Contents

Disad Links................................................................................................................................................. 3
Elections Links: THAAD/Missile Defense Links ..................................................................................... 4
Xi Credibility Links ................................................................................................................................. 5
North Korean Proliferation Advantage Answers ...................................................................................... 6
North Korean Proliferation Answers Front-Line ................................................................................... 7
North Korea Wont Give Up Its Nuclear Weapons Extensions ........................................................... 11
No Korean War Extensions ................................................................................................................. 17
No Nuclear Korean War Extensions .................................................................................................... 21
War Wont Escalate: China Wont Defend North Korea .................................................................... 32
China Cant Control North Korea Extensions ...................................................................................... 34
China Wont Get on Board With Harsh Sanctions Extensions ............................................................ 35
Sanctions Will Fail Against North Korea Extensions ........................................................................... 38
Japanese Proliferation Advantage Answers............................................................................................ 42
Japan Prolif Answers ........................................................................................................................... 43
South Korean Proliferation Answers ................................................................................................... 48
Proliferation Doesnt Cause War ........................................................................................................ 50
NPT Impact Defense............................................................................................................................ 51
US-China Relations Advantage Answers ................................................................................................. 53
Cooperation on North Korea Wont Bolster US-China Relations........................................................ 54
US-China Relations are Resilient ......................................................................................................... 55
South-Korean China Relations Answers.................................................................................................. 57
China Wont Retaliate vs. South Korea ............................................................................................... 58
South Korean-Chinese Relations Resilient .......................................................................................... 59
South Korea Has Strong Middle Power Diplomacy Now .................................................................... 60
Warming Impact Defense ................................................................................................................... 64
Economy Impact Defense ................................................................................................................... 69
South Korea Cant Solve Cyber-Attacks .............................................................................................. 70
Cyber-Security Impact Defense........................................................................................................... 72
Case Turns ............................................................................................................................................... 74
Turn---Appeasement---1NC ................................................................................................................ 75
Link Turn---NoKo Prolif........................................................................................................................ 76
Leadership Add-On Answers ................................................................................................................... 77
South China Sea Add-on Answers ........................................................................................................... 80
Cyber-Security Add-on Answers ............................................................................................................. 86
Disad Links
 Elections Links: THAAD/Missile Defense Links
(--) Missile Defense is a key election issueAmericans demand to be protected from
North Korean and Chinese nuclear weapons:
Pittsburgh Tribune Review, 2/16/2016, America Must Improve Its National Missile-Defense
Program, Retrieved June 14, 2016 from http://www.algemeiner.com/2016/02/16/america-must-
improve-its-national-missile-defense-program/#

North Koreas satellite launch should thus be a powerful incentive to resurrect national missile
defense from the early grave intended by the Obama administration. Politicians might generally be slow learners, but one bedrock
reality of public opinion is that Americans actually expect their government to protect them from
foreign threats. National missile defense was a winning policy for George W. Bush in 2000, and it can be
again in 2016 for the same reasons. Moreover, broader strategic realities have changed since the Cold War ended 25 years ago. Russia has
lost for the foreseeable future its chance for free, representative government and has returned to a non-ideological authoritarianism that prizes
power politics, including at the nuclear level. Chinais expanding and modernizing its nuclear and ballistic missile
forces, particularly by building greater sea-launch capabilities that would be much harder to detect and defend against. While revitalizing
Bushs limited national missile-defense concept now, we should not ignore the possible need later to enhance our defense capabilities to
something closer to Reagans SDI. Bushs program itself contemplated being able to defend against accidental or unintended launches from
Russia and China, thus providing a foundation to defend against larger strikes by expanding the program. In 2014, Americans were rightly
outraged when they saw pictures of ISIS beheading innocent Americans in Syria. That barbarity was far away and incomparably less devastating
than the death and devastation that would occur if a US city were struck by a nuclear warhead. National
missile defense is a
strategic winner and, persuasively articulated, a 2016 political winner for the candidate who raises its
banner.

(--) Powerful media outlets that shape public opinion are on board with THAAD:
MDAA, 2/11/2016, The Tipping Point is Here, Retrieved June 14, 2016 from
http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/alert/the-tipping-point-is-here/

The editorial board of one of the worlds most renowned newspapers, the Washington Post,published
on Tuesday that North Koreas missile test was an example of President Barak Obamas failed policy of
strategic patience with North Korea, and recommended that the U.S. deploy the newest missile
defense system, the THAAD, to the Republic of Korea. This editorial marks a significant shift in the
outlook for the Washington Post, a major influencer and shaper of American public opinion, and a
news outlet that has historically not supported missile defense since President Reagans 1983 Strategic
Defense Initiative.
 Xi Credibility Links
(--) Xi opposes pressuring North Korea because stability in North Korea bolsters his
economic reform agenda:
Stephanie T. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, 2014 (USIPs director of Asia-Pacific programs), U.S.-China
Cooperation on North Korea: What are the Options? June 9, 2014. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from
http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/us-china-cooperation-north-korea-what-are-the-options

Beijing arguably maintains an interest in the survival of the North Korean regime for its own domestic
legitimacy. At a time when President Xi is working to bolster his [Chinese Communist] Partys standing
through ambitious anti-corruption measures and a bold economic reform program, the last thing he
needs is the failure or collapse of a communist regime next door. And these fears are [exacerbated] by
the fact that the Chinese see the fall of Myanmar to western values as a country on Chinas border that
is now falling into the western camp.

(--) Chinese leaders oppose actions that undermine the stability of the North Korean
regime.
Jamie Metzl, 2016 (Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council) NATIONAL INTEREST, Beijing has been
getting a free pass in its policies toward Pyongyang, Feb. 9, 2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/changing-chinas-north-korea-calculus-15148

Despite its anger with North Korea, Beijing continues this policy because it sees North Korea not as an
issue in itself but as a strategic asset in its broader relations with Washington. As unhappy as Chinas
leaders are with the nuclear tests, they have remained unwilling to take any action that could
potentially undermine the stability of North Koreas regime and bring U.S. troops to Chinas border in
case of collapse and Korean reunification.
North Korean Proliferation Advantage Answers
 North Korean Proliferation Answers Front-Line
(--) North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons.
Nicholas Eberstadt, 2/15/2016 (American Enterprise Institute, Wishful thinking has prevented
effective threat reduction in North Korea, https://www.aei.org/publication/seeing-north-korea/,
Accessed 7/17/2016, rwg)
At this juncture, as so often in the past, serious people around the world are calling to bring North Korea back to the table to try to settle the
nuclear issue. However, seeing the DPRK for what it is, rather than what we would like it to be, should oblige us to recognize a highly
unpleasant truth. The real, existing North Korean leadership (as opposed to the imaginary version some Westerners would like to
negotiate with) will never willingly give up its nuclear option. Never. Acquiescing in denuclearization
would be tantamount to abandoning the sacred mission of Korean unification which is to say,
disavowing the DPRKs raison dtre. Submitting to foreign demands to denuclearize could well mean
more than humiliation and disgrace for the North Korean leadership: It could mean delegitimization
and destabilization for the regime as well. And for this reason, international entreaties summitry,
conferencing, bargaining, and all the rest can never succeed in convincing the DPRK to relinquish its nuclear
program. Sovereign governments simply do not trade away their vital national interests.

(--) US & South Korea wont respond to North Korean provocationsNo war risk
Van Jackson, 1/12/2016 (Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a Council on
Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, The Trouble With The US Bomber Overflight Against
North Korea, http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/the-trouble-with-the-us-bomber-overflight-against-
north-korea/, Accessed 2/6/2016, rwg)

In my new book, I explain why North

Koreaa state that Richard Nixon once called a fourth-rate pipsqueak power and that late night
comedians routinely mockhas been able to commit more than one thousand acts of unreciprocated violence
against the United States and South Korea going back to the 1960s. How is a much smaller state repeatedly willing and able to not
only defy a much stronger state, but attack it and its ally without provoking a larger war? It boils down to perceptions of resolve; there can be
no other answer than that the
smaller state believes the larger state wont retaliate if the provocation is
limited in scale. In thousands of strategic interactions over the decades, the United States and South
Korea have shown an unwillingness to take actions that risk war. With few exceptions, when North Korea attacks, the
alliance has not responded in kind, or at all.

(--) No risk of accidental war or miscalculation on the peninsula

Farley 13 Robert, Professor of Diplomacy at the University of Kentucky, North Korea and the Fallacy
of Accidental Wars http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/north-korea-and-the-fallacy-of-accidental-
wars/?allpages=yes

Accidental wars rarely happen . Historians have demonstrated that most wars initially deemed accidental,
(perhaps most notably the First World War), have in actuality resulted from deliberative state policy, even if the
circumstances of the war were unplanned. While war seems discordant, it actually requires a great deal of
cooperation and coordination. Fundamentally, two parties have to agree to conduct a war; otherwise, you
have either a punitive raid or an armed surrender negotiation. Consequently, the baseline for evaluating
the chances for accidental war on the Korean Peninsula should be judged as quite low . South Korea, in
all likelihood, views
the prospect of decisive victory against North Korea as worse than the status quo. The
U nited S tates has no interest in fighting a war against the DPRK at the moment. For example, the sinking of the Cheonan
was obviously an act of war, but neither the U nited S tates nor South Korea were interested in fighting a war
on the terms offered. While we know less about the strategic calculus of North Korea, there is little reason to think that
North Korea was interested in war, either; it probed South Korean capabilities and resolve, but did
not press the issue in ways that could have forced Seouls hand. This said, there are conditions under which the
chances for accidental wars increase. If the main parties do not communicate well (or at all) with one another, they may misunderstand
messages designed to convey commitment or capability. Cultural differences can contribute to a lack of appreciation of how a potential foe
thinks about the costs and benefits of war. Domestic conflict invariably complicates foreign policy, as state leaders often act according to a logic
that places the dictata of their governing coalitions above foreign policy concerns. Finally, leaders do not have full control over their military
organizations; a rogue artillery commander, fighter pilot, or sub skipper can effectively initiate hostilities on their own. All of these conditions
can lead to situations in which states commit what they believe is limited force in service of what they believe are limited objectives, but in
actuality threatens core interests of the enemy. The
potential for accidental war is highest in conditions where
technology and doctrine overwhelmingly favor quick, offensive action, and produce quick, decisive outcomes.
Wars that could de-escalate following a border skirmish and a few artillery duels can escalate beyond control if both sides understand the
timing of offensive action to be critical. Arguably,
the conditions on the Korean Peninsula currently match this
description. Although theres virtually no scenario in which North Korea could win a war , if allowed to
mobilize and launch well prepared, coordinate offensive activities the DPRK could inflict severe damage on the South Korean military and South
Korean civilians. Similarly, a pre-emptive U.S.-ROK assault on the North Korean military, or an attack launched in the very early
stages of a North Korean assault, could substantially undercut the power of North Koreas first punch. Such an
operation would include a wide array of attacks, launched from sea, air, and land platforms, targeting North Korean airfields, communication
nodes, and logistic chokepoints. These attacks would attempt to eliminate North Korean offensive capabilities, especially for direct attacks
against the South (and presumably against Japan). The ability of the DPRK to provide any defense against a committed air offensive is in deep
question, despite a large air force and an extensive SAM network. North Korea is the war that the U.S. Air Force (USAF) (and to a lesser extent,
the U.S. Navy) have been dreaming about fighting since the 1970s, and they remain well prepared to fight it. The last major armored offensive
to push forward under a condition of enemy air supremacy was the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive of 1972, which ended in disaster; the
North Koreans would operate under considerably greater handicap. The North Korean nuclear program exacerbates these
difficulties . If the ROK and United States decided to launch a preemptive strike, DPRK nuclear sites would be among their
first targets. The ability of U.S. and South Korean intelligence to successfully identify these targets (and to assess
their destruction at high levels of confidence) remains highly questionable , but North Korea might nevertheless decide that it needs
to use the weapons in some fashion in order to preserve the strategic and political balance. Whether the use of weapons would prevent regime
destruction is a different question entirely; the senior military and political leadership may assess the weapons as regime saviors, even if a
nuclear detonation would ensure the resolve of South Korea and the U.S. to end the DPRK. Daryl Press and Keir Leiber sensibly warn about the
potential that attacks against the North Korean leadership cadre might have destabilizing effects. The U.S. may well refrain from launching
attacks directly against the North Korean leadership in order to maintain some rump level of communications, and to give the leadership a
potential survival strategy beyond nuclear escalation. Precedents for not directly attacking the leadership include Libya in 2011 and Serbia in
1999. However, given the close ties between the Kim regime and the senior military leadership, and the identification of the state itself with the
Kim clan, there could be considerable temptation to strike. These dynamics operate on the North Korean side, as well. Senior North Korean
military officers are professionals; they surely understand the power of the advanced American and South Korean military establishments, and
appreciate that pre-emption could prove disastrous to North Korean military prospects. The appropriate response to concern about
catastrophic defeat at the hands of the United States and South Korea would surely be to deescalate the crisis, but DPRK domestic politics may,
for the time, preclude that possibility. Nevertheless, it is exceedingly difficult to believe that serious military professionals within the DPRK
believe in the possibility of victory against the United States. Motivated bias surely matters to decision-making, but just as surely must have
some limits. Thus, if North
Korea successfully convinces the U.S. and the ROK that war is inevitable, it is
almost irresponsible for the latter not to launch a pre-emptive attack that would disrupt North Korean preparations.
Were a war to take place without pre-emption, the political opposition in both countries would take
the current leadership to task for failing to take steps to destroy the DPRKs military at its stepping off points. The political
implications of this logic are obviously grim, and it should be clear that neither Seoul nor Washington
believes, at this point, that war is inevitable. At the same time, convincing North Korea that war is inevitable could have
similar disastrous effects. This is undoubtedly why the United States has responded in slow, measured fashion to North Korean provocations.
Again, few wars happen by accident; most take place because policymakers want them, even if those policymakers operate with
poor or incomplete information about the prospects for success. Given
the current balance of capabilities on the Korean
Peninsula, a full war seems exceedingly unlikely, as none of the combatants stand to benefit.

(--) Their Hayes evidence advocates a Nuclear Free Zone on the Korean Peninsula,
which clearly they dont do.
Peter Hayes, & Michael Hamel-Green, AFF AUTHORS, 2010 (Professor of International Relations,
RMIT University, The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And
Northeast Asia, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Michael-Hamel_Green/3267/article.html, Accessed
10/6/2015, rwg)

A Korean Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (WFZ) may be a necessary condition to achieving the full
denuclearization of Korea. As well as providing benefits to the United States in preventing a major direct and wider proliferation
threat from North Korea, and to China, Japan and South Korea in maintaining stability in the Northeast Asian Region, it would also serve to
address North Korean security concerns about potential US nuclear strikes. The two Koreas have already negotiated a legal basis for a Korean
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the form of the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korea Peninsula. This could form the basis
of a NWFZ covering the peninsula. Alternatively, the ROK and Japan could create a Japan Korea NWFZ via a bilateral treaty. This article assesses
the prospects for the creation of a NWFZ in the present international climate.

(--) A KOREAN WAR WONT GO NUCLEAR.

Zheng Jiyong, 2016 (Director of Center for Korean Studies, Fudan University in Shanghai), THAAD
Deployment: A Chinese Perspective, Feb. 5, 2016. Retrieved Apr. 23, 2016 from
http://www.jpi.or.kr/eng/regular/print_ok.sky?id=5284

Meanwhile, my personal observation is that nuclear weapons are only a means to boost North Koreas
self-confidence and North Korea does not yet have the ability or intention to use nuclear weapons in
an actual combat scenario. The probability of a nuclear war in Northeast Asia is very low.

(--) CHINA CANT CONSTRAIN NORTH KOREA.

Marte Galtung, 2014 (China Analyst, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 49 MYTHS ABOUT CHINA,
2014, 150.

The leaders in Pyongyang constantly act contrary to China's wishes, in many cases without informing
Beijing or despite Chinese protests. Before North Korea launched a rocket over the Pacific in 2009, Wu
Dawei, then China's vice foreign minister and special representative for the Korean Peninsula, visited
Pyongyang to convey Chinese authorities' concerns about North Korean armament. The Chinese also
sent a delegation to Seoul to discuss aggressive North Korean behavior. Neither mission was of any
use. The North Koreans fired the rocket on 5 April andmaking things even worseconducted a
nuclear test the same year.

China wont even come to the table---vote neg on presumption

Beauchamp, 16 Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, research assistant at RAND and graduate of the
LSE-PKU MSc Dual-Degree in International Affairs program, and Denise Der, MA from Georgetown
Universitys Security Studies Program, 2-3-2016, The threat to Chinas security isnt THAAD, its North
Korea, CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-15-threat-china%E2%80%99s-security-
isn%E2%80%99t-thaad-it%E2%80%99s-north-korea
While Chinas opposition to THAAD is consistent and clear, so too is its opposition to official
dialogue with the United States about missile defense and strategic stability. Obama administration
proposals for a high-level dialogue on strategic stability have been rebuffed by China. According to
one former senior Obama administration official, such a dialogue could have examined Chinas
concerns about US BMD in East Asia and provided China a better understanding of the specific
technical performance characteristics of the THAAD radar and interceptors and of the strategic
intentions of the United States and its allies vis--vis BMD. This failure to take up the US offer suggests
that China is not interested in US reassurances and instead seeks to exploit the issue to try to drive a
wedge between the United States and its regional allies. For Seoul, THAAD deployment on the
Peninsula is a function of the North Korean threat. Chinas refusal to engage in Track I dialogue has
hampered its ability to participate in the development of a plan that could ease its concerns over
BMD.

(--) North Korea is immune to diplomatic pressure & economic sanctions:

Zhu Feng, 2016 (Executive Director of China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea at
Nanjing University) What New Approach Should the U.S. and China Take to North Korea? Feb. 9, 2016.
Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-new-approach-should-us-
and-china-take-north-korea

Pyongyangs imperviousness to diplomatic pressures and economic sanctions stems largely from its
regime typea vicious combination of personality cult, totalitarianism, and a military first domestic
power structure. Kim Jong-un cares little about the suffering of his people, and instead attempts, as usual,
to maintain his grip on power through nuclear desperation. There is little hope that North Korea will
abandon its nuclear capability as long as the regime type remains unchanged. In addition, Kim Jong-un asks for
international recognition of North Korea as a nuclear status power, a status few other powers in the world are willing to concede.
Engagement doves are confident their path will alter North Koreas regime type.
 North Korea Wont Give Up Its Nuclear Weapons Extensions
(--) NORTH KOREA WONT GIVE UP ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
Sebastian Heilmann, 2014 (Dir., Mercator Institute for China Studies), CHINA'S FOREIGN POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS: AN UNCONVENTIONAL GLOBAL POWER, 2014, 154.

The Chinese leadership appears to have grudgingly accepted the nuclear status of the DPRK. In China's
assessment, Pyongyang will not voluntarily abandon its nuclear weapons by way of negotiations,
for these serve as a security guarantee against the United States and as a means of threatening South
Korea and Japan. Since North Korea's abandonment of the Six-Party Talks in 2009, the US-DPRK rela-
tionship remains deadlocked. Nuclear upgrading in the region has the potential to spiral out of control.

(--) Nothing will stop Kim from expanding his nuclear arsenal:
Doug Bandow, 1/8/2016 (senior fellow @ CATO Institute, How America Should Respond to North
Korea in 5 Steps, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/how-america-should-respond-north-
korea-5-steps-14849, Accessed 2/7/2016, rwg)
Kims son and grandson have since turned the regime into a monarchy, with Communist characteristics. The most significant shared legacy may
be a nuclear weapons program, which continues to unsettle the region. Although Western intelligence widely disbelieves the DPRKs claim to
have tested a thermonuclear device, or H-bomb, Kim
Jong-un has clearly demonstrated that nothingChinese
objections, talks with South Korea, ongoing economic reformwill dissuade the regime from
expanding and improving its nuclear arsenal.

(--) Diplomacy cant end Kims arsenal:

Doug Bandow, 1/8/2016 (senior fellow @ CATO Institute, How America Should Respond to North
Korea in 5 Steps, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/how-america-should-respond-north-
korea-5-steps-14849, Accessed 2/7/2016, rwg)

Whether there ever was a chance to negotiate away the Norths nascent nuclear program may be impossible to know. But virtually
no
one believes the Kim regime is willing to eliminate existing weapons developed at high cost. There
may be a deal to strike, such as limiting future nuclear activities. But diplomacy isnt going to make
the peninsula nuclear-free.

(--) North Korea wont give up its nukesconsidered to be its life:

Robert E. Kelly, 3/6/2015 (associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political
Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University in South Korea, Will South Korea Have to Bomb the
North, Eventually? http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/will-south-korea-have-to-bomb-the-north-
eventually/, Accessed 2/7/2016, rwg)
Ideally North Korea would de-nuclearize. And we should always keep talking to North Korea. Pyongyang is so dangerous that freezing it out is a bad idea. Talking
does not mean we must be taken advantage of by the Norths regular bargaining gimmicks. But we
must admit that North Korea seems
unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons. The program goes back decades, to the 1960s. Rumor has it that
Pyongyang has devoted more than 5 percent of GDP in the last two decades to developing these
weapons. The program continued through the 1990s, even as more than a million North Koreans starved to
death in a famine resulting from post-Cold War economic breakdown. The North has repeatedly lied and flimflammed to outsiders like
the ROK government and the IAEA to keep its programs alive clandestinely. Recently Kim Jong Un has referred to

nuclear weapons as the nations life.

(--) North Korea is not giving up anytime soon on expanding arsenal
Max Fisher, 7/13/2016 (staff writer, Maybe North Koreas Nuclear Goals Are More Serious Than
Once Thought Accessed 7/15/16, sn http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/world/asia/maybe-north-
koreas-nuclear-goals-arent-a-farce-after-all.html?_r=0

Under traditional understandings of North Korea, the countrys test launch of two medium-range ballistic missiles in late
June should not have happened. Neither should its failed launch, on Saturday, of a submarine-based missile. But they did. And that has brought new urgency to
a growing conversation among many North Korea watchers : Is our understanding of this country fundamentally wrong? The countrys
weapons programs have long been understood as meant not for immediate military purposes, but to rally North Koreans behind the leadership and extract concessions from foreign
governments. North Koreas bluster, in this view, is not sincere, but just another set piece in an elaborate, never-ending show. This does not, however, adequately explain North Koreas recent
flurry of weapons tests, often using unproven technology that tends to fail many times, bringing embarrassment to a government that prefers to project confidence, and that incurs heavy

diplomatic and financial tolls the country cannot afford. Such tests, according to a growing chorus of experts, suggest that North Korea is now seeking, in a
more focused and determined way, a real, functioning nuclear weapons program and could be on the way to getting
it. The conventional wisdom treats these tests and strategic programs as political tools, said Mark Fitzpatrick, a scholar at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Theyre more than
that. This realization is forcing analysts to rethink not just nuclear issues, but also the underlying goals and motivations of the North Korean state itself, with sweeping implications for how
one of the worlds most secretive nations is understood. A sudden change in 2014 North Korea has had only three leaders, each of whom has faced the same problem: governing a small
country with few resources, outnumbered by powerful enemies. Kim Il-sung, the nations founding leader, used diplomacy. By allying with the Soviet Union and China and playing the two
off each other he secured protection and support. His son Kim Jong-il came to power in the early 1990s, as the Soviet Union collapsed and Chinas interest in backing a rogue nation waned.
In response, he put the country on a permanent war footing. Kim Jong-il began developing missiles and nuclear weapons, periodically stirring up geopolitical crises that promoted nationalism
at home and won international concessions abroad. Foreign governments and analysts concluded that these programs, which North Korea tested erratically but with great fanfare, were meant
primarily for political rather than military ends. The countrys leadership was seen as reactive and focused on preserving the status quo. State propaganda, warning endlessly of war with South
Korea and the United States, was dismissed as merely a tool for internal control. That view has held for 20 years, through Kim Jong-ils death in 2011 and the ascension of his son Kim Jong-un.
But, three years into the younger Mr. Kims reign, as he carried out a series of high-level political purges, something seemed to shift. In 2014, they started testing things like crazy, said Jeffrey
Lewis, a nuclear weapons expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey in California. The country also built a new underground nuclear testing facility. Because most
of the tests failed and because of popular depictions of the country as silly and backward they were shrugged off as farce. It was easy to kind of laugh at them, Mr. Lewis said. Now, in
retrospect, it seems that the tests indicated a change whose ramifications are only beginning to become clear to analysts. Targeting the United States Andrea Berger, a proliferation expert at
the Royal United Services Institute in London, said that for years she and some of her colleagues believed that one of the motivations behind North Koreas nuclear development was to
eventually sell it for the right price, either in part or in full. Others, of course, thought North Korea was simply engaging in a game of cat and mouse, agreeing to freeze parts of the program in
exchange for cash or food, only to unfreeze them later in hopes of making another deal on the same goods in another round of negotiations. In any case, Ms. Berger said the countrys activity

since 2014 had led to growing sentiment, and I would go so far as to say it is now the majority view, that North Korea may not be willing to give up its
nuclear program or missile programs at all. The medium-range missile North Korea tested in late June, known as a Musudan, had failed in all five of its
prior launches. Last months launch, while not a categorical success, showed progress one of many hard-
won breakthroughs. We are coming to the realization that North Korea is filling some of the technological gaps we thought they had and erasing some of the question

marks quicker than we are comfortable with, Ms. Berger said. Photo A photograph released in March by the Korean Central News
Agency that was said to show Kim Jong-un meeting with nuclear weapons scientists and technicians
in Pyongyang, North Korea. Credit Korean Central News Agency, via Reuters North Korea appears focused on acquiring key nuclear capabilities, including, Ms. Berger said, a
demonstrated ability to strike the continental United States. John Schilling, who tracks North Koreas weapons programs at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, has concluded

that within the next decade, North Korea will probably produce a nuclear-capable intercontinental
ballistic missile that can reach parts of the West Coast of the United States. The country is also developing multiple ways to
deliver these missiles, as indicated by Saturdays submarine test-launch. Theyve just solved one of the key technical challenges to making a mobile I.C.B.M., Mr. Schilling said, referring to a
kind of launcher that is harder for adversaries to find or target because it can be moved on large trucks. Multiple launch systems are considered an expensive but crucial component of any
serious, field-ready nuclear weapons program, underscoring the magnitude of Mr. Kims ambitions. An extreme solution As analysts adjust their view of North Koreas intentions, they are
grappling with a much bigger question: Why is North Korea so bent on a program that brings economic sanctions, the risk of conflict and isolation even from China, its sole remaining ally and
benefactor? Put another way: What does North Korea believe it will gain from nuclear weapons that is worth these costs? Experts have not settled on a consensus answer, but offer a range of
possible explanations. What these theories share is a sense that North Koreas leadership believes it is facing a potentially existential crisis and is willing to take extreme steps to survive. Some
analysts say the North Korean warnings of a looming conflict with the United States and South Korea might not just be for show, but rather indicate that the countrys leaders earnestly believe
war could be coming. In this view, the country would need more than just a single bomb to deter its enemies. It would require a nuclear program large enough to make such a war winnable.
Photo A North Korean defector left a token of her wish for the reunification of the two Koreas on a wire fence in Imjingak, South Korea, in the demilitarized zone that separates the two
nations. Credit Ahn Young-joon/Associated Press Details about North Koreas advances suggest the outlines of a war plan, Mr. Lewis said. The country seems to be building the capability to
launch rapid nuclear strikes against nearby military targets, such as the United States military bases on Guam and the Japanese island of Okinawa, as well as South Korean ports where any
American invasion force would land. I think their hope is that the shock of that will cause us to stop, Mr. Lewis said. Then the whole point of the I.C.B.M.s is that there is something in
reserve to threaten West Coast American cities, in theory forcing the United States to stand down. Mr. Fitzpatrick argued that even if North Korea does not intend to carry out such a plan, it
hopes that raising concerns of a nuclear conflict will drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, particularly South Korea. Should North Korea acquire a nuclear-capable missile
that could hit Washington State, some Americans might well question the value of continuing to guarantee South Koreas security. The North Koreans would like people to doubt that the
United States would trade Seattle for Seoul, Mr. Fitzpatrick said, referring to a Cold War adage that the United States accepted risks to its own cities so as to defend those of its allies. B. R.
Myers, a North Korea scholar at Dongseo University in South Korea, takes this theory one step further. The nuclear program, he believes, is meant not only to scare off the United States, but to
one day coerce the South into accepting the Norths long-stated demand: reunification on its own terms. It is the only goal big enough to make sense of a nuclear program that has made the
D.P.R.K. less secure than it was 10 years ago, Mr. Myers said, using the abbreviation of North Koreas formal name. North Koreas greatest source of insecurity, he argued, is not its enemies
abroad whose efforts at rapprochement it has long spurned but its own looming crisis of legitimacy. Because the country positions itself as the true protector of the Korean people but is
so much poorer than the South, it has no reason to exist as a separate state, Mr. Myers wrote in a recent research paper. Unification is therefore the only long-term solution to the regimes
chronic security problems. While such scenarios may sound outlandish, Mr. Lewis pointed to the 2003 United States-led invasion of Iraq and NATOs 2011 intervention in Libya, which led to
the grisly deaths of those countries leaders. North Korea is far weaker than its enemies, whom the country sees as bent on its destruction. And it faces a possible legitimacy crisis of the sort
that seems to topple another government every year. These fears, analysts say, could be spurring Kim Jong-un to drastically change his countrys behavior upending long-held assumptions
in the process.

(--) North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons:

Winston Lord, 2016 (United States diplomat and leader of non-governmental foreign policy
organizations), What New Approach Should the U.S. and China Take to North Korea? Feb. 9, 2016.
Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-new-approach-should-us-
and-china-take-north-korea

Nothing has succeeded because the Kims will never denuclearize, sticks dont work because of Chinese
sabotage, carrots dont work because of Kim fears of losing political control.

