September 2017 Hindu Leads Printed

LEAD
Understanding the Chinese mind
M. K. Narayanan
SEPTEMBER 01, 2017 00:04 IST
UPDATED: SEPTEMBER 01, 2017 00:29 IST
Any belief that China has been deterred by Indias rm riposte at Doklam could be misplaced
Just when the stand-off between India and China over the Doklam plateau threatened to go the way of the 1986-
1987 Sumdorong Chu incident (Arunachal Pradesh), the two sides agreed to step back and disengage, thus
avoiding a confrontation. The Indian side has pulled back its personnel and equipment to the Indian side of the
boundary, while China has agreed to make necessary adjustments and deployment on its part. It is unclear,
however, whether China will patrol the region, which it claims to have been doing earlier. Road construction will
not continue for the present.
Behind the scenes, quiet diplomacy by the two sides, no doubt, led to the defusing of what could have been a
serious crisis. Chinas interest in Doklam is not of recent origin and has a long history. Those on either side of the
divide currently claiming victory must, hence, pause to think what the future holds. Jumping to conclusions at
this point could amount to missing the wood for the trees.
Indias actions in Doklam are easy to discern, viz. going to the help of a treaty partner in its time of need, a decision
which incidentally has security ramifications for India. Chinas reasons are more complex and labyrinthine but,
nevertheless, cannot be easily wished away.

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To savour victory without understanding the factors at work would be a serious mistake.
Agreeing to
disagree: ending Going into the entire gamut of Sino-Indian relations to try to decipher what prompted China
the Doklam
stand-off
to moderate its stand after weeks of high decibel propaganda may not provide all the
answers we seek.
To begin with, China and India have a kind of competitive coexistence. While professing
friendship, both sides nurse a mutual suspicion of each other at times prompting several
degrees of alienation. Both countries remain wary of each others intentions and actions. Yet,
and despite the long-time rivalry between the two countries, we may need to look elsewhere
for an explanation.
Understanding the way the Chinese mind works is, hence, important. The Chinese mind tends to be relational, i.e.
dictated by context and relationship, and its methodology tends to be obtuse. When the Chinese state that they
have halted road building in the disputed Doklam area, while adding that they may reconsider the decision after
taking into account different factors, what China means is that it is willing to wait to implement its decision, but
at a time of its choosing when an opportunity exists for a settlement suited to its plans. Little finality can,
therefore, be attached to any of Chinas actions.
Conict avoidance
Any belief, hence, that China has been deterred by Indias firm riposte at Doklam could be misplaced. Since the
China-Vietnam conflict in 1980, China has avoided getting into any outright conflict. It has preferred attrition a
protracted campaign to secure a relative advantage to forceful intervention.
By stepping back from a confrontation with India over a minor issue at this time, what it had in mind were two
significant events, viz. the BRICS summit in China in September and the forthcoming 19th Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party. Also, it possibly believes that this would help China dilute global perceptions about its
aggressive designs.

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This may not be as far-fetched as it may seem. China is playing for higher stakes in a
globalised world. For instance, on the South China Sea, it has preferred to employ
confidence-building measures to deal with the U.S. while awaiting a more opportune
moment to assert its claims.
Lessons from
Doklam China is even seeking more opportunities for cooperation, rather than confrontation, with
the U.S. on trade matters. In the case of the U.S., China believes that relations between the
two are adequately multilayered, providing scope for mitigating areas of mutual benefit.
The BRICS summit and the 19th Party Congress both have high priority for China today.
Nothing will be permitted to disrupt either event. Extraneous factors would not be allowed to affect this situation.
For President Xi Jinping, presiding over the BRICS Summit at this juncture will help consolidate his informal
leadership of the group. As the undisputed leader of BRICS, China believes it can take a signal step towards global
leadership.
China is currently seeking to reshape the regional and international order, and is keen to fine-tune its Great
Power diplomacy. It, hence, needs to be seen as preferring peace over conflict. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is
a potent instrument in this direction, but needs a peaceful environment to succeed. Limited wars or conflicts,
even with the possibility of successful outcomes, would damage Chinas peaceful image globally. Active power
projection could at best provide a pyrrhic victory when the goal China has set is much higher.
The 19th Party Congress is even more important from President Xis point of view. It is intended to sustain his
legacy and leave his stamp on the Party in the mould of Chairman Mao. To achieve comprehensive success, he
needs peace to achieve his target. Till then everything else will need to wait.
This is again a delicate moment for China on the economic planes. It needs to redress the economic imbalance
between its coastal regions and the hinterland States. One stated objective of the BRI is linking these regions with
Chinas land neighbours. Chinas growth rate is actually declining, debt levels are dangerously high, and labour is
getting more expensive. At this moment, hence, it is more than ever dependent on international trade and global
production chains to sustain higher levels of GDP growth. It can ill-afford to be seen as a disruptor rather than a
pillar of the existing economic global order. For the present, development, therefore, is the cardinal objective.
The Achilles heel of the Chinese economy is the lack of resources, specially oil. Oil from the Gulf region is critical
for Chinas growth. Peace in Asia is thus vital to ensure uninterrupted supplies of oil. Uncertainties and
disruptions across the Asian region would hamper Chinas economic progress.
Apart from this, China also faces several cross-border security challenges, in addition to unrest in Tibet and
Xinjiang. Embarking on military engagement outside the countrys borders could aggravate Chinas problems. At
a time when China is intent on sustained economic growth at one level, and aspiring to be a Great Power at
another level, this could prove to be a dampener.
For all the above reasons, China currently leans towards the pragmatic when it comes to relations with countries
other than those in its immediate periphery in East Asia. It is not keen to follow a policy adopted by its new-found
strategic ally viz. Russia which has paid a high cost for its interventionist policies. China tends to take a longer
term view of its future and, despite the rising crescendo of nationalism in China today, is anxious not to upset the
international political or economic order. For this reason alone, it would shun a conflict with India in the Doklam
area.
Not a status quoist power

China is not a status quoist power, and aspires to be a Great Power. It is well-positioned to achieve this if it
maintains its present course. Any interruption, by indulging in a conflict with nations small or big, would not
only damage but derail the levels of progress that are essential to achieve this objective. President Xis China
dream seems predicated on this belief. It implies support for a rule-based international system, linked to Tianxia,
in the belief that this would help China overtake the U.S. as the dominant world power. When China talks of a new
type of Great Power relations it already envisages itself as Great Power in the making. It is unlikely to do anything
to deviate from this goal.
While this attitude cannot be taken for granted for all time, the current Chinese leadership seems comfortable in
following this prescription. It appears to believe in the aphorism that the longer you can look back, the farther
you can look forward.
M.K. Narayanan is a former National Security Advisor and a former Governor of West Bengal
Printable version | Sep 1, 2017 10:07:11 AM | http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/understanding-the-
chinese-mind/article19595813.ece
The Hindu
From suo motu to judgment: The arguments for and against triple talaq
To clear the path ahead
A. Faizur Rahman
Abolition of instant triple talaq is the beginning of the process of reforms in Muslim personal
law
Without a doubt, the August 22 Constitution Bench judgment on instant talaq (talaq-e-bida) was a
historic one. For the first time in Indian history talaq-e-bida was specifically debated and set aside by the
Supreme Court. In the 2002 ShamShamim Ara case a two-judge bench of the Apex Court had delegitimised this
medieval practice only when it was not properly pronounced and preceded by attempts at reconciliation.
But the latest ruling completely and unconditionally invalidates talaq-e-bidaand renders it bad in law.
The Koranic procedure of talaq is the only way by which a Muslim husband will be able to divorce his wife
from now on. It is time then to recap the judgment to chart out the next steps.
The majority judgment

The path that was taken to arrive at this landmark decision was tortuous, but intellectually invigorating.
Justices R.F. Nariman and U.U. Lalit started off by correctly concluding that talaq-e-bida cannot be
excluded from the definition of talaq mentioned in Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)
Application Act, 1937. Additionally, they declared that as the Shariat Act was a law made by the legislature
before the Constitution came in force, it would fall within the expression laws in force in Article 13(3)
(b), and would be hit by Article 13(1) if found to be inconsistent with Part III of the Constitution, to the
extent of the inconsistency.

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Surprisingly, the two judges chose not to examine if the Narasu Appa Mali ruling
was a good law. This judgment had held that personal laws cannot be tested against
the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Nonetheless, having brought the 1937
Act under the ambit of Article 13, the judges analysed several engrossing Supreme
Letting go of
instant triple
Court pronouncements to show how capricious, excessive and disproportional laws
talaq are manifestly arbitrary and the very antithesis of equality.
But the biggest achievement of Justices Nariman and Lalit is their harmonisation of
constitutional equality with Koranic egalitarianism. This was done by endorsing the
Koranic law of talaq mentioned in Sham
Shamim Ara and declaring talaq-e-bida to be manifestly arbitrary
and violative of Article 14 because it allows a Muslim man to break the marriage capriciously and
whimsically without attempting to save it through reconciliation. On these grounds, Section 2 of the
1937 Act was struck down as being void to the extent that it recognises and enforces instant talaq.
Interestingly, Justice Kurian Joseph, even while fully agreeing with the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness
on the pure question of law, disagreed with Justices Nariman and Lalit that the 1937 Act regulates instant
talaq and hence can be brought under Article 14. In his view, talaq-e-bida can be set aside without testing
any part of the 1937 Act against Part III of the Constitution. As the whole purpose of the Shariat Act was
to declare Shariah as the rule of decision, any practice that goes against the Shariah cannot be legally
protected. Talaq-e-bida falls outside the Shariah because it goes against its primary source, the Koran.
Therefore, what is bad in theology is bad in law as well.

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Those who criticised the authors of the majority judgment for grounding the crux
of their ruling in the Koran ignore the fact that personal laws of all communities in
India enjoy constitutional protection. And as these laws are sourced from religious
scriptures in most cases the Apex Court cannot but uphold the right of individuals
From suo motu
to judgment:
and groups to profess, practise and propagate everything that forms an essential
The arguments part of their religious scripture, subject to the provisions of Article 25(1). It may be
for and against
triple talaq pointed out here that the Koranic procedure of talaq that was implicitly upheld in
this judgment does not in any way violate our constitutional values.
The minority opinion
In their 272-page ruling former Chief Justice J.S. Khehar and Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, in contradiction to
the majority judgment, declared talaq-e-bida to be an essential part of the Hanafi faith and gave it
protection under Article 25(1). However, this view does not stand up to scrutiny as it is based on the
flawed theological premise that a religious custom which has been in vogue for several centuries
automatically becomes integral to the denomination that practises it. Such a stance is not consistent
with the teachings of the Koran.
Had Justices Khehar and Nazeer given weight to the overwhelming evidence in the Koran and authentic
hadeeses against instant talaq they could have avoided the problematic invocation of Article 142 to direct
the state to enact an appropriate legislation on talaq-e-bida. One fails to understand how after having
declared instant triple divorce a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution the judges could
direct the state to bring a law against it. Article 13(2) clearly states that the State shall not make any law
which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this
clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. Even Justice Kurian had expressed serious
doubts if the exercise of a fundamental right can be injuncted under Article 142.

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The minority view also failed to appreciate the fact that hadeeses quoted by the
AIMPLB were comparatively less authentic than those cited in High Court
judgments relied upon by the petitioners which were from the six most authentic
Sunni hadees books (Sihah Sitta). The AIMPLB cited just one report from Sihah Sitta
Historic day for
Muslim women:
(Hadees No. 5259 from Sahih Bukhari) in which instant talaq is mentioned. But this
Shayara Bano hadees does not show any Prophetic support for talaq-e-bid'a. It clearly states that
on triple talaq
verdict
the man who pronounced triple talaq did so without the Prophets command.
Implications of verdict
As pointed out above, the biggest goal attainment for Muslim women is the realisation that talaq-e-bida
in any of his manifestations will not dissolve the marriage. This renders redundant not just halala but the
incorporation of a platitudinous advisory against instant talaq in the nikahnama. There is also scope now
to amend the 1937 Act, even without designating it as statutory law, to exclude talaq-e-bida from the
definition of the word talaq mentioned in Section 2, and make the Koranic procedure of talaq gender-
neutral. Indeed all provisions of the Shariah mentioned in the 1937 Act can be similarly redefined to
bring them in conformity with the humanitarian teachings of the Koran and the Prophet.
This judgment will also encourage legally and theologically informed Muslim intellectuals to establish
mediation centres across India under the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism to help
Muslim couples amicably resolve their marital disputes. To echo the feelings of many, this is not the end
but the beginning of the process of reforms in the Muslim personal law. The biggest challenge, however,
would be to inform the Muslim masses that the abolition of talaq-e-bida is not against the Shariah but
has, on the contrary, brought it closer to the original principles of Islam.
A. Faizur Rahman is an independent researcher and secretary general of the Chennai-based Islamic
Forum for the Promotion of Moderate Thought. Email: a.faizur.rahman@gmail.com. Twitter:
LEAD
Economy outlook still cloudy
Ajit Ranade
An immediate stimulus is needed to regain the momentum to get India back to

8% growth
T he governments move this past week to publish economic data for the April to
June quarter of this year needs a look. The real growth of GDP, i.e. after removing
the impact of inflation, was only 5.7%, much lower than expected. For the past six
consecutive quarters, the growth rate has gone down steadily, from 9.2% at the end of
the quarter ending March 2016, to 7.9%, 7.5%, 7.0%, 6.1% and now 5.7% at the end of the
June quarter.
This steady declining trend in the growth rate is all the more troublesome because the
economy otherwise enjoys a rather conducive combination of macroeconomic
parameters. Inflation has been moderate, and touched a low of 1.5% recently. Both trade
and fiscal deficits are moderate and manageable. So they dont eat up investible
resources or precious foreign exchange. Even the interest rate has been cut repeatedly
over the past year and a half. The inward rush of dollars is at a peak, both in financial
markets (stocks and bonds) and as direct investment. No wonder the stock market index
is at an all-time high. Even oil prices, the bane of the Indian economy, have been stable
and comfortably low. Finally, the monsoon has been normal. So despite these favourable
macro factors, we have not managed to convert them into a higher growth rate.
As cautioned in the Economic Survey tabled recently in Parliament, it looks as if the

growth rate will be below 7% this fiscal year. That would be a potential loss of 1% growth,
which we can legitimately aspire for. In nominal terms, one percentage less of growth
translates into a loss of 1.5 lakh crore of national income. This is a notional loss, or is
rather what might have been. It also signifies millions of jobs not created.
If you look closer at the numbers, you find that manufacturing growth at 1.2% is the
lowest in the past five years. Its the lowest since we switched to a new methodology
(based on Gross Value Added). Some of this downward movement was caused
supposedly by the suspension of manufacturing activity prior to the rollout of the
Goods and Services Tax (GST) in July, and consequent de-stocking of inventory. But it is
also corroborated by data from commercial banks. From April to August bank credit
shrank by 1.8%, i.e. negative growth. This is the lowest it has been for at least 13 years. If
you remove retail loans such as housing and other personal loans, credit to industry
might actually be shrinking. This was flagged back in April also when the annual credit
flow from banking for the previous fiscal year clocked a multi-decadal low. A State Bank
of India report said that credit growth for the year ending last March was the lowest in
63 years!
A telling metric
The GDP is measured in at least two different ways. The first is by looking at the
production side while the second is by looking at the spending side. We look at the
aggregate of all spending, whether on consumption, or by foreigners buying our
exports, or on investments into new factories and projects. In addition we also have
government spending. The growth in GDP can be traced to the growth and vigour of
each of these components. Investment, which is between 30 and 35% of the total pie,
needs to grow at least in double digits. Investment in future capacity creates GDP
growth of the future. It needs to be led by the private sector. Currently, that component
is barely growing at 1.5%. This is the single most telling metric. As a result, capital
formation (the basis of future growth) is steadily declining for several years. Private
sector investment has practically come to a standstill. Despite the push for Make in
India, reforms for improving Ease of Doing Business, increased access to electricity,
improvement in infrastructure and private investment are not picking up. This must
become the big priority. Initiatives such as Housing For All, Smart Cities and Digital
India give room for huge opportunities for private entrepreneurs. Of course the
corporate sector and banks have been affected by the twin balance sheet squeeze
wherein corporates are over-leveraged, and banks have mounting bad loans. Whether
the new insolvency code and regulator and the Reserve Bank of Indias aggressive
intervention will crack this puzzle remains to be seen.
Strengthening rupee
Another significant challenge to the domestic industry is the ever-strengthening rupee.
Since January the rupee is 7% stronger compared to the American dollar. It is stronger
than its Asian peer currencies too, including China, the Philippines, Indonesia and
Thailand. This directly hurts our export prospects. Since last October, our export growth
has begun showing positive growth, after a long phase of negative growth for 18
months. But thanks to the strong rupee, this trend is weakening. Indeed our exports are
barely up 12% since January, whereas imports are up more than 30%.
More importantly, the strong rupee hurts the domestic industry since cheaper imports
flood the country and eat into the market share of domestic players. The GST regime has
given an extra advantage to importer traders since the countervailing duty that they
now pay as GST can be offset against other taxes, a concession which was not available
earlier. The big jump in imports is also captured in the June quarter of GDP data, which
also show a worrying jump in gold imports, again thanks to a strong rupee. Its no use
saying that since India is a net importing country, our exchange rate should be stronger.
If we remove gold imports, a large part of which is not for consumption but as store of
value, then our trade deficit will be much smaller. Besides most of our other imports are
oil or capital goods, both of which are price inelastic. The rupee needs to be weakened or
else it will hurt domestic manufacturing even more.
Looking at demonetisation
Finally, one must not forget the continuing adverse impact of demonetisation. The first
half of the last fiscal year, that is the period prior to demonetisation, recorded a real
growth of 7.7%. The present April to June quarters growth at 5.7% certainly includes the
negative impact on the informal and rural economy. Investment and consumption
spending which were postponed due to cash shortage might recover. But jobs that are
lost are lost forever. Even the Economic Survey warns about the deflationary impact of
low agricultural prices. The agriculture sector GDP shows nominal GDP growth to be
lower than real GDP, which is very unusual. It means that farmers incomes will be
depressed, and doubling of farm incomes in five years becomes that much more of a
distant dream.
Perhaps in the coming quarters we may see a rebound. That will crucially depend on a
big pick-up in manufacturing and private investment spending. The big structural
reforms of GST, the new insolvency code, the new monetary framework and Aadhaar
linkage are measures which will show results in the medium to long term. What we
need is an immediate stimulus to re-inject the momentum to get us to 8% growth.
Ajit Ranade is an economist
Printable version | Sep 4, 2017 10:43:39 AM |

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/economy-outlook-still-
cloudy/article19615988.ece
The Hindu
LEAD
Making up for lost time
Gautam Mukhopadhaya
In the past half century, India and Myanmar have lost the habit of thinking of themselves as
neighbours
P rime Minister Narendra Modi embarks on an official bilateral visit to Myanmar from September 5.
This follows upon his earlier ASEAN-related visit in November 2014 and former Prime Minister
Manmohan Singhs visit in May 2012. Though overdue, taking into account Mr. Modis Neighborhood First,
Act East and diaspora policies, international and domestic developments since then have clarified the
political context of the visit to an extent not possible earlier. These include the impact of elections in
Myanmar in November 2015 and in the U.S. in late 2016 that brought Aung San Suu Kyis National League for
Democracy (NLD) to power in Myanmar and Donald Trump in the U.S.; the finalisation of Chinas Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) and its assertiveness in the South China Sea; the India-China border stand-off; and
Myanmars travails over the peace process, the Rohingya issue and the economy.
The Rohingya crisis
The visit is taking place amidst some of the worst violence involving Rohingya militants and the Myanmar
security forces ever resulting in a full-fledged international crisis triggered by large-scale, coordinated
attacks by Rohingya militants under a recently formed Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA, now
designated as terrorists) against government and security outposts in northern Rakhine state on August 25-
26.
The attacks and clearance operations against it have resulted in some 400 (and mounting) deaths, mostly
Rohingya; widespread arson and burning of villages allegedly by both sides; displacement of thousands
within Rakhine state and across the Naf river to Bangladesh; and severe disruption in food and humanitarian
supplies. The Modi government has unequivocally condemned the terrorist attacks at a time when the
security forces and Ms. Suu Kyi herself face heightened international criticism on the handling of the issue.
This is likely to resonate in Mr. Modis favour in Myanmar.
The visit is also taking place against the backdrop of uncertainties in the future India-China relationship
caused by the now defused Doklam stand-off and the BRICS summit. Sensitive to its location between the
two Asians giants, Myanmar is keen to leverage the growth potential of good relations with Asias two fastest
growing economies. But it is also wary of its economic dependence on China, characterised by a largely
extractive relationship focused on natural resources and access to the Bay of Bengal where it already has an
oil and gas terminal, concession to build a Special Economic Zone and seeks a possibly controlling stake in a
natural deep sea harbour at Kyaukpyu that could form part of its ambitious BRI. The shadow of China is thus
likely to loom large over the visit. Myanmar would welcome closer economic ties with India to balance and
offset its domineering ties with China. Characterisations of a Great Game East between India and China are,
however, greatly overstated.
Focus on basics
Beyond these topical issues, and the issue of Indian insurgent groups in Myanmar, which remain a matter of
concern, the optics of Mr. Modis much anticipated visit will most likely be taken up by the fundamentals of
the bilateral relationship: the substantive development partnership, trade issues, and revival of cultural and
people-to-people ties. Defence relations too have been growing steadily, especially between the two armies
and navies. Security related talks have been taking place at the National Security Adviser (NSA) level.
A number of bilateral agreements in the areas of capacity building, health, culture, and development, and one
on maritime security are on the anvil, building on Indias nearly $2 billion development partnership with
Myanmar so far. These cover large directly funded and executed connectivity infrastructure projects like the
Trilateral Highway, the Kaladan Multi-modal Transport and Transit Project; high value capacity and human
development projects like the Myanmar Institute of Information Technology in Mandalay; more modest
ones in industry, IT, health, entrepreneurship and language training; small border area development projects
in Chin and Naga areas of Myanmar; and soft lines of credit for other infrastructure projects amounting to
nearly $750 million. Much of this still remains to be utilised.
Though this may not be adequately realised even in Myanmar, few countries are undertaking such large
infrastructure and human development projects out of government funds as India is. When they are all
completed and fully operational by about 2020, they will amount to a substantial mass and base for an
expanded relationship.
Lamentably, the same cannot be said of commercial trade and investments. Both stand on narrow bases,
primary agricultural and forest products from Myanmar in the case of trade, and oil and gas in case of
investments, underlining a strong need to expand, diversify and upgrade commercial ties in ways that also
contribute to Myanmars development needs and meet Indias $3 billion trade target set in 2012.
To an extent not often realised, trade has been the keystone of our post-Independence relationship that
survived both the nationalisation of the 1960s by the military government of Ne Win and the Western
economic sanctions since the crackdown on democratic aspirations starting from the 1980s. Critical to this
trade are Indian imports of beans and pulses that play a vital part in our food security and Myanmars
economy. Standing at around a million tonnes and $1 billion in value, over 90% of which is exported to India,
it is vital to Myanmars farmers and foreign exchange earnings, greater even in the value of its exports of rice
to China that are prone to periodic restrictions, tough inspections and crackdowns on informal trade at the
Myanmar-China border. Past attempts to open a limited market for Myanmar rice in India as an alternative
to China, have floundered on vested public distribution interests in India and should be re-opened.
Unfortunately, the recent decision to impose quantitative restrictions on the trade in pulses does exactly the
opposite, notwithstanding recent relaxations on orders already paid for. In part, this is because of our own
concerns vis--vis speculative global trade in pulses that has resulted in incentives to increase and protect
domestic production in India and induce Myanmar to move towards a government-channelised trade to
stabilise prices and in part on account of resistance to such a move in Myanmar.
Older ties
Underlining our strong cultural, people-to-people and diaspora relationship, Mr. Modi will also visit Bagan
where the Archaeological Survey of India is in the final stages of a face-lift to the venerated Ananda Temple
and where the Cabinet has approved Indian assistance for the restoration of pagodas damaged by the
powerful 2016 earthquake; and Yangon, where he will address the Indian-origin and Indian community and
visit places religious, cultural and historical importance.
In his official meetings with President Htin Kyaw and State Counsellor Suu Kyi in Nay Pyi Taw, Mr. Modi is
likely to forge a bold strategic vision for bilateral relations, taking advantage of the consensus cutting across
political parties and civil and military pillars of Myanmars polity towards stronger ties with India and project
Indias economic and strategic footprint in the region between the Bay of Bengal to the South China Sea.
Key elements of this vision could be greater attention to emerging political forces, ethnic states and the peace
process as part of our democratic political outreach; converting our investments in the Trilateral Highway
and the Kaladan to fuller trade and investment corridors and use Indian investment in the Greater Mekong
Sub-region as an arm of our foreign policy with a focus on agriculture, agro-industries and light industry; a
broader development partnership reaching to the grassroots with the help of civil society; specific prongs in
our Act East policy through the Northeast and Bodh Gaya as a pilgrimage centre; and a new political
approach to the IIG issue (Indian Insurgent Groups) beyond an intelligence-based approaches. These could
perhaps find expression in a joint document sooner or later.
The objective should be to restore the balance in Myanmars relations between East and South Asia that has
been lost with the eastward tilt in Myanmars external relations over 50 years of insular military rule during
which the two countries have forgotten the habit of thinking of themselves psychologically as immediate
neighbours.
LEAD
There is a Rohingya in all of us
Shiv Visvanathan
By contemplating deportation of the hapless refugees, India undermines itself
T he timing could not have been more immaculately disastrous. At a time when Rohingya are
being forced to flee the violence in Myanmars Rakhine state, in the Supreme Court this week
the Centre refused to revise its stand on deporting Rohinya immigrants in India. It was in effect
adhering to its position taken on August 9, when the Minister of State for Home Affairs informed
Parliament that 40,000 Rohingya were to be deported. With that, the idea of India, the India of
democracy and hospitality disappeared in a single stroke. A dream of India disappeared in a single
moment. The marginal life of the Rohingya became a greater nightmare. The Government of India
has returned to an idea of hard state, dropping its dreams of compassion, care and civility. Behind the
tragedy of the decision will be a nit-picking bureaucracy and the security think tanks, convinced that
an aspirational India does not need a defeated people like the Rohingya.
Most persecuted minority

