurrer to Evidence.[2] The Demurrer was denied by Judge Buyser by
Order[3] of March 14, 2002, the pertinent portion of which reads:

xxxx

The evidence thus presented by the prosecution is sufficient to

prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but only for the
crime of homicide and not for murder, as charged. This is because
the qualifying circumstance of treachery alleged in the
information cannot be appreciated in this case.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The defense thereupon presented evidence[4] in the course of which

respondent filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond,[5] contending that in view of
Judge Buysers ruling that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only
Homicide, he could be released on bail. He thus prayed that the bail bond for his
temporary liberty be fixed at P40,000.00 which he claimed was the usual bond for
Homicide in the RTC of Surigao City and Surigao del Norte.

In its Opposition to Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond,[6] the prosecution

contended, in the main, that the case being for Murder, it is non-bailable as the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to death; that it is the public prosecutor who
has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what crime the accused should be charged
with; that the accused should have filed a motion/application to bail and not just a
motion to fix the amount of the bail bond; that the accused had already waived his
right to apply for bail at that stage of the proceedings; that Judge Buysers March 14,
2002 Order, being a mere opinion and not a ruling or a dispositive part thereof,
produced no legal effect inasmuch as it had no jurisdiction to rule on a matter outside
the Demurrer; and that under the Rules, the prosecution could still prove the
existence of treachery on rebuttal after the defense has rested its case.

During the hearing of the Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, Senior State
Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo questioned Judge Buysers impartiality, prompting the
judge to inhibit himself and to order the case transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC
for further proceedings.

Branch 29 Presiding Judge Jose Manuel Tan (Judge Tan) heard the Motion to
Fix Amount of Bail Bond.

By Order[7] of November 12, 2002, Judge Tan, concurring with the finding of
Judge Buyser that since the prosecution evidence proved only Homicide which is
punishable by reclusion temporal and, therefore, bailable, ruled that respondent
could no longer be denied bail. He accordingly granted respondents Motion and
fixed the amount of his bond at P40,000.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration cum prayer for inhibition of Judge Tan
was denied for lack of merit.[8]

Respondent was subsequently released[9] after he posted a P40,000 bond.

 Roberto Murcia (Roberto), the victims brother, impleading the People as co-
petitioner, assailed the trial courts orders via petition for certiorari[10] with the Court
of Appeals.

Roberto faulted Judge Tan for granting bail without an application for
bail having been filed by respondent and without conducting the mandatory
hearing to determine whether or not the prosecutions evidence is strong.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adopted Robertos argument that
the grant of bail to respondent without any separate hearing is contrary to prevailing
jurisprudence.

By Decision of January 31, 2007, the appellate court, observing that the
allegations in respondents Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond constituted an
application for bail, dismissed Robertos petition and affirmed Judge Tans orders.[11]

In its present petition, the People contends that

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF

SUBSTANCE CONTRARY TO LAW AND SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE HEARING
CONDUCTED SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS
AND THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BAIL[12] (Underscoring
supplied)

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that "All persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus
provides that all persons in custody shall, beforeconviction by a regional trial court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be
admitted to bail as a matter of right.
The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused
charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. Stressing this point, this Court held:

. . . [W]hen bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or

otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to
determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the
accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the
evidence presented by the parties. A summary hearing is defined as such
brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt
as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which
is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of
bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter
into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome
of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross
examination.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of the
prosecution evidence when he denied the Demurrer and the latters statement that the
evidence was sufficient to convict respondent of Homicide, holding a summary
hearing merely to determine whether respondent was entitled to bail would have
been unnecessary as the evidence in chiefwas already presented by the prosecution.

The Peoples recourse to Section 5,[14] Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure to support its contention that respondent should be denied bail
is unavailing, for said Section clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the
accused after a judgment of conviction has already been handed down by the trial
court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

In Ubando-Paras v. Fernandez,[10] the respondent judge was fined P5,000.00 for ordering the
release of an accused in a criminal case even though he had paid the bail bond merely by
means of a check and did not post a cash bond.
 [A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511. August 20, 2004]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE

OCTAVIO A. FERNANDEZ, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, General
M. Natividad-Llanera, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This case has its origin in A.M. No. 99-6-81-MTCC, where the Court, in a
[1]