North Korea has missiles and will not give them up.
Max Fisher 16, 7-13-2016, "Maybe North Koreas Nuclear Goals Are More Serious Than Once
Thought," New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/world/asia/maybe-north-koreas-
nuclear-goals-arent-a-farce-after-all.html?_r=3

Andrea Berger, a proliferation expert at the Royal United Services Institute in London, said that for years
she and some of her colleagues believed that one of the motivations behind North Koreas nuclear
development was to eventually sell it for the right price, either in part or in full. Others, of course, thought North
Korea was simply engaging in a game of cat and mouse, agreeing to freeze parts of the program in
exchange for cash or food, only to unfreeze them later in hopes of making another deal on the same
goods in another round of negotiations. In any case, Ms. Berger said the countrys activity since 2014 had
led to growing sentiment, and I would go so far as to say it is now the majority view, that North Korea may not be
willing to give up its nuclear program or missile programs at all. The medium-range missile North Korea tested in
late June, known as a Musudan, had failed in all five of its prior launches. Last months launch, while not a categorical success, showed progress
one of many hard-won breakthroughs. We
are coming to the realization that North Korea is filling some of
the technological gaps we thought they had and erasing some of the question marks quicker than we
are comfortable with, Ms. Berger said. A photograph released in March by the Korean Central News Agency that was said to
show Kim Jong-un meeting with nuclear weapons scientists and technicians in Pyongyang, North Korea. Credit Korean Central News Agency, via
Reuters North Korea appears focused on acquiring key nuclear capabilities, including, Ms. Berger said,
a demonstrated ability to strike the continental United States. John Schilling, who tracks North Koreas
weapons programs at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, has concluded that within
the next decade, North Korea will probably produce a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic
missile that can reach parts of the West Coast of the United States. The country is also developing
multiple ways to deliver these missiles, as indicated by Saturdays submarine test-launch. Theyve
just solved one of the key technical challenges to making a mobile I.C.B.M., Mr. Schilling said,
referring to a kind of launcher that is harder for adversaries to find or target because it can be moved
on large trucks. Multiple launch systems are considered an expensive but crucial component of any
serious, field-ready nuclear weapons program, underscoring the magnitude of Mr. Kims ambitions. An
extreme solution As analysts adjust their view of North Koreas intentions, they are grappling with a much bigger question: Why is North
Korea so bent on a program that brings economic sanctions, the risk of conflict and isolation even
from China, its sole remaining ally and benefactor? Put another way: What does North Korea believe it will gain from
nuclear weapons that is worth these costs? Experts have not settled on a consensus answer, but offer a range of possible explanations. What
these theories share is a sense that North
Koreas leadership believes it is facing a potentially existential crisis
and is willing to take extreme steps to survive. Some analysts say the North Korean warnings of a
looming conflict with the United States and South Korea might not just be for show, but rather indicate
that the countrys leaders earnestly believe war could be coming. In this view, the country would
need more than just a single bomb to deter its enemies. It would require a nuclear program large
enough to make such a war winnable. A North Korean defector left a token of her wish for the reunification of the two Koreas
on a wire fence in Imjingak, South Korea, in the demilitarized zone that separates the two nations. Credit Ahn Young-joon/Associated Press
Details about North Koreas advances suggest the outlines of a war plan, Mr. Lewis said. The country
seems to be building the capability to launch rapid nuclear strikes against nearby military targets, such
as the United States military bases on Guam and the Japanese island of Okinawa, as well as South
Korean ports where any American invasion force would land. I think their hope is that the shock of
that will cause us to stop, Mr. Lewis said. Then the whole point of the I.C.B.M.s is that there is
something in reserve to threaten West Coast American cities, in theory forcing the United States to
stand down. Mr. Fitzpatrick argued that even if North Korea does not intend to carry out such a plan,
it hopes that raising concerns of a nuclear conflict will drive a wedge between the United States and its
allies, particularly South Korea. Should North Korea acquire a nuclear-capable missile that could hit
Washington State, some Americans might well question the value of continuing to guarantee South
Koreas security. The North Koreans would like people to doubt that the United States would trade
Seattle for Seoul, Mr. Fitzpatrick said, referring to a Cold War adage that the United States accepted
risks to its own cities so as to defend those of its allies. B. R. Myers, a North Korea scholar at Dongseo
University in South Korea, takes this theory one step further. The nuclear program, he believes, is meant
not only to scare off the United States, but to one day coerce the South into accepting the Norths
long-stated demand: reunification on its own terms. It is the only goal big enough to make sense of a
nuclear program that has made the D.P.R.K. less secure than it was 10 years ago, Mr. Myers said, using the
abbreviation of North Koreas formal name. North Koreas greatest source of insecurity, he argued, is not its
enemies abroad whose efforts at rapprochement it has long spurned but its own looming crisis
of legitimacy. Because the country positions itself as the true protector of the Korean people but is so
much poorer than the South, it has no reason to exist as a separate state, Mr. Myers wrote in a
recent research paper. Unification is therefore the only long-term solution to the regimes chronic
security problems. While such scenarios may sound outlandish, Mr. Lewis pointed to the 2003
United States-led invasion of Iraq and NATOs 2011 intervention in Libya, which led to the grisly
deaths of those countries leaders. North Korea is far weaker than its enemies, whom the country sees
as bent on its destruction. And it faces a possible legitimacy crisis of the sort that seems to topple
another government every year. These fears, analysts say, could be spurring Kim Jong-un to
drastically change his countrys behavior upending long-held assumptions in the process.

(--) North Korea is building nukes because of security reasonsno reason sanctions
solve
Yang Xiyu, 2015 (Senior Fellow, China Institute of International Studies), North Korean Nuclear Issue in
China-U.S. Relations, Jul. 10, 2015. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-
07/10/content_8062011.htm

Second, the Korean Peninsula is still in a cold war. Although the worldwide Cold War has long ended,
the one on the peninsula has been exacerbated. North Korea on one side and the U.S.-ROK alliance on
the other are implementing similar deterrent strategies so that a mutual deterrence structure has
emerged. That is to say, the present peace and no war are based on mutual deterrence and even
a balance of threat that assures mutual destruction. This security structure, reminiscent of the Cold
War, constitutes the reason why North Korea insists on the development of nuclear weapons.

(--) North Korea wont give up its nuclear weapons to diplomacy:

LA Times, 7/21/2015 (staff writer Max Boot, Op-Ed Why is the Iran deal bad? Think North Korea.,
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-boot-is-iran-more-like-north-korea-or-libya-20150721-
story.html/21 July 2015, Accessed 8/26/2015, eo)

Libya is the shining success story of negotiated disarmament one of the very few. On Dec. 19, 2003,
following nine months of secret talks with the United States and Britain, Moammar Kadafi agreed to give
up his entire arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. The component parts were to be either destroyed
or shipped abroad. Only a few months later, American officials were able to display at Oak Ridge, Tenn., nuclear equipment taken from
Libya. Tons of chemical weapons and weapons precursors were destroyed. Kadafi even turned over to the U.S. for "safekeeping" five Scud-C
missiles as part of his pledge to get rid of any missiles with a range longer than 300 kilometers. Earlier, Kadafi had renounced terrorism and
agreed to pay $2.7 billion in compensation to the families of victims of the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland.The
experience with North Korea was very different. In 1994, after threatening to withdraw from the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Pyongyang signed the Agreed Framework pledging to freeze the
construction and operation of its plutonium reactors. In return, the United States agreed to provide it
with substantial aid, including fuel oil deliveries and help in constructing two light-water reactors that could be used for nuclear energy
but not nuclear weapons. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, were supposed to monitor compliance.The U.S.
duly provided North Korea with $1.3 billion in food and energy assistance. In 2001, ground was broken on the first
of the light-water reactors. Although it was not tied to the Agreed Framework, North Korea received even more largesse from South Korea,
We now know, however, that
which, under its "sunshine policy," delivered $8 billion in economic assistance from 1996 to 2008.
North Korea never had any intention of abiding by its commitments. Before and after signing the Agreed
Framework, Pyongyang was secretly enriching uranium. In 2002, North Korean officials brazenly
admitted as much to a visiting American delegation. The admission sparked a crisis. The U.S. suspended oil shipments and
ended its construction work on the light-water reactor. North Korea left the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. To bring it back into compliance,
the George W. Bush administration launched six-party talks with Pyongyang. As a sweetener, the U.S. even agreed to unfreeze a North Korean
bank account in Macao (2006) and to take North Korea off the list of state sponsors of terrorism (2008).That
effort failed. North
Korea tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006. Recent reports from China suggest that North Korea may
have as many as 20 nuclear warheads, and U.S. military officials suspect that North Korea is close to
being able to place those warheads on long-range ballistic missiles that could hit the West Coast of the
United States.

(--) Diplomacy wont get rid of North Korean nuclear weapons:

Ms. Duyeon Kim, 4/15/2013 (Senior Non-Proliferation and East Asia Fellow at the Center for Arms
Control and Non-Proliferation, http://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/04/better-understanding-north-
korea-part-1/, Accessed 10/6/2015, rwg)
Q: Due to such a volatile situation on the peninsula, shouldnt dialogue be pursued to reduce tensions and what can South Korea do? A:
While dialogue should always be a part of the policy toolkit and serves, at a minimum, as a useful tool for intelligence
gathering purposes into such a reclusive country, the main question is: What can be discussed at the table after
decades of negotiations and no sustainable breakthrough? North Korea has made it clear through
official commentaries that it will not abandon its nuclear weapons and missiles, and that it is only interested in
peace treaty negotiation and not Six Party Talks-like discussions. In other words, Pyongyang is saying it wants to keep its nuclear weapons while
negotiating a peace treaty, which would be unacceptable for Washington.
(--) Diplomacy fails to control North Korea:
Scott A. Snyder, 2016 (senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy
at the Council on Foreign Relations) Where China and the United States Disagree on North Korea, Jan. 8,
2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/01/08/where-china-and-the-united-
states-disagree-on-north-korea/

Instruments: The record of diplomacy with North Korea shows that neither incentives nor efforts at
coercion have been successful in inducing North Korean cooperation. Neither has U.S. signaling (in the
form of nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52 overflights of the Korean peninsula) worked to draw a line designed
to contain North Korean provocations. But China fears that additional pressure will lead to peninsular
instability and has moved too slowly to ratchet up pressure on Pyongyang.

(--) NORTH KOREA IS UNWILLING TO GIVE UP ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

John Owen, 2015 (Prof., Politics, U. Virginia), AMERICA, CHINA, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR WORLD
ORDER: IDEAS, TRADITIONS, HISTORICAL LEGACIES, AND GLOBAL VISIONS, 2015, 318.

The most important cases are North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, and the problem of nuclear terrorism. These
cases are related. North Koreawhose extreme ideological distance from the United States makes
good relations very difficult indeedhas a nuclear arsenal of unclear size, and inducing Pyongyang to
give up its weapons may well be beyond the ability of any external actor.

(--) NORTH KOREA IS COMPLETELY UNPREDICTABLE.

Peter Navarro, 2015 (Prof., Economics and Public Policy, U. California at Irvine), CROUCHING TIGER:
WHAT CHINAS MILITARISM MEANS FOR THE WORLD, 2015, 121-122.

Here, however is the very big problem: Any truly intelligent speculator must assume rationality to
properly handicap outcomes; but once you cross the 38th parallel into the hermitic and Stalinist
kingdom of North Korea, all rationality bets are off on a police state run by a young erratic
megalomaniac with the backing of one of the worlds largest armies.
 No Korean War Extensions
(--) No Korea war tensions decreasing, cooperation increasing
SNYDER 8/24/15 (Scott, Northeast Asia policy expert @ Council on Foreign Relations, "A Modest Start
Toward Inter-Korean Dialogue And Cooperation,"
http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2015/08/24/a-modest-start-toward-inter-korean-dialogue-
and-cooperation/)

Senior representativesof the two Koreas completed three days of marathon negotiations to avert further
escalation of military tensions on August 25 at 12:55 a.m. local time. Despite hours spent at the negotiating table, the agreement
itself is relatively short and straightforward. However, the fact that it took so long to reach the agreement underscores the difficulty both sides
had in allowing each other to save face despite high tensions. The main trade-off in the agreement involves North Koreas expression of regret
regarding South Korean soldiers injured in an August 4 land mine explosion at a South Korean guard post adjacent to the DMZ. The statement
constitutes an indirect admission of responsibility for the incident, which North Korea had denied prior to talks. In return, South Korea agreed
to cut off propaganda loudspeakers from noon on Tuesday absent any surprises at which time North Korea demobilizes its troops from the
current war footing. Longer-term, the
two sides agreed to hold Red Cross meetings in early September to plan for
family reunions later that month during fall harvest holidays, and both sides agreed to promote civilian-level
exchanges. In addition, both sides pledge to continue high-level talks in Pyongyang or Seoul. The
implementation of these
steps should shift the focal point of the relationship from military tensions
to exchanges and cooperation. However, inter-Korean pledges to engage in exchanges or to hold family reunions are historically
breached as often as they are honored. The main lesson learned from the rising tensions and negotiations is that both sides are
vulnerable to each other. (South Korea refuses to bear the costs of North Korean provocations and its economy is vulnerable to spikes
in military tensions while North Korea fears its polity is increasingly vulnerable to South Korean propaganda dissemination.) But admission of
vulnerability may lead either to closer inter-Korean relations or to the possibility of exploitation of the weakness of one side by the other. With
this modest agreement, both sides have also shown that they have the wherewithal to negotiate their
way out of a crisis. For this reason, the test of whether this agreement marks a real turning point in inter-Korean relations will lie in
the ability of both sides to keep their agreements and to institutionalize future dialogue and cooperation in such a way as to minimize their
respective points of vulnerability.

(--) The North Koreans are programmed to want concessions and not war
COLLINS 11 [Robert M. Collins is an adjunct fellow at the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy in Seoul;
North Koreas Strategy of Compellence,1 Provocations, and the Northern Limit Line; chapter in
Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula; 2011]

A leading figure in developing the concepts of coercion, eomas Schelling, emphasizes that compellence is
active and induces his (target of coercion) withdrawal, or his acquiescence, or his collaboration by an action that threatens
to hurt.4 He further explains that compellence requires that the punishment be administered until the
other acts rather than if he acts.5 (For the alliance, deterrence and defense focuses on if he acts.) Apparently, North Korea is
an excellent student of Schellings, as it has consistently punished the alliance through the
aforementioned well-timed provocations. Complementing these aggressive actions, North Korea employs threatening themes
and messages in its strategic communication and information operations to imply that further force is forthcoming if compliance by the alliance
does not take place. The North targets not only ROK and U.S. leaders, but also their regional counterparts, the international media, and the ROK
public as well. North Koreas threats of war are nearly legendary. North Korean compellence creates conditions favorable to further
provocation over those of deterrence and can create an imbalance of willingness to escalate, particularly if domestic political debate and public
opinion in the ROK favors non-response by the alliance. Hyping tensions and threatening war or retaliation serves
to accentuate the perception that tensions are at an intolerable level for those not accustomed to it.ee
North Korean leadership has proven that they are and has arguably shaped the ROK public by inducing
fear of war and creating by-products in political decision-making in the ROK. North Korea has shown it is more motivated than the ROK to
use force and this is likely because the North demonstrates little competence in other forms of national power compared to the South Laying in
direct contrast to the alliances strategy of deterrence and defense, North
Koreas compellence strategy has used a
variety of provocations to gain specific political, economic, and military concessions. Due to
Pyongyangs consistent employment of provocations, the Korean Peninsula has 57 years of experiencing crisis after crisis of varying intensity,
suffered nearly 600 ROK and U.S. military deaths, and has been to the brink of war twicein 1976 and 1994. While alliance deterrence depends
upon posture, vigilance, readiness, and capabilities to demonstrate strength, North Korea
chooses to initiate action strong
enough to draw political and economic responses but not so strong as to draw military retaliation.

(--) North Korean nuclear threat is laughable at best

Joe CIRINCIONE 5-12 (5/12/15; Leading nuclear expert, resident of Ploughshares Fund, member of
Secretary of State John Kerry's International Security Advisory Board and the Council on Foreign
Relations; North Koreas Missile Test Is Less Impressive Than You Think;
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/05/north-koreas-missile-test-less-impressive-you-
think/112600/)

Kim Jong Un was all smiles and cigars in photos that showed a surprise May 9 test of a submarine launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) in the waters off North Korea. But there was less to the dictators photo op than meets the
eye. If North Korea could perfect this technology, it would be an impressive and dangerous new capability. Missiles launched from subs are traditionally second
strike weapons. They are harder to detect and thus harder to take out in an initial attack. So this systemonce operationalcould give North Korea the ability to
respond to an attack, whether conventional or nuclear, with a nuclear strike. In a crisis, that could stay the hand of South Korea, the United States, or another

adversary. It could also be used in a surprise first strike. The photos, predictably, produced a surfeit of officials and experts ringing alarm bells. Relax. North
Korea has a very long way to go. This elaborate photo celebration appears to have been staged at an ejection test, designed to
demonstrate the ability of a sub to shoot up a missile from under the water, have it ignite, and begin flight. The
missile appears to have gone
about 100 or 150 meters, according to South Korean officials, about the length of a football field. That sub would have
to be awfully close to its target to hit anything. The photos of Kim watching the missile pop up through the surface could be
enhanced, but they could well be genuine. Regardless, there were no
photos released of the missile plopping back into the
ocean a few seconds later. They showed the pop but not the plop. Furthermore, as Tyler Rogoway notes in his piece for
Foxtrot Alpha, Just because the missile shown in the photos appeared to safely clear the water and climbed

out through low-altitude doesnt mean that the missile is fully capable of traveling thousands of miles to
a specific target. Hes right. Putting a missile up is actually easier than bringing its warhead back down and
on target. This requires sophisticated guidance, staging, exquisite reliability and, most importantly, a re-
entry vehicle that can survive the heat, vibrations and gravitational stresses of coming back into the
atmosphere and continuing all the way to a successful strike. North Korea has not demonstrated or
tested any of these abilities. North Koreas ability to manufacture such a precise instrument, wrote Rogoway, that can
survive long periods installed atop a missile, housed in submarine, and then endure the rigors of a launching and atmospheric re-entry remains
questionable at best. Further, though North Korea seems to have made some progress on reducing the size of its tested nuclear weapon, there is
no public evidence that it has shrunk the device enough to fit it into the warhead of a missile. The miniaturization of a nuclear warhead, says Gene Habiger, a
retired general who once led the U.S. Strategic Command, is probably the most significant challenge that any proliferant would have to face. Habiger notes that it

took the United States six to eight years of intensive engineering and testing to get our weapons down
to warhead size. To put this in perspective, the United States today has 1,152 hydrogen bomb warheads on sub-launched missiles that can land within the
area of a football field almost anywhere on Earth in under 30 minutes. It also fields 450 similar weapons on long-range land-based ballistic missiles. North

Korea has enough material for perhaps six atomic bombs, maybe more, but there is no available
evidence that it has operationalized any weapons. North Korea plays its weak hand very well. It puts on an impressive show with
ancient technology. The sub in this test appears to be based on the Soviet Golf class that entered service in 1958. The missile itself seems to be a 1970s Soviet
system. Claims
by some South Korean officials that Kim could develop a real SLBM within three to five years
overestimate the ability of even the clever North Koreans to stretch these mid-20th-century
technologies. Even if the alarmists are correct, this missile can fly no more than 1,500 miles. That means, as
nuclear expert Jeffrey Lewis has noted, the
North Koreans would have to sail their sub 60 to 90 days to get within
range of the continental United States, during which time it would run a very high risk of detection and
destruction. Kim Jong Un would be much better off having FedEx deliver the warhead. That, at
least, would ensure it would get there within three days.

(--) Recent nuclear test is part of North Koreas pattern of diplomacynothing unique
about it:
Sung-Yoon Lee and Joshua Stanton, 1/15/2016 (Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Studies &
advisor to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, How to get serious with North Korea,
http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/15/opinions/lee-stanton-north-korea-sanctions/, Accessed 1/25/2016,
rwg)

(CNN)North Korea's nuclear test last week follows a well-worn pattern that spans over a quarter
century: Resort to periodic provocations, wait out the flurry of condemnations, then launch a peace
offensive and call for talks so that its main adversary, the United States, takes heed and responds with concessionary diplomacy.
Repeat. All the while as Pyongyang advances its nuclear and missile technology. This simple strategy has confounded regional powers and
driven them to give North Korea billions of dollars in return for Pyongyang's repeated pledges of denuclearization. The record of the past
quarter-century of nuclear diplomacy vis--vis Pyongyang is distinguished by blame, denial, and fantasy masquerading as policy.

(--) U.S. nuclear deterrence completely deters North Korea: Pyongyang will never be a
threat to the United States.
Doug Bandow, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), NORTH KOREA: PAPER TIGER, June 4, 2009.
Retrieved April 1, 2010 from http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100, eo)

That could eventually change, of course, but the DPRK obviously poses no present danger. There is no
cause for precipitous action. In fact, Pyongyang is never likely to pose a genuine threat to America. The
U.S. has the world's most sophisticated nuclear arsenal: any North Korean attack would be suicidal.
Just one American missile with multiple warheads could destroy everything worth destroying in the
North. If Washington could deter Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, two of the greatest mass murderers
in human history, it can deter Kim Jong-il.

(--) The United States will not escalate a minor incident to a full scale war:
Policymakers understand the cost and danger in such a move.
John Park, 2008 (Dir., Korea Working Group, U.S. Institute of Peace), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 280, eo.

While North Korea's nuclear arsenal has captured the headlines, the North Korean military does not
need it to inflict unacceptable damage to the United States and its allies in the event of a U.S.
invasion. When Pyongyang was believed to possess a meager arsenal comprising only one or possibly two untested nuclear devices and
no effective long-range missiles military experts still calculated that a major war on the Korean peninsula
would cost the United States approximately 80,000 to 100,000 casualties and US$100 billion. When
damage to other countries was also considered, the estimated cost of such a war increased to as high as "one million casualties and one trillion
dollars in estimated industrial damage and lost business." Another estimate calculated that a second Korean War would entail destruction
costing "more than $60 billion and result in 3 million casualties, including 52,000 U.S. military casualties." The
prospect of such a
costly conventional war clearly suffices to deter the United States. The U.S. government could not
persuade its public to approve such a war.
(--) No risk of Korean war --- North Korea provokes but always defers away from
escalation.
Van Jackson and Hannah Suh, 7/9/2015. Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Council on
Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, and author of the forthcoming book Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in
U.S.-North Korea Relations; and Program Coordinator for the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American
Security. The Biggest Myth about North Korea, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-biggest-myth-
about-north-korea-13290?page=2.

Widespread fear of a North Korean total war is a pathology based on an imaginary North Korea . No
matter ones political leanings, right and left alike agree that North Koreas primary goal is regime survival, meaning that North
Korea will not only take actions to safeguard its regime, but also avoid taking actions that put its survival at risk. This bears
out in sixty years of observing North Korean behavioreven during the so-called second Korean war of the late
1960s, North Korea never escalated beyond isolated military attacks . Today, North Korea threatens South
Korean NGOs that send propaganda balloons into its territory, yet fires at the balloons and not the people launching them. In
repeated naval clashes with South Korea in the Yellow Sea, North Korea strikes some blows and
suffers others, but it never escalates beyond the local clash. North Korea has had countless
opportunities to escalate or broaden conflicts in a crisis, yet has consistently chosen restraint . Whatever
North Koreas rhetoric and motivations for violence, its track record shows a preference for not taking actions that would
jeopardize the regime, and the North Korean escalation that everyone fears would do precisely that. Even if North Korea
responded with violence when attacked or retaliated against, there is a massive difference between responding with limited or
tit-for-tat violence (its historical modus operandi) and responding with the most devastatingly lethal response it can come up
with, like a nuclear first-strike or artillery barrages against Seoul. The latter are regime-ending actions, while the former may
demonstrate resolve against the alliance and allow both sides a chance to sue for peace. To be clear, were not saying conflict
with North Korea is impossible. On the contrary, North Korean military adventurism may become more likely as
it feels its expanding nuclear and missile capability affords it greater protections from retaliation. But such conflicts wont
escalate to an all-out war , even if the alliance responds to North Korean violence with a limited counteroffensive. We are
also not calling for preventive strikes on North Korean nuclear facilities at this time. A disarming first-strike against North Korea
requires answering many questions. How confident are we of destroying 100 percent of the targets? How far would a first-
strike set back North Koreas nuclear capabilities? How can we disabuse North Korea of the perception that the alliance is
pursuing regime change (the one scenario that would trigger devastating North Korean retaliation)? But we are arguing that its
a mistake for alliance policy and military plans to be made on the assumption that any preventive or retaliatory strike inevitably
escalates to total war and regime change. Not only is that contrary to North Koreas own primary goal, its the kind of thing that
paralyzes the alliance when faced with North Korean aggression. Just because something is possible, doesnt make it probable.
As a matter of historical observationnot rational assumption North Koreas primary goal is regime survival, and
its foreign policy is bounded by a logic of consequences . If we accept those two propositions, then we must plan
and formulate policy not on the assumption that North Korea will escalate in response to any offensive or counteroffensive
alliance action, but rather with the expectation that North Korea will seek to keep any military friction limited for the sake of
regime survival.
 No Nuclear Korean War Extensions
North Korea wont use nuclear weaponsfears regime survival:
Jillian Bell, 2016 (staff writer) North Korea weapons problem has no easy solution: experts, Feb. 9,
2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/north-korea-weapons-explainer-
1.3439164

"What's pretty clear is that they now have a long history of experimenting with both nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles. And so any estimate of this threat is going to depend upon your conclusions
about how quickly they're developing these technologies. And the truth is, we just don't know."
Baker doesn't think North Korea poses much direct risk, because "it's a regime that understands that
any truly aggressive action ultimately will lead to its own destruction."

(--) North Korea will use nukes for deterrence not pre-emptive strikes:
Yonhap News, 3/29/2016 (Pyongyang uses nuclear development as deterrence: U.S. expert,
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/03/29/0301000000AEN20160329002500315.html,
Accessed 3/31/2016, rwg)

WASHINGTON, March 28 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's push to develop nuclear arms is part of its struggle to
establish deterrence against the United States rather than a scheme to launch a preemptive strike on the
continental U.S., a prominent American expert said Monday. David Albright, head of the U.S-based non-governmental Institute for
Science and International Security (ISIS), said that the communist regime has been utilizing the process of developing
atomic bombs to ensure its deterrence.

Bad technology means North Korean nukes arent a threat:

Jillian Bell, 2016 (staff writer) North Korea weapons problem has no easy solution: experts, Feb. 9,
2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/north-korea-weapons-explainer-
1.3439164

Even if North Korea could launch a missile with its current technology, it's debatable how effective it
would be. "It takes several days for this particular missile system to be set up and fuelled up and
ready to launch," Baker says. "There's really only a few sites where it can be launched from, it's
heavily watched, so they can't really use it."

(--) Even if war starts, the US & South Korea will take out North Korean nukes and win
the war conventionally:
Ji Da, 2016 (staff writer) EPOCH TIMES, Why China Is Willing to Work With United States to Sanction
North Korea, Mar. 10, 2016, Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1989234-why-china-is-willing-to-work-with-united-states-to-
sanction-north-korea/

From the military, economic, and political points of view, it will not be a hard task for the U.S.-South
Korea alliance to resolve the problem. If North Korea started a war, the U.S.-South Korea alliance
could destroy North Koreas nuclear weapons and launching facilities through sophisticated
intelligence operations, and then deploy traditional military operations to win the war.
(--) North Korea wouldnt launch a nuclear attack against the United States:
Dr. Yousaf Butt, 4/17/2013 (Research Professor and Scientist-in-Residence at the James Martin Center
for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies, Better Understanding
North Korea: Q&A with Seven East Asian Experts, Part 2, http://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/04/better-
understanding-north-korea-part-2/, Accessed 2/6/2016, rwg)

In any case, those are just some of the technical aspects of the problem, but one
must also ask if the North Koreans would
be foolish enough to launch a nuclear tipped missile at the United States given the fact that the U.S. can
trace the origin of long-range missiles using infra-red sensors on our surveillance satellites. Any such attack would
invite massive retaliation, and would likely mean the end of the regime. Reuters reported that Kim Jong Un
recently stated that North Korean nuclear devices are for deterring war.

(--) NORTH KOREA WONT USE ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

Jane Perlez, 2016 (staff writer) NEW YORK TIMES, North Koreas Rocket Launch Frays Ties Between
South Korea and China, Feb. 10, 2016, Retrieved Apr. 23, 2016 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/world/asia/china-south-korea-thaad.html

First, many in the Chinese government do not believe that North Korea would use its nuclear
weapons, Mr. Chu said. Second, the belief that deploying the Thaad system is aimed principally at
solidifying Americas position in Northeast Asia is widespread in Beijing, where officials fear the ultimate
goal is to contain China. North Korea is a bad regime, yes, everyone agrees on that, Mr. Chu said. Is
North Korea going to use its weapons? Perhaps not. They are not seen as an immediate threat.

(--) Long time-frame before we have to worry about North Korean nukes:
Dr. Jacques Hymans, 4/17/2013 (associate professor of international relations at the University of
Southern California, Better Understanding North Korea: Q&A with Seven East Asian Experts, Part 2,
http://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/04/better-understanding-north-korea-part-2/, Accessed 2/6/2016,
rwg)
This is not to say that North Korea is incapable of making any technical progress toward its ultimate goal. Its nuclear and missile programs are
not as pathetic as, say, Libyas were. But even
its recent tests can be said to have been successful only relative
to the ridiculously low bar that Pyongyang had set with its prior disastrous test failures. For instance, although the
North Koreans succeeded in putting a satellite into space last December, they broke the satellite in
the process. And as former NASA engineer James Oberg has explained, this failure would likely be repeated if they tried to send up a
nuclear warhead instead. In short, its important not to forget whom were dealing with here. This is a state that still hasnt been able to open
the monstrous Ryugyong Hotel in downtown Pyongyang, despite pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into the project over a quarter-century
to fulfill the Dear Leader Kim Jong Ils personal wish. When
it comes to North Korean nukes, too, there is no doubt in
my mind that we still have timeand probably quite a lot of timebefore they are a real military
threat.

(--) New Agreement reduces the risk of miscalculation:

Jethro Mullen, 8/24/2015 (staff writer, Koreas reach deal, easing military tensions after
exchange of fire, http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/24/asia/koreas-tensions/, Accessed 9/19/2015,
rwg)

Seoul, South Korea (CNN)

North and South Korea have steered military tensions away from the threat of
imminent confrontation, announcing an agreement over a series of recent flashpoints. Landmine blasts,
loudspeakers blaring propaganda, an exchange of artillery fire and threats of more hostilities had put both sides on edge
along the Demilitarized Zone, the world's most heavily fortified border. But after marathon talks between high-level officials,
the two bitter foes said in the early hours of Tuesday that they had found enough common ground to dial back the situation.
Kim Jong Un and North Korea's military 55 photos: Kim Jong Un and North Korea's military Pyongyang expressed regret
over the serious injuries suffered by two South Korean soldiers in landmine blasts in the DMZ, and Seoul agreed to switch off
the loudspeakers pumping propaganda broadcasts over the border Tuesday, both sides said. Korea watchers expressed relief
that the deal had defused the risk of confrontation for the time being after a period in which North Korea had doubled its
artillery forces on the front lines and sent most of its submarines out from their bases.
The agreement "reduces the
risk of a miscalculation with so many forces on the ground there and room for an error," said Philip Yun,
executive director of the Ploughshares Fund, a group that advocates nuclear disarmament. "This is really good news over
the short term."

(--) New agreement is a landmark deallays out a path of reconciliation between

North and South Korea:
Eyder Peralta, 8/25/2015 (staff writer, After Days Of Talks, Tense Standoff, North And South
Korea Reach Dtente, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/08/25/434547721/after-
days-of-talks-tense-standoff-north-and-south-korea-reach-detente, Accessed 9/19/2015, rwg)

After three days of talks and a standoff that escalated into an exchange of artillery fire, North and South Korea have
come to a detente. South Korea has agreed to stop blaring propaganda from speakers across the border and the North
has agreed to lift its semi-war status. Reporting from Seoul, Haeryun Kang filed this update for our Newscast unit: "South
Korea's President Park Geun-hye said the deal 'could serve as an occasion to resolve all inter-Korean issues through trust.'
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has yet to release an official statement. "In
the deal, North Korea expresses regret
for the two South Korean soldiers maimed by landmines. In return, South Korea will stop broadcasting
propaganda by the border. "South Korean Defense advised foreign journalists today not to call the border broadcasts
'propaganda', but the 'Voice of Hope.' These loudspeakers broadcast news, weather, K-pop and information about the Kim
Jong Un regime. Seoul argues that Pyongyang initiated last week's gunfire exchange because of these loudspeakers. The new
agreement doesn't mention who was directly responsible for the recent military standoff." Reuters reports that both sides
began "rolling back heightened military postures."The agreement is also significant because relations between
the two countries have been frozen since 2010, when a South Korean ship was sunk, killing 46 sailors. This could
mark an opening. Reuters reports that with this agreement: "'They both made compromises. South Korea did
not get an apology, they got a statement of regret about the injury, which they can spin as an
apology,' said John Delury of Yonsei University in Seoul. "'The more important point is maintaining this channel
and reopening the relationship. This is hardly going to be easy to implement, but it's a landmark
agreement which lays out a path.'

