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Case Digest: MAMBA vs LARA
MAMBA, ET AL. VS. LARA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 165109, December 14,2009

Doctrine:

Decision to entertain a taxpayers suit is discretionary upon the Court. When

the issue hinges on the illegal disbursement of public funds, a liberal approach should
be preferred as it is more in keeping with truth and justice.

Facts:

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed a resolution authorizing

Governor Edgar R. Lara to engage the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures
Corporation as financial advisor or consultant for the issuance and flotation of bonds to
fund the priority projects of the governor without cost and commitment. It also ratified
the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered into by Gov. Lara and Preferred
Ventures Corporation which provides that the provincial government of Cagayan shall
pay Preferred Ventures Corporation a one-time fee of 3% of the amount of bonds
floated. In addition, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, authorized Gov. Lara to negotiate,
sign and execute contracts or agreements pertinent to the flotation of the bonds of the
provincial government in an amount not to exceed P500 million for the construction
and improvement of his priority projects, including the construction of the New
Cagayan Town Center, to be approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Subsequently,
Lara issued the Notice of Award to Asset Builders Corporation, giving to the latter the
planning, design, construction and site development of the town center project.

Petitioners Manuel N. Mamba, Raymund P. Guzman and Leonides N. Fausto filed a

Petition for Annulment of Contracts and Injunction with prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the respondents (Gov. Lara et
al.). The RTC, however, dismissed their petition on the grounds that the (1) petitioners
have no locus standi to file a case as they are not party to the contract and (2) that the
controversy is in the nature of a political question, thus, the court cant take cognizance
of it.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi to sue as taxpayers

Whether or not the controversy is in the nature of a political question

Ruling:

Yes, the petitioners have legal standing to sue as taxpayers.

No, the controversy is not a political question but a justiciable one.

Ratio Decidendi:

A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.

For a taxpayers suit to prosper, two requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived
from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so,
a law is violated or some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly
affected by the alleged act.

In the case at bar, although the construction of the town center would be primarily
sourced from the proceeds of the bonds, which respondents insist are not taxpayers
money, a government support in the amount of P187 million would still be spent for
paying the interest of the bonds. The governor requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
to appropriate an amount of P25 million for the interest of the bond. So clearly, the first
requisite has been met.

As to the second requisite, the Supreme Court explained that the court, in recent cases,
has relaxed the stringent direct injury test bearing in mind that locus standi is a
procedural technicality. By invoking transcendental importance, paramount public
interest, or far-reaching implications, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
sue even if they failed to show direct injury. In cases where serious legal issues were
raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the court did not
hesitate to give standing to taxpayers.

It argued that, to protect the interest of the people and to prevent taxes from being
squandered or wasted under the guise of government projects, a liberal approach must
be adopted in determining locus standi in public suits.
A political question is a question of policy, which is to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity or by the legislative or the executive branch of the government to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated. A justiciable question on the other
hand, calls upon the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies wherein there are
rights involved which are legally demandable and enforceable. It is one which is proper
to be examined or decided in courts of justice because its determination would not
involve an encroachment upon the legislative or executive power. In simple terms, a
political question refers to the wisdom, while a justiciable question refers to the legality
of the acts complained of.

In the case at bar, the issues raised in the petition do not refer to the wisdom but to the
legality of the acts complained of. Thus, the Supreme Court found the instant
controversy within the ambit of judicial review.

Also, in the present case, petitioners alleged grave abuse of discretion and clear
violations of law by public respondents. They put in issue the overpriced construction of
the town center; the grossly disadvantageous bond flotation; the irrevocable assignment
of the provincial governments annual regular income, including the IRA, to respondent
RCBC to cover and secure the payment of the bonds floated; and the lack of consultation
and discussion with the community regarding the proposed project, as well as a proper
and legitimate bidding for the construction of the town center.

Thus, the high court said that, even if the issues were political in nature, it would still
come within their powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
them by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which includes the authority to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.

see full text here

By nejadzinin CASE DIGESTS, JurisdictionFebruary 8, 2016980 WordsLeave a

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Case Digest: MULLER

vs MULLER
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY; MULLER VS.
MULLER

G.R. No. 149615, August 29,2006

Doctrine:
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands.

Facts:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house
owned by respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from
his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in
Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner, Elena
Buenaventura Muller.

Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and

maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.

On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It also decreed
the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title
during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was
acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent
cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7,
Article XII of the Constitution.

The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of
the RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of
the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered
the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the
acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the
house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.

Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

Ruling:

No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.

Ratio Decidendi:

There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.

Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put
the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the
fundamental law bars him to do directly.

With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.

see full text here

By nejadzinin CASE DIGESTS, JurisdictionFebruary 8, 2016498 WordsLeave a
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REPUBLIC vs ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

This is a case of MARRIAGE FOR CONVENIENCE.

FACTS

Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She later on
filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really
had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations. She said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof,
she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went
their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because
he never processed her petition for citizenship. She described their marriage as one
made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

The RTC ruled in her favor.

In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means
for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the
RTC decision.

Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.
It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting
married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a
marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to
enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family.

The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and void.

RULING:

No, respondents marriage is not void.

The court said:

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there
was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature
and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such
plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with
the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

The court also explained that There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social

institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This
Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits
the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
see full text here
By nejadzinin CASE DIGESTSDecember 4, 2015700 WordsLeave a comment

CLU vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent

G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991

FACTS:

The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order
No. 284 issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino.

The petitioners alleged that Section 1, 2 and 3 of EO 284 contravenes the provision
of Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

The assailed provisions of EO 284 are as follows:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive

officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive
the corresponding compensation therefor.

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they
must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in
rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his
primary position.

Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either
be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, meanwhile, states that:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION: EO 284 adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article

VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are
those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President (may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII: The
Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment
requires no confirmation.) and the secretary of justice (as an ex-officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII: A Judicial and
Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.)

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional

HELD: Yes. EO 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The court said, by allowing Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries

to hold at least two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment which is a direct
contravention of the express mandate of Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution
itself.

The explained that the phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be
given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
constitution itself which are Section 3 of Article VII (for VP) and Section 8 of Article VIII
(for Secretary of Justice).

Thus, the PETITION is GRANTED.

see full text here

By nejadzinin CASE DIGESTSLinkNovember 18, 2015Leave a comment

DAVID vs CA
JOAQUIN E. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents

G.R. Nos. 111168-69. June 17, 1998

FACTS:

Herein petitioner Joaquin E. David was charged with homicide and frustrated homicide
for the fatal shooting of Noel Nora and the serious wounding of the latters brother,
Narciso Nora, Jr., on March 28, 1981, in Malabon, Metro Manila.

The antecedent facts of the event are as follows:

On March 28, 1981, at about 10:00 p.m., while the Nora brothers Arturo, Arnel,
Noel and Narciso were walking along Flerida Street in Malabon, they saw petitioner
near the compound of his house.
Noel Nora, the deceased, confronted him about derogatory remarks allegedly made
by the latter. Petitioner ran to his house to get a gun.
When the Nora brothers reached the intersection of Flerida and Capitan Tiago
Streets, he shouted at them Putang ina ninyo (You sons of a bitch) and other
epithets, and then fired four times at them. One shot hit Noel, killing him. Another
shot hit Narciso Nora on the ankle. Another nearly hit the zipper of Arturo Nora.
Petitioner claimed self-defense. He alleged that on the night in question, he went to
the corner of Flerida and Capitan Tiago Streets because Noel Nora had earlier
challenged him to a fight. However, upon reaching the place, he found that Noel
had brought along his three (3) brothers and other companions who ganged up on
him.

The Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
and Frustrated Homicide without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in both
cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its decision rendered on October 29, 1992, modified
the sentence after crediting petitioner with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. Then on July 29, 1992, the appellate court further modified the sentence on
petitioner on the ground that the evidence did not show that he had a police record or
that he was incorrigible.

The claim of self-defense was denied by the court. However, the court pointed out one
circumstance not raised by the defense but evident from the record of this case
minority.

In his statement to the police given on April 2, 1981, petitioner gave his personal
circumstances as follows: Joaquin David y Ejercito, 17 taong gulang, 2nd year college,
binata at naninirahan sa 12-C Flerida St., Acacia, Malabon, Metro Manila. At the
hearing on November 11, 1987, petitioners mother stated that he was 16 or 17 years old
when the shooting incident happened.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of minority is applicable in the case at bar
RULING:

Yes, herein petitioner is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.

The court said, It is clear that on March 28, 1981, when the crime was committed, he
(the petitioner) was only 17 years old.

