74. Vda. De Medina v. Cresencia, G.R. No.

L-8194, July 11, 1956

Facts:
A passenger jeep driven by Brigido Avorque smashed into a Meralco post on
Azcarraga street, resulting in the death of Vicente Medina (passenger). A criminal
case for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against driver to which he
pleaded guilty on Sept. 9, 1953.Heirs of Medina reserved their right to file a
separate action for dmgs and brought suit on June 16, 1953 against driver and
Cresencia (registered owner and operator of jeep). Cresencia disclaimed liability
saying that he had sold the jeep in question to Cudiamat (and that there were
many subsequent sales after that until it was purchased in 1953 by
RosarioAvorque). The complaint was amended to include Rosario who admitted to
buying the jeep but denied being the public utility operator of the same. C & R
made manifestations admitting that based on the records of the Motor Vehicles
Office and Public Service Commission, Cresencia was still the registered operator
of the jeep while Rosario was the owner at the time of the accident. The lower
court held that as far as the public is concerned, Cresencia is still the owner and is
liable solidarily with Brigido.
Awarded 6k compensatory dmgs , 30k moral dmgs, 10k exemplary dmgs, 10k nominal
dmgs
, 5k attys fees and costs. Rosario is absolved from liability. From this judgment,
defendant Cresencia appealed.

Issues:

Who is the liable with Brigido (Cresencia or Rosario)? Cresencia

What is the basis of the liability? Culpa contractual

WoN the award of Nominal damages was proper. NO. Nominal damages deleted. Decision
affirmed.

ratio
With regard to ownership of the jeep:
As held in the case of Montoya v Ignacio : Sec. 20 (g) CA No. 146 as amended,
requires approval of the Public Service Commission (PSC) in order a franchise/any
privilege pertaining thereto may be sold/leased without infringing the certificate
issued to the grantee. This means that:

(1) if property covered by the franchise is transferred/leased without this requisite approval,
the transfer isnt binding against the public or the PSC; and

(2) in contemplation of law the grantee of record continues to be responsible under the
franchise in relation to the Commission and to the public.
Since the sale of the jeepney was without the approval of PSC, Cresencia being the registered
owner and operator, is correctly held liable.

With regard to the basis of liability Cresencia:

The basis of the action is ERs subsidiary liability under the RPC for dmgs arising
from EEs criminal acts. Since Rosario admitted that she is the employer, she should be the
one subsidiarily liable for Brigidos acts.

SC:
The basis for the action isnt ERs subsidiary liability but on a breach of the carriers contractual
obligation to carry its passengers safely to their destination. Since the liability for
culpa contractual is direct and immediate, theres no need to prove Brigidos
insolvency before damages can be recovered from Cresencia.

With regard to Nominal Damages

While the award is not questioned, the Court said that the award of nominal damages
in this case is untenable since the same cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.
The purpose for nominal damages is to vindicate or recognize a rightthat has been
violated and not to indemnify the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him (Art 2221,
2223 NCC). Since the LC already awarded compensatory and exemplary damages,
the award for nominal damages is unnecessary and improper.