(--) Recent skirmishes will de-escalate: both sides practice restraint:

Stratfor, 8/20/2015 (In Border Standoff, South Korea Adopts a More Aggressive Posture,
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/border-standoff-south-korea-adopts-more-aggressive-posture,
Accessed 9/19/2015, rwg)

Despite the recent skirmishes and the heightened alert levels, however, it is entirely possible that the
situation will rapidly de-escalate, because both sides seek to practice restraint to avoid a larger
conflict. The North Koreans, for instance, reportedly fired just a single projectile, presumed to be a rocket, at 3:52 p.m.
toward a South Korean loudspeaker position near the town of Yeoncheon. The South Korean military, having detected the
rocket with counterbattery radar, returned fired with its own artillery, but not until more than an hour later. Indeed, this kind of
incident has happened before without spiraling out of control. The location of the exchange occurred in roughly the same area
that the North Koreans fired at balloons carrying anti-Pyongyang leaflets in October 2014, also prompting some return fire
from South Korea.
Despite the apocalyptic warnings Pyongyang issued after Seoul resumed its
propaganda broadcasts, the North Koreans are clearly attempting a balanced and controlled
escalation. The North is likely trying, at least in part, to coerce the South into backing down by raising
the specter of a destabilizing conflict.

(--) War not inevitablewill only be minor periodic skirmishes:

Eirini Lemos, 8/21/2015 (staff writer, What is happening in North and South Korea and will they go
to war? http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/11816941/What-is-happening-
in-North-and-South-Korea-and-will-they-go-to-war.html, Accessed 9/19/2015, rwg)

Andrea Berger, deputy director, and senior research fellow in proliferation and nuclear policy at Royal
United Services Institute, spoke to the Telegraph and said there was always a fear that border skirmishes escalate into greater conflict.
Quote Border skirmishes between the Koreas, whether on land or sea, may not be unusual, but they are unwelcome. There is always a risk that
they drag out over a period of time, complicating and jeopardising any ongoing engagement between the two, or that they escalate into greater
conflict. One key difference in recent years has been South Korea's military planning for such provocations. In 2013, President Park Geun-hye
decided that in the event of any provocation by North Korea, local military units would be allowed to respond immediately and without any
political considerations. South Korea has in this incident demonstrated that resolve to respond rapidly. South Korean conservative activists burn
an effigy of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un during a rally denouncing North Korea's rocket firing, in SeoulSouth Korean conservative
activists burn an effigy of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un during a rally denouncing North Korea's rocket firing, in Seoul Photo: Getty Images
Is war between the Koreas inevitable at some point? No. According to Ms Berger, it is not inevitable
that a war between the countries will happen. Quote All-out war between the Koreas is certainly not
inevitable, especially not in the near- or medium-term. We could see the stand-off persist with only
wars of words and minor periodic skirmishes, or we could see a change in the nature of the North
Korean regime, for example.

(--) Risk of war between the Koreas has disappeared:

Woosang Kim, 2008 (Prof., Political Science, Yonsei U., Seoul). THE UNITED STATES AND NORTHEAST
ASIA: DEBATES, ISSUES, AND THE NEW ORDER, 2008, 135, eo.
There is a perception gap on North Korea. The common perception that North Korea represented a serious security threat was the glue that
bound the alliance together. But there is a growing difference over the North Korean threat perception. Many
South Koreans tend
to think that the possibility of war between the two Koreas has disappeared. There is also a difference
over how to deal with the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis between the alliance partners. These
changing perceptions of threat and the ensuing policy gap may deteriorate the existing ROK-U.S. alliance relationship.

(--) North Korea is bluffingthey constantly threaten war and never follow through:
Adam Taylor, 8/17/2015 (The Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/17/north-korea-has-threatened-a-u-
s-attack-for-years-why-arent-you-scared/, eo).

But why don't we take threats from North Korea seriously? Part of it is a simple boy-who-cried-wolf
situation. North Korea has threatened to attack the United States many, many times before. Here's just
a short list: In May, Park Yong Chol, director of North Korea's Institute for Research into National
Reunification, told CNN that the North has the capability to strike the United States with a nuclear
missile, and would do so if the U.S. "forced their hand." In February, officials warned that North Korea
would cause the "final ruin of the US" with its "precision and diversified nuclear striking means." In
2014, following an alleged North Korean cyberattack on Sony Pictures, a North Korean official
threatened attacks on "the White House, the Pentagon and the whole U.S. mainland" if the United
States retaliated. In 2013, North Korea warned it could attack Guam, Hawaii and the U.S. mainland with
rockets. In 2009, North Korea announced that it had "tremendous military muscle and its own method
of strike able to conquer any targets in its vicinity at one stroke or hit the U.S. on the raw, if necessary."
In 2005, a North Korean official said that if war broke out, the country would "first of all strike all bases
of US imperialist aggressors and turn them into a sea of fire." In 2002, following their inclusion in
President George W. Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman warned
that "the option to 'strike' impudently advocated by the U.S. is not its monopoly" and that North Korea
could "mercilessly wipe out the aggressors."

(--) No risk of tensions escalating its just conflict theater

Mullen and Novak, 8/21/2015 Jethro and Kathy, CNN correspondents citing Jamie Metzl, North Korea ratchets up tensions
after trading fire with South http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/21/asia/koreas-tensions/

The question now is whether the situation will escalate further. North Korea has used similarly alarming
language in previous periods of high tension In 2013, the country announced it had entered "a state
of war " with South Korea. That situation didn't result in military action , although North Korea did temporarily shut down the two
countries' joint industrial zone, which lies on its side of the border. During that period, North Korea kept up a barrage of bombastic

threats against the United States, South Korea and Japan. But at the same time, it continued accepting tourists and hosting
international athletes in Pyongyang for a marathon. South Korea said Friday that it was limiting the
number of its citizens entering the joint industrial zone, but the complex was still operating . There are
currently 83 South Koreans in Pyongyang attending a youth soccer event, including players and coaches, according to
the South Korean Unification Ministry. Jamie Metzl, an Asia expert for the Atlantic Council in New York, said he thought

it was unlikely that the current crisis would escalate further. "North Korea has more to gain from
conflict theater than from a conflict that would quickly expose its fundamental weakness," he said,
suggesting leaders in Pyongyang might be trying to "make trouble because they feel ignored by the
international community and feel they have something to gain negotiating their way out of a mini-
crisis."

(--) North Korea wont launch an attack against the USthey realize its suicidal:
Gwynne Dyer, 3/15/2013 (independent journalist whose articles are published in 45 countries, Risk of
miscalculation on Korean Peninsula,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2015/06/197_132154.html, Accessed 10/6/2015,
rwg)

But it's a long way from feeling peeved to feeling suicidal. Any
North Korean nuclear attack on an American target
would be answered by immediate US strikes that would annihilate the military and civilian leadership
in Pyongyang, obliterate its nuclear facilities, and probably destroy much else besides. So North Korea's threat to launch a
"preemptive" nuclear strike against the United States, or even against South Korea, is totally implausible.

(--) No war: North Korea has too much to lose:

New York Times, 4/12/2013 (In Focus: North Koreas Nuclear Threats,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/04/12/world/asia/north-korea-questions.html?_r=0,
Accessed 8/26/2015, eo)
The sanctions leave room for considerable trade in many types of goods and services. China, which supplies much of North Koreas basic needs, is not in any
violation of the United Nations resolutions. There is more news coverage and attention is higher, but we're living normally. We do worry and care but it seems like

more fear and worry exists abroad. We

don't really think a war is going to happen. The probability is highly unlikely
because North Korea has so much to lose. Student, Incheon, South Korea

(--) North Korea will back down in a crisis and resort to dialogue:
HIROTSUGU MOCHIZUKI, 4/14/2013 (staff writer, Former Obama aide: North Korea only 'bluffing'
with belligerent rhetoric, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/korean_peninsula/AJ201304140058,
Accessed 8/26/2015, eo)

Although Samore acknowledged that it was difficult to predict what exactly Kim would do, he said the
North Korean leader would
likely follow in the footsteps of his father, the late Kim Jong Il, and eventually revert to a posture of
dialogue. "After the military exercises end in April, my guess is that sometime in May or June, he will indicate a
willingness to resume diplomacy," Samore said.

(--) North Korea will never go to warthey always engage in a bluff cycle:
Chang May Choon, 8/26/2015 (staff writer, Two Koreas reach deal, but analysts doubt calm will
last, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/two-koreas-reach-deal-but-analysts-doubt-calm-will-
last, Accessed 9/19/2015, rwg)

Dr Kongdan Oh,a researcher at the Institute for Defence Analyses, says the current truce is only
temporary as it is the result of "another round of bluffing, threats and backing down". "North Korea
will trigger another provocation again at an unpredictable time. It is their reason to survive," she said.

(--) North Koreas bomb test doesnt change the realities on the peninsula:
Admiral Dennis Blair, 1/24/2016 (former Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, The North
Korean Nuclear Test and the US-Japan Alliance, http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/the-north-korean-
hydrogen-bomb-test-and-the-us-japan-alliance/, Accessed 1/26/2016, rwg)

The development of an effective thermonuclear bomb will not change the fundamental military and
geopolitical balance on the Korean Peninsula. It would be suicidal for the Kim regime to initiate either
a major conventional attack across the DMZ or to use any kind of weapon of mass destruction against the
Republic of Korea, Japan or the United States. It is important for the United States to make an authoritative statement that
emphasizes the military realities: 1) a major conventional attack would be defeated by combined forces of the Republic of Korea and the United
States and 2) a WMD attack would be met with a devastating retaliatory nuclear strike by the United States. Both alternatives would result in
the end of the Kim regime.

(--) Jong Un is a rational actor:

Dingding Chen, 1/14/2016 (assistant professor of government and public administration at the
University of Macau, Dont believe all the myths about North Korea,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/01/14/commentary/world-commentary/dont-believe-all-
the-myths-about-north-korea/#.VqWH5k--MjA, Accessed 1/27/2016, rwg)
First, is the myth that North Korea under the young leader Kim Jong Un is a crazy and irrational actor. In fact, in reality, he is far from this.
Actually allthe evidence suggest that North Korea and the Kim family have always been rational maybe
too rational. Everything North Korea has done so far centers around the central purpose of all countries in an anarchical
international environment: survival. We can say this is the case for North Korea especially because its survival, from the
perspective of its leaders, is under serious threat. A nuclear test, if successful, can greatly increase the likelihood of the regimes
survival. This doesnt change the fact that a nuclear North Korea might be bad news for other countries in Asia.

(--) No nuclear escalation:

Eirini Lemos, 8/21/2015 (staff writer, What is happening in North and South Korea and will they go
to war? http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/11816941/What-is-happening-
in-North-and-South-Korea-and-will-they-go-to-war.html, Accessed 9/19/2015, rwg)

Would North Korea use a nuclear weapon? It is highly unlikely that North Korea would use a nuclear
weapon against South Korea, Ms Berger said, "or indeed any other nation, unless it felt that the survival of
the leader or the regime as a whole was genuinely and imminently threatened".

(--) North Korean nuclear strike extremely unlikely:

Orange County Register, 8/18/2015 (Analysis: North Korea has threatened a U.S. attack for
years. Are they bluffing? http://www.ocregister.com/articles/north-678016-korea-korean.html,
Accessed 9/19/2015, rwg)

Even with these developments, most experts still argue that a North Korean nuclear strike remains
extremely unlikely. There is a near zero chance of a premeditated North Korean nuclear attack, Daryl
Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, told NK News earlier this year, though Kimball added that a miscalculation by either
side could pose a serious risk. Instead, North Korea seems to view its nuclear weapons as a deterrent and threats as a means of gaining political
concessions. Cathcart notes that if North Korea is able to move up on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, it may be able to achieve some progress
with the Obama administration as it moves into late second term mode, which is historically when US-DPRK relations have made strides.

(--) Any war would be rapid: U.S. air and naval power would wipe the mat with North
Korea.
Doug Bandow, 2009 (Sr. Fellow, Cato Institute), NORTH KOREA: PAPER TIGER, June 4, 2009. Retrieved
April 1, 2010 from http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100, eo)

It is even more obvious that Pyongyang poses no meaningful danger to America. The North has no
ability to project military power. If it attempted to do so, U.S. air and naval power would make quick
work of North Korea's forces.

(--) North Korean war wont escalate: no one would back them up:
John Feffer, 2009 (Co-Dir., Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute for Policy Studies), ESCALATING WITH
NORTH KOREA, June 25, 2009. Retrieved April 1, 2010 from http://sites/google.com/site/nzdprksociety,
eo.

Myth #2: North Korea is a military threat: North Korea has a lot of people in uniform, and its artillery can
cause horrific damage to Seoul. But North Korea spends about half a billion dollars a year on its military.
South Korea alone spends 40 times that amount. And the United States spends 1,000 times more.
Neither China nor Russia would support any North Korean military action. Militarily speaking, North
Korea is a kamikaze country. It can inflict damage, but only in a suicide attack and only close to home.

(--) It is hysterical to fear a nuclear war from North Korea:

John Mueller, 2010 (Prof., Political Science, Ohio State U.), ATOMIC OBSESSION: NUCLEAR ALARMISM
FROM HIROSHIMA TO AL-QAEDA, 2010, 153, eo
A viable policy toward this pathetic regime, then, might be to calm down while continuing to be
extorted for the sake of the miserable North Korean people. Conceivably (but only conceivably), a
reduction in the threat environment might nudge the North Korean regime into reducing its armed
forces some, while spending more on its people. For the rest, one would simply wait for the leadership
to come around. It might be a long wait, but getting hysterical over this regime and launching a war
against it seems a far inferior option.

(--) China and Russia will back up South, not North Korea.
Doug Bandow, 2010 (Sr. Fellow, Cato Institute), SOUTH KOREA NEEDS BETTER DEFENSE, March 30,
2010. Retrieved April 1, 2010 from http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11628, eo

The international environment also has changed. Both China and Russia recognize South Korea;
neither would back aggression by Pyongyang. The ROK could count on support from throughout East
Asia and around the world.

(--) US will never attack North Korea:

Orange County Register, 8/18/2015 (Analysis: North Korea has threatened a U.S. attack for
years. Are they bluffing? http://www.ocregister.com/articles/north-678016-korea-korean.html,
Accessed 9/19/2015, rwg)
Some, including former South Korean president Kim Young-sam, suggest that part of the reason North Korea makes such awful threats is
because they are well aware that there wont be a military response. Looking back, Kim told the New York Times in 2009, I
think the
North Koreans think they can say whatever they want because no matter what they do, the
Americans will never attack them.

(--) North Korean prolif wont cause warNorth Korea knows nuclear use would be
suicide:
Zhiqun Zhu, 2009 (Prof., Political Science & International Relations, Bucknell U.), CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, July 28, 2009 Retrieved April 1, 2010 from http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0728/p09s02-
coop.html, eo)
The cold war has not ended on the Korean Peninsula. Regime survival is a top priority for Pyongyang. Depicted as being belligerent and
menacing to its neighbors and the U.S., North Korea retorts that it is the U.S. that has been hostile and provocative. The
impoverished
North needs the nuclear program as a bargaining chip. It is also in dire need of energy, which nuclear
technology can provide. It is highly unlikely that Pyongyang will actually use nuclear weapons against
its neighbors or the U.S. the Communist leaders are fully aware that it would be suicidal.

(--) North Korea is deterred by regime survival:

David Sanger, 2009 (Chief Washington Correspondent, New York Times), THE INHERITANCE: THE
WORLD OBAMA CONFRONTS AND THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICAN POWER, 2009, 311, eo)

In reality, North Korean missiles raining down on Los Angeles or Tokyo seemed like a pretty dubious
scenario. Kim Jong-Il might be bizarre and paranoid, but he had a strong interest in personal survival.
Shooting a missile, particularly a nuclear-tipped one, would not constitute a very smart strategy if Kim
wanted to rule to a ripe old age, as his father had done. In a nuclear exchange, North Korea's leaders
would have the life expectancy of fireflies. They knew it, and the Bush administration knew it.
(--) North Koreas nuclear weapons are just a bargaining ploy for aid:
John Mueller, 2010 (Prof., Political Science, Ohio State U.), ATOMIC OBSESSION: NUCLEAR ALARMISM
FROM HIROSHIMA TO AL-QAEDA, 2010, 152, eo)

For its part, North

Korea remains essentially the most pathetic country in the world. If there were a
contest for the country on whose side history is most fully not, it would win handily. Its leaders have
apparently wanted to become nuclear for decades, and that extravagant goal has been delayed more
by the country's monumental administrative incompetence than anything else, although increased threats from
abroad may have had an enhancing effect on its efforts. In 2006, the country did manage to stage something of an atomic bomb test, though it
may well have been simply a fizzle, and they tried once again in 2009. In the meantime, the country simply can't feed itself. Not only was there
a massive famine in the 1990s, but the general condition of undernourishment the "eating problem," it is called within the country
continues to the point where both the bodies and the minds of millions of its citizens are being stunted. In the meantime, it
remains
beholden to foreign food aid and uses its nuclear program, such as it is, as a lever of extortion. It has
become, as one observer put it, "the world's first nuclear-armed, missile-wielding beggar."

(--) The US would just shoot down any North Korean missile:
New York Times, 4/12/2013 (In Focus: North Koreas Nuclear Threats,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/04/12/world/asia/north-korea-questions.html?_r=0,
Accessed 8/26/2015, rwg)

How might the United States, South Korea, Japan and China respond to a missile test or an attack?

If a missile attack went into the water, even if it passed over Japan, the two countries could ignore it. But if it headed for land, the
United States would probably use its missile interception technology, including on Aegis-equipped ships
off the Korean coast. If there were to be a more direct attack, like the torpedo that sank a South Korean warship, the Cheonan, three
years ago, it is likely that both the United States and South Korea would respond. China would be unlikely to take action.

(--) North Korea is bluffing about attacking the US with a ballistic missile:
HIROTSUGU MOCHIZUKI, 4/14/2013 (staff writer, Former Obama aide: North Korea only 'bluffing'
with belligerent rhetoric, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/korean_peninsula/AJ201304140058,
Accessed 8/26/2015, eo)

WASHINGTON--North Koreas belligerence is "mainly theatrics and bluffing," and it is doubtful the country
can hit the continental United States with a nuclear missile, a former aide to U.S. President Barack Obama said. Gary
Samore, who served as Obama's coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction terrorism during the president's first term, said
he expects Pyongyang to show interest in resuming dialogue with Washington in May or June after the joint military exercise between the
United States and South Korea ends in April. Samore is currently executive director of research at the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. In an interview with
The Asahi Shimbun on April 12, Samore referred to threats of the Kim Jong Un regime of North Korea to launch a nuclear attack against the
mainland of the United States.
He said Obama administration officials "think that what North Korea is doing is
mainly theatrics and bluffing."

(--) North Korea has a no first use policy:

John Park, 2008 (Dir., Korea Working Group, U.S. Institute of Peace), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 279, eo.

While declaring and demonstrating its nuclear power status, Pyongyang also has promulgated a general
policy of no first use. In October 2006, North Korea officially announced that it "will never use nuclear
weapons first." Although this declared policy might partly seek to reassure the concerned states of its
nonaggressive intent and thereby reduce international pressure, the policy may also reflect its genuine
preference, stemming from strategic realities.

(--) North Korea wont use nukes firstthey fear US retaliatory capability:
John Park, 2008 (Dir., Korea Working Group, U.S. Institute of Peace), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 279.

The United States has massive retaliatory capability against a North Korean nuclear attack, so
Pyongyang has a compelling incentive not to cross the nuclear threshold first under most
circumstances.

(--) North Korean nuclear weapons dont pose an existential threat:

Ted Galen Carpenter, 2008 (Vice President for Defense Studies, Cato Institute), SMART POWER:
TOWARD A PRUDENT FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICA, 2008, 149, eo.

Regardless of how many times North Korea tests its missiles, it does not constitute an existential threat
to the United States or its allies. In fact, some of the suggestions for a response to the missile tests
that have significantly increased international tensions are more dangerous than the specter of a
North Korean missile capability itself.

(--) North Korea lacks miniaturization technology to put nuclear warheads on ballistic
missiles:
Chung-In Moon, 2008 (Prof., International Relations, Yonsei U., South Korea), NORTH KOREAS
NUCLEAR ISSUES: TOWARD PEACE AND SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA, 2008, 27, eo.

Notwithstanding North Korea's possession of nuclear warheads, its limited delivery capability, and
contested claims of nuclear testing as necessary pre-conditions to becoming a nuclear state,
miniaturization technology is still a significant obstacle. It must demonstrate the capability to
miniaturize nuclear warheads and mount them on Nodong and/or SCUD missiles for effective use.
However, most intelligence analyses indicate that North Korea is far short of developing such
technology. In view of the above, North Korea does not deserve being treated as a nuclear weapons
state. Although such a treatment might provoke North Korea's erratic behavior, it can deter North Korea
from abusing and misusing its nuclear bargaining leverage.

(--) North Korea wont use nukes:

Dennis Blair, 2009 (Dir., U.S. National Intelligence), CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO
THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES, Hrg. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Mar. 10, 2009,
27.

Pyongyang probably views its nuclear weapons as being more for deterrence, international prestige,
and coercive diplomacy than for warfighting and would consider using nuclear weapons only under
certain narrow circumstances. We also assess Pyongyang probably would not attempt to use nuclear
weapons against U.S. forces or territory unless it perceived the regime to be on the verge of military
defeat and risked an irretrievable loss of control.
(--) North Korean nuclear weapons arent dangerous even if used:
Richard Muller, 2008 (Prof., Physics, U. California at Berkeley), PHYSICS FOR FUTURE PRESIDENTS: THE
SCIENCE BEHIND THE HEADLINES, 2008, 35, eo.

My own evaluation is that a nuclear weapon designed by anything less than a top-level team is likely
to fizzle. On October 9, 2006, North Korea tested its first atomic bomb. Though a poor country, North
Korea assembled the enormous resources to do this. The yield of this bomb was less than 1 kiloton,
and essentially all the experts I know agree that it was probably designed to release 20 kilotons or
more. It was a fizzle.

(--) North Korea lacks air & missile capabilities to launch nuclear weapons:
John Mueller, 2010 (Prof., Political Science, Ohio State U.), ATOMIC OBSESSION: NUCLEAR ALARMISM
FROM HIROSHIMA TO AL-QAEDA, 2010, 152-153, eo.

Some consideration should be given to what North Korea could possibly do with a nuclear capacity, assuming this ill-led
and monumentally incompetent regime were ever able to attain one. Beyond using its weapons to stoke its nationalist ego and to deter an
attack on itself--which, given the threatening fulminations of its many glowering opponents, it has good reason to be concerned about--the
country is likely, even more than earlier entrants into the nuclear club, to find the weapons to be useless. Delivery
outside the country by airplane would be hugely problematic due to the air defenses of its neighbors.
And North Korea's missile capacity remains pathetic: its missiles are small and exceedingly inaccurate-
-though they have managed to hit the Pacific Ocean several times, in each instance stirring worldwide angst.

(--) North Korea lacks miniaturization technology for nuclear bombs:

Daniel Pinkston, 2009 (Sr. Analyst, International Crisis Group, Seoul, South Korea), NORTH KOREAS
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER KIM JONG IL: NEW PERSPECTIVES, 2009, 103, eo.

North Korea exploded a small nuclear device on October 9, 2006, but North Korean engineers have
probably not been able to miniaturize a nuclear bomb to fit on top of a missile and survive re-entry.

(--) Lack of miniaturization tech impedes North Korean nukes:

John Feffer, 2009 (Co-Dir., Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute for Policy Studies), ESCALATING WITH
NORTH KOREA, June 25, 2009. Retrieved April 1, 2010 from http://sites/google.com/site/nzdprksociety,
eo)

Myth 1: North Korea is about to attack Hawaii: North Korea has two long-range missiles, the Taepodong-
1 and the Taepodong-2. The first, likely used only for satellite launches, can maybe go 2,500 miles. But
it's never been successfully tested. The Taepondong-2 maybe could go about 3,700 miles. But it too has
failed in its two tests: a quick fizzle in 2006 and a failure in the third stage this last April. Even if
Pyongyang gets everything right for a possible July 4 test, it's 4,500 miles between Pyongyang and
Honolulu. As for putting a nuclear warhead on the top of it, North Korea has shown no evidence that
it has the necessary miniaturization technology.
War Wont Escalate: China Wont Defend North Korea
(--) China wont defend North Korea if war breaks out:
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 17, 2016. China unlikely to come to North Koreas defence if
tensions escalate over nuclear weapons tests, say Chinese experts. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1936616/china-unlikely-come-north-
koreas-defence-if-tensions

China is unlikely to defend North Korea in case tensions escalate on the Korean peninsula over
Pyongyangs nuclear provocations despite a mutual defence pact between the two communist allies,
mainland scholars say.

(--) Despite treaty obligations, China will just bail on North Korea in the event of a war:
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 17, 2016. China unlikely to come to North Koreas defence if
tensions escalate over nuclear weapons tests, say Chinese experts. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1936616/china-unlikely-come-north-
koreas-defence-if-tensions

China and North Korea signed their Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 55 years
ago, under which Beijing pledged to give assistance to Pyongyang in the event of an attack. Professor
Pang Zhongying, an international relations expert at Renmin University, said Pyongyangs nuclear
development, which Beijing viewed as a threat to its security interests, had irreversibly damaged Sino-
North Korean relations and rendered the treaty effectively null and void. The treaty is Chinas only
legally binding bilateral security pact remaining in force. But it exists only in the legal sense and it is
highly unlikely that China will provide military aid in the event of a conflict or war, he said.
 China Cant Control North Korea Extensions
(--) CHINA CANT CONTROL NORTH KOREAN NUCLEARIZATION.
Marte Galtung, 2014 (China Analyst, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 49 MYTHS ABOUT CHINA,
2014, 150.

These are the limits of Chinese influence over Pyongyang. It is unlikely that the leadership in North
Korea informslet alone asks permission fromBeijing before it fires rockets and missiles, conducts
nuclear tests, or sinks vessels. What's more, when China does protest, Pyongyang does not give China's
views any consideration worth mentioning. China is like a mother who has limited control over the
actions of her disobedient son.

(--) CHINA IS LOSING INFLUENCE WITH NORTH KOREA.

Sebastian Heilmann, 2014 (Dir., Mercator Institute for China Studies), CHINA'S FOREIGN POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS: AN UNCONVENTIONAL GLOBAL POWER, 2014, 157.

By accepting North Korea's menacing and blackmailing of other nations militarily, the Chinese
government is exposing itself to unpredictable advances and actions by the DPRK leadership. In view of
the precarious state of North Korea's governance and economy, the Korean Peninsula is likely to remain
the focus of ongoing security-policy crisis Management for the Chinese government. It is uncertain to
what extent Beijing will be able to exercise a moderating influence on Pyongyang in the event of a
political crisis.

(--) China is not key to solve North Korean proliferation:

Chen Dingding, 2015 (assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of
Macau), Sorry, America: China Can't Solve Your North Korea Problem, Jan. 26, 2015. Retrieved Apr. 24,
2016 from http://nationalinterest.org/feature/sorry-america-china-cant-solve-your-north-korea-
problem-12110

That being said, whether the pressure approach proves successful is not only dependent on China but
also the United States. Thats because North Korean leaders do not believe a frosty relationship with
China threatens their survival. They do, however, fear that Americas perceived malign intentions
could threaten their survival. As a result, the ultimate solution to the North Korea problem probably
lies in the hands of the U.S., not China. This is a crucial point for U.S. policymakers must understand.
 China Wont Get on Board With Harsh Sanctions Extensions
(--) China wont get on board with harsh sanctions against North Korea:
Gregory Elich, 2016 (Board of Directors of the Jasenovac Research Institute and the Advisory Board of
the Korea Policy Institute) US Plans for North Korea Threaten International Security, Feb. 17, 2016.
Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/02/17/us-plans-for-north-korea-
threaten-international-security/

Behind the scenes, U.S. officials are pressuring China to cancel its contracts to import minerals from
the DPRK, and to deny North Korean planes from entering Chinese airspace. The United States is also
demanding that China terminate food shipments to the DPRK. With eighty percent mountainous
terrain, North Korea has limited arable land, and food imports are needed to supplement agricultural
output. If the United States is successful in forcing China to halt food shipments, much of North
Koreas population would be driven into hunger and malnutrition. The brutality of the measures the
U.S. is hoping to implement is rather breathtaking. Getting China and Russia onboard with such
punitive sanctions is not going to be easy. American officials respond to Chinese and Russian
recalcitrance with the technique they know best: bullying. The Chinese government-linked Global
Times points out, however: Washington should be clear that it cannot push China around.

(--) China wont pressure North Korea to denuclearize:

Stephanie T. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, 2014 (USIPs director of Asia-Pacific programs), U.S.-China
Cooperation on North Korea: What are the Options? June 9, 2014. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from
http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/us-china-cooperation-north-korea-what-are-the-options

Following North Koreas 3rd nuclear test [in February 2013], Western officials and analysts interpreted
President Xi Jinpings stronger emphasis on denuclearization as a sign of a policy shift and greater
convergence between U.S. and Chinese national interests. But this shift in rhetoric did not translate
into any measures to press North Korea to denuclearize or in any sense change Chinese priorities on
the [Korean] Peninsula.

(--) Xi wont pressure the North Korean regime too hard.

WASHINGTON POST, 2016 The U.S. and China have to resolve their impasse on North Korea, Jan.
29, 2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-and-china-
have-to-resolve-their-impasse-on-north-korea/2016/01/29/4cc87342-c529-11e5-a4aa-
f25866ba0dc6_story.html

For China, the detonation on Jan. 6 was another in a series of pokes in the eye. North Korea defied
pressure from Beijing not to act and did not even extend the courtesy of advance warning, as in
previous tests. Yet despite its irritation, the government of Xi Jinping has evidently made a calculation
not to squeeze North Korea too hard, lest it destabilize the regime, leading to what China fears most
the chaos of refugees from a collapsing state and a reunited Korea that would be a U.S. ally.

China opposes fully sanctioning North Korea.

Ji Da, 2016 (staff writer) EPOCH TIMES, Why China Is Willing to Work With United States to Sanction
North Korea, Mar. 10, 2016, Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1989234-why-china-is-willing-to-work-with-united-states-to-
sanction-north-korea/

Both sides do not want to see North Korea have nuclear weapons, but China does not want to exert too
much pressure on North Korea to cause the collapse of the current government. Therefore, China has
only reduced the aid to North Korea rather than fully opposing its nuclear weapons, and uses the issue
to bargain with the international community.

