Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v.

Norway)

FACTS:

On 16 August 1988, the Government of Denmark filed in the Registry an

Application instituting proceedings against Norway, by which it seized the Court
of a dispute concerning the delimitation of Denmarks and Norways fishing
zones and continental shelf areas in the waters between the east coast of
Greenland and the Norwegian island of Jan Mayen, where both Parties laid
claim to an area of some 72,000 square kilometres.
On 14 June 1993, the Court delivered its Judgment. Denmark had asked the
Court to draw a single line of delimitation of those areas at a distance of 200
nautical miles measured from Greenlands baseline, or, if the Court did not find
it possible to draw such a line, in accordance with international law.
Norway, for its part, had asked the Court to find that the median line constituted
the two lines of separation for the purpose of the delimitation of the two relevant
areas, on the understanding that those lines would then coincide, but that the
delimitations would remain conceptually distinct.
A principal contention of Norway was that a delimitation had already been
established between Jan Mayen and Greenland, by the effect of treaties in force
between the Parties a bilateral Agreement of 1965 and the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf as both instruments provide for the
drawing of a median line.
The agreement not to obstruct Danish plans with regard to Greenland was what
Denmark wanted to obtain from Norway. To this request, a declaration on
behalf of the Norwegian government was made by its Minister for Foreign
Affairs that Norway would not make any difficulty in the settlement of the
question.

ISSUE: WON a country bound by the reply given on its behalf by its Minister of Foreign Affairs

HELD: Yes. A country is bound by the reply given on its behalf by its Minister of Foreign
Affairs. Therefore in this case, the response by the diplomatic representative of a
foreign power is binding upon the country the Minister represents.

The Court noted, in the first place, that the 1965 Agreement covered areas different
from the continental shelf between the two countries, and that that Agreement did not
place on record any intention of the Parties to undertake to apply the median line for
any of the subsequent delimitations of that continental shelf. The Court then found that
the force of Norways argument relating to the 1958 Convention depended in the
circumstances of the case upon the existence of special circumstances as envisaged
by the Convention. It subsequently rejected the argument of Norway according to
which the Parties, by their conjoint conduct had long recognized the applicability of
a median line delimitation in their mutual relations. The Court examined separately the
two strands of the applicable law: the effect of Article 6 of the 1958 Convention,
applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary, and then the effect of
the customary law which governed the fishery zone. After examining the case law in
this field and the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, the Court noted that the statement (in those provisions) of an equitable solution
as the aim of any delimitation process reflected the requirements of customary law as
regards the delimitation both of the continental shelf and of exclusive economic zones.
It appeared to the Court that, both for the continental shelf and for the fishery zones in
the instant case, it was proper to begin the process of delimitation by a median line
provisionally drawn, and it then observed that it was called upon to examine every
particular factor in the case which might suggest an adjustment or shifting of the
median line provisionally drawn. The 1958 Convention required the investigation of
any special circumstances; the customary law based upon equitable principles for its
part required the investigation of the relevant circumstances.

The Court found that, although it was a matter of categories which were different in
origin and in name, there was inevitably a tendency towards assimilation between the
two types of circumstances. The Court then turned to the question whether the
circumstances of the instant case required adjustment or shifting of the median line.
To that end it considered a number of factors. With regard to the disparity or
disproportion between the lengths of the relevant coasts, alleged by Denmark, the
Court concluded that the striking difference in lengths of the relevant coasts
constituted a special circumstance within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph 1, of the
1958 Convention. Similarly, as regards the fishery zones, the Court was of the opinion
that the application of the median line led to manifestly inequitable results. The Court
concluded therefrom that the median line should be adjusted or shifted in such a way
as to effect a delimitation closer to the coast of Jan Mayen.

The Court then considered certain circumstances that might also affect the position of
the boundary line, i.e., access to resources, essentially fishery resources (capelin),
particularly with regard to the presence of ice ; population and economy ; questions of
security ; conduct of the Parties. Among those factors, the Court only retained the one
relating to access to resources, considering that the median line was too far to the
west for Denmark to be assured of equitable access to the capelin stock. It concluded
that, for that reason also, the median line had to be adjusted or shifted eastwards.
Lastly, the Court proceeded to define the single line of delimitation as being the line
M-N-O-A marked on the sketch-map reproduced.
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)

On 28 April 2011, the Kingdom of Cambodia submitted to the Court, by an Application

