Ancient Philosophy 17 (1997)

Mathesis Publications 317

The What-Is-X? Question in the Posterior Analytics

Greg Bayer

Whenever we ask what something is, the meaning of the question depends on
precisely how we wish to be enlightened. Sometimes the lexical meaning of a
word is all we are looking for-how it is generally used in our language. Some-
times we are seeking a reliable way to identify what we are asking about in order
to be able to pick it out. Sometimes we are wondering what 'kind' of thing it is,
what familiar class of things it belongs to. And sometimes, already familiar with
its lexical definition, how to identify it, and the class it belongs to, we seek fur-
ther enlightenment through asking what it is. What are we looking for then?
This last sort of What-is-X? question is my concern. It is the sort we ask when
we mean 'What is it to be X?' or 'What is the nature of X?' while already being
quite familiar with what we are asking about, as when we ask, 'What is thunder?'
for example, or 'What is pride?' or 'What is a human being?' What precisely are
we seeking in such cases? If it is a definition of some kind, the view that defini-
tion is merely a means of identification will not suffice-in such cases we are
already perfectly able to identify and pick out the Xs. Perhaps we are looking for
a proper classification, the precise kind of thing each is. This of course often sat-
isfies many What-is-X? questions, until we realize that the X can often be classi-
fied in many ways: human beings are featherless bipeds or civilizable animals as
much as they are discursive rationalists. As Aristotle notes (regarding classifica-
tion based on the method of division), after any classification we can still ask
why-why this classification and not some other (APo ii 5.91b37-39)? The sort
of What-is-X? question I am considering seeks something even beyond simply
classifying. It seeks to determine which classification is to be favored over oth-
ers, and why.
I propose to examine what makes this special sort of What-is-X? question pos-
sible to ask and answer-a kind of 'transcendental investigation' of such ques-
tions. My guide will be Aristotle's discussion of definition in the Posterior
Analytics, because there he seems to engage in just such an investigation as part
of his examination of scientific inquiry. In particular, I shall focus on Aristotle's
notion of definition as an explanation, and his contention in APo ii 2 that 'know-
ing what something is is the same as knowing why it is' (90a31-32). On this
view, the ultimate answer to the What-is-X? question is an explanation of some
kind or, in effect, an explanatory definition; specifically, it is an explanation of
all the various ways the definiendum can be identified and classified, i.e., picked
out as an existent entity. I hope to show why this makes great sense-at least
with the special sort of question I am dealing with-for at least two reasons. In
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contrast to one common notion of definitions that treats them all merely as a way
of identifying or picking out, Aristotle's explanatory definition satisfies two fun-
damental intuitions we have about certain definitions: that they must be unique,
and that they must be searched for. When we ask the special sort of What-is-X?
question I am examining, we are expecting (i) to find just one answer-not the
variety of ways the X can be identified or even classified-and (ii) that answering
it involves a search, perhaps a scientific investigation. Further, I shall argue that
these expectations suggest certain ontological views-commitments-which,
unsurprisingly, are quite compatible with Aristotelian hylomorphism, but which
are not limited to it. That is, the very fact that we ask such questions, I hope to
show, involves certain ontological expectations that the notion of definition as
identifying or classifying fails even to hint at.
Of course not every What-is-X? question need involve explanations, investiga-
tions, uniqueness, or ontological commitments. When we ask, 'What is a trian-
gle?' we need only be told, 'three-sided figure'-we are not looking for why it is
three-sided; and alternative answers like 'three-angled figure' are perfectly
acceptable. But what I am stressing, and what I think motivates Aristotle's analy-
sis, is that, again, there are What-is-X? questions that go beyond such identifica-
tions, and the fact such questions are asked demands a special kind of definition
as an answer.
In addition, I shall suggest a solution to an important problem raised by this
(Aristotelian) analysis ofthe What-is-X? question, a problem lying at the heart of
Aristotle's theory of definition. If, as I am suggesting, in answering such ques-
tions we often go beyond classifying to searching for some sort of explanation,
still, how does this square with Aristotle's frequent emphasis on definitions as
classifications? How does his familiar genus-differentia formula square with his
notion in Posterior Analytics ii of definition as explanation? As I have suggested,
Aristotle's answer is that the explanatory definition, the definition that ultimately
answers the What-is-X? question, is meant to explain every possible 'classifica-
tion definition' (as I shall call it) for X. I shall be considering two illustrations of
this from De Partibus Animalium-illustrations of the theory at work in Aristo-
tle's biological investigations.
I begin, however, with Aristotle's theory of definition itself, found in the first
ten chapters of Posterior Analytics ii, and specifically with the question of where
he locates definition in his more general theory of scientific demonstration.

Definition and Demonstration

Indeed, the task of much of APo ii is to show the role of definition in demon-
strative science. Thus when Aristotle says that 'knowing what something is is the
same as knowing why it is', he explains that this is because both the ti Eon,
'what it is', and Oux ti Eon, 'why it is', can serve as the middle term of a demon-
stration proving the thing's existence. Aristotle's paradigm example in APo ii 2
and 8 (and elsewhere) is a lunar eclipse. 'The earth's blocking the moon's light'
is, first of all, the atnov, 'explanation' or 'explanatory principle' for lunar
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eclipses. Second, it can be taken as a middle term in a syllogism in which the