Despite sanctions, China will remain high levels of trade with North Korea:
Sungtae Jacky Park, 2016 (Middle East, Technology, & Nuclear Security Analyst (Intern) at the
American Security Project), NATIONAL INTEREST, THAAD: The Moment of Decision Has Arrived, Jan. 29,
2016, Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from http://nationalinterest.org/feature/thaad-the-moment-decision-
has-arrived-15059

On January 5, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test. Pyongyang also conducted another
submarine-launched ballistic missile ejection test in December of last year, demonstrating that the Kim
regime is intent on developing deliverable nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. Yet, China,
which can do the most to clamp down on North Korea, is still refusing to do so, despite the
deterioration in Beijing-Pyongyang relations over the last few years. To be sure, China began to
implement UN sanctions after North Koreas third nuclear test in February 2013except that Chinese
trade with North Korea grew by 10.4 percent in 2013 and by 4.9 percent in 2014. In 2015, China-North
Korea trade decreased by 15 percent, but the decline was due to the slowdown in Chinas economy. In
fact, Beijing has been working to improve relations with Pyongyang since late 2014 and early 2015.

(--) China is unwilling to sanction North Korea.

Cheri Cheng, 2016 (staff writer) U.S., China Agree to Find a U.N. Solution for dealing with North Korea,
Jan. 27, 2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from
http://www.newseveryday.com/articles/31084/20160127/u-s-china-agree-to-find-a-u-n-solution-for-
dealing-with-north-korea.htm

Despite agreeing that measures need to be taken, Beijing, who is an ally to North Korea, continues to
appear to be reluctant on agreeing to increase sanctions on North Korea. "Sanctions are not an end of
themselves," Wang said.

(--) China wont pressure North Korea to end the nuclear tests:
Cheri Cheng, 2016 (staff writer) U.S., China Agree to Find a U.N. Solution for dealing with North Korea,
Jan. 27, 2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from
http://www.newseveryday.com/articles/31084/20160127/u-s-china-agree-to-find-a-u-n-solution-for-
dealing-with-north-korea.htm

China, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, can vote to block any measures targeting
North Korea. Since the nuclear test, the U.S. and several other countries have condemned North Korea
for continuing to carry out these tests. Beijing also expressed anger over the most recent test but did
not appear to put extra pressures onto North Korea to end these tests.
China refuses to turn on its last allyNorth Korea.
Scott A. Snyder, 2016 (senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea
policy at the Council on Foreign Relations) Where China and the United States Disagree on North Korea,
Jan. 8, 2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/01/08/where-china-and-the-
united-states-disagree-on-north-korea/

Ideology: It is particularly hard for China to turn on its last ally despite the clear economic and
strategic divergences that have weakened the Sino-North Korean relationship for decades. It appears
even harder for China to give up the idea that, despite four North Korean nuclear tests, U.S. enmity
toward Pyongyang is the root cause of peninsular hostility. This view persists despite U.S.-North Korea
negotiations leading to agreements such as the Agreed Framework, forbearance despite continued
North Korean double-dealing and renewed negotiation efforts through Six Party Talks even despite
North Koreas first nuclear test, and even seeming indifference to Pyongyangs provocations under the
moniker of strategic patience during the Obama administration.

(--) Much more than Chinese pressure needed for a diplomatic solution to North
Korea.
WASHINGTON POST, 2016 The U.S. and China have to resolve their impasse on North Korea, Jan.
29, 2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-and-china-
have-to-resolve-their-impasse-on-north-korea/2016/01/29/4cc87342-c529-11e5-a4aa-
f25866ba0dc6_story.html

Mr. Kerry said that the goal of U.S. policy is inducing North Korea to resume negotiations on giving up
its nuclear arsenal. If that is to be achieved, the United States will have to do much more than hope
that China will apply the necessary pressure.

China wont agree to US demands to pressure North Korea:

Stephanie T. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, 2014 (USIPs director of Asia-Pacific programs), U.S.-China
Cooperation on North Korea: What are the Options? June 9, 2014. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from
http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/us-china-cooperation-north-korea-what-are-the-options

Clearly the U.S. tactic of trying to persuade China to come over to its approach isnt having the desired
effect. The idea that China can and will compel Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons cannot be
the basis of sound U.S. policy.
 Sanctions Will Fail Against North Korea Extensions
(--) Sanctions fail against North Korea.
Dursun Peksen, 7/8/2016 (Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Memphis, Why
Economic Sanctions Have Failed Against North Korea, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/why-
economic-sanctions-have-failed-against-north-korea/, Accessed 7/17/2016, rwg)

Why have sanctions failed against North Korea? Sanctions have been ineffective for two reasons:
Pyongyang has been able to shield its ruling circle from the economic costs of sanctions, and has
employed means of repression to quell dissent and domestic opposition. Sanctioning countries often
assume that foreign economic pressure will impair the targets economy and military capacity, thus
undermining the support base of the leadership. This would in turn force the regime to capitulate to
foreign pressure to avoid the erosion of its authority. Yet, sanctions against authoritarian targets, especially
those with a relatively small support base, rarely put enough pressure to induce concessions. The
targeted regimes survive external pressure by diverting the economic costs of sanctions to ordinary
citizens and using the remaining resources to offer selective rewards to their supporters to isolate them
from the economic hardship. Selective rewards in turn preempt defections from the ruling circles. North Korea is a textbook example of a
sanctioned authoritarian regime with a relatively small and cohesive ruling coalition. The regime is essentially under the control of a coalition of
high-ranking military officials, Korean Workers Party leaders, and top bureaucrats. A large portion of the ruling elites are members of the
extended Kim family, with other members chosen based on their family background and personal connections with the Kim family. The regime
provides a wide spectrum of selective rewards to its ruling elites in return for loyalty, including residency and special housing benefits in
Pyongyang, better and more food, and access to scarce goods such as luxury cars, jewelry, and electronics. Some members of the ruling circle
even profit from the sanctions by participating illicit economic activitiessuch as money laundering, arms trafficking, and counterfeiting goods
and currencyto generate revenue and mitigate the adverse effects of sanctions. The
regime has remained defiant against
foreign pressure also because of its continued use of repression against any potential domestic
opposition. The regimes full command over a repressive state apparatus, among the worlds worst, and total
surveillance of society has enabled the leadership to eliminate any challenges to the status quo. Severe human
rights violations such as public executions, torture, and years of imprisonment in prison camps discourage anti-regime activities and dissent.
Informants in workplaces, schools, and party offices detect organized opposition. Through the neighborhood watch system, Inminban,
members of each neighborhood unit monitor fellow members and report anti-regime activities to party authorities. Hence, even
if foreign
pressure might create more grievances and dissatisfaction against the current leadership, North
Korean citizens simply lack any channels to organize opposition.

(--) NORTH KOREA WILL JUST FLOUT UN SANCTIONS.

Somini Sengupta, 2016 (staff writer) NEW YORK TIMES, U.N. Toughens Sanctions on North Korea in
Response to Its Nuclear Program, Retrieved Apr. 23, 2016 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/03/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions.html?_r=0

The Council has sought to hobble North Koreas nuclear weapons program before, but the country has
repeatedly flouted those measures. In January, it conducted its fourth nuclear test and launched a
rocket in February, even as diplomats were negotiating the current resolution.

(--) SANCTIONS WILL FAIL AGAINST NORTH KOREA.

Somini Sengupta, 2016 (staff writer) NEW YORK TIMES, U.N. Toughens Sanctions on North Korea in
Response to Its Nuclear Program, Retrieved Apr. 23, 2016 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/03/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions.html?_r=0
The Chinese ambassador, Liu Jieyi, focused on the Norths Jan. 6 and Feb. 7 tests, done in violation of
previous resolutions. He also expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of sanctions, and used the
occasion to criticize an American proposal to deploy a missile shield in South Korea. Sanctions are not
an end to themselves, and the Security Council cannot fundamentally resolve the nuclear issue on the
Korean Peninsula, Mr. Liu said. Todays resolution should be a new starting point and a paving stone
for the political settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. .

(--) SANCTIONS WILL FAIL TO CONTAIN NORTH KOREA.

VOICE OF AMERICA, Feb. 25, 2016, U.S. China Agree on Proposed Sanction Against North Korea,
Retrieved Apr. 23, 2016 from http://learningenglish.voanews.com/content/us-china-agree-on-
proposed-sanction-against-north-korea/3208250.html

Some experts doubt that targeting North Korean officials and agencies will have any impact. They
question whether the final agreement will impose real economic pain that will be felt by leader Kim
Jong Un and the leadership.

(--) Isolation strategy with North Korea fails:

Jillian Bell, 2016 (staff writer) North Korea weapons problem has no easy solution: experts, Feb. 9,
2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/north-korea-weapons-explainer-
1.3439164

Baker doesn't think further sanctions are the answer. "Isolation clearly is not working and the North
Koreans are trying to emphasize that. So to shame them or make them sit on the stairs or something
is doing very little to stop them."

(--) Sanctions dont cause policy change in the target state:

Carla Freeman, 2016 (Director of the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute at SAIS), What New Approach
Should the U.S. and China Take to North Korea? Feb. 9, 2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from
https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-new-approach-should-us-and-china-take-north-korea

Since Parks ambitious vision is stalled and neither Chinas calls to get back to the Six Party table, nor
American strategic patience or pleas to Beijing to get Pyongyang in line are working, what should the
U.S. do? Sanctions offer a punitive response but not a strategythey can help create conditions for
negotiations or can contribute to but rarely cause internally-driven policy change on the part of the
targeted state.

Sanctions cant solve the North Korean nuclear dispute:

Yang Xiyu, 2015 (Senior Fellow, China Institute of International Studies), North Korean Nuclear Issue in
China-U.S. Relations, Jul. 10, 2015. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-
07/10/content_8062011.htm

As a matter of fact, the North Korean nuclear issue covers more than nuclear proliferation and nuclear
threat; it is a product of the long-term military confrontation between North Korea and the U.S.-ROK
alliance, as well as an outcome of serious imbalance in the security structure of the peninsula since the
end of the Cold War. For North Korea, the issue is basically about survival and security. This complicated
security issue shaped by the long-standing state of war in the form of a cold war cannot be addressed
simply by carrying out the model of denuclearization in exchange for compensation, nor through isolation,
sanctions or military strikes.

Sanctions will not bring North Korea to the negotiating table:

Mitchel B. Wallerstein, 2015 (deputy U.S. assistant secretary of defense for counterproliferation policy
from 1993 to 1997 and the current President of Baruch College), WASHINGTON POST, Ignoring North
Koreas nuclear threat could prove to be a dangerous mistake, Dec. 18, 2015. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016
from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-price-of-inattention-to-north-
korea/2015/12/18/a3eb5308-9d3b-11e5-8728-1af6af208198_story.html?tid=a_inl

It is beyond dispute that sanctions helped produce a nuclear deal with Iran, but they are an imperfect
instrument. They can be evaded (especially if other states assist), and Pyongyang has been relatively
impervious to such pressure. For diplomacy to have any chance of success, North Korea must first agree
to come to the negotiating table. Unfortunately, the nation typically makes extensive and unreasonable
demands that it says must be fulfilled before it will agree even to talk. The United States must not
capitulate to this ploy.

Sanctions wont be tough enough to cause North Korea to give up its nuclear
weapons:
Choe Sang-Hun and Edward Wong 2016 (Pulitzer Prize-winning South Korean journalist, & American
journalist and a foreign correspondent for The New York Times) BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2016.
Retrieved Apr. 23, 2016 from https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/02/26/doubts-asia-over-
whether-new-sanctions-against-north-korea-can-work/ptfdGOiberUkznz4FI1IxI/story.html

SEOUL, South Korea As a new set of sanctions against North Korea circulated at the U.N. Security
Council, analysts in South Korea and China expressed doubts Friday that the measures would be tough
enough to force the pariah state to give up its nuclear weapons.

Sanctions wont stop North Korean nuclear weapons:

Choe Sang-Hun and Edward Wong 2016 (Pulitzer Prize-winning South Korean journalist, & American
journalist and a foreign correspondent for The New York Times) BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2016.
Retrieved Apr. 23, 2016 from https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/02/26/doubts-asia-over-
whether-new-sanctions-against-north-korea-can-work/ptfdGOiberUkznz4FI1IxI/story.html

These sanctions will certainly hurt the North , said Koh Yu-hwan, a professor at Dongguk University in
Seoul. But I dont think they will hurt them enough to abandon their nuclear weapons.

Too many loopholes in the sanctions for them to be effective:

Choe Sang-Hun and Edward Wong 2016 (Pulitzer Prize-winning South Korean journalist, & American
journalist and a foreign correspondent for The New York Times) BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2016.
Retrieved Apr. 23, 2016 from https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/02/26/doubts-asia-over-
whether-new-sanctions-against-north-korea-can-work/ptfdGOiberUkznz4FI1IxI/story.html

There are still too many loopholes for us to predict that they will lead to North Koreas
denuclearization, said Chang Yong-seok, an analyst at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies
at Seoul National University. These sanctions are more like a warning to the North about how much
more it could suffer if it conducted another nuclear test, and an inducement for the country to return to
the negotiating table.

Sanctions have limited impact on North Korea:

Choe Sang-Hun and Edward Wong, 2016 (Pulitzer Prize-winning South Korean journalist, & American
journalist and a foreign correspondent for The New York Times) BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2016.
Retrieved Apr. 23, 2016 from https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/02/26/doubts-asia-over-
whether-new-sanctions-against-north-korea-can-work/ptfdGOiberUkznz4FI1IxI/story.html

North Korea has been hit with a series of ever-tightening sanctions because of its nuclear tests and rocket
launches since 2006. But the impact on one of the worlds least trade-dependent economies has been
limited, especially when China has opposed crippling penalties. The regime has learned to shift the pain
of international sanctions to its people by squeezing the resources available for the poor, while the elite
has remained intact, defectors from the country have said.
Japanese Proliferation Advantage Answers
 Japan Prolif Answers
TURN: Only THAAD reassures East Asian allies---the plan causes domino nuclear
acquisition by Korea and Japan
Pinkston, 7-14 Daniel Pinkston, North East Asia Deputy Project Director with the International Crisis
Group, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, PhD
in International Affairs from UCSD, 7-14-2016, Why it makes sense to deploy THAAD in South Korea,
https://www.nknews.org/2016/07/why-it-makes-sense-to-deploy-thaad-in-south-korea/

This type of rhetoric is extremely irresponsible and counterproductive. First, it reveals Beijings likely
intentions in the case of an inter-Korean crisis, and second, it strongly encourages South Koreans who
insist that Seoul must acquire its own nuclear deterrent. Many critics fail to appreciate the role THAAD
plays in reassuring Seoul in the shadow of Pyongyangs growing nuclear capabilities. There is strong
support in South Korea for nuclear breakout, it almost certainly would occur if not for the U.S.-ROK
alliance. If South Korea were to seek a nuclear deterrent, it seems implausible that Japan would not
follow. This scenario is not in the interest of China, Russia, the U.S., or any nation with the exception
of North Korea.

South Korea and Japan wont go nuclear.

Se Young Jang, 5/4/2016 (associate of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy Schools
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Will America's Asian Allies Go Nuclear?
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-americas-asian-allies-go-nuclear-16055, Accessed 7/17/2016,
rwg)

With the already existing international and bilateral pressure, another key driver discouraging the ROK
and Japanese governments from going nuclear will be domestic pressure in the form of either
elections or organized public movements. Koreas recent legislative elections have interesting
implications in this regard. One of the reasons that had led some lawmakers from the ruling
conservative party to express their pro-nuclear opinion in public early this year was their confidence
in victory in the April 2016 election. As President Park Geun-hye and her ruling party had high approval ratings and were
expected to overwhelmingly win the legislative election, they were less prudent than usual on such a controversial issue as nuclear armament.
The election, however, turned out to be a humiliating defeat for the ruling Saenuri Party; not only did the party
lose the parliamentary majority that they had held for sixteen years, but they secured even fewer seats than the main opposition Minjoo Party.
This poor result is likely to restrain the attempts of some right-wing politicians to use the North
Korean threat for their pronuclear arguments. Furthermore, opposition parties supportive of denuclearizing the Korean
Peninsula are expected to have a stronger voice in security issues when a new parliamentary term starts at the end of May. In Japan, the
likelihood of opposition parties being able to pressure Prime Minister Shinzo Abes administration on nuclear policy is more limited because the
dominance of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the Diet is not expected to change in the near future. Yet Japanese
civil society has
nurtured a solid antinuclear culture through its own experiences: the U.S. atomic bombings in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, and the Fukushima disaster in 2011. The antinuclear movements in Japan started in the
1950s, and since then have mostly focused on opposing nuclear arms. For instance, Hidankyo (the Japan Confederation of A- and H- Bomb
Sufferers Organizations) was nominated three times for the Nobel Peace Prize for its invaluable work to prevent a nuclear war and to eliminate
nuclear weapons, and Mayors for Peace, initiated by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1982, has also been actively working to raise
international awareness about the necessity for the total abolition of nuclear weapons. However, it was not until when the Fukushima disaster
happened that antinuclear sentiments, particularly against nuclear power, became popular among ordinary Japanese citizens. In June 2012,
Japan witnessed the largest turnout of demonstrators in Tokyo since the 1960stwo hundred thousand people, according to the maximum
estimatesin response to the governments decision to restart Units 3 and 4 at the Oi nuclear power plant. Even though antinuclear power
protests seem to have lost their momentum after the pronuclear LDP returned to power at the end of 2012, Japans
once highly
motivated antinuclear power movements have the potential to grow into a civil movement against
Japans development of nuclear weapons, should the time come.

Japan wont go nuclear:

Se Young Jang, 5/4/2016 (associate of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy Schools
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Will America's Asian Allies Go Nuclear?
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-americas-asian-allies-go-nuclear-16055, Accessed 7/17/2016,
rwg)
Some policy experts argue that South Korea and Japan would not attempt to join the nuclear club regardless of their level of nuclear capability.
The decision to go nuclear would certainly bring a major risk of political and economic isolation. Moreover, as previous U.S. administrations
have done, Washington would not simply let them develop their own nuclear weapons. Currently, there is no reason to believe that the United
States would risk losing its influence in the region and stand by growing military tension and domino effects caused by nuclear newcomers.
Needless to say, South
Korea and Japan, both state parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), would not
want to join North Korea as the only country having ever withdrawn from the treaty which they have
been upholding for almost half a century. Finally, Japans own experience with atomic bombs in the
Second World War is another aspect to be considered; antinuclear sentiments are deeply rooted in the identity
of many Japanese, and the Japanese government might not willingly abandon its position as the only
victim of a nuclear attack by pursuing nuclear armament.

No Japanese prolifthe Japanese public hates nuclear weapons:

Lewis 14director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies (Jeffrey, "If Japan Wanted to Build a Nuclear Bomb It'd Be Awesome at It."
Foreign Policy. 6/26/14. foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/26/if-japan-wanted-to-build-a-nuclear-bomb-itd-
be-awesome-at-it/)
I am a critic of Japans policy of separating and reusing the plutonium inevitably created in the countrys nuclear power plants. Japans stockpile of plutonium sets a terrible example for other

states like, say, Iran. Still, we should not lose sight of the fact that Japan is not going to build nuclear weapons.
Much of the concern expressed by Japans neighbors is simply a convenient opportunity to give Prime Minister Abe a kick in the shins. And, frankly, he probably deserves more than a few kicks
in areas north of the shins for stunts like visiting the Yasukuni shrine and throwing shade at the women raped by the Imperial Japanese Army. Yet the notion of Japanese nuclear weapons
keeps turning up. The idea has gotten some attention in light of the general combativeness of the most recent International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-La Dialogue (I am
trademarking "The Brou-ha-ha in Shang-ri-la"), where Chinese participants acted boorishly, as well as an interesting debate between my friends David Santoro and Elbridge Colby about
whether the United States should ditch Asian allies that leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in search of the bomb. These are important discussions, but they give the wrong
impression. Focusing on the unlikely possibility of a nuclear-armed Japan distracts from more important policy challenges that threaten the shared interests of the United States and Japan in
arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. Dont get me wrong, there will always be a certain constituency within Japan for extremist views. Shintaro Ishihara, the former governor of
Tokyo, has made a career out of saying impolitic things, including his infamous book, The Japan That Can Say No say "no" to the United States, that is. Ishihara says "yes" to nuclear weapons
and a bunch of other terrible ideas, from purchasing the islands at the center of the maritime dispute with China to suggesting that sexual enslavement was "a very good way of making a
living" for a young woman in wartime. There have always been extremists in Japan who arent one bit sorry about the war. Take Ishiharas buddy, the late Yukio Mishima. Three times
nominated for the Nobel Prize in literature, Mishima was also an actor who later in life got into extremist right-wing causes, body-building, and so on. In 1970, he and some of his young
acolytes in a student militia called the Tatenokai entered the military base in Ichigaya and exhorted the soldiers to launch a coup to restore the emperor. The soldiers looked on, sort of baffled
some accounts say they even heckled him and then Mishima retired to an office to commit seppuku, or ritual suicide. The plan was that Mishima would stab himself in the stomach and
then one of the students, alleged to be his lover, would behead the well-known author. The lop job didnt go exactly as anticipated: The poor fool botched it a couple of times, leaving another
student to finish off Misihima. Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who knew Mishima socially, said, "I can only think he went out of his mind." So, yes, there are weirdos in Japan. (And

A far larger and more

elsewhere: Someone pinned Mishimas severed head on Pinterest.) As an American, I can tell you that its not fair to judge a country by its nut-jobs.

important constituency in Japan are the people who categorize the devastation of World War II as a
catastrophe, the post-war reconstruction as a miracle, and the existence of nuclear weapons as
abhorrent. This is the Japan of Yellow Magic Orchestra and Hello Kitty. (Oops.) Its easy to talk about Japan building nuclear weapons,
but the real policy debates reflect Japans nuclear allergy, not enthusiasm. In late 1969, a few months before Mishima killed
himself, the United States agreed to return Okinawa to Japanese control. The sticking point between Tokyo and Washington was whether U.S. bases would continue to host American nuclear
weapons or not. Ultimately, the United States relented to Japans demand for an Okinawa without nuclear weapons, although Prime Minister Sato agreed to consult with the United States in
the event of a crisis. (Sato is Abes maternal great-uncle, by the way.) Even that agreement, however, had to be signed in secret. After signing the official memorandum to return Okinawa to
Japan, then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and his Japanese counterpart actually contrived for U.S. President Richard Nixon to invite Sato into the presidents study to look at some
objets dart so they could sign the secret agreement without anyone present. This is hardly ancient history. In 2010, when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) finally took sole control of the
government for the first time in post-war Japan, it ordered an inquiry into secret agreements like the one Sato signed. (The Japanese copy was found by Satos son, who would be Abes first
cousin once-removed, if you are keeping score.) The DPJ calculated, correctly, that secret agreements to allow U.S. nuclear weapons to enter Japan would outrage a good portion of the public.

The result was an ugly spat between the Obama administration and the DPJ government. The Japanese public, by and large, thinks what
happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a terrible thing. I am a member (thats my head!) of the Governor of Hiroshimas roundtable on
disarmament. Let me tell you, nuclear weapons are not a vote winner in Japan. Nor, I hasten to add, is Japan "six months

away" from a bomb, even if you hear that all the time. Recently some senior U.S. officials repeated the "six month" claim to NBC reporter Robert Windrem. There is
no technical basis for such a statement. I once actually tried to trace the heritage of that irksome claim. As far as I could tell, it dates to a conversation with a
"Japanese strategic thinker" in 1976 that is cited in Richard Hallorans 1991 book, Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited: Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent? The claim is made

in passing, not as a formal assessment of Japans technological capability or plans. "Six months" in context is like the
biblical "40" that is to say, it means "fairly soon" just like "40 days and 40 nights" means it rained a long, long time. Other than one bit of yellow journalism in the Sunday Times, no

one has attempted to document a technical basis for the "six-month" claim. There have been several
Japanese and American assessments, from academic studies to declassified intelligence reports, on
the possibility that Japan might build nuclear weapons. All of them conclude that a nuclear deterrent
would cost Japan a few billion dollars and would take several years to build. Thats because the Japanese would not jury-
rig a tiny arsenal out of civil plutonium. They could do it, sure, but why? Why completely alter the structure of Japanese security policy

for a handful of makeshift bombs that might not work? If Japan goes nuclear, it will do so only as part of a fundamental change in how the
Japanese look at their security environment. In that case, Japan would build nuclear weapons like they do everything else, down to the beer machine at Narita with meticulous care. Japan
would construct dedicated plutonium production reactors and facilities to separate weapons-grade plutonium, probably conduct nuclear tests, and deploy modern delivery systems, such as
missiles. This is, I would argue, the most important point to understanding U.S.-Japan relations, and extended deterrence. We often talk about nuclear weapons in Japan like a thermostat
if U.S. credibility declines in Tokyo, Japan will build a nuclear arsenal to compensate. Its almost as if we cut 10 bombs, the Japanese will want 10 of their own to make up the difference. Thats
not right at all. For Japan, becoming a nuclear weapons power would require a dramatic break in a foreign and security policy that has historically centered on the U.S. alliance. So would
unarmed neutrality. It is Japans lack of such strategic options that account for the most interesting Japanese behaviors in foreign and security policy. As one Japanese observer pointed out to
me, neither alternative nuclear-armed independence nor unarmed neutrality has a mainstream constituency in Japan. That means the only practical approach for Japanese policymakers
is an alliance with the United States. Tokyo has little choice but to accept whatever level of security Washington can provide at the moment. Another colleague compared it to riding on the
back of a motorcycle you can see the bumps and twists in the road, but you cant do anything about it. Thats scary. The result, of course, is a lot of whining from Japan about the credibility
of the U.S. guarantee. What else can they do? And it accounts for the tendency of the countrys politicos to fixate on symbols of Washingtons commitment, just as Max Weber observed that
Protestants tended to obsess about material success as a sign of predestination.

(--) Japan wont build a nuclear weaponhistorical evidence proves:

Berger 15, Senior Research Fellow specializing in nuclear policy at the Royal United Services Institute,
9-20-15 (Andrea, Pacifism bill: Why Japan won't build a nuclear weapon quickly,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/20/opinions/japan-military-opinion-berger/, accessed 10-4-15, CMM)
There's a war of words going on in Asia right now. Japan's upper house of parliament approved a controversial security bill that would allow it
to engage in defensive military action overseas in the event that the national security of its allies is severely threatened. For
the first time
since the end of World War II, Japanese troops can deploy in overseas operations in a combat role in
support of its allies; in other words, for collective self-defense. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's attempts to
explain the change to domestic and international audiences have not gone smoothly. He has faced
opposition at home, with fist fights breaking out between lawmakers debating the bill. In the wider region,
China, which Japan perceives to be one of its greatest security threats, has raised the specter of a less-restrained Japan with possible nuclear
weapons ambitions. China itself has nuclear weapons, making its first test 1964. Chinese
officials and experts have periodically
tied Japan's reinterpretation of its military posture to the country's domestic nuclear capability in order
to raise concerns that Japan could in future become more aggressive. While it is reasonable to debate the new
security bill, such insinuations are unwarranted. Here's why Japan is unlikely to ever build a nuclear bomb.
Since the 1960s, Tokyo has developed one of the most advanced civilian nuclear energy programs that exists amongst the international
community. That program generates approximately one third of the country's electricity at present, but could in theory also be used to produce
material for use in a nuclear weapon. Some assess that the scale and sophistication of Japan's nuclear
infrastructure would enable it to build a nuclear weapon in a matter of months, should the unlikely
political decision be taken to do so. Strategic rival China has sought to draw attention to this fact, issuing loud warnings over
Japan's stocks of nuclear material, for example. But it should be noted that under the terms of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty -- which Japan ratified in 1976 -- states are entitled to peaceful nuclear technology for energy purposes if
they forswear nuclear weapons. To ensure that the country's nuclear sites remain exclusively for peaceful use, they are
subjected to intensive scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. The Agency
consistently verifies the accuracy and completeness of Japan's declarations regarding its nuclear
facilities, material, and activities and conducts monitoring and inspections at relevant facilities. Its role in
Japan will continue to be particularly important in order to dispel any fears that the country may harbor
nuclear weapons intentions. China and the International Atomic Energy Agency are not the only ones following Japan's nuclear
activity closely. Two other audiences are noteworthy. The first is Japan's public, who have become
increasingly wary of the risks and dangers associated with nuclear technology -- whether for civilian or military
applications -- following the disaster at Fukushima in 2011. The second is the country's closest ally, the United
States, who is similarly attentive to the state of Japan's nuclear program. In fact, it is because of Japan's alliance with
the United States that the former has even less of an incentive to build a nuclear weapon. In order to guarantee the security of Japan against
major threats in its region, whether a militarily assertive China or a belligerent and nuclear-armed North Korea, Washington has vowed to
respond to any serious armed aggression against Japan using whatever means necessary, including nuclear weapons. By demonstrating the
depth of its resolve to defend Japan, the U.S. hopes to deter any potential aggressors from attacking in the first place. U.S. troops stationed in
Okinawa are a visible reminder of the alliance and the commitment that underpins it. As long as Japan believes in the strength of the U.S.'s so-
called "extended deterrence" guarantee it is unlikely to see any merit in having its own nuclear weapons capability. For this reason, both
countries work tirelessly to ensure the credibility and durability of their defence partnership -- an immeasurably important aim. Despite what
many may think, the Abe administration sees the new security bill as part of this broader effort to contribute to a two-way military relationship
-- not as a legal green light for offensive action. The bill creates the framework for Japan to give as much to the relationship as it receives, by
enabling it to come to the aid of the United States if necessary. More
than anything else, history is likely to undermine
any temptation Japan might have to build a bomb. Japan was the first and only country to ever be
attacked with nuclear weapons. Over 100,000 Japanese citizens were killed in the August 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. Seventy years on, Japan's nuclear history will not be forgotten any time soon. Indeed, it is because
of that history that Japan has become one of the most active signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Tokyo has invested significant resources into preventing the illegal spread of nuclear weapons-relevant
materials and technology, promoting the conditions needed for nuclear disarmament, and reminding the world
of the grotesque effects of the use of an atomic bomb. The non-proliferation norm is one that Japan will have little
incentive to abandon in the short, medium, or likely even in the long-term.