filed in the Registry, a Request for interpretation of the Judgment rendered by the
Court on 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia
v. Thailand). In that Judgment, the Court had ruled that the Temple of Preah Vihear
is situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia and that Thailand is under
an obligation to withdraw any military . . . forces . . . stationed . . . at the Temple, or in
its vicinity on Cambodian territory. In 2008, on Cambodias request, the Temple was
included on the list of World Heritage sites by UNESCO. Following that inclusion,
several armed incidents took place between the Parties in the frontier area close to
the Temple. On the same day that it filed its Application, Cambodia, stressing the
urgency and the risk of irreparable damage, also filed a Request for the indication of
provisional measures. In its Order of 18 July 2011 on that Request, the Court ruled
that it could exercise its power under Article 41 of the Statute and indicated provisional
measures requiring, among other things, both Parties to withdraw their military
personnel from a provisional demilitarized zone surrounding the Temple, as defined
in the Order. In that Order, the Court observed in particular that a difference of opinion
or views appears to exist between [the Parties] as to the meaning or scope of the 1962
Judgment and that this difference appears to relate to three specific aspects of the
said Judgment : first, to the meaning and scope of the phrase vicinity on Cambodian
territory used in the second paragraph of the operative clause of the Judgment ; next,
to the nature of the obligation imposed on Thailand in the second paragraph of the
operative clause of the Judgment, to withdraw any military or police forces, or other
guards or keepers, and, in particular, to the question of whether this obligation is of a
continuing or an instantaneous character ; and, finally, to the question of whether the
Judgment did or did not recognize with binding force the line shown on the Annex I
map as representing the frontier between the two Parties.

On 21 November 2011, within the time-limit fixed for this purpose, Thailand filed written
observations on the Request for interpretation submitted by Cambodia. The Court then
decided to afford each of the Parties the opportunity of furnishing further written
explanations, pursuant to Article 98, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court. It fixed 8
March 2012 and 21 June 2012 as the respective time-limits for the filing of such
explanations by Cambodia and by Thailand. Those pleadings were filed within the
time-limits thus prescribed. In accordance with the same provision, the Court also
decided to afford the Parties the opportunity of furnishing further oral explanations at
hearings held in April 2013. Following the conclusion of those hearings, the Court
began its deliberation.

In the Judgment delivered by it on 11 November 2013, the Court recalled that

Cambodias Request for interpretation was made by reference to Article 60 of the
Statute, which provides that [i]n the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of [a]
judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party. After examining
whether the conditions indicated in Article 60 were satisfied, the Court concluded that
there was a dispute between the Parties as to the meaning and scope of the 1962
Judgment. The Court then turned to the interpretation of the 1962 Judgment. In
determining the meaning and scope of the operative clause of the original Judgment,
the Court first pointed out that, in accordance with its practice, it would have regard to
the reasoning of that Judgment to the extent that it sheds light on the proper
interpretation of the operative clause. The Court noted that the principal dispute
between the Parties concerned the territorial scope of the second operative paragraph,
namely the territorial extent of the vicinity of the Temple of Preah Vihear.

The Court considered that, in view of the reasoning in the 1962 Judgment, seen in the
light of the pleadings in the original proceedings, the second operative paragraph of
the 1962 Judgment required Thailand to withdraw from the whole territory of the
promontory any Thai personnel stationed on that promontory at the time. Accordingly,
the Court found that the term vicinity on Cambodian territory had to be construed as
extending at least to the area where a police detachment had been stationed at the
time of the original proceedings. The Court observed that that finding was confirmed
by a number of other factors, and in particular by the fact that the area around the
Temple is located on an easily identifiable geographical feature, namely a promontory.
In the east, south and southwest, the promontory descends by a steep escarpment to
the Cambodian plain. The Parties were in agreement in 1962 that this escarpment,
and the land at its foot, were under Cambodian sovereignty in any event. To the west
and north-west, the land drops in a slope, less steep than the escarpment but
nonetheless pronounced, into the valley which separates Preah Vihear from the
neighbouring hill of Phnom Trap, a valley which itself drops away in the south to the
Cambodian plain. The Court considered that Phnom Trap lay outside the disputed
area and the 1962 Judgment did not address the question whether it was located in
Thai or Cambodian territory. Accordingly, the Court considered that the promontory of
Preah Vihear ends at the foot of the hill of Phnom Trap, that is to say, where the ground
begins to rise from the valley.

In the Courts view, the reasoning followed in the 1962 Judgment showed that the
Court considered that Cambodias territory extended in the north as far as the line on
the map annexed to Cambodias pleadings in the original proceedings (the Annex I
map), which the Parties had accepted. Accordingly, the Court found that, in the north,
the limit of the promontory is the Annex I map line, from a point to the north-east of the
Temple where that line abuts the escarpment to a point in the north-west where the
ground begins to rise from the valley, at the foot of the hill of Phnom Trap.

The Court then examined the relationship between the second operative paragraph
and the rest of the operative part. It considered that the territorial scope of the three
operative paragraphs is the same : the finding in the first paragraph that the Temple
of Preah Vihear is situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia must be
taken as referring, like the second and third paragraphs, to the promontory of Preah
Vihear.

Lastly, the Court observed that the Temple of Preah Vihear is a site of religious and
cultural significance for the peoples of the region and is now listed by UNESCO as a
world heritage site. In this respect, the Court recalls that under Article 6 of the World
Heritage Convention, to which both States are parties, Cambodia and Thailand must
co-operate between themselves and with the international community in the protection
of the site as a world heritage. In addition, each State is under an obligation not to
take any deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly such
heritage. In the context of these obligations, the Court emphasized the importance of
ensuring access to the Temple from the Cambodian plain.