existence of the eclipse can be inferred:
Eclipse belongs to the earth's blocking the moon's light.
The earth's blocking the moon's light belongs to the moon.
Eclipse belongs to the moon. (See ii 8.93a30-31.)
The presence of a lunar eclipse is thus explained by and inferred from this middle
term; its presence is guaranteed by the presence of the middle term, by earth's
blocking of the moon's light. And third, this blocking of lunar light is, in fact,
what a lunar eclipse really is, the ultimate answer to one's question, 'What is a
lunar eclipse?'
Aristotle claims in ii 8 that in this way demonstration makes a definition
8ilAOV, 'manifest' (93b 17). He has made it clear earlier that a definition cannot
be demonstrated, in the sense that no definition can be inferred from prior
premises. Definitions are themselves principles and hence cannot be inferred (ii
3); and even if a definition could appear as the conclusion of a demonstration-in
fact, a certain sort can so appear, as we shall soon see-its being a definition
could not be inferred unless this was already assumed among the premises (ii 4).
Nonetheless, by Aristotle's explanatory notion of definition, elements of a defini-
tion are part of a demonstration proving the definiendum's existence. They are
on display in it, as it were-e.g., the 'earth's blocking the moon's light' in the
demonstration above.
Take another example from ii 8, regarding thunder (93b7-12). The explanatory
middle term Aristotle mentions is 'extinguishing of fire', the explanation given
by Anaxagoras and Empedocles, who treat the noise we recognize as thunder as a
very loud cousin of the hissing sound that results from snuffing out a fire (i.e.,
lightning).l Hence, according to this theory, the occurrence of this noise can be
inferred from the presence of this condition in clouds. I have argued (Bayer 1995,
254-256) that the demonstration Aristotle has in mind regarding thunder actually
consists of two syllogisms. In part such an interpretation is an attempt to make
sense of this quite elliptical passage in ii 8, and specifically to account for the
four terms Aristotle seems to mention there (instead of just three needed for one
syllogism). More broadly, however, it is a recognition of the fact that scientific
investigation involves two important tasks, and that Aristotle understands this
(although he does not make it explicit).2 First, what is being investigated must be
precisely identified. Second, the explanation being sought must account for the

I See Meteor. ii 9 .369b 11-24. Interestingly, Aristotle's own account of thunder is very different,
at 370a25ff. It is as if Aristotle is saying the correct account is unimportant in the Posterior
Analytics-we are doing philosophy of science in APo, not science proper.
2 It first must be shown that in the Posterior Analytics Aristotle is in fact concerned with scien-
tific investigation, as much as 'with the teaching offacts already won', as Barnes 196911975,77 has
argued. Recent writing on APo has done just that: McKirahan 1992, 199, e.g., claims to have shown
that in APo 'we are dealing not with finished demonstrative sciences but with techniques for discov-
ering and organizing facts'. See also Bolton 1987, l30-146 and Bayer 1995,243 nn7 and 8.
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property 01' properties by whicb it is identified. Each task is effected with the help
of a syllogism (or chain of syllogisms). What can be called the 'identification'
syllogism uses an identifying property as a middle term, from which the exis-
tence of the definiendum can be inferred. The 'explanation' syllogism has the
explanatory principle as a middle term, from which the identifying property can
be inferred. Thus a chain of (at leastf two syllogisms is involved-one to iden-
tify, one to explain what is identified.
So in the case of thunder, Aristotle mentions fOUT terms (93b9-12): both 'thun-
der' and 'noise' he designates as A-we can designate them as Ath and An-
'extinguishing of fire' is B, 'clouds' is C. Thus the chain of two syllogisms is:
(Ath ) Thunder belongs to (8) extinguishing of fire.
~ (B) Extinguishing of firebelongs to (An> a certain noise. 4
- - - - - - (Ath ) Thunder belongs to (An) a certain noise.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
":::::- ~ A certain noise belongs to (g the clouds.
(Ath ) Thunder belongs to (C) the clouds.
Here in the identification syllogism, the presence of the identifying property, the
'certain noise' which we recognize as thunder, guarantees the presence of thun-
der. In the explanatory syllogism the explanatory principle, 'extinguishing of
fire', accounts for that 'certain noise' as a property of thunder.
To be sure, the second (identification) syllogism here is next to triviaJ.5 But the
genernl task of properly identifying a subject of scientific investigation, which it
represents" is far from trivial. Moreover, it must be separated from the ultimate
task of explaining what is identified. Aristotle's well known distinction in APo i
13 between knowing 'the fact' (to on) and 'the reason' ('to OU)'tl) shows he
understands this. 1be fact that planets are near, for example, can be inferred from
their being non-twinklers; and thus planets can be identified by their inability to
twinkle. But conversely, it is their nearness that is the reason for their inability to
twinkle; inferring non-twinkling from nearness indicates one understands the
reason or explanation for planets' non-twinkling. Further, in ii 8 when Aristotle
considers the case of a lunar eclipse, he introduces a middle term from which the
presence of a lunar eclipse can be inferred, but which clearly is no explanation.
"The full moon's inability to create shadows, with nothing obvious [e.g., clouds]
between it and us' (93a37-39) seems quite contrived as a property of lunar

] The delllOllSb'ative chain accounting for a phenomenon like thunder, e.g., would perhaps
involve prior premises regarding the source of the fire being extinguished, the general principles
involw:d in snuffing (Q: a fire (that it causes a noise), etc. Thus severnl explanatory syllogisms would
be involved.
~ Aristode mentions ~ ru; at 93a22-23, which I (following Sorabji 1980, 186) take to mean
"acedain noise', refening to the padicnlar noise easily n:cognized as thunder.
5 Pabaps this is why Aristotle. in his shorthand ketch of the thunder demonstration at the end of
ii 8. does not bother to treat (explicitly) 'noise' as a separate (fourth) tenn----this largely trivial syllo-
gism would n:sulL But it is clear from an earlier mention of thunder in the chapter (see previous
note)---namely, that our "grasp' ofthunderis through "acertaiu noise ['I'O<pOC; nc;] in clouds' (93a22-
23}---tbatben:gards 'noise' as a separate tennjust as much as 'thunder' or 'clouds'.
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eclipses, but it is precisely that-an identifying property, i.e., a phenomenon that