(--) Technical and political hurdles block Japanese proliferation:

Holmes, 2012 former US Navy surface warfare officer, 12 (James, Japan: Joining the Nuclear
Weapons Club? It Could., http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/japan-joining-the-nuclear-weapons-club-it-
could/)

Despite Japan's renown for high-tech wizardry and long experience operating nuclear power plants, it
would take Tokyo far longer than a year to deploy a working nuclear arsenal. We're talking many years.
As J. C. Wylie defines it, strategy is a plan for using available resources and assets to accomplish some goal. Strategy goes no farther than those implements can
carry it and strategists cannot simply conjure them into being. Toshi and I see a variety of impediments to a Japanese breakout. Let's catalogue just a few.
Consider the politics. It is certainly true that nuclear weapons are no longer the third rail of Japanese
politics a topic officials and pundits dare not touch lest it strike them (politically) dead. But Japan's
painful past experience as a target of atomic warfare, its ardent sponsorship of nonproliferation
accords, and the fury with which pacifist-leaning citizens and Japan's Asian neighbors would greet
evidence of a bombmaking program add up to a forbidding political barrier. That barrier is hardly unbreachable, but it
would demand quite a feat of political persuasion on Tokyo's part. As the learned strategist Mike Tyson points out, "everyone has a strategy 'til they get punched in
the mouth." Memo to nuclear-weapons advocates: duck! Nor are the strategic, operational, and technical challenges less daunting. A nuclear triad land- and sea-
based missiles combined with weapons delivered by manned bombers holds little promise in light of Japan's lack of geographic depth and the vulnerability of
surface ships and aircraft to enemy action. That means fielding an undersea deterrent would be Tokyo's best nuclear option. But doing so would be far from easy.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force operates an impressive fleet of diesel submarines but has no experience with naval nuclear propulsion. And that leaves aside
the difficulty of developing sea-launched ballistic missiles and their nuclear payloads. Such engineering challenges are far from insoluble for Japan's scientific-
technical complex but cannot be conquered overnight. A force of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile subs, or SSBNs, thus looks like a remote prospect for Japan. As an
interim solution, the JMSDF might construct cruise missiles resembling the U.S. Navy's old TLAM-Ns, or nuclear-tipped Tomahawks. JMSDF boats could fire such
missiles through torpedo tubes, the easiest method. Or, shipyards could backfit Japanese subs with vertical launchers much as the U.S. Navy installed Tomahawk
launchers in its fast attack boats starting in the late Cold War. The problem of constructing nuclear weapons small enough to fit on a missile would remain but
nuclear-armed diesel boats would represent a viable course of action should Japan decide to join the nuclear-weapons club. Years
down the road, then
not overnight a modest Japanese nuclear deterrent might put out to sea. Will Tokyo proceed down

that road? I doubt It. But the prospect no longer appears unthinkable.

(--) No imaginable scenario where Japan would develop nuclear weapons:

Gregory Kulacki, 2015 (China Project Manager in the UCS Global Security Program), Japan Calls for
United States to End Hair-Trigger Alert, April 2015.

The study was commissioned by Japanese elected leaders to inform their decision on whether to back
a permanent extension of the NPT in 1995. At the time, North Korea had embarked on a program to
develop nuclear weapons, and the Chinese Communist Party, which had recently crushed stu-dent-led
protests with lethal military force, was threatening Taiwan with missile launches. The study also
considered the possibility that China might use nuclear intimidation to reinforce its claims to the
Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, a focus of tensions be-tween Japan and China. The study found no
imaginable scenario where a decision to develop nuclear weapons would be in Ja-pans national
security interests. Even in a worst-case scenario po siting a break-up of the U.S.- Japan alli-ance, a
collapse of the nonproliferation regime, and an inclination of various countries to go nuclear, the
study concludes: Even in such a case, it is questionable whether there is any value for a trading nation
that de-pends on the stability of international society to try to secure its survival and protect its
interests with its own nuclear weapons. It would more likely undermine the basis of its own survival.

(--) Japan would face several obstacles in building nuclear weapons:

Katsuhisa Furukawa, 2012 (former Fellow of Research Institute of Science and Technology for
Society, of Japan Science and Technology Agency) Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats. 2012.
Retrieved Apr. 29, 2016 via ProQuest ebrary.

The 2006 study also suggested that any Japanese effort to construct a nuclear weapon would confront several
challenges. First, given that a fairly limited domestic reserve of natural uranium exists in Japan, it would
be vulnerable to an embargo of fissile materials that could jeopardize any nuclear weapons program.
Second, the Japanese scientific and academic communities tend to be populated by pacifists , despite the
countrys general shift toward becoming a normal country. A majority of the Japanese universities and academic
societies still embrace the principle of avoiding involvement in military-related research. Third, selecting the
location for nuclear weapon production facilities would surely be a painstaking process for any Japanese government. The political power of
local governments is expanding relative to the national government. Even the selection of a location for a radioactive waste storage site has
been stalled for several decades. Local activism has been energized following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accidents.
 South Korean Proliferation Answers
(--) The nuclear umbrella solves South Korean Proliferation & North Korean
proliferation doesnt encourage the South to build nukes:
Seongwhun 11 [Cheon Seongwhun Present Senior Fellow, Research, Korea Institute for National
Unification April 2011 Changing Dynamics of US Extended Nuclear Deterrence on the Korean
Peninsula http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1976-5118.2011.01055.x/pdf]

Despite North Koreas determined efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, South

Korea has firmly adhered to its non-nuclear
weapon policy since it was first announced in 1990. Geostrategic circumstances on the Korean peninsula, however,
tend to provide a strong rationale for the international community to be suspicious of sincerity of South
Koreas non-nuclear-weapon policy. North Koreas nuclear weapons program has only added to the suspicions. Contrary to
this traditional wisdom, the North Korean nuclear crisis has actually increased the authenticity of South
Koreas non-nuclear-weapon policy. Despite the DPRKs two nuclear tests in 3 years, the South Korean government
has shown no hint of changing the current policy. Emotional public voices for the ROK to respond in
kind by going nuclear on its own have been calmed by sensible and mature opinions to follow international
non-proliferation norms in a responsible manner. The Obama administrations reducing role of nuclear
weapons will not agitate the resolve to maintain South Koreas current policy either. South Koreas
commitment to non-nuclear weapon policy is on a par with its commitment to alliance with the USA in two ways. On one
hand, US extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella, has filled the security vacuum created by the Souths non-nuclear weapon
policy. The history of the bilateral alliance proves that the
US nuclear umbrella has been efficient and effective in
deterring North Korea. On the other hand, as a credible and responsible ally, South Korea is not careless enough to
behave in a way that its ally objects to. Therefore, suspicion of South Koreas non-nuclear-weapon policy
is outdated and futile and should not cast a shadow over the future partnership of the ROKUS alliance, including nuclear energy
cooperation.67 In short, South Korea can provide the USA with alliance security assurance and support the US non-proliferation commitments.
The alliance security assurance is a US allys promise that as an alliance partner under the US nuclear
umbrella, it will neither develop nor possess nuclear weapons as long as extended deterrence, including
extended nuclear deterrence, is provided.

(--) No technical capability for South Korean Proliferation:

Gupta 13, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, and Balachandran, Consulting Fellow at the IDSA, 2013 G.
Balachandran, PhD in Economics and Computer Science from the University of Wisconsin, and Rukmani, doctoral candidate at the Centre for
East Asian Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Examining the Prospects of South Korea Going Nuclear 5/1/2013
http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/ProspectsofSouthKoreaGoingNuclear_gbalachandran_01052013.html

Currently, South Korea is poorly placed to consider any serious proposal for going nuclear for a variety of reasons enumerated
below. 1. South Korea does not have any of the facilities required for five of eight exercises needed to undertake a
programme for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It does not have (i) mining, milling, and refining of uranium; (ii)

isotope separation of uranium, lithium, boron and heavy water; (iii) chemical separations of plutonium, uranium, and tritium from
irradiated fuel and target elements;(iv) weapon operations, including assembly, maintenance, modification, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons;

and (v) research, development, and testing. It does have some (i) fuel fabrication facilities for reactors; (ii) Reactor operations to irradiate
fuel and targets to produce nuclear materials; and (iii) component fabrication of non-nuclear components. Of these, all such facilities under the first two categories
are under IAEA safeguards. In addition some of the reactors in S. Korea of are of indigenous design and manufacture. 2.
South Korea has
international obligations under various bilateral and multilateral agreements that restrict its ability to acquire a nuclear
weapon. It has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with IAEA (INFCIRC/236) in force since November 1975 and also has in force the
Additional Protocol since 19 February 2004 (INFCIRC/256/Add.1). Since 2007 the IAEA on the basis of its safeguards implementation procedures has
declared that the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared
nuclear material or activities in South Korea. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that all nuclear material in South Korea
remained in peaceful activities although on a number of occasions, starting in 1982 and continuing until 2000, the ROK conducted experiments
and activities involving uranium conversion, uranium enrichment and plutonium separation, which it failed to report to the Agency in accordance with its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement. The IAEA conducted special inspections in South Korea subsequent to its declaration in October 2004 about these unreported
activities. The ROK provided active cooperation to the Agency in providing timely information, and access to personnel and locations, and also permitted the
collection of environmental and other samples for Agency analysis and assessment. Based on the information provided by the ROK and the verification activities
carried out by the Agency to date, the IAEA secretariat concluded in late 2004 that there is no indication that the undeclared experiments had continued, and since
2007 has been giving the ROK a clean chit. Therefore, South
Korea asset position to embark on a nuclear weapon program is very weak now. It Has not
mined any natural uranium within its territory; hence has no stock of indigenous natural uranium; Has no
enrichment facility; No reprocessing plant; and All fissile material stock in South Korea is under IAEA
safeguards as a consequence of (1) lack of any domestic uranium; (2) its NPT commitments and bilateral agreements with foreign suppliers of fissile material.

(--) Trade, energy, treaties, and economics prevent South Korean prolif
Hayes and Moon 14 (Executive Director, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, PhD in IR from Yale, Professor of History
at Northwestern; professor of political science at Yonsei University and Ambassador for International Security Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, the Republic of Korea. He served as Dean of Yonsei's Graduate School of International Studies and as Chairman of the
Presidential Committee on the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, a cabinet-level post. Peter and Chung-in, "Should South Korea Go
Nuclear?", 7/28/14, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/should-south-korea-go-nuclear/~~#axzz3AKArVDLT, Nautilus Institute)
The ROK would face very high costs were it to move in this direction because it is deeply embedded in multilateral
and bilateral treaty commitments and nuclear energy supply trading networks. South Korea is a member of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ( NPT ), and therefore cannot receive , manufacture or get any assistance to produce
nuclear explosive devices or weapons under Article 2. It is also obliged to comply with the safeguard regulations of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Seoul would have to emulate Pyongyang and leave the NPT and the IAEA . But unlike North Korea which
had almost no external nuclear ties or market relations to lose, South Korea is highly involved in global markets with Koreans
serving as UN Secretary General and World Bank president. Pulling out of the NPT and the IAEA might lead to UN action ,
possibly UN Security Council sanctions as were imposed on the DPRK, as well as national sanctions. It would certainly end
South Koreas reactor exports and likely also supply of uranium, enrichment services, and other
materials and dual use technology needed for South Koreas nuclear fuel cycle from the Nuclear Supply Group
such as the United States, Australia, Russia, and France. Within a few years, South Korea would face an even large r power
shortfall than Japan had to deal with after shutting down all its nuclear plants in 2011. Also, Washington would likely reject not only Seouls
request to reprocess or pyro-process spent nuclear fuel, but also its desire to enrich uranium, even for research. IAEA alarm bells will
sound loudly the moment such proliferation activity commences , not least due to the Agencys experience with
South Koreas enrichment research and development.
 Proliferation Doesnt Cause War
Prolif doesnt cause war
WALTZ 2007 (Kenneth, Professor UC Berkeley, A Nuclear Iran, Journal of International Affairs, 3-22,
Lexis)

First, nuclear proliferation is not a problem because nuclear weapons have not proliferated. "Proliferation" means to spread like
wildfire. We have had nuclear military capability for over fifty years, and we have a total of nine militarily capable nuclear states. That's hardly
proliferation; that is, indeed, glacial spread. If another country gets nuclear weapons, and if it does so for good reasons, then that isn't an object
of great worry. Every once in a while, some prominent person says something that'sobviously true. Recently, Jacques Chirac [president of
France] said that if Iran had one or two nuclear weapons, it would not pose a danger. Well, he was right. Of course, he had to quickly retract it
and say, "Oh no, that slipped out, I didn't know the microphone was on!" Second, it doesn't matter who has nuclear weapons.
Conversely, the spread of conventional weapons makes a great deal of difference. Forinstance, if a Hitler-type begins to establish conventional
superiority, it becomes very difficult to contain and deter him. But, with nuclear weapons, it's been proven without
exception that whoever gets nuclear weapons behaves with caution and moderation . Every country--
whether they are countries we trust and think of as being highly responsible, like Britain, or countries that we distrust greatly, and for very good
reasons, like China during the Cultural Revolution behaves
with such caution. It is now fashionable for political scientists to test
hypotheses.Well, I have one: If a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily in ways that threaten its
manifestly vital interests. That is 100 percent true, without exception, over a period of more than fifty years .
Pretty impressive.

Nukes wont spread impact is exaggerated.

Carpenter 2007, VP of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ Cato
[Ted Galen Carpenter (Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute) Toward a
Grand Bargain with Iran Mediterranean Quarterly 18:1, 2007, p. 12-27]

Finally, thosewho favor a more confrontational policy toward Iran warn that if Tehran succeeds in its quest for
nuclear weapons, other nations in the region will quickly do the same, creating an especially dangerous
security environment. As in the case of concerns about possible blackmail, this fear has some validity. Because of the uncertain reliability
of the protection afforded by the US umbrella for some US allies and client states in the Middle East, there is a very real prospect that if Iran
develops a nuclear arsenal, sooner or later such countries as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey might follow suit. Indeed, Egypt may already be
thinking along those lines. In late September, Gamal Mubarak, President Hosni Mubarak's son and political heir apparent, stated that his country
needed to develop a nuclear program for power generation.19 Although he stressed that the program would be entirely peaceful, his proposal
had all the earmarks of a hedging strategy. As we have seen with India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran, "peaceful" nuclear programs can easily
Whether additional proliferation would reach epidemic
become the foundation for a nuclear weapons program.
proportions and create the nightmare scenarios forecast by some analysts is uncertain. It is important to recall
that pundits and even international relations experts have tended to overestimate both the probability
and the extent of proliferation in the past. The conventional wisdom in the 1960s was that there would
be as many as two dozen nuclear weapons powers within a generation.20 Similar predictions took place in the late
1970s and early 1980s.21 [End Page 22]
 NPT Impact Defense
The NPT is resilientno cascade of proliferation even if it becomes less credible:
Liviu Horovitz, 2014 (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich), JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES,
Beyond Pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse,
2014. Retrieved Apr. 29, 2016 from https://www.academia.edu/7795260/Beyond
_Pessimism_Why_the_NPT_Will_Not_Collapse_Journal_of_Strategic_Studies_2015_38_1-2_126-158

Thus, there is very little evidence that any additional proliferation would somehow cause the NPTs
members to become disillusioned with the agreement, consider the treatys reputation destroyed, its
normative binding flawed, believe nuclear acquisition to be the appropriate behaviour, and start
forswearing their membership. The domestic influence of NPT noncompliance also seems overrated.
Interested bureaucracies might be able to use a neighbours or foes noncompliance or withdrawal to
aid their case. However, the governance model proposed by recent would-be proliferators does not
seem very appealing to either policy-makers or publics. Thus, it is no surprise that emulation of Iraq,
Libya, or North Korea is very limited. To the contrary, the detection of further proliferation seems to
help generate the consensus to strengthen the NPT regimes constraints: for example, it was the
discovery of Iraqs clandestine programme that spawned the design of enhanced safeguards
instruments.70

(--) NPT collapse wont cause widespread proliferation:

Akira Kimura, 2005 (Professor Kagoshima University) What Can We Do to Resolve the Crisis in the
NPT Regime? Retrieved Apr. 29, 2016 from http://serv.peace.hiroshima-
cu.ac.jp/English/anew/KimuraE.pdf
The NPT regime was not established with the sole aim of obligating the member nations to simply ensure nuclear nonproliferation, that is the
prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear nations. Rather, it must be emphasized that the regime clearly stipulates the
duty of nuclear powers to act on nuclear disarmament, and includes the logical necessity or latent possibility of achieving the elimination of
nuclear weapons as well as a vision of a nuclear free world. Although the prohibition and prevention of nuclear proliferation and the duty to
implement nuclear disarmament are two sides of the same coin, there is no room for doubt that it is the latter that is the decisive factor for the
survival of the NPT regime. The reason for this is the fact that non-nuclear nations have only accepted this unfair treaty based on the
assumption that the nuclear nations would faithfully fulfill their duty of nuclear disarmament, and if that duty is not fulfilled there will be
almost no meaning in continuing with the NPT regime. Yet, the collapse of the NPT regime would not necessarily bring
about the chaos and confusion of immediate and uncontrolled nuclear proliferation, nor would this necessarily represent the
worst case scenario. This is because non-nuclear nations that withdraw from the NPT regime would have
the option of establishing a new nuclear weapon prohibition treaty on their own to put pressure on
nuclear nations to prohibit the preemptive use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations and
fulfill their duty to eliminate nuclear weapons in a more effective manner. The important point here is that it is anticipated that the
majority of non-nuclear nations that withdraw from the NPT regime would not choose to take the
path of nuclear armament themselves, but rather on the contrary, they would implement initiatives
and efforts to pursue not only promotion of nuclear non-proliferation but also the elimination of
nuclear weapons ever more proactively. This is evident when one looks at the past activities and assertions of the member
nations of the New Agenda Coalition or NPT nonmember nations.
US-China Relations Advantage Answers
 Cooperation on North Korea Wont Bolster US-China Relations
(--) TURN: SANCTIONS APPROACH FROM THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS NORTH
KOREA CREATES MUTUAL SUSPICION BETWEEN THE US & CHINA.
Yang Xiyu, 2015 (Senior Fellow, China Institute of International Studies), North Korean Nuclear Issue in
China-U.S. Relations, Jul. 10, 2015. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-
07/10/content_8062011.htm

Second, China has always called for increasing mutual trust, narrowing disagreement with the United
States through dialogue, and gradually creating conditions for a nuclear-free peninsula through political,
security, economic and diplomatic approaches; in comparison, the United States is over-dependent on
imposing pressure and sanctions on North Korea, seeking to force it to give up its nuclear program
unconditionally. Since the nuclear issue broke out again in October 2002, both the Republican Bush
administration and the Democratic Obama administration have refused official talks with North Korea.
Each time when the United States senses that it lacks measures to impose pressure on North Korea, it
asks China to join the sanction club by taking advantage of Chinas resources. Their different
intentions and thinking, characterized by Chinas call for dialogue and the United States preference
for imposing pressure, have led to growing mutual suspicion between the two countries.

(--) THE US & CHINA ARE UNWILLING TO COOPERATE ON NORTH KOREA.

Donald Gross, 2013 (Analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies). THE CHINA FALLACY:
HOW THE U.S. CAN BENEFIT FROM CHINA'S RISE AND AVOID ANOTHER COLD WAR, 2013, 221.

Despite the positive thrust of the CSIS report, it failed to point out that the strategic competition
between the United States and China makes it highly unlikely that China would agree to cooperate
with the U.S. regarding future North Korean instability. Beijing fears that American and South Korean
forces entering North Korea would seek to implement the effective U.S. strategy of militarily containing
China. Although the CSIS report recommends that, "U.S. policymakers should make greater efforts to
assuage Chinese concerns about U.S. strategic encirclement" as a way of furthering cooperation on
North Korea, the stark reality is that containment and encirclement remain core objectives of current
United States policy. Under these circumstances, it is unrealistic to suggest the U.S. could engage in a
process of providing "mutual reassurance" on a subject as sensitive as military planning for regime
breakdown in North Korea.

(--) DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO KOREA PREVENT US-CHINESE COOPERATION ON

KOREA ISSUE.
Yang Xiyu, 2015 (Senior Fellow, China Institute of International Studies), North Korean Nuclear Issue in
China-U.S. Relations, Jul. 10, 2015. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-
07/10/content_8062011.htm

First, China has maintained consistency and stability on the issue throughout the past decade while
the United States has adopted different policies since the Clinton administration. These changes in
policy have not only hindered a smooth settlement of the issue, but also cooperation on it.
 US-China Relations are Resilient
(--) US-China relations resilient:
Daniel R. Russel, 6/25/2014 (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, The Future
of U.S.-China Relations, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/06/228415.htm, Accessed
10/16/2015, rwg)

Mr. Chairman, there are those who argue that cold war-like rivalry is inevitable and that the United States
and China are condemned to a zero-sum struggle for supremacy, if not conflict. I reject such
mechanistic thinking. As anyone who has served in government can tell you, this deterministic analysis overlooks the
role of leaders who have the ability to set policy and to shape relationships. It gives short shrift to the
fact that our two economies are becoming increasingly intertwined, which increases each sides stake in the success
of the other. It undervalues the fact that leaders in Washington and Beijing are fully cognizant of the risk
of unintended strategic rivalry between an emerging power and an established power and have agreed to take deliberate actions
to prevent such an outcome. And it ignores the reality of the past 35 years that, in spite of our differences,
U.S.-China relations have steadily grown deeper and stronger and in doing so, we have built a very
resilient relationship.

(--) Dialogue sustains US-China relations:

Daniel R. Russel, 6/25/2014 (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, The Future
of U.S.-China Relations, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/06/228415.htm, Accessed
10/16/2015, rwg)

In just two weeks, our countries will hold the sixth round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue the S&ED in Beijing. This annual dialogue is unique in its level and scope. It is led on the
U.S. side by Secretaries Kerry and Lew and brings a number of Cabinet-level and other senior U.S.
government officials together with their Chinese counterparts to work on the major issues facing us. The
breadth of the agenda in the two tracks strategic and economic reflects the breadth of modern
U.S.-China relations. The S&ED is an important vehicle for making progress in the pursuit of a
cooperative and constructive relationship; for building a new model that disproves the thesis that
the United States and China are somehow destined for strategic rivalry and confrontation.

(--) Strategic dialogue with China sustains relations:

Daniel R. Russel, 6/25/2014 (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, The Future
of U.S.-China Relations, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/06/228415.htm, Accessed
10/16/2015, rwg)

The S&ED is an important forum for the United States and China to take stock of and set goals for the
bilateral relationship, to review regional and international developments and explain our respective
policies, to coordinate and seek practical areas of cooperation on important issues of mutual interest,
and to constructively manage areas of difference through candid, high-level discussions.

(--) Strong military to military dialogue sustaining US-China relations:

Daniel R. Russel, 6/25/2014 (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, The Future
of U.S.-China Relations, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/06/228415.htm, Accessed
10/16/2015, rwg)
On the military side of the U.S.-China relationship, we are committed to building a sustained and
substantive military-to-military relationship that focuses on identifying concrete, practical areas of
cooperation and reducing risk. This includes not only deepening the use of institutionalized dialogue
mechanisms, including senior defense participation at the SSD and S&ED, but also inviting the Chinese to join regional
cooperative exercises and expanding talks with the Chinese military about operational safety in the
region. For the first time this year, China will participate in RIMPAC June 26-August 1 in Hawaii.

(--) Multiple checks on declining relations with China:

Daniel R. Russel, 6/25/2014 (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, The Future
of U.S.-China Relations, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/06/228415.htm, Accessed
10/16/2015, rwg)

Clearly, a wide-ranging and complex relationship such as ours with China comes with challenges. Some
degree of friction is inevitable. But an essential tool for managing and resolving differences is open
and extensive communications between our two countries at senior and working levels of
government, military to military, through local governments and organizations, between our business
communities, and at the grassroots level. We are now reflecting on the considerable progress attained
in 35 years of bilateral relations. One key lesson is that to ensure that our relationship grows and
matures, we need to build up the links among our two peoples. People-to-people exchanges are
essential to enhancing mutual understanding and furthering U.S. strategic and economic goals. To that end, the United States
in 2013 received 1.8 million Chinese visitors who collectively spent $9.8 billion on goods and services
in our economy. Our State Department personnel work hard to facilitate growing Chinese demand for international travel by maintaining
average visa wait-times under five days over the past two years. Education also plays an important role fostering mutual
understanding. In 2013, we had 235,000 students from China studying in the United States, more than
from any other country, and the United States aspires to increase the number of American students studying in China and learning
Mandarin through the 100,000 Strong Initiative. In March, PRC First Lady Peng Liyuan welcomed First Lady Michelle Obama to China where
together they met with U.S. and Chinese students and faculty and promoted the value of study abroad and educational exchange. We are also
working with groups like the Sister Cities International and the U.S.-China Governors Forum. These programs help by encouraging and
supporting cities and states to deepen their cultural or commercial ties with Chinese counterparts. In the last year alone, we have supported
numerous visits of governors and state delegations and helped them to find opportunities to deepen their involvement and links to China. The
Department works closely with the United States Chamber of Commerce, AmCham China, the U.S.-China Business Council, and other business
groups to support key priorities for U.S. companies doing business in China and to promote - greater Chinese investment in the United States. In
partnership and consultation with those organizations, we have encouraged the Chinese government to eliminate investment restrictions,
strengthen IPR protection, increase regulatory transparency, and establish a level playing field for all companies in China.

(--) US-China relationship strong nowcommitted to expanded cooperation and

constructive management of differences:
Daniel R. Russel, 6/25/2014 (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, The Future
of U.S.-China Relations, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/06/228415.htm, Accessed
10/16/2015, rwg)
In conclusion, let me paraphrase what President Obama said earlier this year when he met with Chinese President Xi at the Nuclear Security
Summit in The Hague. The
U.S.-China relationship has made great strides over these past several decades,
and both sides are committed to building a new model of relations between our countries defined by
expanded cooperation and constructive management of differences.
South-Korean China Relations Answers
 China Wont Retaliate vs. South Korea
China wont take punitive measures against South Korea.
Yi Whan-woo, 7/13/2016 (staff writer, Seoul faces fraying ties with China,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/07/120_209303.html, Accessed 7/17/2016, rwg)

A researcher said China is unlikely to take retaliatory measures against South Korea even if it judges
that Seoul is taking sides with Washington. "Such possible punitive measures will hurt Beijing as much
as they will Seoul," the researcher said on condition of anonymity. Meanwhile, Park said Seoul should refrain from holding a trilateral
meeting with Washington and Tokyo at the ASEM summit and ARF. "Such a meeting may provoke North Korea, China and Russia amid concerns
over a new Cold War in the region and weaken international sanctions against Pyongyang," he said.

Sluggish Chinese economy will prevent retaliatory action against South Korea.
Kang Seung-woo, 2/15/2016 (staff writer, Korea-China relations turning sour, Accessed 7/17/2016,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/02/116_198058.html, rwg)

Park Won-gon said that China's current sluggish economy may prevent the government from taking
retaliatory action, as well. "The two nations have close economic ties, so economic retaliation may also
affect its own economy negatively," he said. Meanwhile, the two nations' vice foreign ministers will meet in Seoul today to
discuss pending issues between them, according to the South Korean foreign ministry. First Vice Foreign Minister Lim Sung-nam will sit down
with his Chinese counterpart Zhang Yesui in the 7th Korea-China Strategic Dialogue. Zhang
is the first senior Chinese official to
visit South Korea since the North conducted its fourth nuclear test. They are highly expected to discuss sensitive
issues such as the THAAD deployment and a rift over the level of punishment against the North.
 South Korean-Chinese Relations Resilient
(--) Need for strong economic ties will cause South Korea to maintain strong relations
with China:
Andrei Lankov, 9/2/2015 (professor of Korean Studies at Kookmin University, Seoul) If China had to
choose, it would be South Korea, Retrieved June 9, 2016 from
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/09/china-choose-south-korea-
150902073117753.html

The economy is what matters most in South Korea, and for the sake of the economy alone, Seoul
works hard to improve relations with China. The historical legacies and ideological commitments are
frequently invoked in East Asia when it is necessary to justify policies, but in practise, economic interests and
geostrategic calculations reign supreme. South Korea is a liberal democracy, but China is still its largest trade partner. In recent
years, South Korea's trade with China has exceeded its combined trade with Japan and the US, which are its
second and third largest trade partners. The economy is what matters most in South Korea - and for the sake of the economy alone, Seoul
works hard to improve relations with China. It also helps that unlike many of China's neighbours, South
Korea does not have a
tradition of wars and hostility with China and has no problem with its fast political ascent. Despite being a
US ally, South Korea does not want to be sucked into Sino-American clashes over territorial claims and
other issues, which mean little to the average South Korean.

(--) South Korean-Chinese relationship is based on economicsmakes it resilient to

political disputes:
Tiffany Ma, 5/20/2014, The Contrasting Trajectories of China's East Asia Policy, Retrieved June 9, 2016
from http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13795/the-contrasting-trajectories-of-chinas-east-
asia-policy

While economic entanglement has been central in Chinas approach toward both Japan and South Korea,
China uses economic and trade relations to reinforce bilateral ties in different ways. Toward South Korea, economic relations
reinforce the positive trajectory of political relations. Chinas approach of expanding cooperation with
South Korea has opened up opportunities for several important trade, finance and technology
agreements. Economic relations also seem to be relatively resilient to political disagreements over the
contested Ieodo reef islet known in China as Suyan Rock, controversy over the legacy of the ancient kingdom of Goguryeowhose territory
spanned parts of todays North Korea and Manchuria in northeast Chinaand responses to North Korean provocations. Since normalization of
relations between China and South Korea, annual bilateral trade has jumped from $6.37 billion in 1992 to $256 billion in 2012.
 South Korea Has Strong Middle Power Diplomacy Now
(--) South Korea is developing strong middle power diplomacy nowthe US-South
Korean alliancenot South Korean-Chinese relations is pivotal to this:
Scott Snyder, February 2015. Senior fellow for Korea studies and director of U.S.-Korea policy program at the Council on
Foreign Relations, February 2015, U.S. Rebalancing Strategy and South Koreas Middle Power Diplomacy,
http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_report/2015030618362920.pdf

In this way, South Korea is developing and testing the limits of its geographic, behavioral, and
normative capacity to be a middle power actor on the international stage, cognizant of the fact that
its capabilities are constrained by its position at the intersection of interests among great powers that
often bring differing perspectives to the table. Over the course of the past few years, South Korea
has sought to play this role on a variety of international issues, most notably as a convener of
international meetings and steward of the international agenda on global financial stability ,
international development policy, nuclear security and safety, and climate change and green
growth , among others.1 In many cases, South Korean effectiveness as a convener of international
forums has indirectly benefited from the context provided by its close relationship with the United
States as well as its status not only as an emerging middle power but also as an U.S. ally.2 Thus far,
South Koreas enhanced capabilities and the U.S.-ROK alliance have had positive, mutually-reinforcing
effects . In principle, South Korean middle power aspirations and a strengthened U.S.-ROK alliance are
not opposed to each other and have the potential to work together as complementary concepts that
generate and take advantage of shared American and Korean foreign policy interests. South Koreas growing scope of interests
and desire to contribute to the international community have benefited the U.S.-ROK alliance as South Korea has become a
partner in a broader range of functional spheres and the scope of alliance cooperation has broadened both functionally and
geographically. The emergence of a South Korea with capabilities and attributes of a middle power has enabled the
transformation of the U.S.-ROK alliance from a peninsula-focused patron-client security relationship to a comprehensive
political and security. The June 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement reflects this broadened scope, showing the impact of both
South Koreas desires to develop greater capabilities and have a greater impact internationally and the result of the Obama
administrations desire to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance.3 But an outstanding question is whether strengthening the U.S.-
ROK alliance might also come at the expense of South Koreas interests as a middle power.

