Rule 114 Cases

Section 4
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC November 24, 2009
RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW
RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson and Members of the Subcommitee on Rules Procedure for Family Courts
submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the proposed revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, the Court
Resolved to APPROVE the same.
This Resolution shall take effect on December 1, 2009 following its publication in two(2) newspapers general circulation not later
than November 27, 2009.
November 24, 2009.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
REVISED RULE ON CHILDREN IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. - This Rule shall apply to all criminal cases involving children in conflict with law.
A child in conflict with the law is a person who at the time of the commission of the offense is below eighteen (18) years old but
not less than fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old.
This Rule shall not apply to a person who at the time of the initial contact as defined in Sec. 4 (q) of this Rule shall have reached
the age of eighteen (18) in which case, the regular rules on criminal procedure shall apply without prejudice to the rights granted
under Secs. 53,54,55 and 56 of this Rule.
Section 2. Objective. - The objective of this Rule is to ensure that the justice system treats every child in conflict with the law in a
manner that recognizes and upholds human dignity and worth, and instills in the child respect for the fundamental rights ad
freedom of others. The Rule considers the developmental age of the child and the desirability of the child's reintegration in the
assumption of a constructive role in society in accordance with the principles of balanced and restorative justice.
To attain this objective, the Rule seeks:
(a) To provide child-appropriate proceedings, including programs and services for crime prevention, diversion,
rehabilitation, re-integration and aftercare to ensure the normal growth and development of the child in conflict
with the law;
(b) To provide procedural rules dealing with children in conflict with the law that take into account their distinct
circumstances, assure all parties of a fair hearing with each party's constitutional and statutory rights recognized
and respected, and ensure that appropriate disposition measures are implemented by law enforcers social
services and the courts;
(c) To divert from the formal justice system children in conflict with the law who can be cared for or placed under
community continuum alternative programs of treatment, training and rehabilitation in conformity with the
principles of balanced and restorative justice;
(d) To deal with the child in a family environment whenever possible, and to separate the child from the parents
only when necessary for the child's welfare or in the interest of public safety.
(e) To remove from children in conflict with the law the stigma of criminality and criminal behavior;
(f) to promote, facilitate and implement in administrative and judicial proceedings respect for the view of the child;
(g) To provide for the care, protection and wholesome moral, mental, and physical development of children in
conflict with the law; and
(h) To promote and protect the rights and interest of children as zones of peace in situations of armed conflict, but
who are alleged to be in conflict with the law. (a)
Section 3. Interpretation. - This Rule shall be interpreted liberally to promote the best interest of the child in conformity with
Philippine laws, the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the Child and relevant international treaties and protocols.
Section 4. Definitions. - As used in this Rule,
(a) Age of criminal responsibility is the age when a child, fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old or above but
below eighteen (18) years of age, commits an offense with discernment.
(b) Bail refers to the security given for the release of the child in custody of the law, furnished by the child, the
child's parent, guardian, or a bondsman, to guarantee the child's appearance before the court. Bail may be
posted in a form such as corporate security, property bond or cash deposit.
(c) Balanced and Restorative Justice is a principle in juvenile justice that requires a process of resolving conflicts
with the participation of the victim, the child in conflict with the law, and the community. It seeks to obtain
reparation for the victim; reconciliation to the victim, the child in conflict with the law, and the community, and the
reassurance that the child in conflict with the law can be reintegrated into society. It also enhances public safety
by involving the victim, the child in conflict with the law, and the community in prevention strategies. (a)
(d) Best interest of the child refers to the totality of congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of security of
the child and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional development. It also means
the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and development.
(e) Case study report is a written report on the social case inquiry conducted by the social worker of the local
government unit or the Department of Social Welfare and Development or by the social worker designated by the
court on the social, cultural, economic and legal status or condition of the child in conflict in the law. It shall
include, among other matters, the child's development age; educational attainment; family and social
relationships; the quality of the child's peer group; the strengths and weaknesses of the family; parental control;
the child's attitude towards the offense ; the harm or damage done to others resulting from the offenses, if any;
and the attitude of the parents towards the child's responsibility for the offense. The social worker shall also
include an initial determination of the child's discernment in the commission of the offense. (a)
(f) Community continuum refers to the aftercare of a child in conflict with the law and is a provides continuous
guidance and support to the child in conflict with the law upon release from rehabilitation and subsequent
reintegration into society. Community continuum for the child includes timely release, suitable residence, food,
clothing, available employment and sufficient means to facilitate successful reintegration in local government unit
and other appropriate agencies. (n)
(g) Corporal punishment is any kind of physical punishment inflicted on the body as distinguished from pecuniary
punishment or fine.
(h) Court refers to a designated family court or in places where there are no designated family courts, any
regional trial court hearing family and youth cases. (a)
(i) Deprivation of Liberty refers to any form of detention or imprisonment, or to the placement of a child in conflict
with the law in a public or private custodial setting, from which the child in conflict with the law is not permitted to
leave at will except by order of any judicial or administrative authority. (a)
(j) Discernment means the capacity of the child at the time of the commission of the offense to understand the
differences between right and wrong and the consequences of the wrongful act.
(k) Disposition conference is a meeting held by the court with the social worker who prepared the case study
report, together with the child in conflict with the law and the parents or guardian ad litem, and the child's counsel
for the purpose of determining the disposition measures appropriate to the personal and special circumstances of
the child.
(l) Diversion refers to an alternative child-appropriate process of determining the responsibility and treatment of a
child in conflict with the law on the basis of the child's social, cultural, economic psychological or educational
background without resorting to formal court adjudication.
(m) Diversion programs refer to programs the child in conflict the law is required to undergo in lieu of formal court
proceedings.
(n) Expedited Transfer of a Child is a process where a child who commits an offense is immediately brought by
the apprehending officer or private individual to a social worker for preliminary determination of discernment. (n)
(o) Guardian Ad Litem is a person appointed by the court to protect the best interest of the child. (a)
(p) In conflict with the law means take into custody, detained, or charged with the commission of an act defined
and punished as a crime or offense under the law, including violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations, and
ordinances of local government units. (a)
(q) Initial contact refers to apprehension or taking into custody of a child in conflict with the law by law
enforcement officers or private citizens. It includes the time the child alleged to be in conflict with the law receives
a subpoena under Section 3 (b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or summons under
Section 6 (a) or Section 9(b) of the same Rule in cases that do not require preliminary investigation, or where
there is no necessity to place the child alleged to be in conflict with the law under immediate custody. (n)
(r) Intake report is the initial written report containing the personal and other circumstances of the child in conflict
with the law prepared by the social worker assigned to assist the child entering the justice system.
(s) Intervention programs refer to a series of individualized treatment activities or programs designed to address
issues that caused the child to commit an offense . These may include counseling, skills, training, education, and
other activities that are aimed to improve and enhance the child's psychological, emotional and psychosocial well
being. (n)
(t) Law Enforcement Officer refers to the person in authority or an agent as defined in Article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code, including a barangay tanod. (n)
(u) Non-Serious Offense refers to an offense where the imposable penalty for the crime committed is not more
than six (6) years imprisonment. (n)
(v) Probation is an alternative disposition, ordered by the court, under which a child in conflict with the law is
released after conviction and sentence and permitted to remain at home or with an appropriate custodian, subject
to certain terms and conditions imposed by the court.
(w) Recognizance is an undertaking in lieu of a bond, assumed by a mother or father, or appropriate guardian or
custodian, or in their absence, the nearest relative, or any responsible member of the community to assume
custody of a child in conflict with the law and be responsible for the appearance of the child in court whenever
required during the pendency of the case. (a)
(x) Segregation refers to the procedure where, upon initial contact with a child alleged to have committed an
offense, the law enforcer places the child in a separate and different area from adult detention prisoners, and
ensures that female children are separated from male children. (n)
(y) Serious offense refers to an offense where the imposable penalty for the offense committed exceeds six (6)
years imprisonment. (a)
(z) Status offenses refers to offenses that discriminate only against a child, such as curfew violations, truancy,
parental disobedience and the like. (n)
(aa) Suspended sentence is the holding in abeyance of the service of the sentence imposed by the court upon a
finding of guilt of the child in conflict with the law, whereby the child undergoes rehabilitation within a fixed period
under such terms and conditions as may be ordered by the court. (n)
(bb) Victimless Crimes refer to offenses where there are no private offended parties. (n)
(cc) Youth detention home refers to a 24-hour child-caring institution managed by accredited local government
units and licensed and/or accredited non-government organizations providing short-term residential care for
children in conflict with the law and where the child may be physically restricted by order of any judicial,
administrative or other public authority, and from which the child is not permitted to leave at will, pending court
disposition of the charge or transfer to other agencies or jurisdiction. (a)
(dd) Youth rehabilitation center refers to a 24-hour residential care facility managed by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, local government units, licensed and/or accredited non-government organizations
monitored by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. The Center provides care, treatment and
rehabilitation services for children in conflict with the law under a structured therapeutic environment through the
guidance of a trained staff, where the physical mobility of the children may be restricted pending court disposition
of their cases. (a)
Section 5. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority and shall enjoy all the
rights of a child in conflict with the law until proven to be eighteen years old or older at the time of the commission of the offense.
The age of the child shall be determined according to the following rules:
(1) The best evidence to prove the age of a child is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth;
(2) In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificates and
school records or any pertinent document that shows the date of birth of the child;
(3) In the absence of the documents under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this section due to loss, destruction or
unavailability, the testimony of the child, the testimony of a member of the family related to the child by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of
the child pursuant to Sec.40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, the testimonies of the other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence, shall suffice.
Section 6. Burden of Proof of Age. - Any person alleging the age of the child in conflict with the law has the burden of proving the
age of such child.
If the age of the child is contested prior to the filing of the information in court, a case for determination of age under summary
proceeding may be filed before a court which shall render its decision within 24 hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of
all the parties. (n)
In all cases involving a child, the court shall make a categorical finding as to the age of the child.
Section 7. Exemption from Criminal Liability. - A child fifteen years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program as provided for in
Republic Act No. 9344 when consented to by the child and the parents. (a)
Exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption from civil liability which shall be enforced in accordance with the
provisions of Article 221 of the Family Code in relation to Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the act or omission of the child involves a quasi-delict, Article 2180 of the Civil Code shall apply.
Section 8. Procedure for Handling Children Exempted from Criminal Liability. - If it is determined at the initial contact that the
child is 15 years of age or below, the procedure provided in Section 20, Republic Act No. 9344 shall be observed as follows:
(a) The authority who had the initial contact with the child shall immediately release the child to the custody of the
mother or father, or the appropriate guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest relative.
(b) The authority shall immediately notify the local social welfare and development officer of the taking of the child
into custody.
(c) The local social welfare and development officer shall, with the consent of the child and the person having
custody over the child, determine the appropriate intervention programs for the child.
(d) If the child's parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the
child may be released to any of the following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization; a
barangay official or a member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children; a local social welfare and
development officer; or, when and where appropriate, the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
(e) If the child has been found by the local social welfare and development office to be abandoned, neglected or
abused by the parents, or if the parents and the child do not consent to or do not comply with the prevention
program, the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the Local Social Welfare and Development
Office shall file before the court a petition for involuntary commitment pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as "The Child and Youth Welfare Code." (a)
Section 9. Procedure for Children Not Exempted from Criminal Liability. - A child fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old or above
but below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense shall, at the sound discretion of the court and
subject to its supervision, be released on recognizance to the care of the willing and responsible mother or father, or appropriate
guardian or custodian, or, in their absence, the nearest relative. However, if the prosecution determines that the child acted with
discernment, the child shall be proceeded against in accordance with Secs. 25 to 29 or, in case of diversion, Secs. 31 to 38 of
this Rule.
Section 10. Determination of Discernment. - Discernment is preliminarily determined by a social worker and finally by the court in
the case of a child charged with a non-serious offense. In all other cases, discernment is determined by the court.
The determination of discernment shall take into account the ability of a child to understand the moral and psychological
components of criminal responsibility and the consequences of the wrongful act; and whether a child can be held responsible for
essentially antisocial behavior.
Section 11. Duties of a Person in Authority Taking a Child into Custody. - Any person taking into custody a child in conflict with
the law shall:
(a) Assign an alias to the child;
(b) Ensure that the blotter details containing the true name of the child, if any, are modified, to reflect the alias by
which the child shall be known throughout the proceedings;
(c) Explain to the child in simple language and in a dialect that can be understood the reason for placing the child
under custody, and the offense allegedly committed;
(d) Advise the child of his/her constitutional rights in a language or dialect understandable to the child;
(e) Present proper identification to the child;
(f) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words and from sexually harassing or abusing, or making sexual
advances on the child;
(g) Avoid displaying or using any firearm, weapon, handcuffs or other instrument of force or restraint, unless
absolutely necessary and only after all methods of control have been exhausted and have failed;
(h) Avoid violence or unnecessary force and refrain from subjecting the child to greater restraint than is necessary
for apprehension and custody;
(i) Ensure that a body search of the child is done only by a law enforcement officer of the same gender as that of
the child;
(j) Ensure expedited transfer of the child by immediately, or not later than eight (8) hours after apprehension,
turning over custody of the child to the local social welfare and development office or other accredited non-
government organizations;
(k) Notify the child's parents, guardians or custodians or in their absence, the child's nearest relative and the
Public Attorney's Office of the child's apprehension;
(l) Ensure that the child is not locked up in a jail or detention cell during the investigation;
(m) Bring the child immediately to an available government medical or health officer for a thorough physical and
mental examination;
(n) Ensure that should detention of the child in conflict with the law be necessary, the segregation of the child be
secured in quarters separate from that of the opposite sex and adult offenders, except where a child is taken into
custody for reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier, guide or spy, and families are
accommodated as family units in which case, the child shall not be separated from the family;
(o) Record all the procedures undertaken in the initial investigation including the following: whether handcuffs or
other instruments of restraint were used, and if so, the reason for such use; that the parents or guardian of the
child, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, and the Public Attorney's Office were informed of the
taking into custody of the child and the details thereof; the measures that were undertaken to determine the age
of child, and the precise details of the physical and medical examination or in case of failure to submit a child to
such examination, the reason therefore; and
(p) Ensure that all statements signed by the child during the investigation are witnessed and signed by the child's
parents or guardian, social worker or legal counsel in attendance. (n)
Section 12. Rights of a Child Under Custody. - At the custodial investigation, a child who has been taken into custody shall have
the following rights:
(a) At the police station, to be immediately assisted by a lawyer and a social worker who shall make sure that the
child is effectively informed of his/her rights, as far as the child's maturity and discernment allow;
(b) To demand that the questioning or interrogation take place in conditions that respect the rights of the child and
are complaint with child-sensitive procedural rules;
(c) To have the child's family located and notified with dispatch;
(d) To be informed, together with the parents, guardians or custodians or nearest relatives, by the social welfare
and development officer of the local government unit or of the Department of Social Welfare and Development of
the consequences of the offense alleged to have been committed with a view towards counseling and
rehabilitation, diversion from criminal justice system and reparation if appropriate;
(e) To have the results of the child's medical and dental examination kept confidential unless otherwise ordered
by the court. Whenever medical treatment for any physical or mental defect is necessary, to demand that steps
must be immediately taken by the medical officer to provide the child with the necessary and proper treatment;
(f) To have the right of privacy respected and protected at all times, including the utilization of all measures
necessary to promote this right, including the exclusion of the media; and
(g) While under investigation, not to be fingerprinted or photographed in a humiliating and degrading manner.
Section 13. Taking Custody of a Child Without a Warrant. - The law enforcement officer or a private person taking into custody a
child in conflict with the law without a warrant shall observe the provisions in Sections 5, 8 and 9 of Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure and shall forthwith deliver the child to the nearest police station. The child shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 14. Conduct of Initial Investigation by the Police. - The police officer conducting the initial investigation of a child conflict
with the law shall do so in the presence of either or both of the parents, guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest
relative of the child, the child's counsel of choice, or a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office, and the local social welfare officer.
A representative of a non-government organization, religious group, or member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of
Children shall be allowed to be present at the investigation in the absence of the parents, guardian, relative, or social welfare
officer. (a)
Section 15. Guidelines for Fingerprinting and Photographing of the Child. - The following guidelines shall be observed when
fingerprinting or photographing the child:
(a) The child's fingerprint and photograph files shall be kept separate from those of adults and shall be kept
confidential. They may be inspected by law enforcement officers only when necessary for the effective discharge
of their duties and upon prior authority of the court; and
(b) The fingerprint and photograph shall be removed from the files and destroyed: (1) if the case against the child
is not filed, or is dismissed; or (2) when the child reaches twenty-one (21) years of age and there is no record that
the child committed an offense after reaching eighteen (18) years of age.
Section 16. Intake Report by the Social Welfare Officer. - Upon the taking into custody of a child in conflict with the law, the
social welfare officer assigned to the child shall immediately undertake a preliminary background investigation of the child and,
should a case be filed in court, submit to the court the corresponding intake report prior to the arraignment.
Section 17. Filing of Criminal Action. - A criminal action may be instituted against a child in conflict with the law by filing a
complaint with the prosecutor.
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor assigned to the court.
Petitions for confinement of a child drug dependent shall be filed under Section 21 of the Rule on Children Charged under
Republic Act No. 9165. (n)
Section 18. Prosecution of Civil Action. - When a criminal action is instituted against a child in conflict with the law, the action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be governed by Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Section 19. Preliminary Investigation. - As far as consistent with this Rule, the preliminary investigation of a child conflict with the
law shall be governed by Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. A specially trained prosecutor shall
be assigned to conduct the inquest, preliminary investigation and prosecution of the case involving a child in conflict with the law.
The child, on the other hand, shall be assisted by a private lawyer or if none, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office. If there is
an allegation or evidence of torture or ill-treatment of a child in conflict with the law during custody or detention, it shall be the
duty of the prosecutor to investigate the same. (n)
Section 20. Conduct of Preliminary Investigation. - Preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following instances: (a)
when the child in conflict with the law does not qualify for diversion; (b) when the child, the parents or guardian do not agree to
diversion as provided in Sections 27 and 28 of Republic Act No. 9344; or (c) when, after considering the assessment and
recommendation of the social worker, the prosecutor determines that diversion is not appropriate for the child in conflict with the
law. (n)
At the preliminary investigation, should there arise a need for clarificatory questions to be propounded on the child, the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness shall apply.
Section 21. Filing of Information. - If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause to hold the child in conflict with the law for
trial, there being discernment, the corresponding Resolution and Information shall be prepared for the approval by the provincial
or city prosecutor, a s the case may be. The child and the mother or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian, or in the
absence thereof, the nearest relative, and the child's private counsel or lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office shall be furnished
forthwith a copy of the approved resolution and the Information.
The Information shall be filed with the court within forty-five (45) days from the start of the preliminary investigation. (n)
No Information shall be filed against a child for the commission of the following:
(a) status offences;
(b) vagrancy and prostitution under Section 202 of the Revised Penal Code;
(c) mendicancy under Presidential Decree No. 1563; and
(d) sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619.
Children taken into custody for the foregoing shall, with their consent and that of their parents, guardian or custodian, instead
undergo appropriate counseling and treatment program. (n)
Section 22. Duties of the Clerk of Court Upon Receipt of information. - The Clerk of Court, upon receipt of the Information, shall:
(1) Maintain a separate case docket or logbook for cases involving children in conflict with the law. Whenever
possible, the Clerk of Court shall use color coding or other method to easily distinguish the records of children in
conflict with the law from the other case records;
(2) Determine whether the offense charged qualifies for diversion, that is it punishable by imprisonment of not
more than twelve (12) years, regardless of fine, or fine alone regardless of the amount;
(3) If the crime charged is punishable by such imprisonment, immediately assign a temporary case number in
accordance with Sec. 23 of this Rule and raffle off the case to a court so that its Diversion Committee can
immediately undertake the appropriate action under Section 33 of this Rule; and
(4) If the crime charged does not quality for diversion because it is punishable by imprisonment of more than
twelve (12) years, the case shall be assigned a regular criminal case docket number raffled off to a court for
formal proceedings. (n)
Section 23. Docketing of the Case - a case that qualifies for diversion under paragraph 3 of the preceding Section shall not be
docketed as a regular criminal case but instead shall be assigned a temporary case number as follows: CICL-(no.) ___- (year)
___ -D (which means diversion), before the same is raffled off to the appropriate court.
Section 24. Venue - Subject to the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, any criminal
or civil action involving a child in conflict with the law shall be instituted and tried in the appropriate court nearest the place where
the offense was committed or where any of its essential elements occurred.
Section 25. Released of Children on Recognizance to the Parents, Guardian, Custodian or Nearest Relative. - The release of a
child from a custody during the pendency of the case involving a non-serious offense as defined in Sec. 4 (u) of this rule may be
ordered by the court only after a hearing for that purpose, and upon favorable recommendation of the social worker assigned to
the child, with the conformity of the public prosecutor and the private complainant. The child shall be released to the custody of a
willing and responsible mother or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian or in their absence, the nearest relative, who shall
be responsible for the child's good behavior and appearance in court whenever required.
No child shall be ordered detained in jail pending trial or hearing of the child's case, subject to the provisions of this Rule. (n)
Section 26. Commitment and transfer to a youth Rehabilitation Center. - A child charged with non-serious offense as defined in
Section 4 (u) of this Rule, unless released on bail or recognizance, may be transferred to a youth detention home rehabilitation
center or other appropriate facility such as the Department of Social Welfare and Development which shall ensure the
appearance of the child in court.
In the absence of a youth detention home established by the local government pursuant to Section 8 of the Family Courts Acts,
in the city or municipality where the child resides or, a local rehabilitation center recognized by the government in the province,
city or municipality within the jurisdiction of the court, or the Department of Social Welfare and Development or other appropriate
local rehabilitation center, the youth shall be placed under the care of a provincial, city or municipality jail which shall ensure the
appearance of the child in court when so required. (a)
Section 27. Bail as a Matter of right. - All children in conflict with the law shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right before final
conviction of an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua life imprisonment.
Section 28. When Bail Not a Matter of Right. - No child charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. In this case, the court shall commit the to a youth
detention home or youth rehabilitation center, or in the absence thereof, to the care of a provincial, city or municipal jail as
provided for in Section 27 of this Rule, which shall be responsible for the appearance of the child in court whenever required.
Section 29. Care of Child in Youth Detention Homes or Rehabilitation Centers. - The child in conflict with the law who has been
transferred to a youth rehabilitation center or youth detention home shall be provided with a healthy environment. If the child is
placed under the care of the provincial, city or municipal jail, the child shall be provided with adequate quarters separate from
adults and prisoners of the opposite sex depending on the age, sex, sexual lifestyle, and such other circumstances and needs of
the child.
Section 30. Case Study Report. - After the institution of the criminal action, the social worker assigned to the child shall
immediately undertake a social case inquiry of the child and the child's family, the child's environment and such other matters
relevant to aid the court in the proper disposition of the case. The report shall be submitted to the court preferably before
arraignment. If not available at that time, the Report must be submitted to the court as soon as possible.
Section 31. Diversion Committee - In each court, there shall be organized a Diversion Committee composed of its Branch Clerk
of Court as chairperson; the prosecutor, a lawyer of the Public Attorney's Office assigned to the court, and the social worker
assigned by the court to the child, as members.
Section 32. Proceedings Before Arraignment - The Diversion Committee shall determine if the child can be diverted and referred
to alternative measures or services. Subject to pertinent provisions of this Rule and pending determination of diversion by the
Committee, the court shall release the child on recognizance to the parents, guardian or custodian, or nearest relative; or if this is
not advisable, commit the child to an appropriate youth detention home or youth rehabilitation center which shall be responsible
for the presence of the child during the diversion proceedings.
If the Diversion Committee determines that diversion is not proper, or when the child or the private complainant object to the
diversion, or when there is failure if the diversion program if undertaken by the child, it shall submit a report to the court
recommending that the case be subjected to formal criminal proceedings. The court in turn shall direct the transmittal of the
records of the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court for the assignment of a regular criminal docket number to the case as
follows: CICL Crim. Case No.___-___( year). The Office of the Clerk of Court shall thereafter return the case to the court for
arraignment and formal proceedings.
Section 33. Proceeding Before the Diversion Committee. - Upon receipt by the Committee of a case for diversion from the Office
of the Clerk of Court, the chairperson shall call for a conference with notice to the child, the mother or father, or appropriate
guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest relative, the child's counsel, and the private complainant and counsel to
determine if the child can be diverted to the community continuum instead of formal court proceedings.
In determining whether diversion is appropriate for the child, the Committee shall consider the following factors:
(a) The past records, if any, involving the child in conflict with the law;
(b) The likelihood that the child will be an obvious threat to himself/herself and the community;
(c) Whether the child has feeling of remorse for the offense committed;
(d) If the child or the parent are indifferent or hostile; and whether this will increase the possibility of delinquent
behavior; and
(f) If community-based programs for the rehabilitation and reintegration of the child are available.
If the Committee finds that diversion is appropriate, it shall design a diversion program in accordance with Section 34 of this Rule
for the consideration and approval of the court.
Should the Committee determine that diversion is not appropriate, it shall make the corresponding report and recommendation in
accordance with Section 31 of this Rule.
The Committee cannot recommend diversion in case the child or the private complainant objects.
Section 34. Diversion programs. -The Committee shall design a diversion program talking into consideration the individual
characteristics and peculiar circumstances of the child in conflict with the law. The program shall be for a specific and definite
period and may include any or a combination of the following:
(a) Written or oral reprimand or citation;
(b) Written or oral apology;
(c) Payment of the damage caused;
(e) Payment of the cost of the proceedings;
(f) Return of the property;
(g) Guidance and supervision orders;
(h) Counseling for the child and his family;
(i) Training, seminar and lectures on (i) anger management skills; (ii) problem-solving and/or conflict resolution
skills; (iii) values formation; and (iv) other skills that will aid the child to properly deal with situations that can lead
to a repetition of the offense;
(j) Participation in available community-based programs;
(k) Work-detail program in the community; or

