Bioeconomic evaluation of fisheries

enforcement effort using a multifleet

simulation model

Within fisheries the study of compliance and how it can be regulated has
focused on the effects of instrumental approaches in changing individual
behaviour, Thus, by modifying the economic costs and benefits of illegal
behaviour (through changes in _ and f) compliance can be managed to achieve a
socially optimal return from the fishery. Generally, increases in _ carry an
associated cost, so that the optimal level of enforcement is attained when the
marginal cost of enforcement is equal to its marginal benefit for a fixed, Quotas
are strictly enforced so that licensed vessels are considered fully compliant.
Although significant in the past, illegal activity is currently negligible (only one
illegal vessel observed since 2000), with its decline correlating with increased
enforcement in recent years.
This framework includes representations of the underlying biomass
dynamics of the stock, legal and illegal harvests. The legal harvest is determined
by prescribed catch quotas (with some implementation error), estimated by a
control rule within the model. Implementation error for the legal fleet refers to
the fact that the prescribed TAC is rarely taken exactly. Instead there is a small
degree of error that can be ascribed to logistical considerations regarding when
fishing should stop for the season. The illegal harvest is determined by the
number of illegal vessels and resultant effort. Illegal vessels enter the fishery at a
constant rate and leave if detected by the FPV, which acts probabilistically within
the model to exclude illegal activity. The exit of illegal vessels from the fishery
once apprehended is justified by the large fines imposed, which usually lead to
forfeit of the vessel.
The full bioeconomic model therefore consists of the following
components: an operating model describing the biomass dynamics of the
exploited stock; a harvest control rule to predict legal catches; a means of
predicting illegal fleet dynamics and therefore effort; a production function
relating illegal fishing effort to harvest; and finally bioeconomic relationships
describing the private benefits to both the legal and illegal fleets and overall
social benefit;
all for a given FPV effort.
The model was run over 1000 Monte Carlo iterations, Monte Carlo
iterations of the system were projected for 50 years from 2009 and the
performance of each management regime (FPV days) evaluated using the
biomass depletion and social benefit (combination of legal fishery net revenue
and the net cost of the fishery patrol operation), with the associated level of
uncertainty.

Theory and calculations

Biomass dynamic operating model, The model was parameterised to

reproduce historic changes in biomass, as represented by the full age-structured
assessment model. Details of this parameterisation process are described in,
giving median and 95% confidence intervals of r = 0.122 [0.087; 0.169] and K =
109 [89; 130] thousand tonnes. Uncertainty in these parameters was obtained
through parametric bootstrapping.
Legal harvest, Legal catches are set solely by this harvest control rule,
which is applied each year assuming an arbitrary degree of assessment error
(CVASM = 0.1), with uncertainty in the actual catch taken (implementation error)
also included in model predictions. This was estimated from a bootstrap of
historic catch statistics, giving CVIMP = 0.01.
Illegal harvest, Predicting illegal fleet dynamics requires a relationship
between FPV effort and the probability of detecting illegal activity. This forms the
basis for the exit of illegal vessels from the fishery. The entry of legal vessels
occurs at a constant mean rate, with vessels allowed to enter and then leave the
fishery in a single year. Whereby harvest is expressed as a multiplicative function
of effort and exploitable biomass. Projections were initialised with no illegal
vessels, corresponding to the currently perceived absence of illegal activity.
Profit, The illegal profit was estimated in a similar fashion, with the
exception that there were no fixed costs (license fees, port fees or insurance).
This is a reasonable assumption since vessels involved in illegal activities are
typically very old (personal communication with observers) with low opportunity
costs compared to the legal fleet. To account for a lower value product (as a
result of fishing in sub-prime locations) and the flouting of restrictive fishing
regulations (such as by-catch mitigation): pIUU < p and cIUU < c.
Bioeconomic relationships, When comparing effort control strategies we
report both the
final values of_ and the discounted sum over the projection period:
50 y
1
l =
y=1
( ) y
1+
where the discount rate 0.02. The discount rate is set at a low level to
account for the strong conservation objectives of CCAMLR (and society as a
whole) that considers the Antarctic ecosystem a high conservation priority.

Results and discussion

the rate of illegal entry will determine the vulnerability of the legal fishery
to collapse at any given level of enforcement effort. Nevertheless, some general
conclusions can be made. First, the legal fishery is more likely to be sustained in
the long-term if management is willing to accommodate reductions in total
licence revenue if the fleet shrinks. The maintenance of the legal fleet not only is
of direct economic benefit (as described here) but in reality also contributes to
the deterrence of illegal vessels. Second, our results indicate that initiatives by
management to maintain enforcement have longterm benefits, maintaining legal
fleet size (and therefore social benefit) and resource biomass levels. Taking the
long-term view given by final estimates of social benefit and biomass depletion
we have shown that social benefits can be maintained even at high enforcement
expenditure, and that biomass depletion improves monotonically with increasing
FPV days (Fig. 4b). The enforcement effort for 2007 (the most recent year of
available data) was 219 FPV days, and we therefore conclude that this will likely
facilitate both a high economic return and attainment of CCAMLR management
objectives.