Pardell vs. Bartolome [L-4656 November 18, 1912]
He owned
Facts: Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and
respondent Matilde Ortiz y Felin Bartolome were the existing
heirs of the late Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin. On 1888,
Matilde and co-defendant Gaspar de Bartolome y Escribano
took it upon themselves without an judicial authorization or
even extra judicial agreement the administration of the
properties of the late Calixta and Miguel. These properties
included a house in Escolta Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a house
in Washington Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a lot in Magallanes
Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; parcels of rice land in San Julian and
Sta. Lucia; and parcels of land in Candon, Ilocos Sur.
Vicenta filed an action in court asking that the judgement be
rendered in restoring and returning to them one half of the
total value of the fruits and rents, plus losses and damages
from the aforementioned properties. However, respondent
Matilde asserted that she never refused to give the plaintiff
her share of the said properties. Vicenta also argued that
Matilde and her husband, Gaspar are obliged to pay rent to
the former for their occupation of the upper story of the
house in Escolta Street.
Issue: Whether or not Matilde and Gaspar are obliged to pay
rent for their occupation of the said property
Held: No. The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to
pay rent. Their occupation of the said property was a mere
exercise of their right to use the same as a co-owner. One of
the limitations on a co-owners right of use is that he must
use it in such a way so as not to injure the interest of the
other co-owners. In the case at bar, the other party failed to
provide proof that by the occupation of the spouses
Bartolome, they prevented Vicenta from utilizing the same.
RESUENA vs. CA
CASE DOCTRINES: Co-owners right to file an action for
ejectment; occupation by tolerance.
Respondents action for ejectment against petitioners is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of
the property since petitioners were not able to prove that
they are authorized to occupy the same.
Petitioners lack of authority to occupy the properties,
coupled with respondents right under Article 487, clearly
settles respondents prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot
No. 2587.
Time and again, this Court hasruled that persons who occupy
the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, are necessarily bound
by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon
demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against them
.FACTS:Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45.Juanito
Borromeo, Sr. is the co-owner and overseer of certain parcels
of land located in Pooc, Talisay,Cebu, designated as Lots Nos.
2587 and 2592 of the Talisay-Manglanilla Estate.
six-eighths (6/8) of LotNo. 2587 while the Sps. Bascon owned
two-eights (2/8) thereof. On the other hand, Lot No. 2592 is
owned incommon by Borromeo and the heirs of one Nicolas
Maneja. However, the proportion of their undivided
shareswas not determined a quo. Tining Resuena, Alejandra
Garay, Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, and Unisima
Resuena resided in theupper portion of Lot No. 2587,
allegedly under the acquiescence of the Spouses Bascon and
their heir, Andres Bascon. On the other hand, petitioner
Eutiquia Rosario occupied a portion of Lot No. 2592, allegedly
with thepermission of the heirs of Nicolas Maneja, one of the
original co-owners of Lot No. 2587. Borromeo claimed
thatthey have occupied portions of the subject property by
virtue of his own liberality.
Borromeo developed portions of Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592
occupied by him into a resort known as theBorromeo Beach
Resort. In his desire to expand and extend the facilities of the
resort that he established on thesubject properties,
respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the property.
Petitioners, however, refused tovacate their homes.On 16
February 1994, Borromeo filed a Complaint for ejectment
with the MTC against the petitioners.MTC decision (summary
proceeding): dismissed the complaint. Borromeo had no right
to evict thepetitioners because the area was owned in
common and there was no partition yet.RTC decision:
reversed the MTC decision. It held that Article 487 of the Civil
Code, which allows any oneof the co-owners to bring an
action in ejectment, may successfully be invoked by the
respondent because, in asense, a co-owner is the owner and
possessor of the whole, and that the suit for ejectment is
deemed to beinstituted for the benefit of all co-owners.CA
decision: affirmed the RTC decision.I
ISSUE: WON Borromeo can lawfully evict the petitioners.
RULING: Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides simply
that *a+ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment, is a categorical and an unqualified authority in
favor of respondent to evict petitioners from the portions of
Lot. No. 2587.This provision is a departure from Palarca v.
Baguisi, which held that an action for ejectment must be
brought by all the co-owners. Thus, a co-owner may bring an
action to exercise and protect the rights of all. When the
action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a
favorable decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision
cannot prejudice their rights.
Respondents action for ejectment against petitioners is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of
the property since petitioners were not able to prove that
they are authorized to occupy the same.