South Korean middle power regionalism is high now they are widely recognized as a
strong middle power
Vio, 2014 PhD candidate Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS) in Yonsei University, 2014
South Korea's Leadership in East Asia: A Middle Power Advancing Regionalism
https://www.academia.edu/10174771/South_Koreas_Leadership_in_East_Asia_A_Middle_Power_Adva
ncing_Regionalism
Although the processes associated to regionalism provide good terrain for middle power activity, few studies look into a middle power advancing regional integration and institution-building.
This is mainly because elsewhere these efforts have normally come from the great regional powers. Such was the motivation behind the research carried out by this author in Seoul as part of
his dissertation work. An East Asia-wide regional framework requires the institutionalization of Northeast Asia including China and Japan in it, and with endogenous leadership driving the

process. South Korea - which is characterized here as the region's middle power - has shown clear signs of exerting that leadership
which neither China nor Japan have being able to achieve. This chapter aims to show how Korea has positioned itself
as a middle power at the centre of East Asian regionalism by exerting a special kind of leadership
unique to middle power countries. This is widely recognized throughout the entire region today , and Seoul has indeed
achieved the legitimacy to practice what will be described as intellectual and entrepreneurial
leadership.

(--) South Korea will pursue middle power diplomacy now:

ONeil, 2015 professor of political science and head of the School of Government and International
Relations at Griffith University, 6/1/2015 Andrew, South Korea as a Middle Power: Global Ambitions and Looming Challenges
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/middle-power-korea/p36623

South Koreas middle-power identity maps closely to its global foreign policy strategy, which has been in place
since the early 1990s. In this sense, the link between what Kal Holsti has termed national role conception and the direction of South Korean foreign policy is
strong.1 This link reflects a similar pattern for other medium-size states that are established middle
powers (such as Australia) and emerging middle powers (such as South Africa) that have sought to make a greater impact on international relations through
proactive diplomacy, aimed principally at influencing multilateral outcomes. Yet the ROKs foreign policy ambitions have expanded

coterminous with deteriorating security circumstances at the regional level. Although South Korea has pulled well
ahead of North Korea across nearly every major indicator of national power and influence, Pyongyangs nuclear weapons inventory has introduced a new
destabilizing element to the Korean peninsula. Moreover, Chinas growing great-power shadow and rising concern in Seoul over what some see as Japans
determination to be more assertive strategically have added to worries over Northeast Asias security landscape. The
ROK-U.S. alliance is today
more robust than ever , but Washington and Seoul did experience some tense periods during the first decade of the twenty-first century under the
Roh Moo-hyun and Bush administrations. South Koreas global ambitions have flourished despite increasing
challenges at the local level. This may appear slightly counterintuitive; a country with finite resources
and more demanding regional circumstances could be assumed to be less ambitious globally.
However, deepening participation and leadership on specific issues on the global stage makes sense
for South Korea , not only for reasons of economic integration but also because Seoul knows that it needs to attract
significant international support to deal with the continuing challenges emanating from North Korea,
including managing any future transition to Korean reunification

(--) South Korea is rising as a middle power now and is focusing on global initiatives
and is working with the US.
ONeil, professor of political science and head of the School of Government and
International Relations at Griffith University, 6/1/2015 Andrew, South Korea as a Middle Power: Global
Ambitions and Looming Challenges http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/middle-power-korea/p36623

Rather than signifying a detachment from the U.S. alliance, Seouls initiative dovetailed with the 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement, which
expanded alliance cooperation beyond the Korean Peninsula and enabled South Korea to contribute to new dimensions of international
security.31 This underscored and built on South Korean contributions to postconflict operations worldwide as well as initiatives in the area of
cybersecurity, and widened cooperation with the increasingly global NATO alliance. The shift toward a globally oriented alliance with the United
States was noteworthy in a historical context because traditionally it had been conceived and designed exclusively as an operationally focused
alliance to deter and ultimately defeat North Korean military aggression. Although this purpose has not disappearedand in many respects it
has been reinforced since 2010 through initiatives such as the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee32the conclusion in 2012 of the Korea-
U.S. free trade agreement has added a more explicit economic dynamic to U.S.-ROK relations. It has, to quote President Park, moved the
United States closer to a comprehensive strategic alliance.33 The timing of the Global Korea initiative was significant for three interrelated
reasons. First, it coincided with the announcement that the G20 would replace the G8 as the premier economic global governance institution.
South Korea was a founding member of the G20, which was formed in 1999 as a result of Canadian leadership and had its inaugural leaders
summit in Washington in 2008. In 2010, South Korea became the first non-G8 country to host the annual G20 leaders summit in Seoul. A
hallmark of the ROKs preparation for the summit was the role of developing states in crafting the agenda and moving it toward discussing
alternative models of development to those of the West; the South Korean model (predictably) loomed large.34 The emergence of the so-called
Seoul Development Consensus focused less on the delivery of aid from the developed world to developing countries and more on structurally
important pillars of development like education and skills, infrastructure, domestic mobilization of resources, private sectorled growth, social
inclusion, and food security.35 South Korea has maintained a strong emphasis on development at subsequent G20 meetings, including at the
2014 leaders summit in Brisbane. Second, the Global Korea strategy was unveiled at the same time that Seoul articulated the New Asian
Initiative that staked a claim for greater South Korean leadership in the region.36 A major theme in the Lee governments rhetoric was an
aspiration for the ROK to act on behalf of other Asian states in international forums. As President Lee stated, Korea is capable enough to
become a leader in Asia and represent the continent on the global stage.37 In practical terms, this translated into a more integrated approach
by Seoul to developing closer economic, security, and political ties with Southeast Asian states and expanding South Koreas footprint in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), both as an existing formal dialogue partner and also in terms of more intimate bilateral
relations with strategic ASEAN countries Vietnam, Singapore, and Myanmar.38 The nomenclature of the New Asian Initiative passed with the
end of the Lee administration in 2013, but its thrust has been continued under President Park
and expanded with her
governments highly ambitious Eurasia Initiative , which envisages making Eurasia into a single united
continent, a continent of creativity and a continent of peace.39 Third, Global Korea emerged as the ROK
made the significant transition in 2009 from being a net recipient of aid to being a net donor of official
development assistance, the first state to have achieved this transition. The same year, South Korea joined the OECDs twentyseven-
member Development Assistance Committee, whose mission is to both coordinate ODA and promote global economic and social
development.40 Significantly, the ROKs ODA budget has increased above the DAC member average, despite tough economic conditions at
home and ongoing aid program deliveries to North Korea, which Seoul does not count as part of its ODA budget.41 This
transition from
being a recipient of ODA to a major donor has been significant because it provides credibility to
Seouls claim to be a bridge between the developed and developing worlds , a central feature of South
Koreas middle-power identity and global strategy.

(--) South Korea regional leadership high now

Jose Guerra Vio, January 2014. PhD Dissertation, National Chengchi University in Taipei. South Korea's Leadership in East
Asia: A Middle Power Advancing Regionalism,
http://www.academia.edu/10174771/South_Koreas_Leadership_in_East_Asia_A_Middle_Power_Advancing_Regionalism.

This chapter began by exposing the problematic of the leadership issue that has marked East Asian regionalism at the
international level. Certainly, the idea of having either China or Japan as the sole superpower leading East
Asian integration makes most regional actors uncomfortable. Another aspect underscored by this chapter which
is particularly important in the Asian context of policymaking is the relevance of personal leadership stemming from strong,
popular and visionary leaders like the ones initiating these regional frameworks in East Asia over 15 years ago. In this more
individual level of analysis, the paternalistic style of leadership that prevails in Asia is observed, due to its cultural tradition.

In the cases reviewed here the role and vision of the President was a determinant factor in the
development, display and acceptance of Korea's regional leadership. Indeed, strong and charismatic
leaders - something very distinctive to Asian politics - and particularly the political will of the President to stir
Korean diplomatic behavior in any which way, affected directly Seoul's role within the region. Thus, a
strong head of state seems necessary in the pursuit of foreign policy options towards the exercise of a country's leadership in
the East Asian context. Accordingly, the emblematic leadership of Kim Dae-Jung to drive Korea into its regional engagement
after the 1997 financial crisis is often paralleled to Mahathir's overt push for Malaysia's leadership in the context of ASEAN, for
instance. Today, however, many argue there is a lack of such strong regional leaders with a clear vision for
institution and
community building. Most head of governments in Asia today are too much absorbed in domestic or
nationalistic issues, so they cannot behave like regional leaders, argues expert Jaehyon Lee.30 This
certainly complicates the issue of regional leadership needed for East Asian regionalism. In the Asian context, too often
individuals in the form of strong leaders overshadow institutions. Strong and charismatic leaders " although important as
catalysts " should not be the most important factor once institutionalization is in process. Then it is a matter of capacity,
managerial skills and continuity. This is where Korea's middlepowermanship presents the most potential
to become that missing piece in the leadership puzzle.

Certainly, Korea's diplomatic behaviour in East Asian regionalism has manifested an intellectual and
entrepreneurial kind of leadership. Besides acting as the catalyst of several initiatives, one of its main
tasks has been bridging and mediating between the two regional powers, which provides Seoul
with the legitimacy to link the industrialized NEA countries to the ASEAN region. Ultimately, to become a
regional leader it is not enough to just claim
that position, but it must be accepted and recognized collectively. So far, the responses of others

regional actors to Korean activism has been generally positive, showing such collective perception of
Korea does exist.

(--) South Korean middle power regionalism is high now

Vio, PhD candidate Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS) in Yonsei
University, 2014 South Korea's Leadership in East Asia: A Middle Power Advancing Regionalism
https://www.academia.edu/10174771/South_Koreas_Leadership_in_East_Asia_A_Middle_Power_Advancing_Regionalism

Although the processes associated to regionalism provide good terrain for middle power activity, few studies look into a middle power advancing regional integration and institution-building.
This is mainly because elsewhere these efforts have normally come from the great regional powers. Such was the motivation behind the research carried out by this author in Seoul as part of
his dissertation work. An East Asia-wide regional framework requires the institutionalization of Northeast Asia including China and Japan in it, and with endogenous leadership driving the

process. South Korea - which is characterized here as the region's middle power - has shown clear signs of exerting that leadership
which neither China nor Japan have being able to achieve. This chapter aims to show how Korea has positioned itself
as a middle power at the centre of East Asian regionalism by exerting a special kind of leadership
unique to middle power countries. This is widely recognized throughout the entire region today , and Seoul has indeed
achieved the legitimacy to practice what will be described as intellectual and entrepreneurial
leadership.
 Warming Impact Defense
(--) No impact to warming
Idso and Idso 11 (Craig D., Founder and Chairman of the Board Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, and
Sherwood B., President Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Carbon Dioxide and Earths Future Pursuing the Prudent
Path, February, http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/ prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf)

As presently constituted, earths atmosphere contains just slightly less than 400 ppm of the colorless and odorless gas
we call carbon dioxide or CO2. Thats only four-hundredths of one percent. Consequently, even if the air's
CO2 concentration was tripled, carbon dioxide would still comprise only a little over one tenth of one
percent of the air we breathe, which is far less than what wafted through earths atmosphere eons
ago, when the planet was a virtual garden place. Nevertheless, a small increase in this minuscule amount of CO2 is
frequently predicted to produce a suite of dire environmental consequences, including dangerous global
warming, catastrophic sea level rise, reduced agricultural output, and the destruction of many natural ecosystems, as well as dramatic increases
in extreme weather phenomena, such as droughts, floods and hurricanes. As strange as it may seem, these
frightening future
scenarios are derived from a single source of information: the ever-evolving computer-driven climate
models that presume to reduce the important physical, chemical and biological processes that
combine to determine the state of earths climate into a set of mathematical equations out of which
their forecasts are produced. But do we really know what all of those complex and interacting processes are? And even if we did --
which we don't -- could we correctly reduce them into manageable computer code so as to produce reliable forecasts 50 or 100 years into the
future? Some people answer these questions in the affirmative. However, as may be seen in the body of this report, real-world
observations fail to confirm essentially all of the alarming predictions of significant increases in the frequency and
severity of droughts, floods and hurricanes that climate models suggest should occur in response to a global warming of the magnitude that
was experienced by the earth over the past two centuries as it gradually recovered from the much-lower-than-present temperatures
characteristic of the depths of the Little Ice Age. And other observations have shown that the rising atmospheric CO2 concentrations associated
with the development of the Industrial Revolution have actually been good for the planet, as they have significantly enhanced the plant
productivity and vegetative water use efficiency of earth's natural and agro-ecosystems, leading to a significant "greening of the earth." In
the pages that follow, we present this oft-neglected evidence via a review of the pertinent scientific literature. In the case of the biospheric
benefits of atmospheric CO2 enrichment, we find that with more CO2 in the air, plants grow bigger and better in almost every conceivable way,
and that they do it more efficiently, with respect to their utilization of valuable natural resources, and more effectively, in the face of
environmental constraints. And when plants benefit, so do all of the animals and people that depend upon them for their sustenance. Likewise,
in the case of climate model inadequacies, we reveal their many shortcomings via a comparison of
their "doom and gloom" predictions with real-world observations. And this exercise reveals that even
though the world has warmed substantially over the past century or more -- at a rate that is claimed by many to
have been unprecedented over the past one to two millennia -- this report demonstrates that none of the
environmental catastrophes that are predicted by climate alarmists to be produced by such a warming
has ever come to pass. And this fact -- that there have been no significant increases in either the frequency
or severity of droughts, floods or hurricanes over the past two centuries or more of global warming --
poses an important question. What should be easier to predict: the effects of global warming on extreme weather events or the effects of
elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations on global temperature? The first part of this question should, in principle, be answerable; for it is
well defined in terms of the small number of known factors likely to play a role in linking the independent variable (global warming) with the
specified weather phenomena (droughts, floods and hurricanes). The latter part of the question, on the other hand, is ill-defined and possibly
even unanswerable; for there are many factors -- physical, chemical and biological -- that could well be involved in linking CO2 (or causing it not
to be linked) to global temperature. If, then, today's climate models cannot correctly predict what should be relatively easy for them to
correctly predict (the effect of global warming on extreme weather events), why should we believe what they say about something infinitely
more complex (the effect of a rise in the airs CO2 content on mean global air temperature)? Clearly, we should pay the models no
heed in the matter of future climate -- especially in terms of predictions based on the behavior of a
non-meteorological parameter (CO2) -- until they can reproduce the climate of the past, based on the behavior of one of the most
basic of all true meteorological parameters (temperature). And even if the models eventually solve this part of the problem, we should
still reserve judgment on their forecasts of global warming; for there will yet be a vast gulf between
where they will be at that time and where they will have to go to be able to meet the much greater
challenge to which they aspire

Previous temperature spikes disprove the impact

Singer 11 (S. Fred, Robert M. and Craig, PhD physics Princeton University and professor of environmental science UVA, consultant
NASA, GAO, DOE, NASA, Carter, PhD paleontology University of Cambridge, adjunct research professor Marine Geophysical Laboratory @
James Cook University, and Idso, PhD Geography ASU, Climate Change Reconsidered, 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental Panel
on Climate Change)

Research from locations around the world reveal a significant period of elevated air temperatures that
immediately preceded the Little Ice Age, during a time that has come to be known as the Little
Medieval Warm Period. A discussion of this topic was not included in the 2009 NIPCC report, but we include it here to
demonstrate the existence of another set of real-world data that do not support the IPCCs claim that
temperatures of the past couple of decades have been the warmest of the past one to two millennia.
In one of the more intriguing aspects of his study of global climate change over the past three millennia, Loehle (2004) presented a graph of the
Sargasso Sea and South African temperature records of Keigwin (1996) and Holmgren et al. (1999, 2001) that reveals the existence of a major
spike in surface air temperature that began sometime in the early 1400s. This abrupt
and anomalous warming pushed the
air temperatures of these two records considerably above their representations of the peak warmth
of the twentieth century, after which they fell back to pre-spike levels in the mid-1500s, in harmony with the work of McIntyre and
McKitrick (2003), who found a similar period of higher-than-current temperatures in their reanalysis of the data employed by Mann et al. (1998,
1999).

Warming is irreversible
ANI 10 (IPCC has underestimated climate-change impacts, say scientists, 3-20, One India, http://news.oneindia.in/2010/03/20/ipcchas-
underestimated-climate-change-impacts-sayscientis.html)

According to Charles H. Greene, Cornell professor of Earth and atmospheric science, " Even if all [sic
hu]man-made greenhouse gas emissions were stopped tomorrow and carbon-dioxide levels stabilized at today's
concentration, by the end of this century, the global average temperature would increase by about 4.3
degrees Fahrenheit, or about 2.4 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels, which is significantly above the level
which scientists and policy makers agree is a threshold for dangerous climate change." "Of course,
greenhouse gas emissions will not stop tomorrow, so the actual temperature increase will likely be
significantly larger, resulting in potentially catastrophic impacts to society unless other steps are taken to reduce the Earth's
temperature," he added. "Furthermore, while the oceans have slowed the amount of warming we would otherwise have seen for the level of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the ocean's thermal inertia will also slow the cooling we experience once we finally reduce our
greenhouse gas emissions," he said. This means that the temperature rise we see this century will be largely
irreversible for the next thousand years. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions alone is unlikely to
mitigate the risks of dangerous climate change," said Green.

Reject their impactthey cherry-pick the worst case scenarios and assume they are
likelyevery scientific study concludes that the likelihood of such devastation is
virtually zero
Eastin et al. 11 (Josh, Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington, Reiner Grundmann and Aseem Prakash, The two
limits debates: Limits to Growth and climate change, Futures, February, Vol 43, Issue 1, pp. 16-26, ScienceDirect)

And Hjerpe and Linnr point out, The IPCC describes scenarios as alternative images of how the future might unfold to
analyze how driving forces may influence future emission outcomes (), i.e., they are not designed to provide blueprints for the future. The
IPCC emphasizes that neither probability nor desirability is attached to the various scenario families The
future evolution of society is recognized as an uncertain process of interaction between, for example, demographic
development, socio-economic development, and technological change. [50] There is no probability assigned to the various

scenarios which opens the way for decision makers to pick the one that aligns with their
preconceptions . In this sense, both LtG and IPCC have used scenarios in order to communicate the
possibility of a dystopian future, not as a prediction, but as a reminder that something needs to be done urgently if we
are to prevent the worst.

Doomsayers use faulty data and rely on consensus at the expense of sound science
Kampen 11 (Jarl, Assistant professor, Research Methodology group at Wageningen University and Research, A methodological note on
the making of causal statements in the debate on anthropogenic global warming, June, Theoretical & Applied Climatology, 104:423-427,
EBSCO)

Briefly stated, the major shortcoming of the verification criterion is that it allows only experience to decide upon the truth or falsity of scientific
statements (Popper 1965: 42; see Rapp 1975). Popper's most important contribution to the debate was to state that every scientific theory
should be able to list counter-examples which, if found in reality, disconfirm (falsify) the theory. This is the principle of falsification. In the
case of anthropogenic global warming (AGW), the theory should list one or more counterexamples that could (potentially) disconfirm the
theory. This listing of potential falsifiers appears to be missing in the present debate on AGW. In fact,
some skeptics in the debate on AGW point out that all natural climatic disasters are used as evidence
(verification) for the human impact on climate, whereas evidence that a post WWII global warming is absent in, e.g., the
Greenland Ice-Core Bore Record is ignored as falsifying evidence (see, e.g., Dahl-Jensen et al. 1998; Feldman and
Marks 2009). Needless to say that a methodologically sound theory would encompass all available evidence and
not cherry-pick those pieces of evidence that confirm the theory while ignoring those that do not.
Unfortunately, when a theoretical phenomenon such as AGW becomes a global political program, it soon
becomes vulnerable to methodological fallacies in the realm of social and political science. Leaving aside the
quality of used data and methods, the IPCC report aimed at reaching a consensus. Consensus is recognized by
some social scientific methodologists as the defining feature of social science (Swanborn 1996; Feyerabend 1987). However, if reaching
consensus were really the hallmark of sound science, the scientific theories of Galileo, Copernicus,
Darwin, and many others would never have seen daylight. Also, there is no guarantee that majorities
will reach sensible opinions (think only of the democratic Weimar republic in the 1930s). Finally,
scientists need to make a living, and they will not bite the hand that feeds them, an argument used by
some advocates of AGW who claim that climate skeptics are sponsored by Big Carbon. Therefore,
consensus must be dismissed as a defining feature of science . The IPCC recognizes the limitation of
consensus by adding the phrase and much evidence when it makes statements as in, e.g., there is high agreement and
much evidence that with current climate change mitigation policies and related sustainable development practices, global GHG emissions will
continue to grow over the next few decades (IPCC 2007: p. 7, italics added). We must therefore discuss the sources of
evidence that are used to formulate the many causal statements on AGW issued in the report. The quality
of all scientific research depends of course, on the quality of the data that are being processed. Regardless of
the quality of the (statistical) model used for analysis, if bad data are fed to the model, then the result of the analysis
will be bad. This principle is known as garbage ingarbage out. In other words, if the data that are fed into climate
models are open to dispute, then so are the projections of these models. In the scientific (i.e., peerreviewed) literature, several authors
have expressed doubts about the quality of the analyzed data and the possibility to derive at valid
inferences on human impact on global warming (e.g., Jaworowski 1994; Soon et al. 2004; Michaels 2008; Pielke et al. 2007).
However, since the author of this article is no expert on climate science, the issue of whether or not data used in climate science are of enough
quality will be left for others to decide. Instead, in this methodological note on the making of causal statements in the debate on AGW, we
focus on the study designs that are used to establish the causal hypotheses. The following sections discuss briefly the consequence of a lack of
experiment and the relying on correlational data for establishing causal relationships. This discussion prepares the ground for the formulation
of possible falsifiers of AWG. Some concluding remarks remain in the last section.
Adaptation means no catastrophic impact to warming
Kenny 12 (April 9, 2012, Charles, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a Schwartz fellow at the New America Foundation,
and author, most recently, of Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding and How We Can Improve the World Even More., Not
Too Hot to Handle, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/09/not_too_hot_to_handle?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full)

But for all international diplomats appear desperate to affirm the self-worth of pessimists and doomsayers worldwide, it is important to
put climate change in a broader context. It is a vital global issue -- one that threatens to slow the worldwide march toward
improved quality of life. Climate change is already responsible for more extreme weather and an accelerating rate of species extinction -- and
may ultimately kill off as many as 40 percent of all living species. But it
is also a problem that we know how to tackle, and
one to which we have some time to respond before it is likely to completely derail progress. And that's
good news, because the fact that it's manageable is the best reason to try to tackle it rather than abandon all hope like a steerage class
passenger in the bowels of the Titanic. Start with the economy. The Stern Review, led by the distinguished British economist Nicholas Stern, is
the most comprehensive look to date at the economics of climate change. It suggests that, in
terms of income, greenhouse gasses
are a threat to global growth, but hardly an immediate or catastrophic one. Take the impact of climate change on
the developing world. The most depressing forecast in terms of developing country growth in Stern's paper is the "A2 scenario" -- one of a
series of economic and greenhouse gas emissions forecasts created for the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It's a
model that predicts slow global growth and income convergence (poor countries catching up to rich countries). But even under this
model, Afghanistan's GDP per capita climbs sixfold over the next 90 years, India and China ninefold,
and Ethiopia's income increases by a factor of 10. Knock off a third for the most pessimistic simulation of the economic
impact of climate change suggested by the Stern report, and people in those countries are still markedly better off -- four
times as rich for Afghanistan, a little more than six times as rich for Ethiopia. It's worth emphasizing that the Stern report suggests
that the costs of dramatically reducing greenhouse-gas emissions is closer to 1 (or maybe 2) percent of
world GDP -- in the region of $600 billion to $1.2 trillion today. The economic case for responding to climate change by pricing carbon and
investing in alternate energy sources is a slam dunk. But for all the likelihood that the world will be a poorer, denuded place than it would be if
we responded rapidly to reduce greenhouse gases, the global economy is probably not going to collapse over the
next century even if we are idiotic enough to delay our response to climate change by a few years. For all the flooding, the
drought, and the skyrocketing bills for air conditioning, the economy would keep on expanding, according to the data that Stern
uses. And what about the impact on global health? Suggestions that malaria has already spread as a result of climate change and that malaria
deaths will expand dramatically as a result of warming in the future don't fit the evidence of declining deaths and reduced malarial spread over
the last century. The authors of a recent study published in the journal Nature conclude that the forecasted future effects of rising
temperatures on malaria "are at least one order of magnitude smaller than the changes observed since about 1900 and about two orders of
magnitude smaller than those that can be achieved by the effective scale-up of key control measures." In other words, climate change is and
will likely remain a small factor in the toll of malaria deaths into the foreseeable future. What about other diseases? Christian
Zimmermann at the University of Connecticut and Douglas Gollin at Williams evaluate the likely impact of a 3-degree
rise in temperatures on tropical diseases like dengue fever, which causes half a million cases of hemorrhagic fever and 22,000
deaths each year. Most of the vectors for such diseases -- mosquitoes, biting flies, and so on -- do poorly in frost. So if the weather stays
warmer, these diseases are likely to spread. At the same time, there are existing tools to prevent or treat most tropical
diseases, and Zimmerman and Gollin suggest "rather modest improvements in protection efficacy could
compensate for the consequences of climate change." We can deal with this one. It's the same with agriculture. Global
warming will have many negative (and a few positive) impacts on food supply, but it is likely that other impacts -- both positive,
including technological change, and negative, like the exhaustion of aquifers-- will have far bigger effects. The 2001 IPCC
report suggested that climate change over the long term could reduce agricultural yields by as much as 30 percent. Compare that with the 90
percent increase in rice yields in Indonesia between 1970 and 2006, for example. Again, while climate
change will make
extreme weather events and natural disasters like flooding and hurricanes more common, the negative effect
on global quality of life will be reduced if economies continue to grow. That's because, as Matthew Kahn from
Tufts University has shown, the safest place to suffer a natural disaster is in a rich country. The more money that
people and governments have, the more they can both afford and enforce building codes, land use regulations, and public infrastructure like
flood defenses that lower death tolls. Let's also not forget how human psychology works. Too many environmentalists suggest that dealing
with climate change will take immediate and radical retooling of the global economy. It won't. It is affordable, practical, and
wouldn't take a revolution. Giving out the message that the only path to sustainability will require medieval standards of living only
puts everyone else off. And once you've convinced yourself the world is on an inevitable course to disaster if some corner of the U.S. Midwest is
fracked once more or India builds another three coal-fueled power plants, the only logical thing to do when the fracking or the building occurs
is to sit back, put your Toms shoes on the couch, and drink micro-brewed herbal tea until civilization collapses. Climate change isn't like that --
or at the very least, isn't like that yet. So, if
you're really just looking for a reason to strap on the "end of the
world is nigh" placards and go for a walk, you can find better excuses -- like, say, the threat of global
thermonuclear war or a rogue asteroid. The fight to curb greenhouse gas emissions is one for the hard-
nosed optimist.
 Economy Impact Defense
(--) Economic decline doesnt cause war
Tir 10 [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an
Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, Territorial
Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict, The Journal of Politics, 2010, Volume 72:
413-425), Ofir]

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic
performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in
Models 34.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature.
In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 12 and 56, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood
that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to
divert the publics attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem,
thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998)
find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude
that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic
conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more
in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 34), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions
are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordhams (2002) revision of Gowas (1998) analysis shows some
effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the publics attention from a poor economy.
Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett
(1990)but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some
significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic
underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my
own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong
support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that
embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their
unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic
malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and
prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that
leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is
threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming
economy).