(l) Institutional care and custody.
The Committee shall also include in the program a plan that will secure satisfaction of the civil liability of the child in accordance
with Sec. 2180 of the Civil Code. Inability to satisfy the civil the liability shall not by itself be a ground to discontinue the diversion
program of a child. On the other hand, consent to diversion by the child or payment of civil indemnity shall not in any way be
construed as admission of guilt and used as evidence against the child in the event that the case is later on returned to the court
for arraignment and conduct of formal proceedings.
The court shall act on the recommendation within five (5) days from the termination of the hearing.
Section 36. Undertaking. - In all cases where a child in conflict with the law is granted diversion by the court, the child, together
with the mother or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest relative, and the child's counsel
shall sign an undertaking to comply with their respective duties and obligation under the terms and conditions of the express
agreement by complainant assisted by counsel to the diversion of the child, shall be approved by and enforced under the
supervision and control of the court. It shall contain the following minimum principal terms and conditions:
(a) The child shall appear before the social worker assigned to the child by the Court that approved the diversion
program at least once a month for evaluation of its effectiveness.
(b) The child shall faithfully comply with the term and conditions of the program. Should the child fail to do so, the
Committee shall report such failure to the court which shall set a show- cause hearing with notice to the child and
private complainant. The court shall thereafter determine whether to allow the child to continue with the diversion
program, or to end the same and direct that the case now undergo a formal proceeding.
Should the child be permitted by the court to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another court, control and supervision over
such child shall be transferred to the appropriate court of that place. The diversion records of the case such as the minutes of the
diversion proceedings, copy of the undertaking, the intake and case study reports and all other pertinent documents shall be
transmitted to the court to which jurisdiction over the diverted child has been transferred.
Section 37. Report of Social Worker. - The court social worker shall conduct regular monthly visit to the child undergoing
diversion proceedings and shall submit the corresponding reports about the status of the diverted child to the committee. At any
time before or at the end diversion period, the committee shall file with trhe court of the report recommending termination or
extension of diveertion, as the case may be. The report and recommendation shall be heard by the court within fifteen (15) dyas
form receipt, with notice to the members of the Committee, the child, the mother or father, or the appropriate guardian or
custodian, or in the absensce thereof, the nearest relative, the child's councel, and the complainant and counsel.
The court shall thereafter determine whether the diversion program has been full and satisfactorily complied with
Section 38. Closure Order. - On the basis of the report and recommendation of the Committee, the court may:
(a) Issue a closure order terminating the case if it is convinced that the child has complied satisfactorily with the
diversion program; or
(b) Extend the period of diversion if it is convinced that the child may still be rehabilitated; or
(c) Order the case to undergo formal court proceedings if it finds that the child has not complied with the diversion
program, is incorrigible, or that the program is not serving its purpose.
In case of the judicially-approved transfer of residence of the child in conflict with the law, the court to which supervision of the
diversion program was transferred shall make the proper finding. IF it finds that diversion has been successful. It shall order the
closure of the case. However, if it determines that diversion has failed it shall return the case to the original court for formal
criminal proceedings.
Section 39. Rights of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - In all criminal proceedings, the child in conflict with the law shall have
the following rights which shall be respected and protected by the court:
(a) To be presumed innocent until guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt;

(b) To be informed promptly and directly of the nature and cause of the charge and if appropriate, through the
child's mother, father, legal guardian, or appropriate custodian;
(c) To be present at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgement. The child
may, however, waive presence at the rial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in the bail bond, unless presence at
the trial is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the child without
justifiable cause at the trial of which there was due notice shall be considered a waiver of the right of the child to
be present. Escape by the child under custody shall be deemed a waiver of the right to be present in all
subsequent hearings until custody over such child is gained;
(d) To have legal and other appropriate assistance in the preparation and presentation of the child's defense; in
case of a child arrested for reasons related to armed conflict, to have immediate free legal assistance;
(e) If detained, to be released (I) on recognizance to the willing and responsible mother or father or appropriate
guardian or custodian, or in the absence thereof, the nearest relative; (ii) on bail; or (iii) by commitment to a youth
detention home or youth rehabilitation center, 1avvphi 1
(f) Not to be detained in a jail or transferred to an adult facility pending trial or hearing of the case, unless
detention is used as a last resort which must be done for the shortest time possible, and only upon order by the
court;
(g) In the case the child has been arrested for reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier,
guide or spy:
(i) To be segregated and have separate detention quarters from adults except where families ate
accommodated as family un its;
(ii) To immediate free legal assistance in the absence of private counsel;
(iii) To immediate notice of such arrest to the parents, guardians or custodians or nearest relatives of the
child; and;
(iv) To be released on recognizance within twenty-four (24) hours to the custody of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or any responsible member of the community as determined by the
court.
(h) To testify as a witness in his/her own behalf; and subject to cross-examination only on matters covered by
direct examination. The child shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself/herself and the child's silence
shall not in any manner prejudice him/her;
(i) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him/her;
(j) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in
the child's behalf
(k) To have speedy and imparial trial, with legal or other appropriate assistance and preferable in the presence of
the child's parents or legal guardian or custodian, unless such presence is considred not to be in the best interest
of the child taking into account the latter's age or other peculiar circumstances;
(l) To be accorded all the rights un der the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness;
(m) To have the child's privacy fully protected in all stages of the proceedings; and
(n) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.
Section 40. Rights if Victims of Offences Committed by Children in Conflict with the Law. - In any case involving a child in conflict
with the law, the victim has the following rights:
(1) To be reasonably protected from the child in conflict with the law;
(2) To timely notice of any public proceedings, or any parole proceedings involving the crime or of any release or
escape of the child in conflict with the law;
(3) Not to be excluded from any public proceeding, unless the court, after receiving any clear and convincing
evidence, determines that the testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other
testimony in that proceeding.
(4) To be reasonably heard at any administrative or public proceeding involving diversion, release, plea,
suspension of sentence and determination of disposition measures, or any parole proceeding;
(5) To confer with the prosecutor in the case;
(6) To avail of legal assistance from the Public Attorney's Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. any other legal
aid office or any law practitioner.1avvphi 1
(7) To be informed of the availability of compensation from the Department of Justice Board of Claims in
accordance with the provisions of Rep Act. No.7309.
(8) To be entitled to support services from the Department of Social Welfare and Development and local
government units;
(9) To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under the Family Code;
(10) To be informed of the rights and the services available to victims of offenses including the right to apply for a
protection order;
(11) To full and timely restitution as provided in law;
(12) To proceedings that are free from unreasonable delay; and
(13) To be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy.
Section 41. Responsibilities of the Court. - For the protection of the rights of the child in the conflict with the law, the court shall
have the following responsibilities:
(1) To monitor the status of a child whose case is pending in its court placed in a youth detention center or other
institution during the pendency of the child's case;
(2) To receive and investigate complaints concerning violations of the rights of the child whose case is pending on
its court;
(3) To require all professionals working for the welfare of the child, such as barangay captains, teachers, social
workers, medical professionals, and law enforcers, to render regular monthly reports to the court.
(4) To order access to adequate services for rehabilitation, counseling and other forms of reintegration for the
child;
(5) To ensure that the child who is capable of forming his or her own views has the right to express those views
freely in all matters affecting the child, and that such views be accorded due weight in accordance with the
developmental age and maturity of the child;
(6) To ensure that the child, either directly or through a representative , is provided the opportunity to be heard in
all proceedings affecting such child;
(7) To ensure communication at all times between the judge and the child;
(8) To ensure that the child sits with close family members of the child's choice during the court proceedings;
(9) To ensure that the child can communicate freely with counsel at all times;
(10) To ensure that the child is informed in age-appropriate language of all stages of the judicial proceeding
affecting such child;
(11) To ensure that a child placed in a Youth Detention Home or Youth Rehabilitation Center or in any child
facility be given appropriate medical examination in order to determine and put on record any evidence of ill-
treatment; to identify any physical or mental condition requiring medical attention; and thereafter make sure that
child is provided by adequate treatment and medical attention;
(12) To insure that a child is informed as soon as possible of the death, serious illness or injury of any immediate
family member and be allowed to visit the ill family member or attend the funeral, when appropriate and
advisable;
(13) To ensure if a child dies during the pendency of the case or within six (6) months of release, an independent
inquiry is conducted on the circumstances of the death and a report thereof, including the child's death certificate,
be made available to the child's mother or father , guardian, custodian or nearest relative;
(14) When appropriate and advisable, to allow the child temporarily leave the detention home or rehabilitation
center by means of an "out-on-pass" order to attend special family occasions such as Christmas and New Year
celebrations. The "out-on-pass" order shall contain reasonable restrictions to ensure safety, security and timely
return to detention as may be determined by the court;
(15) To allow at all times, and from the moment of initial contact, any member of the family or the guardian of the
child to visit the child, unless prejudicial to the latter's best interest;
(16) To allow the appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem if available and advisable, to enable the child to raise
concerns and complaints without fear or retribution; and
(17) To undertake all other appropriate measures to ensure the promotion of the best interest of the child and the
child's eventual reintegration in society.
Section 42. Determination of the Bests Interests of the Child. - The following factors may be considered in determining the best
interests of a child in conflict with the law: the child's age and sex, the child's mental and physical health, the mental and physical
health of the parents, their lifestyle and other social factors; the emotional ties between the parents and the child, the ability of the
parents to provide the child with food, shelter, clothing and medical care; the established living pattern for the child concerning
school, home, community and religious institution, quality of schooling, the existence of other relatives who may be in a better
position to be with the child and the child's relationship with these relatives; the child's background, maturity and level of
understanding, sexual lifestyle and any other characteristics and needs of the child that the court may deem relevant.
Section 43. Arraignment and Plea. - The provisions of Rules 116 and 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply
to the arraignment of the child in the conflict with the law. The arraignment shall be scheduled within three (3) days from the date
of receipt of the complaint or information by the court, unless a shorter period is provided for by law.
In case the child is not assisted by a private counsel, the court shall immediately appoint its Public Attorney as the child's counsel
de oficio.
Arraignment shall be held in chambers and conducted by the judge by furnishing the child and counsel a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in a language or dialect known to and understand by the child, explaining the nature and
consequences of a plea of guilty or not guilty and asking the child's plea.
Section 44. Pre-trial. - The provisions of Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure shall govern the pre-trial of the
child in conflict with the law. Agreements or admissions made during the pre-trial conference shall be in writing and signed by the
child, the mother, the father or duly appointed guardian, and counsel; otherwise, the agreements or admissions shall not be
admissible against the child.
Whenever possible and practicable, the court shall explore all possibilities of settlement of the case, except its criminal aspects.
Plea bargaining shall be resorted to only as a last measure when it shall serve the best interest of the child and the demands of
truth and restorative justice.
Section 45. Trial. - All hearings shall be conducted in am manner conductive to the best interest of the child and in an
environment that will allow the child to participate fully and freely in accordance with the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness.
Section 46. Guiding Principles in Judging the Child. - Subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
other special laws, the judgment against a child in conflict with the law shall be guided by the following principles:
(1) The judgment shall be in proportion to the gravity of the offense, and shall consider the circumstances and the
best interest of the child, the rights of the victim, and the needs of society in line with the demands of balanced
and restorative justice.
(2) Restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum. Where discretion is given by
the law to the judge whether the penalty to be imposed is fine or imprisonment, the imposition of fine should be
proffered as the more appropriate penalty.
(3) No corporal punishment shall be imposed.
(4) In case of the presence of any exculpatory evidence or doubt in the prosecution's evidence, the doubt shall be
resolved In favor of the child.
Section 47. Promulgation of Sentence. - If. After the trial, the court should find the child in conflict with the law guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, it shall impose the proper penalty, including any civil liability which the child may have
incurred, and promulgate the sentence in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules if Criminal Procedure.
Section 48. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. - If the child is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court, instead of executing the judgments of conviction, shall palce the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application. Suspension of sentence can be availed of even if the child is already eighteen years (18) of age or
more but not above twenty-one (21) years old, at the time of the pronouncement of guilt, without prejudice to the child's availing
of other benefits such as probation, if qualified, or adjustment of penalty, in interest of justice.
The benefits of the suspended sentence shall not apply to a child in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of
sentence, but shall nonetheless apply to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty and in lieu thereof,
reclusion perpetua, and after application of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
If the child in conflict with the law reaches eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine
whether to discharge the child in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 9344, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
maximum period of up to the time the child reaches twenty-one (21) years of age, or to order service of sentence.
Section 49. Disposition Conference. -In case of suspended sentence, the court shall set the case for disposition conference
within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of sentence with notice to the social worker of the court, the child and the parents
or guardian ad litem of the child and the child's counsel , the victim and counsel. At the conference, the court shall proceed to
determine and issue any or a combination of the following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of
the child:
(1) Care, guidance, and supervision of orders;
(2) Community service orders;
(3) Drug and alcohol treatment
(4) Participation in group counseling and similar activities; and
(5) Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or
other centers for children in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development.
Section 50. Compliance with the Disposition Measures. - The social worker assigned to the child shall monitor the compliance by
the child in conflict with the law with the disposition measures and shall submit regularly to the court a status and progress report
on the matter. The court may set a conference for the evaluation of such report in the presence, if practicable, of the child, the
parents or guardian, counsel and other persons whose presence may be deemed necessary.
Section 51. Discharge of Child Subject of Disposition Measure. - Upon the recommendation of the social worker assigned to the
child, the court shall, after due notice to all parties and hearing, dismiss the case against the child who has been issued
disposition measures, even before reaching eighteen(18) years of age, and order a final discharge if it finds that the child has
been rehabilitated and has shown the capability to be a useful member of the community.
If the court finds that the child (a) is incorrigible; or (b) has not shown the capability of becoming a useful member of society; or
(c) has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of the disposition or rehabilitation program; (d) or the child's continued stay in
the training institution is not in the child's best interest, the child shall be brought before the court for execution of the judgment.
The final release of the child shall not extinguish the civil liability. The parents and other persons exercising parental authority
over the child shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of the child living in their
company and under the parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
Section 52. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. - The court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a child in
conflict with the law and upon application at any time, place the child on probation if qualified, in lieu of service of sentence taking
into account the best interest of the child.
Section 53. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in conflict with the law who has undergone preventive imprisonment shall
be credited in the service of the sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which the child has
undergone preventive imprisonment, if the child agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same or similar disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in any of the following cases:
(1) When the child is a recidivist or has been convicted twice or more times of any crime; or
(2) When upon being summoned for execution of sentence, the child failed to surrender voluntarily.
A child who does not agree to the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners shall be credited in the service of
the sentence with four-fifths of the time during which the child has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Whenever the child has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which the child may be sentenced and the case is not yet terminated, the child shall be
released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of any on-going intervention program, and the trial thereof or the
proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the child may be sentenced is
destierro, the child shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
Any form of physical restraint imposed on the child in conflict with the law, including community service and commitment to a
rehabilitation center, shall be considered preventive imprisonment.
Section 54. Confidentiality of Proceedings and Record. - All proceedings and records involving children in conflict with the law
from initial contact until final disposition of the case by the court shall be considered privileged and confidential. The public may
be excluded from the proceedings and pursuant to the provisions of Section 31 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness,
the records shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone by any of the parties or the participants in the proceeding for
any purpose whatsoever, except to determine if the child may have the sentence suspended under Section 38 of this Rule or if
the child may be granted probation under the Probation Law, or to enforce the civil liability imposed in the criminal action.
The court shall employ other measures to protect confidentiality of proceedings including non-disclosure of records to the media,
the maintenance of a separate police blotter for cases involving children in conflict with the law and the adoption of a system of
coding to conceal material information, which lead to the child's identity. The records of children in conflict with the law shall not
be used in subsequent proceedings or cases involving the same offender as an adult.
Section 55. Non-liability for Perjury or Concealment or Misrepresentation. - Any person who has been in conflict with the law as
a child shall not be held guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of failure to acknowledge the case or
recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry.
Section 56. Sealing of Records. - The court, motu proprio or on application of a person who has been adjudge a child in conflict
with the law, or if still a minor, on motion of the parents or legal guardian, shall, upon notice to the prosecution and after hearing,
order the sealing of the records of the case if it finds that two (2) years have elapsed since the final discharged of the child after
suspension of sentence or probation, or from the date of the closure order and the child has no pending case of an offense or a
crime involving moral turpitude.
Upon entry of the order, the case shall be treated as if it never occurred. All index references shall be deleted and in case of
inquiry, the court, prosecution, law enforcement officers and all other offices and agencies that dealt with the case shall reply that
no record exist with respect to the child concerned. Copies of the order shall be sent to these officials and agencies named in the
order. Inspection of the sealed records thereafter may be permitted only by order of the court upon petition of the child who is the
subject of the records or of other proper parties.
This procedure shall be without prejudice to the rule on destruction of video or audio tapes under Section 31 of the Rule on the
Examination of Child Witness.
Section 57. Prohibition of Labeling. - In the conduct of proceedings from initial contact with the child in conflict with the law to the
final disposition of the case, there shall be no branding or labeling of the child as a young criminal, juvenile delinquent, prostitute,
vagrant, or attaching to the child in any manner any derogatory description or name. Likewise, no discriminatory statements,
conduct and practices shall be allowed, particularly with respect to the child's social or economic status, physical or mental
disability or ethnic origin.
Section 58. Contempt Powers. - A person who directly or indirectly disobeys any order of the court or obstruct or interferes with
its proceedings or the enforcement of its orders issued under this Rule shall be liable for contempt of court.
Section 59. Effectivity. - This Rule as revised shall take effect on December 1, 2009 after its publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation not later than November 27, 2009.
See A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, April 15, 2002
Section 6
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Thirteenth Congress
Second Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fifth day of July, two thousand and five.
Republic Act No. 9346 June 24, 2006
AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One
Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed.
Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all
other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal
Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code.
SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.
SEC. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the publication at least one a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation of the names of persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment by reason of this Act who are being considered or recommend for commutation or pardon; Provided, however,
That nothing herein shall limit the power of the President to grant executive clemency under Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitutions.
SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect immediately after its publication in two national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
FRANKLIN DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of
Representatives
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2254 and House Bill No. 4826 was finally passed bu the Senate and the
House of Representative on July 7, 2006.
OSCAR G. YABES ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Represenatives
Approved: June 24, 2006
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
Section 9
G.R. No. 187464, November 25, 2015
CABIB ALONTO TANOG, Petitioner, v. HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, 12th Judicial Region, MARAWI CITY, AND GAPO SIDIC, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 filed by petitioner Cabib Alonto Tanog (Cabib) assailing the orders dated February 11,
2009; February 13, 2009; and March 2, 2009, respectively, issued by respondent Hon. Rasad G. Balindong (Judge
Balindong), then Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Marawi City, in Criminal Case No.
4471-04.
The Antecedents:
On July 5, 2004, Cabib Tanog, Jr. was shot to death by a group of armed persons inside the canteen of Dansalan College
Foundation, Inc. in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur.
On the same day, members of the Marawi City police apprehended Gapo Sidic (Sidic) at a police checkpoint while he was
on board a Tamaraw FX vehicle bound for Iligan City.
On July 8, 2004, the petitioner filed a complaint for murder before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Marawi City against
Sidic, Anwar Bonsalagan, Papas Balindong, Nago Balindong, and Arsad Balindong for the death of his son, Cabib, Jr.
In its resolution dated August 3, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict the five (5)
accused, and recommended the filing of an information2 for murder against them.
The prosecution filed an Information for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City against the accused,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 447i_04. This case was raffled to Branch 9, which was presided by Judge Amer Ibrahim.
Thereafter, Judge Ibrahim issued an "order of arrest" against the accused.
On January 8, 2005, Sidic filed a motion to fix bail before the RTC, claiming that the evidence of guilt against him was
not strong.3 After the prosecution presented four witnesses, the RTC, Branch 9: (a) considered the presentation of
evidence by the prosecution for the purposes of the motion to fix bail deemed terminated; and (b) set the presentation of
Sidic's counter evidence on May 21, 2008.
Due to the death of Judge Ibrahim, Judge Lacsaman Busran of the RTC, Branch 11, Marawi City, was designated as
Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 9. The records of Criminal Case No. 4471-04 was re-raffled to Branch 10 because Judge
Busran had been previously designated as its Acting Presiding Judge.
On February 4, 2009, Sidic filed an urgent ex-parte motion to direct special raffle before the RTC, Branch 10 since he had
been in detention for more than four years, and Branch 10 was already overburdened with numerous cases.
In its Order of February 4, 2009, Judge Busran granted Sidic's motion to direct a special raffle, and directed his Branch
Clerk of Court to forward the records of Criminal Case No. 4471-04 to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC).
On the next day, the OCC transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 4471-04 to RTC, Branch 8, presided by
respondent Judge Balindong.
In its order dated February 11, 2009,4 the RTC, Branch 8 granted Sidic's motion to fix bail, and fixed the amount at
P30,000.00. It essentially held that evidence of guilt against Sidic was not strong since the witnesses presented by the
prosecution did not actually see the victim shot.
In its order5 of February 13, 2009, the RTC, Branch 8 directed the City Warden to release Sidic after the latter had posted
the P30,000.00 cash bond.
The prosecution filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration to cancel bond posted for the provisional liberty of the
accused and for inhibition6 before the RTC, Branch 8.
In his order7 dated March 2, 2009, Judge Balindong held that "[t]he motion to fix bail was resolved justly and fairly in
accordance with the law, rules and jurisprudence."8 He, however, opted to inhibit himself "from further taking action on
the other incidents"9 of the case out of "delicadeza." The dispositive portion of this order provides: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
WHEREFORE, the undersigned Acting Presiding Judge is inhibiting himself from trying and deciding the case of accused
Gapo Sidic. The rest of the accused are at large, hence, the most that the next Judge/Acting Judge can do is to archive
the case insofar as they are concerned and issue alias Warrant of Arrest.
Let the record in its entirety be forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for appropriate action considering that it
cannot be re-raffled to RTC Branch 9 as the latter sala is presided by Judge Lacsaman M. Busran of RTC Branch 10 who
earlier inhibited himself from trying this case.
SO ORDERED.10
cralawlawl ibra ry
ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary
The Petition for Certiorari
In the present petition, the petitioner alleged that Judge Balindong committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he granted Sidic's motion to fix bail despite the strong evidence of guilt against
him, and in fixing the amount of bail at only P30,000.00. He maintained that Judge Balindong should have inhibited
himself from taking part in Criminal Case No. 4471-04 since the latter is related to the accused within the prohibited
degree under Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
OUR RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to DISMISS the petition.
The case is already moot
A case is said to be moot or academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a ruling would be of no practical use or value. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over moot cases
because there is no substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled and which would anyway be negated by the
dismissal of the petition.11
In Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Santiago,12 we held that: chanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary
The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or
controversyone which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extralegal or other similar considerations not cognizable
by a court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an
adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. cralawlaw lib rary
The events which took place during the pendency of the present case have rendered the present petition for certiorari
moot. The record shows that during the pendency of this petition, the RTC, Branch 28, Catbalogan City, presided by
Judge Sibanah E. Usman,13 rendered a decision on January 20, 2015, in Criminal Case No. 4471-04 finding Sidic guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
decision became final and executory on March 26, 2015.
We recall that the present petition questioned Judge Balindong's orders granting the motion to fix bail filed by Sidic and
setting the amount of bail at only P30,000.00. Sidic was charged with a capital offense, and his conviction clearly imports
that the evidence of guilt against him of the offense charged was strong. Thus, whatever judgment is reached in this case
would no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced. Simply put, the
petitioner's conviction of a capital offense, which had already attained finality,14 warranted his incarceration. Any
resolution on the propriety of Judge Balindong's challenged orders relating to Sidic's provisional release would be of no
useful or practical value.
The petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of judicial hierarchy.
We also point out that the present petition for certiorari should have been filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) and not
with this Court pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although this Court, the CA, and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and
injunction, the commonality does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice in the forum to be
used.15 The appropriate forum is the court lowest in the judicial hierarchy.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (b) it would
cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases that some of these cases may
have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or because these
courts are better equipped to resolve the issues given that this Court is not a trier of facts.16
In Dy v. Bibat-Palamos,17 the Court recognized various exceptions to the strict application of the principle of hierarchy of
courts, as follows:chanRoblesvi rtu alLaw lib rary
xxx, the invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on
the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as, (1) when dictated by the public
welfare and the advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3) when the
challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and
justified the immediate and direct handling of the case. cralawlawli b rary
Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances (such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications) justify the use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.18
Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases: (a) Chavez v. Romulo on citizens'
right to bear arms; (b) Government of the United States of America v. Purganan on bail in extradition proceedings; (c)
Commission on Elections v. Quijano-Padilla on government contract involving modernization and computerization of
voters' registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich
v. Corona on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office of the President which modified the approval of the
conversion to agro-industrial area.19
In the present case, the petitioner failed to offer any explanation on why he failed to comply with the principle of judicial
hierarchy; he gave no justification why he did not challenge the assailed RTC orders before the CA. We thus reaffirm the
judicial policy that this Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts below, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to this Court
through the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari.20 We reiterate that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary
remedy and the party who seeks to avail of this remedy must strictly observe the procedural rules laid down by law and
the rules.
The grave abuse of discretion issue
Even if we decide the case on the merits, we still dismiss the present petition for its failure to establish that the assailed
orders of Judge Balindong were tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
a. The grant of the motion to fix bail
The right to bail flows from the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the law who
may be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required
under specified conditions. Before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when
the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. If the offense charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Bail is denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's
discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.21
Corollarily, Article 114, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, states that no person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
We point out that the accused were charged of murder, a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. If the
information charges a capital offense, the right to bail becomes a matter of discretion and the grant thereof may be
justified as a matter of right if the evidence of guilt is not strong. The determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge.
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised within
reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the
law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules that, while allowing the judge rational latitude for
the operation of his own individual views, prevent rulings that are out of control.22
In the present case, we find that Judge Balindong did not act in a whimsical, arbitrary, and capricious manner when he
granted Sidic's motion to fix bail. The records showed that a hearing on the application for bail was conducted and that
the prosecution presented four witnesses, namely Noma Tanog, Cabib Tanog, Sr., Saripada Tanog, and Saripoden Tanog
Lucman. Judge Balindong evaluated the testimonies of these witnesses, and found out that none of them witnessed the
actual shooting of the victim: Noma merely saw Sidic running towards the direction of the vehicles after he (Noma) went
to Dansalan College Foundation, Inc. to verify the gunshots he heard; Saripada admitted that he did not see Sidic shoot
the victim; Cabib admitted that it was Noma who pointed Sidic to him as one of the victim's assailants; and Saripoden
merely described the attire of one of the men he saw at the canteen, and did not mention the name of Sidic. On the basis
of these testimonies, Judge Balindong concluded that the prosecution failed to show that the evidence against Sidic was
strong.
We additionally examined the affidavits of Cabib and Noma,23 and found that these documents supported the findings of
Judge Balindong.
In his affidavit, Cabib stated that he was informed of the death of his son by Adil Dima;24 and that it was Noma who told
him the identities of five of the assailants. For his part, Noma stated in his.affidavit that he saw Sidic as one of the
persons who ran towards a maroon Tamaraw FX (bearing plate number ATF 754) and a blue Toyota Corona (without any
plate number) after the shooting. He (Noma) mentioned, however, that the Tamaraw FX the police flagged down was
colored red.25cra lawred
In the light of the testimonies and affidavits of the witnesses, we cannot fault Judge Balindong if he had ruled that the
evidence of guilt against the accused was not strong.
That the RTC eventually convicted Sidic is of no moment, since the trial judge, in determining the weight of evidence for
the purposes of bail, did not sit to try the merits of the case.
b. Amount of bail
Contrary to the petitioner's claim, we also hold that Judge Balindong did not act with grave abuse of discretion when he
set the amount of Sidic's bailatP30,000.00.
Section 9 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that in fixing the amount of bail in criminal cases, judges shall
primarily consider the following factors: (a) financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) nature and circumstances of
the offense; (c) penalty for the offense charged; (d) character and reputation of the accused; (e) age and health of the
accused; (f) weight of the evidence against the accused; (g) probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h)
forfeiture of other bail; (i) the fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j) pendency of other
cases where the accused is on bail.
It is settled that the amount of bail should be reasonable at all times. In implementing this mandate, regard should be
taken of the prisoner's pecuniary circumstances. We point out that what is reasonable bail to a man of wealth may be
unreasonable to a poor man charged with a like offense. Thus, the right to bail should not be rendered nugatory by
requiring a sum that is relatively excessive. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the defendant
when required, but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.26
Judge Balindong explained how he arrived at the amount in this manner: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
Considering the guidelines under Section 9, Rule 114, Rules of Court, among them: the health of the accused who has
languished in jail since his apprehension on July 5, 2004 and up to the present or for more than four (4) years; his
character and reputation as he is a former Councillor of Pualas, Lanao del Sur, in fact, he was incumbent councillor at the
time of his detention; the weight of evidence against him, a weak one; and his financial ability and considering further
the constitutional and statutory provision that "excessive bail shall not be required," the bail is fixed at P30,000.00.27 cralawlaw lib rary
Assuming that the bail set by Judge Balindong is low considering that the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) recommends "no bail" for murder, we cannot use this fact alone to hold that his order -with respect to the
amount of bail set - had been issued with grave abuse of discretion. We point out that the DOJ Bail Bond Guide - while
persuasive and merits attention - is not binding on the courts. In fixing the amount of bail, the judge is given the
discretion to set an amount which he or she perceives as appropriate under given circumstances in relation to the factors
enumerated under Section 9 of Rule 114. As quoted above, Judge Balindong enumerated the reasons (i.e., accused's
incarceration for more than 4 years; his reputation as a former councillor; his financial ability; and the weak evidence
against him) why he set the amount of bail at P30,000.00.
c. Non-inhibition of Judge Balindong
The rule on disqualification of judges is laid down in Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides: chanRoblesvi rtualLaw lib rary
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
xxx
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons
other than those mentioned above, (emphasis ours)
cralawlawl ibra ry
The reason behind the rule on compulsory disqualification of judges was explained in Villaluz v. Judge Mijares28 as
follows: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the respondent judge is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge
should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the
duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness
and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case
and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of
all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice. cralawlawlib rary
In the present case, we hold that the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation that Judge Balindong is related to
Sidic within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to warrant his (Judge Balindong's) mandatory inhibition from the
case.
In his omnibus motion for reconsideration to cancel bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused and for
inhibition, the petitioner prayed, among others, that Judge Balindong inhibit himself from trying and deciding the case on
the merit[s]. He alleged that: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry
xxx the accused is allegedly a relative of the Honorable Acting Presiding Judge of this Court especially the other
accused, namely: Papas Balindong, Nago Balindong alias Hilal and Arsad Balindong. Besides, accused Gapo Sidic is a
resident and native of Barangay Yaran which is an adjacent or adjoining barangay of Barangay Dapao which is allegedly
the native place of the Honorable Acting Presiding Judge. Moreover, Barangays Yaran and Dapao are parts of the
Sultanate territory of Picong wherein the Honorable Acting Presiding Judge of this Honorable Court was crowned as
Sultan [of] Picong.29 (emphasis ours) cralawlawl ibra ry
The petitioner described the relationship between Judge Balindong and the accused with more specifity in the present
petition for certiorari by alleging that: Judge Balindong is the "uncle-in-law" of Sidic; Judge Balindong is the first cousin
of accused Papas; and accused Nago and Arsad are Judge Balindong's "nephews by first degree cousins."
To support these claims, the petitioner attached to the present petition an affidavit executed by Manorbi Sidic essentially
stating that: (1) Sidic's mother-in-law is the sister of Judge Balindong; (2) Judge Balindong and Papas are first-degree
cousins; and (3) Nago and Arsad are the "nephews by first-degree cousins" of Judge Balindong.
To our mind, these bare claims, supported by a mere affidavit of Manorbi that had not been presented before the RTC,
Branch 8, are grossly insufficient to determine whether Judge Balindong falls within the compulsory inhibition under Rule
137. We point out that the petitioner's use of the term 'allegedly' in his omnibus motion for reconsideration to cancel
bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused and for inhibition revealed that he himself was unsure and
uncertain if Judge Balindong was indeed related to Sidic and the other accused. Corollarily, the presentation of Manorbi's
affidavit - attached for the first time in this petition for certiorari - without any other evidence to substantiate the matters
stated therein, is inadequate and lacking to determine the degree of Judge Balindong's relationship to the accused. We
note in this regard that a mere relation by affinity or consanguinity is not enough cause for the compulsory inhibition of a
judge; it should be shown that the he or she is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity,
or to counsel within the fourth degree.
We are not unaware that after Judge Balindong had granted Sidic's motion to fix bail, he opted to inhibit himself "from
further taking action on the other incidents"30 of Criminal Case No. 4471-04 out of "delicadeza." The records do not
indicate what Judge Balindong meant to convey when he used the term "delicadeza" to justify his inhibition; we cannot
imply something that is not supported by the records of the case.
It would have been ideal if the petitioner had filed an administrative case against Judge Balindong if he truly believed
that the latter committed a violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics or the Rules. This would have enabled Judge Balindong
to properly answer the charges against him, particularly his decision not to initially inhibit from Criminal Case No. 4471-
04. It would have also given us ample and sufficient basis to rule on the validity of the petitioner's claim that Judge
Balindong was related to the accused within the prohibitive degree under Rule 137.
We reiterate that grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or an arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law. In this case, the petitioner failed to establish that Judge Balindong gravely abused his discretion in issuing the
challenged orders.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Cabib Alonto Tanog.
SO ORDERED.
Section 11
RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL A.M. No. 06-6-340-RTC

AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 4, DOLORES,
Present:
EASTERN SAMAR
DECISION
PER CURIAM: This administrative case arose from a memorandum1 an audit team of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted. The audit team reported on the judicial audit
conducted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar (trial court) on 7
October 2004.
Judge Gorgonio T. Alvarez (Judge Alvarez), who was due for compulsory retirement on 9
September 2005, used to preside over the trial court. In view of his compulsory retirement, the
audit team conducted a judicial audit of cases. The audit team found that the trial court had a
total caseload of 200 cases consisting of 132 criminal cases and 68 civil cases.2
The audit team found that Judge Alvarez inhibited himself from hearing Civil Case Nos.
3 (206), 53, and 139, and A.M. Nos. 03-1 and 03-2. Civil Case Nos. 3 (206), 53, and 139 were
assigned to Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas (Judge Bugtas), RTC, Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern
Samar, while Administrative Matter Nos. 03-1 and 03-2 were assigned to Judge Juliana
Adalim-White (Judge Adalim-White), RTC, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar.3
The audit team found that:
1. Judge Alvarez failed to act on 27 cases for a considerable length of time.

2. Judge Bugtas:
a. failed to decide Civil Case No. 3 (206) within the

reglementary 90-day period;
b. failed to resolve pending incidents in Civil Case No. 53 for

more than four years; and
c. failed to resolve a motion for reconsideration in Civil

Case No. 139.
3. Judge Adalim-White failed to act on A.M. Nos. 03-1 and 03-2 for a considerable
length of time.4
The audit team also found that Judge Bugtas accepted the bail bonds in Criminal Case
Nos. 393 and 358, both of which were pending before Judge Alvarez.5 In Criminal Case No.
393, the supposed surety, Esperanza G. Aseo (Aseo), filed with Judge Alvarez an affidavit of
disclaimer6 dated 28 January 2004 stating that (1) she did not know the accused, neither was
she related to him; (2) the use of her property as bail bond was unauthorized; (3) the signature
on the property bond was forged; (4) she did not sign as a surety; (5) her real signature was
different from the signature on the property bond; (6) she did not sign her name as Esperanza
Galo, but as Esperanza G. Aseo; (7) Galo was her maiden name while Aseo was her family
name; and (8) the truthfulness of the property bond was questionable because copies of the tax
declaration and original certificate of title over the property were not attached to the bond.
In Criminal Case No. 358, Judge Bugtas accepted the bail bond on 9 December 1999
and, on the same day, then officer-in-charge Ernesto C. Quitorio (Quitorio), now legal
researcher, RTC, Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar signed the order of release. Judge Bugtas
and Quitorio did not forward the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers to Judge
Alvarez until after a subpoena duces tecum was issued on 29 January 2002.7
Thus, the audit team recommended to the OCA to:
1. Direct Judge Alvarez to explain his failure to act on the 27 cases for a
considerable length of time, act on these cases, and submit to the Court a copy of
his decisions, resolutions, orders, and other documents.
2. Direct Judge Bugtas to:
a. explain his failure to decide Civil Case No. 3 (206)

within the 90-day reglementary period, decide the case, and submit to
the Court a copy of his decision;
b. explain his failure to resolve the pending incidents in

Civil Case No. 53 for more than four years, resolve the incidents, and
submit to the Court a copy of his orders;
c. explain his acceptance of the bail bonds in Criminal Case

Nos. 393 and 358;
d. explain his order to release the accused in Criminal

Case No. 393 on the strength of a spurious property bond; and
e. resolve the motion for reconsideration in Civil Case
No. 139 and submit to the Court a copy of his order.
3. Direct Judge Bugtas and Quitorio to explain their failure to forward the bail, order
of release, and other supporting papers in Criminal Case No. 358.
4. Direct Judge Adalim-White to:
a. explain her failure to act on A.M. Nos. 03-1 and 03-2 for
a considerable length of time, act on these cases, and submit to the Court a
copy of her orders.8
The OCA sent a memorandum9 dated 18 March 2005 to Judge Alvarez, Judge Bugtas,
Quitorio, and Judge Adalim-White detailing the audit teams recommendations.
In his letter10 dated 6 April 2005, Judge Alvarez explained the status of the 27 cases.
Thereafter, he submitted a copy of all his decisions, resolutions, orders, and other
documents.11
In his letter12 dated 25 April 2005, Judge Bugtas explained that he (1) failed to decide
Civil Case No. 3 (206) within the 90-day reglementary period because the transcript of
stenographic notes of the case was incomplete; (2) failed to resolve the pending incidents in
Civil Case No. 53 for more than four years because he misplaced the records of the case; (3)
accepted the bail bonds in Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 because Judge Alvarez was
unavailable; (4) ordered the release of the accused in Criminal Case No. 393 because the
property bond and other bail documents were regular on their face and the suretys signature
was genuine; (5) was in the process of resolving the motion for reconsideration in Civil Case
No. 139; and (6) failed to forward the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers in
Criminal Case No. 358 because the accused failed to cause the annotation of the lien on the
propertys certificate of title.
On 11 May 2005, the OCA received a copy of Judge Bugtas resolution in Civil Case No. 139.
On 2 August 2005, it received a copy of his decision in Civil Case No. 3 (206).13
In his letter14 dated 25 April 2005, Quitorio stated that he failed to forward the bail,
order of release, and other supporting papers in Criminal Case No. 358 because the accused
failed to cause the annotation of the lien on the propertys certificate of title.
In a letter,15 Judge Adalim-White stated that she had already resolved A.M. Nos. 03-1
and 03-2 by her orders dated 24 November 2004 and 31 January 2005, respectively. She
submitted a copy of these orders.16
In its 1st indorsement17 dated 16 May 2005, the OCA referred Judge Bugtas explanation
regarding his acceptance of the bail bonds in Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 to Judge Alvarez
for comment. On Criminal Case No. 393, Judge Alvarez stated that he issued several orders
for the arrest of the accused and forfeiture of the property bond after the supposed surety, one
Esperanza Galo, failed to produce the accused before the trial court. Thereafter, Aseo filed
with Judge Alvarez the affidavit of disclaimer dated 28 January 2004.18
Judge Alvarez directed Aseo to furnish the trial court a copy of her voters affidavit. He
then compared Aseos signatures on her voters affidavit and affidavit of disclaimer with the
signature on the property bond. After a very careful study, Judge Alvarez concluded that the
signature on the property bond was forged the signatures on the voters affidavit and the
affidavit of disclaimer were different from the signature on the property bond.19 On 12 May
2004, Judge Alvarez cancelled the property bond and ordered the issuance of an alias warrant
of arrest.20
On Criminal Case No. 358, Judge Alvarez stated that Judge Bugtas accepted the bail
bond and Quitorio signed the order of release on 9 December 1999.21 However, Judge Bugtas
and Quitorio failed to forward the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers to Judge
Alvarez until after a subpoena duces tecum was issued on 29 January 2002. Judge Alvarez
directed Quitorio to appear before him and answer questions regarding the bail. Instead of
appearing before Judge Alvarez, Quitorio sent a written explanation stating that he did not
forward the bail documents because the accused failed to cause the annotation of the lien on
the propertys certificate of title.22
In its memorandum23 dated 6 May 2006, the OCA:
1. Found that Judge Alvarez had fully complied with its directives when he acted
on the 27 cases within the given period and submitted a copy of all his decisions,
resolutions, orders, and other documents;
2. Found that Judge Bugtas:
a. failed to decide Civil Case No. 3 (206) within the 90-day

reglementary period;
b. failed to resolve the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 53

for more than four years;
c. acted without authority when he accepted the bail bonds in

Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358;
d. violated the Rules of Court when he failed to forward the

bail, order of release, and other supporting papers in Criminal Case
No. 358; and
e. went beyond the call of his duties when he approved the

spurious property bond in Criminal Case No. 393.
3. Found that Quitorio erred when he:
a. presented to Judge Bugtas for acceptance the bail bonds in

Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358; and
b. signed the order of release in Criminal Case No. 358.
4. Found that Judge Adalim-White had substantially complied with its directives
when she acted on the two adminisrative cases and submitted a copy of her orders.
5. Recommended that:
a. the audit teams memorandum dated 18 March 2005 be

treated as an administrative complaint against Judge Bugtas and
Quitorio;
b. Judge Bugtas be dismissed from the service for gross

inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law; and
c. Quitorio be suspended for one month and one day for

simple misconduct.
In a Resolution dated 3 July 2006, the Court approved Judge Bugtas application for
optional retirement effective 31 January 2006, but held in abeyance the release of his
retirement benefits. In a Resolution24 dated 2 August 2006, the Court required the parties to
manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings
already filed.
In his manifestation dated 11 August 2006, Judge Bugtas stated that (1) the Court had
no jurisdiction over the instant case because of the approval of his optional retirement effective
31 January 2006, and (2) the Courts attitude towards judges is the reason why there are many
unfilled positions in the judiciary. He told the Court to dismiss the instant case outright for
lack of jurisdiction and order the immediate release of his retirement benefits.
In a Resolution dated 11 December 2006, the Court (1) considered Judge Bugtas to have
waived his compliance with the Resolution dated 2 August 2006 and (2) dispensed with Judge
Alvarezs compliance with the Resolution dated 2 August 2006. In a Resolution dated 26
February 2007, the Court considered Quitorio and Judge Adalim-White to have waived their
compliance with the Resolution dated 2 August 2006.
The Court agrees with the OCAs recommendations, with some modifications.
Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution25 states that judges must decide all cases
within three months from the date of submission. In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (Branch 1), Surigao City,26 the Court held
that:
A judge is mandated to render a decision not more than 90 days from the time a
case is submitted for decision. Judges are to dispose of the courts business promptly and
decide cases within the period specified in the Constitution, that is, 3 months from the
filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum. Failure to observe said rule constitutes
a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge, absent sufficient
justification for his non-compliance therewith. (Emphasis ours)
Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should administer
justice without delay. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 states that judges shall dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. In Office of the Court
Administrator v. Javellana,27 the Court held that:
A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an
extension granted by this Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required
period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.
The Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 3, Rule 3.05 mandates judges to
attend promptly to the business of the court and decide cases within the periods
prescribed by law and the Rules. Under the 1987 Constitution, lower court judges are also
mandated to decide cases within 90 days from submission.
Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the
integrity, competence and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of justice
more efficient. Time and again, we have stressed the need to strictly observe this duty so
as not to negate our efforts to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of
congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. (Emphasis ours)
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Garcia-Blanco,28 the Court held that the 90-day
reglementary period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period
constitutes a ground for administrative liability except when there are valid reasons for the
delay.29
Civil Case No. 3 (206) was submitted for decision on 10 December 2003; therefore, the
decision was due on 10 March 2004. Judge Bugtas decided the case only on 22 July 2005, and
only after the OCA required him to do so. If it were not for the judicial audit, Judge Bugtas
would have left the case undecided indefinitely.
Judge Bugtas explained that he incurred the delay because the transcript of stenographic
notes was incomplete. This is unacceptable. The incompleteness of the transcript of
stenographic notes is not a valid excuse for delay in rendering judgment. Judges are required
to personally take down notes of the salient portions of the hearings and to proceed in preparing
the decisions without waiting for the transcript of stenographic notes. In Re: Report on Judicial
Audit in RTC Br. 26, Manila,30 the Court held that judges are required to take down notes and
to proceed in the preparation of decisions, even without the transcript of stenographic notes as
the reglementary period continues to run with or without them. In OCA v. Judge Salva,31 the
Court held that:
[T]he 90-day reglementary period for deciding or resolving cases submitted for such
purposes is reckoned from the date when the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by
the Rules of Court or by the court itself is submitted, and not from the time when the
transcript of stenographic notes of a case is completed by the stenographer.32 (Emphasis
ours)
Judges are allowed, for valid reasons, to ask for an extension of the 90-day reglementary
period.33 Judge Bugtas did not ask for any extension. In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branches 3, 5, 7, 60 and 61, Baguio City,34 the Court
held that failure to decide even one case within the 90-day reglementary period constitutes
gross inefficiency.
Aside from the long delay in deciding Civil Case No. 3 (206), Judge Bugtas also failed
to resolve pending incidents in Civil Case No. 53 for more than four years. Section 15, Article
VIII of the Constitution states that judges must resolve all matters within three months from
the date of submission unless the law requires a shorter period. Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct states that judges should administer justice without delay. Rule 3.05 of
Canon 3 states that judges shall dispose of the courts business promptly. In Sianghio, Jr. v.
Judge Reyes,35 the Court held that unreasonable delays in resolving pending motions violate
the norms of judicial conduct and in Custodio v. Quitain,36 the Court held that unreasonable
delays in resolving motions or other incidents are administratively sanctionable.
In the instant case, Judge Bugtas did not act on the pending incidents for more than four
years. Inaction for more than four years is clearly unreasonable. Worse, if the audit team had
not conducted the judicial audit, Judge Bugtas would have left the pending incidents
unresolved indefinitely.
Judge Bugtas explained that he incurred the delay because he misplaced the records of
the case. This is unacceptable. Judge Bugtas explanation cannot exonerate him or mitigate his
inefficiency.37 Losing the records of the case constitutes gross negligence.38
Judge Bugtas was responsible for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt
delivery of court services.39 Rule 3.08, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct40 states that judges should diligently discharge administrative
responsibilities and maintain professional competence in court management. Rule 3.09 states
that judges should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of
public service and fidelity. Judge Bugtas opted to ignore these rules. The audit team had to ask
for the assistance of one Atty. Crisolito A. Tavera in looking for the records of Civil Case No.
53, which were later found in a heap of papers. In Sianghio, Jr.,41 the Court held that:
If only respondent judge performed his mandated duty of devising an efficient recording
and filing system in his court to enable him to monitor the flow of cases and to manage
their speedy and timely disposition, the records of the case would not have been
misplaced.
Canon 3, Rule 3.09 requires judges to manage their dockets in such a manner that the
work of their courts is accomplished with reasonable dispatch. However, we would like to
emphasize that the responsibility of making a physical inventory of cases primarily rests
on the presiding judge. (Emphasis ours)
This is not the first time Judge Bugtas has been found grossly inefficient. In Montes v.
Bugtas,42 the Court found him grossly inefficient for failing to decide a case within the 90-
day reglementary period. In Montes, Judge Bugtas explained that he incurred the delay because
he left the decision in his chamber and forgot about it.43 The Court sanctioned him and warned
him that a repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.44
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court45 classifies undue delay in rendering a
decision or order as a less serious charge. It is punishable by (1) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months, or (2) a fine
of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.46
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should be faithful
to the law and maintain professional competence. Section 17(a), Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court
where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with
any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, municipal trial judge,
or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested
in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be
filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with
any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
(Emphasis ours)
In Cruz v. Judge Yaneza,47 the Court held that:
There are prerequisites to be complied with. First, the application for bail must be filed in the
court where the case is pending. In the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, the
application for bail must be filed with another branch of the same court within the province or
city. Second, if the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the
case is pending, bail may be filed with any regional trial court of the place.
In the instant case, Judge Bugtas did not present any proof to show that (1) Judge
Alvarez was unavailable, or (2) the accused were arrested in Borongan. According to the OCA:
The criminal cases were pending before RTC, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar and
there was no showing that Judge Alvarez was absent or unavailable when Judge Bugtas
approved the bail bonds in Criminal Cases [sic] Nos. 393 and 358 on December 20, 1996
and December 9, 1999, respectively. There is also no proof that the accused were arrested
in Borongan to clothe Judge Bugtas with authority to grant bail.48 (Emphasis ours)
Since (1) Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 were pending before Judge Alvarez, (2) there
was no showing that Judge Alvarez was unavailable, and (3) the accused were not arrested in
Borongan, Judge Bugtas had no authority to accept the bail bonds in these cases. In Espanol
v. Mupas,49 the Court held that judges who approve applications for bail of accused whose
cases are pending in other courts are guilty of gross ignorance of the law. In Lim v. Dumlao,50
the Court held that:
The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114 x x x must be complied with before a judge
may grant bail. The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the
law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in
cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the law is
straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know
it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of
release. He is expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with
before he can approve [the accuseds] bail and issue an order for his release. The law
involved is rudimentary that it leaves little room for error. (Emphasis ours)
In Criminal Case No. 358, Judge Bugtas not only wrongfully accepted the bail but also
failed to forward the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers to Judge Alvarez as
required in the Rules of Court. ection 19, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 19. Release on bail. The accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by
the judge with whom it was filed in accordance with section 17 of this Rule.
When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who
accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting
papers, to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a
different one to be filed. (Emphasis ours)
In Naui v. Mauricio, Sr.,51 the Court held that judges should forward the records
pertaining to the bail bond immediately after receiving them. In the instant case, Judge Bugtas
accepted the bail bond in Criminal Case No. 358 on 9 December 1999. He forwarded the bail,
order of release, and other supporting papers only after a subpoena duces tecum was issued on
29 January 2002. If the subpoena duces tecum were not issued, Judge Bugtas would have
continued to ignore the provisions of Section 19 indefinitely.
Judge Bugtas explained that he did not forward the records pertaining to the bail because
the accused failed to cause the annotation of the lien on the propertys certificate of title. This
is unacceptable. Section 19 is very clear: When bail is filed with a court other than where the
case is pending, the judge who accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of
release and other supporting papers, to the court where the case is pending.
Section 11, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court52 states that failure of the accused to cause
the annotation of the lien on the propertys certificate of title within 10 days after the approval
of the property bond shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the bond and re-arrest and
detention of the accused. Judge Alvarez could have cancelled the property bond and issued the
warrant of arrest much sooner had Judge Bugtas followed Section 19. Moreover, since Judge
Bugtas opted to accept and retain possession of the bail bond, albeit erroneously, the least he
could have done was to cancel the property bond and issue a warrant of arrest when the accused
failed to cause the annotation of the lien within 10 days, yet he did not do so.
Not every judicial error constitutes ignorance of the law. When the error is committed
in good faith, it does not warrant administrative sanction. However, the error must be within
the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. When the law is clear and leaves little room for error,
not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.53 In the instant case, the law is very
clear and Judge Bugtas is grossly ignorant.
This is not the first time Judge Bugtas has been found grossly ignorant of the law. He
has had two cases finding him grossly ignorant of the law, both dealing with the release of
persons charged with penal offenses. In Adalim-White v. Bugtas,54 the Court found him
grossly ignorant of the law for ordering the release of the accused on recognizance pending
approval of the accuseds application for parole and before serving the minimum period of his
sentence. And in Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas,55 the Court found him grossly ignorant of
the law for granting bail to the accused charged with murder without conducting a hearing to
determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong. In both cases, the Court sanctioned him
and warned him that a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court56 classifies gross ignorance of the law or
procedure as a serious charge. It is punishable by (1) dismissal from the service, with forfeiture
of all benefits except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch
or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations;
(2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but
not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.57
Considering that this is Judge Bugtas fourth offense, the Court agrees with the OCAs
recommendation to impose the penalty of dismissal.
Although Judge Bugtas can no longer be dismissed because of his early retirement, his
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, shall be forfeited, with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
In Criminal Case No. 393, Judge Bugtas not only wrongfully accepted the bail bond but
also approved a spurious property bond. In Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of
Confiscated Cash, Surety and Property Bonds at RTC, Tarlac City, Branches 63, 64 and 65,58
the Court held that judges are bound to review the bond documents before approving the bond.
In that case, the Court agreed with the observations of the OCA that:
Although the duty to ensure compliance with the requisites of bail bond application
rests mainly with the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized personnel and the task of the Judge
is only to approve the same, said task has an accompanying responsibility on the part of
the approving Judge to review or determine its validity. Understandably, he should be
employing the minimum standard the rules require the clerks of court to observe.
Considering the seriousness of the purpose in the posting of bail bond, approval thereof
should pass through strict scrutiny and with utmost caution on the part of both the Clerk
of Court (or his duly authorized personnel) and the approving Judge. (Emphasis ours)
In Padilla v. Judge Silerio,59 the Court sanctioned a judge for his negligence in
approving a spurious bond and held that judges are enjoined to carefully pore over all
documents before they sign the same and give their official imprimatur. It agreed with the
observations of the OCA that:
[R]espondent Judge should be made liable for carelessness and failure to exercise the
necessary diligence when he signed the Order approving the spurious x x x bond of [the]
accused x x x.
Signing of Orders must not be taken lightly nor should it be considered as one of
the usual paperwork that simply passes through the hands of a judge for signature.
Respondent Judge should be made to account for his negligence and lack of prudence
which resulted in the anomaly now in question. (Emphasis ours)
In the instant case, Judge Bugtas approved the property bond in Criminal Case No. 393
without the knowledge and consent of the registered owner of the property. In her affidavit of
disclaimer, Aseo stated:
I was shocked to receive an ORDER issued by Hon. Presiding Judge Gorgonio T. Alvarez,
ordering the alleged bond forfeited in favor of the government and directing the sheriff to cause
the confiscation of the bond[.]
x x x [T]he use of my said property as a surety [sic] is of dubious character since what is now
attached to the BAIL BOND is only a CERTIFICATION from the Office of the Treasurer,
Dolores, Eastern Samar, signed by Dario C. Quitorio, the Real Property Tax Clerk, certifying
to the effect that Esperanza Galo is the owner of TD No. 400100, and another
CERTIFICATION signed by Adolfo V. Codiamat, Asst. Municipal Treasurer, to the effect that
the said Tax Declaration No. 400100 has no record of liens and encumbrances of claims to the
said property, and no copy of the said Tax Declaration was attached nor a copy of the original
certificate of Title, being a titled property[.]60
In his letter dated 25 April 2005, Judge Bugtas stated that he found no significant
disparity between the signature on the property bond and Aseos signature on her voters
affidavit. He stated that Judge Alvarezs conclusion that the signature on the property bond was
forged had no legal basis because it was not supported by findings of a handwriting expert.
These are unacceptable.
The Court agrees with Judge Alvarezs conclusion that the signature on the property
bond was forged. The dissimilarity between the signature on the property bond and the
signatures on Aseos voters affidavit and affidavit of disclaimer is glaring. The signature on
the property bond reads Esperanza Galo, while the signatures on the voters affidavit and
affidavit of disclaimer read Esperanza G. Aseo. Moreover, the handwriting on the property
bond is markedly different from those on the voters affidavit and affidavit of disclaimer.
In De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,61 the Court held that resort to handwriting experts is
dispensable in cases involving comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not
entirely depend on the testimony of a handwriting expert because the judge must conduct an
independent examination of the questioned signature in arriving at a conclusion on its
authenticity. Resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory especially when, as in this case,
the dissimilarity is so obvious.
The Court agrees with the OCA that, Judge Bugtas should be held liable for approving
the spurious property bond x x x in Criminal Case No. 393.62 Simple misconduct is any
unlawful, wrongful, or improper conduct.63 It constitutes a less serious charge, punishable by
(1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more
than three months, or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.64
Judge Bugtas contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the instant case because
of the approval of his optional retirement effective 31 January 2006. This is unacceptable. In
Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila v. Veneracion,65 the Court held that cessation from office
because of retirement does not render the administrative case moot or warrant its dismissal:
Cessation from the office of respondent judge because of death or retirement does
not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was
still in the service or render the said administrative case moot and academic. The
jurisdiction that was this Courts at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint
was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased [to hold] office
during the pendency of his case. Indeed, the retirement of a judge or any judicial officer
from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he
shall still be answerable. (Emphasis ours)
In the instant case, the audit team conducted the judicial audit on 7 October 2004 and
submitted to the OCA a memorandum dated 18 March 2005. Upon the recommendation of the
OCA, the memorandum dated 18 March 2005 was treated as an administrative complaint
against Judge Bugtas and Quitorio. The OCA sent a memorandum dated 18 March 2005 to
Judge Bugtas detailing the audit teams recommendations. On 28 April 2005, the OCA received
Judge Bugtas letter dated 25 April 2005 containing his explanations. These show that, when
Judge Bugtas retired on 31 January 2006, the instant administrative case was already pending.
In Aquino, Jr. v. Miranda,66 the Court held that it is not ousted of its jurisdiction over
an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office
during the pendency of respondents case. The retirement of Judge Bugtas did not preclude the
finding of any administrative liability, to which he shall still be answerable.67
Aside from the instant case and the three previous cases decided against him, Judge
Bugtas has another administrative case68 pending against him. Undoubtedly, he has
demonstrated his incorrigibility and unfitness to be a judge. In Adalim-White,69 the Court
agreed with the observations of the investigating justice on Judge Bugtas. These observations
continue to hold true today, and with more reason. According to the investigating justice:
The undersigned Investigating Justice does not accept Judge Bugtas good faith because
Judge Bugtas was apparently lacking in sincerity. He was not unaware that [the accused]
was serving final sentence for which his indeterminate penalty had a minimum of 4 years and
2 months. When Judge Bugtas ordered the release, [the accused] had not yet served even the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence, a fact that Judge Bugtas should have known through
a simple process of computation. x x x He was fully aware that [the accused] could not be
released even upon recognizance of the Provincial Jail Warden.
xxxx
Judge Bugtas could give no acceptable explanation for his acts.
xxxx
The undersigned Investigating Justice opines that Judge Bugtas contention