accompanies all and only lunar eclipses. 6 It thus is contrived as a means of prop-
erly identifying lunar eclipses without giving the slightest hint of how they can
be explained. It is as if Aristotle, by using this contrived term, is deliberately
straining to make this distinction between identifying property and explanation.?
Now the sort of demonstration mentioned in ii 8, such as the one regarding
thunder, is meant to 'manifest' the definition of what is being defined, again, by
first identifying it, then accounting for one of its identifying properties. So one
finds in such a demonstration all the elements of the definition Aristotle proposes
for thunder (in ii 10): 'noise [resulting] from the extinguishing of fire in clouds'
(94a5). From the demonstrative chain above we can 'read off' the definition:
Ath =df An from B in C.
But this demonstration's making the definition 'manifest' goes beyond simply
being able to read off the definition. In effect, the demonstration provides a way
of arguing for one. The first syllogism shows that the extinguishing of fire in
clouds is the aXnov for thunder because it accounts for the certain noise that is a
property of thunder. But the second syllogism tells us this is indeed a property of
thunder because occurrences of thunder we can experience can be inferred from
it (albeit trivially). And the entire demonstration, therefore, can be judged as a
whole on the basis of whether it can give an account of such actual occurrences.
The same can be said for the definition manifested in the demonstration; it can be
judged on the basis of whether it tells the right explanatory story to account for
those phenomenal occurrences.
This 'save the appearances' approach by which scientific demonstration and
principles can be verified, is an important part of Aristotelian methodology. In
investigating the nature of anything, he says in De Anima iI, we usually must
begin with its attrihutes, primarily phenomenal, to learn about the nature of the
thing (the soul, for example).
For when we have the attributes <of the thing> presented to us
in the imagination, either all or most of them, we are then best
qualified to speak about <the thing's> essence (ouota); for the
principle of every demonstration is a statement of what <the
thing> is (ti Eon), so that definitions that do not contribute to
knowledge of the attributes, or even help us make conjectures
about them, are clearly only dialectical and empty (402b25-
403a2).
And in De Caelo iii 7, Aristotle reminds us that the principles of our scientific
demonstrations can be ill-chosen (as were those of many of his predecessors, he

6 This is Aristotle's notion OftOLOV, 'property', in the Topics, e.g., at i 5.l02aI8-l9: what is
'predicated convertibly of [a subject]'.
7 This might suggest another reason an identifying and non-explanatory fourth term ('noise') is
needed in the thunder demonstration-just as an identifying, non-explanatory fourth term ('full
moon's inability to create shadows .. .') is needed in the eclipse demonstration.
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claims) if we forget they must be 'judged from their results', namely, in terms of
'the phenomena given in perception' (306a15-17).
An important illustration of this is found in Metaphysics vii 17 where Aristotle
is, in effect, concerned with the What-is-X? question when applied to an ouota
instead of events like thunder and eclipses-a human being, for example. At the
climax of the discussion of substance in Metaphysics vii, Aristotle tells us that in
seeking to find what a 'composite' substance is (form with matter), such as a
human being, we must still seek an explanatory principle (see vii 17.1041b2-9).
But this requires us to 'render the [What-is-X?] question articulate'
(Otap9pwoav1:ar;). Simply to ask, 'What is a human being?' is to treat humanity
as a simple unity, and to miss its necessarily composite, form-in-matter character.
Thus we must ask instead, 'What is the atnov for this matter being a definite
thing', viz., a human being-in other words, 'Why is this body human?' At this
point in the Metaphysics the answer is that it is because 'the matter' is enformed
by human form or essence-the human soul. Just as 'to be a shelter' accounts for
why these bricks and mortar are a house, so does the human soul account for this
organic body being organized the way it is as a human body.
Now of course the Aristotelian student of nature, if he is true to his hylomor-
phism, must go further than this. He must tell the detailed story of how specific
features of the human body are to be accounted for by human form. It is this sort
of account that Aristotle gives, for example, in De Partibus Animalium iv,
regarding human bipedalism. His argument (686a27ff.), which presupposes
many details of his hylomorphic view of human being, amounts to the following.
Human nature or essence (ouota) entails thinking and intelligence (1:0 VOEtV Kat
<ppoVEtv)-this is the human task or function (EpyOV, a27-29).8 Most animals,
however, have much more weight in their upper extremities than humans do, thus
requiring forelegs to support them; such excessive weight-and hence excessive
'earthy' matter-'hampers the motion of the intellect and the general sense'
(a30-31, Peck), which takes place in the vicinity of the heartY By design the
human body has less upper-body earthy material in order to avoid hampering
such 'motion'. As a result, humans both are more capable of intelligence than
other animals and need less upper body support-and thus need only two legs.
Furthermore, Aristotle argues that human inteiligence is the explanation for
another characteristic feature of the human body, hands. He contends that 'the
most intelligent of animals is the one that [is] able to make good use of the most
instruments' in order to pursue ends (687a18-19, Peck). This makes humans nat-
ural inventors and users of a vast variety of instruments. As a consequence,
humans have hands to fashion and use these instruments; a hand is an 'instrument