75. Equitable PCI Bank v. Tan, G.R. No. 165339, August 23, 2010

FACTS: Respondent Arcelito B.Tan maintained a current and savings account with EPCI.
Respondent issued a postdated check in favor of Sulpicio (Check No.275100) which the latter
deposited to formers account with Solid Bank. The same was debited by petitioner from
respondents account. Meanwhile, respondent issued three checks to ASELCO and ANECO
which were both dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds. As a result, the electric
power supply for the two mini-sawmills owned and operated by respondent were cut off and
restored only months later. Respondent filed with the RTC a complaint against petitioner,
praying for payment of losses consisting of unrealized income in the amount of P1,864,500.00.
He also prayed for payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
litigation expenses. Respondent claimed that Check No. 275100 was a postdated check and that
his account with petitioner would have had sufficient funds to cover payment of the three
other checks were it not for the negligence of petitioner in immediately debiting from his
account. RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed the
decision and directed petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P1,864,500.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 by way of moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and
attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in awarding actual damages, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.
 RULING:
Actual damages respondent is DELETED. Instead, EPCI directed to pay respondent the amount
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as temperate damages.
The bank's negligence was the result of lack of due care required of its managers and
employees in handling the accounts of its clients. Petitioner was negligent in the selection and
supervision of its employees.
Aside from the purchase orders and his testimony, respondent failed to present
competent proof on the specific amount of actual damages he suffered during the entire period
his power was cut off. No other evidence was provided by respondent to show that the
foregoing purchase orders were not met or were canceled by his various customers. The Court
cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the amount
of damages. The Court resolves to delete the award of actual damages rendered by the CA in
favor of respondent for his unrealized income.
The allowance of temperate damages when actual damages were not adequately
proven is ultimately a rule drawn from equity, the principle affording relief to those definitely
injured who are unable to prove how definite the injury.
Anent the award of moral damages, it is settled that moral damages are meant to
compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries
unjustly caused. The unexpected cutting off of respondent's electricity, which resulted in the
stoppage of his business operations, had caused him to suffer humiliation, mental anguish and
serious anxiety. The award of P50,000.00 is reasonable, considering the reputation and social
standing of respondent.
The law allows the grant of exemplary damages to set an example for the public
good. The banking system has become an indispensable institution in the modern world and
plays a vital role in the economic life of every civilized society. The highest degree of diligence is
expected, and high standards of integrity and performance are even required of it. Petitioner,
having failed in this respect, the award of exemplary damages in the amount ofP50,000.00 is in
order.
As to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides, among
others, that attorney's fees may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded or when
the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest. Respondent has been forced to undergo unnecessary
trouble and expense to protect his interest. The Court affirms the appellate courts award of
attorneys fees in the amount of P30,000.00.

76. People v. Murcia, G.R. No. 182460, March 9, 2010

FACTS: The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson and frustrated
homicide. The houses of Eulogio and his neighbors were razed by fire and the commission of the
crime of arson resulted in the demise of Felicidad whose remains were burned beyond
recognition. The accused is sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death; to indemnify the
heirs of the victim Felicidad Quilates, the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages;
Php50,000.00 as death indemnity; Php10,000.00 as actual damages and another Php10,000.00
as temperate damages. Further, the accused is ordered to indemnify Eulogio Quilates the
amount of P250,000.00, representing the value of the burned house.

In view of the penalty imposed, the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic
review and judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts findings but reduced the
penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in awarding actual damages to the heirs of Felicidad.

RULING: Yes.

A close examination of the records, as well as description of the crime as stated in the
information, reveals that the crime committed is in fact simple arson because the burned
properties are residential houses.

This Court, however, takes exception to the trial courts award of damages.

Anent the actual damages awarded to Eulogio amounting to P250,000.00, as

indemnification for the burned house, We note that said amount representing the value of the
burned house was merely given by Eulogio as an estimate. It was not substantiated by any
document or receipt. For one to be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the
actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof
and the best evidence obtainable by the injured party.

Instead, We award temperate damages in accordance with Art. 2224 of the Civil Code,
providing that temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with
certainty. It is thus reasonable to expect that the value of the house burned down amounted to
at least P200,000.00.

77. People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010

FACTS: The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, frustrated
murder and three (3) counts of attempted murder. The appellant filed an appeal before CA. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 62) in Criminal Case No. 03-3639 for
murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. The award of actual
damages in favor of the heirs of Leo Salvador E. Regis is reduced to P42,337.25. Moral damages
of P50,000.00, temperate damages of P10,000.00, and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 are
additionally awarded to the heirs of Leo Salvador E. Regis. which affirmed the decision of the
RTC with modification as to the award of damages.

ISSUE: W/N the award of damages is proper under the circumstances.

RULING: Damages awarded are affirmed with modifications. When death occurs due to a crime,
the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2)
actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.