Resolution dated June 3, 2003, directed among others, the Office of the Court
Administrator to investigate Judge Octavio A. Fernandez on his involvement in
the anomalous collection of an additional cash bond in People of the Philippines
v. Florentino Marcelo, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 505-506, for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries, originally pending before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Palayan City.
Per judicial audit conducted at the MTCC, Palayan City, formerly presided
by Judge Marciano C. Mauricio, Sr., it was discovered that upon motion of the
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 505-506, the bail bond was reduced from
P6,000.00 to P2,000.00. At 5:15 p.m. of July 2, 1996, accused Marcelo
accompanied by a warrant officer, went to the residence of Judge Mauricio for
the purpose of posting bail but the latter had left for Manila. Hence, they went
to see respondent Judge Octavio A. Fernandez of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Gen. Natividad-Llanera, Nueva Ecija. Upon receipt of the cash bond of
P2,000.00, Judge Fernandez ordered the release of accused in an Order which
stated that he is (sic) already deposited to this Court the required cash bond.
It was only sometime in March 1999 that a copy of the Order of Release
dated July 2, 1996 was received by Rosita L. Bagan, the Clerk of Court of the
MTCC of Palayan City. On March 23, 1999, she requested Judge Fernandez
for the receipt of the cash bond and other pertinent papers related to the above-
mentioned cases. Respondent judge replied that the original receipt of the cash
bond had been sent to the MTCC of Palayan City through Teresita Esteban,
Clerk of Court II of the MCTC of Gen. Natividad-Llanera. However, Clerk of
Court Bagan allegedly has not received the said original receipt of the cash
bond.
 Respondent judge, by way of defense, alleged that it was Judge Mauricio
who received the cash bond; hence, the request of Clerk of Court Bagan should
have been directed to Judge Mauricio.
The case was thereafter referred to the Office of the Court Administrator,
which found respondent judge guilty of grave misconduct in office and
recommended that he be fined P20,000.00, with stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
During the pendency of this proceeding, respondent judge optionally retired
on January 2, 2004.
Cessation from office of respondent judge because of death or retirement
does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him
while he was still in the service or render the said administrative case moot and
academic. The jurisdiction that was this Courts at the time of the filing of the
[2]

administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent
public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. Indeed,[3]

the retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not
preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be
answerable. [4]

The primordial question to be resolved is who between Judge Mauricio and

respondent Judge Fernandez actually received the cash bond of P2,000.00
from the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 505-506.
It appears from the records that it was respondent judge who actually
received the P2,000.00 cash bond. The Order in Criminal Case No. 505 dated
July 2, 1996 states:

At 5:15 oclock in the afternoon this day, Florentino P. Marcelo who is the accused in
Criminal Case No. 505 for Reckless Imprudence before the MTCC Palayan City,
came to this Court accompanied by a warrant officer of Palayan City alleging that said
accused went to the residence of Hon. Marciano C. Mauricio, Sr., Presiding Judge of
MTCC Palayan City for the purpose of posting his cashbond. The accused declared
that Judge Mauricio left for Manila a few minutes before the arrival of the accused
and police officer. The said accused requested the undersigned Presiding Judge to
accept and receive the amount of P2,000.00 as cashbond.

WHEREFORE, in fairness and in justice to the said accused and considering that he
is (sic) already deposited to this Court the required cashbond, it is hereby ordered
the released (sic) from custody, unless he is detained for some other cause or causes.

Let copy of this order be furnished the Presiding Judge of MTCC Palayan City. [5]
 Respondent judge violated the provisions of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure by receiving the cash bond instead of directing the accused
or any person acting in his behalf to deposit the cash with the nearest collector
of internal revenue, provincial, city or municipal treasurer. In Agulan, Jr. v.
Fernandez, it was held:
[6]

The rules specify the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be deposited namely:
the collector of internal revenue, or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. Section
14 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1,
2000) provides:

SEC. 14. Deposit of Cash as Bail The accused or any person acting in his behalf may
deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or
municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the
prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate
of deposit and of a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of
section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money
deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs
while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the
deposit.

A judge is not one of those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor
should such cash be kept in the office of the judge.

However, we take exception to the finding of OCA that respondent judge is

guilty of gross misconduct in office.
In Yap v. Inopiquez, Jr., this Court explained the concept of gross
[7]

misconduct, thus:

Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in

the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right
determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper, unlawful conduct
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however,
does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. On the other hand, the term
gross connotes something out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused;
flagrant; shameful.

For administrative liability to attach it must be established that the

respondent was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like
motive. As defined
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a sworn
duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some
motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a
manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause
damage. (Citations omitted)

Indubitably, respondent judge is guilty of simple misconduct for violating the

rules on bail. There is no showing that such violation was moved by evident bad
faith, dishonesty or hatred so as to merit any sanction for serious charges. The
records show that accused Marcelo deposited the cash bond with respondent
judge at 5:15 in the afternoon, when the clerk of court have already left the
office.
Section 9(4), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended,
classifies violations of the Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars as less
serious charges punishable by any of the sanctions enumerated in Section
11(B) of the same Rule, viz.:

SEC. 11. Sanctions.

xxxxxxxxx

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions
shall be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1)
nor more than three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

In view of the foregoing, the fine of P20,000.00 recommended by OCA is

well-taken as the penalty of suspension may no longer be imposed since
respondent judge optionally retired on January 2, 2004.
In addition, respondent judge is ordered to immediately remit to the MTCC
of Palayan City the sum of P2,000.00 which he received as cash bond on
Criminal Cases Nos. 505-506.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Octavio A. Fernandez is found GUILTY
of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is FINED Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) which shall be deducted from whatever benefits may be due
him. Further, he is ordered to REMIT to the MTCC of Palayan City the sum of
P2,000.00 representing the amount of the cash bond paid by accused
Florentino Marcelo in Criminal Cases Nos. 505-506.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, J