compounds his already dire situation. x x x Such ignorance, whether pretended or not, is
terrifying to see in a judicial officer like Judge Bugtas, a presiding judge of the Regional
trial Court. (Emphasis ours)
Clerks of court have no authority to order the release of persons charged with penal
offenses. In Gonzalo v. Mejia,70 the Court held that:
There is usurpation of judicial function when a person who is not a judge attempts to
perform an act the authority for which the law has vested only upon a judge. In Escanan vs.
Monterola II, we ruled that the clerk of court, unlike a judge, has no power to order either
the commitment or the release of persons charged with penal offenses. Thus, respondent,
in ordering the release of the four prisoners, has duly usurped the judicial prerogative of
a judge. Such usurpation is equivalent to grave misconduct. (Emphasis ours)
In Judge Vallarta v. Vda. De Batoon,71 the Court held that:

[T]he approval of the bail of an accused person and the authority to order the release of a
detained person is purely a judicial function. The clerk of court, unlike a judicial authority,
has no power to order either the commitment or the release on bail of person [sic] charged
with penal offenses. (Emphasis ours)
In Biag v. Gubatanga,72 the Court held that:
Clearly, the Clerk of Court is not empowered to issue the questioned order in the
name of the judge. It was gross misrepresentation on the part of respondent to issue the Release
Order x x x, thus causing the release of the accused x x x without a proper court order. By
taking a direct hand in the release of the accused, who is now at large, respondent is guilty
of grave misconduct, as she has arrogated unto herself the disposition of a judicial matter
pending adjudication before the court. (Emphasis ours)
In the instant case, Quitorio personally signed the order of release in Criminal Case No.
358. The OCA found that:
He x x x signed the Order of Release in Criminal Case No. 358 on the same day that Judge
Bugtas approved the property bond of the accused. By releasing the accused on account of the
property bond he had posted, Quitorio arrogated unto himself the authority to exercise judicial
discretion.
The issuance of a release order is a judicial function, not an administrative one. A Clerk
of Court has no power to order the release on bail of persons charged with penal offenses (Hon.
Jose S. Arcilla vs. Alfredo Sabido, 88 SCRA 53 [1979]).73
Section 17(a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where
the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any
regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested
in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be
filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with
any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
(Emphasis ours)
In the instant case, (1) Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 were both pending before Judge
Alvarez, (2) there was no showing that Judge Alvarez was unavailable, and (3) the accused
were not arrested in Borongan. Thus, Quitorio should not have presented the bail bonds in
these cases to Judge Bugtas for approval. In Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of
Confiscated Cash, Surety and Property Bonds at RTC, Tarlac City, Branches 63, 64 and 65,74
the Court agreed with the observation of the OCA that the duty to ensure compliance with the
requisites of bail bond application rests mainly on the clerk of court. Considering the
seriousness of the purpose in posting a bail bond, its approval should pass through strict
scrutiny.
Quitorio fully knew that Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 were pending before Judge
Alvarez, yet he opted to present the bail bonds in these cases to Judge Bugtas for approval.
Section 19, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 19. Release on bail. The accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the
judge with whom it was filed in accordance with section 17 of this Rule.
When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who
accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting
papers, to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a
different one to be filed. (Emphasis ours)
In the instant case, Quitorio failed to forward the bail, order of release, and other
supporting papers to Judge Alvarez for more than two years. He only did so after a subpoena
duces tecum was issued. Quitorios failure to observe the clear and simple mandate of Section
19 is sanctionable. In Santiago v. Judge Jovellanos,75 the Court sanctioned a clerk of court
for failing to forward the bail documents.
Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the
established rules of conduct for public officers.76 It is an unlawful behavior.77 Misconduct in
office is any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful
in character. It generally means wrongful, improper, unlawful conduct motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose although it may not necessarily imply
corruption or criminal intent.78
Section 52(B)(2)79 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service80 classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of
one month and one day to six months for the first offense.
Section 15
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 March 31, 2006
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
x--------------x
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC March 31, 2006
Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.
x--------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 March 31, 2006

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-812-RTJ)
LUZ ARRIEGO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
"Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives." Justice Brandeis, Loughran v. Loughran
1
THE CASES
The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite psychological
evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic) revealed "(e)vidence of ego
disintegration" and "developing psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June
1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem, mood
swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions.
Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty.
Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving
the way to Atty. Floros appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4
November 1998.
Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.2
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, reported its findings to
erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other things, that his report be
considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an
appropriate psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended as well that
Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation against him.
In a Resolution4 dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA, docketing the
complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of the following acts or omissions as reported by
the audit team:
(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding
qualifications and for announcing in open court during court session his qualification in violation
of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;
(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules
of Procedures;
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is pro-accused which is
contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial
Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial
Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without
filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing;
(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the
accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of
examination of the custodian of the accused;
(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case,
by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the
presence of the trial prosecutor;
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and
physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-
up";
(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in
Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide;
(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the
Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system;
(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings;
(m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.
Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court of Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez
(consultant, OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was
directed to comment within ten days from receipt of the resolution and to subject himself to an appropriate
psychological or mental examination to be conducted "by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly
authorized medical and/or mental institution." In the same breath, the Court resolved to place Judge Floro under
preventive suspension "for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against him." He was
barely eight months into his position.
On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set forth both affirmative and negative
defenses6 while he filed his "Answer/Compliance" on 26 August 1999.
On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of his case for failure to prosecute.7
However, on 21 March 2000, he presented himself as his first witness in the hearing conducted by Justice
Ramirez.8 Subsequently, on 7 July 2000, Judge Floro filed a "Petition for Inhibition/Disqualification" against
Justice Ramirez as investigator9 which was denied by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July 2000. 10 Judge
Floros motion for reconsideration 11 suffered the same fate. 12 On 27 July 2000, Judge Floro submitted the
question of Justice Ramirezs inhibition/disqualification to this Court. 13 On 8 August 2000, the Court ruled
against the inhibition of Justice Ramirez. 13
On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to comment on Judge Floros motion
to dismiss, 15 recommended that the same should be denied.
Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001. 16 The day after, Justice Ramirez came out with a
"Partial Report" recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro from office "by reason of insanity which renders him
incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73." 17
In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him and even after Justice Ramirez
came out with his report and recommendation on 7 March 2001, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing
cases against those he perceived to have connived to boot him out of office.
A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July 1999 preventive suspension follows:
1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA against Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Team Leader,
Judicial Audit Team, Office of the Court Administrator 18
2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ against Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch
72, Malabon City 19
3. AC No. 5286 against Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo and Judge Benjamin Aquino,
Jr.20
4. AC No. CBD-00-740 against Thelma C. Bahia, Court Management Office, Atty. Mary Jane
Dacarra-Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of the Office of the Court
Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 73, Malabon21
5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) against former Court Administrator Justice Alfredo L.
Benipayo and (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator22
6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez23
7. A.C. No. 6050 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez24
On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling seven, be dismissed.25 On 14
February 2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss.26
The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460: "(f)or using/taking advantage
of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide)
in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to
sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor." The complainant Luz Arriego is the mother
of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN.
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer Jocelyn Japitenga testified on 16 July 2001. On 31
July 2001, Arriego filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On
5 September 2001, Judge Floro testified on his behalf while Atty. Galang testified against him on 4 October
2001. On 16 October 2001, Judge Floro filed a Memorandum in this case.27
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in
Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN "In Re: Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng
Nei, Petitioner." The resolution disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the
reconsideration of the order denying the petition for naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.
This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty. David S. Narvasa, the petitioners
counsel.28 The OCA, through Court Administrator Benipayo, made the following evaluation:
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition and declared it as null
and void. However, he ordered the raffling of the case anew (not re-raffle due to inhibition) so
that the petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have a chance to have the case be assigned to other judges
through an impartial raffle.
When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should have continued hearing and
taking cognizance of the case. It is improper for him to order the raffle of the case "anew" as this
violates Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987
Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which provides to wit:
"8. Raffle of Cases:
xxxx
8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of the interested party
who seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive Judge that
unless the special raffle is conducted, irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The
special raffle shall be conducted by at least two judges in a multiple-sala station.
x x x x"
Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the special raffle of a case since such is only
allowed upon a verified application of the interested party seeking a provisional remedy and only upon the
Executive Judges finding that if a special raffle is not conducted, the applicant will suffer irreparable damage.
Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.s order is contrary to the above-mentioned Administrative Circular.
Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even mention in his resolution that Justice Regino C.
Hermosisima, Jr. is his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship. It is not unusual to hear a judge who speaks
highly of a "padrino" (who helped him get his position). Such remark even if made as an expression of deep
gratitude makes the judge guilty of creating a dubious impression about his integrity and independence. Such
flaunting and expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges concerned. A judge shall not allow family,
social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of Judicial
Conduct).
The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling on the motion for reconsideration are judicial
matters which this Office has no authority to review. The remedy is judicial, not administrative.29
The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering the raffle of the case in
violation of Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on page 5 of the subject resolution that "Justice
Hermosisima, Jr. x x x helped undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding his nomination x x x."
In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA.30 Judge
Floro, through his counsel, filed his Comment on 22 October 199931 which was noted by this Court on 7
December 1999. On 11 January 2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of Evidence which this Court, in a
resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred to Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his report and recommendation.
For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in this case as well as in the
second case (i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated 14 February 2006, the Court directed
Judge Floro as well as the other parties in these two cases to inform the Court whether or not they are willing to
submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed and the
evidence so far submitted by them or to have the decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the two.
On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., manifested its willingness to
submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution based on the pleadings and the evidence submitted therein.
Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise informed this Court, in a Letter dated 28 February
2006, her willingness to submit her case for decision based on the pleadings already submitted and on the
evidence previously offered and marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006, Judge Floro manifested his
preference to have A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC.
In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are consolidated cases, we resolve to
render as well a consolidated decision.
But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding Judge Floros alleged mental illness
and its effects on his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is
indeed psychologically impaired and/or disabled as concluded by the investigator appointed by this Court is
frankly beyond our sphere of competence, involving as it does a purely medical issue; hence, we will have to
depend on the findings of the mental health professionals who interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our job is
simply to wade through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the irreverent in order to determine once and
for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the charges against him. If the evidence makes out a case against Judge
Floro, the next issue is to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil mind or because of a psychological or
mental incapacity. Upon the resolution of this question hinges the applicability of equity.
As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges ("c" and "g", "h" and "j", "e" and "f") will be jointly
discussed as they had likewise been jointly discussed by the OCA. These charges involve common facts and to
treat them separately will be superfluous.
DISCUSSION
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal against
Judge Floro
(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications AND for
announcing in open court during court session his qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of
Judicial Conduct
As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his name as the Presiding
Judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein that he is a "bar exams topnotcher (87.55%)" and
with "full second honors" from the Ateneo de Manila University, A.B. and LL.B.32 The audit team likewise
reported that: "(b)efore the start of court session, Judge Floro is introduced as a private law practitioner, a
graduate of Ateneo de Manila University with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during the 1983 Bar
Examinations with an average score of 87.55%. Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible, particularly the Book of
Revelation according to Saint John, was made. The people in the courtroom were given the opportunity to ask
Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions were asked; hence the session commenced."33
Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, 34 "the use of professional cards
containing the name of the lawyer, his title, his office and residence is not improper" and that the word "title"
should be broad enough to include a Judges legal standing in the bar, his honors duly earned or even his Law
School. Moreover, other lawyers do include in their calling cards their former/present titles/positions like
President of the Jaycees, Rotary Club, etc., so where then does one draw the line? Finally, Judge Floro argues
that his cards were not being circulated but were given merely as tokens to close friends or by reciprocity to
other callers considering that common sense dictates that he is not allowed by law to seek other professional
employment.
As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications, Judge Floro counters that it was
his branch clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who suggested that during his initial court session, she
would briefly announce his appointment with an introduction of his school, honors, bar rating and law practice.
Naively, Judge Floro agreed as the introduction was done only during the first week of his assumption into office.
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that "a judge should not seek
publicity for personal vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility: "a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services." This means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their profession,
cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading
authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x using or permitting the use of any
undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or
self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity." 35
The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his professional card, did Judge Floro violate
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 36 we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers
is permitted and that the card "may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced." In herein case, Judge Floros
calling cards cannot be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his
law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and modesty
required of judges.
Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these were just given by him as tokens and/or
only to a few who requested the same. 37 The investigation by Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals otherwise.
An eye-witness from the OCA categorically stated that Judge Floro circulated these cards. 38 Worse, Judge
Floros very own witness, a researcher from an adjoining branch, testified that Judge Floro gave her one of these
cards. 39
As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should be measured against Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC being more favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule
140, before its amendment, automatically classified violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious
charges. As amended, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may amount to gross misconduct, which is a
serious charge, or it may amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious charge or it may simply be a
case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light charge.
"Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross" connotes something "out of all measure;
beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful." 40 For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act
complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-
known legal rules. 41
With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-
laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see from
the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all
too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the
proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they
must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe.
As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing in open court his
qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it
smacks of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their
qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a
sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice confident, competent and true.
And to discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has to court the
litigants and their lawyers approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a week, Judge Floro is guilty of
simple misconduct only.
(b)Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters
The audit team observed that "inside Judge Floros chamber[s], there is a folding bed with cushion located at the
right corner of the room. A man, who was later identified as Judge Floros driver, was sleeping. However, upon
seeing the audit team, the driver immediately went out of the room." 42
Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The man the audit team saw "sleeping" on
his folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floros aide or "alalay" whom he allows to rest from time to time (in
between periods and especially during court sessions) for humanitarian reasons. J. Torralba was not sleeping
during that time that the audit team was in Branch 73 as he immediately left when he saw the members thereof.
This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in Judge Floro having allowed another
person to use his folding bed for short periods of time during office hours and while there is no one else in the
room. The situation would have been different if there had been any allegation of misuse or abuse of
government funds and/or facilities such as in the case of Presado v. Genova 43 wherein Judge Genova was
found guilty of serious misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he and his
family used his chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial government paying for the electrical bills.
Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such familiarity from his aide as this becomes
fodder for gossip as what had apparently happened in this case. Judge Floro should have been aware of and
attuned to the sensibilities of his staff who were understandably uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement
of a judge allowing his aide easy access to his folding bed.
(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of
Procedure
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused
without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of the
custodian of the accused
The memorandum report reads:
c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the absence of the trial prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr.
still proceeded with the hearing of the following matters:
(c-1) "Motion for Release on Recognizance" filed by the accused, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384, 20371, 20246
and 20442 entitled "People vs. Luisito Beltran", "People vs. Emma Alvarez, et al.", "People vs. Rowena Camino",
and "People vs. John Richie Villaluz", respectively. In the hearing of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded
questions (in a form of direct examination) to the custodian of the accused without the accused being sworn by
the administering officer. (Note: initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch Clerk of Court Dizon to place the
accused under oath prior to the start of his questions. However, COC Dizon refused). The hearing on the
aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous hearing wherein the accused had pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge Floro, Jr. would automatically inform the accused that they are
qualified to apply for probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to draft the application in
behalf of the accused so that a motion for release on recognizance will immediately be heard and be
consequently granted. As appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith as Annexes "3" to "6"), the
custodians of the accused are either a barangay kagawad, barangay tanod or a member of the lupong
tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order granting the motion for release on recognizance is being issued by
Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him neither rules nor circular mandates the issuance of a written order.
Instead, after granting the motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign the minutes of the session.
Photocopies of the minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and 20371-MN
are hereto attached as Annexes "3" to "5".
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-MN, Judge Floro, Jr. granted a similar motion
without issuing a written order. Copies of the minutes are hereto attached as annexes "6" to "7." 44
In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule of procedure with respect to the
cases mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that
Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court refers only to final and not interlocutory
orders. Only final orders and judgments are promulgated, rendered and entered.
xxxx
Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar, herein respondent faithfully complied with
the requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding the applications for release on recognizance,
thus:
a. The application for release on recognizance, although captioned as MOTION FOR RELEASE
ON RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D. 968, a Special Law on Probation.
b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due course/taken cognizance of by

respondent, if on its face, the same bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the Office of the
City/Public Prosecutor.
c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all courts), especially in RTC,
MALABON, and in Malolos, Bulacan (where respondent practiced from 1985-1998 almost 14
years), [and especially the practice of former Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro
Manila], is to interview the custodian, in the chambers, regarding his being a responsible member
of the community where the accused reside/resides; the questions propounded are in the form of
direct and even cross examination questions.
d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness stand, since there is no such
requirement. All that is required, is to inform the accused regarding some matters of probation
(optional) such as whether he was sentenced previously by a Court, whether or not he has had
previous cases, etc.
e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court hearings on application for release on
recognizance, respondent, for caution in most of the applications, included the interview/hearing
on the applications for release on recognizance, during criminal trial dates, where a fiscal/trial
prosecutor is available; at other times, the hearing is held in the chambers.45
The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of the rules on probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as amended. Contrary to his remonstrations, the release of an
accused on recognizance entails more than a cursory interview of the custodian and the applicant. Under the
Probation Law,46 and as we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares,47 it is incumbent upon the Judge hearing the
application to ascertain first that the applicant is not a "disqualified offender" as "(p)utting the discharge of the
accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the request for provisional liberty."
Moreover, from Judge Floros explanations, it would seem that he completely did away with the requirement for
an investigation report by the probation officer. Under the Probation Law, the accuseds temporary liberty is
warranted only during the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report on the application for
probation and the resolution thereon.48 As we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares49 :
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to conduct case study prior to action on
application for release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely to underscore the interim character of the
provisional liberty envisioned under the Probation Law. Stated differently, the temporary liberty of an applicant
for probation is effective no longer than the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report and the
resolution of the petition, which the law mandates as no more than sixty (60) days to finish the case study and
report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report for the trial judge to resolve the application
for probation. By allowing the temporary liberty of the accused even before the order to submit the case study
and report, respondent Judge unceremoniously extended the pro tem discharge of the accused to the detriment
of the prosecution and the private complainants. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on recognizance need not be in
writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals
50 wherein we held that "no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and
unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for
filing, release to the parties and implementation." Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his duties as judge
when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases
No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, "People v. Luisito Beltran," "People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.,"
"People v. Rowena Camino," and "People v. John Richie Villaluz." 51 From his explanation that such written
orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floros failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence
on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.
In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floros handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the
release on recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any
opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the probation
officer to render a case study and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the release of
the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on recognizance, as well as his eventual
probation, was already a done deal even before the hearing on his application as Judge Floro took up the
cudgels for the accused by instructing his staff to draft the application for probation. This, Judge Floro did not
deny. Thus, we agree in the observation of the audit team that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been
approving applications for release on recognizance hastily and without observing the requirements of the law for
said purpose. Verily, we having nothing against courts leaning backward in favor of the accused; in fact, this is a
salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants. In herein case, however, we cannot countenance
what Judge Floro did as "the unsolicited fervor to release the accused significantly deprived the prosecution and
the private complainants of their right to due process." 52
Judge Floros insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. 53
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously.
54 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for anything less is
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 55 True, not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and
that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanctions. 56 To hold otherwise "would be nothing
short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments." 57 This rule,
however, admits of an exception as "good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the
parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal
principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of error." 58 Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith
but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable. 59
(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared that he is pro-accused which is contrary to
Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct
The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in criminal cases, he is always
"pro-accused" particularly concerning detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually pay for
the premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart upon Atty. Buenaventura was the
need for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused whose
cases could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor assigned to his sala. He narrated as well to
Atty. Buenaventura the sufferings of detention prisoners languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases
had not been tried during the vacancy of his sala from February 1997 to 5 November 1998. At any rate, Judge
Floro submits that there is no single evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or private complainant that he
sided with the accused.
Atty. Dizon, Judge Floros Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro,
during a staff meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with them especially those
under detention as he, himself, had been accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded
offenses. 60
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible especially since it is corroborated by
independent evidence, 61 e.g., Judge Floros unwarranted eagerness in approving application for release on
recognizance as previously discussed.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the
law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and
perceived to be impartial, independent and honest" as well. 62 Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure
but above suspicion. 63 Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused,
opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge
should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness.
Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. 64 "His language,
both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued." 65
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent judiciary is to be