The CA awarded P42,337.25 as actual damages and P10,000.00 as temperate damages to the
heirs of Regis. In People v. Villanueva and People v. Abrazaldo, we ruled that temperate and
actual damages are mutually exclusive in that both may not be awarded at the same time.
Hence, no temperate damages may be awarded if actual damages have already been granted.
The award of P10,000.00 as temperate damages must, therefore, be deleted.

The grant of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages is proper, and
thus, we sustain the same. In murder, the grant of civil indemnity, which has been fixed by
jurisprudence at P50,000.00, requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the
crime and proof of the accused's responsibility therefor. Moral damages, on the other hand, are
awarded in view of the violent death of the victim. There is no need for any allegation or proof
of the emotional sufferings of the heirs.

Likewise, the award of exemplary damages is warranted when the commission of the offense is
attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, as in this case.
Accordingly, we sustain the CAs award of exemplary damages to the heirs of Regis, but we
increase the award to P30,000.00.

Similarly, we affirm the award of P22,596.50 as actual damages to Dalit, who is, likewise,
entitled to moral damages, which this Court fixes in the amount of P40,000.00. Ordinary human
experience and common sense dictate that the wounds inflicted on the surviving victims would
naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injuries.
Finally, the award in the amount of P20,000.00, as exemplary damages to Dalit, is also in order
considering that the crime was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

78. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584 (1999)

FACTS:
 June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust woman underwent on an
operation to the stone at her gall bladder removed after being tested that she was fit
for "cholecystectomy" operation performed by Dr. Orlino Hozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee
of P16,000.00, which was to include the anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid
after the operation. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, husband that he will get a
good anesthesiologist who was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda's hand was held
by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the
Capitol Medical Center together with her husband went down with her to the operating
room.
Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15 P.M.
Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing, saw the nailbed of Erlinda
becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon.
She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that something is wrong.
When she went back she saw Erlinda in a trendelenburg position and at 3 p.m. she was
taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) where she stayed for a month due to bronchospasm
incurring P93,542.25 and she was since then comatosed.
She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five
minutes.
She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage"
Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000
Spouses Ramos and their minors filed against Dr. Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez
RTC: favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly expenses totalling
to P632,000 as of April 15, 1992, P100,000 atty. fees, P800,000 moral
damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of suit
CA: reversed ordering the Ramos' to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus interest
ISSUE: W/N the Ramos' are entitled to damages

HELD: YES. CA modified in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the
following: 1) P1,352,000 actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation plus a
monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or
miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000 moral damages, 3) P1,500,000 temperate damages; 4)
P100,000 exemplary damages and P100,000 attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law
since it is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a
matter of law, permit a given inference.
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical
testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence -
applicable in this case
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon
which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment
As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient
according to witness Herminda
With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied with her testimony
 Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled
operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the
subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized
authorities on the subject or by practical experience.
Dr. Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated that oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic
encephalopathy was due to an unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate
was not accepted as expert opinion
Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not
determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols
Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as
Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation.
Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the
anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his
patient
private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
"consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which
respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the
control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages
in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature
of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are
provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home
without the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the
circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be
reasonable.
the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be
permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would
normally undergo through the years.
Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been in a
comatose state for over fourteen years now
Ramos' are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's
moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. Award of P2,000,000 in moral
damages would be appropriate.
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby
awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that
attorney's fees valued at P100,000 are likewise proper.
79. Azcuna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116665, March 20, 1996

FACTS: Under a one (1) year lease contract commencing on July 1, 1992 and ending on June 30,
1993 but renewable upon agreement, herein petitioner Azcuna, Jr., as lessee, occupied three
(3) units (C, E and F) of the building owned by private respondent Barcelona's family. Came
expiration date of the lease without an agreed renewal thereof and coupled by petitioner's
failure to surrender the leased units despite private respondent's demands, private respondent
filed before the Municipal Trial Court an ejectment case against petitioner. Judgment of that
inferior court, affirmed in its entirety by the Regional Trial Court and herein public respondent
Court of Appeals on subsequent appeals taken by petitioner, favored private respondent.
Petitioner now comes to the Court via the instant petition not to contest his ouster from
the leased premises nor the amount monthly rental he was adjudged to pay until he vacates
the same, but only to take particular exception to respondent CA's decision insofar as it
affirmed the municipal trial court's award of P3,000.00 per day as damages.