In many ways, the Rohingya represent the last man of international society that Gandhi talked
about. They are the worlds most persecuted minority. They are Muslims, belonging to the Sunni sect,
scattered mainly over the Rakhine state of Myanmar. Harassed by the Myanmar Army and forced to
serve as slave labour, they have also been systematically persecuted by the Buddhist majority. The
persecution of the Rohingya also highlights the silence of Aung San Suu Kyi, destroying another
myth of ethics and human rights. A woman whose campaign for human rights won her the Peace
Nobel now stands embarrassingly silent in case her broader political strategies are affected. The
dispensability of the Rohingya is clear and so is the callousness of the nation state. India can no
longer criticise the West for being hostile to Syrian and Sudanese refugees.
One thing is clear. No Nehruvian state, or even regime of Indira Gandhi, would have made such a
decision. Both upheld the principle of hospitality, of the openness of borders. Jawaharlal Nehru was
open to Tibet and courageously invited the Dalai Lama to make a home here, and Indira Gandhi
played host to refugees from the then East Pakistan, ignoring the threats of tough people such as
Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon.
The Rohingya situation has been bleak for years. The turning point was the attitude of the Burmese
military junta which cracked down on them in 1982, contending that Rohingya as late comers were
not part of the original ancestors of Burmese society. Denied an autonomous cultural status, they lost
all claims to the entitlements of citizenship. They were denied not only access to health, education
but also any claim to the idea of citizenship.
A slow exodus
Persecuted by the army and the Buddhist majority, they began a slow exodus over India, Bangladesh,
spreading to States such as Rajasthan, Jammu and Kashmir, moving as far as Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
Their exodus has once again a cynical side to it as agents arranged for their travel. These touts of
international suffering arranged for their travel at exorbitant rates. The Rohingya became temporary
boat people as Bangladesh shut its borders on them piously condemning them as drug peddlers. The
Rohingya then attempted to cross into Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia only to realise that fellow
Islamic nations had little sympathy for them. The no-welcome sign was clear and categorical. Each
state would react piously, claiming to have fulfilled its humanitarian quota. It was also realistically
clear that unlike the Syrians, the Rohingya, as a tiny speck of the refugee population would hardly be
front page news for a sufficient length of time. At the most their memories would survive in a few
PhD theses in international relations. The refugee has always been an enticing topic for PhDs.
In fact, Pope Franciss statement that the campaign of terror against the Rohingya must cease fell on
deaf ears. Sadly, India missed the leadership and compassion of a Mother Teresa. She would have
stepped out and offered some care and relief to them, stirring the Indian middle class into some acts
of caring.
The odd thing is that the genocide, the vulnerability of such a people is often lost in bureaucratic
issues of legal and political status. It is not clear whether Rohingya are refugees or illegal migrants.
As refugees they are entitled to some care; as illegal migrants they become subject to harassment and
exploitation. Refugees become a target for an informal economy of bonded labour.
Union Home Minister Kiren Rijiju already sounded the warning signals in response to a question in
the Rajya Sabha. He was clear that the Rohingya were illegal migrants. He was cited as claiming in an
interview that the Rohingya have no basis to live here. Anybody who is an illegal migrant will be
deported. Yet one wonders whether in terms of humanitarian law and the conventions of the UN, Mr.
Rijiju is right. This is a group that is threatened with continuous persecution, whose homes are
unsafe, whose livelihoods have been destroyed. To be forced to return to Myanmar would only
subject them to harassment, ethnic persecution and a genocidal future.
Being human
One is grateful that the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), which often plays the Rip Van
Winkle of human rights, responded quickly. On August 18, it issued a notice to the government over
its plan to deport Rohingya staying illegally in India, asking the government to report in four weeks.
The Commission added hopefully that the Supreme Court had declared that fundamental rights are
applicable to all regardless of whether they are citizens of India. Yet such appeals to rights and
humanitarianism cut little ice in todays bureaucracy which is obsessed with security issues and
content to raise the bogey of terrorism and law and order when it comes to such a helpless people.
The NHRC came up with a memorable line that Rohingya refugees are no doubt foreign nationals
but they are human beings.
It is clear that the everydayness of Rohingya life must be miserable. They face the challenge of
survival and the prospect of persecution if they return to Myanmar. One need not hide under legal
excuses. What India confronts is a case of ethics, a challenge to its understanding of citizenship and
freedom. If we abandon the Rohingya, we abandon the idea of India as a home of refugees and
hospitality. A country which offered a home to the Parsis, the Tibetans, the Afghans and the Jews
cannot turn a little minority of helpless people back. One hopes civil society protests, challenging the
indifference of the state. It is not just a question of saving a beleaguered people, it is question of
saving the soul of India. The idea of India is being threatened today. Should civil society remain mute
and indifferent? There is a Rohingya in all of us.
Shiv Visvanathan is Professor, Jindal Global Law School and Director, Centre for Study of Knowledge
Systems, O.P. Jindal Global University
Printable version | Sep 6, 2017 10:22:50 AM | http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/there-is-a-
rohingya-in-all-of-us/article19626127.ece
LEAD
Testing times in the Korean peninsula
Rakesh Sood
Old objectives of denuclearisation and reunication have to be set aside, at least for now
T he sixth nuclear test by North Korea on Sunday has provoked a predictable chorus of condemnation and
hand wringing in capitals around the world. The test was anticipated, given the shrill rhetoric
accompanying North Koreas missile tests. Yet there is little to indicate if the key countries (the U.S., China, South
and North Koreas and Japan) are ready to acknowledge that old policies no longer work and a new approach is
needed to de-escalate tensions.
Measuring 6.3 on the Richter scale, this test indicates an explosive yield of approximately 120 kilotons, six times
bigger than the Hiroshima bomb. The North Koreans described it as a successful hydrogen bomb test and also
released a photograph of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un posing with a hydrogen bomb. In August, reports had
appeared in the U.S. based on intelligence estimates that North Korea had succeeded in producing a miniature
warhead that could be mated with its missiles.
While experts continue to debate whether North Korea has mastered the technology behind a fusion device or
whether the posed picture was of a mock-up, the fact is that under Mr. Kim, the nuclear and missile programmes
have accelerated. Four of the six nuclear tests have been conducted after he took over in 2011; the earlier two were
conducted in 2006 and 2009. Missile development began earlier but while Kim Jong-il conducted 16 missile tests
during his rule from 1994 to 2011, his son and successor Kim Jong-un has undertaken more than 80 missile tests.
Longer range and solid fuel missiles have been tested and North Koreas fissile material stockpile is enough for 25
devices.
On July 4, North Korea tested Hwasong-14, described as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of
reaching the U.S. mainland. Tested in a lofted trajectory, it reached a height of 2,800 km and travelled a distance of
933 km, implying a range of 6,500 km in a normal trajectory, bringing mainland America within range. It was
described as a game changer, something that U.S. President Donald Trump had vowed he would prevent by doing
whatever was necessary.
Trumps ballistic stand

The U.S. policy under Mr. Trump has been maximum pressure on North Korea and engagement with China. Since
July, Mr. Trumps tweets indicate a growing impatience with Chinas inability to restrain North Korea. He has
blamed China for increasing its trade with North Korea despite sanctions and conveyed disappointment that
they do nothing for us with North Korea, just talk.
In August, he tweeted that North Korean threats will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.
North Korea countered with a threat to launch four missiles around Guam enveloping it in fire, adding that
sound dialogue is not possible with such a guy bereft of reason. Meanwhile, the U.N. Security Council has met
regularly to condemn North Korean missile tests and tighten sanctions.
While Mr. Trump has indicated that military solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded, should North
Korea act unwisely, his Secretary of State Rex Tillerson adopted a measured tone when he said, We do not seek a
regime change, we do not seek a collapse of the regime, we do not seek an accelerated reunification of the
peninsula, we do not seek an excuse to send our military north of the 38th Parallel.
China and Russia have been critical of North Koreas missile and nuclear tests, proposing that if the U.S. and South
Korea were to suspend their joint military exercises, North Korea could agree to suspending its tests, opening the
way to a dialogue. This was rejected and the joint exercises took place in end-August, as scheduled. Meanwhile,
live firing drills have been taking place in the region raising the risks of a crisis erupting through miscalculation
or miscommunication as North Korea prepares to celebrate its Foundation Day this week with military parades.
Nuclear crises in the past

Since 1991, this is the third nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. Post-Cold War, there was a thaw when the U.S.
(and then the U.S.S.R.) withdrew naval and tactical nuclear weapons globally, including the ones in South Korea. A
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula between the two Koreas followed, even though
the two countries do not recognise each other. With resumption of U.S.-South Korea military exercises and new
U.S. sanctions on North Korea, positions hardened leading to the first crisis in 1993 with North Korea threatening
to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In Pyongyang, there was a leadership change with
Kim Jong-il taking over after his fathers death. The crisis was averted by direct talks with the U.S. leading to an
Agreed Framework in 1994 under which North Korea suspended its decision to withdraw from the NPT, agreed to
freeze its nuclear activities and in return, the U.S. pledged to build two light water nuclear power reactors.
The Clinton administration also provided more than $800 million of food aid and humanitarian assistance. The
fact that the NPT was to be extended in 1995 was undoubtedly a factor in ensuring that North Koreas withdrawal
be blocked.
The Bush administration annulled the 1994 Framework Agreement (the two reactors remain unfinished), and in
2002 declared North Korea part of the axis of evil. North Korea reacted by formally quitting the NPT in 2003
provoking the second crisis. China and Russia initiated the Six-Party Talks in 2003 which the U.S. joined under
pressure from its regional allies, Japan and South Korea. These took place in a broader context leading to the 2005
Joint Statement which reiterated the commitment to the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, agreed to
negotiate a peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice, provided for a U.S. security guarantee to North Korea which
in turn agreed to rejoin the NPT as soon as possible. However, when the U.S. imposed new sanctions a few months
later, North Korea responded with its first nuclear test in 2006 and the Six Party Talks collapsed.
Resolving the issue

Kim Jong-un took over in 2011 and, having seen the outcome of western interventions in Libya and Iraq and
Russian intervention in Ukraine, is convinced that he needs a nuclear deterrent for regime survival. In addition,
he wants direct talks with the U.S. that will provide him recognition and lessen his dependence on China, and
finally, an easing of sanctions. He might agree to a temporary halt in testing as a means to start a dialogue but will
not accept any restriction on capabilities in return for mere verbal assurances. The old carrot and stick policies
will not work. Military action may lead to nuclearisation in Japan and South Korea. Sanctions have limited utility
because China accounts for 90% of North Koreas foreign trade and for China, a nuclear North Korea is a lesser
threat than a regime collapse that could lead to a unified Korea allied to the U.S.
The 1953 Armistice Agreement was signed by North Korea, China and the U.S. (representing the U.N. Command)
ending hostilities and was to be followed by a peace treaty which remains pending. South Korea (and the U.S.) and
North Korea do not recognise each other; North Korea considers the South under U.S. occupation while South
Korea considers the entire peninsula as its territory. Sovereignty issues have been bypassed when politics is
favourable as in 1991 when both Koreas were simultaneously admitted to the UN. China, looking for investment
and technology, pragmatically recognised South Korea in 1992, much to North Koreas annoyance.
Today, times have changed and there is more mistrust all around. Moreover, Mr. Kim is suspicious of China and
the Chinese consider his provocations timed to embarrass President Xi Jinping with missile tests during the Belt
and Road summit and the nuclear test during BRICS, and with the crucial Party Congress due in October.
The old objectives of denuclearisation and reunification have to be set aside. North Koreas nuclear capability
will have to be accepted, at least for the foreseeable future. Mutual recognition will have to precede reunification
and for this, the two Koreas need to begin a dialogue in due course. Managing this requires closer understanding
between the U.S. and South Korea than is currently on display. For Mr. Kim, the stakes are existential and parallel
negotiations on political and nuclear tracks are needed if the current crisis is to be averted.
Rakesh Sood is a former diplomat and currently Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation
Printable version | Sep 7, 2017 5:12:33 PM | http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/testing-times-in-the-
korean-peninsula/article19631699.ece
LEAD
Social revolution in a JAM
Pulapre Balakrishnan
Equality in the digital space is different from empowering Indians in the bricks-and-mortar world
In a post on Facebook made on the third anniversary of the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) last week, the
Finance Minister reportedly said: Just as GST (goods and services tax) created one tax, one market, one India, the
PMJDY and the JAM revolution can link all Indians into one common financial, economic, and digital space. No Indian
will be outside the mainstream. The suggestion of equality as a criterion of governance that is conveyed by this is to be
welcomed. JAM, deriving from Jan Dhan, Aadhaar and Mobile, combines bank accounts for the poor, who barely had
the money to deposit in them, direct transfer of benefits into these accounts and the facility of making financial
payments through mobile phones. Aadhaar is the pivot here, allowing the government to ensure that benefits reach
the poor and enabling them to make payments through ordinary mobile phones. For furthering the latter the
government has devised the Bharat Interface for Money (BHIM) app. The Minister spoke of these developments as a
social revolution, perhaps alluding to the feature that the poor are the most direct beneficiaries.
Beyond bank accounts

There is no doubt that eliminating leakage in the transfer of welfare payments and enabling the poor to have bank
accounts are worthy objectives, and when achieved should be considered significant. Indeed, it is damning that a
largely nationalised banking sector had done very little to extend banking services to the poor till recently, and credit
goes to this government that it made this a priority. But claims of having achieved inclusion by operationalising the
JAM trinity appear somewhat exaggerated. A financial inclusion, in the sense of everyone having a bank account and
access to reliable and free electronic payments system, is not the same as economic inclusion. At its most basic level,
inclusion from the economic point of view would entail equal access to opportunities for earning a livelihood. This in
turn implies employment opportunities. As the demand for labour is a derived demand, in the sense that it exists only
when there is demand for goods and services, a significant element in ensuring inclusion is to maintain, directly or
indirectly, the level of demand in the economy. Next, even when the demand for labour exists, potential workers must
be endowed with the capabilities to take advantage of the opportunity offered. The potential of the JAM trinity for
bringing about either of these conditions for economic inclusion is limited. This is so because JAM functions in the
digital space while much of our life is lived in the brick and mortar world. In the latter space we have seen very little
improvement, not just recently but since economic reforms were launched over 25 years ago.
The economic reforms of 1991 were largely in the nature of liberalisation of the policy regime, meant to make it easier
for firms to produce while at the same time exposing them to international competition with a view to increasing
efficiency in the economy. What a strategy based exclusively on liberalisation overlooks is that an ecosystem of
production is constituted not only by the laws and regulations determining the ease of doing business, but also the
access that firms have to producer services ranging from water supply to waste management. These producer services
require large capital outlay, often deterring private firms. When private entities do provide these producers services
they tend to be expensive, deterring their off-take. It is for this reason that globally they are generally provided by
governments. In India the case for public provision of producer services, and there is no reason to provide them free of
charge, is particularly high as the overwhelming part of employment is in the form of self-employment. These units
are scraping the barrel as it is. Even when producer units employ workers they are poorly capitalised, making it almost
impossible for them to generate producer services themselves. Thus the public provision of producer services should
be an essential part of public policy. Empowerment in the brick and mortar space would require public infrastructure
on a gigantic scale compared to what we have now.
Focus on capabilities
Moving from production to being, JAM cannot even claim equalisation, leave alone empowerment. Amartya Sen
effectively settled a longstanding debate on the question of the metric to be used to gauge equality when he proposed
that it should be human capabilities. These are the endowments that allow individuals to undertake functionings they
value. We would have achieved a social revolution when we have equipped all individuals with the essential
capabilities. This happens when a society has, at a minimum, universal health and education infrastructure accessible
to all.
We have in recent weeks witnessed governance failure on a major scale in many parts of the country. In U.P.s
Gorakhpur district children have died due to systemic failure that meant that a districts only hospital is not able to
maintain a steady supply of oxygen. Later a heavy downpour in Mumbai led to a complete shutdown, widespread loss
of livelihood and some of life. And most recently, in Delhis suburb of Ghazipur a garbage mountain came crashing
down, again causing death and disruption. But we would need to turn to Bengaluru to recognise the limits to
information technology in solving problems of living. Lakes that are toxic when they havent been gobbled up by the
real estate mafia, traffic snarls and inadequate sewerage make life less than easy in this IT hub aspiring to play first
cousin to Silicon Valley.
Given the extraordinary challenges faced by India in the provision of public infrastructure ranging from health and
education to drainage and sewerage, the claim made for JAM is breathtaking in its simplicity. JAM ensures seamless
transfer of welfare payments and facilitates the making payments in real time. Once again, these are worthy
objectives, but fall well short of the social revolution the honourable minister claims for them. Our social revolution
will arrive when all Indians are empowered through an equality of capabilities. This would require committing
resources to building the requisite social and physical infrastructure and investing time to govern its functioning. JAM
may have achieved equality in the digital space but is far from having empowered Indians in spheres in which they are
severely deprived at present, an empowerment that they clearly value. The government has leveraged IT smartly in
operationalising JAM but the possibility of replicating this to transform the ecosystem of production for firms and the
ecosystem of living for individuals is limited. The widespread disempowerment faced by the people of this country
predates the arrival of Narendra Modi, but his government appears to give false comfort through its claims.
Slip-sliding economy
In a market economy one of the markers of what the public think of the governments policies is the response of
private investors. Private investment in India has declined steadily over the past few years. Overall growth had
however been maintained, partly through the demand generating impact of public investment. But now even growth
appears to be stalling. The latest GDP figures from the Central Statistics Office show growth in the first quarter of the
current financial year to be lower than the average for 2016-17. Data actually point to a steadily slowing economy with
growth having been successively lower in the past five quarters. There appears to be a mismatch between the
governments own assessment of its policies and the private sectors valuation of their worth. The jubilation over JAM
is an instance of this.
Pulapre Balakrishnan is Professor of Economics at Ashoka University, Sonipat and Senior Fellow, IIM Kozhikode. Views
are personal
The very foundation of Aadhaar must be reconsidered in the light of the privacy judgment
P redictably enough, the recent Supreme Court order affirming that privacy is a fundamental right sent Aadhaars
public-relations machine into damage control mode. After denying the right to privacy for years, the government
promptly changed gear and welcomed the judgment. Ajay Bhushan Pandey, CEO of the Unique Identification Authority of
India (UIDAI), suddenly asserted, The Aadhaar Act is based on the premise that privacy is a fundamental right. He also
clarified that the judgment would not affect Aadhaar as the required safeguards were already in place.
Types of information
The fact of the matter is that Aadhaar, in its current form, is a major threat to the fundamental right to privacy. The nature of
this threat, however, is poorly understood.
There is a common perception that the main privacy concern with Aadhaar is the confidentiality of the Central Identities
Data Repository (CIDR). This is misleading for two reasons. One is that the CIDR is not supposed to be inaccessible. On the
contrary, the Aadhaar Act 2016 puts in place a framework for sharing most of the CIDR information. The second reason is
that the biggest danger, in any case, lies elsewhere.
To understand this, it helps to distinguish between three different types of private information: biometric information,
identity information and personal information. The first two are formally defined in the Aadhaar Act, and protected to some
extent. Aadhaars biggest threat to privacy, however, relates to the third type of information.
In the Aadhaar Act, biometric information essentially refers to photograph, fingerprints and iris scan, though it may also
extend to other biological attributes of an individual specified by the UIDAI. The term core biometric information
basically means biometric information minus photograph, but it can be modified once again at the discretion of the UIDAI.
Identity information has a wider scope. It includes biometric information but also a persons Aadhaar number as well as the
demographic characteristics that are collected at the time of Aadhaar enrolment, such as name, address, date of birth, phone
number, and so on.
The term personal information (not used in the Act) can be understood in a broader sense, which includes not only identity
information but also other information about a person, for instance where she travels, whom she talks to on the phone, how
much she earns, what she buys, her Internet browsing history, and so on.
Coming back to privacy, one obvious concern is the confidentiality of whatever personal information an individual may not
wish to be public or accessible to others. The Aadhaar Act puts in place some safeguards in this respect, but they are
restricted to biometric and identity information.
Sharing identity details

