Você está na página 1de 4

Democracy is the accepting of others, to prevent alienation and to prevent the alienation of our selfs

from the world around us.

McAfee 2008 (Democracy's Normativity, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, New Series, Volume
22, Number 4, 2008, pp. 257-265)
Democracy’s normativity comes from a communal recognition of prob- lems, from disappointment
in the world as it is and from the ability of peoples to collectively imagine an alternative state of
affairs. It does not rest on foundations. It is a performative anticipation of and creation of a new
world. Democracy is aspirational in that it is ideally open to all, and it is aspirational in that all
those involved deliberate and decide what their community should aspire to become.
Hence this essay is really about democratic politics as resisting subjection and alienation. It
describes democracy as, for want of a better term, antialien- ation. I wish there were a good word
for this. Marx (1964) taught us a bit about alienation and in so doing hinted at its opposite. In the
modern economic climate, alienation occurs at many levels: we become alienated by an economic
system that divorces us from the products of our own labor; we become alienated from our fellow
citizens in the economic climate that pits one against one’s fellows; we become alienated from
humanity itself when we start seeing ourselves as mere workers and machines of the larger
economic order. In a climate of alienation, it is difficult to start imagining ourselves as higher than
all that.

We need to work though our differences in order to reach the truth


McAfee 2008 (Democracy's Normativity, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, New Series, Volume
22, Number 4, 2008, pp. 257-265)
There are very real, consequential reasons to do this. In the logos of com- munities deliberating we
encounter differends among ourselves, incommensura- bility that arises from participants’
different perspectives and histories (Lyotard 1988). Laying off workers could be good news for
managers, terrible news for families. François Lyotard’s concept can be used to understand much
of what is at issue in contemporary politics. For example, the meaning of “America” differs from
one population to the next, and the immigration debate is at bottom a debate about what America
means. It is a debate about identity and belonging. In the immigration debate, America is a
differend, the term an object of dispute where the referent seems to slip away or await
designation.
Because of differends, in political discourse it seems that people of differ- ent backgrounds are
doomed to keep talking past each other. So long as they are engaged in debate, this is certainly
so. But if they adopt a deliberative posture they are likely to encounter something else: the fragile,
vulnerable, and some- times perplexing views that others hold. We have to attend to these
differends because we are very likely to miss them. Speaking for myself, I have been in situations
(e.g., a series of U.S.–China dialogues) where I thought I understood completely where the other
party was coming from, and it is easy to carry on as if this is so. But when I tried to really
understand the other, I became aware of how little I knew. For example, when the Chinese use the
term civil society they mean something altogether different from what I mean. This is a differend.
It is a real task of discovery to figure out what they mean, so that our two countries might be able
to fathom each other and occupy the globe together peacefully. So I know firsthand that logos as
speaking together is the practice of trying to get a handle on these differends (Lyotard 1988).
We need to work through our differends not in order to get to “the truth of the matter.” There is no
antecedent truth or referent to the term America or civil society. And it is not just a matter of
coming to some agreement and stipulating a meaning of what we mean when we say America.
The task of talking is to change relationships and to create new understandings and possibly
commonly agreed- upon choices that respect plurality. Repeatedly in observing public
deliberations, I and others note something quite stunning. Participants often leave saying that they
did not necessarily change their own views on things but they did change their views of others and
others’ views.
Goldman
US Border Patrol sexualizes anyone that crosses the border.
Goldman 2002 (Border Patrol and the Immigrant Body: Entry Denied: Policing Sexuality at the
Border. Eithne Luibhéid Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2002)
Admittedly, the basic premise and theoretical framing of the study will prove extremely familiar to any
scholar of gender and/ or sexuality. The point of departure for Luibhe ́id’s work is the claim that,
through their mandate to protect the nation from ‘‘un- desirable elements, U.S. immigration officials not
only regulated
but—in fact—engendered sexuality. In order to enforce mandated restrictions on ‘‘undesirable’’
individuals seeking admission to the country, they created a code that rendered bodies legible. Through
the construction and application of this code, moreover, the bor- der patrol effectively sexualized the
regulated subjects.