Petitioners lack of authority to occupy the properties,
coupled with respondents right under Article 487,clearly
settles respondents prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot
No. 2587.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that persons who occupy
the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, are necessarily bound
by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon
demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against them
.HELD: Petition is DENIED.
ACABAL vs. ACABAL
FACTS: Alejandro Acabal and Felicidad Balasabas, owned a
parcel of land situated in Barrio Tanglad, Manjuyod, Negros
Oriental, containing an area of 18.15 hectares more or less,
described in Tax Declaration No. 15856. By a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 6, 1971, his parents transferred for
P2,000.00 ownership of the said land to [Villaner Acabal],
who was then married to Justiniana Lipajan. On April 19,
1990, Villaner executed the deed in question, by which the lot
was transferred to his nephew and godson Leonardo Acabal,
who later sold it to Ramon Nicolas. On October 11, 1993
Villaner filed a case for annulment of the sale to Leonardo
and to Nicolas. Villaner claimed that he did not know the
contents of the deed he signed, which he claimed was a Deed
of Sale (earlier in the proceedings he said it was a Lease
Contract). The RTC dismissed the complaint. Villaner
appealed to the CA, who reversed the RTC and held that the
deed in question was simulated and fictitious. Leonardo and
Ramon thus appealed to the SC on certiorari.
ISSUE:
1) W/N the deed is valid
2) W/N the property in question is conjugal property
HELD/RATIO:
1) YES. The failure to deny the genuineness and due
execution of an actionable document does not preclude a
party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake,
compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel, and
want of consideration. It is a basic rule in evidence that the
burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations.
If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove it by
competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent.
Villaner failed to prove his allegations for he failed to adduce
evidence to support his claims of simulation and lack of
knowledge as to the nature of the deed. Leonardos witness
(the drafter of the actual deed) on the other hand was able to
prove that the deed was duly drafted, read and signed by
Villaner.
Even assuming that the disposition of the property by
Villaner was contrary to law, he would still have no remedy
under the law as he and Leonardo were in pari delicto, hence,
he is not entitled to afirmative relief one who seeks equity
and justice must come to court with clean hands. In pari
delicto potior est conditio defendentis.
2) YES. The issue arose when Villaners co-heirs denied the
validity of the transfer as to their shares because they did not
consent to such transfer. Art. 160 of the Civil Code gives rise
to a presumption that properties acquired during the
marriage are conjugal. In this case it was clear that Villaner
was married when he acquired the land. A tax declaration or
[r]egistration of the properties in the name of the husband
does not destroy the conjugal nature of the properties. What
is material is the time when the land was acquired by Villaner,
and that was during the lawful existence of his marriage to
Justiniana. Upon his wifes death, the conjugal partnership
was dissolved and Villaner became entitled to a undivided
share. The other share accrued to Justinianas heirs: Villaner
and their 8 children. They are now the co-owners of the lot in
question. With respect to Justinianas one-half share in the
conjugal partnership which her heirs inherited, applying the
provisions on the law of succession, her eight children and
Villaner each receives one-ninth (1/9) thereof. Having
inherited one-ninth (1/9) of his wifes share in the conjugal
partnership or one eighteenth (1/18) of the entire conjugal
partnership and is himself already the owner of one half (1/2)
or nine-eighteenths (9/18), Villaners total interest amounts
to ten-eighteenths (10/18) or five-ninths (5/9). While Villaner
owns five-ninths (5/9) of the disputed property, he could not
claim title to any definite portion of the community property
until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior
to partition, all that he has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the property. Villaner, however, as a
co-owner of the property has the right to sell his undivided
share thereof, by virtue of NCC 493; but such sale will only
be valid as to the portion pertaining to Villaner. In effect, the
buyer becomes a co-owner of the property. The proper
action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale
or the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common
from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-
owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the
common property as if it continued to remain in the
possession of the co-owners who possessed and
administered it. The proper action is partition under Rule 69.