The strongest safeguards in the Act relate to core biometric information. That part of the CIDR, where identity information
is stored, is supposed to be inaccessible except for the purpose of biometric authentication. There is a view that, in practice,
the biometric database is likely to be hacked sooner or later. Be that as it may, the UIDAI can at least be credited with trying
to keep it safe, as it is bound to do under the Act.
That does not apply, however, to identity information as a whole. Far from protecting your identity information, the Aadhaar
Act puts in place a framework to share it with requesting entities. The core of this framework lies in Section 8 of the Act,
which deals with authentication. Section 8 underwent a radical change when the draft of the Act was revised. In the initial
scheme of things, authentication involved nothing more than a Yes/No response to a query as to whether a persons Aadhaar
number matches her fingerprints (or possibly, other biometric or demographic attributes). In the final version of the Act,
however, authentication also involves a possible sharing of identity information with the requesting entity. For instance,
when you go through Aadhaar-based biometric authentication to buy a SIM card from a telecom company, the company
typically gains access to your demographic characteristics from the CIDR. Even biometric information other than core
biometric information (which means, as of now, photographs) can be shared with a requesting entity.
Quite likely, this little-noticed change in Section 8 has something to do with a growing realisation of the business
opportunities associated with Aadhaar-enabled data harvesting. Data is the new oil, the latest motto among the champions
of Aadhaar, was not part of the early discourse on unique identity at least not the public discourse.
Section 8, of course, includes some safeguards against possible misuse of identity information. A requesting entity is
supposed to use identity information only with your consent, and only for the purpose mentioned in the consent statement.
But who reads the fine print of the terms and conditions before ticking or clicking a consent box?
There is another important loophole: the Aadhaar Act includes a blanket exemption from the safeguards applicable to
biometric and identity information on national security grounds. Considering the elastic nature of the term, this
effectively makes identity information accessible to the government without major restrictions.
Mining personal information

Having said this, the proliferation and possible misuse of identity information is only one of the privacy concerns associated
with Aadhaar, and possibly not the main concern. A bigger danger is that Aadhaar is a tool of unprecedented power for
mining and collating personal information. Further, there are few safeguards in the Aadhaar Act against this potential
invasion of privacy.
An example may help. Suppose that producing your Aadhaar number (with or without biometric authentication) becomes
mandatory for buying a railway ticket not a far-fetched assumption. With computerised railway counters, this means that
the government will have all the details of your railway journeys, from birth onwards. The government can do exactly what
it likes with this personal information the Aadhaar Act gives you no protection, since this is not identity information.
Further, this is just the tail of the beast. By the same reasoning, if Aadhaar is made mandatory for SIM cards, the government
will have access to your lifetime call records, and it will also be able to link your call records with your travel records. The
chain, of course, can be extended to other Aadhaar-enabled databases accessible to the government school records,
income-tax records, pension records, and so on. Aadhaar enables the government to collect and collate all this personal
information with virtually no restrictions.
Thus, Aadhaar is a tool of unprecedented power for the purpose of mining personal information. Nothing in the Aadhaar Act
prevents the government from using Aadhaar to link different databases, or from extracting personal information from
these databases. Indeed, many State governments (aside from the Central government) are already on the job, under the
State Resident Data Hub (SRDH) project, which integrates all the departmental databases and links them with Aadhaar
number, according to the SRDH websites. The Madhya Pradesh website goes further, and projects SRDH as the single
source of truth for the entire state nothing less. The door to state surveillance is wide open.
What about private agencies? Their access to multiple databases is more restricted, but some of them do have access to a fair
amount of personal information from their own databases. To illustrate, Reliance Jio is in possession of identity information
for more than 100 million Indians, harvested from the CIDR when they authenticate themselves to buy a Jio SIM card. This
database, combined with the records of Jio applications (phone calls, messaging, entertainment, online purchases, and more)
is a potential gold mine a dream for big data analysts. It is not entirely clear what restrictions the Aadhaar Act imposes,
in practice, on the use of this database.
In short, far from being based on the premise that privacy is a fundamental right, Aadhaar is the anti-thesis of the right to
privacy. Perhaps further safeguards can be put in place, but Aadhaars fundamental power as a tool for mining personal
information is bound to be hard to restrain. The very foundation of Aadhaar needs to be reconsidered in the light of the
Supreme Court judgment.
Jean Drze is Visiting Professor at the Department of Economics, Ranchi University

A voice for Rohingya
The disaster next door: on the Rohingya issue
Syed Munir Khasru

Indias stance on the Rohingya refugees undermines its ties with Bangladesh and its regional
leadership
I n a span of two weeks, almost 300,000 Rohingya have crossed over to Bangladesh from the northern
Rakhine state in Myanmar, putting Bangladesh under immense strain and compelling the refugees
to find shelter in squalid, unsanitary camps scattered along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. Excluded
from the 135 officially recognised ethnic groups, the Rohingya have been harassed and hounded by the
Myanmar authorities for decades. The latest surge follows attacks on police posts by an extremist
Rohingya group in late August and military action. While the Myanmar authorities claim that 400 lives
have been lost, advocates cite double this number.
Where is the spirit?

The flight of the Rohingya has quickened in the past two weeks, but Rohingya refugees have been trying
to find a home outside their native Rakhine for years now, braving human traffickers and fraught
conditions on rickety, overcrowded boats. The Rohingya have also sought refuge in India where they have
been shunned, denied basic public services and deemed by authorities as the undesirables.

ALSO READ
While the government has called them to be illegal immigrants and trespassers, the
fact is that India, throughout its history, has been generously accommodative
towards refugees in the neighbourhood fleeing persecution, which includes Parsis,
Tibetans, Afghans, Sri Lankan Tamils, and Bangladeshis during the war of liberation
For Rohingya,
there is no
in 1971. India has prided itself in its tradition of Atithi Devo Bhava (the guest is
place called equivalent to god).
home
The stance on the Rohingya issue by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during his
recent visit to Myanmar, has been disappointing and is contradictory to the values
of hospitality and inclusiveness that India stands for. South Asia, particularly Bangladesh, which has
been most affected by the crisis, was hopeful that Mr. Modi would express concern about the
humanitarian crisis with Myanmars State Councillor and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi.
Instead, he was seen empathising with Myanmar, and the joint statement at the end of the visit said:
India stands with Myanmar over the issue of violence in the Rakhine state which has led to loss of
innocent lives. In doing so, he overlooked the atrocious crimes committed in the neighbourhood and
almost turned a blind eye to both the untold sufferings caused to the refugees fleeing persecution and
the resulting difficulties that a resource-constrained country such as Bangladesh has been put to a
country which Indian politicians and officials frequently refer to as a role model of friendship in Indias
neighbourhood.
Bangladeshs burden
International relief agencies in Bangladesh such as the office of the UNHCR and the World Food
Programme are struggling to attend to the large number of refugees arriving each day on foot or by boat
(picture shows refugees at the border, at Teknaf, Bangladesh). Bangladesh, itself one of the worlds most
densely populated nations, has hosted more than 600,000 Rohingya compared to 40,000 by India.
Initially, hesitant to open borders along the Naf river, Bangladesh has now started allowing in refugees.

ALSO READ
Through the International Committee of the Red Cross, Dhaka has proposed that
No country for
the Rohingyas Myanmar secure areas in Rakhine under international relief agency supervision,
but there has been no response so far from Myanmar. Bangladesh has plans of
making another 607 hectares of land available near the Myanmar border for camps
to accommodate refugees. It has also urged the international community to put
pressure on Myanmar to take back the refugees and stop the violence against them.
Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina recently said: It affects a countrys
dignity when tens of thousands of its own nationals are fleeing home to take refuge outside.
On the other side of the fence

Last Friday, Indias move to dissociate itself from the Bali Declaration adopted at the World
Parliamentary Forum on Sustainable Development in Indonesia, and which called on all parties to
contribute to the restoration of stability and security ... respect human rights of all people in Rakhine
State regardless of their faith and ethnicity, as well as facilitate safe access for humanitarian assistance,
puts into question its respect for human rights and the treatment of minorities. It weakens Indias moral
authority to speak for minorities in other parts of its neighbourhood. Interestingly Nepal, Bhutan and Sri
Lanka joined the declaration.

ALSO READ
In his 2015 visit to Bangladesh, Mr. Modi used eloquent phrases to describe the
India-Bangladesh friendship. Since 2009, Bangladesh has emerged as one of Indias
most trusted neighbours, with Dhaka addressing almost all of New Delhis security
concerns. This includes cracking down on cross-border terrorism and insurgency
There is a
Rohingya in all
conducted against India from Bangladeshi soil. The India-Bangladesh border today
of us is one of the safest for India, enabling massive redeployment of its vital border
resources for other purposes. Despite this, Bangladesh has neither received water
from the Teesta or support in times of humanitarian crisis from its biggest
neighbour.
Ironically, when Bangladesh procured two submarines from China, indicating the growing economic and
defence ties between the two countries, New Delhi rushed its then Union Defence Minister, Manohar
Parrikar, to Dhaka to elevate military cooperation. Such promptness is missing when it comes to
supporting Bangladesh when it is overcome by helpless refuges persecuted at home and accepted by
none. The world does not expect Myanmars other big neighbour, China, to be vocal about the atrocities
being committed, but as the upholder of democratic values, India has a unique opportunity to
demonstrate statesmanship and regional leadership by mediating a solution to the Rohingya crisis on
the basis of a report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State headed by former UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan and set up by none other than Ms. Suu Kyi.
While Myanmar is an important factor in Indias ocean diplomacy and a valuable stakeholder in its Look
East Policy, Indias nonchalant attitude towards the humanitarian plight of the Rohingya reflects
inadequate moral leadership and an inability to rise to the occasion as expected from a regional power
vying to enhance its influence in the neighbourhood. One of the reasons why India, despite its enviable
soft power and formidable hard power, fails to generate confidence in the region, including with friends
such as Bangladesh, is its complex geopolitics based more on political opportunism and economic
interests as opposed to principles and values, practised consistently. This must be food for thought for
India.
LEAD
New strategy, old game: on Trump and Afghanistan
Varghese K. George
The Trump administration has presented its plan for Afghanistan as a regional approach its anything
but that
The core goal of the U.S. must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to
prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan And after years of mixed results, we will not, and cannot, provide
a blank check (to Pakistan) As President, my greatest responsibility is to protect the American people. We are not
in Afghanistan to control that country or to dictate its future, said the President of the United States, announcing
a regional strategy for Afghanistan after the worst year of the conflict. The President was Barack Obama and the
year was 2009.
On August 21, when President Donald Trump unveiled his new regional strategy for Afghanistan, it was in large
part a reiteration of the above speech in terms of strategic objectives. By now 2016 has become the worst year of
the conflict. Mr. Trumps speech was high on rhetoric and low on detail. Three weeks later, do we know better?
Interactions with people close to the subject, including Ahmad Daud Noorzai, head of the office of President
Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan, and Joshua White, who was Director for South Asian Affairs at Barack Obamas
National Security Council, provide some clues.
Junking timelines
Mr. Trumps announcement of military commitment without a deadline in Afghanistan could be a game changer,
both agree. The word on the street is that Afghans are happy. This allows us to create a culture of peace, to build
institutions and improve delivery of public services, Ahmad Daud Noorzai, said during an interaction with a
group of journalists and experts at the Afghanistan embassy in Washington last week. He said the most important
reason for Afghanistans failure to stabilise has been the uncertainty around security.

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Not announcing a timeline is wise strategy, feels Mr. White, who played a crucial role in
President Obamas Afghanistan strategy. We examined the risk of drawdown and the
outcomes looked ugly. Withdrawal would have been unwise. Significant scaling up of
American troops would also have been unwise that is the lesson that we learnt from the
Mission
indenite:
surge (in U.S. troop deployment in Afghanistan). We could not have fundamentally changed
Donald Trumps the balance of power without a large number of forces there for ever, he said in an interview
Afghanistan
policy at the Johns Hopkins University, where he teaches now (http://bit.ly/JoshuaTWhite).
Mr. Noorzai said Mr. Trumps declaration that the U.S. would go after terrorists has already
made a difference on the ground in Afghanistan: From the military point of view, this is a huge change. This has
already impacted the armed insurgents. When your commander-in-chief says to go after the terrorists, the nature
of the military presence changes. So more than the number of American boots on the ground, the nature and
quality of Americas military presence has changed, and this could make a difference.
Pressure on Pakistan
The most tangible measure against Pakistan came a week after Mr. Trumps speech as the administration decided
to keep $255 million in military assistance to Pakistan in suspension until Islamabad demonstrates action
against terrorist groups. This was earmarked in the U.S. budget for 2017. In July, Defence Secretary James Mattis
did not provide certification that Pakistan was taking action against the Haqqani network, and held back $50
million from reimbursements to Pakistan for logistical support for the war in Afghanistan.

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This is a continuation of the Obama administrations policy. In 2015 and 2016, it had held
back part of reimbursements to Pakistan from the Coalition Support Funds. Though Mr.
Trump spoke tough on Pakistan, it is still unclear what could be the tough measures. Mr.
White thinks overdoing this could be counterproductive: Increased pressure is likely to
Full texts of
Donald Trump's
push Pakistan into a corner, unlikely to deliver results in terms of cooperation on critical
speech on security issues. The insurgency in Afghanistan is largely organically funded. The safe havens
South Asia
policy help the Taliban, but I dont think they are vital to the Taliban. So even if the pressure on
Pakistan produces results, I dont think its impact on the situation in Afghanistan will be
significant.
Mr. Noorzai said Mr. Ghani is trying to impress upon Pakistan to make the best use of Afghanistans economic
potential: We have excellent relations with the countries on the north, west and south. New trade routes and
opportunities are opening up and Pakistan has a lot to gain from it all.
Mr. Trump called upon India to play a larger role, but Washingtons expectations from India are very modest. No
specific demand for monetary assistance has been made.
Expectations from India

The Trump administration, it appears, would like India to help in working with Afghanistans domestic factions in
widening and buttressing the political legitimacy of the current government, and helping it improve its
governance. For his part, Mr. Noorzai finds Indias increasing role in Afghanistan very welcome. The Indian
private sector must come to Afghanistan, he said. Start your business, make your profit. We could start with IT,
we have so many needs. There is an impression in India that Indians are targeted in Afghanistan; Indians will need
as much security as any other, but they can do their business. India needs to create a positive view in the country
about Afghanistan so that the private sector understands the economic opportunity in Afghanistan. Mr. White
believes India has been self-restrained for good reasons in its role in Afghanistan, though from 2012
onwards the Obama administration was open to New Delhi playing any role that it could agree with the Afghan
government. There is value in signalling that the U.S. sees India as a critical partner for Afghanistan. But there is
also a risk, because feeding Pakistans anxiety about Indian influence in Afghanistan is not necessarily helpful to
either Washington or New Delhi, he said.

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Following Mr. Trump speech, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said India has a role to play in
changing Pakistans behaviour: India and Pakistan, they have their own issues that they
have to continue to work through, but I think there are areas where perhaps even India can
take some steps of rapprochement to improve the stability within Pakistan and remove
India welcomes
Trumps new
some of the reasons why they deal with these unstable elements inside their own country.
Afghanistan
policy Mr. White feels this is continuation of U.S. policy under President Obama: The Trump
administration has spoken more clearly and more directly about safe havens, not only for
Afghan-focussed groups but also for Indian-focussed groups. But again, near the end of the
Obama administration there were some strong statements and acknowledgment on that issue, particularly after
the Uri attack. He adds that America always wanted India to remain constantly engaged with Pakistan, despite
the disappointments India and the U.S. had with Islamabad. There is an unmistakable level of continuity between
the Obama and Trump administrations in viewing the India-Pakistan rivalry as a potential nuclear catastrophe. In
fact, Mr. Trump mentioned that in his South Asia speech, and he has inherited the idea from the Obama era.
Not exactly regional

The Trump administration has presented the new strategy as a regional approach, but in the last three weeks it
is clear that there is hardly any regional cooperation evolving or to be expected. Russia has termed the strategy a
dead end, China has said Pakistan should be on board. The administration has acknowledged that Russia will
work to undermine America in Afghanistan, but believes that China is interested in stability in Afghanistan. In
June, the Pentagons half-yearly report on the situation in Afghanistan described India as Afghanistans most
reliable regional partner and noted the interests conflicting in many cases of countries such as Iran, Saudi
Arabia, China, Russia and the Central Asian states in Afghanistan, not to mention Pakistan. The new strategy does
not appear to be addressing this factor and other measures of the Trump administration could aggravate the
rivalries. Herein lies the most serious challenge in making any meaningful progress in Afghanistan.
LEAD
Time for course correction
C. Rangarajan
Both public and private investment must pick up for the Indian economy to get back to high growth
rates
W hat do the latest numbers on national income indicate? What are the chances of the Indian economy
moving out of the current phase of relatively low growth? Or are we stuck at a new Hindu rate of growth?
Recent trends
About a week ago, the Central Statistics Office (CSO) released the estimates of the gross domestic product (GDP)
for the first quarter (April-June) of 2017-18. The numbers showed that in Q1 of 2017-18, GDP grew by 5.7%. Gross
value added (GVA) at basic prices grew by 5.6%. Whichever measure you take, the growth rate has fallen below 6%.
In the corresponding quarter of the previous year, GDP grew at 7.9% and GVA at 7.6%. What accounts for the
decline in growth rate by almost 2 percentage points? Certainly, demonetisation must have had a negative impact.
Also, the destocking of goods which might have happened prior to the introduction of goods and services tax (GST)
must have also had a negative impact.
However, it might be inappropriate to attribute the entire decline of 2 percentage points to the two factors. What
has been happening is a steady decline from the first quarter of 2016-17 when the growth rate of GVA was 7.6%. By
the third quarter of 2016-17, the growth rate had declined to 6.7%. Since then it has fallen by another 0.9
percentage point. Given the growth rate of 5.6% in Q1, it is unlikely that the growth rate for the year as a whole
will exceed 6.5%. For this to happen, the growth rate in the next three quarters will have to be 7%. The most
disappointing aspect of the first quarter numbers is the steep fall in the growth rate of manufacturing to 1.2%.
Because of the good monsoon, agriculture will do better. Since agricultural growth rate last year was also good, the
increase may not be that much.
If the economy has to get back to the high growth rate seen earlier, we need to understand the factors that might
have been operating to bring down the growth rate.

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One of the arguments attributed to the low growth rate is the poor performance of the
external sector. Growth is fuelled broadly by two types of demand, domestic and external.
High export growth has propelled the growth rate of many countries, including Chinas. In
Indias own experience, the high growth phase between 2005-06 and 2007-08 saw exports
Why Indias GDP
growth is
growing at an average annual rate exceeding 20%.
falling?
Indias declining growth rate has also coincided with poor export performance. Export
demand has been weak because of the tepid growth rate of the advanced economies. Both in
2014-15 and 2015-16, the export growth rate was negative. However, the export growth rate
has become positive since the second half of 2016-17. While undoubtedly export demand is critically important to
sustain high growth, the sharp decline in growth rate noted in the last few quarters cannot be attributed to poor
export performance. In fact, as compared to the previous year, the export performance has improved.
Fall in investment rate

The fundamental problem has been the sharp fall in the investment rate. Gross fixed capital formation rate stood
at 34.3% in 2011-12. This started falling steadily and touched 29.3% in 2015-16. It fell further to 27.1% in 2016-17.
According to the latest numbers, in the first quarter of 2017-18, it stood at 27.5%. Since the public investment rate
has not shown any decline (it stands at 7.5% of GDP), it is the decline in private investment, both corporate and
households, that has been responsible for the steady fall. While the fall in corporate investment is steep compared
to what was achieved in 2007-08, it has more or less stabilised at a lower level of around 13%. Household
investment, however, has continued to decline even in recent years. Household here includes not only pure
households but also unincorporated enterprises.