ISSUE: W/N the municipal trial courts award of P3,000 per day damages is proper.

RULING: YES.
The municipal trial court, in making the "P3,000.00 per day" award, was merely enforcing what
was stipulated upon in black and white by private respondent-lessor and petitioner-lessee
appearing in paragraph 10 of the lease contract.

This is clearly an agreement for liquidated damages entitling private respondent to claim a
stipulated amount by way of damages (correctly totalling P3,000.00 per day as there were
three (3) units being leased by petitioner) over and above other damages still legally due
him, i.e., the fair rental value for the use and occupation of the property as provided for in
Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The freedom of the contracting parties to make
stipulations in their contract provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy is so settled, and the Court finds nothing immoral or illegal with the
indemnity/penalty clause of the lease contract (paragraph 10) which does not appear to have
been forced upon or fraudulently foisted on petitioner. Petitioner cannot now evade further
liability for liquidated damages, for "after entering into such an agreement, petitioner cannot
thereafter turn his back on his word with a plea that on him was inflicted a penalty shocking to
the conscience and impressed with iniquity as to call for the relief sought on the part of a judicial
tribunal.

80. Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138980, September 20, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner awarded to respondent Pacific Equipment Corp (Pecorp) development of its
residential subdivisions, a contract amounting to P12,470,000.00. Pecorp posted two surety
bonds to guarantee faithful compliance. Both agreed that liquidated damages of P15,000/day
shall be paid by Pecorp in case of delay. Petitioner claimed that Pecorp failed to complete the
works (94.53%) and claims for damages. Pecorp on the other hand contended that their work
stopped due to failure of petitioner to pay for certain completed portion. RTC assigned a
commissioner to evaluate the claims and counter-claims. The total amount due to Pecorp was
computed to be P1,881,867.66. Petitioner claimed that liquidated damages amounted to
P3,990,000.00 Both claims and counter-claims were dismissed. Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling of RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty (liquidated damages) of P15,000.00 per day of delay shall be
binding upon mutual agreement of parties.
RULING:
NO. As a general rule, courts are not at liberty to ignore the freedom of the parties to agree on
such terms and conditions as they see fit as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the
principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there
has been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable (Art.1229, NCC). A penalty interest of P15,000.00 per day of delay as liquidated
damages or P3,990,000.00 (representing 32% penalty of the P12,470,000.00 contract price) is
unconscionable considering that the construction was already not far from completion.

81. Development Bank of the Philippines v. Family Foods Manufacturing Co., Ltd., G.R. No.
180458, July 30, 2009

FACTS: Respondent obtained an industrial loan from DBP. The loan was evidenced by a
promissory note and secured by real estate and chattel mortgage. Respondent failed to pay.
DBP filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage and set a public auction. The sale
proceeded as scheduled and the properties were awarded to DBP as the highest bidder. A
certificate of sale was issued and registered with the ROD. Respondent filed a suit for
annulment of sale and claimed that the imposed interest and other charges in excess of those
provided in the promissory note and in the real estate and chattel mortgages, unnecessarily
increased their outstanding obligation. RTC dismissed the complaint. Respondents appealed to
the CA which modified the RTC decision. upholding the validity of the auction sale, the CA
reduced the interest rates and penalty charges stipulated in the two (2) promissory notes for
being iniquitous and unconscionable. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the stipulate penalty charge and interest rates are reasonable.