(--) Ninety-three economic downturns disprove the impact

Miller 2000 (Morris, Adjunct Professor of Administration at the University of Ottawa, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol 24 No 4)
The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities
in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to
this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be

According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei

tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war.

and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit

in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in
Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that: Much of the conventional wisdom about the

political impact of economic crises may be wrongThe severity of economic crisis as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth bore

no relationship to the collapse of regimes(or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violenceIn the cases of dictatorships
and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).
 South Korea Cant Solve Cyber-Attacks
(--) Numerous factors limit South Koreas ability to affect cyber-politics that they dont
solve for:
David Fidler, 6/4/2015 (David, Visiting Fellow for Cybersecurity @ Council on Foreign Relations, "South
Koreas Difficult Path as a Middle Power in International Cyber Politics,"
http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/06/04/south-koreas-difficult-path-as-a-middle-power-in-international-
cyber-politics/, Accessed 2/19/2016, rwg)
Last month, I gave lectures on cybersecurity in South Korea shortly after Secretary of State John Kerry delivered remarks in Seoul on An Open
and Secure Internet. This experience provided an opportunity to consider the challenges South Korea faces in cyber policy. I was particularly
interested in how South Koreas desire to influence world affairs as a middle power plays out in the cyber realm. Although South
Korea
engages in active cyber diplomacy, numerous factors limit its ability to affect international cyber
politics in a significant manner. South Korea as a Middle Power and Cyber Diplomacy Since approximately 2008, South Korean
officials have described South Koreas role in world politics as that of a middle power: a medium-sized country with resources, capabilities,
networks, and willingness to advance strategies that improve international cooperation. According to the East Asia Institutes Middle Power
Diplomacy Initiative, [m]iddle power diplomacy generally involves the adoption of an internationalist perspective and policy, actively
participating in multilateral forums, leading in specific niche areas, and acting as a bridge among nations. Middle power status has traditionally
been associated with countries such as Australia and Canada, but, as explored in a forthcoming book by CFRs Scott A. Snyder on Middle Power
Korea: Contributions to the Global Agenda, South Korea has pursued middle power diplomacy in international development, financial stability,
nuclear security, and climate change. South Koreas middle power efforts also have included cyberspace policy. In cyber, South Koreas middle
power diplomacy has included hosting the 2013 Seoul Conference on Cyberspace (an iteration of the London Process) and the 2014
plenipotentiary of the International Telecommunication Union. South Korea has engaged cyber issues diplomatically in the UN as a participant
in the Governmental Group of Experts process, in Asian regional cooperation (e.g., through the ASEAN Regional Forum), in the middle power
MITKA initiative (involving Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, Korea, and Australia), as a founding member of the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, and
bilaterally with, among others, China, India, Japan, and the United States. Despite the diplomatic activity, identifying South Koreas middle
power contributions to international cyber relations proves difficult. During the time South Korea has tried to exert middle power influence,
international cyber politics have become more contentious and dangerous, which undermines, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
claim that the success of the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace 2013 reinforced Koreas stature as an agenda-setter on global issues. The
deteriorating trajectory in international cyber politics is not South Koreas fault, but a middle powers ambition and function is to provide
leadership when cooperation falters, especially when great powers disagree. Factors Weakening South Koreas Middle-Power Potential in Cyber
Policy South Korea is one of the worlds most wired countries, which demonstrates the countrys embrace of cyber technologies. However, this
commitment renders South Korea vulnerable to malicious cyber activities. As has happened in many countries, South Korea has scaled up its
domestic cybersecurity efforts to address cyber threats, including the appointment in 2015 of a presidential adviser on cybersecurity.
Despite increased attention on cyber defense and resilience, South Korea has not developed
approaches that obviously stand out from equivalent efforts by other countries. South Korea struggles
with the same problems as other nations, which means its domestic cybersecurity activities do not
necessarily boost its middle power ambitions. These ambitions also suffer because South Korea faces
threats from North Korea that dominate South Koreas cybersecurity agenda. Although North Korea is a cyber
menace beyond the Korean peninsula, no other country bears the cyber burden Pyongyang imposes on South Korea. Indeed, in no other
country is cybersecurity so interwoven as part of an existential security threat. This
burden damages South Koreas middle
power aspirations in cyber affairs by highlighting South Koreas vulnerabilities, forcing Seoul to
prioritize North Korean cyber threats, and undermining the idea South Korea has effective strategies
other countries can use. South Koreas close political, economic, and security relationship with the
United States also affects its desire to be a middle power on cyber issues. A function of middle powers is to find ways
to navigate international cooperation through the shoals of great-power competition. Middle powers should beor perceived to be
sufficiently independent to be able to broker such cooperation. South Korea remains dependent on the United States in defending against
North Korea, which colors perceptions of how autonomous South Korea can be on security issues. South Korea has not followed the U.S.
position on all cyber issues. It has not ratified the U.S.-supported Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, nor did it join the United States in
rejecting the revised International Telecommunication Regulations negotiated in 2012. However, such differences have not strengthened South
Koreas middle-power status, especially with countries most at odds with the United States on cyber issues, namely China, Iran, North Korea,
and Russia.
(--) South Korea must understand the technical characteristics of cyber-security to
solvethe plan does nothing to cause this:
KIM 15 (Sangbae Kim, Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations,
Seoul National University, March 2015. Policy Recommendation for South Koreas Middle Power
Diplomacy: Cyber Security. http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/kor_report/2015031215253285.pdf,
Accessed 2/19/2016, rwg)
Cyber security issues have recently become considered as some of the most pertinent emerging agenda items that South Korea is likely to
play a meaningful role as a middle power. These issues have largely been the domain of computer experts and specialists since the Internet
began as a small community where an authentication layer of code was unne-cessary and the development of norms was simple. But as it
grew, everything changed and although cyberspace offered an arena for business an d social activities, it also became an environment for
crime, hacking, and terror. Governments, private companies and non - state actors are making efforts to develop stronger capabilities for
securing their resources and activities in cyberspace. Foreign policy makers and International Relations scholars are struggling to understand
cyberspaces basic structures and dynamics, which are different from traditional security sectors. It is obvious that cyber security issues are
becoming a m a jor concern of International Relations in various senses. Amid the fast spread of hacking technologies, many countries and
international organiz a- tions focus more on crafting security measures and enhancing multilateral cooperation to fend off cyber threats,
which could be as devastating as physical military strikes. For example, they are making efforts to build a global framework for Internet
governance, of which cyber security is one of the contentious sub - fields; but their consensus has not been framed yet. In particular, th e
United States and China, two world powers in the 21st century, have recently been in co n- flict with each other over hackings and
espionage. The issue of cyber security is becoming an ever larger presence in U.S. - China relations and is seriously affecting threat
perceptions on both sides. Indeed, despite it being such a new issue, the cyber realm is proving to be as cha l- lenging as the more traditional
concerns that have long dominated the U.S. - China agenda. South Korea, which has a high reputation as an In ternet Strong Nation, is
expected to play a contributive role in the cyber security sector. South Korea boasts cutting - edge digital technology, efficient computer
networks and the worlds top high - speed Internet penetr a- tion rate. But behind these feats is an unpleasant truth: its vulnerability to
cyber threats, suspected as the work of North Korea. There is a concern that the on - line attacks are likely to be coupled with off - line
nuclear attacks. It is urgent and crucial for South Korea to build capabiliti es enough to fend off any attacks through cyberspace. However,
securing cybe r- space is not solely based on fostering material capabilities, but also figuring out diplomatic solutions among committed
actors. In recent years, South Korea as an Internet power is likely to play diplomatic roles in easing cyber conflict between world powers,
and to building a new global mechanism for cyber security governance. To achieve these tasks of middle power diplomacy
in the sector, it is essential that South Korea properly identify the structural conditions in which it cu r- rently operates, and determine
adoptable options for the future to aid in its success. In oth-er words, a major task here is to comprehend the overall configuration of the
technological and political structures, and define the coordinating or conflicting interests of the actors who are engaging the game. In this
context, it
is essential for South Korea to identify the structural condition that could be epitomized at
three levels. First of all, cyber security issues have a number of particular technological and stru c- tural
characteristics, which are different from traditional security issues. Among them, the key to understanding the potential
magnitude of cyber threats is the complex ch a- racter of the In ternet as a network of networks. Cyber
threats are continuously evol v- ing, as well as increasingly blurring distinctions between civil and military domains, non - state
and state actors, and even human and non - human actors.
(--) Multiple factors undermine South Korean cyber-diplomacy that they dont solve
for:
David Fidler, 6/4/2015 (David, Visiting Fellow for Cybersecurity @ Council on Foreign Relations, "South
Koreas Difficult Path as a Middle Power in International Cyber Politics,"
http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/06/04/south-koreas-difficult-path-as-a-middle-power-in-international-
cyber-politics/, Accessed 2/19/2016, rwg)

Rather than exerting influence in global cyber affairs, South

Koreas cyber diplomacy confronts problems that shrink
its ability to affect global cyber relations. Mounting pressures from its domestic online vulnerabilities,
the unrelenting threat from North Korea, the close alliance with the United States, and deteriorating cyber
relations among major powers jeopardize South Koreas desire to shape international cyber politics as
a middle power.
 Cyber-Security Impact Defense
(--) US wont escalate a cyber-war:
David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, 2015 (Distinguished Visiting Professors at the US Naval
Academys Center for Cyber Security Studies, Waging Cyber War the American Way,
http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/kor_report/2015031215253285.pdf, Accessed 2/19/2016, rwg)

Apart from its preparedness to conduct counter-military cyber

operations during wartime, the United States has been reticent about
using its offensive capabilities. While it has not excluded conducting cyber operations to coerce
hostile states or non-state actors, it has yet to brandish such a threat.9 Broadly speaking, US policy is to rely on the
threat of retaliation to deter a form of warfare it is keen to avoid. Chinese criticism that the US retaliatory policy and
capabilities will up the ante on the Internet arms race is disingenuous in that China has been energetic in forming and using capabilities for cyber operations.10

(--) Escalation of a cyber-war doesnt mean it is a prelude to armed conflict:

David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, 2015 (Distinguished Visiting Professors at the US Naval
Academys Center for Cyber Security Studies, Waging Cyber War the American Way,
http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/kor_report/2015031215253285.pdf, Accessed 2/19/2016, rwg)
This raises the question of whether the laws of war should apply to coercive cyber war (and cyber war in general). Specifically, must the target
of a cyber attack be a military capability? Because cyber war is war, the answer would be yes if cyber attacks worked the same way that kinetic
attacks do. But they do not. In theory, cyber war can destroy things; but in actuality, attacks rely on computer instructions that can cause things
to destroy themselves. Stuxnet broke centrifuges because the centrifuges were built to execute potentially self-destructive sequences.
Otherwise, cyber
attacks are essentially disruptive: they keep things from working. In this sense, cyber
war is generally not violent. Moreover, its direct effects can be reversed, and far more quickly than
those of physical war. An attack against the computer systems of military forces that are not at war
may be troublesome, but any degradation is temporary, and physical hardware is left intact.26 Unless cyber attacks are a
prelude to armed conflict, and hence more pre-emptive than coercive, there is time to mend any ruptures, so long as the country being
threatened is not itself at war with a third party. Hence, the threat of a cyber attack on military forces is unlikely to be very persuasive or
produce much coercive leverage.

(--) Cyber-deterrence already exists in Asia-Pacific region:

Dean Cheng, 1/2016 (Senior Research Fellow for Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian
Studies Center, Prospects for Extended Deterrence in Space and Cyber: The Case of the PRC,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/01/prospects-for-extended-deterrence-in-space-and-
cyber-the-case-of-the-prc, Accessed 1/27/2016, rwg)

Interestingly, some Chinese analysts seem to believe that a state of mutual information deterrence
already exists in the AsiaPacific region, at least insofar as disruptive attacks against each others information
networks are concerned. It is noted that among states of roughly equal levels of information technology, and given the
wide penetration of the Internet into all aspects of all nations societies, economies, and political structures, states will not engage in
disruptive network warfare lightly.[15] This would suggest that with respect to computer network exploitation
(i.e., cyber espionage), there is some degree of restraint against proceeding to erase data or physically
destroy key elements of a potential adversarys information networks, at least in peacetime.

(--) Hackers can only cause localized disruptions in service:

Jonathan Pollet, 11/23/2014 (17-year veteran of the critical infrastructure industry. As an ethical
hacker, he consults for some of the worlds largest energy companies, as well as electric utilities,
chemical plants, water treatment plants, etc. to help them better defend against cyber attacks, Here's
What Chinese Hackers Can Actually Do To The US Power Grid, http://www.businessinsider.com/what-
hackers-can-do-to-our-power-grid-2014-11, Accessed 10/14/2015, rwg)
In the meantime, the individual asset owners who are the ones technically responsible for securing their networks and facilities need to start
taking more aggressive steps immediately to guard against highly sophisticated cyber actors. But the
real risk when it comes to
the electric grid specifically is of localized disruptions in service not a widespread outage. It would
be extremely difficult for hackers, without an almost superhuman effort, to cause a power outage
that stretched across the country.

(--) The US desire to avoid cyber-war escalation means it has tight command and
control:
David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, 2015 (Distinguished Visiting Professors at the US Naval
Academys Center for Cyber Security Studies, Waging Cyber War the American Way,
http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/kor_report/2015031215253285.pdf, Accessed 2/19/2016, rwg)
Although the problems of proportionality, discrimination and respect for neutrality are not unique to cyber war, they can be exacerbated by the
difficulty inherent in controlling the course, paths and effects of cyber attacks. As important as norms may be to the
United States, its
desire to avoid cyber-war escalation is at least as important. For both reasons, the United States favours tight
command and control (C2). Authority to conduct offensive cyber operations flows from the president via the secretary of defense to
military commanders for execution. Once ordered, cyber war is directed by regional combatant commanders, who oversee virtually all US
military operations in their respective theatres, in collaboration with US Cyber Command, which is responsible for delivering actual effects.17
The assignment of teams from Cyber Command to the combatant commanders enables the latter to integrate cyber-war actions into joint
operations.18
Case Turns
 Turn---Appeasement---1NC
Reversing the THAAD decision is appeasement---results in nuclear emboldenment and
turns case
Pinkston, 7-14 Daniel Pinkston, North East Asia Deputy Project Director with the International Crisis
Group, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, PhD
in International Affairs from UCSD, 7-14-2016, Why it makes sense to deploy THAAD in South Korea,
https://www.nknews.org/2016/07/why-it-makes-sense-to-deploy-thaad-in-south-korea/

Finally, if South Korea were to reverse the decision under domestic pressure or Chinese intimidation,
it could have dangerous consequences. Acquiescence to such demands would be perceived as South
Korean weakness and lack resolve. Caving in to the current threats would only embolden those who
might consider more lethal threats, such as a nuclear attack.

Critics might argue that North Korean nuclear blackmail would not be credible. However, setting a
precedent for appeasement would encourage more attempts at coercion. If we face a serious crisis in
the coming years, such as the Korean version of the Cuban missile crisis, why would we want
Pyongyang to think it could exploit Seouls lack of resolve?
 Link Turn---NoKo Prolif
THAAD deployment forces China to pressure North Korean denuclearization
Bennett, 16 Bruce Bennett, senior defense analyst at RAND, 4-05-2016, THAAD's Effect on South
Korea's Neighbors, http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/04/the-effect-on-south-koreas-neighbors.html

It is hard to determine how China (or Russia) will respond to THAAD deployment in South Korea. China
could continue its current course and rhetoric, perhaps punishing South Korea economically.
Alternatively, THAAD deployment could change the dynamic and terms of the debate, leading to
greater Chinese pressure on North Korea to curb its nuclear and missile threats. Regardless, South
Korea and the United States need to do a better job of explaining their defensive resolve and rationale
to the Chinese government and people. Chief among their many arguments should be the danger of
allowing the North Korean nuclear weapons program to continue its unfettered growth.
 Leadership Add-On Answers
(--) Leadership doesnt solve war: Empirically proven
Christopher J. Fettweis (Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College) 2010
Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 82

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do
not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the
stabilizing power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of
American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its
defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it
had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace
dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William
Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to
world peace'.30And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the
United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable
US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were
enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional
balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the
threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities.
Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the
United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration
ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military
expenditure are unrelated.

(--) Hegemonic decline doesnt cause war Empirics go neg

MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul K. and Joseph M., Professors of Political Science at Williams and
Miami, Graceful Decline?, International Security, Spring 2k11, Volume 35, Number 4, Project Muse)
In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out
the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great
eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment
powers. We examine

pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy
of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical
record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. When international
conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on
domestic populations.

(--) Empirics dont support that hegemony leads to peace:

Simon Reich, 2014 (Rutgers University Division of Global Affairs, Good-Bye Hegemony!: Pow
er and Influence in the Global System, Accessed via google books, 9/30/2014, rwg)

American academics catered to this illusion by developing the concept of hegemony . It made it appear that hierar
chy in the form of American hegemony was beneficial to democracy and development and was welcomed by major actors everywhere outside the Soviet bloc. Ameri
cans considered Moscows opposition to US hegemony as opposition to global order and thus a sign of aggressive intentions. A growing bloc of neutrals who also ex
Instead of speaking truth t
pressed their disquiet, with India as its most vocal spokesmen, were dismissed as misguided, or even as dupes of Moscow.
o power, international relations scholars, with few notable exceptions, became spokesmen, therapists, and propagandists
on behalf of the burgeoning national security establishment for the assumptions that undergirded Am
erican foreign policy. Almost seventy years later, American realists and liberals continue to defend he
gemony in theory and practice. They ignore the evidence that hegemony was only partial and short-li
ved and that American efforts to maintain order (e.g., in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq) were a primary
source of disorder in the international system. Despite ample evidence to the contrary, they delude t
hemselves into believing that most of the world welcomes American leadership and that is policies invariably engen
der stability.

(--) No impact to hegemonic decline no challengers

Bandow 10 [Military SpendingFor What?, Japan Times, 1/19, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/eo20100119db.html]

WASHINGTON The United States dominates the globe militarily. The threats facing America pale compared to its
capabilities. Why, then, is Washington spending so much on the military? In 2010 the U.S. will spend roughly $700
billion on the military. This is an increase of 2 percent (after inflation) from the Obama administration's original nonwar defense
budget of $534 billion. Despite initial plans for zero growth in defense spending in coming years, there are rumors that the Department of
Defense will receive a 2 percent increase in real outlays through 2015. Still, some conservatives want to enshrine a military buildup in a law
mandating fixed outlays at 4, 5 or even 6 percent of gross domestic product. Hawks focus on the percentage of GDP going to the military
currently about 4.4 percent since that figure has fallen over the years. America spends more inflation- adjusted dollars on the military today
than at any time since the end of World War II. Figured in 2000 dollars, the U.S. devoted $774.6 billion to the military in 1945, the final year of
World War II. In 1953, the final year of the Korean War, military outlay ran to $416.1 billion. Expenditure during the Vietnam War peaked at
$421.3 billion in 1968. By contrast, in 2010 even before the Afghan surge and other unplanned expenditure the administration expected
to spend $517.8 billion. That's more than during the lengthy, but often warm, Cold War. Expenditure as a percentage of GDP has fallen because
the U.S. economy has grown. GDP in 2010 (in 2000 dollars) will run to about $11.7 trillion. That is almost twice as much as in 1986, more than
three times as much as in 1968, and nearly six times as much as in 1953. Military outlay should be tied to threats, not economic growth. Can
anyone credibly claim the military threat facing America is two, three, or six times as great today as
during those years? Today the U.S. does not face a significant military threat. As Colin Powell famously
declared in 1991 when chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "I'm running out of enemies. I'm down to Castro and Kim
Il Sung." The U.S. has no great power enemies. Relations with China and Russia are at times uneasy, but
not confrontational, let alone warlike. Washington is allied with every other industrialized state.
America possesses the most sophisticated nuclear arsenal and the most powerful conventional force.
Washington's reach exceeds that of Rome and Britain at their respective peaks. Other nations, most
notably China, are stirring, but it will take years before they match, let alone overtake, the U.S. Even
subtracting the costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars leaves American military outlay around five
times that of China and 10 times that of Russia. Combine a gaggle of adversaries, enemies and rogues
Burma, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria and the U.S. spends perhaps 25 times as much. The United States is not alone.
The European Union has 10 times the GDP and three times the population of Russia. Military outlay by the U.S. plus its NATO allies accounts for
about 70 percent of world military spending. Add in America's other allies and friends, such as South Korea, and the total share of global
military outlay hits 80 percent. In short, Washington spends what it spends not to defend America but to maintain the ability to overpower
other nations. But it will become increasingly expensive for America to preserve the ability to attack countries like China. Terrorism
remains a pressing security threat. However, terrorist attacks, though horrid, do not pose an
existential danger. Al-Qaida is no replacement for Nazism and Communism, nuclear-topped ICBMs
and armored divisions. Nor is traditional military force the best way to combat terrorism. Indeed, foreign intervention often promotes
terrorism, like swatting a hornet's nest. America's military spending is determined by its foreign policy. America's commitments are a matter of
choice. They don't make sense today. Engagement is good, but military force is not the only form of engagement. And any international
involvement must balance costs and benefits. Adjusting commitments would allow a vastly different, and less expensive, force structure. The
U.S. could make significant cuts and still maintain the globe's strongest and most sophisticated
military one well able to defend Americans.
(--) Heg impacts empirically denied
Preble 10 Former prof, history, Temple U. PhD, history, Temple (Christopher, U.S. Military Power:
Preeminence for What Purpose?, 3 August, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-
preeminence-for-what-purpose/)
commissioners who produced the alternate QDR argue that the purpose of American military
Goure and the Hadley-Perry

power is to provide global public goods, to defend other countries so that they dont have to defend themselves, and otherwise shape
the international order to suit our ends. In other words, the same justifications offered for American military dominance since the end of the Cold War. Most in Washington still
embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the worlds indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic
of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds
with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the
international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of
mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose --- or gain --- the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly
comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than

Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between
we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao.

nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its

efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense,
and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as
world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and
indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.
 South China Sea Add-on Answers
(--) China wont go to war over South China Seas and US wont escalate:
Brendan Taylor, 2014 (Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian
National University, Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, The South China Sea is Not
a Flashpoint, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Taylor_PDF.pdf,
Accessed 8/30/2015, rwg)
This article challenges the popular assumption that the South China Sea is an increasingly perilous
Asian security flashpoint. First, East Asias traditional flashpointsTaiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and the East China Seastand a
significantly higher prospect of combusting into broader, region - wide conflict. Second, Chinas interests in the South China Sea
are often overstated, and Beijing will continue to favor options short of military force to advance what
interests it does have in this region. Third, the balance of military power in the South China Sea is not
shifting against the United States at the rate many pundits suggest, rendering overblown the prospects for
Washington being drawn into war with China to defend the credibility of its Asian alliances. While the
South China Sea is not a flashpoint, however, there are dangers in continuing to refer to it as one.

(--) No accidents over South China Seas: multiple confidence building measures check:
John Kemp, 5/31/2015 (staff writer, South China Sea disputes test Chinas peaceful rise,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/05/31/commentary/world-commentary/south-china-sea-
disputes-test-chinas-peaceful-rise/#.VePAJH1HSf5, Accessed 8/30/2015, rwg)

LONDON The
South China Sea has become the most important testing ground for the changing
economic, political and military relationship between China and the United States. The islands, rocks, reefs and
shoals at the heart of the dispute most of them uninhabited and submerged at high tide cover just a few square kilometers of a sea area
that extends over 3 million sq. km. But long-festering disputes over sovereignty among the littoral states (principally China, Vietnam and the
Philippines but involving Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia) have been transformed into a dangerous and unpredictable confrontation between
the superpowers (China and the U.S.). In theory, the dispute is straightforward and consists of three elements: (1) who owns the outcrops; (2)
what rights, if any, does ownership confer to natural resources in the surrounding seas and beneath the seabed; and (3) what does ownership
mean for ships and aircraft of other nations journeying through the area, which contains some of the worlds busiest and most important sea
lanes. China and the other littoral states dispute ownership (element 1) as well as the rights to resources and maritime control that flow from it
(elements 2 and 3). The U.S. officially takes no view about ownership and control of resources (elements 1 and 2) but has a strong commitment
to freedom of navigation and resists attempts to assert control over the surrounding sea (element 3). Washington wants to freeze
development of the outcrops and other activities it considers provocative pending a resolution of which country, if any, owns them and
insists its ships and aircraft have the right to operate anywhere in the area. China says it owns the outcrops so is entitled to exercise full
sovereignty over them including construction of structures and land reclamation, as well as proclaiming territorial seas around them and
claiming an exclusive economic zone. The South China Sea is often made to seem like a technical legal dispute. But it is really a raw contest for
power and influence between an incumbent superpower and a rising one. The South China Sea has become a combustible battle of wills
between a status quo power (the U.S.) and a dynamic one that wants to rewrite the settlement produced at the end of World War II when it
was largely powerless (China). It pits a legalistic, multilateral model of dispute resolution based on international law (favored by the U.S.)
against a bilateral approach based on diplomacy and military power (favored by China). It raises questions about whether states can be bound
by the decisions of international tribunals against their will (the Philippines has taken its dispute to arbitration but China has insisted it does not
consent to the arbitrators authority). In the military realm, it tests whether Chinas naval power will be confined by the first island chain (Japan,
Taiwan and the Philippines) or out into the heart of the Pacific Ocean. By extension, it raises issues about whether China will remain primarily a
land-based power or become a maritime power to rival the U.S. with operations across all the worlds oceans. More generally, it raises
questions about whether the U.S. is trying to engage China or construct a network of alliances across Asia and the Pacific to contain the
countrys economic, political and military power. South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Taiwan and Malaysia are in varying degrees allies of the
U.S., which is also forging closer links with Vietnam, fueling Chinas suspicions of encirclement. And the South China Sea dispute has become
entangled in the domestic politics of both countries. For China, it is about adjusting the postwar international framework to accommodate the
countrys peaceful rise and recognize Beijings rights as a big power after centuries of humiliation at the hands of Western colonialists and
Japan. For the U.S., the dispute is entwined with fraught discussions about the countrys economic, political, diplomatic and military decline,
whether the Obama administration should have taken a more robust approach to projecting U.S. power, and whether the next president
should take a harder line with China, Russia and Iran. Neither Chinese President Xi Jinping nor U.S. President Barack Obama can afford to
display any weakness on the issue, which is a matter of national pride on both sides. So far, the two sides have opted for a strategy of
controlled escalation. China has accelerated land reclamation and is sending thousands of tourists each year on cruise ship tours to islands it
claims. The U.S. has responded by flying a spy aircraft near some disputed outcrops to exercise its claim to freedom of navigation (complete
with invited television crew to make the point clear). China has hinted it could proclaim an air defense identification zone in the area, which
would presumably mean its ships and aircraft would be more aggressive in challenging overflights by military and civilian aircraft. There is a
substantial element of theater in this conflict, which is being played out in front of the media and conferences: both sides want to appear
strong in front of a domestic audience and their foreign allies while minimizing the risk of accidental confrontation. To avoid accidents,
the two sides have reached a military-to-military understanding on how to handle unplanned
encounters at sea between their navies and sought to do the same for aviation after a series of hair-raising
intercepts of U.S. military aircraft by Chinese fighters operating from the island of Hainan. Both governments have notified the
other in advance of publishing military strategy documents likely to draw media interest and stoke
controversy. Neither wants to jeopardize the wider relationship. On a wide range of issues from climate change,
intellectual property protection, trade and cybercrime to the Middle East and the proliferation of sensitive military technologies, the two
sides need each other. Chinas Xi has been invited to make a state visit to Washington later this year,
which means both sides have a strong incentive to stress cooperation over confrontation in the
overall relationship. The problem is that both sides are still committed to a controlled escalation strategy, which could easily become an
uncontrolled one if not carefully managed. The sheer number of actors in the South China Sea dispute increases the risk of miscalculation. The
U.S. appears to have only limited control over the activities of Vietnam and the Philippines. Manila is a U.S. ally, but Hanoi is nominally a
communist government, though it enjoys increasingly close relations with the U.S. at the military-to-military level. Commanders of individual
aircraft and ships in the area have to make instant decisions in the case of unplanned encounters or unexpected behavior. In theory, local
commanders can be controlled through strict protocols, but in practice those may not always work and military-to-military communications is
poor. In 2014, Chinas close intercepts of U.S. military aircraft, which drew fierce protests from U.S. officials, were blamed on idiosyncratic
military officers on Hainan. Whether this was true or was a matter of central policy remains unclear, but it points to concern about the level of
centralized command and control over local military forces. There is an urgent need to break the escalation cycle and find a better way to
manage the disputes. International law, appeals for a freeze on the dispute, and other norms of international relations are not terribly helpful
since the dispute is fundamentally about military power. Rather than ratchet up the confrontation, hoping the other side will back down, both
sides need to find some creative diplomacy to help transform the nature of the dispute and change the narrative before it becomes even more
poisonous.

(--) No South China Sea escalation

Goldstein, 2011, Lyle, associate professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval
War College in Newport, R.I. He is co-editor of the recent volumes China, the United States and 21st-
Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership and Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving
Maritime Roles. The South China Sea's Georgia Scenario,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/11/the_south_china_seas_georgia_scenario?page=0,2

The brutal truth, however, is that Southeast Asia matters not a whit in the global balance of power. Most of the
region comprises small, poor countries of no consequence whatsoever, but the medium powers in the region, such as Vietnam,
Indonesia, and Australia will all naturally and of their own accord stand up against a potentially more aggressive China. If China and Vietnam go to

war over some rocks in the ocean, they will inevitably both suffer a wide range of deleterious
consequences, but it will have only a marginal impact on U.S. national security. True, these sea lanes are critical to
the Japanese and South Korean economies, but both of these states are endowed with large and

capable fleets -- yet another check on Beijing's ambitions. China, moreover, is all too aware of what
happened to Georgia in 2008. In that unfortunate case, the United States showered a new ally with high-level attention and military advisors. But
when Russian tanks rolled in, effectively annexing a large section of the country and utterly destroying Tbilisi's armed forces, Washington's response

amounted to a whimper: There was, in the end, no appetite for risking a wider conflict with Moscow over a
country of marginal strategic interest. The lessons for Southeast Asia should be clear. Washington must avoid the temptation -- despite local states cheering it on at

every opportunity -- to overplay its hand. The main principle guiding U.S. policy regarding the South China Sea has
been and should remain nonintervention. Resource disputes are inherently messy and will not likely be decided by grand proclamations or multilateral
summitry. Rather, progress will be a combination of backroom diplomacy backed by the occasional show of force by one or more of the claimants. In fact,
Beijing's record of conflict resolution over the last 30 years is rather encouraging: China has not
resorted to a major use of force since 1979 .

(--) South China Sea wont cause conflictthe fact that it is a naval dispute limits the
danger of war:
Brendan Taylor, 2014 (Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian
National University, Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, The South China Sea is Not
a Flashpoint, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Taylor_PDF.pdf,
Accessed 8/30/2015, rwg)
The strategic geography of the South China Sea also militates against it being a genuine flashpoint.
Throughout history, large bodies of water have tended to inhibit the willingness and ability of
adversaries to wage war. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics , for instance, John Mearsheimer refers
to the stopping power of water, writing of the limits that large bodies of water place on the capacity
of states to project military powerrelative, at least, to when they share common land borders. Even
when clashes at sea do occur, history suggests that these generally afford statesmen greater time and
space to find diplomatic solutions. As Robert Ross observes, in such cases neither side has to fear that
the others provocative diplomacy or movement of troops is a prelude to attack and immediately
escalate to heightened military readiness. Tension can be slower to develop, allowing the protagonists
time to manage and avoid unnecessary escalation.

(--) China & the US can successfully navigate crises over the South China Sea:
Brendan Taylor, 2014 (Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian
National University, Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, The South China Sea is Not
a Flashpoint, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Taylor_PDF.pdf,
Accessed 8/30/2015, rwg)
Finally, the capacity of Beijing and Washington to navigate crises in their bilateral relationship further
suggests that the South China Sea is not a flashpoint. Over the past two or more decades, the U nited
States and China have gone to great lengths to manage bilateral tensions and prevent them from
spiraling out of control. A recent example occurred in May 2012, when the two arrived at a mutually
acceptable solution after the blind Chinese activist Chen Guangcheng sought refuge at the U.S. embassy in
Beijing. 48 In the South China Sea, two major, modern SinoU.S. crises have been successfully
managed. The first occurred in April 2001, when a U.S. EP - 3 conducting routine surveillance in airspace above the South China Sea collided
with a Chinese J - 8 jet fighter and was forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island. To be sure, efforts to address this crisis did not
initially proceed particularly smoothly, as Chinese officials refused to answer incoming calls from the U.S. Embassy. Ultimately, however, those
most intimately involved in the crisissuch as then - Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blairhave written
subsequently how top
U.S. officials made every effort to exercise prudence and restraint while they
collected more information about the nature of the incident. They have also acknowledged that their
Chinese counterparts made a series of grudging concessions that ultimately resulted in success...after
they decided that it was important to overall SinoU.S. relations to solve the incident. 49

(--) South China Sea wont escalatedoesnt engage the vital interests of China & the
US:
Brendan Taylor, 2014 (Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian
National University, Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, The South China Sea is Not
a Flashpoint, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Taylor_PDF.pdf,
Accessed 8/30/2015, rwg)
Finally, and related to the third of Hoyts criteria, the South China Sea cannot be said to engage the vital interests of
Asias great powers. To be sure, much has been made of Indias growing interests in this part of the world particularly following
reports of a July 2011 face - off between a Chinese ship and an Indian naval vessel that was leaving Vietnamese waters. However, New
Delhis interests in the South China Sea remain overwhelmingly economic, not strategic, driven as they are
by the search for oil. Moreover, even if New Delhi had anything more than secondary strategic interests at stake in the geographically distant
South China Sea, it is widely accepted that Indias armed forces will for some time lack the capacity to credibly defend these. Similarly, while
much has been made of Tokyos willingness to assist Manila with improving its maritime surveillance
capabilities, for reasons of history and geography, Tokyos interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
dispute, the Korean Peninsula, and even the Taiwan flashpoint dwarf those which it has at stake in the
more distant South China Sea. The extent to which this body of water genuinely engages the vital
interests of China and the United States continues to be overstated.

(--) China de-escalates disputes over the South China Seaengages in confidence
building measures:
Brendan Taylor, 2014 (Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian
National University, Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, The South China Sea is Not
a Flashpoint, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Taylor_PDF.pdf,
Accessed 8/30/2015, rwg)
Unlike its recent behavior in the East China Sea, Beijings approach toward the South China Sea disputes has
traditionally been one of conflict de - escalation. Beijings clear preference has been to manage such
tensions bilaterally. Following a period where an increase in Chinese maritime patrols led to a rise in the number of clashes with
Vietnamese (and Philippine) vessels, for instance, Beijing and Hanoi reached agreement in October 2011 on
principles for settling maritime disputes. Likewise in June 2013, China and Vietnam agreed to establish
new hotlines to assist with managing incidents at sea and dealing with fishing disputes.