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Deep concerns have been expressed about the fact that the growth that we have seen in
Where the jobs
are: on the recent years has not resulted in an increase in employment. The current period has therefore
been described as one of jobless growth. It may be noted that data on employment are not
unemployment very reliable. Firm data are available only for the organised sector. The rest are estimated
rate
through surveys. In fact, in the case of unorganised sectors, very often the position is one of
underemployment rather than unemployment. Growth can occur because of two reasons.
One, it results from better utilisation of existing capacity. Two, it can come out of new
investment. Whatever growth we have been seeing recently has come out of better
utilisation of capacity rather than new investment. It is real growth spurred by new investment that generates
more jobs.
Another intriguing factor about the falling investment rate is that the last few years have shown a steady and
substantial increase in foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI inflows in 2016-17 were at an all-time peak of $60
billion. In the first quarter of 2017, the inflows were $10.9 billion. With this type of inflow and if the investment
rate has not grown, the one surmise that one can make is that much of the FDI has gone into acquiring old assets
rather than going to greenfield projects. All this implies is that domestic investors continue to remain shy.
Private investment
What can be done to stimulate private investment? First, in creating an appropriate investment climate, reforms
play an important role. Some of the noteworthy changes that have happened in the last few years are the passing
of the bankruptcy code and GST legislation, and modifications in FDI rules.
We must continue with the reform agenda and there is still a lot to be done in the area of governance. Second,
financing investment has taken a beating because of the poor health of banks. Banks in India today are universal
banks providing both short-term and long-term credit. The sharp reduction in the flow of new credit has also put
prospective investors in a difficult situation. To resolve the non-performing asset (NPA) problem, banks need to
take a haircut. To bring banks back to good health, recapitalisation has become urgent. The government should go
beyond the amount indicated in the Budget regarding disinvestment and fund banks through the money raised by
disinvestment. Third, a close look must be taken at stalled projects to see what can be done to revive those which
are viable. This is indeed a low-hanging fruit. In fact, this must be part of an overall effort to hold consultations in
small groups with investors to understand and overcome the obstacles that come in the way of new investment.
Not all investor groups are plagued with intractable problems. Industry-by-industry consultations and analyses
are needed to pinpoint problems and their solutions. Fourth, even though the progress of small and medium
industries is very much dependent on the fortunes of the large, a separate look at medium and small enterprises
may be needed to prod them into new investment.
Two engines of growth

To sum up, the growth rate in 2017-18 is unlikely to exceed 6.5%. Once the glitches and fears of the GST are over,
the growth rate may pick up. Our goal must be to achieve and sustain a growth rate of 8% and above over an
extended period. The Achilles heel is private investment, which has been steadily falling. However, there has been
a slight pick-up in public investment recently. That is not enough. Only when the two engines of public and
private investment function at full throttle will India fly high.
C. Rangarajan is former Chairman of the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister and former Governor,
Reserve Bank of India
LEAD
Equality for what?
Neera Chandhoke
We must incorporate the right to equality into our political vocabulary to arrest deepening inequality
I n 1820 the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, in his magnificently crafted Philosophy of
Right, had written with some despair of the moral squalor and of the ravages that poverty brings in its
wake. The state of poverty, he argued, is not an aberration, it is a product of industrial society, of the
overproduction and underconsumption which marks this social order. But it is precisely society that banishes
its victims to the twilight zone of collective life. Here, removed from the advantages of solidarity that civil
society offers, the poor are reduced to a heap of fragmented atoms, rabble, poebel. When the standard of living
of a large mass of people falls below a certain subsistence level, he wrote, we see a loss of the sense of right and
wrong, of honesty and of self-respect. Against nature man can claim no right, but once society is established,
poverty immediately takes the form of a wrong done to one class by another.
Hegel suggests that poverty is a social phenomenon. One, society is complicit in the creation and recreation of
poverty. Destitution, that is, is the outcome of a skewed economy. Two, poverty breeds unfortunate
consequences, such as suffering, which seriously demoralises human beings. Three, the existence of large
numbers of the poor pose a direct threat to the social order, simply because the poor are (justly) resentful of
their exclusion from the benefits of society.
We should be seriously reflecting on Hegels criticism of a society that refuses to correct the wrongs it has
heaped on its own people, in the light of the research findings of the economist Thomas Piketty and his
colleague Lucas Chancel.
Inequality in India
In a paper aptly titled Indian income inequality, 1922-2014: From British Raj to Billionaire Raj?, they conclude
that income inequality in India is at the highest level since 1922, when the countrys income tax law was
conceived, and that the top 1% earners corner 22% of income. These research findings should send a powerful
warning signal to power elites, leaders who prefer to concentrate on the politics of beef, brutal repression of
dissent, and curtailment of basic human freedoms, even as the lives of thousands of Indians are mired in mind-
numbing poverty.

ALSO READ
There is more to the proposition that some persons are poor beyond belief, and others are
rich beyond belief in India. P is poor, we can say, when she does not possess access to the
basic resources which enable q, or s, or m to consume nutritious food, avoid ill health,
attend school, take up a job, and own a home, let alone go on holiday or possess a car. This
Income
inequality in
implies that p is not just poor, she is unequal to q, s, or m, since the latter three, unlike p,
India at its have access to certain advantages that p does not. Poverty is the effect of inequality as well
highest level
since 1922, says as the prime signifier of inequality. And inequality is demeaning.
Lucas Chancel
Implications for society
Arguably, inequality is not only a matter of statistics. It is a shattering reflection on the kind of society we live in.
Logically, if the economic ordering of society is responsible for ill-being, it is obliged to remedy the wrongs that
it has visited upon the heads of the poor. This constitutes a basic code of justice. People who have been wronged
are entitled to ask for justice. If justice is not delivered, inequalities are reinforced and compounded over time.

ALSO READ
Resultantly, people fated to occupy the lowliest rungs of the social ladder are not only
denied access to basic material requirements that enable them to live a decent life, they are
likely to be socially overlooked, politically irrelevant except in times of elections when
their votes bring parties into power, disdained, and subjected to disrespect in and through
The selsh way
to combat the practices of everyday life. To be unequal is to be denied the opportunity to participate
inequality in social, economic, and cultural transactions from a plane of equality.
Starkly put, the presence of massive inequality reflects sharply and pejoratively on the
kind of social relations that we find in India. Because these social relationships are
indisputably unequal, they cannot but be entrenched in massive discrimination and exploitation. Can we
reflect on inequality without taking on exploitation and discrimination? And unless we confront these
background inequalities directly, will not inequality continue to be produced and reproduced along with the
production and reproduction of a lopsided social order, indeed as an integral part of this order?
Morality of mutual respect

Let us not understate the implications of inequality, it violates a basic democratic norm: the equal standing of
citizens. Persons have equal standing because each human being has certain capacities in common with other
human beings, for instance, the capacity to make her own history in concert with other human beings. Of
course the histories that persons make might not be the histories they chose to make, but this is not the issue at
hand. What is important is that each person realises this ability.

ALSO READ
The principle of equal standing generates at least two robust principles of democratic
morality. For one, equality is a relation that obtains between persons in respect of some
fundamental characteristic that they share in common. Equality is, morally speaking, a
default principle. Therefore, and this is the second postulate, persons should not be
The everyday
embrace of
discriminated against on grounds such as race, caste, gender, ethnicity, sexual preferences,
inequality disability, or class. These features of the human condition are morally irrelevant.
These two postulates of political morality yield the following implications. To treat
persons equally because they possess equal standing is to treat them with respect. The idea
that one should treat persons with respect not only because some of these persons possess some special skill or
talent, for example skilled cricketers, gifted musicians, or literary giants, but because persons are human beings,
is by now part of common sense morality. If someone were to ask, equality for what, we can answer that
equality assures equal standing and respect, and respect is an essential prerequisite for the making of human
beings who can participate in the multiple transactions of society from a position of confidence and self-
respect. If they cannot do so, the government is simply not taking the well-being of its citizens seriously.
There is urgent need, in the face of government inaction and insensitivity towards people trapped in inequality
as a social relation to invoke the collective conscience of Indian citizens. If the right to equality is violated,
citizens should be exercised or agitated about this violation. But for this to occur, for society to feel deeply about
the right on offer, we have to incorporate the right to equality into political thinking, into our values, and into
political vocabularies. The project requires the harnessing of creative imagination and courage on the one hand,
and careful reasoning, persuasion, and dialogue on the other. The task also demands the investment of rather
high degrees of energy and time. But this is essential because a political consensus on what constitutes, or
should constitute the basic rules of society, is central to our collective lives. The political is not a given, it has to
be constructed, as Karl Marx had told us long ago, through determined and sustained political intervention.
Neera Chandhoke is a former Professor of Political Science at Delhi University
LEAD
At home and in the world: on the Rohingya issue
Suhrith Parthasarathy
Deporting Rohingya refugees would run counter to Indias obligations under domestic and
international law
O ver the past month, from Coxs Bazar, in the south-east of Bangladesh, smoke can be seen billowing into
the grey sky across the countrys border. Villages, home to the Rohingya community, in the fractious
state of Rakhine in western Myanmar, are being mercilessly, horrifically burnt down. Nurul Islam, a 30-year-
old farmer, who had fled to Bangladesh by boat, told The Economist that he left his home in Myanmar after the
military blasted bullets on villagers and set their houses on fire. They separated the women and men, the
magazine reported, and raped Islams 13-year-old sister Khadiza, proceeding to then mutilate her body.
Despite living for centuries in Myanmar, the Rohingya, who are mostly Muslim, have been denied citizenship
and have been rendered stateless. In February, a United Nations report had documented numerous instances of
gang rape and killings, including of babies and young children, by Myanmars security forces. Now, the armys
viciousness, already unimaginably ghastly, has escalated even further.
Unfolding catastrophe
By any account, the Rohingya are at the centre of a humanitarian catastrophe of terrifying proportions. On
Monday, the U.N. human rights chief, Zeid Raad al-Hussein, called on Myanmar to put an end to this brutal
security operation. He termed the states actions against the Rohingya as a textbook example of ethnic
cleansing. Some would go further. In October, 2015, a Yale Law School study warned that efforts were being
made not merely to forcibly displace the Rohingya but towards committing the crime of genocide through the
complete annihilation of the ethnic group.

ALSO READ
Repercussions of the violence in Myanmar are now being felt around the globe,
particularly in nearby countries; in India, where scores of Rohingya are lodged
reportedly totalling 40,000 it must come to us as a matter of shame that the state is so
much as considering returning the refugees back to the jaws of not merely political
In Bangladesh, a
hungry and persecution but of mind-boggling terror and savagery. Going by thestatements made by
traumatised the Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju, quite regrettably, it appears
Rohingya
everywhere India might find itself committing a grave error of substantial moral purport. Although
hes since backtracked from some of his assertions, Mr. Rijijus message, delivered over the
course of the last week, remains deeply troubling. They are doing it, we cant stop them from registering, but
we are not signatory to the accord on refugees, he said, in one interview, when asked about the registration of
Rohingya as refugees by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. As far as we are concerned they are all illegal
immigrants. They have no basis to live here. Anybody who is [an] illegal migrant will be deported.
These threats are not only chilling on a humanitarian level, if translated into action, they would also constitute
a contravention of Indias obligations under both domestic and international law.
The case in court

Indeed, it is precisely such an argument that a pair of Rohingya refugees, Mohammad Salimullah and
Mohammad Shaqir, have made in a petition filed in the Supreme Court. Their submissions rest on two broad
planks: one, that any deportation would violate their fundamental rights to equality and to life, under Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution, and, two, that any action by India in returning them to Myanmar would infringe
international law, particularly the principle of non-refoulement.
When the case comes up for hearing next, on September 18, in response, the government may expand on Mr.
Rijijus statements. It could point out, first, that India is not bound to follow the principle of non-refoulement,
since it is not a signatory to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and, second, that, in
any event, any deportation would be saved by the exceptions to the principle, in that the Rohingya are guilty of
committing crimes against peace and are a threat to Indias national security. On any close examination,
however, these arguments ought to fail.

ALSO READ
The principle of non-refoulement is articulated in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. It
mandates that no state shall expel or return a refugee to the frontiers of territories where
Can India ignore his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
the Rohingya membership of a particular social group or political opinion. However, it allows for an
crisis?
exception in cases where there are reasonable grounds for regarding a refugee as a
danger to the security of the country. Whats more, the Convention also excludes
generally from refugee status individuals guilty of, among other things, committing war
crimes or crimes against peace and humanity.
Now, India is not a party to the 1951 Convention. But we need to heed the existence of sources of law that
stretch beyond treaty obligations. These include norms of customary international law, where binding rules
have been crystallised as a result of the practice of states. The principle of non-refoulement is widely regarded
as one such rule. In fact, some scholars argue that the principle is so well enshrined that it constitutes a
peremptory norm from which no derogation whatsoever is permitted. But even if one were to discount such
arguments, there is no denying that non-refoulement is now nearly universally accepted as constituting a
fundamental rule of international law.
At least two high courts in India have expressly held that the country is bound to follow the principle. In their
judgments respectively in Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi v. Union of India (1998) and Dongh Lian Kham v. Union
of India (2015) the Gujarat and Delhi High Courts have virtually incorporated non-refoulement into the
guarantees of Article 21 of the Constitution. [The principles] application, wrote the Gujarat High Court,
protects life and liberty of a human being irrespective of his nationality. It is encompassed in Article 21 of the
Constitution, so long as the presence of a refugee is not prejudicial to the law and order and security of India.
A foundational principle
Now, the Supreme Court in different cases has incorporated other principles of customary international law
into municipal law, where theres no local statute embodying rules to the contrary. Theres no reason why non-
refoulement should be treated any differently. The Supreme Court can have little option but to recognise, as the
Gujarat and the Delhi High Courts have done, that non-refoulement is a foundational principle that creates
obligations under both domestic and international law alike.
On arguments concerning national security, it might well be true that the state must be accorded an element of
latitude in shaping its policies. But, in the absence of any material, the government cannot plausibly be arguing
that each of the 40,000 Rohingya constitutes a threat to Indias safety, or that each of them is guilty of
committing crimes against peace.
Ultimately, the petitions filed by the Rohingya refugees are an important test of both the Supreme Court and
the Indian states moral calibre. In an interview on Wednesday, Mr. Rijiju urged an end to the chorus branding
India as a villain, for its apparent stand seeking to return the Rohingyas, a calibrated design, in his view, to
tarnish Indias image.
However, the present crisis goes beyond matters of mere perception. It goes to the root of what it means to be a
civilised state, of treating every person, irrespective of constructs of citizenship, with equal care, compassion
and respect.
Suhrith Parthasarathy is an advocate practising at the Madras High Court

LEAD
The federal manoeuvre: on the Dravidian movement
Pulapre Balakrishnan
The Dravidian movements contribution to keeping India united is not appreciated enough
T o have served for 60 consecutive years as a legislator is a rare achievement especially if it is in Tamil Nadu, a
large and relatively successful State. Few politicians in India can match this record of Muthuvel
Karunanidhi, known as Kalaignar, or artist, to his admirers. When some do come close to it, they possess none of
his achievements. He was Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu more than once and played a role on the national stage
once coalition governments became a reality. He also has quite a unique significance to which I shall return. How
are we to view his legacy?
Karunanidhis role
Despite his long presence in Indian politics, Mr. Karunanidhi is really a beneficiary of the Dravidian movement
and its vehicle, the political party Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK). The movement itself had been sculpted by
E.V. Ramaswami Naicker and its presence in national politics was cemented by C.N. Annadurai, who led the party
in the Lok Sabha. Thus unlike his contemporaries, Mr. Karunanidhi inherited significant political capital. For
instance, he did not have to carve out a path for a party, as did E.M.S. Namboodiripad almost a generation before
him. Namboodiripad had to first craft the Communist movement in the country and then govern a newly formed
State during the high noon of Congress hegemony, the 1950s. In a brief and turbulent tenure, Namboodiripad
attempted a move to a distinctly new model economy and society in Kerala, even though subsequent
developments may not have conformed to what he had anticipated of them. It is difficult to detect a similar
motivation in Mr. Karunanidhi as judged by his actions while in office. Tamil Nadu today may be considered a
leading Indian State economically, but most of its achievements in this sphere had been initiated by Congress
politicians, notably R. Venkataraman when he was Industries Minister of Madras State.

ALSO READ
In fact, Mr. Karunanidhis chief ministerial accomplishments may be considered less
impressive than that of M.G. Ramachandran or even Jayalalithaa, Chief Ministers who
followed him. MGR is known for having scaled up to unimagined levels the noon meal
scheme started by K. Kamaraj in the fifties, an intervention that has received global
A stalwart of the
Dravidian
attention. Jayalalithaas implementation of compulsory rainwater harvesting in Chennai
movement ameliorated the situation in a city that was once the byword for water shortage. It is difficult
to ascribe a similar game-changing role to the flyovers in the State capital associated with
the Karunanidhi government.
Standing up to Mrs. Gandhi

He does have a unique significance though. He had stood up to Indira Gandhi and dared to oppose the Emergency
when few politicians even outside the Congress party had done so. For this he paid a price. His government was
dismissed, though on grounds of charges of corruption. It is not entirely surprising that Karunanidhis
achievements are difficult to detect for it is not clear how he saw himself, whether as an artist or as a politician
aiming to improve the condition of his people, an urge evident in Kamaraj and even in MGR, both politicians
much loved by their people. As Mr. Karunanidhis own record in office does not stand out when compared to the
Chief Ministers who came after him, the occasion of his completing 60 years as legislator is perhaps better utilised
reflecting upon the role of the Dravidian movement of which, as we have seen, he is a scion.

ALSO READ
Paradoxically, the significance of the Dravidian movement lies in its having played a major
role in keeping India together at a crucial juncture. This may appear counter-intuitive given
its image as a permanent opposition to the Indian mainstream, but is actually not so. By
staunchly opposing the imposition of Hindi on the rest of the country, an end relentlessly
A journey to
reckon with
pursued by certain sections of the north, the Dravidian movement and its principal heir, the
DMK, saved India from going the way of Pakistan or Sri Lanka. Before the former lost its
eastern wing, West Pakistans conspicuously anglicised establishment had imposed Urdu on
their Bengali co-religionists who were unwilling to bear the injustice. In Sri Lanka the
Oxford-educated S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike disempowered the Tamil minority through the Sinhala Only Act, making
it the official language of the country. While Sri Lanka remains intact, it has lost some stature in the eyes of the
international community due to its suppression of minority rights. India avoided this fate only due to the creative
leadership of the Dravidian parties.
That the DMK had only sought cultural autonomy and not secession was made clear in Annadurais parliamentary
intervention during the Indo-China war in 1962, when he affirmed his States unwavering commitment to the
Indian Union. This was not reciprocated though, when, at the first opportunity after the death of Nehru, cultural
chauvinism was to raise its ugly head and the possibility of Hindi being adopted as the sole official language re-
emerged. Riots erupted in Tamil Nadu accompanied by acts of self-immolation. A compromise was arrived at and
English was to be retained till such time as the southern States desired it. This remarkably mature arrangement
saved Indian democracy. From time to time linguistic chauvinism has been on display from actors as diverse as
Mulayam Singh Yadav and Central ministers in the Narendra Modi government, but by and large the principle has
been adhered to by the Centre in its dealing with the States. Of course, the other southern States must thank the
Tamil leadership for this extraordinary achievement, but so must the rest of India, for it contributed to the
country being left in one piece.

ALSO READ
It is possible to argue that the Dravidian parties love of the Tamil language may have been
more steadfast than their commitment to the Tamil people. As already mentioned, it is not
obvious they have led the State to exceptional achievements in any sphere. Punjab matches
it in agriculture, Karnataka leads it in IT and Maharashtra dominates it in manufacturing.
Breathe in the
spirit of 1967
Also, Chennai is no longer the iconic southern city that Madras was when these parties first
came to power. Tamil Nadu was among Indias first States to allow private entry into
education, leaving it to entrepreneurs, often from the political class itself, who get away with
poor-quality service. Over time they have emerged as a vested interest opposing all
regulation that curbs their exploitative practices. The State has had no land reforms and populist policies for
electricity and water use have led to a plunging of the water table with long-term implications for its agriculture.
And, finally, the State pioneered the practice of using the treasury to dole out private goods. This has weakened its
public finances and encouraged the politics of clientelism with individual politicians depicted as the fount of
welfare. Termed social justice by the Dravidian parties, the practice is at odds with the usual understanding of
democracy.
The social sphere

Ironically, it is not in the economic sphere but in the social that the Dravidian movements legacy is more dubious.
While the Keezhvenmani massacre of agricultural labourers attempting to form a union may have taken place at
the very beginning of DMK rule, violence against Dalits has not ceased, and even very recently activists have
claimed that it has increased. The Dravidian movement may have succeeded in unseating the upper castes in
governance but it has actively strengthened the middle castes that form the backbone of the rural economy. In the
absence of land reforms, they control the rural economy and with patronage from the state have succeeded in
keeping the lower castes in a state of permanent suppression. This is a disappointing denouement for what had
started out as an anti-caste movement. Tamil Nadus history suggests a difference between loving your identity
and nurturing your country. The nationalists in todays India share a similar predicament.
Pulapre Balakrishnan is Professor, Ashoka University and Senior Fellow, IIM Kozhikode. The views expressed are
personal
LEAD
Reading the tea leaves
Rakesh Sood
The emerging India-Japan alignment sets the stage for the reordering of the Asian strategic landscape
I n history, defining moments like 9/11 that can be identified as markers of change are rare. More often, there are trend
lines of slow-moving geopolitical changes which come together at a particular moment in time resulting in an inflexion
point. Reading the tea leaves indicates that 2017 may well be the year which marked the reordering of the Asian strategic
landscape.
Two trend lines

The two slow moving trend lines clearly discernible since the Cold War ended a quarter century ago are the shift of the
geopolitical centre of gravity from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific region and the rise of China. The U.S. rebalancing
announced in 2011 was a belated recognition of these changes, driven home by the impact of the 2008 financial crisis. Most of
the rivalries are being played out in the crowded geopolitical space of the Indo-Pacific, and Asian economies now account for
more than half of global GDP and becoming larger in coming years.
Chinas rise is reflected in a more assertive China. According to President Xi Jinpings two guides policy announced in
February, China should guide the shaping of the new world order and safeguarding international security. Much has changed
during the last quarter century when Deng Xiaoping advised China to observe calmly, secure its position, hide its capability,
bide its time and not claim leadership.
Todays China is not just willing but eager to assume leadership and expects other countries to yield space. China has
suggested a new type of great power relations to the U.S. Its assertiveness in the East China Sea with Japan and in the South
China Sea with its Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) neighbours sends a signal that while multipolarity may be
desirable in a global order, in Asia, China is the predominant power and must be treated as such.
Even though China has been a beneficiary of the U.S.-led global order, it is impatient that it does not enjoy a position that it
feels it deserves, especially in the Bretton Woods institutions. During the last five years, it has set about creating a new set of
institutions (the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank) and launched the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) to create a new trading infrastructure that reflects Chinas centrality as the largest trading nation.
The BRI is also complemented by a growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Beginning in 2009, the PLA Navy
started rotating three ship task forces through the Indian Ocean as part of the anti-piracy task force off the Somalia coast.
Visits by nuclear attack submarines to littoral ports began to take place. In addition to Gwadar, China is now converting the
supply facility at Djibouti into a full-fledged military base.
Accelerating the trends