Immigration Officals are required to prevent admission to the US of people who are immoral.
Goldman 2002 (Border Patrol and the Immigrant Body: Entry Denied: Policing Sexuality at the Border. Eithne
Luibhéid Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2002)
legislation that has adjudicated the re- quirements for admission to the United States, such as the Page
Law and the McCreary Amendment, has often enumerated restric- tions without offering concrete
guidelines for implementing or enforcing those restrictions. Hence, immigration officials were re- quired
to deny admission to anyone who appeared to be indecent or to be seeking entrance to United States
for ‘‘immoral pur- poses,’’ yet they frequently received little or no instruction on how to recognize or
assess these characteristics. The border thus be- came a site of incarnation as well as implementation;
that is, immi- gration officers constructed policies, tests and measures that were designed to identify
(and, consequently, interpellate) individual bodies as appropriate or undesirable.

Immigration Officials create a normative code which prevents immora people who could infect the US
from entering.
Goldman 2002 (Border Patrol and the Immigrant Body: Entry Denied: Policing Sexuality at the Border. Eithne
Luibhéid Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2002)
immigration policies and practices wield the discursive power of the state and—through their interpreta-
tion of legal mandates and proscriptions—render female sexuality visible and thus available for
evaluation. As the author explains in the introduction, the study proposes to address the question of
how the law negotiates the epistemological elusiveness of sexuality. In fact, the introduction begins
with a quotation from a student who once asked Luibhe ́id, ‘‘How would the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS) know if someone was gay, anyway?’’ (ix). Of course, the question can easily be
altered slightly to encompass the ‘‘mysteries’’ of promiscuity, seductiveness and fecundity that
immigration policies sought to control. The officers charged with carrying out these policies and
realizing the necessary assessments must differentiate between women’s bodies that are capable of
(re)producing appropriate citizens and those that could ‘‘infect’’ the nation with unwanted sexuality
and/or genealogy. They at- tempt to guard the nation against inappropriate penetration and—in doing
so—create a specific code of normative and non- normative behavior.

By policing sexuality, immi- gration officials construct a corporeal model of desirable subjectivity.
Goldman 2002 (Border Patrol and the Immigrant Body: Entry Denied: Policing Sexuality at the Border. Eithne
Luibhéid Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2002)
Conven- tional wisdom might suggest that borders constitute a site of enforcement, a boundary at
which internal policies and restric- tions regarding the nation and its citizens are extended or applied to
external subjects. As Luibhe ́id’s study demonstrates, however, the border is a space of self-definition.
By policing sexuality, immi- gration officials construct a corporeal model of desirable subjectiv- ity.
Hence, through the articulation and implementation of this model, the border becomes the spatial locus
where the national Self regulates female bodies in order to maximize its potential to effectively
reproduce itself.
By focusing on specific cases and shifts in the policies and practices of U.S. immigration efforts to enact
and regulate sexual- ity since the late 19th century, Luibhe ́id is able to interrogate com- plex
relationships among gender, class, sexuality, racialization and nationalism, arguing that sexuality
functions as a regulatory mech- anism that produces difference through these policies and prac- tices.
Sexuality generates, and thus renders visible, the line of demarcation between the purported ‘‘us’’ of
the nation and the ‘‘them’’ that must always already be located beyond its borders. More important,
Luibhe ́id’s analysis underscores the precise prac- tices through which women’s bodies have been
interpellated by immigration officials as the site of mediation for this binary divi- sion.

States continue to produce normality in respond to ongoing crisis.


Goldman 2002 (Border Patrol and the Immigrant Body: Entry Denied: Policing Sexuality at the Border. Eithne
Luibhéid Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2002)
Entry Denied does not seek to refute the claims of these scholars nor to deny the potential for the
productive reterritorial- ization of non-normative sexuality. Luibhe ́id’s work, however, fo- cuses on how
the hegemonic power of the state is enacted by and through its control of the border. It offers a
compelling and con- vincing analysis of the forces that a queer and/or alternative vision of
(trans)national sexuality must contend with and—ultimately— contest and destabilize.
Given its date of publication, Entry Denied only touches briefly on the Patriot Act and its theoretical
implications for border stud- ies. Nevertheless, recent changes in national and international pol- itics
only further reinforce the significance of Luibhe ́id’s study. According to many scholars, the processes of
globalization that have become increasingly prominent and powerful since the col- lapse of the Soviet
Union have fundamentally called into question national paradigms of citizenship and subjectivity. The
policies and practices enacted in the wake of September 11th underscore how the state continues to
(re)produce normativity in spite of—or, perhaps, in response to—this crisis of subjectivity and national
identity. Although the precise role of female sexuality within the current shifts of national and
international policy may not prove as readily apparent as the examples Luibhe ́id examines, her work
suggests that the desire to define a unified Self in direct opposition to a monolithic Other will inevitably
be mediated through the con- trol of women’s bodies. In the end, Entry Denied offers important critical
tools for understanding how this crisis forms part of a larger tradition of border patrol—in every sense of
the phrase.