realized. And by professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his capacity
for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the publics trust in his ability to render justice. As we
held in Castillo v. Juan 66 :
In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended
party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-
times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging
matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts,
of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well
as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with patience
and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he
should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally
important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not
merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance.
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading
the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor.
(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in
Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide.
The memorandum report states:
During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN entitled: "People vs. Nenita Salvador",
Judge Floro, Jr., in the absence of the public prosecutor and considering that the private complainant was not
being represented by a private prosecutor, used his moral ascendancy and influence to convince the private
complainant to settle and eventually cause the dismissal of the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect by
making the private complainants and the accused sign the settlement. (Copy of the signed stenographic notes is
hereto attached as Annex "8").
xxxx
In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put
on record the "manifestations" of the private complainant and the accused relative to their willingness to settle
the civil aspect of the case. In the same order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his ruling on the said settlement until
after the public prosecutor has given his comment. However, per report of the court employees in Branch 73, the
aforesaid order was actually a revised one or a deviation from the original order given in open court. Actually, the
said criminal case was already settled even without the presence of the public prosecutor. The settlement was in
the nature of absolving not only the civil liability of the accused but the criminal liability as well. It was further
reported that the private complainants signed the compromise agreement due to the insistence or persuasion of
Judge Floro, Jr. The audit team was furnished a copy of the stenographic notes (unsigned draft order) and the
revised order (signed). Copies of the stenographic notes and the revised order are hereto attached as Annexes
"8", "13", and "14". (Note: the stenographic notes were signed by the parties to the case).
In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, Luz Arriego, filed an
administrative case against Judge Floro docketed as A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit Complaint
67 dated 9 August 1999, she alleged that on 8 March 1999, Judge Floro forced them to settle her daughters case
against the accused therein despite the absence of the trial prosecutor. When the parties could not agree on the
amount to be paid by the accused for the medical expenses incurred by complaining witness, they requested
respondent that they be given time to study the matter and consult a lawyer to which Judge Floro replied that the
case be settled immediately, uttering, "ngayon na! ngayon na!" Moreover, Judge Floro allegedly made them
believe that the counter-charges filed by the accused against the complaining witness would likewise be
dismissed, so they agreed to settle the case. However, the written Order issued by respondent Judge did not
reflect the agreement entered into by the parties in open court.
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint filed by Mrs. Arriego, maintaining
that the hearing on said case was not only in accordance with the Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the
litigants concerned as they openly manifested their willingness to patch up their differences in the spirit of
reconciliation. Then, considering that the parties suggested that they would file the necessary pleadings in due
course, Judge Floro waited for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated Order could be reduced to writing.
Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation between Judge Floro and Court Administrator Benipayo, the latter
opined that under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of compromise in criminal cases is
tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some cases. With this in mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the
hearing on even date was superseded by the revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.
Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventuras stance that he has no power to revise an Order, courts
have plenary power to recall and amend or revise any orally dictated order in substance and in form even motu
proprio.
The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of Appeals 68 wherein we declared:
x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down
in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the
parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and
unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order
or judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and
signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party. In truth, even after promulgation (i.e., filing
with the clerk of court), and even after service on the parties of notice of an order or judgment, the Court
rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall and amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of
any party or even motu proprio, provided that in the case of a final order or judgment, the same has not attained
finality. (Emphasis supplied)
In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open court ostensibly a judicial approval
of a compromise agreement which was amended or revised by removing the stamp of judicial approval, the
written order merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling regarding the manifestations of the parties
to enter into a compromise agreement after the public prosecutor shall have submitted its comments thereto. 69
Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral order per the Echaus
ruling and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an amendment, we find no basis for the charge of
dishonesty (under paragraph "j" of the complaint).
Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case
No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the
private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor, the
same must likewise fail for lack of basis. The controversial settlement never came to pass. It was not judicially
approved as reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999, thus, Mrs. Arriego actually had no cause for
complaint. She cannot, on one hand, complain that the written order did not reflect the agreement reached
during the hearing and, on the other hand, claim that this agreement was reached under duress at the instance
of Judge Floro.
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical
examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up"
The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20347-MN, Judge Floro
"motu proprio ordered the physical and mental examination of the accused by any physician, over the strong
objection of the trial prosecutor, on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up." 70
In refutation, Judge Floro argues --
In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the demeanor of the accused NESTOR ESCARLAN and
noted the manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO lawyer, and the comment/objections of
the trial prosecutor, Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:
a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted to enter a plea of not guilty;
b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the bench and he appeared trembling
and stammering;
c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily admitted that accused is "nauutal", has
difficulty of reasoning, of speaking, and very nervous;
d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often changed his mind regarding the plea,
from not guilty to guilty and to not guilty, and so forth;
e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation by the Court/respondent of the
pertinent provisions of the Rules, namely Rule 28 (Mental Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of
Rule 116, and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135, Rules of Court (plenary powers to issue orders to conform
to justice), manifested orally that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up";
f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing the ORDER OF MENTAL
EXAMINATION.
The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is well-settled that "the court may order a
physical or MENTAL examination of a party where his physical or mental condition is material to the issues
involved." (27 C.J.S. p. 119, cf. MARTIN, p. 107, id.). 71
PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro. He testified that he moved for the
suspension of the arraignment of the accused Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness
for trial. 72 As reflected in the Order for suspension, however, and as admitted by Judge Floro himself in his
Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested that accused is "mahina ang pick-up."
Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment motu proprio and "over the strong
objection of the trial prosecutor." It must be remembered that the scheduled arraignment took place in February
1999 when the applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable
to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order
his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused
unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the
suspension be made "upon motion by the proper party." 73 Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro
to order the suspension of the arraignment motu proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact,
jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that the accused, even
with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense. 74 As we underscored in People v. Alcalde 75 :
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a present condition
of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such
affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to
suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are
recovered. x x x.
xxxx
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of
Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him
to effectively prepare for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the
mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the
proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the
law secures or gives. x x x.
Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the accuseds mental fitness for trial is
already beside the point. If ever he erred, he erred in the side of caution which, under the circumstances of the
case, is not an actionable wrong.
(e)Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial
Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits
a judge from engaging in the private practice of law
(f)Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without filing
the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing
In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states:
i.Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal cases pending before the lower courts in
Bulacan. He admitted that Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in some of these cases, is just signing the
pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as collaborating counsel. When attending the hearing of the
cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted that he does not file an application for leave of absence.
Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending civil case in the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported that
in these cases, he is appearing and filing pleadings in his capacity as party and counsel for himself and even
indicating in the pleadings that he is the Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.
Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr. indeed has a pending case before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: "In Re: In the
Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Robert V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus
Jesie V. Floro and Benjamin V. Floro". In this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
Entry of Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission" wherein he signed as the petitioner and at the
same time indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro Manila. Court
stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan confirmed this information. Judge Floro, Jr.
even attached a copy of his oath taking and his picture together with President Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid
pleading. Photocopy of the said Motion is hereto attached as Annex "9".
Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, to
appear as counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil cases (except the above-mentioned case) pending
before lower courts. 76
Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law. Section 35,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: "No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give
professional advice to client." Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides
that: "A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law."
Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired lawyers to attend to his personal
cases. 77
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any concrete proof of Judge Floro having
appeared as counsel in his personal cases after he had already been appointed Judge except that he prepared
a pleading ("Ex Parte Motion For Issuance of Entry of Judgment With Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission")
jointly with his counsel of record in connection with a habeas corpus case he filed against his brothers for the
custody of their "mild, mentally-retarded" brother. He explained, however, that he prepared the said pleading in
the heat of anger as he could not accept the judgment of dismissal in that case.78 He likewise explained that the
pleading was signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he had rectified the same by filing an Amended
Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit. 79 Finally, during the hearing of this case, Judge Floro argued that he filed
the subject pleading as petitioner and not as counsel. 80
The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on sound public policy, thus:
[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with
the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges
give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own
private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives
are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest. 81
Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is envisioned by "private practice" is more than
an isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. 82 In herein case, save for the
"Motion for Entry of Judgment," it does not appear from the records that Judge Floro filed other pleadings or
appeared in any other court proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe to conclude, therefore,
that Judge Floros act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and does not in any wise
constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that Judge Floro is obviously not
lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the petitioner.
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty
of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch
73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only
logical explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put
pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the right. 83 Verily, Canon 2,
Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a "judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner
the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency." By doing what he
did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge Floro has been attending the hearing of
his personal cases without filing for leave of absence. As Judge Floro vehemently protests the charge as untrue,
it was incumbent upon the OCA to prove its case. Time and again we have held that although administrative
proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence, the liberality of procedure in administrative
actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due process. 84
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings
The memorandum report reads:
In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to observe the way Judge Floro, Jr. conducts court
proceedings. With the assistance of the court staff, the team was able to obtain a tape-recorded proceeding
conducted by Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the transcript of the proceedings (Annex "15"). The tape record of the
court proceedings is also submitted along with this report as Exhibit "A".
xxxx
The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty. Abelarde was appearing for the
plaintiff while Atty. Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the defendant. During the hearing, it seems that the
counsels for both parties were guiding Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the trial.
There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court, to wit:
"Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi nila maayos ang Rules of Court
natin, hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law of California on Civil Procedure; pagdating dito eh dahil sa kanila
maraming nagkakaproblema, masyadong maraming eh ako wala akong pinagkopyahan yan but ginawa ko
lang yon Sabi ko si Judge nagko-complain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na sa akin
except na hindi papayag kasi marami diyang "
In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr., instead of holding trial, discussed, in open
court, the case involving his brother. He even condemned the Philippine justice system and manifested his
disgust on the unfairness of the system. Thus, he said:
"Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng eto bulok ang hustisya. Ang kapatid ko
napakayaman, ako walang pera."
He continued:
"Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung kapatid ko retarded, bawal. In
memory of my brother, Robert Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun
ganun Sabi ko paano ko makikita ang katarungan. Tapos ngayon ang nangyari di Judge na ako, hindi ko
pa nakita ang kapatid ko. Di ngayon, ang ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala akong
nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay napakaraming pera. Alam ko naman kung ang isang court eh
parehas o may kiling eh. Yung abogado niya malakas na malakas doon. Sana hindi naka-record eto (laughs)
baka ako ma-contempt dito." 85
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these are all hearsay fabrications
supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC personnel due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to
allegedly cover-up their consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of duties which were all
unearthed by Judge Floro).
As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the Philippine judicial system, Judge
Floro contends that this recording was done clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law
(Republic Act No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by cutting portions thereof. They also
made it appear that the conversation took place in a court proceeding when, in fact, this was inside his
chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question were submitted to the OCA sans the
"yellow notes" and the official transcribed copy thereof. 86 This means that the transcribed copy that was
submitted by the audit team as Annex "15" is but an unofficial copy and does not, by itself, prove that what was
being recorded was a court proceeding. This being the case, the two tapes, without concrete proof that they
were taken officially during a court proceeding, cannot be used against Judge Floro as the unauthorized
recording of a private conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200. 87
Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus left with only Judge Floros word
against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who testified under oath as to Judge Floros alleged propensity to
criticize the judiciary and to use intemperate language. Resolving these particular charges would therefore
depend upon which party is more credible.
Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the
Rules of Court and the Philippine Justice System?
A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch 73 the alleged "kabulukan ng
hustisya". Time and again he said the Rules of Court is of no use. He said that since theory and the practice of
law are very different, the Rules of Court does not always apply to different cases. Not only the justice system
did he criticize but likewise Judges and Justices. He told us . . . and I quote "Dyan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang
corrupt na Judges . . . Sa Court of Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan diyan."
To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very institution he is now serving? Where is his
respect to the court, to the bar and to the bench? How can he uphold courts as temples of justice if he himself
did not believe in the justice system?
xxxx
Q What can you say about charge letter "L" which reads for the use of highly improper and intemperate
language during court proceedings?
A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence of me, the Court Interpreter, the Legal
Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters regarding practitioners in our court. There is one time
one Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, "Luka-luka, talaga yang babaing yan" and then he would call even not
during court session, but during office hours our Court Interpreter "malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the sun". So, it
did not surprise us one time when during a pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for Civil Case No. 25-86-MN
"Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado", he uttered offensive language against his fellow judge. Take the transcription of
this court proceeding is already adapted by the Court Administrator. It was the content of the tape he sent the
Court Administrator. Actually, for consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro discussed in open
Court, before all of us, the court staff present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the defendants in the
case, we were in quandary whether or not to attach in the record the stenographic notes or even the actual
transcription of the proceedings because it contained offensive languages against the justice system, against a
certain judge, against a certain Clerk of Court named Jude Assanda, against people he is disgusted with. In fact,
instead of discussing the merit of the case or the possibility of the amicable settlement between the parties, he
integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of Court, I may not use my discretion whether or not to advise
the stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the same in the record because it contained offensive
languages highly improper and intemperate languages like for example, "putang ina", words like "ako ang anghel
ng kamatayan, etcetera, etcetera". 88
The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward and candid declarations of Atty. Dizon
especially in the light of confirming proofs from Judge Floro himself.
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject utterances are consistent with Judge
Floros claims of intellectual superiority for having graduated with several honors from the Ateneo School of Law
and having placed 13th in the bar examinations. Moreover, his utterances against the judicial system on account
of his perception of injustice in the disposition of his brothers case are not far removed from his reactions to
what he perceived were injustices committed against him by the OCA and by the persons who were either in
charge of the cases against him or had some sort of participation therein. Consequently, although there is no
direct proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said, nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as
intellectually superior as well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go his way, show that it is
more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of unbecoming
conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 89 In
this case, there is ample and competent proof of violation on Judge Floros part.
(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987
The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro
[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses matters involving his personal life and beliefs.
Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that "[a] judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court." A disorderly
judge generates disorderly work. An indecorous judge invites indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to maintain
order and proper decorum in court. When the judge respects himself, others will respect him too. When he is
orderly, others will follow suit. Proceedings in court must be conducted formally and solemnly. The atmosphere
must be characterized with honor and dignity befitting the seriousness and importance of a judicial trial called to
ascertain the truth. Anything which tends to detract from this atmosphere must be avoided. And the judge is
supposed to be in control and is therefore responsible for any detraction therefrom.
Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should
be conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the course and direction of trials so that waste of
time is avoided.
Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and movements. He must always keep
in mind that he is the visible representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.s claims that he is endowed with psychic
powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen
"little friends" are manifestations of his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to carry
out the functions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge Floro, Jr. once again to
psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness to remain in the judiciary. 90
Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as its title would suggest, it merely sets
the guidelines in the administration of justice following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that the 13 charges are inextricably
linked to the charge of mental/psychological illness which allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue
discharging the functions of his office. This being the case, we will consider the allegation that Judge Floro
proclaims himself to be endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is
the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" in determining the transcendental issue of his
mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.
But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed for the seven of the
13 charges discussed above. To recapitulate, we have found Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of seven
of the 13 charges against him. Thus:
1) Charge "a" - simple misconduct
2) Charges "c" and "g" gross ignorance of the law
3) Charge "d" unbecoming conduct
4) Charge "e" unbecoming conduct
5) Charges "k" and "l" unbecoming conduct
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140 as amended, a judge guilty of a
serious charge may be dismissed from the service, suspended from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three but not exceeding six months or fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P
40,000.00 depending on the circumstances of the case. In herein case, considering that Judge Floro had barely
warmed his seat when he was slammed with these charges, his relative inexperience is to be taken in his favor.
And, considering further that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in bad faith or with corrupt motives, we
hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The fine is to be imposed in the maximum, i.e. P 40,000.00, as we will
treat the findings of simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct as aggravating circumstances. 91
Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to a medically disabling
condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office
As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated accusations in A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental illness against Judge Floro embodied in the requirement for him to undergo
an appropriate mental or psychological examination and which necessitated his suspension pending
investigation. This charge of mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office
notwithstanding the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no finding of dismissal from the
service against Judge Floro.
The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when the latter applied for judgeship
(which application he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in September 1995. The psychological report, as
prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D. (Director III, Chief SC Clinic Services) and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist),
stated in part:
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.
REMARKS:
Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the interview. He was argumentative and over
solicitous of questions asked, giving the impressions of marked suspiciousness. He centered on his academic
excellence, an Ateneo de Manila graduate of the College of Law, rated top 13th place in the bar examination. He
emphasized his obsessive and compulsive method of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of whether
it was school days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the time and graduated Law as second honor, he calls
this self-discipline and self-organization. He expressed dissatisfaction of his achievements, tend to be a
perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To emphasize his ultra bright mind and analytical system, he related
that, for the past 3 to 5 years, he has been experiencing "Psychic vision" every morning and that the biggest
secret of the universe are the "unseen things." He can predict future events because of "power in psychic
phenomenon" as when his bar results was to be released, he saw lights in the sky "no. 13-1," and he got the
13th place. He has been practicing "parapsychology" seeing plenty of "dwendes" around him.
He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be irrelevant.
Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego disintegration are prominent findings, both in the
interview (conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious level). 92
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented himself to the Supreme Court Clinic
when he applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC Malabon. Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P.
Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV) did the interview and evaluation. Dr. Vista observed:
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he takes pride in this. During the interview, he
was quite reluctant to reveal information about his family background and would rather talk about his work and
academic achievements. However, he failed to integrate his knowledge into a cohesive unit which he can utilize
to cope with the various tasks that he undertakes. This renders him confused and ambivalent with a tendency to
vacillate with decision-making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to mood swings with the slightest
provocation.
From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in his personality and level of functioning as a
lawyer in private practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits. He has
poor social skills and showed discomfort with close social contacts. Paranoid ideations, suspiciousness of
others motives as well as perceptual distortions were evident during the interview.
Atty. Floros current intelligence function is along the mild mental retardation (68) which is below the expected
cognitive efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses
in judgment and may have problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and
seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as
a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. Furthermore, he
is at present not intellectually and emotionally equipped to hurdle the responsibilities of a judge and he may
decompensate when exposed to anxiety-provoking and stress-laden situation. 93
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed Judge Floro to seek a second
opinion from private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, however, resurrected the issue of his mental and
psychological capacity to preside over a regional trial court. Thus, the Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically
ordered Judge Floro to submit to "appropriate psychological or mental examination."
On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, 94 the Court clarified that the "appropriate
psychological or mental examination" being adverted to in the Resolution of 20 July 1999 is to be conducted by
the SC Clinic. The Court thereby directed Judge Floro to "submit himself to the SC Clinic for psychological or
mental examination, within ten (10) days from notice." 95 Judge Floro sought reconsideration which was denied
by the Court on 22 February 2000. 96
The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC Clinic was reiterated by the Court on
17 October 2000 with the admonition that Judge Floros failure to do so would result in appropriate disciplinary
sanctions. 97
On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October 2000 Resolution with a conjunctive
special motion for him to undergo psychiatric examination by any duly authorized medical and/or mental
institution. 98 This was denied by the Court on 14 November 2000. 99
On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the inhibition or disqualification of Supreme
Court Clinic doctors 100 and psychologist 101 with a manifestation that he filed cases against them for revocation of
licenses before the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), the Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and
the PAP 102 for alleged gross incompetence and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No. 2382/1959
Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics. 103
On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court Administrator Benipayo, moved that Judge
Floro be sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to comply with the 1 February 2000 and 17 October 2000
resolutions. According to Justice Ramirez, Judge Floros filing of administrative cases with the PRC against Dr.
Mendoza, et al., is an indication of the latters intention to disregard and disobey the legal orders of the Court. 104
The Court en banc agreed in the report of Justice Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was ordered to submit to
psychological and mental examination within 10 days from receipt, otherwise, he "shall be ordered arrested and
detained at the jail of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x." 105
Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December 2000. 106 He likewise sought the services
of a private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who came out with his own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3
January 2001. 107
Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in December 2000, this time in
connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff
Officer reported that "(o)ver all data strongly suggest a delusional disorder with movement in the paranoid
direction." Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part, stated that:
Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is basically a cautious, and suspicious individual
with a compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu. Despite his status, cognitive assets and
impressive educational background, his current functioning is gauged along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.
He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine situations. However, his test protocol is
characterized by disabling indicators. There is impairment in reality testing which is an indicator of a psychotic
process. He is unable to make an objective assessment and judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to
misconstrue signals from his environment resulting to perceptual distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses
in judgment. Such that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena and divine gifts of healing
have become incorporated in a delusional (false and unshakable beliefs) system, that it has interfered and
tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in performing his court duties as a
judge. 108
Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro, Supreme Court Senior Chief Staff Officer
Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that
The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially supported by evidence. Based on the
three[3] psychological tests and evaluation of the two[2] psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other recourse but
to recommend that Judge Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective
immediately.
Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted earlier psychological evaluations
conducted by several mental health professionals which were all favorable to him. The first three evaluations
were in connection with his application as RTC Judge of Malabon City in 1998 brought about by him having
"failed" the examination given by the Supreme Court Clinic. The report dated 04 September 1998 by staff
psychologist, Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villasor of the
Metropolitan Psychological Corporation (MPC), states in part:
I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to cope with everyday
demands. He is able to handle both concrete and abstract requirements of tasks. Alert to
details, he has a logical approach in evaluating the relationship between things and
ideas.
2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where he can consider solid facts to
arrived (sic)at concrete, tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he can organize procedures
and details so as to get things done correctly and on schedule. He uses conventional
standards to determine personal progress. Set in his views, he may not readily accept
others ideas and contributions especially if these oppose his own.
3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is expected of FFJ. Generally,