R This of course echoes (or anticipates) EN i 7.1098a7-8: EPYOV uv8pol1tou \jIuxil~ EVEPYWI
KU'ta 'A.6yov f\ 1.l1] aVEu 'A.6you. Thus we can add that the human epyov involves rational thought
(Ka'ta A6yov): a human is a rational animal. (See also EE ii 1.l2l9b39-l220a2, Pol. vi 13.1332b3-S.)
9 See PA iii 3.665alO-13. The 'motion' here is the physical motion associated with 'sensation'
generally (4.666all-13), but more precisely with the q>avtacrta, 'which is a kind of motion' (De An.
iii 3.428bl!), and the KOlY1] alcrlh]crt~, of which q>uv'tacrl.lu'tu are affections (Mem. i 1.4S0alO-ll).
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for instruments' (a21). Such a complex tool would by useless to any animal inca-
pable of deliberating on a variety of means to pursue a single end. Moreover,
Aristotle is adamant concerning the direction of explanation in this case: 'it is not
true to say that man is the most intelligent animal because he possesses hands,
but he has hands because he is the most intelligent animal' (a16-18, Peck).
Now whatever one thinks of these arguments concerning hands and two-foot-
edness, the Aristotelian motivation for making them is clear: since intelligence is
at the core of humanity, it must account for all essentially human phenomena,
including the unique structure of the human body.1O It must, accordingly, account
for any classification based on such phenomena. Indeed, if 'two-footed animal' is
offered as part of what might be called a 'classification definition' for human,
one still might ask why humans can be so classified. In effect, any such definition
as an answer to the What-is-X? question simply raises a further question-which
can only be answered by an explanatory definition accounting for this and all
possible classifications. Insofar as rational intelligence accounts for two-footed-
ness, possession of hands, along with other human properties like civilizability, it
earns its role as the fundamental element of the 'ti Eon for humanity.

More Illustrations from Aristotle's Biology

There are many examples of this sort of inquiry regarding other animals in De
Partibus. Just as we might begin a study of humans with such features as 'two-
footed', 'possessing hands', and 'rational', and end with an explanation of the
former two in terms of the last, investigations concerning any other animal might
also begin with a list of identifying attributes and culminate with (or approach)
an arrangement of them into an explanatory story. It is true that no such perfectly
neat picture regarding the investigation of a single animal is found in anyone
passage in PA; the treatise is arranged more in accordance with animal 'parts'
than species or genera. Nevertheless, regarding any such class, numerous sepa-
rate passages, each accounting for a single property or group of properties, can be
pieced together to give an often fairly complete explanatory picture of the class
and its identifying properties.
At any rate, it is clear that in PA Aristotle intends to go beyond the numerous
catalogues of attributes for animal groups found in Historia Animalium; it is in
De Partibus that we find many attempts at determining the explanatory links

10 One might object that Aristotle never explicitly gives the definition of human as 'animal with
intelligence' or 'rational animal' or the like, and that here in PA iv he seems unconcerned with defin-
ing. Two points can be made in reply. First, surely if Aristotle is concerned here in this passage with
expounding on human 'nature and essence', he is concerned with parts (at least) of a definition of
humanity, and hence parts of an answer to the question 'What is a human?' And second, it is in keep-
ing with Meta. vii 17 to discuss this question not by explicitly posing it, but through inquiries of the
form, 'Why is this matter thus?' i.e., 'Why is (this particular sort of) body human?' This is precisely
the kind of question this passage in PA iv is posing: 'Why is this two-footed body possessing hands
uniquely human?' The answer, which involves intelligence and rationality (see n8). is presented as an
utnov, which, given the doctrine of APo ii discussed above, is meant to be definitory.
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joining these various attributes. I I Or, as Aristotle announces as his method in PA:
'First we must describe the attributes eta.
O"UJ.1~E~TJK6'ta) associated with each
kind (YEVO~), i.e., those belonging essentially (Ka9' au'ta) to all the animals <of
the group>, and then to try to describe the explanations for them' (i 5.645a36-
b3). We can take a brief look at two illustrations of this, one involving one of the
J.1EYHna YEVTJ (the 'principal kinds' that are the most general classes of ani-
mals)-namely, birds-and another involving a species--elephants.
As part of his most sophisticated discussion of classification in PA i 2-4, Aris-
totle criticizes the method of classification that depends on division alone.
Roughly the method of Plato in the Sophist and Statesman, OtaipE(Jt~ involves
dividing a given principal kind into two sub-classes each by means of a differen-
tia, then dividing each of these sub-classes into two more, again each in accor-
dance with one differentia, and so on, until the ultimate species are
reached--essentially the scheme of a simple Porphyrian tree. One salient feature
of the method is that each class is assigned just one differentia, and each differen-
tia represents one class. Now Aristotle the biologist realizes that this one-differ-
entia-at-a-time method of division is unworkable, given the vast diversity of life;
for one thing, many differentiae are shared by several different classes, which the
biologist would wish to distinguish. 12 Aristotle's solution is (at least in some
cases) to accept popular designations for the most general classes-like birds-
and assign to each such class several differentiae at once, anyone of which could
be shared by other classes, but the conjunction of which would be limited to the
given class (644b 1-7). Each of these differentiae is still taken from a scheme of
division-each is one of two (or possibly more) divisions-but no longer is there
a one-to-one correspondence between one differentia and one species or genus.
The result is the sort of list of identifying attributes for each class one finds in
abundance in Historia Animalium. For example, birds are no longer to be classi-
fied simply as winged; they are winged, feathered, two-footed, possessing beaks,
etc. (as in HA ii 12). This list is derived from several divisions, instead of just
one: birds are winged and two-legged, instead of possessing forelimbs (503b32-
35); they have beaks, not mouths with lips and teeth (504a20-22); they have
feathers, not scales or hair (a30-31), etc.
Now as we have noted, Aristotle's method does not end with a list of attributes,
but with an explanation of those attributeS-Of arranging them into a single
explanatory story. Just as in the case of human beings, not all identifying features