According to the court, if the accused alleges minority and the prosecution does not
disprove his claim by contrary evidence, such allegation can be accepted as a fact. And
that any doubt in respect of the accused is resolved in his favor.

see full text here

By nejadzinin CASE DIGESTSNovember 18, 2015497 WordsLeave a comment

MENDOZA vs PEOPLE
DANILO DANNY MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

G.R. NO. 139759, January 14, 2005

FACTS:

The trial court convicted accused Danilo Mendoza, petitioner herein, for homicide
wherein the victim was Alfonso Nisperos. Petitioner does not seek acquittal but merely
prays that the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense be
considered in his favor.

Herein petitioner narrated the antecedent facts as follows:

That during a drinking spree, he had an altercation with a certain Willy Baluyot.
Feeling bad, he slammed the table with a pitcher containing water. Then he left.
At a distance, he heard the victim calling him. When they were close to each other,
the victim blamed him for his conduct. He apologized but the victim started
stabbing him with a knife.
He tried to parry the attack as he retreated. That moment, his back was against the
wall. He then grappled for the knife which he was able to wrench from the victim.
They rolled over on the ground. At that point, he repeatedly stabbed the victim with
his own knife.

On the other the hand, the prosecution, to prove that the petitioner was the aggressor
presented Loreta Nisperos, mother of the victim.

Loreta said:

Alfonso Nisperos, stepped out of their house. When he returned, he told her that he
saw a person near their cow tied to a tamarind tree.
 Alfonso then went out again to check on the person he saw. After a short while,
Loreta suddenly heard Alfonso screaming Mother, help me!
She rushed to her son. She found him lying, face down, with petitioner on top of
him, stabbing him with a knife.
She then approached petitioner, pleading to him not to kill her son. But instead of
heeding her plea, he suddenly attacked her with his knife, hitting her right arm.
Petitioner then dashed away from the scene.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of

incomplete self-defense

RULING:

No, the petitioner cannot be accorded with privileged mitigating circumstance of

incomplete self-defense.

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim should be clearly established to make the
claim of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, acceptable.

In the case at bar, the court found that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. This element being absent, petitioner cannot be accorded the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.

see full text here

By nejadzinin CASE DIGESTSNovember 18, 2015400 WordsLeave a comment

Case Digest: CSC vs SOJOR

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. HENRY A. SOJOR, respondent

554 SCRA 160, May 22, 2008

FACTS:

Herein respondent, Henry Sojor, president of Negros Oriental State University

(formerly known as Central Visayas Polytechnic College) was charged of nepotism,
dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service before the Civil Service Commission.

Herein petitioner moved to dismiss these cases on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.
Academic freedom was also invoked.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a president of a State University is outside the reach of the

disciplinary jurisdiction constitutionally granted to the Civil Service Commission
2. Whether or not the assumption by the Civil Service Commission of jurisdiction over
a president of a State University violate academic freedom

RULING:

1. No, the president of a State University is still within the reach of the disciplinary
jurisdiction constitutionally granted to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

As explained by the court, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law,

the CSC shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters
relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees.

In the case at bar, it is clear that while the Board of Regents (BOT) of the Negros
Oriental State University (NORSU) has the sole power of administration over the
university, such power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its
employees. Instead, such power is concurrent between the BOT and the CSC.

Hence, herein respondent Henry Sojor, the president of NORSU, is within the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC.

2. No, the assumption by the CSC of jurisdiction over a president of a State University
does not violate academic freedom.

While it is certain that academic institutions and personnel are granted with wide
latitude of academic freedom, such freedom does not give an institution the unbridled
authority to perform acts without any statutory basis. For that reason, as the court
explained in its ruling, a school official, who is a member of the civil service, may not be
permitted to commit violations of civil service rules under the justification that he was
free to do so under the principle of academic freedom.

In the case at bar, the respondent is facing charges of grave offenses punishable with
suspension or even dismissal. And evidently, these cases have not been acted upon by
the university officials based on the re-appointment they have given to respondent. And
according to the law, in complaints against civil service officials and employees which
are not acted upon by the agencies and such other complaints requiring direct or
immediate action, in the interest of justice the CSC may take over.

Hence, the assumption of the CSC of jurisdiction over herein respondent State
University president is only deemed proper and not in violation of academic freedom.