he prefers to control his emotions and does not let this get in the way of his judgment and
decisions.
II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for his undertakings. Achievement-
oriented, he sets high personal standards and tends to judge himself and others according to
these standards. When things do not develop along desired lines, he may become restless and
impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his social stature and can be expected to comply with
conventional social demands. 109
Testifying as one of Judge Floros witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross-examination that
"psychologically speaking," Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge. Thus:
JUDGE AQUINO:
Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his testimony here and on every available records of
the proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed with Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in the
interview. Would you consider his failure to tell you about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook of the patient?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxxx
Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] proceedings and you were here when we were cross-
examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we mentioned in the course of our cross-examination. Would you
consider his failure to tell you about his power of by location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of his
psychological outlook?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Fatal [flaw]?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that he is capable of being in a trance?
A: He did not.
Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type letters?
A: He did not.
xxxx
Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will not be pronouncing or making
pronouncement concerning his psychic powers. Is this not correct?
xxxx
A: Yes sir.
Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is capable of having trances in the course of
his private activities and even in the course of the performance of his official duty as a Judge. Will you not agree
with that?
A: I agree with you, Sir.
Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented person. Meaning tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha
naman "na ako ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng ipower ng by location, na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng
ibat iba pang bagay at the same time." Yan ay hindi compatible sa pagiging reality oriented?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a Judge.
xxxx
Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir. 110
Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant Psychiatrist of the Makati Medical Center,
stated in her report dated 3 September 1998 that at the time of the interview Judge Floro
[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current issues, able to discuss a wide variety of
topics intelligently without hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational, logical and reality based. He is well oriented,
intelligent, emotionally stable, with very good judgment. There is no previous history of any psychological
disturbances. 111
This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated September 1998, who stated in his report
that
Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-spectacled person with graying hair. When
interviewed he was somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times approximate in his answers. He was alert,
oriented, conscious, cooperative and articulate in Pilipino and English. He denied any perceptual disturbances.
Stream of thought was logical and goal-directed. There was pressure of speech with tendency to be
argumentative or defensive but there were no flight of ideas, thought blocking, looseness of associations or
neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and appropriate but mood was anxious. There were
no abnormal involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is intact. Judgment, insight, and
other test for higher cortical functions did not reveal abnormal results.
Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. do not contradict his
nomination and appointment to the post he is seeking. 112
On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floros witness, Dr. Jurilla clarified that the interview had
its limitations 113 and he might have missed out certain information left out by his patient. 114 The following
exchange is thus instructive:
JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that he has little unseen, unheard friends known
as duwendes?
DR. JURILLA: He did not.
xxxx
Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you information about his claim to be the number five
psychic in the country?
xxxx
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called, psychic phenomena?
A: He did not.
xxxx
Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to another, at least four (4) kilometers apart, he used
to ride on a big white or whatever it is, horse?
A: Not during our interview.
xxxx
A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might have missed some information or it
is possible that our clients or patients might not [have] told us everything.
Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as those that Judge Floro did not admittedly tell you
in the course of the interview, your opinion of the patient would be altered a little?
xxxx
A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be altered. Yes, Your Honor in the absence of
any corroborative contradiction.
Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired after the interview, would that be correct?
A: The interview has its limitations.
Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the interview are confirmed by events that transpired
after the interview, would you not say you have more reason to have your evaluation altered?
A: Yes.
Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge Floro has been proclaiming himself as the
number five psychic in the country [where] no one has called him as a psychic at all?
xxxx
Q: Would it be really more altered?
A: I would say so.
xxxx
Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview, which are confirmations of what Judge Floro
did not tell you during the interview, would your finding of [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will tell you
that he is capable or possessed of the power of bilocation?
xxxx
A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.
Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge Floros mental and psychological x x x?
A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.
Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you suspect that there was abnormality in the person
of Judge Floro?
A: Given the data.
Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you also have your evaluation favorable to Judge
Floro drastically altered if I tell you that based on record Judge Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is
capable of typing a letter?
xxxx
A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, probably drastically altered. 115
Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T. Maaba, M.D., 116 dated 3 January 2001,
the relevant portions of which state:
Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed. Content of thought did not reveal delusional
thought. He was proud of his achievements in line with his profession and expressed his frustration and
dissatisfaction with the way his colleagues are handling his pending administrative cases. He was observed to
be reality-oriented and was not suffering from hallucinations or abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation, with
respect to time, place and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and decision-making capacity were adequately
functioning.
xxxx
An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on December 26, 2000. He talked about his family
and academic achievements. He claimed to possess a divine gift for prophecy and a gift of healing. He also
talked about a "covenant" made during a dream between him and 3 dwarf friends named Luis, Armand and
Angel. He reported that the first part of his ministry is to cast illness and/or disease and the second part is to heal
and alleviate sufferings/pain from disease.
A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on December 28, 2000. The battery of test
consisted of the following: (1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA Language Test (3) Purdue Non-Language
Test (4) Sacks Sentence Completion Test and (5) Draw A Person Test. Test results and evaluation showed an
individual with an Above Average Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessive-compulsive person who is
meticulous to details and strive for perfection in tasks assigned to him. He is reality-oriented and is deemed
capable of making day-to-day decisions in his personal as well as professional decisions. Confusion with regard
to sexual identification, was further observed.
Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests, respondent Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr., was found to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-oriented and is not suffering from any major
psychotic disorder. He is not deluded nor hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in making
sound decisions. His belief in supernatural abilities is culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups.
On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that Judge Floro was unfit to be a
judge. 117 The relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba and Judge Aquino are hereunder reproduced:
JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with a judge who shall claim that he is possessed
with power of [bi-location]?
xxxx
DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2) places at one time.
Q: And that something must be wrong?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge claiming in the course of his testimony and in
this very case that while [he] was so testifying there is another spirit, another person, another character unseen
who is with him at the same time or in tagalog "sumapi sa kanya".
xxxx
A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion "sumapi" to me is unbelievable.
Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from some delusion?
xxxx
A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual distortion, your Honor.
Q: No, Delusion.
A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.
Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?
A: Both are on the same footing.
Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding as a witness about hallucinatory matters
would turn out to be fit to become a judge?
xxxx
A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a major psychiatric disorder like schizophrenia or an
organic mental disorder, this individual suffering from hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge,
however, there is, this symptom might also exi[s]t in a non-psychotic illness and the hallucinations and delusions
could be transient and short in duration.
Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?
A: Yes, doubtful capacity.
Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are practicing with psychiatry.
A: Yes.
Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings
particularly in the course of his testimony that while he was doing so, he was under trance normal.
xxxx
A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually considered in the Philippines as part of a culture bound
syndrome and it could also be an indication Basically the phenomenon of trance are often seen in cases of
organic mental disorder. It is also common in culture bound syndrome and the effect of person is usually loss of
concentration in a particular settings or situations so that a person or a judge hearing a case in court would [lose]
concentration and would not be able to follow up testimony of witnesses as well as arguments given by the
counsel for the defense and also for the prosecution, so I would say that there is this difficulty in manners of
attention span and concentration if that person sitting as a judge experience trance as in the case of Judge
Floro, this trance is manifested by flashing of lights and he might not be able to rationalize or to control
expressions or as well as physical when he is in a trance.
Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a proceeding, he was in a trance?
A: No, I have not encountered any.
Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe such claim you will call that person not a normal
person.
A: Maybe weird.
Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the proceedings in these cases held on October
10, 2000, afternoon session, page 30 we start with the question of Atty. Dizon. "Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness, can you
tell us? Are you in trance at this very precise moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: "Nakalakip sila". I call it a trance,
but I distinguished not the trance that you see the nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas. Thats a trance that is created
by the so called Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao, multi awarded Jesuit priest, considered that as mind projection.
He is correct in a sense that those nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind projection or the hypnosis do come,
and there is a change in the psychological aspect of the person. But in my case I never was changed physically
or mentally. Only the lights and heat will penetrate that person. ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at this very
moment, Mr. witness, "meron kayong kalakip ngayon?"" "Ngayong oras na ito?" JUDGE FLORO: Yes, they are
here. Atty. DIZON: Where are they? Judge Floro, Jr.: They cannot be seen but ATTY. DIZON: No, can you
see them?" To point to us where are they in this room?", Now that you have read and seen this portion wherein
Judge Floro himself admitted that in the course of his testimony in these cases he was in a trance, would you
still consider him at least insofar as this claim of his to be a normal person?
A: No.
Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these proceedings also and I will show to you the
transcript of stenographic notes later have claimed that he had, always had and still had a socalled counter
part, his other side, other self, what can you say to that claim, would that be the claim of a normal, mental sound
person?
A: No.
Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not fit to sit as judge?
xxxx
A: Yes. 118
Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma. Nieves Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla,
respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of insanity to remain in office as Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.
It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case that President Estrada would not
finish his term as President. It is unusual and queer of him to state in his calling card that he is a graduate of
Ateneo de Manila, second honors, bar topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and include in his address the name
Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was involved in a coup detat attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of
his alleged psychic powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned to his court. It is improper and grandiose of
him to express superiority over other judges in the course of hearings he is conducting and for him to say that he
is very successful over many other applicants for the position he has been appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge
to distribute self-serving propaganda. One who distributes such self-serving propaganda is odd, queer, amusing,
irresponsible and abnormal. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit to be one. So is he who gets
into a trance while presiding at the hearing of a case in court. One need not be a doctor of medicine, a
psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine and conclude that a person in such circumstances is mentally unfit
or insane and should not be allowed to continue discharging the duties and functions of a judge. The life, liberty
and property of the litigants in the court presided by such judge are in his hands. Hence, it is imperative that he
is free from doubt as to his mental capacity and condition to continue discharging the functions of his office.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit
to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73, respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED from
such office. 119
We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge because of the findings of
mental impairment that renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office. We hasten to add, however, that
neither the OCA nor this Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is "insane" as, in fact, the psychologists
and psychiatrists on his case have never said so.
When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the service due to "insanity," he was
apparently using the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a general laymans term, a catchall word referring to
various mental disorders. Psychosis is perhaps the appropriate medical term 120 as this is the one used by Drs.
Vista and Villegas of the Supreme Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological
evaluations all reported signs and symptoms of psychosis.
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and happiness of the people. 121 An
honorable, competent and independent judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of
government, and the well-being of the people. 122 Carrying much of the weight in this daunting task of
administering justice are our front liners, the judges who preside over courts of law and in whose hands are
entrusted the destinies of individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts will only succeed in their tasks if
the judges presiding over them are truly honorable men, competent and independent. 123
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in our disposition of the
13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the
findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in
competence and independence.
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in "psychic visions," of foreseeing the future because of
his power in "psychic phenomenon." He believes in "duwendes" and of a covenant with his "dwarf friends Luis,
Armand and Angel." He believes that he can write while on trance and that he had been seen by several people
to have been in two places at the same time. He has likened himself to the "angel of death" who can inflict pains
on people, especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He took to wearing
blue robes during court sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His own witness testified that Judge Floro
explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro
conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his break time. All these things validate the findings of the
Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floros uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over to action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However, such beliefs, especially since Judge
Floro acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial thinking required of a judge under our judicial
system.
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive
law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floros reference
to psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr. 124 sticks out like a sore
thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness by
concluding that the testimony was a "fairytale" or a "fantastic story." 125 He then went to state that "psychic
phenomena" was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the testimony of the witness. The
pertinent portion of Judge Floros decision is quoted hereunder:
3. The testimony of the prosecutions PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness of the incident) NORMANDY is
INCREDIBLE, is full of inconsistencies (major and not regarding minor points), ergo, the court concludes that
due to several indicia of fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable deception of the Court), his testimony is not worthy of
belief, assuming ex-gratia argumenti, that the same may be admissible, and his Court narrative is hereby
declared a FAIRY TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that is acceptable only for
SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The following details, are proof of the foregoing conclusion:
a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and Raul Ineria were "sinalubong" by
Lando/accused on June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and that he
saw the "nagpambuno" between Raul and Ando, and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE
WAS NO LONGER THERE, but he still saw the "nagpambuno"; MORE IMPORTANTLY, he
SWORE that HE NOTICED the ACCUSED P. Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY;
b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR CONCOCTION (Big Lie, having been asked
to submit false testimony); for how could have he witnessed the stabbing by accused when he
NOTICED him the following day? (TSN dated May 2, 1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the
TSN was incorrect due to typographical error, or maybe the Court Stenographer III Eloisa B.
Domingo might have been SLEEPING during the testimony, so that the word DAY should have
been corrected to another word SUITABLE to Normandys FAIRY TALE, still, the Court had
synthesized the entire NARRATIVE of Normandy, but the Court found no reason that the
seeming error DAY should be corrected; the Courts sole/remaining conclusion is that EVEN the
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES cooperated by PSYCHIC PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in
having BEEN DESTINED to be FATEFULLY INSCRIBED WITH THE WORDS FOLLOWING
DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.) 126 (Emphasis supplied)
In State Prosecutors v. Muro 127 we held that
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can
resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges
perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and
procedural rules of law. 128
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-
errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from
consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is
to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to
the "primordial necessity of order in the social life." 129
Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial tasks leaves much to
be desired. As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic:
Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have
problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and
preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may
cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. x x x 130
Judge Floros belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he served as RTC judge,
indubitably shows his inability to function with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government. Thus:
Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and identified himself with large components of the
judges role. Especially if he has aspired to a judges status, he is likely to have conducted himself, more or less
unconsciously, in the fashion of one who is said to have "the judicial temperament." He is likely to have
displayed the kinds of behavior that the judges role demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the
bench develop and reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of investiture and of court
procedure, the honorific forms of address, and even the imposing appearance of some court buildings serve to
emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the most unscrupulous former ambulance chaser who owes
his position to a thoroughly corrupt political organization must conform at least in part to the behaviors expected
of him as a judge. 131
The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected of other public officials. Judges are
seen as guardians of the law and they must thus identify themselves with the law to an even greater degree than
legislators or executives. 132
As it has been said, "[j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according to some abstract ideas of right and
justice, but according to the rules laid down by society in its Code of Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The
function of the judge is primarily adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft but the exercise of a creative art,
whether we call it legislative or not, which requires great ability and objectivity." 133 We, thus, quote Justice
Frankfurter, in speaking of the functions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt demands of judges the habit
of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that ones own views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward
views not shared. But these are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely the
qualities society has a right to expect from those entrusted with judicial power.
xxxx
The judicial judgment must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon
the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. 134
In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental requirements of competence and
objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to continue as judge for to do so might result in a
serious challenge to the existence of a critical and impartial judiciary.
Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic benefits for a period of three (3)
years.
In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined the judiciary as RTC judge. However,
we have assiduously reviewed the history of this case and we cannot hold anyone legally responsible for such
major and unfortunate faux pas.
Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application for judgeship. He went through the
entire gamut of tests and interviews and he was nominated by the JBC on the strength of his scholastic
achievements. As to having failed the psychological examinations given by the SC Clinic, it must be pointed out
that this was disregarded by the JBC upon Judge Floros submission of psychiatric evaluations conducted by
mental health professionals from the private sector and which were favorable to him. Nowhere is it alleged that
Judge Floro acted less than honorably in procuring these evaluations.
The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic for a second opinion of his mental
and psychological fitness. In performing its functions, the JBC had been guided primarily by the Constitution
which prescribes that members of the Judiciary must be, in addition to other requirements, persons of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence. 135 It was only on 18 October 2000 when it promulgated JBC-
009, the "Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council," that the JBC put down in writing guidelines or criteria it had
previously used in ascertaining "if one seeking such office meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and
possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of the Judiciary." 136 Rule 6 thereof states:
SECTION 1. Good health. Good physical health and sound mental/psychological and emotional condition of
the applicant play a critical role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate task of administering justice.
xxx
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. The applicant shall submit to psychological/psychiatric tests to be

conducted by the Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the
Council.
It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the evaluation of a private psychologist
or psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot be faulted for accepting the psychological
evaluations of mental health professionals not affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge Floros appointment as RTC judge is fait accompli. What awaits us now is the
seemingly overwhelming task of finding the PROPER, JUST AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floros almost
seven years of suspension in the light of the fact that the penalty imposed herein does not merit a suspension of
seven years.
Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts. 137 The Constitution limits this power through the admonition that such rules "shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 138
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in administrative cases against judges.
Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the steps to be taken in cases when the judge is preventively suspended
pending investigation. This is the state of things even after its amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took
effect on 1 October 2001.
The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of administrative supervision
over all courts and the personnel thereof. 139 This power -- consistent with the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts -- is hemmed in only by the Constitution which
prescribes that an adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive suspension resolved to:
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing charges against him within ten (10) days from
notice; (2) REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator for
investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records thereof; (3)
SUBJECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted by
the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution.
Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective immediately under PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against him. 140
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floros suspension, albeit indefinite, was for the
duration of the investigation of the 13 charges against him which the Court pegged at 60 days from the time of
receipt by the investigator of the records of the case. Rule 140, as amended, now states that "(t)he investigating
Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or
within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant" 141 and, "(w)ithin thirty (30) days from the termination of
the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing
findings of fact and recommendation." 142
From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for the entire period of
his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it
would take the investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may preventively
suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her. 143
This is because
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged with a serious offense warranting
preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as
mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the
administrative case especially where there is a strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged.
Indeed, the measure is intended to shield the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that may be caused
by the continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts image as
temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an exalted position.
Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast government bureaucracy,
judges are beacon lights looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate
weapons against justice and oppression. 144
In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present because of the serious charge
of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the actual investigation into his cases dragged on for a much
longer period than 90 days. And the reasons for the delay, for the most part, can be directly ascribed to Judge
Floro himself. From the records, it would seem that not only did Judge Floro move for several re-settings of the
hearings of his cases; he likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order to submit himself to the appropriate
psychological/mental examination. Worse, what started out as single case against him ballooned into 10 cases
which were consolidated into one due to common questions of fact and law. 145 All in all, Judge Floro filed seven
cases against those he perceived had connived to remove and/or suspend him from office, the last of which he
filed on 19 May 2003 against Justice Ramirez. 146
Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in this case considering that the rules
on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at
best. We have ruled similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was placed under preventive suspension
pending investigation is not entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for
the entire duration of the preventive suspension. The inequity of the doctrine as applied to judges is clearly
apparent, given the peculiar circumstance in which a judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court
"until further orders".
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13 months, during which period he was not paid
his salaries, allowances and other benefits. Except for a teaching job that the Court permitted him to undertake
pending resolution of the administrative case, Judge Iturralde had no other source of income. He thus incurred
several loans to provide for his familys basic needs.
It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits
for the entire period that he was preventively suspended. As we have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals,
preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but only a measure intended to enable the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered formal investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample time
to conclude the investigation of an administrative case. Beyond ninety (90) days, the preventive suspension is
no longer justified. Hence, for purposes of determining the extent of back salaries, allowances and other benefits
that a judge may receive during the period of his preventive suspension, we hold that the ninety-day maximum
period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, should likewise be applied.
Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend beyond ninety (90) days and such may
not be entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in such a situation, it would be unfair to withhold his
salaries and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in
the resolution of the case was not due to his fault. Upon being found innocent of the administrative charge, his
preventive suspension exceeding the ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without basis and would indeed
be nothing short of punitive. It must be emphasized that his subsequent acquittal completely removed the cause
for his preventive suspension in the first place. Necessarily, therefore, we must rectify its effects on just and
equitable grounds. 147
Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is likewise entitled to the payment of back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits being at the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who find
themselves preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders" or, as this case, "for the duration of the
investigation." Judge Iturraldes suspension of 13 months even pales in comparison to Judge Floros
suspension of 81 months, more or less. During this entire excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro could not
practice his profession, thus putting him solely at the mercy of his brothers largesse. And, though he was given
donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously, these could not compensate for his loss of income
as Judge.
Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period of suspension exceeding 90 days
should be the basis for the payment of back salaries, we hold that, as a matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled
to back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to three of his almost seven
years suspension. We cannot apply the ruling in Gloria that any suspension served beyond 90 days must be
compensated as we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floros propensity to delay the resolution of his case
through the indiscriminate filing of administrative cases against those he perceived connived to oust him out of
office. In Judge Iturraldes case, the investigation was not delayed through any fault of his. More importantly,
Judge Iturralde was ultimately held innocent, thus, using by analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his suspension
in excess of 90 days was already in the nature of a penalty which cannot be countenanced precisely because,
being innocent, he cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand, and as already discussed, contributed
to the delay in the investigation of his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde, Judge Floro has not been
adjudged innocent of all the 13 charges against him.
These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro beyond the reach of equity. To
paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity does not demand that its suitors are free of blame. As we are wont to say:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law,
through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of
cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the
substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts. 148
In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the delay in the resolution of his case,
equitable considerations constrain us to award him back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a
period corresponding to three years. This is because Judge Floros separation from the service is not a penalty
as we ordinarily understand the word to mean. It is imposed instead upon Judge Floro out of necessity due to a
medically disabling condition of the mind which renders him unfit, at least at present, to continue discharging the
functions of his office.
The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the circumstances. As discussed, if we were to
give him more than three years of back salaries, etc., then it would seem that we are rewarding him for his role
in delaying the resolution of these cases (as well as the seven cases he filed which were only dismissed on 14
February 2006 at his own bidding). On the other hand, if we were to peg the period at less than three years then
the same would only be a pittance compared to the seven years suspension he had to live through with
Damocles sword hanging over his head and with his hands bound as he could not practice his profession.
Judge Floros separation from the service moots the case against him docketed as A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re:
Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is dismissed for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floros separation from the service renders moot the complaint in A.M. No. 99-
7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most favorable of resolutions in this case will not cause a ripple on the Courts
decision to separate Judge Floro from the service. Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot and academic.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988
Considering that this case is a replica of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering that charge "h" is
without basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego must necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit.
Judge Floros separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor
disqualification from appointment to any other public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
As Judge Floros separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty, such separation does not carry
with it the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public
office including government-owned or controlled corporations.
In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock of the finding of mental impairment
against Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify him from re-entering government service for positions that do
not require him to dispense justice. The reports contain statements/findings in Judge Floros favor that the Court
cannot overlook in all fairness as they deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floros assets and
strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor modification of work environment. Thus:
a. High intellectual assets as a result of "self-discipline and self- organization." 149
b. "(I)mpressive academic achievements" with "no drastic change in his personality and level of
functioning as a lawyer in private practice." 150
c. "(C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation with paranormal and

psychic phenomena not detrimental to his role as a lawyer." 151
d. "Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in moderate proficiency . His
concern for the details that make up a total field represents his attempts at being systematic and
cautious." 152
e. "(E)quipped with analytical power." 153
Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of the sensitive nature of said
position, he may still be successful in other areas of endeavor.
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floros current administrative and medical
problems are not totally of his making. He was duly appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for now,
appear to render him unfit with the delicate task of dispensing justice not because of any acts of corruption and
debasement on his part but clearly due to a medically disabling condition.
Finally, if Judge Floros mental impairment is secondary to genetics 154 and/or adverse environmental factors
(and, unfortunately, such essential information is not available), we cannot condemn people for their faulty genes
and/or adverse environment factors they have no control over.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00)
PESOS for seven of the 13 charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;
2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 73, Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically
disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office,
effective immediately;
3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back salaries, allowances and
other economic benefits corresponding to three (3) years;
4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
for LACK OF MERIT; and
5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Section 16.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 6036
AN ACT PROVIDING THAT BAIL SHALL NOT, WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, BE REQUIRED IN CASES
OF VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL OR CITY ORDINANCES AND IN CRIMINAL OFFENSES WHEN THE
PRESCRIBED PENALTY FOR SUCH OFFENSES IS NOT HIGHER THAN ARRESTO MAYOR AND/OR A
FINE OF TWO THOUSAND PESOS OR BOTH.
Section 1. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, bail shall not be required of a person
charged with violation of a municipal or city ordinance, a light felony and/or a criminal offense the prescribed
penalty for which is not higher than six months imprisonment and/or a fine of two thousand pesos, or both,
where said person has established to the satisfaction of the court or any other appropriate authority hearing his
case that he is unable to post the required cash or bail bond, except in the following cases:
(a) When he is caught committing the offense in flagranti;
(b) When he confesses to the commission of the offense unless the confession is later
repudiated by him in a sworn statement or in open court as having been extracted through force
or intimidation;
(c) When he is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
jumped bail;
(d) When he is found to have previously violated the provisions of Section 2 hereof;
(e) When he is found to be a recidivist or a habitual delinquent or has been previously convicted
for an offense to which the law or ordinance attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or
more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty;
(f) When he commits the offense while on parole or under conditional pardon; and
(g) When the accused has previously been pardoned by the municipal or city mayor for violation
of municipal or city ordinance for at least two times.
Section 2. Instead of bail, the person charged with any offense contemplated by Section 1 hereof shall be
required to sign in the presence of two witnesses of good standing in the community a sworn statement binding
himself, pending final decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of the Court hearing his case periodically every
two weeks. The Court may, in its discretion and with the consent of the person charged, require further that he
be placed under the custody and subject to the authority of a responsible citizen in the community who may be
willing to accept the responsibility. In such a case the affidavit herein mentioned shall include a statement of the
person charged that he binds himself to accept the authority of the citizen so appointed by the Court. The Clerk
of Court shall immediately report the presence of the accused person to the Court. Except when his failure to
report is for justifiable reasons including circumstances beyond his control to be determined by the Court, any
violation of this sworn statement shall justify the Court to order his immediate arrest unless he files bail in the
amount forthwith fixed by the Court.
Section 3. This Act shall apply to all person who, at the time of its approval, are under temporary detention for
inability to post bail for charges contemplated by Section 1 above.
Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: August 4, 1969