II Lennox 1987. 109 notes that HA stands to PA roughly in this relation: while 'HA gives us the
relevant descriptions of the features of the animal in question, assigns those features under the appro-
priate wider kind, [it] leaves it up to PA to ... [quoting Aristotle, PA ii 1.646alO-ll] "investigate the
causes through which each [animal] is the way it is".'
12 The method of division described here is dichotomy-division of each class into two sub-
classes. Balme 1987, 101, however, has pointed out that the problems plaguing dichotomy are prob-
lems for any division-trichotomy or any 'polytomy' -in which a single differentia represents a
single class.
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have the same explanatory priority-intelligence explains two-footedness and

possession of hands, not the reverse-so in the case of birds, not all of the
attributes of birds (on the list in HA ii 12) are on the same explanatory level. This
is clear from a passage in PA ii 16, which gives an account for why birds have
beaks, not jaws:
A bird, at any rate, has nothing one might call a nose. This is
the case because instead of jaws it has what is called a beak.
The explanation for this is that the natural organization of birds
is as follows. It is two-footed and winged, so that its neck and
head must be light in weight and its breast narrow. Thus in
order to be useful in defense as well as nutrition, the beak has a
bonelike character (being) narrow because of the head's small-
ness. In this beak are the passages for smell, but nostrils could
not possibly (be placed there). (659b4-l3)
Here we have an explanatory story linking the several properties of birds. The
story develops from an explanatory kernal, 'two-footed and winged'. Being
winged for flight, birds are generally small (697b25-6); and being two-footed
they must be small-headed, perhaps to keep from being top-heavy. Their beak
must accordingly be small-'narrow'-and so especially hard-'bonelike'-to
compensate for its smallness, in order to perform its dual function of mastication
and defense. And given a bird's (generally) small head, there is no room for a
nose or nostrils, but only enough room for small breathing holes in the beak.
Thus from the fact that birds are winged and have two feet, we can understand
why they are generally small, have (hard) beaks (as opposed to a mouth or snout)
and no nose or nostrils.
And so we first ask, What is a bird? We then learn a list of characteristics asso-
ciated with birds-winged, two-footed, possessing a beak, noseless, etc. We
could answer the 'tl 0n question with a conjunction of such characteristics-
this would be an identification or classification definition. But this list would
simply raise the further question: What is to account for all these characteristics
appearing in one animal? The answer to this question will be the most informa-
tive answer to the question, What is a bird? It will fulfill the requirements for a
definition, and in the most complete way possible.
Let us consider one other example from De Partibus. Part of what it is to be an
elephant is to be a huge, heavy land animal (659a2-3, 26-27), and Aristotle seems
to think that elephants spend most of their time in swamps (a2-3); add to this
their perhaps most prominent feature, their trunk (658b33-34). If we were to ask
the What-is-X? question-'What is an elephant?'- this would have to be 'ren-
dered articulate' (a fa Meta. vii 17) in terms of particular kind of body (the 'mat-
ter') easily recognizable as an elephant's, viz., 'Why is this body, one of whose
most prominent features is a trunk, that of an elephant?' which would be analo-
gous to 'Why is this body, one of whose most prominent features is being two-
footed, that of a human?' In the case of the elephant, the answer would take the
form of an explanation, or explanatory definition, accounting for the prominent
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lCa9' auto attribute, possessing a trunk, in terms of other, more explanatorily

fundamental-and hence more definitory-attributes. Aristotle gives just such an
explanation (at 6S8b33ff.), which we can summarize as follows:
(1) Elephants have a 'double character': they are land animals (hence
they breathe with lungs), but live in water (swamps).
(2) They are huge, heavy creatures requiring much support from their
legs.
(3) Because of (1), they must have access to air even while submerged.
(4) For this Nature has designed their trunk, which being long must be
pliable and snake-like, in order for the elephant to avoid obstacles (tree
branches and the like) with this long appendage.
(5) Because of (2), elephants' legs cannot perform the task of grasping
for food.
(6) But the pliable trunk is ideally suited for this purpose; elephants use
it for gathering food.
Thus being heavy swamp dwellers can be considered the explanation for ele-
phants' having a trunk, which doubles as both a flexible snorkel and a substitute
hand. One could give the ti Eot!, 'What-is-it?' of elephant as 'animal with
trunk' -but the ultimate answer would be the explanation accounting for this and
all other elephantine characteristics.

Different Sorts of Definitions: A Shifting Theory of Reference

All these examples involve (at least) three different sorts of definitions, the
three Aristotle lists in APo ii 10. The first can be called the 'identification' defini-
tion, e.g., 'a certain noise in clouds' (94a7-8), 'two-footed animal with hands' or
'animal with trunk' (and insofar as it identifies by placing in a class, it can be
considered a 'classification' definition). This serves to pick out accurately what
is being defined by means of a coextensive feature, i.e., a property or conjunction
of properties; in the above two-syllogism account of the thunder demonstration
of ii 8, the identification definition serves as the conclusion of the 'explanatory'
syllogism. 13 The second definition is the alnov, the undemonstrated explanatory
principle (a9-1O, 11-12) that acts as a middle term in the 'explanatory' syllogism
accounting for the property. This syllogism indicates that the presence of the
property can always be inferred from the presence of the explanatory principle: a
thunderous rumbling in clouds accompanies-because it results from-an extin-
guishing of fire in them. A third definition is the combination of the first two, the
entire explanatory story, such as 'noise [resulting] from the extinguishing of fire
in clouds' for thunder (as). It is this definition that most fully defines, and most
closely resembles the demonstration. In fact, Aristotle says that this sort of defi-
nition differs from demonstration only tTl 9EOt, 'in arrangement' of terms (a2).