The rule in Cruz v. Leis, which held that [w]here a parcel of
land, forming part of the undistributed properties of the
dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to
a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of
title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the
purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the
heirs of the deceased spouse does not apply because the
land subject of that case was unregistered. The issue of good
faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where the subject
of the sale is a registered land but not where the property is
an unregistered land.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
LAVADIA v. COSME
Object of litigation: a gold crown, choker, belt, bracelet,
necklace, all made of gold and encrusted with diamonds and
precious gems in the possession and custody of 6 religious
ladies of the municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna all surnamed
Lavadia. By agreement, they decided to entrust the
safekeeping of the jewelry to Pia Lavadia (depositary). From
Pia, to Paula, to her husband Pedro, to their daughter Paz,
and to her husband Baldomero. Jewelry is kept at a BPI safety
deposit box in the name of Rosario Cosme de Mendoza
(defendant). the 6 ladies used their own money to have the
jewelry made specifically to adorn the image of the Lady of
Guadalupe, the patron saint of the municipality. In effect,
they are the co- owners of the jewelry. Rosario, in her
capacity as administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme,
announced that she would be making a formal delivery of the
jewelry to the Bishop of Lipa, but the plaintiffs objected and
filed a suit to retain possession and custody of the same.
"There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved
by the co- owners who represent the controlling interest in
the object of the co- ownership." In this case, the plaintiffs
constituted the majority, since they represent 4/6 of the
original owners. Defendants only represent 2/6. Thus CFI
ruling that Rosario return the jewelry as an obligation of a
depositary holds.
DOCTRINE:
1. Even among co-owners of a thing, one of them may be the
depository, and when he is, he is subject to the same
obligations imposed by law on all depository with respect to
the preservation of the thing with the care, diligence and
interest of a good father.2. For the administration and better
enjoyment of thing owned in common, according to article
398 of the Civil Code, it is mandatory that there be an
agreement of the majority of the participants (owners).
ISSUES:
1) Whether Ramona was a depositary and therefore obligated
to return the jewelries to the owners even if she is a co-
owner? (YES)
2) Whether the plaintiffs constitute the majority of the co-
owners and therefore can elect who has custody of the
property owned in common? (YES)
3) Whether, assuming that Ramona is a depositary, the
property cannot be withdrawn as she has complied faithfully
in performing their duties as repository? (NO, it can be
withdrawn)
RATIO:
1) The contract which existed between the first owners of the
jewels at issue and the first person who had their custody,
was a contract of deposit.
According to this contract as defined in Articles 1758 and
following the Civil Code, Pia Lavadia first, and afterwards
Paula Lavadia and then her descendants, one being Rosario,
received and possessed, one after the other, the said jewels,
only for purposes of custody or such that they must not use
them for their own benefit.
If it was under a deposit agreement, it is clear that to those
who received the jewelry has an obligation to return them to
their owners as soon as claimed by the latter.
Article 1766 of the Civil Code: "The, depositary is obliged to
keep the thing and restore it, when so requested, to the
depositor, or his successors, or the person who has been
designated in the contract. Their responsibility for the care
and the loss of the thing, is governed by the provisions of title
I of this book. "
The restitution must be made with all the fruits and
accessions of the thing deposited, if any, without it being
given to the depositary who may not withhold, as Sanchez
says Roman, (IV Sanchez Roman, 885), even under the
pretext of obtaining compensation for other credits or
compensated for expenses incurred for preservation.
ROSARIO AND OTHERS: Contract is not that of a deposit
because the jewels cannot be considered as belonging to
other persons with respect to Rosario as she is also a co-
owner as descendant of one of its early owners.
SC:The first owners of the jewelry concerned who came to
entrust the custody of the same to some of them, expressly
reserved them to their property
.Even among co-owners of a thing, one of them may be the
depository, and thus it is subject to the same obligations
imposed by law on all depository with respect to the
conservation of the thing with the care, diligence and interest
of a good father.
"Joint owner. The fact that the depositary is a joint owner of
the res does not alter the degree of diligence required of
him." (C. J. 18, 570).
2) Appellees are owners of said fourth-sixths of jewelry, and
appellants only own the remaining portion (2/6). Therefore,
EngraciaLavadia must have the custody and administration of
constituting the majority of the primitive owners
As there is no evidence of the contribution of the six
primitive owners in the making or acquisition of the jewels
often mentioned in the same proportion, the conclusion, as
reasonable as it is - and this is supported by a presumption of
law (Art. 393, Civil Code) -is that the cost is the same and as
such the portions corresponding to the participants of the
community shall be presumed of an equal share.