Recent developments have accelerated these geopolitical trends. The first was the outcome of the U.S. elections last year. By
invoking America first repeatedly, President Donald Trump has made it clear that the U.S. considers the burden of leading the
global order too onerous. American allies, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, are nervous about Mr. Trumps harangues that they
are enjoying the benefits of the U.S. security umbrella on the cheap.
Recent nuclear and long-range missile tests by North Korea have added to South Korean and Japanese anxieties. Japan has
been particularly rattled by the two missiles fired across Hokkaido. Given the U.S. push for more sanctions that depend on
China for implementation, most Japanese reluctantly admit that North Koreas nuclear and missile capability is unlikely to be
dismantled any time soon.
Another significant development was the Doklam stand-off between India and China that lasted from June to August. The
Chinese playbook followed the established pattern creating a physical presence followed by sharpened rhetoric, together
becoming an exercise in coercive diplomacy. This worked in pushing the nine-dash line in the South China Sea with the
Philippines and Vietnam even as China built additional facilities on reclaimed land in the area. India, however, chose to block
China and a few hundred soldiers on the plateau maintained their hostile postures even as Prime Minister Narendra Modi and
President Xi attended the the G-20 summit in July amidst heightened rhetoric recalling the 1962 war.
Differences with China did not begin with Doklam. It was preceded by the stapled visa issue for Indians belonging to
Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir, growing incidents of incursions along the disputed boundary, blocking of Indias
bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group last year, ensuring that no language relating to Pakistan-based terrorist groups found
mention in the BRICS summit in Goa and preventing the inclusion of Masood Azhar from being designated as a terrorist by
the UN Security Council by exercising a veto.
Since 1988, India has followed a consistent China policy based on putting aside the boundary dispute and developing other
aspects of the relationship in the expectation that this would create mutual trust and enable a boundary settlement. However,
the gap between India and China has grown, both in economic and military terms, and with it has emerged a more assertive
China. The shared vision of an Asian century with a rising India and rising China is long past. Mr. Modis personal diplomacy
with Mr. Xi has had little influence on changing Chinese attitudes or behaviour. After Doklam, there is finally a consensus that
the old China policy does not serve our national interests and a review is long overdue.
A new strategic landscape

It is against this backdrop that Japanese Prime Minister Shinz Abes visit to India took place last week. The contours of a new
relationship were defined during Mr. Abes earlier tenure, in 2006-07, when annual summits were introduced, the relationship
became a Special Strategic and Global Partnership, Japan was invited to join in the Malabar naval exercises and a Joint
Declaration on Security Cooperation was concluded. Since then, significant content has been added.
A singular achievement was the conclusion of the agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy last year.
Under negotiation for five years, this was a sensitive issue for Japan given the widespread anti-nuclear sentiment (though
Japan enjoys the U.S. nuclear umbrella) and (misplaced) faith in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; it would not have gone
through but for Mr. Abes personal commitment.
To deepen strategic understanding, the two sides initiated a 2+2 Dialogue involving the Foreign and Defence Ministries in
2010. A memorandum on enhancing defence and technology/security cooperation was signed and talks on acquiring the
amphibious maritime surveillance ShinMaywa US-2i began in 2013. Trilateral dialogue involving both the U.S. and Japan and
covering strategic issues was elevated to ministerial level in 2014. Japanese participation in the Malabar exercises, suspended
because of Chinese protests, was restored in 2015. Once the agreement for the 12 US-2i aircraft is concluded with a follow-up
acquisition as part of Make in India, the strategic relationship will begin to acquire critical mass.
However the strategic partnership needs stronger economic ties. Today, India-Japan trade languishes at around $15 billion, a
quarter of trade with China while Japan-China trade is around $300 billion. Therefore, the primary focus during the recent
visit has been on economic aspects. The Mumbai-Ahmedabad high speed rail corridor is more than symbolism, in
demonstrating that high-cost Japanese technology is viable in developing countries and that India has the absorption capacity
to master it. Completing it in five years is a management challenge but the bigger challenge will be to transfer the know-how
of best practices to other sectors of the economy.
Another major initiative is the recently launched Asia-Africa Growth Corridor to build connectivity for which Japan has
committed $30 billion and India $10 billion. This adds a critical dimension to the global partnership between the two
countries. However, to make this productive, India needs to change its style of implementing projects abroad, most of which
have been plagued by cost and time over-runs.
Ensuring effective implementation and setting up mechanisms for delivery will align Mr. Modis Act East policy with Mr. Abes
Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. This alignment sets the stage for the reordering of the Asian strategic landscape.
Rakesh Sood is a former diplomat and currently Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. E-mail:
rakeshsood2001@yahoo.com
Printable version | Sep 18, 2017 10:58:31 AM | http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/reading-the-tea-
leaves/article19704235.ece
The Hindu
LEAD
Gauging the status quo
M. K. Narayanan
With Chinas critical 19th Party Congress set to take place soon, peace on its periphery is a
necessity
T he Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa grouping (BRICS) has since long ceased to be of
material significance as multilateral institutions go. The recent BRICS Summit in Xiamen
(China) only seemed to confirm this. It suggests that BRICS may be going the way of quite a few other
organisations.
Inconsequential declaration
Little of consequence appears to have happened, or to have emerged, from the latest summit. The
Xiamen Declaration is proof of this. Considering that this meeting was taking place in the shadow of
significant global events, notably North Koreas nuclear provocations and the U.S. response, other
serious developments in Asia, including Afghanistan and West Asia, apart from issues of consequence
elsewhere, the absence of any reference to these events in the Summit Declaration suggests that
BRICS is clearly out of sync with current realities.
Much has been made by the media about theinclusion of Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as
the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed among the many terrorist groups active in the
region. It, however, needs to be understood that this was merely a reiteration of something already
mentioned in the declaration of the Heart of Asia Conference held in India in December 2016.
The Heart of Asia declaration had highlighted the gravity of the security situation in Afghanistan and
in the region, drawing attention to the high levels of violence caused by the Taliban, terrorist groups
including the Islamic State, al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the Haqqani network, Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed,
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Jundullah and other foreign terrorist groups. To attach
special significance to the inclusion of this passage in the Xiamen Declaration, and view it as China
administering a resounding slap on its ally, would be a profound mistake.
The BRICS declaration is perhaps more significant for what it did not include. Absence of any
mention of Chinas Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) even though Beijing sets such great store by it is
one. At this point one can only speculate on the reason. It is possible that China may not have wanted
to introduce a discordant note into the proceedings knowing Indias reservations regarding the
project of a conference that it was presiding over. Or perhaps, China does not think that BRICS
could make a material contribution to the achievement of its objective.
BRICS limited scope

One takeaway from the conference also could be that China sees little use of BRICS to achieve its
geopolitical and geo-economic objectives across Asia and beyond. BRICS as a body can hardly help
China in dealing with a knotty problem like North Korea. It has no need for BRICS to deal with
problems such as the South China Sea and freedom of navigation on the seas. From its point of view,
BRICS is an outlier as far as pressing problems in the region and beyond are concerned.
BRICS suffers from other infirmities as well. Brazil and South Africa are increasingly becoming
peripheral to BRICS aims and objectives. Russia is currently more preoccupied with establishing its
supremacy in Eurasia, and its interest in BRICS is not of the same order as in the past. This leaves only
India, and limits the scope of BRICS to issues and regions such as Afghanistan that have featured in
previous BRICS meetings.
The summit, however, provided an opportunity for leaders to meet and conduct business. For
instance, Prime Minister Narendra Modis intervention at the BRICS Business Council helped
highlight Indias emergence as one of the most open economies on the globe. At the BRICS Emerging
Markets and Developing Countries Dialogue, Mr. Modi highlighted Indias long tradition of
partnership with fellow developing countries. Among the ten commitments he listed was that of
creating a safer world by organised and coordinated actions on at least three issues: counter-
terrorism, cyber security and disaster management. The Prime Minister also called for a skilled,
healthier and equitable world, as also the critical importance of sustainable development goals.
Bilaterals, Beijing dtente

Considerable significance attaches to the meetings held between Mr. Modi and the Russian and
Chinese leaders on the sidelines of the summit. The emphasis during his meeting with Russian
President Vladimir Putin seems to have been on the restoration of ties between the two countries to
levels that existed in the past. Discussions also centred on ways to boost bilateral trade and
investment, especially in the oil and natural gas sectors.
The meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping acquired particular significance coming as it did after
the over two-month-long stand-off at the Doklam Plateau. The convergence between the two
countries on international terrorism at the BRICS Summit seems to have led to a thaw for the time
being. Assurances emanating from the meeting, and the adoption of a low-key approach, were aimed
at enhancing mutual trust. The intention seemed to be to establish new ways to prevent future
incidents such as Doklam, and concentrate on essentials needed to establish better relations.
Notwithstanding the carefully structured discussions between the two leaders and while Doklam
did not figure in the discussions relations between India and China are unlikely to show any
marked improvement in the near, and perhaps even in the medium, term. For the present, avoidance
of a conflict will remain the principal objective on both sides, with China no doubt looking for an
expansion of opportunities for trade. The key watchwords would, hence, be peace and tranquility.
The road after Doklam

It would take much longer for trust to return; as it is, trust between the two countries had begun to be
affected as India moved closer to the U.S., strengthened its relations with countries like Japan and
Vietnam that were not too well disposed towards China, and participated in multilateral defence
exercises which appeared to have an anti-China slant. In the circumstances, restoring trust is not
going to be easy.
In Astana in June this year, when the Indian and Chinese leaders met on the sidelines of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation Summit, the emphasis was on not allowing differences to become
disputes. This was reflected in the so-called Astana Understanding. Doklam effectively put paid to
this. While Mr. Modi is possibly willing to put Doklam behind him, the Chinese are unlikely to do so
and are more likely to moderate their response keeping the Doklam incident in mind. China may
continue to reiterate the obvious and talk of peaceful co-existence and mutually beneficial
cooperation to strengthen bilateral relations, but India needs to be cautious. China is likely to view
Indias actions with even greater suspicion than hitherto.
The kind of language employed by the Chinese side in the context of the meeting of the two leaders is
an index of this. Mr. Xi observed that China and India are each others opportunities and not threats;
India and China need to show to the world that peaceful co-existence and win-win cooperation is
the only right choice for the two countries; China would like to work with India to uphold the Five
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (Panchsheel), advance political mutual trust, mutually beneficial
cooperation and move forward the development of bilateral relations along the right track. This
might sound like accenting the positive in Sino-Indian relations and moving to a more calibrated
approach, but it does not necessarily reflect any greater willingness on the part of China to see the
other sides point of view.
Evidently, the China-centric world view will continue to prevail. For the moment, China is anxious to
maintain peace on its border with India, as China has lately been sensing opposition to its policies
from many other countries, apart from a host of problems in its neighbourhood. In totality, these
could undermine the Chinese Dream of Mr. Xi. North Korea is perhaps the most vexatious of the
problems, one that is happening on Chinas doorstep. Smaller countries of Southeast Asia such as
Indonesia, and even Singapore and Vietnam, are signalling opposition to Chinas restrictions on rites
of maritime passage and freedom of navigation in the seas around China.
China also faces an ever widening arc of threats from terrorists of different categories such as the
ETIM, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Uighur separatists to its West. With the critical 19th
Party Congress set to take place soon, peace and tranquillity on its periphery has thus become an
imperative necessity.
M.K. Narayanan is a former National Security Adviser and a former Governor of West Bengal.
Printable version | Sep 19, 2017 10:54:48 AM | http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/gauging-the-
status-quo/article19710538.ece
The Hindu
LEAD
India needs to push for a new deal
Padmashree Gehl Sampath

It must reopen the discussion on balancing the global intellectual property

system with development
G lobal trade and intellectual property are at a crossroads. In a time when

multilateral consensus is languishing on a large number of issues, the Trump
administration is considering pulling the U.S. out of most free trade agreements on the
ground that it needs a more favourable environment for its companies and its people.
Much will be written about the carnage as far as jobs, wages and national sovereignty
that the current American onslaught on trade deals brings to the fore. Here, I focus on a
critical issue how trade deals are becoming the new Trojan horse to ensure stronger
patent protection and continued profits to global companies.
Problem with trade deals

A bit about the historical trajectory of events. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) embodied an international regulatory regime for
the first time, in 1995. Although it represented a major compromise for most
developing countries, it was only the starting point for many other nations, which have
since then promoted excessive protection of private investor interests through bilateral
trade agreements, often at the expense of wider public interests. Corporate libertarians,
riding high on increased market power, continue to lobby their governments for
absolute protection of intellectual property (IP) rights of corporations.
For the U.S. in particular, which has never made any qualms about the importance of its
domestic corporate interests, trade agreements are a prime vehicle to supplant its
strong domestic standards of IP protection in partner countries, in a bid to ensure the
same level of privileges for its companies abroad. Over the past 20 years, the American
strategy has been a neat one: to pursue bilateral agreements with individual countries
one by one to ensure stronger IP protection across markets, by sidestepping the
multilateral regime.
Gaming the system

In an inter-connected and highly globalised world, what goes around comes around
quite fast and often with drastic consequences for all. In this case, the crux of the matter
lies in how these stronger rules are changing the global corporate landscape. For years
now, while patent protection is getting stronger in all sectors in a large number of
countries, the conditions for its grant are becoming greatly relaxed. Not only do such lax
patenting requirements allow companies to claim patents more broadly or
consecutively, with little show of original effort as in the case of evergreening but also
patents can be claimed on all possible inventions (and discoveries) that are of relevance
to the present, and even to the future. A large number of countries have already
foregone many degrees of policy freedom by signing up to TRIPS-Plus standards of
protection. This, in conjunction with other trade measures, is disintegrating existing
markets and rigging established rules of the game. A superstar firm today is not
necessarily one with the greatest technological breakthroughs or the largest research
and development labs, but surely is one that has a large IP portfolio, engages in
extensive litigation on patent issues, and thrives on licensing revenues. Noting the
gravity of the situation, The Economist in 2016 produced two short opinion pieces on
how corporate profits and returns on capital are at near record levels in the U.S. and
what might be wrong with it. It argued that established companies are becoming more
entrenched in existing markets worldwide, and made the case that high profits may be
a sign of a sickness rather than growth and called for reining in IP rights.
At the global level, these sectors are stratified, with profits neatly split up between large
corporations and new kinds of non-innovator firms that simply amass patents
speculatively in upcoming, promising technologies for spurious returns. The non-
innovator companies are the patriciates of the system: when they hit the technology
jackpot, they control the market and have the power to shift wealth and control
competition. An example that beautifully captures the situation is Qualcomm Inc., an
American company that is the legal patent holder of thousands of patents that are
considered critical to build mobile phones with wireless technologies, accounting for a
total profit of $5.7 billion through intellectual property licences in 2016 alone.
Stemming the tide
For India, the fate of its pharmaceutical and software sectors swings in the balance, and
guaranteeing fair and unfettered competition will be critical to ensure that we do not
lose more ground to global companies abroad and at home. The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)s recent Trade and Development
Report calls for stronger measures to protect domestic sectors against the undue
domination of large companies, particularly in high-profit sectors such as
pharmaceuticals, media and information and communications technology (ICT), where
foreign companies still account for most of the transfer of profits across borders.
Warning against trade deals that seek to protect the status quo, the report identifies
patents as an instrument of unfair market power across markets. The report uses data
for U.S. multinational companies (MNCs) and their foreign affiliates in India to show
that patent reforms have led to significant increases in the rates of return to affiliates of
American companies by enabling monopoly profits when compared to publicly listed
and locally headquartered companies, which are increasingly being left behind. In the
pharmaceutical sector, for example, the analysis that ranges 20 years (from 1996) shows
that profits of domestic companies are in sharp decline since the late 2000s while those
for the American MNC affiliates operating in the Indian market are rising steeply. A
similar trend is visible in the ICTs sector as well.
It is important to take these findings in the broader perspective of what Indias growth
drivers will be in the years to come. Our high-technology sectors are already taking a
beating because they operate in a volatile global environment. Supporting IP standards
that simply follow a winner takes all ideology without emphasis on technological
advancement and competitive markets will be a regrettable mistake. What India needs
right now is a clear and tough stance on intellectual property both in domestic policy
and at the multilateral level. At home, support for innovation has to be accompanied
with instruments that guard against the misuse of market power, coercive bargaining
and aggressive merger and acquisition strategies if local firms should survive and
flourish.
Heated negotiations in the run-up to the upcoming WTO Ministerial Conference in
Argentina already show that these issues will be central: there are ongoing attempts by
big business to push for new rules in areas such as e-commerce to slice up profit-
making opportunities of the future. Other proposals being made will largely limit the
ability of governments to constrain corporate behaviour in the public interest even if
they succeed partially. In such an international context, we need to stop soft-peddling
on these issues in the pretence that we aspire to be a major IP player in the same vein as
the U.S. What we need is a return to old-fashioned pragmatism that clearly shows the
West that India recognises the fallacy of the current IP system and leads the way to
broker a global new deal. This new deal should not only call for a return to business in
the WTO by tackling the forgotten issues of the Doha Round but also firmly reopen the
discussion on balancing the global IP system with development. That way, even if we
dont win in Argentina, we will have made an ambitious start in redefining the global
trade and IP agenda.
LEAD
States of the Opposition
G. Sampath
Political parties must frame their campaign as a referendum not on leadership but on democratic values
O f late, its become almost a matter of conventional wisdom that the 2019 Lok Sabha elections are the Bharatiya
Janata Partys for the taking. The only unknown, apparently, is the margin of victory. If the partys ambitious
Mission 350-plus plan proves successful, we could soon have a Parliament that is practically Opposition-mukt.
In such a scenario, does it still make sense to hope for a meaningful Opposition in the run-up to 2019 and after? If yes,
what might be the contours of a political strategy that would enable it to pose a credible challenge to the BJP juggernaut?
Reams have been written about the failures of the Opposition parties. Far from holding the government to account, they
have either been dormant or busy fighting for survival. The BJP, on the other hand, has been steadily expanding its
footprint. It was in power in five States before the 2014 polls. Today the National Democratic Alliance is in power in 18
out of the 29 States. Thirteen of those have a BJP Chief Minister.
Some have argued that the Indian polity has reverted to a state it has witnessed before that of single-party dominance,
with the BJP taking the place of the Congress. While this is true in a formal sense, there is a big difference in substantive
terms, one that could seal the fate of Indian democracy as we have known it.
The Congress system

For more than two decades after Independence, political competition in Indian democracy took place within the confines
of what political scientist Rajni Kothari termed the Congress system. It denoted a polity marked by single-party
dominance. Until the onset of the 70s, the Congress incorporated oppositional drives into itself by way of multiple
factions at the regional and national level that mirrored the extraordinary pluralism and diversity of a complex
nationhood.
In a traditional society where a political culture centred on democracy was yet to strike roots, it was the accommodative
pluralism of the Congress system that allowed the normative modernity of the Constitution to slowly achieve a fragile
social hegemony. More than the steel frame of the bureaucracy, it was the elastic frame of the Congress system that
held the country together by respecting its pluralistic genotype.
Subsequently, as the Congress went into decline, regional configurations came to power in State after State, and India
entered the coalition era. As it lost ground in State politics, the Congress was forced to play ball with smaller parties at
the national level. Seen another way, the intra-party coalitions within the Congress system became externalised into an
inter-party dynamic in the coalition era that began with the ninth Lok Sabha in 1989, and continued till the 2014
elections.
Political competition being what it is, the vacuum at the national level caused by the shrinkage of the Congress has now
been filled by the BJP. It did so by scripting an alternative national narrative around three elements: a Hindutva-infused
nationalism; turning elections into a referendum on national leadership, specifically Narendra Modis leadership; and
framing the electoral competition in all-India terms rather than engage with State-level issues.
If the Opposition has floundered so far, it is because it has tried, without much conviction, to challenge the BJP on its
narrative home ground. Not surprisingly, its attempts have failed to strike a chord.
Debating nationalism ends up giving more oxygen to chauvinism. The Opposition does lack a politician who can match
Mr. Modis appeal. And regional leaders are better off sticking to State-level issues where they are on stronger political
ground than trying to reinvent themselves overnight for a national role. In other words, the Opposition needs to stop
being reactive and formulate its own counter-narrative.
Lessons from the past

Much has been made of the Congress being reduced to 44 seats in the Lok Sabha. It is taken as a sign of structural
weakness in the Opposition camp. Yet, after Independence, in the first five Lok Sabhas, the highest number of seats held
by an Opposition party was 44 seats. Did that mean India was Opposition-mukt for a quarter of a century?
History shows us that the Congresss own fall from dominance was sparked by challenges at the State-level, not by a
national rival. But that was possible because of the space for political pluralism offered by the Congress system.
The fundamental difference between the Congress system and the BJP system of one-party dominance is the latters
determination to eliminate this pluralistic space. Politically, this is the toughest challenge facing the Opposition, as well
as the biggest weakness of the BJP, one that could be tapped to construct an alternative narrative.
Put simply, the Oppositions counter-narrative would need to dwell on two aspects. One, it must convey that the 2019
polls are about choosing between two options: a coalition regime structurally constrained to protect the values of
pluralism and federalism, and a stable majority under an authoritarian leadership unlikely to entertain democratic
niceties.
Second, the Opposition needs to frame the election as a referendum not on leadership but on democratic values. A
massive win for the BJP in 2019 would certainly pose a threat to the historical consensus, established at the time of
Independence, which institutionalised pluralism, a degree of federal autonomy, and a democratic framework for nation-
building. The Opposition has the simple but onerous task of using its political imagination to bring this threat to the
centre of the electoral agenda.
Onus on regional parties

Its political strategy, therefore, must aim for a hung Parliament and a coalition government. An ideal outcome would be
one where no party gets more than 170-180 seats. A Mission 180 minus, as it were. With such numbers, even a BJP-led
coalition government would be a victory for the Opposition, as the objective of safeguarding Indias pluralism would
have been achieved.
Regional parties are best placed to take the lead here, for they are the ones which would be hardest hit by a creeping
centralisation of power. If they could come together, with or without the Congress, over a single point agenda of
protecting Indias pluralism, it would obviate the need for a formal pre-poll or seat-sharing arrangement. There is no
other way that, say, a Trinamool Congress and a Communist Party of India (Marxist) would come together to battle a
common rival that could prove more lethal to both than they have been to each other. Given that the BJP has always
struggled more against non-Congress, regional opponents, it is also a more canny electoral strategy.
And in case they still lose badly, they can take heart from the fact that Indias political traditions give the Opposition an
institutional role disproportionate to their actual numbers in Parliament, through mandatory membership of key
committees, appointments panels, and so on. So, regardless of how they fare in 2019, Opposition parties would continue
to have a major role to play.
All said and done, Indian democracy has never fared well under powerful parliamentary majorities led by a charismatic
Prime Minister unchecked by coalition dynamics. We have two examples, in Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. While one
briefly downed the shutters on democracy, the other gave a fillip to Hindu fundamentalism and tried to muzzle the
press.
The Oppositions success would ultimately hinge on how effective it is in convincing the people that if they value their
nations democratic traditions as much as they do development, they must either elect a coalition government in 2019,
or force the BJP system to become more like the Congress system, not by importing Congressmen, but by imbibing the
values of pluralism and respect for dissent that the Congress stands for in its Nehruvian vision of itself, if not always in
reality.
LEAD
Solving the Afghan riddle
Satinder K. Lambah
The U.S. has clearly identied the root cause of the Afghan problem; India has always been a part of the
solution
A fghanistan, counterterrorism and defence ties are expected to be the prime issues on the table during James
Mattiss visit to India next week. The U.S. Defence Secretarys trip will happen barely a month after President
Donald Trump announced the latest U.S. policy on Afghanistan on August 21, a blueprint that has been welcomed in
Kabul and criticised in Islamabad.
Mr. Trumps policy envisages more pressure on Pakistan, no early U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, robust military
action on counterterrorism and a greater role for India. It is for the first time that a U.S. President has been publicly so
critical of Pakistan. In 2009, President Barack Obama had spoken of Pakistans lack of action, but not so strongly and
harshly as his successor. Sharp words on Pakistan have been said at different levels by earlier U.S. administrations too.
They were also codified in the form of conditions in various assistance laws, including the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill. The
important issue today is how the U.S. strategy differs from the past in terms of addressing concerns regarding Pakistans
role in Afghanistan, particularly in view of a shift in Pakistans strategic priority towards China.
The situation in Afghanistan continues to be fragile. Though the Taliban has made some gains, it is not a cohesive
movement and has divisions within it. At the same time it has to be understood that since 1747, Afghanistans territorial
borders have remained unchanged unlike its neighbours Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics.