13 Aristotle refers to this sort of definition in APo ii 10 as the 'conclusion of the demonstration of
It Ean' (94a8-9),
 327

We have noted that something being defined-the X we are asking about-has

numerous properties that can be inferred in this way, which in effect can act as
'identification definitions': human being defined as 'featherless biped', 'civiliz-
able animal', 'rational animal', etc. Yet Aristotle stresses an important vOo~ov,
or 'received opinion', about definition-an important intuition we have about
it-that a definition is unique, and hence there is only one ultimate answer to the
What-is-X? question (seeking a definition). In answer to those who might suggest
there are different definitions of the same thing for different people, Aristotle in
the Topics counters that 'for those declaring that all such definitions accord with
truth ... , it will turn out that they give many definitions' for one thing (vi
4.141 b34-36). For Aristotle, giving two definitions of something is to give no
definition at all-we in effect still do not know what underlies the two 'defini-
tions'. Thus defining something in tenns of several alternative properties is sim-
ply to ask what is the underlying entity responsible for them. It is to seek the
explanatory principle-the single 'explanatory' definition responsible for all the
many 'identification' definitions. Thus if human rational intelligence is at the
core of what it is to be human, it will account for whatever is detennined to be a
human property.
One gathers from Aristotle's analysis of definition in APo ii 8-10 that, in
effect, there is a progression of What-is-X? questions leading to the ultimate
answer. First, there is what could be called an imperfect identification definition.
One very often picks out what one intends to investigate in an imperfect, inciden-
tal way-which is the case at the start of most scientific inquiries. This is to
know the thing K"a'tu OUIl~~llK6s, 'incidentally', as Aristotle says in ii 8, which
is not to know what it is at all (93aI9), because we are unable to infer from 'inci-
dental' knowledge even 'that it is' (a25-26). Because we have not yet found an
identifying property, we are unable even to fonnulate an identification syllogism
from which we can reliably infer the presence of what we are defining.
For example, heat as discussed in PA ii 2 has this uncertain status. Aristotle
there surveys the various ways we consider things 'hot', or 'hotter' than other
things. He finds cases where the tenns are applied incidentally, and perhaps mis-
takenly, as when we depend entirely on our sensation of heat, which may be dis-
torted by the condition of our own body (648b 15-17). It is at this prescientific
stage that we might ask, 'What is heatT while referring merely to an incidental
(and perhaps misleading) attribute. Another example from PA ii (and one
quintessentially Aristotelian) concerns misidentifying blood. Expecting to learn
about blood's essential nature by examining 'blood' outside the body, the layman
(i.e., one uninitiated in Aristotelian biology) is not really examining a true speci-
men of what he hopes to explain. Blood outside the body has lost its heat and,
strictly speaking, is no longer truly blood but a mere 'substratum', 14 because it is

14 See PA ii 3.649b20-27: true blood is said here to be analogous to 'boiling water'-just as

when boiling water ceases to boil it loses its nature, so blood when it loses its heat ceases to be true
blood because heat is part of the A.Oyo~ of blood.
328

unable to perform its functions of forming, nourishing, and adding to the bulk of
the body.IS Thus someone examining cooled blood is not properly picking out
the subject of his research, but something merely incidental to it; for Aristotle, it
is as if he is examining the hand of a corpse, in order to learn about the nature of
the hand (see GA i 19.726b22-24, Meta. vii 1O.1035b24-25). By the same token,
lunar eclipses could not be identified as such, say, by primitive humans who,
having seen just one, might regard it as a freakish event; only repeated experi-
ences of eclipses would enable them recognize the essentially repeatable and
even predictable nature of eclipses. Only then would they understand precisely
what they were asking in the question, 'What is a lunar eclipse?'
Thus with more and more careful observations we begin to discern true proper-
ties and hence true identifying definitions. This is to grasp 'something of the
thing itself', as Aristotle phrases it at APo ii 8.93a22. At this point, and only at
this point, we are able to raise our second What-is-X? question. Recognizing that
heat always and only accompanies blood in (or just having left) the body, we are
in a position to ask what this warm fluid called blood is for, and hence, what it is.
Without knowing that heat is an essential feature we could never come to learn
blood's true nature, because we would be misconceiving the very question,
'What is blood?' Knowing blood's true nature, conversely, helps us to account
for the presence of heat in it. And in the case of heat itself, to ask what it is is to
seek the account for all the various ways it can be properly identified. 16
This progression of interpretations of the What-is-X? question in effect con-
firms another important Evi5o~OV about this class of questions, and about defini-
tion as well. In APo ii 8 Aristotle several times speaks of 'seeking' (1;T]'tEtV) and
'finding' (EUp(j)~EV, Aa~pa.VE'tat) definitions (e.g., 93a26, a27, a35, b4-5, bI5),
implying that definitions, at least some definitions, are more than simply stipula-
tions or even identifications-they must be inquired about and sought. To ask
what something is, even once one has established an identification definition, is
to engage in an investigation for an explanation. Once eclipses were identified as
regular and even predictable phenomena, for example, people still wanted to
know what an eclipse is-what is going on when one occurs. Once blood is iden-
tified as a necessarily warm fluid, we still want to know what it is-what is the
explanation for its always being warm.
Contrast this view of the What-is-X? question and definition with the usual
view, what can be called the 'nominalist' view of definition. I mean here the
Lockean notion of 'nominal' essence, which is nothing more than the 'abstract

15See PA ii 1 647a34-b4, GA ii 6.744b33ff. and Peck 1942, lxiv, 232-233 note a.