RULING: NO. The 18% and 22% stipulated rates of interest in the two (2) promissory notes are
not unconscionable or excessive, contrary to the CA ruling.
This Court has recognized a penalty clause as an accessory obligation which the parties attach
to a principal obligation for the purpose of insuring the performance thereof by imposing on
the debtor a special prestation (generally consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in
case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately fulfilled. The enforcement
of the penalty can be demanded by the creditor only when the non-performance is due to the
fault or fraud of the debtor. The non-performance gives rise to the presumption of fault; in
order to avoid the payment of the penalty, the debtor has the burden of proving an excuse
the failure of the performance was due to either force majeure or the acts of the creditor
himself.[25]

In this case, respondents failed to discharge the burden. Thus, they cannot avoid the payment
of the agreed penalty charge.

82. Makabali v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46877, January 22, 1988

FACTS: Petitioner Georgina was given a graduation gift by her father a trip to Hongkong. She
was to be accompanied by her sister. An advertisement of private respondent offering a package
tour to Hongkong caught the attention of petitioner Georgin. In response to her inquiry, private
respondent sent her the literature pertaining to its Hongkong package tour together with the time
schedule, description of the tour, tour conditions and brochure. The petitioners accepted the offer.
However, on departure date, they met neither private respondents tour group nor its representative.
When they were paged through the public address system to board their plane for Hongkong, they
had no choice but to do so without receiving any instructions from private respondent's
representative. It was only at 9:00 in the morning of the fourth day of the supposed five-day tour that
petitioners were notified that private respondent had finally made arrangements for the payment of
their bills. By that time, the supposed tour was practically over.

Upon their return, petitioners complained to private respondent who according to petitioners did not
even bother to apologize but simply ignored their complaint and gave them the run around. An action
for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs was filed by the petitioners in the CFI.
The court rendered judgment in petitioner's favor but awarded them only P500.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, P100.00 as attorney's fees and costs. Unsatisfied, petitioners appeared to the
CA which modified the decision in that the defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages and the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and the
costs. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to more than the P5,000.00 moral and exemplary
damages, P1,000.00 attorney's fees and costs awarded to them by the Court of Appeals in the light
of the circumstances of the case.

RULING: YES. Decision by CA was modified, increasing the award to petitioners of moral and
exemplary damages to P35,000.00 and attorney's fees to P5,000.00.

To begin with, there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of
moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances. 4
Article 2217 of the Civil Code recognizes that moral damages which include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injury, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.

As to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, 5they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled
to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded. 6

It will thus be noted that We have awarded moral and exemplary damages depending upon the facts
attendant to each case. It will also be noted that We gave separate awards for moral and exemplary
damages. This is as it should be because the nature and purposes of said damages are different.
While moral damages have to do with injury personal to the awardee, such as physical suffering and
the like, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.

It is essential however, in the award of damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven
during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to
defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are
in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not
to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer, 13 and are allowable only when specifically prayed for in the
complaint. 14

In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, especially the social standing of
petitioners and the embarrassment and humiliation suffered by them, the anxiety they must have felt
in their first journey to a foreign land under uncertain circumstances and with meager funds which
could run out any time, We are inclined to award damages to the petitioner more than what was
awarded by the Court of Appeals.

It must be emphasized that moral damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the
expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured parties to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings the injured parties have
undergone by reason of defendant's culpable action. In other words, the award of moral damages is
aimed at a restoration within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore
it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. 15 The amount of P5,000.00 is minimal compared to
the sufferings and embarrassment of petitioners who left Manila with high spirits and excitement hoping to
enjoy their first trip to a foreign land only to be met with uncertainties and humiliations.

We note however that petitioners limited their claim for moral and exemplary damages in their
complaint filed with the Court of First Instance to a total of P35,000.00 plus attorney's fees and costs.
We feel that Our award should not exceed the said amount.