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas of RTC, Branch 2, Borongan,
Eastern Samar GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. Accordingly, the Court
orders the FORFEITURE of his entire retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. The Court also finds Judge Bugtas guilty of (1)
UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING A DECISION, (2) UNDUE DELAY IN
RENDERING ORDERS, and (3) SIMPLE MISCONDUCT. These constitute aggravating
circumstances to the offense of gross ignorance of the law.
The Court finds Ernesto C. Quitorio, Legal Researcher of RTC, Branch 2, Borongan,
Eastern Samar GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS
him from office for three months without pay and STERNLY WARNS him that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Section 18
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
These two administrative cases at bar, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1976 and A.M. No. RTJ-06-
1977, were originally consolidated with two other cases: A. M. No. RTJ-06-1978, Office of
the Court Administrator v. Judge Roberto A. Navidad, RTC, Br. 32, Calbayog City, Samar,
and A.M. No. RTJ-06-1980, Eric C. Isidoro and Atty. Anecio R. Guades v. Judge Roberto A.
Navidad, RTC, Br. 32, Calbayog City.
By Resolution of January 31, 2007,81 this Court dismissed the complaint in A.M. No.
RTJ-06-1978, while that in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1980 was also dismissed, Judge Roberto A.
Navidad (Judge Navidad or respondent) was reminded to be more circumspect in the
performance of his duties. This leaves for disposition the first and second cases.
Re: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1976
On July 16, 2003, Provincial Prosecutor Manuel Torrevillas, Jr. brought to the attention
of then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. the inapropriate actuation of Judge Roberto A.
Navidad of Branch 32, the RTC of Calabayog City in the handling of cases before his sala.
The Chief Justice thus instructed the Provincial Prosecutor to submit a written report thereon
to which he complied by letter-complaint dated August 15, 2003,82 attaching thereto the
reports83 of the trial prosecutor in the sala of Judge Navidad.
By 1st Indorsement dated August 25, 2003,84 the above-said August 15, 2003 letter-
complaint was referred by the Chief Justice to then Court Administrator and now a member of
this Court, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., for comment and recommendation.
By Resolution of September 23, 2003,85 this Court acting on the recommendations of
Justice Velasco in his September 8, 2003 Memorandum86 to the Chief Justice, required Judge
Navidad to comment on the complaint and directed the Court Management Office of the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) to: (1) conduct a judicial audit on all undecided criminal
cases, which include cases that are pending, submitted for decision, archived, etc. for the
purpose of determining any inappropriate actuation with respect to the issuance of court orders
especially on matters pertaining to the grant of bail in non-bailable offenses; and (2) coordinate
with Trial Prosecutor Cicero T. Lampasa as regards the other cases that needed to be
investigated.
By Resolution of March 8, 2006, the Court referred the complaint to Justice Isaias P.
Dicdican of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
Covered by A.M. No. RTJ-06-1976 are: (1) Criminal Case No. 4037, People of the
Philippines v. Nestor Sandongan, for murder; (2) Criminal Cases No. 4023 and 4024, both
entitled People of the Philippines v. Simproso Paghunasan, for frustrated murder and murder,
respectively; and (3) Criminal Case No. 4147, People of the Philippines v. Alfredo L. Tesoro,
et al., for murder.
Justice Dicdican synthesized the version of complainant in his October 25, 2006 Report
of Investigation and Recommendation87 as follows:
Criminal Case No. 4037 People of the Philippines v. Nestor Sandongan
In this case, respondent allegedly improperly cited a witness, SPO2 Rolando Rebortura,
in contempt of court for not telling the truth or for violating his oath. Complainant, through
(then) Prosecutor Lampasa, alleged that SPO2 Rebortura was testifying on the matter of
whether or not he recovered a shotgun from the crime scene. When the said witness first stated
that he did not recover any shotgun, he was reminded by defense counsel, Atty. Sisenando Fiel,
that he had already revealed to him (Atty. Fiel) in a conference earlier held that he had
recovered a shotgun. After the respondent sought a clarification on the matter, SPO2 Rebortura
replied to the effect that he might have said that he recovered a shotgun to Atty. Fiel but,
because of the lapse of time, he could not anymore recall.
The respondent then adjudged SPO2 Rebortura in contempt of court and allegedly
ordered the witness to be detained under the custody of the Clerk fo Court for two (2) days.
This order of detention was not, however, stated in the order issued by the respondent.
After that session, SPO2 Rebortura allegedly pleaded with the respondent that he be
not detained.88
Criminal Cases No. 4023 and 4024 - People of the Philippines v. Simproso Paghunasan
In these cases, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Calbayog City, on July 1, 2002,
a copy of a Motion to Grant Accused Provisional Liberty filed by the accused. On July 11,
2002, the prosecution then interposed its Opposition/Comments thereto, not knowing that, on
July 2, 2002, the respondent had already issued an order granting the accused provisional
liberty and approving the bonds filed by the accused.
Complainant claims that the accused had been charged with the capital offense of
murder which is a non-bailable offense. The respondent granted bail without conducting a
hearing and without affording the prosecution the opportunity to prove the strength of its
evidence.89
Criminal Case No. 4147 People of the Philippines v. Alfredo l. Tesoro, et al.
An Information was filed against the accused in June 2002. The accused later on filed,
on August 13, 2002, a Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest and For Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause. The prosecution filed an opposition to said motion, contending that the
accused should first submit to the jurisdiction of the court before he could ask for any positive
relief.
During the scheduled hearing of the case on December 4, 2002, counsel for the accused
filed a Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest and for Accused Alfredo L. Tesoro To Be Allowed
To Be Placed Under the Custody of Counsel Pending Resolution of Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause. The prosecution vehemently opposed such motion but the
respondent recalled the warrant of arrest previously issued and allowed the accused to be places
under the temporary custody of his counsel.
The December 4, 2002 order issued by the respondent was received by the prosecution
only on August 7, 2003. Moreover, the recall of the warrant of arrest was not stated therein.
On December 10, 2002, the prosecution filed its Comments/ Opposition to the Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Reinstate the Recalled Warrant
of Arrest. Since the accused had not filed any opposition to the motion to reinstate the recalled
arrest warrant, the prosecution filed, on March 11, 2003, a Motion to Submit Incident for
Resolution.
However, the respondent granted the motion for judicial determination of probable
cause filed by the accused without acting on the motion to reinstate recalled warrant of arrest
filed by the prosecution.90
Justice Dicdican summarized respondents defense as follows:
Regarding the alleged irregularities in his handling of Criminal Case No. 4037,
respondent contends that he cited SPO2 Rebortura in direct contempt of court because he found
the said witness lying and telling untruths at the witness chair. Respondent further contends
that it was very evident then that the said witness was the one masterminding the manufacture
or filing of trumped-up cases. At the behest of (then) Prosecutor Lampasa, the witness asked
for forgiveness and admitted his wrongdoings and misconduct. Upon a sincere promise by the
said witness, the citation for contempt was lifted and he was released from his detention at the
office of the Clerk of Court.
As for Criminal Cases Nos. 4023 and 4024, respondent denies that the prosecution was
not given the opportunity to prove the strength of its evidence and that the petition for bail was
granted without a hearing.
Respondent claims that an oral petition for bail had been presented in open court which
was duly heard and partially argued. In fact, the prosecution had allegedly energetically argued
and suggested that the defense reduce its petition into writing so the matter can be brought up
to the Provincial Prosecutor. The proceedings even revealed that there was an error on the part
of the prosecution in not applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and the petition for
bail was granted only after the prosecution refused to rectify the error.
Finally, as to Criminal Case No. 4147, respondent said that he quashed the warrant of
arrest for failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence. Furthermore, the preliminary
investigation was allegedly improperly conducted with a tutored alleged sole eyewitness.
As for the grant of custodial rights to the counsel for accused who were charged with
heinous crimes, respondent contends that this grant is given only to the said counsel as officer
of the court. Respondent further contends that he followed certain parameters before granting
such custodial rights.91
Justice Dicdican thus came up with the following Evaluation:
From the totality of the evidence adduced by the parties, the undersigned investigator,
after a judicious evaluation and scrutiny thereof, has come up with a finding that the
respondent had indeed committed irregularities and procedural lapses in the handling of
the cases pending before his sala.
Anent the charge that he granted the accused bail without a hearing in Criminal Cases
Nos. 4023 and 4034, the record shows that, in reality, no hearing had been conducted by the
respondent before he issued the order dated July 2, 2002 granting the accused provisional
liberty and approving the bonds filed.
Respondents claim that there had been an oral petition for bail which was extensively
heard and argued during the pre-trial of the cases on June 20, 2002 is not supported by the
record .x x x x
While the respondent maintains that the stenographer failed to take down the discussion
on the oral petition for bail, the undersigned finds this unsubstantiated and totally self-serving.
The record speaks for itself and the transcript of the stenographic notes is wholly bereft of any
reference to the oral petition for bail...
The motion filed by the accused for the grant of provisional liberty was dated June 27,
2002 and was received by the prosecution on July 1, 2002. On July 2, 2002 the respondent had
issued an order granting said motion.
It was established by the undersigned that the July 2, 2002 order was based on the June
27, 2002 motion filed by the accused. Respondent contends that the motion filed by the accused
was in compliance with an order by the court for the accused to file a formal petition for bail.
However, no such order requiring the accused to file a formal petition for bail can be found in
the record. The undersigned is thus convinced that the respondent did not conduct a hearing
before he granted the motion filed by the accused for the grant of provisional liberty.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether

summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving offenses
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, whether bail is a matter of
discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a
matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail, in cases
where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt
of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidenceis strong is a
matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly
exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence, he
must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even
in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.
After the hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of
the evidence of the prosecution and, based thereon, the judge should formulate his own
conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused. However, the July 2, 2002 order of the respondent judge does not contain such
summary and conclusion.
Based on his investigation and on the evidence presented in this case, the undersigned
concludes that the respondent did not conduct the requisite hearing before he granted bail
to the accused, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure...
xxxx
It has been held that such error cannot be characterized as mere deficiency in prudence,
discretion and judgment but a patent disregard of well-known rules and, therefore, constitutive
of gross ignorance of the law. In line with existing jurisprudence, the undersigned recommends
that the respondent be fined P20,000.00 with a stern warning that the commission of the same
or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Similarly, in Criminal Case No. 4147, where accused Alfredo Tesoro is charged with
murder, the respondent judge allowed the said accused to be placed in the custody of his
counsel. The record shows that a warrant of arrest for the said accused had already been issued
long before he filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest and for judicial determination of
probable cause. Thus, at the time of the filing of the motion to place the said accused under the
custody of counsel dated December 4, 2002, the accused was technically a fugitive in the eyes
of the law. In granting the said motion on the same day when it was filed, the respondent acted
prematurely and incongruously in allowing the accused to be placed under the custody of
counsel when, in fact, the freedom of the accused had yet to be curtailed.
The basic rule is that the right to bail, or in this case to be released on recognizance, can
only be availed of by a person who is in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty. The respondent also deprived the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the
evidence of guilt of said accused is strong, considering that the accused was charged with
murder.
Likewise, in granting the motion to recall the warrant of arrest, the respondent did not
allow the prosecution sufficient time to oppose said motion. There is no showing that
respondent conducted a hearing to determine whether or not there was probable cause which
respondent contends was made the basis of his recall of the warrant of arrest previously issued.
For this irregularity in the recall of the warrant of arrest and for allowing the accused
to be placed in the custody of his counsel, the undersigned recommends that the respondent be
fined P20,000.00
Anent the charge in Criminal Case No. 4037, the undersigned did not find any
impropriety in the respondents act of citing the witness in contemot of court. There is no
showing that the respondent acted with malice and bad faith.92 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Accordingly, Justice Dicdican recommended that respondent be fined in the total

amount of P40,000.93
Re: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1977
Per his October 25, 2006 Manifestation,94 Justice Dicdican manifested his
incompetency in passing upon the findings made by the judicial team that conducted the audit
in Branch 32 and thus prayed that the matter be referred to the OCA.
As recommended and prayed for, the results of the judicial audit were referred to the
OCA which, by Memorandum dated September 12, 2007,95 came up with the following
findings:
The audit team found that Judge Navidad failed to decide Criminal Cases Nos. 3440,
3043 and 3274 within the reglementary periods. Instead of deciding these cases after the
expiration of the period to file memorandum, respondent judge issued Orders similarly dated
July 3, 2003 directing the parties to study their cases and submit the necessary pleadings so
that the cases can be disposed of accordingly.
There were eleven (11) cases with pending motions/incidents which Judge Navidad
failed to resolve within the reglementary period. These are Criminal Cases Nos. 3585, 3586[,]
4248, 4312, 4373, 4350 and 4101; and Civil Cases Nos. 809, 846, 747 and 712. Moreover,
fifty-one (51) cases had not been acted upon by Judge Navidad for a considerable length of
time which have not moved since then, to wit: 3631, 4143, 4098, 4082, 4179, 4180, 4097, 4098,
4036, 4084, 4125, 4126, 4226, 3783, 4122, 3724, 3869, 3902, 3914, 3943, 3975, 4001, 4022,
4080, 4069, 4094, 4121, 4124, 4130, 4205, 4298, 3847, 4231 and 4214; and Civil Cases Nos.
845, SCA 050, SP 189, 394, 546, 722, 721, 527, 293, 209, 675, 755, 758, 766, SCA 051 and
SP 171.
xxxx
Aside from [the] four (4) cases mentioned in the complaint of Prosecutor Torrevillas,
irregularities in other cases were also uncovered. Judge Navidad released the accused under
the custody of Atty. Fiel in Criminal Cases Nos. 3701, 4101, 4109 and 4110, despite the fact
that they were all facing charges for murder and homicide. Respondent judge also granted bail
to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4109 for Murder, and 4110 for Murder, without
conducting hearing. In Criminal Case No. 4350, Judge Navidad ruled that the offense
committed was only homicide allegedly becuase the qualifying circumstances stated in the
information were not supported by evidence, despite the findings of Judge Salvador P.
Jakosalem, Acting Presiding Judge, MCTC, Sta. Margarita, Samar of probable cause for the
crime of murder. In Criminal Case No. 3718, the information for murder was downgraded by
Judge Navidad to homicide. Similarly, he dismissed Criminal Case No. 4373 on the ground
that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not supported by any credible
evidence, despite the contrary.
... On March 22, 2004, Judge Navidad was also directed to explain (a) his failure to
decide Criminal Cases Nos. 3440, 3093 and 3274 within the reglementary period, (b) his
inaction in fifty-one (51) cases, (c) why he allowed the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3701,
4101, 4109 and 4110 to be placed under the custody of Atty. Fiel, and (d) to inform the Court
whether the pending incidents in Criminal Cases Nos. 3585, 3586, 4248, 4312, 4373, 4350 and
4101 and Civil Cases Nos. 850, 809, 846, 747 and 792 had already been resolved.
In his Comments, Judge Navidad claimed that Criminal Cases Nos. 3440, 3093 and
3274 were not yet submitted for decision when the audit was conducted. He said that the
prosecution in Criminal Cases Nos. 3440 and 3093 had not yet formally offered evidence, while
the parties in Criminal Case No. 3274 had not yet filed their respective memoranda. He also
informed the Court that the incidents in Criminal Cases Nos. 3585, 3586, 4248, 4312, 4350,
4373 and 4101 and Civil Cases Nos. 850, 809, 846, 747 and 792 were already resolved.
Judge Navidad contended that some cases were left unacted upon because his court
personnel failed to archive ten (10) cases, the police officers failed to make return of the
warrants of arrest issued in eighteen (18) cases, and in other cases, the parties failed to submit
the pleadings he required them to file.
Respondent judge explained that he released on recognizance to Atty. Fiel all the
accused in four (4) criminal cases because the charges were mere fabrications and no
preliminary investigation was conducted or if conducted, was improperly done...96(Italics in
the original; emphasis supplied)
The OCA came up with the following Evaluation:
Judge Roberto A. Navidad should be held administratively liable for gross

inefficiency. He failed to decide Criminal Cases Nos. 3440, 3093 and 3274 within the 90-day
reglementary period. Judge Navidads contention that the cases were not yet submitted for
decison when the audit was conducted is an outright falsehood meant to mislead this Court.
The audit was conducted on October 14-17, 2003, but Criminal Cases Nos. 3440, 3093 and
3274 were already submitted for decision on February 28, 2003, June 2, 2002 and April 30,
2002, respectively. The failure of the parties to file their memoranda within the period given
them is not a valid reason for Judge Navidad not to decide the cases. A case is considered
submitted for decision upon the admission of the parties evidence at the termination of the trial
and respondent is well aware of this. Should the court allow or require the submission of
memorandum, the case is considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last
memorandum or the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier.
The issuance of respondent judge of an Order in these cases requiring the parties to file
the necessary pleading so that the cases can be disposed of accordingly was purposely done to
subvert the 90-day mandatory period to decide cases. Respondent judge could have asked the
Court for an extension of time to decide these cases instead of issuing this Order. If he honestly
believed that he could not decide the cases within the reglementary period, all he had to do was
to ask for an extension of time. The Court, cognizant of the caseload of judges and mindful of
the difficulty encountered by them in the disposition of cases, usually grants the request.
Judge Navidad also failed to promptly resolve the incidents in Criminal Cases Nos.
3585, 3586, 4248, 4312, 4373, 4350 and 4101 and Civil Cases Nos. 809, 846, 747 and 792.
The resolution of the petition for bail in Criminal Cases Nos. 3585 and 3586 was due on
February 22, 2000, yet it remained pending in October 2003 (three years and eighth months
since then) when the audit was conducted. In Civil Case No. 792, the Motion for Special Raffle
was due for resolution on May 16, 2001 but was likewise not yet resolved as of audit date.
xxxx
Respondent judge ascribes his inaction in fifty-one (51) cases to the inadvertence of
his court personnel and the failure of the police officers to make a return of the warrants of
arrest. This is totally unacceptable. A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency of his
court personnel, for the latter are not guardians of the judges responsibilities. Efficient court
management is primarily the duty of the presiding judge. In this, he is found wanting. As
regards the cases where there were no return of the warrants of arrest, Section 4, Rule 113,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the head of the office to whom the warrant of
arrest was delivered for execution to cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from
its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was
assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the warrant. Thus, it is the
duty of respondent judge to see to it that this is strictly complied with by the police officers
assigned to serve the warrants. His failure to faithfully comply with this duty has contributed
to the delay in the disposition of cases in his court.
Judge Navidad should also [be] held liable for gross ignorance of the law. In granting
bail without conducting any hearing to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4023, 4024, 3701,
4109 and 4110 who were charged with murder and frustrated murder, respondent judge
knowingly disregarded the well-established rule that no person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Under the
present rule, a hearing on application for bail is mandatory. Whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion, the prosecutor should be given reasonable notice of hearing, or at least his
recommendation on the matter must be sought. These tasks were ignored by the judge.
Judge Navidad also erred in allowing the accused in Criminal Case No. 4147 through
his counsel, to post bail notwithstanding that the accused was not yet in custody of the law. The
right to bail or to be released on recognizance can only be availed of by a person who is in
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. An application for admission to bail of
a person against whom a criminal action has been filed, but who is still at large is premature.
The judge likewise has no authority to conduct his own determination of probable cause
and downgrade the offense charged or dismiss the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Judges of the Regional Trial Courts no loner have the authority to conduct preliminary
investigations. This authority was removed from them under the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure effective January 1, 1985. The determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. Whether that function has been
correctly discharged by the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter the trial court itself
cannot and may not be compelled to pass upon. As a general rule, if the information is valid on
its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the
part of the public prosecutor, the courts should not dismiss the case for want of evidence.
Judge Navidad should also be sanctioned for placing the accused in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3701, 4101, 4109 and 4110 who were charged with heinous crimes under the custody of
Atty. Sisenando Y. Fiel, Jr. pending re-investigation of the cases. The grant of bail based on
recognizance in these cases are not among the instance the accused may be released on
recognizance.
Section 15, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
Whenever allowed by law or these Rules, the Court may release a person in custody on his own
recognizance or that of a responsible person. The accused may be released on recognizance
under Republic Act No. 6036[,] P.D. No. 603[,] and P.D. 968, as amended. Also, Section 16
of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly provides, A person in custody for
a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense
charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying
circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the discretion
of the court.
It is clear that Judge Navidad not only failed to perform his duties in accordance
with the Rules, but he has also been acting willfully, and grossly disregarding and defying
the law and controlling jurisprudence. Verily, his actions indicate a blatant contempt for the
law and the rules of procedure. This cannot be countenanced especially because the laws
involved are simple and elementary for which he cannot claim ignorance. It is imperative that
a judge be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative
doctrines. When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider a basic and elemental rule,
law or principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either incompetent and undeserving
of the position and title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.
This is not the first time Judge Navidad has been charged administratively. Verification
with the the Statistical Reports Division, CMO-OCA shows that from the time Judge Navidad
was appointed to the judiciary (January 30, 1987), several cases had been filed against him[.]
xxxx
While several of the charges were dismissed, this however is not at all reflective of his
innocence, because the issues raised in these cases were judicial in nature, hence, improper for
an administrative charge, or respondent had already inhibited from the case, or complainants
failed to attend the investigation conducted by investigating justices/judges and failed to
substantiate their charges. There were complaints though which even if dismissed, the Court
nevertheless rebuked respondent judge and reminded him to be more circumspect in the
performance of his duties, reprimanded him for improper conduct, advised him to refrain from
the use of intemperate language or the use of the words Supreme Court in any of his judgments,
orders, letters and correspondence presumably to show that these acts were authorized by or
had the imprimatur of the Court, to avoid any misinterpretation and confusion by the public
and directed him to couch his inhibition orders in clear and specific language.
Respondent judges outrageous conduct was again exhibited recently when he

stubbornly refused to inhibit himself in Civil Case No. 586 (Ciriaco Tan vs. Emmanuel Lao),
despite the fact that he is residing in a building owned by plaintiff, in that case, a fact he has
not denied, and which is of public knowledge in Calbayog City. Judges must maintain and
preserve the trust and faith of the parties-litigants. They must hold themselves above reproach
and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-
grounded or not, the judge has no alternative but to inhibit himself from the case. Judge
Navidads persistent refusal to recuse himself from the case has impaired the peoples faith in
the court and destroyed the ideal of impartial administration of justice.
Respondent judges comportment shows that he is not an upright man of the law
who deserves to sit on the bench. That an NGO, the Samarenos for Equity, Justice and
Reform, saw it fit to file a case against him, shows how badly he has performed as member of
the bench. Such reputation by itself has besmirched the integrity not only of his court but more
omportantly of the entire juducial system which he represents. Respondent does not deserve to
remain any further in the bench.
Informatively, Judge Navidad was absent for the whole month of May 2007 as reported
to OCA by Executive Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens, RTC, Calbayog City, Samar., However, on
July 30, 2007, the Leave Division, Office of the Administrative Services, OCA received a
Certificate of Service of Judge Navidad for May 2007 stating that he had rendered the services
required of him by the law for the period May 1, 2007 to May 31, 2007 except on May 16, 17,
18 and 21 when he was on sick leave and on May 22, 23, 24 and 25 when he was on vacation
leave. He did not indicate therein that he was also absent from May 2-15, 2007....He was also
absent on June 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 25, 27, 28, and 29, 2007 , but he declares in
his Certificate of Service for that month that he was absent only on June 6, 7, 8, 28 and 29.
Likewise, his Certificate of Service for July 2007 showed that he was absent only on July 4, 5,
6, 9 and 10 but Judge Clemens reported that Judge Navidad did not render service on July 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 30. Attached to Judge Navidads Certificates
of Service for June and July 4, 5, 6, 9 and 10, 2007. All his leave applications did not bear the
signature and approval of his Executive Judge, Judge Clemens. Simply put, he was absent
without leave.
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to
the personal demeanor of judges. In the case at bar, respondent judge violated Sections 1 and
2 of Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary[.]
xxxx
Judge Navidad also violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 4 of the same Code, which
provides that Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.
Respondent judge likewise transgressed the Judges Oath wherein he swore that he shall
perform his judicial duties efficiently, fairly and to the best of his knowledge and ability.97
(Italics in the original; Emphasis and underscoring supplied))
The OCA thereupon recommended respondents dismissal from the service for gross
ignorance of and contempt for the law, gross inefficiency and negligence and violations of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Judges Oath.98
The Court finds the respective recommendations of the Investigating Justice and the
OCA well-taken.
Rule 114, on bail, of the Rules of Court reads
Sec. 8. Burdern of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail
filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burdern of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any
witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or
otherwise unable to testify.
xxxx
Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail under section 8
of this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require
him to submit his recommendation. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
While it is well-settled that the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public
prosecutor to determine the specificity and adequacy of the offense charged, the judge may
dismiss a complaint if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or without any ground;
otherwise, he may proceed with the case if in his view it is sufficient and proper in form.99
In the discharge of a judges duties, however, when the inefficiency springs from a failure
to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle, the judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds, or is too vicious that the
oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority. If the rule or law is so elementary, as the above-quoted sections of Rule 114 are, not
to know it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law, without
even the complainant having to prove malice or bad faith on the part of the judge, as it can be
clearly inferred from the error committed.100 On this score, as reflected in the Investigating
Justices and the OCAs separate reports, the Court finds respondent guilty of gross ignorance
of the law.
Respondent also committed undue delay in disposing of the cases assigned to him.
Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. A judge who fails to do
so has to suffer the consequences of his omission, as any delay in the disposition of cases
undermines the peoples faith in the Judiciary.101
Inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes
gross inefficiency. The Court has constantly reminded judges to decide cases promptly. Delay
not only results in undermining the peoples faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing
of their applications is anticipated and expected; it also reinforces in the mind of the litigants
the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly, and worse, it invites suspicion
of ulterior motives on the part of the judge.
Likewise, delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within the
reglementary period of 90-days fixed by the constitution and the law is not excusable and
constitutes gross inefficiency. We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge, especially
at a time when clogging of court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary, whose present
leadership has launched an all out program to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket
congestion and undue delay in the disposition of cases. Prompt disposition of cases is attained
basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If they do not possess these
traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable, to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly,
judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their
obligation to promptly administer justice.102
In the course of exculpating himself, respondent committed dishonesty, by falsely
claiming, for instance, that Criminal Case Nos. 3440, 3093 and 3274 were not yet submitted
for decision when the judicial audit was conducted, and that he conducted bail hearings, albeit
the records do not show so.
Likewise, among other things, in his Certificates of Service for May, 2007, respondent
declared that he was on sick leave on May 16, 17, 18 and 21, and on vacation leave from May
22, 23, 24 and 25. Executive Judge Reynaldo Clemens declared, however, that respondent was
absent for the entire month of May 2007.
Dishonesty, especially when committed by judges who are supposedly the visible
representation of the law, not only tends to mislead the Court; it also tarnishes the image of
the judiciary.
Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;

untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. This is a grave
offense that carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service, even for the first offense,
with forefeiture of retirement benefirs except accrued leave credits and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in government service.103
Respondent, on his inaction in 51 cases, ascribes it to the inefficiency of his staff and
the failure of the police officers to make a return of the warrants of arrest.
Judges cannot, however, take refuge in the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court
personnel since proper and efficient court management is their responsibility. Court personnel
are not the guardians of judges responsibilities. It is the duty of judges to devise an efficient
recording and filing system in their courts to enable them to monitor the flow of cases and to
manage their speedy and timely disposition.104 And as correctly pointed out by the OCA, it
is the judges duty to see to it that the police officers assigned to execute the warrants comply
with Section 4, Rule 113, requiring them to make a report to the judge who issued the warrant
within ten days after the expiration of the period within which to execute the warrant.
Respondent was felled by a bullet of an assassin on January 14, 2008, however, in view
of which the penalty of dismissal that the proven charges against him call for can no longer be
imposed. He could still be fined, however, in the amount of P40,000 each in A.M. No. RTJ-
06-1976 and A.M. No. RTJ-06-1977, to be deducted from the benefits due him.
WHEREFORE, for Dishonesty, Gross Ignorance of and Contempt for the Law, Gross
Inefficiency and Negligence, and Violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary and the Judges Oath, respondent, Judge Roberto A. Navidad, who has, in
the meantime died, is in each of these cases subject of this Decision FINED the amount of
Forty Thousand (P40,000) Pesos. The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court
Administrator is authorized to deduct the total sum of Eighty Thousand (P80,000) Pesos from
the benefits due respondent and to release the remaining amount to his heirs unless there exists
another lawful cause for withholding the same.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Section 20
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative complaint for usurpation of authority, grave misconduct, and

gross ignorance of the law filed by Lydelle L. Conquilla (complainant) against Judge
Lauro G. Bernardo (respondent judge), Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Bocaue, Bulacan.
The Facts
In a verified complaint dated 30 July 2008, complainant Conquilla charged respondent

judge with usurpation of authority, grave misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant alleged that on 4 July 2008, a criminal complaint for direct assault was
filed against her before the MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan. The complaint was signed by
Police Chief Inspector Rizalino Andaya of the Bocaue Police Station.
On 8 July 2008, respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation and found

probable cause to hold the complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault.
Respondent judge then issued a warrant of arrest dated 8 July 2008, with the bail fixed
at P12,000.
On 10 July 2008, upon motion of complainant, respondent judge issued an order