ALSO READ
India-Afghanistan ties
Indo-Afghan relations are unique. Just after Independence, on January 4, 1950, India signed a Treaty
of Friendship with Afghanistan which also permitted opening of consulates in each others country.
Trump offers
India a role in Interestingly, not standing on protocol, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru signed this agreement
Afghanistan with the Afghan Ambassador in India to indicate the importance New Delhi attached to its relations
with Kabul. More recently, in October 2011, India was the first country Afghanistan signed a
strategic partnership agreement with.
The basic tenets of Indias aims, policy and approach towards Afghanistan in respect of bilateral and regional cooperation
remain unchanged. India has always wanted a democratic, stable and strong Afghanistan able to decide its own future.
India has a close strategic partnership with Afghanistan covering a broad spectrum of areas which include political,
security, trade and economic cooperation as well as capacity development. Indias assistance in the defence sector has
been modest and based on specific requests by the government of Afghanistan. The cumulative level of committed
Indian assistance to Afghanistan amounts to $2 billion. New Delhi is always ready for more intensive bilateral relations.
It has been at the forefront in respect of assistance for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and can be expected to do more
in different sectors. Surveys conducted by various Afghan and foreign news agencies over the years show that the Afghan
people ranked Indian assistance as the most suitable because of the positive role India played in the development
programme of Afghanistan. Furthermore India is considered as non-threatening with its democratic traditions upheld
as a model. The Afghans also appreciate that India had never interfered in their internal affairs.
Speedy augmentation, training and supply of equipment for the Afghan National Security Forces is important to enable
Afghanistan to protect its interests and maintain peace in the country. The Afghans want more help, for instance, at
present for their air force. India could assist Afghanistan in training as per their requirement and supplying much-
needed spare parts and such equipment as is possible without deployment of Indian troops in Afghanistan.
Asia is a region of energy and resources stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to Siberia
and Russias Far East. The energy basket needs to be exploited for the benefit of Afghanistan and the surrounding region.
The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline is one example. SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation) and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) should help in encouraging regional economic cooperation
between Afghanistan and its neighbours. Expeditious action on completion of the Chabahar port will help in increasing
Afghanistans contacts with India and the outside world.
No outside interference
It is essential that there is no outside interference in Afghanistan. To enable this, the infrastructure of terrorism has to be
dismantled. It is important to deny sanctuary and support to the Talibans Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network, as
terrorism and insurgency cannot end without action taken against them. For any effective counterterrorism policy, all
major terrorist groups operating in the area should be considered a single group. President Trump has stated in his policy
statement that Pakistan gives safe haven to agents of chaos, violence and terror. The elimination of terror outfits will
bring peace to Afghanistan.
Simultaneously, it is also imperative to redouble counter-narcotics efforts as Afghanistan remains the worlds largest
producer of opium accounting for 90% of the worlds supply. Success in this field will have a positive effect on its
neighbours.
India is in favour of a reconciliation process which has overall Afghan support and is based on internationally accepted
redlines. India supports the Afghan quest for peace and reconciliation. Indeed peace and reconciliation were embedded
in the very first international compact on Afghanistan, in the text of the Bonn Agreement of December 2001.
Renunciation of violence will help this process. For regional security there must be closer involvement of regional
help this process. For regional security there must be closer involvement of regional powers in
international efforts to ensure non-interference and a stable Afghanistan; this also requires
involvement of the Central Asian Republics, which border Afghanistan. It is important for India to
coordinate its efforts with those of Russia and Iran to ensure success. The U.S. will benefit in helping
this to happen.
India-Pakistan relations
Unfair attempts have been made now and then to link the Afghan issue with India-Pakistan
relations. There is no connection. A study of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations since 1947 will reveal
that their relations have always been thorny and replete with problems except during the brief
Taliban era. Even during that period there were differences on issues like the Durand Line. Neither
have India-Pakistan relations, good or bad, impacted on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. India and
Afghanistan have never exploited their friendly bilateral relations to harm Pakistan. This is clear
from three things: (a) In both the 1965 and 1971 wars, Afghanistan was non-committal and did not
support India; (b) On the Kashmir issue, Afghanistan has not publicly supported India; (c) Similarly,
India has not entered the debate on the Durand Line.
Some instances in the last three decades also reflect the same viewpoint. Neither India nor India-
Pakistan relations were responsible for the situation which prevailed in Afghanistan following the
departure of the Soviet troops which threw the country back to medieval times and brought the
Taliban to power and Al Qaeda/Osama bin Laden in the region. No extremist group the Taliban,
Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba is based in India or has any Indian connection. The U.S.
operation to kill Osama bin Laden and the recourse to drone attacks in Afghanistan were due to the
situation prevailing there, which had nothing to do with India or India-Pakistan relations. Again
when Pakistan decided to shift over 100,000 of its security forces from its eastern border with India
to its western border with Afghanistan in 2010, India did not exploit the situation. India, in fact, has
always been a part of the solution. To blame India-Pakistan relations for the situation in Afghanistan
is neither fair nor just. The root cause of the Afghan problem has been clearly stated in President
Trumps policy statement of August 21 and also mentioned in his address to the UN General
Assembly on September 19. Now Afghanistan, and the region, await to see how it is implemented.
Satinder K. Lambah is former Special Envoy of the Prime Minister and currently Chairman of Ananta
Aspen Centre, an independent, not-for-profit organisation
Printable version | Sep 25, 2017 11:51:16 AM | http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/solving-the-
afghan-riddle/article19729685.ece
The Hindu
LEAD
Questions of numbers
K. Venkataramanan
More clarity is needed in the law to prevent manipulation while conducting a oor test
T he key political question that has arisen in Tamil Nadu is whether Chief Minister Edappadi K. Palaniswami
commands a majority in the State Assembly. There is a remarkable concordance among political and
constitutional functionaries concerned in abdicating their core responsibility to find an answer to this question. The
Governor is obviously averse to ordering a floor test. The Chief Minister is not keen on demonstrating his strength on
the floor of the House. The Speaker is concentrating on ensuring that dissidents are kept out of any possible confidence
vote, if and when one takes place. The Leader of the Opposition has not moved a motion of no confidence, but, on the
contrary, believes that the Governor should order a floor test.
Dissident legislators from the ruling All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), the group that has pulled
back the ruling partys strength below the half-way mark in the Assembly, have not asked for a meeting of the
legislature party to replace Mr. Palaniswami with some other leader. And the Madras High Court, instead of grappling
with the core question concerning the governments legislative majority or lack of it, has passed two peculiar interim
orders that are contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers and touch on matters outside the judicial domain.
Over to the courts

The High Court has become a battleground for the three-way political sparring going on between the rebel group, the
ruling party, and the main opposition Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), when it ought to be the legislative chamber.
The first decisive move came from the 19 MLAs owing allegiance to T.T.V. Dhinakaran, nephew of jailed and deposed
former AIADMK general secretary V.K. Sasikala. On August 22, the dissident legislators approached the Governor with a
memorandum expressing lack of confidence in the Chief Minister, and, on September 18, Speaker P. Dhanapal ruled
that this amounted to voluntarily giving up their membership of the party and disqualified 18 of them. One
dissociated himself from the dissenters and returned to the loyalist fold. The DMK leader, M.K. Stalin, who also heads
the Opposition in the Assembly, also approached the Governor with a demand that he order a floor test as the ruling
party has lost its majority. With the Governor not acting on it for weeks, he moved the Madras High Court for a direction
to the Governor to direct the Chief Minister to seek a confidence vote.
Then came the disqualification, as a result of which the ousted legislators also approached the court. Thus, the two
issues the question whether the Governor ought to intervene and whether the Speaker was helping the ruling party
by disqualifying rebels and thereby converting its minority into a majority are both before the court.
The Governors role

The principal reason for the political impasse is Governor Ch. Vidyasagar Raos silence. Is he justified in not acting on
the request for a floor test? Going by the observations made by the Supreme Court last year, his inaction is possibly
justified. While dealing with the Arunachal Pradesh crisis last year, a Constitution Bench said: The activities within a
political party, confirming turbulence, or unrest within its ranks, are beyond the concern of the Governor... Who should
or should not be a leader of a political party, is a political question, to be dealt with and resolved privately by the political
party itself. The Governor cannot, make such issues, a matter of his concern. It said a breakaway group could be
legitimate and recognisable only if it constituted two-thirds of a party, as stipulated in the Tenth Schedule, and the
Governor could embark on a constitutional course of action only on the claims of such a group. However, does it
necessarily mean that Governors should not act until a rebellion touches the two-thirds mark within the legislature
party? No, for the Bench adds that such a recourse is available during a constitutional crisis as when the government is
seen to have lost the confidence of the House. Therefore, the correct reading of the judgment is that the court bars
Governors from political embroilment and has not restrained them from their constitutional duty to allay doubts that a
particular regime has lost its majority.
As the Governor has not acted on a reasonable apprehension that the Palaniswami government has been reduced to a
minority, should the DMKs petition for a direction to the Governor to order a floor test be allowed by the Madras High
Court? Given that it is a matter that falls under the Governors discretion, is such a petition maintainable? When the
matter came up for admission, the courts attention was drawn to the fear expressed by the counsel that the Speaker was
planning to disqualify the dissenters in an effort to bring about a majority in a truncated House. As a result, it passed an
order staying a possible floor test that may have taken place after the feared disqualification! This was said to be in the
interests of justice, as otherwise the government would have sailed through the vote. In a couple of days, the
disqualification did take place, and once again, on petitions challenging the Speakers order, the court did not grant a
stay. Instead, it extended the stay on the floor test on a request from the Speakers advocate, and with the consent of all
other parties.
It is not clear what provision in the Constitution empowers the court to stall a floor test, but there are precedents. The
Supreme Court had ordered a composite floor test in 1998 and 2005 in Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand, but these
directions attracted considerable criticism. Further, the only persons aggrieved by the possible adoption of a confidence
vote in their absence will be the disqualified MLAs. Therefore, only a stay of their disqualification or an interim
direction allowing them to vote during a floor test could have met the interests of justice. However, instead of adopting
this constitutionally permissible course disqualification under the anti-defection law is justiciable, whereas setting
the legislative agenda is outside judicial purview the court chose to stay the trust vote. Similarly, to address the fear
that the 18 vacant seats could be filled up by holding by-elections, the court restrained the issue of a notification for
bypolls. A stay of the disqualification would have addressed the fears of those disqualified as well as obviated the need
for the questionable stay on the floor test to be extended. Thereafter, only the constitutionally relevant question on
whether the Governor ought to be directed to order a trust vote would have remained for adjudication. While
adjudicating constitutional questions, courts ought not to take recourse to the civil law principle of balance of
convenience and pass orders appearing to give some relief to all parties.
The main basis for the challenge to the disqualification of 18 legislators is the 2011 judgment in the Karnataka case
when B.S. Yeddyurappa was Chief Minister. The Supreme Court had quashed the disqualification on the ground that the
Speaker had given insufficient opportunity and time, but it had also noted that approaching the Governor to set in
motion a constitutional process to replace the Chief Minister could not attract the drastic action of removal from the
House. Speaker Dhanapals order has tried to address many such issues, but it will still have to be tested against the
proposition that expressing lack of confidence in the Chief Minister may not amount to voluntarily giving up the party
membership.
The disqualication trick

Taking up disqualification petitions for adjudication just ahead of a floor test has now become a pattern. Disqualifying
rebellious MLAs seems to be a favoured way of ensuring the majority of a Chief Minister. The time may have come to
amend the law conferring on the Speaker the authority to adjudicate questions of defection. When the floor test
remains the sole and supreme means of ascertaining majority, the partisan element should be taken out of anti-
defection law, and the adjudicatory power be transferred to an independent body such as the Election Commission.
venkataramanan.k@thehindu.co.in
COMMENT
A fight against prejudice
Vidya Ram
Britain may be one step closer to including measures against caste discrimination in equality law
L ast week the British government concluded a consultation on whether measures against caste discrimination
should be included in equality law, to ensure there is appropriate and proportionate legal protection against
unlawful discrimination because of a persons origins. The consultation has been inviting submissions from late
March and attracted substantial interest from Britains sizeable South Asian diaspora within which the debate on this
issue has been raging for years.
Focussing on such practices

In June 2009, the first World Conference on Untouchability took place in London, to explore versions of untouchability
in all its forms, bringing together experts and activists from across the globe from India to Japan and Nigeria. At the
conclusion of the conference, delegates issued what has come to be known as the Conway Hall Declaration on
Untouchability, calling on all states where such practices were prevalent to introduce legislation to outlaw the practice
and undertake programmes of education. Untouchability is the most widespread, pernicious and intractable form of
discrimination affecting the lives of millions of men and women and with a negative impact on the lives of untold
millions of children and their potential for growth and developmentyet many of the states concerned deny that such
discrimination exists in their territories, they urged.
The initiative and also evidence of those who had suffered from abuse and discrimination attracted the attention of
some legislators in Britain, particularly members of the House of Lords who were already debating issues around
equality as the government sought to streamline and simplify Britains legislation on equality into a single act of
Parliament, now the Equality Act 2010. Following a tough battle with the House of Commons, members of the House
of Lords succeeded in bringing in a provision that stated that secondary legislation on this could be passed by a
ministerial order.
Following another heated political battle three years later, an amendment tabled by Lord Harries, a crossbench peer,
required that the government must by order provide for caste to be an aspect of race. Since then, the government
has dragged its heels on the issue, highly divisive within the Indian community in Britain, finally announcing late last
year that they would consult on the issue. This will be an open consultation, insisted Justine Greening, the Minister
responsible, last year.
However, the consultation has done little to quell concern about the issue. Campaigners who are pushing for the
legislative protections to be introduced are fearful the consultation is a ploy to sweep the issue under the carpet amid
heavy lobbying from religious groups. They point to the highly legalistic consultation document, which has made it
opaque to many of those who want to contribute, and argue that the whole direction of the questioning is tilted in
favour of pushing for a solution within existing legislation. A 2014 legal case, Chandhok and Anor v Tirkey, had
suggested that caste discrimination could be considered unlawful under existing legislation but only under very
particular circumstances, which the government has repeatedly referred to.
Moreover they argue, there is already ample evidence of such discrimination taking place, dating back to a
comprehensive study in 2010 by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, which identified evidence of
caste discrimination in the workplace, in the provision of services and in education.
They have also expressed concern about some of the tactics used by the anti-legislation lobby, largely comprising
religious organisations, which have sought to shift the focus of the debate away from questions around whether or not
discrimination takes place to accusations that the efforts to bring the legislation itself were reflective of colonial
ambitions and entrenched racism against South Asian communities. The legislation is part of a wider campaign
conducted through EU institutions and UN human rights organs aimed at putting pressure on India to extend caste
based reservations to Christians also Proponents hope that such interference in Indias internal affairs will
augment the number of converts, a chief target of churches and Western governments, wrote Prakash Shah, a reader at
Queen Mary University of London in a blog posting for the London School of Economics.
A political hue
Hindu organisations response to an international mobilisation of Dalits rights activism has brought the Indian
Hindu nationalist agenda into U.K. politics including the frankly eccentric imagination of U.K. anti-caste
discrimination as being all about driving Indian reservation policy and Christian religious conversion, noted David
Mosse, a professor of social anthropology, in a lecture last year.
Indeed the message that protecting against caste discrimination could somehow do more harm than good and could be
disrespectful of South Asian communities has impacted the tone of the governments approach. The consultation
document insists it wants to ensure measures do not create or entrench any notion of caste consciousness or caste-
based practices into British society, which may prove counterproductive or divisive.
The issue has perhaps unsurprisingly played out in the political arena: in the build-up to the 2015 general election, one
Hindu organisation sought to urge traditionally Labour voters to switch their allegiances to the Conservatives, arguing
voting for Labour by Hindus, Sikhs and Jains was akin to turkeys voting for Christmas. While the charitable
organisation was forced to withdraw its statements, the fear that a partys stance on the issue could alienate it from
certain sections of the influential South Asian community has persisted. It is notable that the issue of caste was
entirely absent from the Labour partys election manifesto in June, with only the Liberal Democrats committing to
supporting the introduction of legislation outright.
Where things will go remains to be seen. With the government focussed on Brexit-related legislation, both sides are
eager for change. While those against the legislation want reference to obligations relating to it removed, those who
believe such practices are endemic within South Asian society in Britain are equally determined to ensure the long-
standing legislative mandate is finally acted upon, even if it could require legal action to ensure it.
vidya.ram@thehindu.co.in
LEAD
The idea that used to be Bangalore
Shiv Visvanathan
The city has to revive itself because it embodied a sense of hope of what India could be
A city is more than a place to live, it embodies a dream and the possibilities of a dream. Sometimes a city acquires
the status of a myth, becomes a character in a novel. Many great cities have been characters in novels. Moscow,
Paris, London, Delhi have all shared the sense of being novelesque, capturing in their character a sense of hope, a sense of
the future. Their decay signals in a sense a death of a world, a paradise lost. Bombay and Calcutta have smelt of that slow
decay, a period where the city grows like a cancer, explodes like an epidemic corroding the dreams of millions of its
migrants. Yet if one city showed hope in India, expressed its cosmopolitan dreams and its intellectual inventiveness, it
was Bangalore. Bangalore was myth and metaphor for modern India, a flag we could wave in the global world. Yet today
one senses the myth is dying. There is a sense of loss, a silence of mourning which no amount of political bluster and
brand bravura can conceal. One senses that the myth of Bangalore as the cutting edge Indian city is dying. Myths are like
signs that have to be read like symptoms by the shamans of the city. Today Bangalore is a desiccated myth. This essay is
written as an almost futuristic plea asking for the renewal of the myth. Myth has to be restored symbolically. One needs
an event that creates a new grammar, a new vision of storytelling.
Back to Visvesvaraya
Modern Bangalore as a creation myth goes back to the iconicity of one man, the dewan of development, the patriarch of
Indian planning, M. Visvesvaraya. No technocrat is as much a part of folklore, subject to immediate recall and
celebration as the ectomorphic Visvesvaraya. He conveyed a sense of hybridity, of being Indian and more, a man who
believed that character building, dam building and nation building went together. His iconicity stands up to Gandhi. If
one wrote, industrialise and perish, the other replied, industrialise or perish. Their contrasts were stark but each was
home grown. Visvesvaraya was one of the great icons of modernity and his style, his integrity invoked the myth of
Bangalore. His urge to create the motor car industry, his vision of planning, his ideas of dam building, his integrity were
all the stuff of legend. He balanced in himself, the public and private, the national and vernacular, the scientific and the
managerial. His life helped create the mythic Bangalore.
The institutions established in the fifties and sixties, the aircraft and space industries, the biotechnology labs,
supplemented the legend of the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) and Raman Research Institute. Bangalore was Indias
premier science city and the scientific leadership of Satish Dhawan, Sivaraj Ramaseshan, Amulya Reddy, Roddam
Narasimha nursed this image with care. They were outstanding scientists who had a wider vision of society. They were
institution builders who conveyed the idea that this city worked and innovated, yet there was a complementarity we
must recognise.
Bangalore was not only a modern city, a haven for science. It was also the seat of a great creative imagination, where a
Bangalorean could be as proud of Kannada literature as of Bangalores science. The vernacular and the cosmopolitan
combined in a miraculous way in the lives of Shivaram Karanth, A.K. Ramanujan, U.R. Ananthamurthy and others. It was
a world where Hindustan aircraft and the literary world of Hegudu, with its visions of theatre, could combine creatively.
There was no sense of dualism because dualism had become dialectic, a dizzy list of creative combinations. Anchoring all
this were shrewd politicians like Devaraj Urs and Ramakrishna Hegde, who made electoral democracy a part of
Bangalores creativity. Bangalore was modern, hopeful, liveable, scientific, local, cosmopolitan, a retired persons dream
and a professionals first choice. IT added to the lustre and created the myth of Bangalore as Indias Silicon Valley. Firms
like Infosys attracted other firms and Bangalore had its new legends of technocracy and entrepreneurship in N.R.
Narayana Murthy, Nandan Nilekani and in Biocons Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw. Yet it was IT as it tended to outgrow itself
that created the first cracks in the myth.
Onward to IT
IT reasserted the dualism between science and technology and created a tension between playful freedom and
technological productivity. A C.V. Raman in his heyday could assert that he was more interested in the properties of a
diamond than worry about its industrial uses. But decades later, Mr. Narayana Murthy was challenging IISc to name one
its inventions that had made a difference. The technocrat, the manager and the entrepreneur were edging out a more
cosmopolitan world of science. Earlier, the pursuit of science was seen as a public good, an attempt to create a public
culture. Today scientific research without a technological catchment was seen as unproductive. What Narayana Murthy
mounted as a challenge was read as obvious by the Modi government which wanted Big Science to be a money spinning
enterprise, what in business folklore was called a paisa vasool regime. Worse, IT became cocky, overconfident about its
powers convinced that what was good for IT should be good for Bangalore. It tried to substitute technocratic ideas for the
creativity of politics. There was a managerial hubris at the centre of it, symptomised in the tragedy of the Aadhaar card,
which not only created a split between technocracy and politics but a fissure between the formal and informal economy
destroying a sense of the openness and availability of citizenship, confusing identity with identification. The halo
around such half-thought-out projects ate into the imagination of democracy, where those who battle for the Right to
Information now struggled against the hubris of the Aadhaar card. Suddenly the wisdom of the whole seemed less than
the creativity of the parts. IT lacked the wisdom of institutions like IISc which were nursed by leaders who had a sense of
the state, the polity, the people.
Civic issues, civil society

Democratic politics too has suffered as the city faces a host of civic problems. But here one senses the sadness of civil
society and the opening breach between the vernacular and cosmopolitan styles. The Karnataka of today is becoming
more local and parochial in its manifestations. There is a desperate need for rethinking the imagination of Bangalore as a
city. Todays protest movements are a gasp of survival than a creative attempt to heal the polity. One has to rework the
alchemy, the grammar of the myth that made Bangalore, Bengaluru. The imagination of the city as diverse, open, wise to
the ways of the world needs to be reworked and mere technocratic projects cannot be the quick fix for the problem. They,
in fact, might be the source of the problem. Oddly, the death of Gauri Lankesh, and the responses, showed that a lot of
civil society is sheer nostalgia. It triggered this essay and its list of questions. How does a city revive its dynamism which
goes beyond the hype of start-ups? Bangalore has to come up with answers because it embodied a sense of hope of what
India could be and should be. The city has to desperately reinvent itself because the idea of India needs an idea of a re-
inventive Bengaluru.
LEAD
Diary of a very long year
Happymon Jacob
A year after the surgical strikes across the Line of Control, India must recover its role as
a regional stabiliser
The surgical strike was a point we wanted to drive home, that the Line of Control is not a line
that cannot be breached. When we want to, we will be able to breach it, go across and strike when
we need. This was the message we wanted to convey and we did, Lt. Gen. Devraj Anbu, the
Northern Army Commander, stated in a recent press conference at his headquarters in
Udhampur.
The big picture
It has been one year since the special forces of the Indian Army carried out surgical strikes to
destroy terror launchpads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir on September 29, 2016. It is important
to take stock at this point on how India-Pakistan bilateral relations and the regional security
situation have evolved over the past year since the strikes. Showing no appetite for a bilateral
rapprochement, the two acrimonious neighbours have limited their interactions to firing across
the borders in Jammu and Kashmir and calling each other names in global forums. At the United
Nations General Assembly a few days ago, for instance, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj
termed Pakistan a pre-eminent exporter of terror to which Pakistans Permanent
Representative to the UN, Maleeha Lodhi, responded: India is the mother of terrorism in South
Asia.