(--) Any scenario is two decades away:

Brendan Taylor, 2014 (Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian
National University, Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, The South China Sea is Not
a Flashpoint, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Taylor_PDF.pdf,
Accessed 8/30/2015, rwg)
That said, it is equally important not to exaggerate the pace and scope of Chinas military modernization,
conflating trends in the Southeast Asian distribution of power with a potential Chinese challenge to U.S. primacy in the broader Western Pacific.
China currently does not possess the capability to project substantial power into the South China Sea,
and will likely remain unable to do so for at least another two decades, its ongoing experimentation with aircraft
carriers notwithstanding. As Dan Blumenthal has observed, the PLA lacks a sustained power projection capability
associated with asserting full control over the area, including sufficient at - sea replenishment and
aerial refueling capabilities, modern destroyers with advanced air defense capabilities, and nuclear submarines, as well as regional
bases to support logistical requirements. 42 Added to this, questions have risen regarding the as yet largely unproven
ability of PLA Navy crews to undertake prolonged operations at sea, particularly under conditions of
high - intensity conflict. 43

(--) Diplomacy will solve disputes over the South China Seas:
Brendan Taylor, 2014 (Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian
National University, Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, The South China Sea is Not
a Flashpoint, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Taylor_PDF.pdf,
Accessed 8/30/2015, rwg)
To argue that the South China Sea is not a flashpoint is not a call for complacency. As studies of international conflict dating back to Thucydides
have demonstrated, a quarrel in a far -away country that bears little obvious or immediate relevance to the central dramas of the
international politics of the day can still provide the spark which ignites a war of epochal proportions. That said, it
is equally dangerous
to unduly and indiscriminately overstate the importance of each and every point of tension in
international politics. To do so about the South China Sea unnecessarily raises the temperature
around a set of disputes that, while protracted and complex, appear eminently manageable with sufficient time
and patience for creative diplomatic solutions.

(--) ASEAN checks disputes in the South China Sea:

Japan Times, 8/4/2015 (Malaysia seeks amicable solution to South China Sea dispute,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/04/asia-pacific/malaysia-seeks-amicable-solution-south-
china-sea-dispute/#.VeO84n1HSf5, Accessed 8/30/2015, rwg)
He urged all parties to support China and the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations in speeding up negotiations for a code of
conduct that governs behavior in the resource-rich and busy waterway. Its not a constructive move to exercise double standards on the
issue, Wang told reporters. China
and ASEAN are capable enough to work together to maintain the peace
and stability in the South China Sea. China, Taiwan and several ASEAN members the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and
Brunei have wrangled over ownership and control of the South China Sea in a conflict that has flared on and off for decades. Tensions rose
last year when China began to build artificial islands in the Spratly chain, which the U.S. and Beijings rival claimant countries fear could impede
freedom of navigation and overflights in a major transit area for the worlds oil and merchandise. The disputes have led to deadly
confrontations between China and Vietnam, and Washington and governments in the region are concerned that boosting military deployments
increase the risk of miscalculations and accidental clashes that can spiral out of control. U.S. officials have said that the amount of land
reclaimed by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan in the disputed area over the last 45 years totaled a mere 40 hectares (100 acres),
a fraction of the more than 1,200 hectares (3,000 acres) reclaimed by China in the last 18 months alone. Malaysian
Foreign Minister
Anifah Aman said ASEAN must play a role to ensure an amicable settlement in the dispute over the sea .
Above all, we must be seen to address these issues peacefully and cooperatively, he said at the start of a meeting with his ASEAN
counterparts. We have made a positive start but we need to do more. Washington has said it would call for a halt to aggressive actions by
China and other rival nations to allow a diplomatic solution to a problem that threatens regional stability. Washington is not a party to the
conflict and has a policy of not taking sides in the territorial dispute, but says a peaceful resolution of the problem and freedom of navigation in
the disputed waters were in the U.S. national interest. China rejects any U.S. involvement. Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario said
Tuesday that Manila would support the U.S. call in the meetings this week, but would not agree to be bound by it unless China and other
countries locked in the conflict also do so. As a means of de-escalating tensions in the region, the Philippines fully supports and will proactively
promote the call of the United States on the three halts a halt in reclamation, halt in construction and a halt in aggressive actions that could
further heighten tensions, del Rosario said in a statement. We have to emphasize, however, that this should not in any way legitimize the
status of the features reclaimed by China, he said. Australia will also register its concerns over rising tensions in the South China Sea at the
Malaysian meetings, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said in a statement. ASEAN foreign ministers will meet their counterparts from the U.S.,
Chinese, Australia and several other countries in the ASEAN Regional Forum, an annual Asian security gathering, in Kuala Lumpur on Thursday.

(--) South China Sea is stableno risk of major conflict:

Alton Harrington, 8/8/2015 (staff writer, Settle South China Sea dispute under UN convention,
http://theweatherspace.com/2015/08/08/102031-settle-south-china-sea-dispute-under-un-
convention/, Accessed 8/30/2015, rwg)

Arase said that ifChina decided to pursue a "balance of power" approach in the South China Sea issue, the
United States will "change its strategy from engagement to China to probably lean toward stronger
hedging". "The paragraphs relating to the South China Sea are causing some problems", he added. "Before criticizing others, Japan must first
take a good look at its own words and behavior", Wang said. "The overall situation in the South China Sea is stable and
there is no possibility of major conflict", said a statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry early yesterday morning.
Tensions remain between Japan and China as Beijing claims the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
(--) China wont confront US over South China Sea:
Leonard Schuette, 10/15/2014 ((English) Benign or Bellicose? China and the South China Sea: the
ambiguities of the Peaceful Rise Paradigm, http://ifair.eu/think/english-benign-or-bellicose-china-and-
the-south-china-sea-the-ambiguities-of-the-peaceful-rise-paradigm/, Accessed 8/30/2015, rwg)

Therein, history provides a blueprint for Chinas intentions. Whether legitimate or not, the Middle Kingdom will not concede its
claims in the South China Sea. First and foremost, the United States will need to acknowledge that central Chinese interests are at
stake and consequently ponder the options to face it. Whatever option it choses, a strategic reorientation is needed. Assuming that
domestic stability in China will prevail, its economic and in the long term military capacities will make
a direct confrontation with the U.S. costly. If the Superpower does not decisively rather than symbolically pivot to Asia, the
days of American dominance in the region seem counted. A better option for the West appears to be to recognize Chinese claims whilst
integrating it into multilateral frameworks such as the planned Trans-Pacific Partnership. This form of appeasement is no guarantee to stop
further claims nor will it please Japan, Vietnam or others, but it provides the best chance to accommodate Chinas return as a great power and
deescalate the situation in East Asia.

(--) No major factors for conflict in the South China Sea:

Brendan Taylor, 2014 (Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian
National University, Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, The South China Sea is Not
a Flashpoint, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Taylor_PDF.pdf,
Accessed 8/30/2015, rwg)
Thucydides famously wrote that war is motivated by honor, fear, and interest. This article contends that none of these
factors are at play in the South China Sea. This region doesnt engage the interests of Asias great
powers to the extent so often portrayed. Beijings purported energy security fears in the South China Sea are
typically exaggerated, as are anxieties that the U.S. -led Asian alliance network would unravel if
Washington fails to confront Chinese assertiveness in this body of water. And questions of honor are substantially less
pertinent to the South China Sea than to East Asias traditional flashpoints such as the status of Taiwan or the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. When
assessing Washingtons willingness and ability to honor alliance commitments, the United States closest strategic partners will continue to pay
most attention to U.S. actions on the Korean Peninsula and in the East China Sea.

(--) Wont escalate to involve the US or China

Piper 12 (David, writer for Fox News, David against Goliath on the South China Sea, 5/10,
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/05/10/david-against-goliath-on-south-china-
sea/#ixzz20W2KsqZ3)
China has been watching the growing presence of the U.S military in the region and analysts suggests this latest dispute is linked to the joint
exercise, which involves dealing with terrorists who have taken over an oil rig in the South China Sea. But the Philippines should be not expect
help from the U.S. if it turns into a shooting war, says Subramaniam. Given this capability gap, the Philippines knows it has a lot to gain
through alliance with the U.S. But any
hope that the U.S. would provide 'cover' from China over disputed
maritime borders in the South China Sea, in case of a military conflict, is unlikely to be met, as there is
little for Washington to gain by openly siding with Manila in any dispute with Beijing. China has been
prepared to support its claims in the South China Sea with military action in the past. In 1974, China and Vietnam fought a short battle over
the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, a battle that China won. Despite
the rhetoric coming out of China at the moment of
backing up its territorial claims by force, it's still questionable if it wants to cause an international crisis now while
it continues to grow economically and militarily.
 Cyber-Security Add-on Answers
Risk is systemically over-estimated and has been for decades
Healey, 2013 Atlantic Council Cyber Statecraft Initiative director, 2013
(Jason, No, Cyberwarfare Isn't as Dangerous as Nuclear War, 3-20,
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/20/cyber-attacks-not-yet-an-existential-
threat-to-the-us, ldg)

Eighty years ago, the generals of the U.S. Army Air Corps were sure that their bombers would easily
topple other countries and cause their populations to panic, claims which did not stand up to reality. A study of the
25-year history of cyber conflict, by the Atlantic Council and Cyber Conflict Studies Association, has shown a similar dynamic
where the impact of disruptive cyberattacks has been consistently overestimated. Rather than theorizing about

future cyberwars or extrapolating from today's concerns, the history of cyberconflict that have actually been fought, shows that cyber
incidents have
so far tended to have effects that are either widespread but fleeting or persistent but narrowly
focused. No attacks, so far, have been both widespread and persistent . There have been no
authenticated cases of anyone dying from a cyber attack. Any widespread disruptions, even the 2007 disruption
against Estonia , have been short-lived causing no significant GDP loss .

Cyber-attacks are difficult to mount and limited in their damage:

Thomas Rid, 2012 3/2012 (Think Again: Cyberwar,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar#6)
"A Digital Pearl Harbor Is Only a Matter of Time." Keep waiting. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta delivered a stark warning last summer:
"We could face a cyberattack that could be the equivalent of Pearl Harbor." Such alarmist predictions have been
ricocheting inside the Beltway for the past two decades, and some scaremongers have even upped the ante by raising the alarm about a cyber 9/11. In his 2010
book, Cyber War, former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke invokes the specter of nationwide power blackouts, planes falling out of the sky, trains
derailing, refineries burning, pipelines exploding, poisonous gas clouds wafting, and satellites spinning out of orbit -- events that would make the 2001 attacks pale
in comparison. But the empirical record is less hair-raising, even by the standards of the most drastic example
available. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command (established in 2010 and now boasting a budget of more than $3 billion), shared his worst fears
in an April 2011 speech at the University of Rhode Island: "What I'm concerned about are destructive attacks," Alexander said, "those that are coming." He then
invoked a remarkable accident at Russia's Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant to highlight the kind of damage a cyberattack might be able to cause. Shortly
after midnight on Aug. 17, 2009, a 900-ton turbine was ripped out of its seat by a so-called "water hammer," a sudden surge in water pressure that then caused a
transformer explosion. The turbine's unusually high vibrations had worn down the bolts that kept its cover in place, and an offline sensor failed to detect the
malfunction. Seventy-five people died in the accident, energy prices in Russia rose, and rebuilding the plant is slated to cost $1.3 billion. Tough luck for the Russians,
but here's what the head of Cyber Command didn't say: The ill-fated turbine had been malfunctioning for some time, and the plant's management was notoriously
poor. On top of that, the key event that ultimately triggered the catastrophe seems to have been a fire at Bratsk power station, about 500 miles away. Because the
energy supply from Bratsk dropped, authorities remotely increased the burden on the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant. The sudden spike overwhelmed the turbine,
which was two months shy of reaching the end of its 30-year life cycle, sparking the catastrophe. If anything,
the Sayano-Shushenskaya incident
highlights how difficult a devastating attack would be to mount. The plant's washout was an accident at
the end of a complicated and unique chain of events. Anticipating such vulnerabilities in advance is
extraordinarily difficult even for insiders; creating comparable coincidences from cyberspace would be a
daunting challenge at best for outsiders. If this is the most drastic incident Cyber Command can conjure up, perhaps it's time for
everyone to take a deep breath.

(--) Zero impact to cyber-attacks --- overwhelming consensus of qualified authors goes neg

Colin S. Gray 13, Prof. of International Politics and Strategic Studies @ the University of Reading and
External Researcher @ the Strategic Studies Institute @ the U.S. Army War College, April, Making
Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not Falling, U.S. Army War College Press,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1147.pdf

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE SKY IS NOT FALLING This analysis has sought to explore, identify, and explain the
strategic meaning of cyber power. The organizing and thematic question that has shaped and driven the inquiry has been So what? Today we
all do cyber, but this behavior usually has not been much informed by an understanding that reaches beyond the tactical and technical. I have
endeavored to analyze in strategic terms what is on offer from the largely technical and tactical literature on cyber. What can or might be done
and how to go about doing it are vitally important bodies of knowledge. But at least as important is understanding what cyber, as a fifth domain
of warfare, brings to national security when it is considered strategically. Military history is stocked abundantly with examples of tactical
behavior un - guided by any credible semblance of strategy. This inquiry has not been a campaign to reveal what cy ber can and might do; a
large literature already exists that claims fairly convincingly to explain how to . . . But what does cyber power mean, and how does it fit
strategically, if it does? These Conclusions and Rec ommendations offer some understanding of this fifth geography of war in terms that make
sense to this strategist, at least. 1. Cyber can only be an enabler of physical effort. Stand-alone (popularly misnamed as strategic)
cyber action is inherently grossly limited by its immateriality. The physicality of conflict with cybers human
participants and mechanical artifacts has not been a passing phase in our species strategic history. Cyber action, quite independent of action
on land, at sea, in the air, and in orbital space, certainly is possible. But the
strategic logic of such behavior, keyed to anticipated
success in tactical achievement, is not promising. To date, What if . . . speculation about strategic cyber attack

usually is either contextually too light, or, more often, contextually unpersuasive . 49 However, this is not a great strategic truth, though
it is a judgment advanced with considerable confidence. Although societies could, of course, be hurt by cyber action, it is important not to lose
touch with the fact, in Libickis apposite words, that [i]n
the absence of physical combat, cyber war cannot lead to
the occupation of territory. It is almost inconceivable that a sufficiently vigorous cyber war can
overthrow the adversarys government and replace it with a more pliable one. 50 In the same way that the
concepts of sea war, air war, and space war are fundamentally unsound, so also the idea of cyber war is unpersuasive. It is not impossible, but
then, neither is war conducted only at sea, or in the air, or in space. On the one hand, cyber war may seem more probable than like
environmentally independent action at sea or in the air. After all, cyber warfare would be very unlikely to harm human
beings directly , let alone damage physically the machines on which they depend. These near-facts (cyber
attack might cause socially critical machines to behave in a rogue manner with damaging physical consequences) might seem to ren - der cyber
a safer zone of belligerent engagement than would physically violent action in other domains. But most likely there
would be serious
uncertainties pertaining to the consequences of cyber action, which must include the possibility of
escalation into other domains of conflict. Despite popular assertions to the contrary, cyber is not likely to prove a
precision weapon anytime soon. 51 In addition, assuming that the political and strategic contexts for cyber war were as serious as
surely they would need to be to trigger events warranting plausible labeling as cyber war, the distinctly limited harm likely to
follow from cyber assault would hardly appeal as prospectively effective coercive moves. On balance, it is
most probable that cybers strategic future in war will be as a contribut - ing enabler of effectiveness of physical efforts in the other four
geographies of conflict. Speculation about cyber war, defined strictly as hostile action by net - worked computers against networked
computers, is hugely unconvincing. 2. Cyber defense is difficult, but should be sufficiently effective. The structural
advantages of the offense in cyber conflict are as obvious as they are easy to overstate. Penetration and
exploitation, or even attack, would need to be by surprise. It can be swift almost beyond the imagination of those encultured
by the traditional demands of physical combat. Cyber attack may be so stealthy that it escapes notice for a long while, or it might wreak digital
havoc by com - plete surprise. And need one emphasize, that at least for a while, hostile cyber action is likely to be hard (though not quite
impossible) to attribute with a cy - berized equivalent to a smoking gun. Once one is in the realm of the catastrophic What if . . . , the world
is indeed a frightening place. On a personal note, this defense analyst was for some years exposed to highly speculative briefings that
hypothesized how unques - tionably cunning plans for nuclear attack could so promptly disable the United States as a functioning state that our
nuclear retaliation would likely be still - born. I should hardly need to add that the briefers of these Scary Scenarios were obliged to make a
series of Heroic Assumptions. The
literature of cyber scare is more than mildly reminiscent of the nuclear
attack stories with which I was assailed in the 1970s and 1980s. As one may observe regarding what Winston Churchill
wrote of the disaster that was the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, [t]he terrible Ifs accumulate. 52 Of course, there are dangers in the cyber
domain. Not only are there cyber-competent competitors and enemies abroad; there are also Americans who make mistakes in cyber
operation. Furthermore, there are the manufacturers and constructors of the physical artifacts behind (or in, depending upon the preferred
definition) cyber - space who assuredly err in this and that detail. The
more sophisticatedusually meaning complex
the code for cyber, the more certain must it be that mistakes both lurk in the program and will be
made in digital communication. What I have just outlined minimally is not a reluc - tant admission of the fallibility of cyber, but
rather a statement of what is obvious and should be anticipat - ed about people and material in a domain of war. All human activities are more
or less harassed by friction and carry with them some risk of failure, great or small. A strategist who has read Clausewitz, especially Book One of
On War , 53 will know this. Alternatively, anyone who skims my summary version of the general theory of strategy will note that Dictum 14
states explicitly that Strategy is more difficult to devise and execute than are policy, operations, and tactics: friction of all kinds comprise
phenomena inseparable from the mak - ing and execution of strategies. 54 Because of its often widely distributed character, the physical
infrastruc - ture of an enemys cyber power is typically, though not invariably, an impracticable target set for physical assault. Happily, this
probable fact should have only annoying consequences. The discretionary nature and therefore the variable possible characters feasible for
friendly cyberspace(s), mean that the more danger - ous potential vulnerabilities that in theory could be the condition of our cyber-dependency
ought to be avoidable at best, or bearable and survivable at worst. Libicki offers forthright advice on this aspect of the subject that deserves to
be taken at face value: [T]here is no inherent reason that improving informa - tion technologies should lead to a rise in the amount of critical
information in existence (for example, the names of every secret agent). Really critical information should never see a computer; if it sees a
computer, it should not be one that is networked; and if the computer is networked, it should be air-gapped. Cyber
defense
admittedly is difficult to do, but so is cyber offense. To quote Libicki yet again, [i]n this medium [cyberspace] the best
defense is not necessarily a good offense; it is usually a good defense. 56 Unlike the geostrategic context for nuclear-framed competition in
U.S.Soviet/Russian rivalry, the geographical domain of cyberspace definitely is defensible. Even when the enemy is
both clever and lucky, it will be our own design and operating fault if he is able to do more than disrupt and irritate us temporarily. When
cyber is contextually regarded properly which means first, in particular, when it is viewed as but the latest military domain for defense
planningit should be plain to see that cyber performance needs to be good enough rather than perfect. 57 Our Landpower, sea
power, air power, and prospectively our space systems also will have to be capable of accepting combat damage
and loss, then recovering and carrying on. There is no fundamental reason that less should be
demanded of our cyber power. Second, given that cyber is not of a nature or potential character at all likely to parallel nuclear
dangers in the menace it could con - tain, we should anticipate international cyber rivalry to follow the competitive dynamic path already fol -
lowed in the other domains in the past. Because the digital age is so young, the pace of technical change and tactical invention can be startling.
However, the mechanization RMA of the 1920s and 1930s recorded reaction to the new science and technology of the time that is reminiscent
of the cyber alarmism that has flour - ished of recent years. 58 Wecan be confident that cyber defense should be able to
function well enough , given the strength of political, military, and commercial motivation for it to do
so. The technical context here is a medium that is a constructed one, which provides air-gapping options for choice regarding the extent of
networking. Naturally, a price is paid in convenience for some closing off of possible cyberspace(s), but all important defense decisions involve
choice, so what is novel about that? There is nothing new about accepting some limitations on utility as a price worth paying for security. 3.
Intelligence is critically important, but informa - tion should not be overvalued. The strategic history of cyber over the past decade confirms
what we could know already from the science and technology of this new domain for conflict. Specifically,
cyber power is not
technically forgiving of user error. Cyber warriors seeking criminal or military benefit require precise
information if their intended exploits are to succeed. Lucky guesses should not stumble upon passwords, while
efforts to disrupt electronic Supervisory Con - trol and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems ought to be unable to
achieve widespread harmful effects. But obviously there are practical limits to the air-gap op - tion, given that control (and
command) systems need to be networks for communication. However, Internet connection needs to be treated as a potential source of serious
danger. It is
one thing to be able to be an electronic nuisance, to annoy, disrupt, and perhaps delay. But it is quite
another to be capable of inflicting real persisting harm on the fighting power of an enemy. Critically
important military computer networks are, of course, accessible neither to the inspired amateur
outsider, nor to the malignant political enemy. Easy passing reference to a hypothetical cyber Pearl
Harbor reflects both poor history and ignorance of contemporary military common sense.
We dont have to prove that a cyber attack is impossible, just that high costs will cause
enemies to seek alternatives
Rid, 2012 reader in war studies King's College London, and McBurney, professor Agents and
Intelligent Systems Group Department of Informatics @ King's College, 12 (Thomas and Peter, Cyber-
Weapons, The RUSI Journal Volume 157, Issue 1, p. 6-13)

A thorough conceptual analysis and a detailed examination of the empirical record corroborates our
hypothesis: developing and deploying potentially destructive cyber-weapons against
hardened targets will require significant resources, hard-to-get and highly specific
target intelligence, and time to prepare, launch and execute an attack. Attacking secured
targets would probably require the resources or the support of a state actor; terrorists are unlikely culprits
of an equally unlikely cyber-9/11. The scant empirical record also suggests that the greatest
benefit of cyber-weapons may be using them in conjunction with conventional or
covert military strikes, as Israel did when it blinded the Syrian air defence in 2007. This leads to a second
conclusion: the cost-benefit payoff of weaponised instruments of cyber-conflict may be far more

questionable than generally assumed: target configurations are likely to be so specific that
a powerful cyber-weapon may only be capable of hitting and acting on one single
target, or very few targets at best. The equivalent would be a HARM missile that can only destroy one unique emitter,
not a set of targets emitting at the same frequency. But in contrast to the missile where only the seeker needs to be
specifically reprogrammed and the general aviation and propulsion systems remain functional the
majority of
modular components of a potent cyber-weapon, generic and specific, would have a rather
short shelf-life after discovery. Two findings contravene the debate's received wisdom. One insight
concerns the dominance of the offence. Most weapons may be used defensively and offensively. But the information age,
the argument goes since at least 1996, has offence-dominant attributes.37 A 2011 Pentagon report on cyberspace again
stressed the advantage currently enjoyed by the offense in cyberwarfare.38 But when
it comes to cyber-
weapons, the offence has higher costs, a shorter shelf-life than the defence, and a
very limited target set.39 All this drastically reduces the coercive utility of cyber-
attacks. Any threat relies on the offender's credibility to attack, or to repeat a
successful attack. Even if a potent cyber-weapon could be launched successfully once, it would be
highly questionable if an attack, or even a salvo, could be repeated in order to achieve a political
goal. At closer inspection cyber-weapons do not seem to favour the offence. A second insight concerns the risk of
electronic arms markets. One concern is that sophisticated malicious actors could resort to asymmetric methods, such as
employing the services of criminal groups, rousing patriotic hackers, and potentially redeploying generic elements of
known attack tools. Worse, more complex malware is likely to be structured in a modular fashion. Modular design could
open up new business models for malware developers. In the car industry, for instance,40 modularity translates into a
possibility of a more sophisticated division of labour. Competitors can work simultaneously on different parts of a more
complex system. Modules could be sold on underground markets. But if our analysis is correct, potential
arms
markets pose a more limited risk: the highly specific target information and
programming design needed for potent weapons is unlikely to be traded
generically. To go back to our imperfect analogy: paintball pistols will continue to be
commercially available, but probably not pre-programmed warheads of smart missiles.

(--) Cyber-assaults are too hard to pull off

Birch, 2012 Foreign Correspondent Associated Press, 10-1-12 (Douglas, Forget Revolution: What
would really happen if the lights went out Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget_revolution)
But pulling
off a cyber assault on that scale is no easy feat. Weiss agreed that hackers intent on inflicting this kind of
long-term interruption of power would need to use a tool capable of inflicting physical damage. And so far, the
world has seen only one such weapon: Stuxnet, which is believed to have been a joint military project of Israel and the United States. Ralph
Langner, a German expert on industrial-control system security, was among the first to discover that Stuxnet was specifically designed to attack the Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) at a single site: Iran's Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The computer worm's sophisticated programs, which infected
the plant in 2009, caused about 1,000 of Natanz's 5,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges to self-destruct by accelerating their precision rotors beyond the speeds at
which they were designed to operate. Professionals like Weiss and others warned that Stuxnet was opening a Pandora's Box: Once it was unleashed on the world,
they feared, it would become available to hostile states, criminals, and terrorists who could adapt the code for their own nefarious purposes. But two years after the
discovery of Stuxnet, there are no reports of similar attacks against the United States. What has prevented the emergence of such copycat viruses? A 2009 paper
published by the University of California, Berkeley, may offer the answer. The report, which was released a year before Stuxnet surfaced, found that in
order to
create a cyber weapon capable of crippling a specific control system ---- like the ones operating the U.S. electric grid -- six
coders might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA system.
Even then, the report says, hackers likely would need the help of someone with inside knowledge of how the
network's machines were wired together to plan an effective attack. "Every SCADA control center is
configured differently, with different devices, running different software/protocols," wrote Rose Tsang, the report's author. Professional
hackers are in it for the money -- and it's a lot more cost-efficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used
computer programs like the Windows operating system, used by banks and other affluent targets, than in one-of-a-kind SCADA
systems linked to generators and switches. According to Pollard, only the world's industrial nations have the means to use the
Internet to attack utilities and major industries. But given the integrated global economy, there is little
incentive, short of armed conflict, for them to do so. "If you're a state that has a number of U.S. T-bills in your treasury, you have an economic interest
in the United States," he said. "You're not going to have an interest in mucking about with our infrastructure."

(--) No incentive or technical capability much more likely attackers steal info than
destroy infrastructure
Larry Clinton 2012 president of the Internet Security Alliance 10/18/12, Exaggeration Unfairly
Shifts Responsibility, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/10/17/should-industry-face-more-
cybersecurity-mandates
We need to start by clearly defining which problem we are trying to solve. Our government has not yet done that. Theoretically,
nation
states, like China, have the ability to disable our nations critical infrastructure through cyber attacks just as
they do through conventional weapons. However, why would the Chinese want to destabilize the U.S.
economy by taking down our electric grid? China owns about half our debt, and destabilizing our economy
would also destabilize Chinas economy. Yes, terrorists or rogue states may have this desire, but they do not have
the technical ability to launch the ultra- sophisticated cyber attacks that would have this effect, and probably
wont for some time. Moreover, its wrong to say that the recently failed Senate bill, which would have established government
standards for private-sector cyber security, is an answer to catastrophic cvber threats. The ultra-sophisticated cyber attacks known as
Advanced Persistent Threat could disable critical infrastructure. However, these ultra-sophisticated attacks are not going to he stopped by
the adoption of best practices and standards. These are nonstandard attacks that overcome defenses like intrusion detection, firewalls and
passwords. This is a much more sophisticated problem than would be solved by the Senate bill. And who should be responsible for protecting
us from these nation-state attacks? Lets say the damage Panetta refers to was caused by conventional means, rather than digital. Would we
expect the owners of power plants to erect their own anti-aircraft weapons and radar? A recent Blooinberg study reports that if Lhis maximum
defense were paid for by the private sector, it would require a tenfold increase in spending by private companies. A mandate of this sort would
drive companies off-shore, crippling employment and innovation and not solving the problem. While
the unrealistic threats of
crumbling critical infrastructure may be useful rhetoric to scare senators into voting on issues they have not studied
adequately, the real cyber problem lies elsewhere. Nation states and criminals are not trying to take down the
Internet; they want to use it to steal intellectual property. This is an entirely different sort of attack requiring a completely
different solution that promotes collaboration between industry and government. Cyber security is not simply a technical or standards issue. It
has strategic and economic dimensions as well, and none of the current proposals deal with it in a truly comprehensive way that goes beyond
standards to deal with economics and incentives at both a domestic and international level.
Terrorists arent even thinking about cyber-terror
Smith and Wallman, 10-11-11 (Austin and Laurenne, Terrorists yet to turn to cyberattacks
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/10/11/Terrorists-yet-to-turn-to-cyberattacks/UPI-
50111318362866/?spt=hs&or=tn)

Despite their prevalent, tech-savvy online presence, terrorist groups may not have demonstrated the ability -- or
even interest in attaining the ability -- to launch cyberattacks, experts said. National security experts aren't arguing against better
security -- they are just noting that while the United States faces many cyberthreats, terrorism may not yet be one of them.
Terrorist groups' use of the Web has proliferated in the past decade and, former CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden says, they are "cybersmart." But
Hayden said the organizations, perhaps surprisingly, haven't exhibited evidence that terrorists use cyberspace for anything
beyond support activities. "I don't know why. I really don't," he said last week in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Intelligence
Committee. Cybersecurity expert James Lewis, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in a telephone interview that causing
physical damage and devastation using the Web is far more complicated than the minor attacks terrorist groups
may be able to launch. "They are looking for a splashier event," Lewis said. "They want explosions and things that will play well on the nightly
news. Making the traffic lights blink on and off might not do that for them." A key example of physical destruction caused by a cyberattack is the June 2010 Stuxnet
virus, which infected computers at a nuclear reactor in Iran, causing it to malfunction and ultimately break down. The undetected virus caused the closure of the
plant and setbacks in Iran's uranium enrichment program. Experts said that U.S. infrastructure is no better protected than the reactor in Iran was but that
terrorist groups aren't likely to have the resources to gain the internal knowledge they would need to infiltrate
U.S. systems. "It's actually a lot harder not because of the technical component, but because of the amount of intelligence required to do it properly," said
Allan Friedman of the Center for Technology Innovation at the Brookings Institution, a nonpartisan Washington think tank. Liam O Murchu, of Symantec Corp., a
California software security company, said, Stuxnet "has shown us that you can write a piece of software that will be able to change how a factory works." To
replicate a similar attack -- one focused on a particular target -- would require precise insider intelligence and millions of dollars. Terrorist
organizations
could look at Stuxnet as a blueprint, Murchu said in a telephone interview, and they could also look at it to learn certain techniques. However,
"the sophistication of the threats would depend on how skilled the attackers were and how much insider information they had," he said. Lewis, whose research at
CSIS focuses on Internet policy and cybersecurity, said the only organizations with the capability to do this -- at the moment -- are
nation states.