For the administration and better enjoyment of thing
owned in common, according to article 398 of the Civil Code,
it is mandatory that there be an agreement of the majority of
the participants 3) The deposit agreement is such that allows
the depositor to withdraw from the depository, the thing
deposited, any time he wanted, especially, when the latter, as
in the case of Rosario Cosme Mendoza, has executed an act
against the order received intrying to entrust to another's
custody and administration the thing deposited, on their own
without the consent of depositors or their heirs.
MELENCIO vs. DY TIAO LAY
Parcel of land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija was originally
owned by one Julain Melencio who died before the 1905,
leaving his widow Ruperta Garcia and 5 children. Ruperta
held nothing but a widow's usufruct in the land. Contract of
lease in favor of Yap Kui Chin. Term of Lease: 20 years, for the
establishment of a rice mill with necessary buildings for
warehouses and quarters for employees. Document
evidencing lease acknowledged but never recorded with the
Register of Deeds. Lessee took possession of the land and
erected the mill and other necessary buildings. lease was
transferred to Uy Eng Jui who transferred it to Uy Eng Jui &
Co.(unregistered partnership); until the lease finally came to
Dy Tiao Lay. Land was registered under the Torrens system in
1913 but the lease was not mentioned in the title, though it
was mentioned that one house and 3 warehouses were
owned by Yap Kui Chin. 1920 - heirs of Julian Melencio made
an extrajudicial partition of parts of the inheritance. After
Mrs. Macapagal, wife of one the heirs of Julian, Ramon,
demanded an increase of the lease from P20 per mo. to
P300/mo., she was informed by Dy Tiao Lay that a written
lease existed and that according to its terms, Dy Tiao was
entitled to an extension of the lease at the original rental.
Plaintiffs insisted they had no knowledge of it and in such
case the lease was executed without their consent and was
thus void.
The power of the majority (of co-owners of an indivisible
property) would be confied to decisions touching the
management and enjoyment of the common property and
would not include acts of ownership, such as a lease of 12
years w/c gives rise to a real right, which must be recorded
and which can be performed only by owners of the property
leased. Where the contract of lease may give rise to a real
right in favor of the lessee (constituting a sundering of the
ownership which transcends mere management) then the
part owners representing the greater portion of the property
held in common have no power to lease the property for a
period longer than 6 years w/o the consent of all co-owners.
In this case, the fact that the lease was for 20 years
amounted to an act of rigorous alienation and NOT a mere
act of management, thus necessitation the consent of ALL co-
owners.
MARIANO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 101522
Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner within the
redemption period does not terminate the co-ownership and
does not vest in him sole ownership.
FACTS: Francisco Gosiengfaio is the registered owner of a
parcel of land in Tuguegarao. In his lifetime, he mortgaged
the land to Rural Bank of Tuguegarao to secure payment of a
loan. Francisco died in without paying the debt. His intestate
heirs were: his wife Antonia and children Amparo, Carlos,
Severo, Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina, and
Jacinto.
The bank foreclosed on the mortgage but before the
redemption period expired, Antonia, Emma, Lina, Norma,
Lina, Carlos and Severo executed a deed of assignment of the
right of redemption in favor of Amparo. Amparo later on sold
the land to Spouses Mariano.
Grace Gosengfiao, and the other heirs excuded in the deed of
assignment filed a complaint for recovery and legal
redemption with damages against spouses Mariano.
RTC decided in favor of spouses Mariano. CA for Grace
Gosiengfia, et. al.
ISSUE: Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole
property with her own personal funds becomes the sole
owner of said property and terminates the existing state of
co-ownership?
HELD: No. Admittedly, as the property in question was
mortgaged by the decedent, a co-ownership existed among
the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the
foreclosed property. Redemption of the whole property by a
co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership over said
property but will inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In
other words, it will not end to the existing state of co-
ownership. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-
ownership.
Respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the
absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors,
the 30-day period has not even begun to run.
RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ
FACTS: Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his
widow Marcelle Ramirez, a French. In the project partition,
the property was divided into 2 parts: 1st part to the widow,
and 2nd part to the grandnephews the naked ownership.
Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2nd part, 1/3 was
given to the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an
Austrian. The grandnephews opposed on the ground that
usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the
constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by
aliens.
ISSUE: WON the ground for the opposition is correct.
HELD: No, it is not correct. The SC held that the Constitutional
provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does
not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the
prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. The SC upheld
the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real
right, it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and
it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.
AGUILAR v. CA- Co-ownership
Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and
lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand;
thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally
according to their respective interests.
FACTS: Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a
house and lot in Paraaque where their father could spend
and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood.