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The future direction of the foremost regional forum, the South Asian
Crossing the
Line of Control Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), remains unclear after India
dropped out of the 2016 Islamabad summit in the wake of the Uri terror
attack. (The summit was eventually postponed.) The regional security
situation remains embattled, thanks to confused American policies in
South Asia, continuing turmoil in Afghanistan, heightening India-China
rivalry, and the India-Pakistan hostility.
Regional stability
From a regional stability point of view, the surgical strikes do not seem to have had much of an
adverse impact. The fact that Pakistan neither acknowledged the attacks nor responded in kind
shows that the general deterrence between the South Asian nuclear rivals remains intact. It is
easy to talk about nuclear use and threaten nuclear retaliation, as Pakistan has been doing for
long. It is, however, not easy to translate such talk into action. In that sense, the surgical strikes
have called Pakistans nuclear bluff. And that certainly is good news for regional stability.
But such higher-level stability seems to have come with heightened lower-level instability
and that is the bad news. There are two sets of challenges that are more apparent today, one year
after the surgical strikes. One, the India-Pakistan escalation ladder has become far more
precarious today it has ever been in the past one and a half decades, i.e. since the ceasefire was
agreed to in 2003. The recurrent, and almost daily, occurrence of border battles between the two
militaries in Jammu and Kashmir today have a worrying potential for escalation to higher levels.
The border stand-offs often lead to, as is evident from the data from the past 15 years, military,
political and diplomatic escalation as well as contribute to escalating an ongoing crisis.
While this was common even prior to the surgical strikes, the September 2016 operation has
made ceasefire violations more worrisome in at least two ways: first, Pakistan has been
retaliating ever since the surgical strikes by increasing the pressure on the frontlines; and
second, surgical strikes have reduced the critical distance between ceasefire violations and
conventional escalation. While stealthy surgical strikes may not, strictly speaking, qualify as
conventional escalation, they certainly reduce the psychological distance between sub-
conventional violence and conventional escalation in the classical sense. That sure is bad news
for regional stability.
The second challenge is more practical than theoretical. Conventional escalation as discussed in
the academic/policy literature tends to put too much emphasis on pre-conceived and war-
gamed escalation scenarios. However, surgical strikes could easily offset the logic behind such
familiar and analytically elegant scenarios. The perils of preventive strikes, in other words, are
unpredictable. Preventive strikes are pregnant with immense potential to lead up to a
competition in risk-taking, a tendency already prevalent on the frontlines of the India-Pakistan
border in J&K. Put differently, preventive strikes in hyper-nationalist bilateral settings could
defy our expectations and go out of control, with disastrous implications.
Deteriorating environment
Have the surgical strikes helped the countrys overall national security environment? The
Central government argues that surgical strikes have been a spectacular success.
Notwithstanding the more conceptual challenges I have explained above, lets try and break
down this claim to see if indeed surgical strikes have improved our national security in plain
practical terms. The first obvious question to ask is whether the strategy of punishment has
worked vis--vis Pakistan.
There are two reasons why the strategy of punishment may not have worked. For one, a strategy
of punishment requires consistency and commitment. The momentum achieved by the surgical
strikes was not followed up (despite several attacks thereafter), nor was the government
committed to its declared determination to respond firmly to terror strikes, thereby lacking in
both consistency and commitment. Second, and more importantly, Pakistans responses
thereafter of supporting insurgency in Kashmir, aiding infiltration across the border, and
allegedly supporting attacks on the Indian army convoys and bases continued without much
reaction from New Delhi. This has led to a visible lack of credibility on New Delhis part which
makes one wonder whether, bereft of domestic political uses, there was any strategic planning
behind the September operation.
By all accounts, Indias national security environment is fraught today. Terror attacks in Kashmir
continue to break the calm. Consider Gen. Anbu remarks: Large number of terrorist camps and
launch pads exist across south and north of Pir Panjal, they have not decreased... Launch pads
and terrorist camps have increased since last year.
Lets also look at some figures from J&K. Credible media reports show that 110 militants, and 38
army personnel were killed between January and September 2016 (i.e. prior to the surgical
strikes). However, since the surgical strikes, at least 178 militants and 69 Army personnel have
been killed. Forty-four army personnel were killed between January and September this year,
compared to 38 last year between January and September (including those killed in the Uri Army
base attack). One might argue that the terrorist casualties have also gone up. While that is true,
more militants killed can be a barometer of the level of militancy too.
Surgical strikes, then, may have been a tactical victory for New Delhi, but its strategic value is far
from settled.
The big picture

With two hostile neighbours on either side, terror attacks against India on the rise, and the
South Asian neighbourhood unsure of Indias leadership any more, New Delhi has a lot to be
concerned about the continuation of its pivotal position in the region and the nature of its
future engagement with it. The events since September last year have further contributed to
South Asias regional insecurity complex. For a country that has traditionally been the regional
stabiliser, New Delhi seems to be quickly embracing the virtues of geopolitical revisionism. The
costs of aggression, self-imposed regional exclusion and an absence of strategic altruism are
bound to become starker sooner or later.
Happymon Jacob is Associate Professor of Disarmament Studies, Centre for International

Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru
COMMENT
Waiting for a signal
Sarabjit Arjan Singh

The Railway Minister must put a safety upgrade above plans for punctuality and new
trains
E very time there is a change of guard in the Railway Ministry, expectations are raised that the
new minister will cut the Gordian knot by focussing on issues that will enable the Indian
Railways to recoup from past excesses. This also holds true for the new Railway Minister, Piyush
Goyal. It is not as if the problems cannot be addressed, but those who have to address them tend
to focus on issues that may be important in themselves but are not necessarily the ones that will
enhance the performance of the Railways. Is this out of ignorance? Or are these issues
insignificant? Or are they a political hot potato? It is anybodys guess.
For decades the lack of consistent political direction has affected the Railways. The country lacks
civilian expertise on railway matters and only a few politicians are interested in the railways.
Railway officers are professional and have the expertise. However, results are determined by the
Ministry-Railway Board relationship and how much the Minister is willing to follow professional
advice, especially when it does not gel with the political compulsions of pandering to
constituencies. The results are a haphazard introduction of trains, subsidising passenger fares by
overcharging freight, investment in unwanted new facilities, and modernisation and induction of
new technologies without a plan. The fallout of all this is a balkanisation of the organisation on
departmental lines, with each following its own narrow interests. Decision-making revolves
around pursuing immediate goals that can show the department in a good light.

ALSO READ
Safety concerns
That this state of affairs has led to a breakdown of systems is exemplified in
the case of the Puri-Haridwar Utkal Express derailment in Uttar Pradesh in
Govt. may open
railway lines to August, where over 20 passengers lost their lives and scores were injured.
private players Safety is not something that can be separated from the normal functioning
of the Railways and is a window that reveals the underlying health of the
system. The accident shows that the numbers of trains have now reached a
level where field staff are unable to carry out maintenance without cutting corners. In this case,
track maintenance staff had decided to replace a defective glued joint even though the section
control staff had refused to block trains from entering the section that was to be repaired. Repair
work involved cutting out the defective joint and welding in a new one. Trying to carry this out
without stopping trains was an invitation for disaster. If this was an isolated case, then the case
could have been closed by punishing the guilty. But it appears that the practice of repairing tracks
without blocking trains is quite widespread, which is cause for concern.
The situation is the outcome of pursuing three inconsistent goals at the organisational level.
These are: moving more people by continuously adding trains even when sections are saturated;
focussing on increasing speed and punctuality; and diverting freight earnings to subsidise
passenger fares. These are incompatible with the declared objective of safety, especially when
there is a shortage of capacity to run existing services. Unless the numbers of trains can be
brought down to what the system can handle without cutting corners in track, signalling and
rolling stock maintenance, there is really no way to make the system both safe and punctual. The
problem is further exacerbated by a lack of money to replace old assets or purchase spares. The
Utkal train accident is a distressing example of how incompatible organisational goals connect to
unsafe behaviour at the field level.

ALSO READ
It can be done
The task before Mr. Goyal may be politically challenging but is doable
technically. He has to make difficult political decisions such as cutting back
What is the
lowdown on
on trains on saturated sections and putting punctuality on the back burner,
railway safety? at least until the system can recoup its capacities. He has to accept that time
has to be allotted for maintenance systems to stabilise even at the cost of
delaying trains. His aim must be to restore the strong culture that
underpinned every decision in the field that no unsafe condition would be allowed to exist and
be addressed even at the cost of delaying or slowing down trains. For this, the judgment of the
supervisory staff must be respected. There is also a need to restore the well-established practice of
field inspections at all levels to grasp what is happening in the field. The energies of field officers
should not be sapped by meaningless drives and responding to social media as it diverts their
attention from their main job of oversight and correction of divergences from standard
procedures. He needs to ensure money for maintenance and replacement of aged assets. This
should be done by freeing freight from subsidising passenger fares through a subvention from
the general Budget. Which path will Mr. Goyal choose? Will he give the Railways the space to
recoup or will he follow the beaten path of pushing goals that are incompatible with enhancing
safety?
LEAD
Of paramount interest?
Suhasini Haidar
This years session of the U.N. General Assembly has conrmed the growing ineffectiveness of the world body
I n June 1945, Indias princely states sent a single representative to sign the Charter of the United Nations at the San
Francisco conference, a charter that realised Alfred Tennysons poem where he called for a Parliament of man,
Federation of the world. There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe, and the kindly earth shall
slumber, lapped in universal law, Tennyson wrote in his work, Locksley Hall, spelling out his vision for a world where
the war-drum throbbd no longer, and the battle flags were furled.
The poem was famously carried by U.S. President Harry Truman in his wallet, which he called his inspiration as the UN
Charter was being drafted. A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, then the Dewan of Mysore added prose to that poetry as he spoke
on behalf of undivided India with the words, There is one great reality which all religions teach the dignity of the
common man.
A word war
As the bitterly divided Indian and Pakistani delegations stood up over the past week to face each other more than 70
years later, however, all those words rang hollow. Reality was in short supply, as even the photograph brandished by
Pakistans envoy Maleeha Lodhi as being from Jammu and Kashmir turned out to be from Gaza; religion became cause
to divide rather than build a common understanding, and the dignity of the United Nations, let alone the common man,
disappeared as each side used its multiple rights of reply for name-calling and rhetoric hurled at the other. Of course,
the India-Pakistan word-war was outdone by the U.S. and North Korea who sparred over Pyongyangs latest
provocations.
Secretary Generals list

However, it wasnt the language employed that made the UNs 72nd General Assembly one of its most disappointing
sessions, but the picture of the UNs ineffectiveness on each of the issues confronting the world today, that were spelt
out by the Secretary General Antnio Guterres in his speech on September 19. We are a world in pieces, we need to be a
world at peace, he said, listing the worlds seven biggest threats: nuclear peril, terrorism, unresolved conflicts and
violations of international humanitarian law, climate change, growing inequality, cyber warfare and misuse of artificial
intelligence, and human mobility, or refugees. Even a cursory glance shows that each of these issues saw little
movement at the UNGA.
To begin with, the UNs actions in response to North Koreas missiles and nuclear tests just amounted to another round
of sanctions against the Kim Jong-un regime. Past history points to the slim chances of success of this tack. Since 1966,
the UN Security Council has established 26 sanctions regimes, of which about half are still active. In some cases, the
sanctions only squeezed the countrys poor, as in Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) and DPRK itself, while not changing its
belligerent positions. In most cases, the misery was heightened by international military interventions, from
Yugoslavia to Libya and Yemen. Even the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, against which the U.S. and Russia united to
pass a slew of economic, political and travel sanctions in the 1990s, didnt change course on its support to al-Qaeda or its
brutal treatment of women and minorities. The truth is that sanctions do not work on rogue states; they only help
isolate their populations from the world, which in turn tightens the regimes stranglehold on its people, and
strengthens its resolve to disregard the UN.
Lacking guarantees
In addition, to those who may just consider, as Libya did, to relinquish nuclear weapons, the fact that NATO destroyed
Libya anyway is a disincentive. The UN has done itself no favours by failing to censure NATO on violating its mandate
only to the responsibility to protect (R2P) and not for regime change in Libya in 2011. To other countries that may enter
talks, as Iran did, the imminent threat from the U.S. of walking out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (P5+1
agreement) would make them question the efficacy of the UN in guaranteeing any deal struck. Other decisions of the
Trump administration in the U.S., to walk out of the climate change agreement as well as threaten to cancel its funding
contributions to the UN, have also seen little comment from the world body, which further reduces the respect it is
viewed with.
Nowhere is that lack of respect more obvious than regarding Myanmar, where the military junta faced sanctions for
years. Despite inviting former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to prepare a report on Rakhine state, post-democracy
Myanmar has been able to carry out one of the regions most frightening massacres just days after the report was
submitted. On the basis of satellite pictures, and eyewitness accounts, the UN Human Rights chief called military action
a textbook case of ethnic cleansing, as half a million Rohingya fled for their lives from Rakhine villages that were then
burnt down, with landmines laid along the border to Bangladesh to prevent their return. The Security Council will now
meet on Thursday to consider the situation, but it is short on ideas and late on action, and restoring more than a million
stateless refugees to their homes seems a daunting task, even for a world-body that was set up expressly to ensure that
such a displacement would never again be allowed to occur.
A similar impotency has been imparted to the UN on the issue of terrorism. Indias grievances here are justified and are
a symptom of the UNs powerlessness to enforce even the basic strictures against terrorists it sanctions, given that Hafiz
Saeed and associates now plan to stand for public office in Pakistan, while others like Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, who
received bail despite UN financial sanctions, have simply disappeared. Meanwhile India struggles to convince China to
allow the Security Council to sanction Masood Azhar, whose release in exchange for hostages in 1999 should have been
proof enough of his perfidy.
Mr. Guterress concerns about what he calls the dark side of innovation are valid, and the world is seeing an increasing
number of cyber-attacks, especially from non-state actors. But the UN must do more to act on attacks carried out by
states, especially those that are permanent members of the Security Council. Both Russia and the U.S. have been known
to use cyber warfare, but equally the use of new-age warfare drones, robotic soldiers and remote killings must see
more regulation from the international community.
Each one rst

Solving the worlds inequalities, the last point on his list, where Mr. Guterres pointed out that eight men represent as
much of the worlds wealth as half of all humanity, will be a harder and harder task for the UN, where member
countries speak only of putting themselves first.
Clearly the vision of the UN dreamt by Tennyson or Mudaliar or any of the leaders over time has far to go. The important
issue is the road it employs, and the respect the institution is accorded, not just as a structure at New Yorks 42nd Street,
but a shared ideal. This was summed up best by the UNs first Secretary General, Trygve Lie, who ran an equally divided
forum and finally resigned from his post in 1952 saying, The United Nations will not work effectively if it is used
merely as forum for destructive propaganda. Neither will it work if it is used only as a convenience when national
interests are directly involved, and regarded with indifference, or bypassed or opposed, when the general world interest
is paramount.
suhasini.h@thehindu.co.in
COMMENT
The fourth-term challenge
Tyson Barker
The German electorate has dealt Angela Merkel a wake-up call. Her new term will dene her
legacy
G ermanys election was supposed to be a sedate affair. Angela Merkel would be confirmed as
Chancellor. The German people, happy with brisk growth, 4% unemployment, and a high trade
surplus, were supposed to rubber stamp their satisfaction with the status quo. Chancellor Merkels
moment of peril in 2015 when her open door policy brought more than 900,000 asylum seekers to
Germany had passed.
A different campaign
Ms. Merkel thought so too. Having overcome the twin challenges of the Eurozone and refugee crises, she
relied lazily on satisfaction with the life in Germany today to carry her to victory. Together with Martin
Schulz, leader of the centre-left Social Democrats, she made a Faustian bargain to run the anaesthetising
campaign focussed more on German happiness than hidden anxieties and future challenges. In their one
and only TV debate, Ms. Merkel and Mr. Schulz talked more about highway tolls than they did about
NATO, Russia, Brexit, the Eurozone crisis, Syria, North Korea, the rise of Asia or terrorism. Even the issues
that Germany is known around the world for climate change and trade played little if any role in the
election.
But in an election that brought 75.6% of eligible voters to the polls, the German electorate dealt Ms.
Merkel a wake-up call. The message was muddled. But certain trend lines and warnings are present.
First, Germany is entering into a period of uncertainty. Germany is not immune to the anti-
establishment, reactionary forces sweeping the western world. The comfortable position that the grand
coalition had after 2013 was winnowed down to a mere 54%. The right-wing, populist Alternative for
Germany (AfD) catapulted to the third strongest party in Parliament. It even came in first in the state of
Saxony. Combined with the Communist successor party, Die Linke, extremist parties will make up 22% of
the new Parliament.
Second, the German political landscape is more fragmented. Not one but two parties, the AfD and the pro-
business Thatcherite Liberals, that were not in the previous Parliament are in. The size of the Bundestag
will also grow from 631 to 708 seats. The Social Democrats have already indicated that Ms. Merkel is on
her own to forge a new governing coalition. That leaves her with no other option than an unstable
coalition with the Liberals and the ecologically-minded Green party. Most estimate that laboured
coalition talks could extend into early 2018.
Third, Germany has turned toward a more insular brand of conservatism. In total, 56.4% of Germans voted
for parties to the right. That compared to 37.8% for progressive parties. But what drove this process?
Economic performance, at least in the top line numbers, is not responsible for the rising tide of
reactionary populism in Germany. Even 73% of AfD voters would describe the economic situation in the
country as good.
Behind the swing

Two elements animated the swing rightward: a simmering unease toward Muslim immigration and a
resentment toward a world that thinks Germany needs to do more in the Eurozone, the European Union
(EU), NATO and globally.
German voters bristled at attempts both at home and internationally to talk more about German
leadership. As one former Defence Minister quipped wryly, When Americans or Europeans talk about
German leadership, they really mean money. Its a resentment that many Germans feel. Some of the
campaigns best applause lines excoriated what others expected from Germans. Do more to support
French President Emmanuel Macrons EU vision with a transfer union to stabilise weak Eurozone
economies; do more on domestic spending to balance out Germanys massive trade surplus; do more on
defence spending to meet NATOs 2% mark; do more on sanctions against Russia and Iran; more on Brexit;
the list goes on.
And across the spectrum, there was a new-found embrace of the politics of national identity coupled with
fear and distrust of Islam in political, social and moral life. Even as the refugee crisis waned, the sparring
from Turkeys Recep Tayyip Erdoan this summer drew new anxieties into high relief. Germans in Turkey
jailed for no reason. Reporters suppressed. Rule of law rolled back in the wake of a shadowy coup. Mr.
Erdoans demagogic rhetoric attacking Germany for not allowing him to hold rallies on German soil. And
all the while, over 60% of Turks from Cologne to Berlin to Hamburg voted in support of Mr. Erdoans
authoritarian referendum. The incident left many German asking whether Germanys Turks and Muslims
share their values.
The EU factor
These elements leave Ms. Merkel more politically constrained as she enters her fourth term. She joins
Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl in the pantheon of German leaders to have served for well over a
decade at the helm of the Federal Republic. Adenauer saved West Germany from the ashes of World War II
and firmly embedded it in the family of Western liberal democracies. To this day, he is still the most
admired person in German history beating out Luther, Gutenberg, Bismarck and Einstein. Kohl was the
reunification chancellor, the man who literally erased borders both between Germans and within Europe.
What will Ms. Merkels legacy be?
Many expect her next four years to be defined by the EU. But it is hard to see how she will forge an EU with
cleaner lines with a smaller majority in the Bundestag, the austerity-driven Liberals in her coalition and a
Euro-hostile AfD breathing down her neck. Given the domestic constraints, it wont be easy.
Tyson Barker is Programme Director and Fellow at the Aspen Institute Germany. He is a former U.S. State
Department official
COMMENT
Falling off the health-care radar
Vani S. Kulkarni & Raghav Gaiha