16The ultimate answer, Aristotle's definition of heat he gives in GC ii 2.329b26-29 is: 'the hot is
the bringing together [OUYKp'ivov I of what is like'. entailing a 'separating off of the foreign', i.e., a
kind of purifying or refining. This perhaps would amount to a kind of explanatory definition,
although Aristotle does not (so far as I know) show how this would account for all the various mani-
festations of heat. Yet it is easy to see how this definition would explain the importance of heat in the
body, e.g., in 1tElJlt~, . concoction , , which in both digestion in the stomach (PA ii 3.650a2-5) and in
other organs (PA iii 7.670a20ff.) requires heat.
 329

idea' the mind assigns to a group of things, 'taking occasion from the similitude
it observes amongst them to make abstract general ideas';17 or what amounts to
nearly the same thing, Hobbes's notion of definition as nothing more than the
agreed upon 'settling on the significations of... words' (Leviathan 1.4)- By Robin-
son's helpful classification of definitions in his short treatise Definition, Lockean
definition seems to be a 'word-thing' definition, which has a 'word' as the
definiendum and which picks out an actual 'thing'; the Hobbesian definition
seems to qualify as either a 'word-thing' or 'word-word' definition, the latter
pointing to another term or phrase (and which hence may be non-existent or oth-
erwise indeterminate).18 But what is important about both is that neither can be
considered as 'thing-thing' definition, which links two actually existing items-
for example, Aristotle's linking of the actually observed phenomenon of thunder,
or of the elephant's trunk, with underlying explanatory principles. As a conse-
quence, the Hobbes-Locke nominalist view- 'nominalist' because both treat def-
inition only as a descriptive phrase or 'name'-begins and ends with
identification. Once we have described what identifies the definiendum, accord-
ing to this view the 'search' for a definition is complete (provided the definition
is internally consistent)-or indeed is never really undertaken if the definition is
stipulated, or if one of many identifying properties is arbitrarily chosen as defini-
tory. If, on the other hand, we are to retain the important intuition that definitions
must be sought, we must regard the purely nominalist view of definition as sus-
pect.
This is especially ironic if one recalls that in Hobbes's and Locke's day many
of the controversies raging in the new mechanistic physics arose over alternative
attempts to define familiar and fundamental terms, like motion and force.
Regarding force, for example: Is it to be defined as mv, mass times velocity
(Descartes),19 or rna, mass times acceleration (Newton),20 or mv2 , mass times the
square of velocity (Leibniz Discourse on Metaphysics XVII)? For the nominalist
definer, the question becomes moot and the controversy becomes meaningless.
Why not simply 'settle upon' one of these arbitrarily (provided each is internally
consistent) and leave it at that? Or to take a suggestion from a (near) contempo-
rary nominalist definer, why not start with the definiens and then arbitrarily
assign a term to it? Just as we can assign the term 'puppy' to the definition 'small
dog', as Popper 194511985,91-93 suggests, so we can (if we wish) designate rna

17 Essay Concerning Human Understanding II.3.13. Nominal essences are opposed to 'real
essences', which are not mere creatures of the mind, but the 'real, internal, but generally (in sub-
stances) unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend' (Essay
III.3.IS). Although this sounds a great deal like Aristotle's explanatory principles, Locke's strict
empiricism requires that such 'insensible' entities be entirely beyond our ken.
18 Robinson 1954, 18.
19 See Principles of Philosophy 11.43. Thus Descartes seems to equate force and 'quantity of
motion' or momentum; see also Principles 11.36.
20 Principia Law of Motion II: 'The alteration of motion [acceleration] is ever proportional to
the motive force impressed'.
330

as 'force', provided other relevant designations (e.g. 'momentum' to mv) are con-
sistent with this. But on the contrary, the very fact that a question like 'What is
force?' was taken seriously as the basis for a scientific inquiry, let alone scien-
tific controversy, would seem to belie the nominalist contention that such a ques-
tion could be settled by fiat or arbitrary agreement. Asking 'What is force?'
involves a search for the proper answer. For that matter, our first intuition about
definition seems incompatible with the nominalist notion as well. Since there
may be many properties with which to pick out any given definiendum, there
seems to be no way the nominalist can prevent many definitions for anyone
thing-many answers to the question of what it is.
To be sure, the issues dividing Aristotle from the Hobbes-Locke-Popper view
involve more than just the nature of definition. (Nor am I suggesting, anachronis-
tically, that Aristotle's notion of definition can help us better understand the
modern notion of force.) What I am suggesting is that the intuitions underlying
seventeenth century questions like 'What is force?' (and perhaps twentieth cen-
tury questions like 'What is light?' and 'What is gravity?') are better understood
in terms of the Aristotelian view of definition as explanatory.
In contrast to the nominalist view, the Aristotelian view can be characterized
as entailing what might be considered a special theory of reference for the What-
is-X? question-in effect, a shifting reference. In the first version of this ques-
tion, the X is loosely determined and refers to phenomena that may in fact be
incidental to the actual entity one is asking about. After more experience, it refers
to various (coextensive) properties, which accurately identify or classify it. This
identification/classification may be quite elaborate and itself the conclusion of
much investigation; it may in fact be an elaborate collection of properties of what
is being investigated, as we saw in the case of birds or elephants. Finally, perhaps
after much more investigation, once an explanatory principle for this collection
of properties is found. the X refers to this principle; at this point the What-is-X?
question is effectively answered. But it should be noted that once this explana-
tion is determined, the earlier references are not now ignored. They are in effect
the explananda that serve to test the final explanatory answer; they are the phe-
nomena by which the explanatory definition is to be justified and argued for. The
point to be emphasized is that this process is entailed by any instance of the sort
of What-is-X? question that begins with some cognizance of X. It is this progres-
sion from one reference to another, from phenomena to identification to explana-
tion, that makes such a question possible.