They initially agreed that Vergilio will get 2/3 and Senen will
get 1/3; but later they agreed on equal shares. Senen was left
in the said lot to take care of their father since Vergilios
family was in Cebu. After their fathers death petitioner
demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the
house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof
divided among them but the latter refused. Petitioner then
filed to compel the sale of the property. The chunk of the
issue tackled by the courts was regarding the pre-trial.
Respondent filed a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the
counsel had to accompany his wife in Dumaguete City where
she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding. CFI denied the
motion; and the pre-trial proceeded on the scheduled date.
The respondents did not appear thus they were declared in
default. The trial went on ex parte without the respondent
and held that the property should be sold to a third party and
that the proceeds be distributed to the parties; in addition
respondent was made to pay rent from the time the action
was filed. Respondents appealed this and the decision was
reversed by the CA saying that the TC erred in declaring
respondents in default; the case was then remanded to the
trial court. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
A) W/N CA erred (1) in holding that the motion of respondent
through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory in
character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court for
pre-trial and trial?
ISSUE RELEVANT TO PROPERTY:
B) W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and
rent?
RULING: A) YES, CA erred in granting the respondents motion
and remanding the case. The law is clear that the appearance
of parties at the pretrial is mandatory. A party who fails to
appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or
considered as in default. It is the discretion of the court to
grant the motion if it sees that the reason for the cancelation
of the same would be reasonable. SC found that the reason
for the cancelation of the pre-trial was insufficient and that
the trial court was not in grave abuse of discretion when they
denied it.
B) YES, with a few modification. Petitioner and respondents
are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares; either
one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any
time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter
the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to
their respective interests.
BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner
shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each
co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing
owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary
to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the
thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree
that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the
others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed.
SC held that of the proceeds should go to the petitioner
and the remainder to the respondent (1,200 each.) Also rent
was awarded 1,200 pesos per month with legal interest from
the time the trial court ordered the respondent to vacate, for
the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property.
BASIS: When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of
the property and the trial court granted the petition and
ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was
deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession
jointly also ceased.
456 SCRA 193 Civil Law Law on Sales Elements of a
Contract of Sale Consent Vitiated
Cleopas Ape died in 1950 and left a parcel of land (Lot 2319)
to his 11 children. The children never formally divided the
property amongst themselves except through hantal-hantal
whereby each just occupied a certain portion and developed
each.
On the other hand, the spouses Lumayno were interested in
the land so they started buying the portion of land that each
of the heirs occupied. On 11 Apr 1973, one of the children,
Fortunato, entered into a contract of sale with Lumayno. In
exchange of his lot, Lumayno agreed to pay P5,000.00. She
paid in advance P30.00. Fortunato was given a receipt
prepared by Lumaynos son in law (Andres Flores). Flores also
acted as witness. Lumayno also executed sales transactions
with Fortunatos siblings separately.
In 1973, Lumayno compelled Fortunato to make the the
delivery to her of the registrable deed of sale over Fortunatos
portion of the Lot No. 2319. Fortunato assailed the validity of
the contract of sale. He also invoked his right to redeem (as a
co-owner) the portions of land sold by his siblings to Lumayno.
Fortunato died during the pendency of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid contract of sale?
HELD: No. Fortunato was a no read no write person. It was
incumbent for the the other party to prove that details of the
contract was fully explained to Fortunato before Fortunato
signed the receipt.
A contract of sale is a consensual contract, thus, it is perfected
by mere consent of the parties. It is born from the moment
there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object
of the sale and upon the price. Upon its perfection, the parties
may reciprocally demand performance, that is, the vendee
may compel the transfer of the ownership and to deliver the
object of the sale while the vendor may demand the vendee to
pay the thing sold. For there to be a perfected contract of
sale, however, the following elements must be present:
consent, object, and price in money or its equivalent.

For consent to be valid, it must meet the following requisites:

(a) it should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the

matter to which it refers; (b) it should be free and (c) it should
be spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error;
freedom by violence, intimidation or undue influence;
spontaneity by fraud.

Lumayno claimed that she explained fully the receipt to

Fortunato, but Flores testimony belies it. Flores said there
was another witness but the other was a maid who also
lacked education. Further, Flores himself was not aware that
the receipt was to transfer the ownership of Fortunatos land
to her mom-in-law. It merely occurred to him to explain the
details of the receipt but he never did.