83. People vs Catubig

Facts:

On November 27, 1997, private complainant Dannilyn Catubig, and her four younger
siblings were watching television in the sala of their house . After an hour, Dannilyns father,
herein appellant Danilo Catubig, arrived and told Dannilyns siblings to proceed, as in fact they
did proceed, to her aunts house which is just located nearby. Thereafter, appellant told Dannilyn
to go inside a room and to lie down on the bed. After Dannilyn had complied,the appellant then
raped her. Subsequently, Dannilyns aunt, who got suspicious of what appellant was doing to
Dannilyn, informed the latters mother, Jocelyn Catubig, about the said suspicion. Thus, when
confronted by her mother, Dannilyn was forced to reveal that she was indeed raped by
appellant. The accused denied the accusation against him. He claimed that the rape charge
was brought about only because of the ill-will between him, on the one hand, and his wife and
daughter Dannilyn. The appellant was then arrested and a complaint for rape was filed against
him.

Issue: WON the victim is entitled to damages.

Held: The trial court has correctly awarded P50,000.00 moral damages, an award that
rests on the jural foundation that the crime of rape necessarily brings with it shame, mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation to the offended party. In
addition, the offended party deserves to receive the amount of P50,000.00 civil indemnity, the
equivalent of compensatory damages, and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
The courts may still award exemplary damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even
if the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal
cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter.

84. People vs Dalisay

Facts:

The accused, Antonio Dalisay, is the live-in partner of the victim's mother. The 16-year
old victim was raped by the accused, but was also molested even prior to the crime committed.
An Information was filed against the accused and in it the victim was identified as the accused's
stepdaughter. The RTC convicted Dalisay of qualified rape. Upon appeal, the CA modified the
RTC's ruling, convicting the accused of simple rape instead.

Issue: Whether or not the victim is entitled to exemplary damages.

Held: Yes. Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts
generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime,
even if the same was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid
Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider
the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in
the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was
not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages.

85. Kapalaran Bus Line vs Coronado

Facts:
 The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was then coming from Pila, Laguna and traversing
the an old highway towards Sta. Cruz collided with a KBL bus driven by its regular driver Virgilio
Llamoso. As testified to by Atty. Conrado L. Manicad who was driving a Mustang car coming
from the direction of Sta. Cruz and proceeding towards the direction of Manila, he stopped at
the intersection to give way to the jeepney driven by Grajera. The sketch marked very clearly
that the jeepney had already traversed the intersection when it met the KBL bus head-on. It is
also obvious that the point of impact was on the right lane of the highway which is the lane
properly belonging to the jeepney. Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad and
the sketch (Exhibit 'E'), the sequence of events shows that the first vehicle to arrive at the
intersection was the jeepney. Seeing that the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at
the intersection began to move forward, and for his part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the
intersection to give way to the jeepney. The KBL bus had no more room within which to stop
without slamming into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver
chose to gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven by Grajera ,which
had the right-of-way, was about to cross the center of the highway and was directly on the path
of the KBL bus. The impact indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed
because, after the collision, it did not stop; it travelled for another 50meters and stopped only
when it hit an electric post.

Issue: Whether or not KAPALARAN BUS LIN is liable for damages from the
collision.

Held: YES. KBL is liable for the damages in the collision. The patent and
gross negligence on the part of the petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the legal
presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence either in the
selection or in the supervision of its bus driver, where the employer is held liable
for damages; it has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent
employee. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. So far
as the record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of
negligence on its own part. The award of moral damages against petitioner
Kapalaran is not only entirely in order; it is also quite modest considering Dionisio
Shinyo's death during the pendency of this petition, a death hastened by, if not
directly due to, the grievous injuries sustained by him in the violent collision.

86.Quezon City Government vs Dacara

Facts.

Dacara Jr.s car turned turtle upon hitting a rammed into a pile of earth
diggings found at Matahimik St. Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the
Quezon City government. As a result, Dacara Jr., and his son who was likewise on
board the car, sustained injuries. Fulgencio Dacara in behalf of his minor children
filed a complaint for damages against Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamon before
the RTC praying for damages. The LGU contended that the fault is with the driver,
since the LGU have out up warning signs. The trial court ruled that the LGU if
liable. The CA agreed with the ruling of the RTC finding that the petitioners
negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent.