Ontological Underpinnings
At this point. an objection could be raised. Why should what X is and the
explanation for X be the same? Contrary to this contention of Aristotle's in APo ii
2, we might note that 'prima facie ... understanding the why of something is not
understanding that thing, but some other thing, namely its cause, that which is
 331

responsible for it being the case' .21 And so why should we accept Aristotle's the-
sis of definition as explanation?
It should be stressed again that Aristotle does not treat every definition as
explanatory. 'Triangle' can be defined nominally as a figure with three angles, or
three sides-i.e., expressing what the term means;22 similarly with 'goat-stag'
and the like. There is no reason to suggest Aristotle would not want to define, for
example, 'bachelor' as 'unmarried male' and leave it at that. In such cases we
should not expect to go on to find some explanation for the nominal, or what I
have been calling the 'identification', definition.23 Some definitions of this sort
can be very elaborate. 'Void', for example, must be defined in terms of an elabo-
rate theory, but for Aristotle this must be entirely nominal since void does not
exist; no explanatory definition-no explanation for existence-can be sought
for something that does not exist. 24 Nevertheless, it is Aristotle's point in intro-
ducing the notion of explanatory definition that it would be wrong to suppose
that all definitions are merely nominal or just means of identification. Again, this
is best seen in examining the What-is-X? question, and recognizing that it can
have different meanings: sometimes it is answered by an identification, some-
times it looks further, for an explanation. Perhaps this can be made clearer by the
following possibility. We usually ask, 'What is a bachelor?' expecting nothing
other than a nominal definition. Yet suppose we were to ask the question already
knowing that bachelors were 'unmarried males', but with the assumption that
bachelorhood is, say, a disease. 25 The question 'What is a bachelor?' would then
take on a whole new meaning, one that could not be entirely satisfied by a nomi-
nal definition. We would, in effect, be seeking an explanation for why some
males fail to marry.
Second, Aristotle does not assume that for every entity for which an explana-
tory story can be told, the explanation is restricted to that entity. When he repeats
(in APo ii 8) his claim that 'knowing what something is (ti Eon) is the same as

21 Kosman 1973, 376 raises this objection, only to reject it and essentially defend the Aris-
totelian view.
22 Perhaps Aristotle would define most mathematicals in this way-nominally, and hence not
through an explanatory definition. If so, an Aristotelian might countenance alternative definitions for
mathematicals-alternative ways of 'constructing' triangles or circles, e.g., and hence alternative
ways of identifying them-though there is no indication (so far as I know) Aristotle himself would
allow this.
23 There is some questior. as to precisely what Aristotle's notion of a definition that is a 'formula
of what a name means' (APo ii 10.93b30-1)-usually dubbed a 'nominal' definition-refers to, and
specifically whether it can refer to non-existents. For varying views on this issue, see Bolton 1976,
530-532, Demoss and Devereux 1988, 146, and Bayer 1995,247-248. If Aristotle's nominal defini-
tion can refer to things like 'goat-stag' and 'void', then my notion of 'identification' definition is not
quite as broad as Aristotle's nominal definition. I am treating the identifying property as a means by
which the existence of the definiendum can be proven.
24 Concerning nominal definitions in Aristotle for such terms as 'void' or 'infinite', see Demoss
and Devereux 1988, 144.
25 Sorabji 1980, 186-187 raises a similar hypothetical possibility.
332

knowing why it is', he makes it clear that some entities are 'self-explanatory' ,26
but some must be explained in terms of something external. Thus eclipse must
ultimately be explained in terms of general principles oflight and occultation, the
same principles at work in any production of shadows. Even if thunder is
explained as 'extinguishing of fire', the entire explanation for what this fire in
clouds is, why it is extinguished (and so on) will have to be told. And for that
matter, human intelligence must be described in terms of a wider conception of
intelligence. Nevertheless, Aristotle believes it is to risk infinite regress to sup-
pose that every entity must be explained in terms of others and that nothing is
self-explanatory. Thus there must be entities that are defined, and explained,
entirely in terms of themselves. (These are the ultimate principles of APo ii 9.)
At any rate, our objector may not be so concerned with these self-explanatory
entities as with the others. He may still insist on knowing why we do not define
even non-self-explanatory items simply in terms of identifications. Why must
there be this progression to an explanatory definition? Why can we not simply
define any natural entity, for which an explanation may later be sought, in terms
of one of its properties? Yes, the entity undoubtedly has many properties, and we
must choose one in order to define it properly, but why can this not be a matter of
common usage or even stipulation? And though we may go on to attempt to
explain all these properties, including the one we initially choose as definitory,
why should we include this explanation as part of the definition? Or in Aris-
totelian terms, why consider both identification (or classification) and explana-
tion as part of the tl Eon? Why not define human being, e.g., as 'featherless
biped', which we then will later go on to explain in terms of rational intelligence?
All this is a possible means of engaging in scientific investigation. But on Aris-
totelian grounds, it is to overlook a very important ontological point. Any natural
entity like a human being-any natural, compound ouota-surely has both what
might be called ontological surface and depth. That is to say, it has perhaps
numerous phenomenal properties by which it becomes manifest and by which it
is identified and classified. But it also must have an underlying unity responsible
for all of them-which allows us to consider them all as properties of one thing.
Discovering this unity is a matter of inquiry and investigation that only starts
with identifying which phenomenal features are genuine properties and which
are merely incidental. This ontological structure Aristotle of course describes in
terms of matter and form, potentiality and actuality: the human body, a phe-
nomenon to be studied by the student of nature, is a highly developed matter with
the potential of performing the functions associated with humanity-which func-
tions explain the details of that organization. For our purposes, however, we need
only recognize that this ontological analysis is meant to be of a single composite,
a single structure, a single entity (albeit another cardinal doctline of Aristotle's
hylomorphism). To treat defining X and explaining it as entirely separate tasks

26 Barnes 1994, 217 uses this tenn for the at-nov that is 1;0 aino, as opposed to &/../..0, at 93a5-6.
 333

would be to ignore this unity, allowing it to remain concealed. Thus we must

treat the two tasks, identifying and explaining, as two parts of the same investi-
gating endeavor into the nature of a single entity. And again, all this is reflected
in our fairly common use of the What-is-X? question, when we are seeking the
underlying nature of something, and hence its underlying unity.27
Deparment of Philosophy
College of Wooster
Wooster OH 44691

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334

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