Brassington

Moral arguments will not work to stop terrorism as terrorist employ a different set of morals in support
of their actions.
Brassington, Ian 2007 Truth and Normativity An Inquiry into the Basis of Everyday Moral
Claims
. As I suggested a moment ago, I shall use as my moral termini democracy and terrorism.
Commonsense morality says that terrorism is wrong and that democracy is right – or, if not exactly that,
then something very much like it. However, once we begin to look at why this might be, it becomes
apparent that, at least in practice, there is not so big a difference between these two forms of behaviour
as there might appear to be at first. This being the case, we can either ditch the idea that there is a
compelling moral difference between them, or we can try to establish why we draw the moral line
where we do. As I said above: none of the extant ways of thinking about morality can answer this
satisfactorily. Thus, if we were engaged in debate with a terrorist or advocate of terrorism, we would
have a hard time in getting him to change his behaviour or beliefs for the right reason if all we had to
hand was extant moral thinking.
The point that will occupy me for the rest of this chapter – and the first half of the book – is not so much
that we should stop worrying and learn to love the bomb as that we should worry even more if we want
to avoid having even to respect the bomb. The problem is structural, though: the same points will apply
in some form in relation to other moral claims that we might want to make. The democracy versus
terrorism example functions as a test case, and as such it will recur; however, there is no shortage of
examples that we might want to use in its place.
A commonsense moral critique of terrorism will be aimed at establishing two things: that the terrorist
should abandon his strategy; and that this rejection will be based on a recognition of the strategy’s
impermissibility. Yet, while a term such as ‘terrorist’ comes with plenty of moral baggage that is
generally not shared by a term such as ‘democracy’ or ‘civil society’ (this is a point that will turn out to
be important in the second half of the book), the distribution of that baggage is more even than might
be thought; the civil-social or democratic polis and the terrorist carry similar weights. For this reason, if
there is something about criticisms of terrorism compelling enough to make the terrorist abandon his
strategy, then the polis should, for the sake of consistency, halt a good number of its functions.
The first point to make is that it is not as if terrorists have a categorical desire to do evil things: either
they reject the idea that they do evil things, or they claim that what they do is undesirable, but
unavoidable as a means of ensuring some future good. This I shall take as axiomatic. Either way, they
operate morally rather as does the state, which also believes either that it does not do evil things, or
that it does so only for the very best raisons d’êtat. Hence, either we have to revise the content of the
commonsense moral intuition that distinguishes terrorism from democratic civil society, or else we have
to find what it is that gives the distinction its authority, lest the terrorist reject it.

Immigrants does not always enter the US by will, sometimes their entry is a temporary escape from
their home.
Brassington, Ian 2007 Truth and Normativity An Inquiry into the Basis of Everyday Moral Claims
There is yet another route that might be able to legitimise the polis and rescue me from galley-slavery.
This route depends on a distinction being drawn between tacit and implicit consent. Some people might
have implicitly, rather than tacitly, consented to political membership: the most obvious class of person
to whom this might apply is the immigrant. There would seem to be a good argument to say that
immigrants chose to be there, and so have entered into a contract, albeit one that is so informally
drawn up that it does not require verbalisation. Their allegiance is not forced upon them. But there are
problems even with this view: it would seem to compel us to say that only people such as immigrants
have any duty to obey the law, for example. Further, they might have come (say) to Britain without
intending to become British. There is a difference between choosing to come to Britain and choosing to
go to the most convenient place that springs to mind that offers a decent life: they might have every
intention to return ‘home’ the minute it stops raining bullets or can afford to educate their children.
People who arrive through desperation do not look like contractors. Hence expectations of consent from
anyone seem to be in need of serious scaffolding; the most we can expect is that the social contract is
something that could only be signed by those who, for whatever reason, have made an uncoerced and
unforced decision to relocate from the place of their birth to another. So few are these people that the
idea of a social contract being at the heart of social relations is absurd.