Issue: Whether or not the Quezon City Government is liable for damages.

Held: Yes. The provisions of Article 2189 of the NCC capsulizes the
responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and
bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the
defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject article is
tantamount to negligence which renders the City government liable. Harsh
application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the
responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither
exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable.

87. Velasco vs Manila Electric Co.

Facts:

Velasco bought three (3) adjoining lots. He sold two (2) of these to Meralco and
maintained the last one as his residence. Meralco constructed on their lots a sub-station at a
distance of 10-20 meters away from appellants house. The company also built a concrete wall
at the sides along the streets but put up only an interlink wire fence (previously a sawali wall) on
the boundary with appellant. An unceasing sound emanates from the substation, caused by
transformers. Such, appellent contends, constitute a nuisance which has worsened his health
condition and has lowered the value of his property. Several witnesses came forth but their
testimonies were vague and imprecise. Resort was made to a sound level meter. The audible
sound from different areas in Velasos property was measured in terms of decibels. It was found
that the sound exceeded the average intensity levels of residences.

Issue: Whether or not Velasco had the right to claim for damages.

Held: The court held that the substation constituted a public nuisance in form of noise, of
which they made reference and consideration with cases in the U.S. regarding what level of
noise would constitute as public nuisance as defined in Art. 694 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The court also contended that the damage claims by the plaintiff-appellant was
exaggerated, taking into consideration that 1) the appellant did not make all the possible
measures, for example to perhaps lease the property to others, 2) as for his health, it was
observed that only Velasco, among the other locals seem to have the ailments as he listed, and
therefore lowered it to a more justifiable amount of 20,000 pesos in damages and 5,000 pesos
in attorneys fees, payable by the appellee. They also ordered that the appellee should take
measures in lowering the noise within 90 days.
88. Lim vs Court of Appeals

Facts:

Private respondent herein purchased an Isuzu passenger jeepney from Gomercino

Vallarta, a holder of a certificate of public convenience for the operation of a public utility
vehicle. He continued to operate the public transport business without transferring the
registration of the vehicle to his name. Thus, the original owner remained to be the registered
owner and operator of the vehicle. Unfortunately, the vehicle got involved in a road mishap
which caused it severe damage. The ten-wheeler-truck which caused the accident was owned
by petitioner Lim and was driven by co-petitioner Gunnaban. Gunnaban admitted responsibility
for the accident, so that petitioner Lim shouldered the costs of hospitalization of those wounded,
compensation for the heirs of the deceased passenger and the restoration of the other vehicle
involved. He also negotiated for the repair of the private respondent's jeepney but the latter
refused and demanded for its replacement. Hence, private respondent filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners. Meanwhile, the jeepney was left by the roadside to corrode and
decay. The trial court decided in favor of private respondent and awarded him his claim. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, petitioner filed this
petition.

Issue: WoN the new owner of a passenger jeepney who continued to operate the same
under the so-called kabit system can bring an action for damages.

Held:

YES. According to the Court, the thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is not
much as to penalize the parties but to identify the person upon whom responsibility may be fixed
in case of an accident with the end view of protecting the riding public. In the present case, it is
once apparent that the evil sought to be prevented in enjoining the kabit system does not exist.