Care for the elderly needs to be better targeted by the health system and social networks
T he National Health Policy (NHP), 2017 is unable to see the wood for the trees. Life and death questions are dealt with
perfunctorily or simply overlooked. For example, it overlooks the rapid rise in the share of the old (60 years or more), and
associated morbidities, especially sharply rising non-communicable diseases (NCDs) and disabilities. With rising age,
numerous physiological changes occur and the risk of chronic diseases rises. The co-occurrence of chronic diseases and
disability elevates the risk of mortality.
Another, more recent report, Caring for Our Elders: Early Responses, India Ageing Report 2017 (UNFPA), complements the
NHP by focussing on the vulnerability of the aged to NCDs, recent policy initiatives and the role of non-governmental
organisations in building self-help groups and other community networks. While all this is valuable, it fails to make a
distinction between the aged in general and those suffering from chronic conditions. It matters as many suffering from
chronic conditions and disabilities may find it harder to participate in such networks. Nor are the important questions of the
impact of these networks and their replicability discussed except in a piece-meal manner.
The health system is ill-equipped to deal with surging NCDs; nor is the staff well trained to treat/advise the aged suffering
from dementia or frailty, and for early diagnosis and management of conditions such as hypertension. The quality of medical
care is abysmal, and hospitalisation costs are exorbitant and impoverishing. Health insurance covers a fraction of medical
expenses incurred. However, many of these chronic conditions such as hypertension can be prevented or delayed by engaging
in healthy behaviours. Physical activity and healthy diets can mitigate these conditions. Others could be managed effectively
if detected early such as diabetes. Some of course cant be treated but rendered less painful and debilitating through assistive
devices such as stroke). Supportive families and community networks often make a significant difference.
Based on the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) 2015, among aged males and females (over 60 years) the proportions
of those suffering from NCDs nearly doubled during 2005-12, accounting for about a third of the respective populations in
2012. More females than males suffered from these diseases. The proportions were higher among those over 70, and these
doubled in the age groups 60-70 years and over 70.
A vast majority of those with NCDs had access to medical advice and treatment and the proportion remained unchanged
during 2005-12. As there is considerable heterogeneity in providers of medical help from qualified doctors to faith healers
and quacks and a sharp deterioration in the quality of medical services, it is not surprising that the proportions suffering
from NCDs have shot up despite high access. Access to government health insurance nearly doubled but remained low as
barriers for the aged remain pervasive such as fulfilling eligibility criteria, slow reimbursement and a lack of awareness of
procedures. In any case, the proportion of medical expenses covered was measly.
Loneliness and immunity

Loneliness is a perceived isolation that manifests in the distressing feeling that accompanies discrepancies between ones
desired and actual social relationships. The link between loneliness and mortality is mediated by unhealthy behaviours and
morbidity. The fact that loneliness predicts health outcomes even if health behaviours are unchanged suggests that loneliness
alters physiology at a more fundamental level. Research shows that loneliness increases vascular resistance and diminishes
immunity.
We have used two proxies for loneliness: one is single-member households and the other is whether one is married or
widowed. Snapping of the spousal bond in old age poses serious health risks. In 2005, old females with NCDs were twice as
likely to live in single member households than the corresponding males. In 2012, while the females were two and a half times
more likely to be living in single member households, the share of males rose more than moderately. In effect, old females
with NCDs became much lonelier.
Whether related to or unrelated to loneliness, a high risk factor for NCDs is daily consumption of alcohol, especially local
brews. Daily consumption of alcohol among the aged with NCDs rose more than twice over the period 2005-2012. Banning of
liquor sales in a few States hasnt helped because of strong resistance from vested interests including politicians and
expansion of illicit sales.
Networking as support
Another measure is the proportion of those married and widowed. More females were married than males while the widowed
were much higher among the females in 2005. Both male and female proportions of those married doubled in 2012 but the
latter remained larger. While widowed males tripled, widowed females rose just under twice. However, children often play an
important role in elderly support with the caveat that filial piety shows signs of diminishing. So if we look at households with
2-4 members, we find that the proportion of aged females with NCDs living in them was much higher than that of males in
2005, and both rose rapidly, especially the latter. So it is arguable that family support more than compensated for the sharp rise
in loneliness. An important point is that today, women are increasingly filling other roles, which provides them with greater
security in older age. But these shifts also limit the capacity of women and families to provide care for older people who need
it.
That social networks are effective in providing support to the aged is far from axiomatic as there are questions of size of a
network, whether it is proximal or non-proximal and whether there is social harmony. If social networks are instrumental in
bonding together in periods of personal crises, this could compensate for a lack of family support, e.g. widows living alone, and
help alleviate morbidity. We find that bonding rose sharply among both aged males and females suffering from NCDs during
2005-12.
The IHDS also provides data on inter-caste and village conflicts, with the proportion of those suffering from NCDs living in
villages that experienced inter-caste or other conflicts more than doubling during 2005-2012. Lack of social harmony induces
helplessness, disruption of medical supplies and network support.
The World Report on Ageing and Health 2015 (WHO) is emphatic about what is known as ageing in place, that is the ability of
older people to live in their own home and community safely, independently, and comfortably, regardless of age, income or
level of intrinsic capacity. Ageing in place can be further enhanced by creating age-friendly environments that enable mobility
and allow them to engage in basic activities. This reinforces the case that solutions to those with chronic diseases lie within
but also outside health systems.
From a policy perspective, health systems have to be configured to deal with not one NCD but multiple NCDs to manage them
better. The impact of multi-morbidity on an old persons capacity, health-care utilisation and the costs of care are significantly
larger than the summed effects of each. Besides, the reconfigured medical system must be complemented by stronger family
ties and social networks. This is not as Utopian as it may seem as examples of such complementarities abound.
LEAD
The unilateral vote
Srinivasan Ramani
A rush to hold referendums, from Kurdistan to Catalonia, highlights the importance for nuance
in such votes
R eferendums are in the news, with tensions mounting in Spain and West Asia over regional votes
in Catalonia and Iraqi Kurdistan, respectively. Both in their own ways are a caution on how such
instruments of direct democracy need to be used with care.
A referendum is, no doubt, a powerful tool to deepen participation and reflect public opinion in a
democracy. But when, how and for what reasons referendums should be held need to be carefully laid
out so as to ensure their legitimacy. As the Brexit referendum proved last year, these instruments can
reduce layered issues such as the membership of a single market into a vote on the narrower subject of
immigration. When referendums are used as blunt instruments to decide upon complicated issues such
as independence or secession, there needs to be an additional stress on mechanisms: questions framed
for the vote, legitimacy of the institution calling for the vote and so on.
Question of cooperation
Some of the well-known referendums on independence that were held in recent years include the ones
in Scotland in 2014, South Sudan in 2011 and Quebec (Canada) in 1995. The first two were outcomes of
agreements with the Central governments in the U.K. and Sudan, respectively. The Quebec vote was the
outcome of a provincial decision, which however resulted in failure for secessionists. The two
referendums in Iraqs only autonomous region, of Kurdistan (held on September 25) and in the Catalonia
autonomous province in Spain (to be held on October 1) follow the Quebec model without the stamp
of approval or an agreement with national government in Iraq and Spain, respectively.
The question of legitimacy of referendums is important and it is automatically provided if the Centre
concedes this mechanism on such issues. Central acquiescence to the process of a referendum to decide
or infer opinions on sovereignty also allows for a true campaign on both sides of the yes/no positions in
the referendum. This is not the case with the Catalonian and the Kurdish referendums, which means
that a yes outcome would not necessarily push the envelope in the direction of secession in a peaceful
manner.
Legitimacy apart, on the face of it, there is a common thread in these two referendums. The rulers of
Iraqi Kurdistan sought the non-binding referendum as a step towards independence from Arab Iraq.
The dominant parties in Catalonia also have a similar aim framing the binding yes/no vote for
independence as a decisive step towards the formation of a new republic, independent of Madrid. But
the similarities end there in the tactics used by these pro-secession forces from the nation-states of
Iraq and Spain.
The Kurdish case

Iraqi Kurdistan is just one of four Kurd majority areas, the other three being in Syria, Turkey and Iran.
Kurds were denied a homeland of their own after the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and various
movements seeking autonomy and independence in the four countries have been brutally repressed
over the years.
In Iraq, Kurds were repressed during Baath rule. After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, they managed to get
a better deal in the new regime and enhanced their autonomy following Baghdads entanglement in the
civil war against the Islamic State (IS).
Kurds are an important partner for Baghdad in the fight against the IS, with the U.S. also treating the
Peshmerga forces as an ally. With a weakened Baghdad dependent upon Shiite militias and Irans proxy
forces in the long civil war, Kurds have used the situation to enhance the territory under their control.
Why do Kurds want a separate country?
00:00 01:19
The move by the Iraqi Kurds towards independence is being viewed with alarm by the Turkish and
Iranian regimes. Turkey has in the past treated Kurdish demands for minority rights such as recognition
of their language, let alone autonomy, as secessionist. Following concessions towards minority rights in
the early 2000s under the AKP regime of Recep Tayyip Erdoan, a long-running battle against insurgents
led by forces such as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) eased, but hostilities were renewed recently by
the Erdoan-led regime.
Iran is also fighting a minor insurgency in the mountains of its northern region led by another affiliate
of the PKK, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) and has recently closed its eastern borders in the light of
the referendum held in Iraqi Kurdistan.
In short, any moves for independence of south Kurdistan in Iraq have geopolitical ramifications and
are severely opposed by Turkey and Iran in particular, as well as the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria,
which remains tactically silent on the matter for now. The referendum in Iraq cannot be seen in isolation
from the other battles which are being fought by Kurds in neighbouring countries and which could
complicate matters such as the still unfinished civil war against the IS in Syria and Iraq, regardless of
how legitimate the historical claims of the Kurds for a separate homeland are.
The view from Barcelona

Catalonias referendum does not suffer from these complications. Catalans were also subject to similar
centralisation and unitary principles during Francos rule in Spain as Kurds were in Turkey, being unable
to speak their language in public. But this was a fate suffered by other minorities in Spain as well, the
Basques for example.
Unlike the Basque region where movements for decentralisation, autonomy and even independence
took a violent turn with a raging insurgency led by the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Catalan
demands were through the democratic route. This gained significance in the post-Franco
transformation of Spain, with a degree of autonomy guaranteed to its many nationalities such as the
Basque region, Galicia and Catalonia apart from other autonomous communities in a process of
devolution regulated by the Spanish Constitution of 1978.
While the recognition of nationalities such as the Catalonian one in Spain has decisively moved the
country away from the centralised and unitary nation-state under Franco, there have been demands for
a truer federalisation and greater devolution of power, especially in Catalonia lately. This has expressed
itself as a movement for independence in the past decade as an array of political parties from the Left to
the Right have asked for a separate nation-state due to the distinctiveness of the Catalan identity and
notions of economic injustice. Secessionists point out that while Catalonia is the richest province, it
gives more to Spain than it gets from the government in Madrid.
The real reasons for the demands of independence lie in the vagaries of Spains economy which have
affected Catalonia as well. Catalan nationalists from both the Left and the Right have used
independence as the way to answer raging problems such as unemployment instead of pursuing reforms
and measures that will relieve Catalonia (and indeed Spain) of these issues.
The October 1 referendum itself is problematic it asks participants if they prefer independence
through a yes/no vote and choices such as greater federalisation are not provided on the ballot. In any
case, parties supporting the no option (and endorsed mostly by non-Catalan long-time residents of the
region) are boycotting the referendum. Yet, the Catalan government is pushing the referendum as a
binding step towards independence.
Different strokes
In sum, the issues at stake in Iraqi Kurdistan and Catalonia in Spain are vastly different. Kurdish claims
of independence might be legitimate due to the repression faced by Kurds in their respective
sovereignties and the parcelling of the Kurdish homeland into regions across those sovereignties. But a
push for independence in this milieu is fraught with new tensions rising out of geopolitics. The Catalan
case for independence is lesser as the real problem in Catalonia is related to economic issues, which are
shared by the rest of Spain as well.
COMMENT
Expanding the common ground
Harsh V. Pant
James Mattis visit buttressed the growing India-U.S. convergence on regional and global security
issues
Hours after U.S. Secretary of Defence James Mattis landed in Kabul, he was welcomed with six rockets landing
near Kabuls international airport, as if to remind Washington whats at stake in the ongoing conflict in
Afghanistan. This visit came weeks after the Trump administration unveiled its South Asia strategy which in
many ways marks a radical departure from the past by putting Pakistan on notice and bringing India to the
centre stage of Washingtons Afghanistan policy.
This was reinforced by Gen. Mattis during his visit to India this week when he suggested India and the U.S.
would work together to fight terrorism. There can be no tolerance of terrorist safe havens, he said. As global
leaders, India and the United States resolve to work together to eradicate this scourge. While announcing his
new Afghanistan policy, U.S. President Donald Trump had mentioned, We appreciate Indias important
contributions to stability in Afghanistan, but India makes billions of dollars in trade with the U.S., and we want
them to help us more with Afghanistan, especially in the area of economic assistance and development.
In line with this, Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman made it clear that while there shall not be boots from
India on the ground in Afghanistan, New Delhi will be stepping up its development and capacity-building
engagement with Afghanistan.
Wider role in Kabul

India has decided to take up 116 high-impact community developmental projects in 31 provinces of
Afghanistan. India and Afghanistan have also agreed to strengthen security cooperation, with New Delhi
agreeing to extend further assistance for the Afghan national defence and security forces in fighting the
scourge of terrorism, organised crime, trafficking of narcotics and money laundering. India will be training
Afghan police officers along with Afghan soldiers. This is aimed at sending out a message to Pakistan, which
continues to assert that India has zero political and military role in Afghanistan.
After handing over four attack helicopters to Kabul as part of its assistance package, India is keen to expand the
scope of its security cooperation with Afghanistan which had remained limited in the past not only due to
geographical constraints, but also due to Washingtons desire to limit Indias security engagement in the
country.
The U.S. is sending about 3,000 more troops to Afghanistan, most of which are preparing to arrive in the coming
weeks. A lot is riding on this of course as we look toward how do we put an end to this fighting and the threat of
terrorism to the Afghan people, Gen. Mattis said in Kabul. We are here to set the military and security
conditions for that but recognise ultimately the responsibility for the Afghan leadership to step up and fully
own the war.
The convergence between India and the U.S. on Pakistan has evolved at an extraordinary pace. The Trump
administrations hard-line approach on Pakistans support for terrorism comes at a time when New Delhi has
led an active global campaign to marginalise Islamabad and bring its role as a state sponsor of terror to the
forefront of the global community. During Gen. Mattiss visit, Ms. Sitharaman reminded the U.S. that the very
same forces which did find safe haven in Pakistan were the forces that hit New York as well as Mumbai. Mr.
Trump had made it clear that Washington can no longer be silent about Pakistans safe havens for terrorist
organisations, the Taliban and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond. The Xiamen BRICS
declaration earlier this month also listed Pakistan-based terror organisations for the first time. It is not
surprising, therefore, that Pakistans Foreign Minister has had to admit that terrorist Hafiz Saeed and terror
group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) are a liability for his country and for the South Asian region.
Stronger ties with U.S.

The visit of Gen. Mattis also underscored the growing salience of defence ties in shaping the trajectory of Indo-
U.S. relations. Washington is no longer coy about selling sensitive military technologies to India. Chinas
growing assertiveness in the wider Indo-Pacific is a shared concern and this was reflected in the reiteration by
the two countries of the critical importance of freedom of navigation, overflight and unimpeded lawful
commerce in the global commons. Bilateral defence ties have been growing in recent years, underpinned by a
strategic convergence. As Gen. Mattis suggested, the U.S. is looking forward to sharing some of our most
advanced defence technologies with India to further deepen the robust defence trade and technology
collaboration between our defence industries.
The sale of 22 Sea Guardian Unmanned Aerial Systems, which was announced during Prime Minister Narendra
Modis visit to the U.S. earlier this year, is high on the agenda. With this deal, the Indian Navy will not only
acquire the worlds most advanced maritime reconnaissance drone, it will also lead to greater defence
technology sharing.
As India and the U.S. expand military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, new alignments are emerging which have
the potential to reshape the regional security architecture. In the past, India had been reluctant to play an active
role in East and Southeast Asia. Now as part of its Act East policy, Indias engagement with the region has
become more robust and Washington has been encouraging India to shape the regional strategic realities more
potently. At a time when regional security in the wider Indo-Pacific has taken a turn for the worse, the U.S. is
looking at India to shore up its presence in the region. And India, driven by Chinas growing profile around its
periphery, is keen to take up that challenge.
Gen. Mattiss visit has highlighted the growing convergence between the U.S. and India on key regional and
global security issues. As the two nations move ahead with their ambitious plans, the challenge will be to
sustain the present momentum given the myriad distractions that Washington and New Delhi have to contend
with.
LEAD
The activist and the intellectual
Sundar Sarukkai
When the moral temperature of a society falls, as it has globally in recent times, activists will arise
It is ironical that those who have always been an essential catalyst for a just society have also been those who
have been kept at its margins. Activists have become increasingly unpopular and have become the targets of
an upwardly mobile middle class. It is difficult to understand this phenomenon: why would those who have a
comfortable life get so angry and upset at those who sacrifice their personal well-being for the good of
others? The public and government reaction against NGOs, the killing of social activists, the cynicism
towards those who decide not to follow the mainstream are all part of this larger trend, a symptom of the
silent corporatisation of society itself.
In the line of attack

Intellectuals, including artists and academics, also bear the brunt of this hatred. As many have pointed out, it
has never been as difficult as it is now to disagree about something without being called names. These are
symptoms of what our society is becoming. As a society, we lack a culture of protest, whether in the public or
in institutions. Disagreeing with a policy is always misinterpreted as if it is an attack on individuals
associated with that policy.
It is not easy being an activist, although it is somewhat easier being an intellectual. The activist is in the
middle of conflicts while the intellectual is in the midst of the world of ideas and scholarship. Historically,
this tension is powerfully manifested in the apparent opposition between thinking and doing. The
stereotype is that activists do while intellectuals think.
Like almost everything else, this is not an Either-Or situation. There are good arguments for supporting the
view that some intellectual activity, especially that which develops new vocabulary and arguments for social
change, helps activism. Similarly, major agents of social change have often contributed to the creation of new
perspectives on society which academics have not been able to.
Nevertheless this tension persists. Activists working with a variety of marginalised groups often believe that
scholarship and theory is of little use to them. Intellectuals, on their part, seem to have got cocooned inside
their academic spaces or other elite spaces with very little engagement with the people and the situations
that they write about. This has led to a rejection of intellectuals by many activists, and a benign neglect of
activists by the intellectuals.
However, there is an important difference between both these acts. There is something special to the domain
of activism which a knowledge-based intellectual activity does not have.
Being an activist
Becoming an intellectual is a long process and is often dependent on access to education as well as resources
of various kinds. A school student will not be considered an intellectual but she can be an activist. She can
join marches, shout slogans and write blogs. The opportunity to be an activist is more easily available. There
is something more democratic and egalitarian about activism as compared to intellectualism, a feature which
has often led to cynicism about intellectuals.
The idea of an organic intellectual, drawing from Gramscis original use of this term, can be understood as a
mediation between these extremes. The history of activism in India has shown us that some of the greatest
activists have also been organic intellectuals. Nevertheless, this invocation of the organic intellectual is itself
a response to the specific privilege of being an intellectual.
I believe that there is one significant difference between the activist and the intellectual. An activist may or
may not be a scholar. But what she does is far more important than the scholar because her action is most
fundamentally a moral action. On the other hand, an intellectuals action is most often an epistemic action,
an action that is concerned with information and knowledge.
An activist acts on behalf of, and with, others. In most cases, activists work with the dispossessed and the
marginalised. They can imagine a better world for those the larger society forgets about and, in doing this,
they sacrifice something. Their actions are not geared towards personal benefit but for the benefit of
communities and individuals with whom they can stand in solidarity. For an intellectuals action to become
moral, it needs the intervention of activists.
All activism involves a sense of giving and giving-up something. While normal individuals in a society act in
order to benefit themselves or their family, activists often act against their own interests. Often the actions of
the activist improves the well-being of others (who are not just family and friends) more than that of the
activist herself. And this is the real strength of an activist. Her actions are not rationally utilitarian but
morally robust, as powerfully exemplified by countless activists who have worked with labour, women, the
marginalised and the dispossessed.
This is the important skill that differentiates an activist and the intellectual. When a student goes on a
protest, she is picking up an important skill that of developing a moral sense of the social, a sense of
concern and respect for others who may or may not be in a situation like hers. Her actions have the benefit of
others as her good. And this sense, akin to the truth or soul force as Gandhi would call it, is the most
important quality of being an activist.
The intellectual does not possess this necessarily, although some intellectuals have a deep sense of the moral.
The history of intellectual labour has consistently removed the moral from the accumulation of knowledge.
This is best exemplified by science and the creation of scientific knowledge decoupled from moral
considerations. Academic intellectualism is clever, deep in knowledge and understanding but less so in its
moral force. Organic intellectualism can be seen as an attempt to put back the moral within this pursuit of
knowledge.
So when the larger society fails in its moral sense or when its intellectuals ignore moral action, activists will
arise to counter them. When the moral temperature of a society falls, as it has globally in recent times,
activists will arise. If this does not happen, the moral force of a society gets depleted. It is only the activists
who can make sure that the moral skills of a society do not vanish. It is activists, who give up their personal,
material comforts for the larger values of dignity, respect and equality of individuals in a society, who can
function as the moral compass for others. Activists and intellectuals are essential to protecting the society
from two of the greatest dangers power and profit. Getting rid of such people is to compromise our present
as well as the future of our society.

September 2017 Hindu Leads Printed

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LEAD

Understanding the Chinese mind

Not a status quoist power

To clear the path ahead

The majority judgment

Economy outlook still cloudy

An immediate stimulus is needed to regain the momentum to get India back to

As cautioned in the Economic Survey tabled recently in Parliament, it looks as if the

Printable version | Sep 4, 2017 10:43:39 AM |

Making up for lost time

There is a Rohingya in all of us

By contemplating deportation of the hapless refugees, India undermines itself

Most persecuted minority

Testing times in the Korean peninsula

Trumps ballistic stand

Nuclear crises in the past

Resolving the issue

Social revolution in a JAM

Beyond bank accounts

Sharing identity details

Mining personal information

Jean Drze is Visiting Professor at the Department of Economics, Ranchi University

The disaster next door: on the Rohingya issue

Syed Munir Khasru

Where is the spirit?

On the other side of the fence

New strategy, old game: on Trump and Afghanistan

Expectations from India

Not exactly regional

Time for course correction

Fall in investment rate

Two engines of growth

Equality for what?

Morality of mutual respect

At home and in the world: on the Rohingya issue

The case in court

Suhrith Parthasarathy is an advocate practising at the Madras High Court

The federal manoeuvre: on the Dravidian movement

Standing up to Mrs. Gandhi

The social sphere

Reading the tea leaves

Two trend lines

Accelerating the trends

A new strategic landscape

Gauging the status quo

BRICS limited scope

Bilaterals, Beijing dtente

The road after Doklam

India needs to push for a new deal

Padmashree Gehl Sampath

It must reopen the discussion on balancing the global intellectual property

G lobal trade and intellectual property are at a crossroads. In a time when

Problem with trade deals

Gaming the system

States of the Opposition

The Congress system

Lessons from the past

Onus on regional parties

Solving the Afghan riddle

Over to the courts

The Governors role

The disqualication trick

A fight against prejudice

Focussing on such practices