First, neither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is being held liable for
damages. Second, the case arose from the negligence of another vehicle in using the public
road to whom no representation, or misrepresentation, as regards the ownership and operation
of the passenger jeepney was made and to whom no such representation, or misrepresentation,
was necessary. Thus it cannot be said that private respondent Gonzales and the registered
owner of the jeepney were in estoppel for leading the public to believe that the jeepney
belonged to the registered owner. Third, the riding public was neither bothered nor
inconvenienced at the very least by the illegal arrangement. On the contrary, it was private
respondent himself who had been wronged and was seeking compensation for the damage
done to him. Certainly, it would be the height of inequity to deny him his right. Hence, the private
respondent has the right to proceed against petitioners for the damage caused on his
passenger jeepney as well as on his business

89. Sotelo vs Behn, Meyer & Co.

Facts:
 Behn, Meyer, & Co., is a mercantile corporation organized under the laws of the Dutch
East Indies. It was engaged in business in the Philippine Islands. Manuel Sotelo on the
otherhand is an employee of the said corporation. t was stipulated that this employment should
extend over a period of five years, beginning April 1, 1928, and terminating March 31, 1933,
with a salary of P500 per month. The corporation was not successful and wants to get out of the
region as soon as practicable. In order, to test the matter with Sotelo, the manager of the
defendant company, on October 5, 1929, wrote him a letter accepting his resignation from the
position which he had been employed to fill. Much surprised at the reception of this letter Sotelo
replied that he had not tendered his resignation and intimated that he intended to abide by his
contract. Nevertheless, the corporation still discharged the plaintiff from its service, which
subsequently prompted him to file an action for damages for breach of contract. The defense of
the defendant was that the plaintiff had been guilty of disobedience to orders and had failed to
carry out the instructions given by the defendant.

Issue: Whether or not Sotelo is entitled for damages.

Held: Yes. The defendant has failed to justify its action. The point most relied upon by
the defendant is the failure of the plaintiff to supply beforehand, to the central office, the
itineraries of the proposed trips of the plaintiff into neighboring provinces. In this connection it
appears that the plaintiff was a salesman, who, upon receiving information, or forming his own
impressions, that business might be found at the particular points, was accustomed to go after it
without much red tape; and although the business of the Iloilo agency did not prosper,
nevertheless its failure to make money was not the fault of the plaintiff. At any rate the plaintiff
testified that the regulations referred to were impracticable, and we conclude that the discharge
of the plaintiff was not really due to his failure to conform to them. We are of the opinion that the
trial court committed no error in holding that the discharge of the plaintiff constitutes a breach of
contract on the part of the defendant and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages
therefor.

90. Lemoine vs Alkan

Facts:

On the 10th day of July, 1913, the plaintiff and defendant signed a written contract
whereby the defendant hired the plaintiff, as an expert mechanic in his automobile repair shop in
the city of Manila for the period of three years from the date of the contract at a salary of P350 a
month. Plaintiff entered defendant's service on the day on which the contract was executed and
continued therein until he was discharged by the defendant the latter part of August of the same
year, plaintiff actually leaving defendant's service on the 5th day of September. On the 8th of
the same month this action was begun to recover, as damages for breach of contract, the
wages to which he was entitled under the contract. The defendant presented three defenses.
The first is that plaintiff was incompetent and insubordinate. The second is founded on the claim
that plaintiff, if he had used due diligence, would have been able to obtain a like position in the
city of Manila,. The defendant claims as his third defense that on the 6th of December, 1913 he
offered to take him back into his employ under terms and conditions substantially the same as
those specified in the original contract of service and at the same rate of wages; and that
plaintiff, without reason or justification, refused to accept the offer.
 Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to damages.

Held: Plaintiff can recover in this action only the wages for the three months' period from
the discharge and up to the defendants offer of re employing him. Plaintiff proved no other
damages than the loss of wages. The damages in an action for wrongful discharge are prima
facie the amount of wages for the full term. These are the damages and the only damages
which plaintiff proved. The complaint alleges damages to character and reputation arising from
the fact of the wrongful discharge. No evidence was offered showing damages of that kind or
the amount thereof. The amount which defendant proved in mitigation or recoupment is equal to
the amount which plaintiff proved his damages to be, with the exception of the period between
September 5th and December 5th of the same year. The court below allowed plaintiff his wages
for the months of September, October and November, but on a different theory from that on
which we have based his right; but, whatever the theory, the amount is correct and the judgment
of the trial court is to that extent proper.