reducing the bail for complainants provisional liberty to P6,000. On the same date,
complainant posted cash bail of P6,000 for her provisional liberty.
Complainant then filed an administrative complaint, alleging that under A.M. No. 05-08-
[2]6-SC, first level court judges no longer have the authority to conduct preliminary
investigations. Thus, complainant avers that respondent judge committed an illegal act
constituting gross ignorance of the law and procedure when he conducted the
preliminary investigation and issued the warrant of arrest. Complainant claims that the
hasty issuance of the warrant of arrest was without legal basis and unjustly prejudiced
complainant and deprived her of her liberty. Complainant submits that respondent
judge usurped the power of the prosecutor, who was not even given the chance to
comment on complainants Motion to Reduce Bail. Furthermore, complainant alleges
that when she learned about the warrant of arrest, she called respondent judges wife,
who said she would help in having the bail reduced to P6,000.00 and would have the
case for direct assault against herein complainant dismissed provided herein
complainant cancel the wifes debt of P35,000.00 and provided that herein complainant
loan the wife an additional amount of P50,000.00.1
In his Comment, respondent judge states that he issued the warrant of arrest in good
faith because he was convinced that there was probable cause and that it was
necessary to place the complainant under immediate custody to prevent a frustration of
justice. Although respondent judge knew that the Supreme Court already amended
Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by removing the
conduct of the preliminary investigation from judges of first level courts, he argues that
the power to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of arrest
cannot be revoked. Besides, even if such power to determine probable cause was
indeed revoked by the amendment, respondent judge submits that technical rules can
be relaxed if their implementation will result in injustice.
Respondent judge further states that he did not usurp the power of the prosecutor when
he reduced the bail considering that under Section 20 of Rule 114, the court may
increase or decrease the bail upon good cause.
Lastly, respondent judge denies any knowledge of the alleged conversation and
transaction between complainant and his wife.
The OCAs Report and Recommendation
In its Report dated 12 February 2009, the OCA found respondent judge guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for his patent and unjustified violation of the provisions of the
Resolution in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. The OCA stated that the Resolution in A.M. No. 05-
8-26-SC, which took effect on 3 October 2005, removed the conduct of investigation
from the scope of authority of first level courts judges. Had respondent judge been
more prudent in understanding the pertinent provisions of the Resolution in A.M. No.
05-8-26-SC, which are very clear and concise, no administrative complaint would have
been filed against him.
The OCA, however, found the charge of usurpation of authority without merit. The OCA
agreed with respondent judge that the power to determine the amount of bail is vested
in the judge.
The OCA recommended (a) that the administrative complaint against respondent judge
be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (b) that respondent judge be
fined in the amount of P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
The Ruling of the Court
In this case, respondent judge makes it appear that he merely conducted a preliminary
examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. However, the records of the case clearly show that
respondent judge indeed conducted a preliminary investigation on 8 July 2008. After
finding probable cause to hold complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault,
respondent judge then issued a warrant for her arrest. That respondent judge
conducted a preliminary investigation and not just a preliminary examination to
determine existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is evident
in his Order dated 8 July 2008, which reads:
ORDER
The undersigned, after personal examination of the witnesses in writing and under oath, finds that a
probable cause exists and there is sufficient ground to hold the accused LYDELLE L.
CONQUILLA for trial for the crime of DIRECT ASSAULT as charged in the complaint. In order not
to frustrate the ends of justice, there is a need to place the accused in immediate custody. Let warrant
immediately issue for his [sic] arrest hereby fixing bail in the amount of P12,000.00 for his provisional
liberty.2
SO ORDERED.
Bocaue, Bulacan, July 8, 2008.
(signed)
HON. LAURO G. BERNARDO
Judge
Furthermore, after complainant posted bail on 10 July 2008, respondent judge then
issued an Order dated 10 July 2008, ordering the complainants release and setting the
case for her arraignment on 3 September 2008.
The conduct of preliminary investigation by respondent judge was in direct

contravention of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which took effect on 3 October 2005, amending
Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by removing the
conduct of preliminary investigation from judges of the first level courts. Thus, under
Section 2 of Rule 112, only the following officers are authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations: (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) National and
Regional State Prosecutors; and (c) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Furthermore, Section 5 of Rule 112 provides:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue.
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on records clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice
and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or
information.
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of
this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court SHALL be conducted by the prosecutor. The procedure for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest by the judge shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, MTC judges are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.
In this case, the crime charged against complainant was direct assault against a public
school teacher, who is a person in authority under Article 1523 of the Revised Penal
Code.4 Under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, when the assault is committed
against a person in authority while engaged in the performance of his official duties or
on the occasion of such performance, the imposable penalty is prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods. The duration of the penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods is 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years. Thus, the
offense charged against complainant requires the conduct of preliminary investigation
as provided under Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SECTION 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or

proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Except as provided in Section 6 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted

before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law
is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and (1) day without regard to the fine. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It was therefore incumbent upon respondent judge to forward the records of the case to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, instead of
conducting the preliminary investigation himself.
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence and
diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.5 Section 3, Canon
6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct6 requires judges to maintain and enhance their
knowledge and skills to properly perform their judicial functions, thus:
SEC. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and
personal qualities for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the
training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.
When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law.
Anything less is gross ignorance of the law.7 Judges should exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules,8 and should be diligent in
keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence.9
On the alleged promise of respondent judges wife that the bail would be reduced
provided her P35,000 debt will be cancelled and that complainant grant respondent
judges wife an additional loan, we find that complainant did not substantiate her
allegation. Nevertheless, the Court notes that although respondent judge denies
knowledge of such transaction between his wife and complainant, respondent judge did
not categorically deny his wifes debt to complainant. In his Comment, respondent judge
states: Assuming arguendo that there really was a loan made by his wife, he did not
know of such transaction between his wife and the complainant and given this, he did
not allow such transaction to take place.10
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct stresses the importance of propriety and
the appearance of propriety to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
Respondent judge should bear in mind that judges should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.11 Furthermore, judges and members
of their families are prohibited from asking for or accepting any gift, bequest, loan or
favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him in
connection with the performance of judicial duties.12
On respondent judges issuance of the warrant of arrest and reduction of the amount of
bail, we find such acts void for want of jurisdiction. While Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
allows a judge to grant bail in bailable offenses and to increase or decrease bail, it
assumes that the judge has jurisdiction over the case. In this case, respondent judge
conducted the preliminary investigation without authority and issued the warrant of
arrest. Thus, these acts are void for want of jurisdiction. The reduction of bail is also
void because in the first place, respondent judge had no jurisdiction over the case itself.
The Court notes that this is respondent judges third offense. In 2003, the Court found
respondent judge administratively liable for undue delay in rendering decisions and
fined him P19,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt
with more severely.13
More importantly, in the 2008 case of Santos v. Bernardo,14 the Court found respondent
judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and basic rules of procedure and fined him
P20,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be
dealt with more severely.15 The Court found no merit in respondent judges supposition
that grave coercion is an offense not subject to preliminary investigation. The Court,
however, emphasized that when the complaint was filed on 3 January 2006,
respondent judge no longer had authority to conduct preliminary investigation by virtue
of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. Thus, the Court held that respondent judge should have
referred the complaint to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor instead of issuing the
subpoena directing complainants to appear before the Court.
Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law or
procedure is classified as a serious charge, for which the imposable penalty is any of
the following:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporation: Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six
(6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.16
Considering that this is respondent judges third offense, the second of which was also
for gross ignorance of the law, we hold that the penalty of six (6) months suspension
from office without salary and other benefits is in order.17
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Lauro G. Bernardo GUILTY of gross

ignorance of the law and SUSPEND him from office for a period of six (6) months
without salary and other benefits, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Section 21
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a Memorandum dated October 23, 2007 in A.M. No. 06-7-416-RTC (Audit
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 72, Olongapo
City), of then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, which recommended the following:
1. that A.M. 06-3-196-RT[C] (Letter of Judge Josefina D. Farrales, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 72,
Olongapo City [Re: 30 cases and 84 motions submitted for decision/resolution in the said Court])
be CONSOLIDATED with this instant administrative matter;
2. that Judge Eliodoro [G]. Ubiadas be held administratively liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT, GROSS
INEFFICIENCY and VIOLATIONS OF SC CIRCULAR and he be FINED in an amount equivalent to his
six (6) months salary;
3. that Branch Clerk of Court Gerry R. Gruspe be held administratively liable for GROSS INEFFICIENCY
and VIOLATIONS OF SC CIRCULAR and that he be FINED in the amount of Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future
shall be dealt with more severely;
4. that Misses Catalina A. Atienza and Rizanilla R. Vito, Clerks-in-Charge of the Docket Books, same
Court, to SUBMIT a quarterly report until the updating of aforesaid docket books are completed
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely;
5. the Documentation Division-Legal OCA to COLLECT from Pacific Union Insurance Company
Incorporated its liability for forfeited bonds in the following cases:
CERTIFICATION NO. ISSUED TOTAL AMOUNT OF

THE BOND
Atty. John V. Aquino
488-0, Series of 2005 Office of the Clerk of Php256,000.00

Court
Branch Case Numbers Amount of Remarks
Bond
72 CR No. 435-02 Php 12,000.00 Bond of accused

Cecilia Asuncion
amounting to
Php80,000.00 which
was reduced to 15%
included in the
Php530,000.00
reduced bond.
74 CR Nos. 321-02- 64,000.00
and 270-02
75 CR Nos. 662-03, 180,000.00 Not paid yet paid to
the OCC
134-03 and 743-
03
It is likewise recommended that the Office of the Court Administrator be DIRECTED to make
a REPORT and RECOMMENDATION that will be used as guidelines for the reduction of the liability of
the bondsmen in forfeited bonds within sixty (60) days from notice hereof.
The present consolidated administrative matters have the following antecedent facts:
A.M. 06-3-196-RTC
The Court, through the First Division, issued Resolution dated February 7, 2005 in A.M.
No. RTJ-05-1902 (PAGCOR, etc. v. Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, etc.), preventively suspending
Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas (Judge Ubiadas), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Olongapo
City, effective immediately pending resolution of the said administrative case. Judge Ubiadas
received the said Resolution on March 11, 2005.
Subsequently, several judges were designated105 to preside over Branch 72, namely:
Hon. Renato J. Dilag, RTC, Br. 73, Olongapo City from April 18 to June 10, 2005; Hon. Ramon
S. Caguioa, RTC, Br. 74, Olongapo City, from June 10, 2005 to January 25, 2006; and Hon.
Josefina D. Farrales, RTC, Br. 69, Iba, Zambales, from January 30, 2006 until the present.
Upon her assumption, Judge Farrales immediately conducted an inventory of the

pending cases in Branch 72. In her letter dated February 15, 2006, Judge Farrales reported
that there are still 30 cases and 84 motions submitted for decision and resolution and that
she requested for sixty (60) days extension to resolve the same. Of the cases, 15 cases and
33 motions were already beyond the reglementary period to decide/resolve even before
Judge Ubiadas was suspended. The other 15 cases and 51 motions were submitted for
decision/resolution when Judge Caguioa took over as presiding judge of Branch 72, of which
6 cases and 30 motions were already beyond the reglementary period.
The Court106 noted Judge Farrales letter, directed her to resolve the cases/motions
within six (6) months and to submit a copy of each of her decisions/resolutions within 10 days
from rendition/promulgation thereof. The Court likewise required Judge Ubiadas and Judge
Caguioa to explain within 10 days from notice, their failure to decide/resolve the subject
cases/motions within the reglementary periods and to make the necessary request for
extension of time within which to decide/resolve the same.
In a series of compliances, Judge Farrales informed the Court through the OCA that she
had decided/resolved all the 30 pending cases and 84 motions. The Court noted said
compliances and considered the same as full compliance in the present administrative
matter.
In the meantime, Judge Caguioa, in a letter dated April 19, 2007, explained that upon
his designation as the Acting Presiding Judge of Br. 72, he immediately heard all the cases
already set and calendared thereat in order to prevent a disruption of the court calendar and
settings already made during the incumbency of Judge Ubiadas. Thus, together with the
equally heavy docket of his own station in Branch 74, he heard all pending incidents
calendared and conducted trial of scheduled cases in Branch 72 in order not to cause any
further delay in the proceedings. Judge Caguioa further explained that he inherited all the
unresolved cases and motions as acting judge of said branch. During his incumbency therein,
they were not brought to his attention even at the time the Semestral Docket Inventory of
Branch 72 was prepared. He was therefore unaware that he had to address the matter or at
the very least ask for an extension of time to decide all of them.
On June 20, 2007, the Court noted Judge Caguioas letter and referred the same to the
OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation within 30 days from receipt of the records.
A.M. No. 06-7-416-RTC
On May 17-26, 2006, a judicial audit and physical inventory of cases was conducted at
Branch 72, RTC, Olongapo City due to Judge Ubiadas indefinite suspension and his
forthcoming compulsory retirement on July 3, 2006.
The Report dated June 29, 2006 revealed that Branch 72 has a total caseload of 1,114
cases, consisting of 880 criminal cases and 234 civil cases.
Apart from the 30 cases and 84 motions submitted for decision/resolution mentioned
in A.M. No. 06-3-196-RTC, the audit team noted that there were still other cases submitted
for decision/resolution and matters which were not acted upon for a considerable length of
time, to wit:
Status Criminal Civil

SFD* beyond the reglementary period 1 3
SFD* still within the reglementary period 7 7
SFR** beyond the reglementary period 4 6
SFR** still within the reglementary period 2 13
Cases in different stages of proceedings without
further action for a considerable length of time
3 5
Warrants of Arrest
1. No Return/Unacted 39 -
2. For issuance of alias warrant of arrest 32

Summons - 2
No further action/setting 4 17
For compliance of the parties 4 23
For compliance of the Bondsmen 51 -
Total
* SFD-Submitted for Decision
** SFR-Submitted for Resolution
Consequently, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution dated July 26, 2006, reiterating
the directive to Judge Farrales to decide/resolve the 114 cases subject matter of A.M. 06-3-
196-RTC until July 31, 2006. As regards the other cases submitted for decision/resolution
which were not acted upon for a considerable length of time, the Court gave Judge Farrales
a period of three (3) months from notice to decide/resolve/take appropriate action thereon.
In the same resolution, the Court directed Judge Farrales and Branch Clerk of Court,
Atty. Gerry R. Gruspe, to take appropriate action on the lapses in records management,107
as well as on the observation of the Audit Team concerning the archiving of cases.108 They
were also required to submit a report on the action taken and the present status of all the
cases mentioned in the audit report, with instruction to attach to the report the copies of the
orders/decisions/resolutions for reference as well as the measures taken with regard to the
records management issues.
The latter part of the said resolution is quoted as follows:
(c) DIRECT Presiding Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas to
(i) EXPLAIN within thirty (30) days from notice hereof his failure to decide/resolve
the cases enumerated in Exhibits A-A-1 and B-B-4 of the subject OCA Memorandum, which
cases are already beyond the reglementary period to decide/resolve, and FILE a request for
extension of time to decide/resolve the same;
(ii) EXPLAIN within thirty (30) days from notice hereof why he granted the reduction
of the liability of the bondsmen in the following cases, to wit:
AMOUNT OF THE
CASE NUMBER PARTIES
BOND
CR NO. 383-02 Pp vs. Joel Llanilo Php 10,000.00
CR NO. 356-02 20,000.00 each
Pp vs. Rey dela Cruz
CR NO. 357-02 Accused
CR NO. 642-03 Pp vs. Renato Silva 200,000.00
CR NO. 22-02 Pp vs. David Dengwas 10,000.00 each
Total Amount of the Bond Php340,000.00
REMARKS
1. In a joint Motion to Reduce Bondsman Liability dated August 31, 2004,

Commonwealth Insurance Company, thru its authorized representative,
Dolores K. Millora, moved that the liability of the bonding company be
reduced from Php340,000.00 to Php17,000.00 or equivalent to five (5%)
of the total forfeited bond. She averred that bondsman has already
exerted earnest effort to locate them and had already spent much more
than the premium of the bonds received from them.
2. Order dated September 23, 2004, Judge Ubiadas approved the said
motion and reduced bondsman liability to Php17,000.00.
3. Order dated April 27, 2005, considering the payment of

Commonwealth Insurance paid the reduced amount of Php17,000.00 per
OR No. 21257141 dated January 31/ February 1, 2005 said Bondsman
was absolved of its liability in the aforesaid cases. The said Order was
signed by Pairing Judge Dilag as Judge Ubiadas was already suspended at
that time.
AMOUNT OF THE
CASE NUMBER PARTIES
BOND
CR NO. 18-01 Pp vs. Sernan Patero
CR NO. 675-01 Pp vs. Beth Mendoza, et
al. Total Amount of
CR NO. 672-99 Pp vs. Edgar Natividad the Bond
CR NO. 95-01 Pp vs. Pedro Sarmiento
CR NO. 435-02 Pp vs. Cecilia Asuncion
CR NO. 397-01 Pp vs. Joel Santos
CR NO. 289-99 Pp vs. Remedios De Dios Php530,000.00
CR NO. 30-02 Pp vs. Michael Garon
REMARKS
1. In the Order dated February 16, 2005, Judge Ubiadas approved the
Motion for Mitigation of Suretys Liability of Pacific Union Insurance
Company from the above-mentioned cases from the total amount of
Php540,000.00 to 15% of the aforesaid amount (Php81,000.00) and
accordingly the writs of execution issued by the Court in connection with
the bonds posted was amended (Annex F).
2. Per confirmation with the Office of the Clerk of Court, said amount was
not paid by the bonding company.
(d) DIRECT Branch Clerk of Court Gerry R. Gruspe, same court, to EXPLAIN within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof:
(i) why the Monthly Report of Cases for the months of May 2005 up to February
2006 were only submitted to the Court on April 17, 2006;
(ii) his failure to execute the judgments on the bond in the following cases as well as
those cases enumerated in paragraph 2.d (B), to wit:
Case No. Name of Bondsman Amount of Date of

Accused Bond Judgment
1. 124-03 B. Sangco P
Plaridel 24,000.00
October 21,
2. 296-03 I. Baula Surety 24,000.00
2004
3. 297-03 I. Baula Company 24,000.00
4. 501-03 A. Naga 80,000.00
(iii) the non-submission of the stenographic notes of the cases submitted for
decision/resolution that further causes the delay in the disposition of the cases;
(e) DIRECT Ms. Catalina A. Atienza and Rizanilla R. Vito, Clerks-in-Charge of the Docket Books,
same court, to UPDATE the entries in the docket books assigned to them from year 2005 to 2006, and
SUBMIT COMPLIANCE herewith within sixty (60) days from notice hereof; and
(f) REQUIRE Ms. Catalina A. Atienza and Rizanilla R. Vito to SUBMIT a quarterly report until
the updating of the aforesaid docket books is completed.
The Court further resolved to:
(a) REFER the Orders dated September 23, 2004 and February 16, 2005 of Judge
Ubiadas, reducing the liabilities of the Commonwealth and Pacific Union Insurance Company,
respectively, as well as the Certification No. 488-0, Series of 2005, issued by Clerk of Court
John V. Aquino, RTC, Olongapo City, to the COMMITTEE ON BONDS-OCA and
DOCUMENTATION-LEGAL DIVISION, OCA, for study, report, recommendation and
appropriate action, including Judge Ubiadas liability, if there is any, within thirty (30) days from
notice hereof; and
(b) DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to WITHHOLD the
retirement benefits of Judge Ubiadas pending the submission of the recommendation
of the Committee on Bonds-OCA.
In a Resolution dated November 27, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate A.M. No. 06-7-416-RTC
with A.M. No. 06-3-196-RTC and to note the OCA Memorandum dated October 23, 2007.
With regard to the status of the pending cases and incidents subject of these consolidated administrative
cases, records show that Judge Farrales had already resolved and acted upon all the cases and unresolved
motions pending in Branch 72. She also informed the Court that new measures/procedures are being
implemented in order to correct the lapses in records management and that regular counter-checking is being
done to avoid recurrence of similar incidents.
We now come to the OCAs recommendations with respect to Judge Ubiadas. Two (2)
issues must be addressed herein: first, whether Judge Ubiadas is guilty of gross ignorance
and/or gross misconduct in reducing the liability of Commonwealth Insurance Company
(Commonwealth) and Pacific Union Insurance Company, Incorporated (Pacific Union); and
second, whether he is guilty of gross inefficiency in the conduct of court business and
violations of existing SC circulars.
On the first issue, the Audit Team reported that Commonwealth filed a motion to
reduce bondsman liability from P340,000.00 to P17,000.00 or equivalent to 5% of the total
forfeited bond in Criminal Case Nos. 383-02, 356-02 to 357-02, 642-03 and 224-02. In said
motion, Commonwealth averred that it exerted earnest efforts to locate and apprehend the
accused and has already spent much more than the premium of the bonds it had received
from the accused.
In an Order dated September 23, 2004, Judge Ubiadas granted the motion.
Accordingly, Commonwealth paid the amount of P17,000.00.109 Later, then acting presiding
Judge Dilag issued an Order dated April 27, 2005 absolving Commonwealth of its liability.
Pacific Union, on the other hand, filed a motion for mitigation of suretys liability in
Criminal Case Nos. 18-01, 675-01, 672-99, 95-01, 435-02, 397-01, 289-99 and 30-02 in the
total amount of P 530,000.00. Pacific Union claimed that it had already spent nearly the
amount of the bond posted in the said cases and that it spared no time and effort to comply
with the court orders but was, however, hampered by unavoidable circumstances. It also
claimed that should it be held liable to the full amount of the confiscated bonds, it will suffer
tremendous losses in its business. Hence, it prayed that the court reconsider its order of
execution and that it be allowed to pay 10% of the P530,000.00.
Judge Ubiadas, in an Order dated February 16, 2005, reduced Pacific Unions liability to
15% of the P 530,000.00 or to P 79,500.00. The writs of execution previously issued were
thus amended. From the records, it would appear that Pacific Union did not pay even this
greatly reduced amount, among other unpaid liabilities as found by the Audit Team.
On this matter, the OCA further informed the Court that there is no existing Committee
on Bonds which could appropriately act on Judge Ubiadas Orders dated September 23, 2004
and February 16, 2005. Although the Court created three (3) committees which will handle
the property bonds, cash bonds and recognizance, their creation was however solely for the
purpose of drafting the guidelines thereon110 and that the said committees have been
inactive for a considerable length of time. The OCA, thus, believed that the instant
administrative matter is beyond the competence of the said committees.111
As a defense to charge of misconduct with respect to the reduction of the liabilities of
the aforementioned bondsmen, Judge Ubiadas explained that he was guided in good faith by
the ruling112 of this Court which were cited by Commonwealth and Pacific Union.
The rule governing forfeitures of bail bonds is found in Section 21, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 21. Forfeiture of bail. When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these
Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the
accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen
given thirty (30) days within which to produce the principal and to show cause why no judgment
should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondmen
must:
a. produce the body of the principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
b. explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly
and severally, for the amount of the bail. The Court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability
of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.
Significantly, OCA Circular No. 100-2006 (Re: Guidelines on the Reduction of Bond
Liability) provides:
1. REDUCTION OF BOND LIABILITY Following an Order of Forfeiture, the Court may reduce or
otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, PROVIDED, the accused has been surrendered or is
acquitted. Only in these two instances may Judges reduce or mitigate the liability of the bondsmen.
(RULE 114, SEC. 21)
The OCAs assessment of Judge Ubiadas mitigation of the liabilities of Commonwealth

and Pacific Union follows:
In the case at bar, Judge Ubiadas not only failed to perform his duties in accordance with
the Rules, but he also acted willfully and in gross disregard of the law and controlling jurisprudence.
As noted, the case of Pp vs. Sanchez is one of the cases cited by Judge Ubiadas in explaining his grant
of the motion for reduction/mitigating the liabilities of bondsmen. Hence, he is fully aware that the
surrender of the accused is the common consideration in the reduction of liability of the surety. It
can be said, therefore, that the said oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in
grave abuse of judicial authority.
However, other issues should be clarified. In this particular instance, the said orders were
not questioned by the accused nor the surety company as the same were not adverse to them. It
was only discovered during the audit of the records. There is no way by which the abuse of
discretion/propriety, if there is any, in granting reduction of the liability maybe counter-checked. It
is necessary, therefore, that specific guidelines be used as basis for the reduction of the liability of the
bondsmen in order to prevent appearance of impropriety and/or impropriety in the grant if the
reduction of the liability of the surety. (emphasis supplied)
We agree with the OCA that Judge Ubiadas failed to strictly comply with the rules
pertaining to forfeitures of bail bonds, in particular the prescription that the bondsmans
liability can only be mitigated when the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.
However, Judge Ubiadas conduct on this matter cannot be readily characterized as gross
ignorance or gross misconduct in the absence of specific guidelines which the OCA itself
stated in its report as necessary as a standard to measure the propriety or impropriety of
mitigation of a bondsmans liability.
Anent the second issue, We hold that Judge Ubiadas is guilty of gross inefficiency in
the conduct of court business and of violations of existing SC circulars.
The Constitution provides that lower courts have three (3) months within which to
decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. 113 Moreover, the Code
of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases
within the required period.114 In addition, this Court laid down guidelines in SC
Administrative Circular No. 13 which provides, inter alia, that [j]udges shall observe
scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the
adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases
or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all
lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do
so. We have reiterated this admonition in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-99 which requires
all judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding
cases and the failure to comply therewith is considered a serious violation of the
constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of their cases.
In his letter, Judge Ubiadas cited his health conditions as an explanation for the delay
in deciding/resolving the cases/other matters submitted for decision/resolution in Branch
72. Judge Ubiadas averred that on August 2, 1997, he suffered a heart attack, diagnosed as
myocardial infraction, and was confined in the intensive care unit (ICU) of the UST Hospital.
He had a second heart attack on January 2, 1998, this time it was diagnosed as cardiac arrest.
Again, he was confined in the ICU of the same hospital. Then a third heart attack occurred in
July 1998, which, although not as serious as the first and second attacks, nevertheless,
required his confinement at the James Gordon Memorial Hospital.
Judge Ubiadas further explained that he was confined since March 19, 1999 and
subjected to a triple by-pass operation on April 13, 1999. It was only on June 1, 1999 that he
was able to return to work. Notwithstanding his failing health then, he still acted as the judge
of the four (4) RTCs for two (2) months as: (1) presiding judge of Br. 72; (2) pairing judge of
Br. 73;115 (2) acting presiding judge of Br. 75;116 and (3) pairing judge of Br. 74.117
Indeed, Judge Ubiadas illness could have adversely affected the performance of his
duties. Despite having just been subjected to a triple by-pass operation, he knew fully well
that he still had to act as the judge of four (4) RTC branches for two (2) months. If his illness
had indeed seriously hampered him in the discharge of his duties, Judge Ubiadas could have
requested this Court for additional time to decide/resolve pending cases and incidents. His
illness cannot be an excuse for his failure to render decisions or resolutions within the
constitutionally prescribed period, considering that he could have requested an extension or
other relief from this Court but he did not. It is incumbent upon him to dispose the cases
assigned to him without undue delay.
This Court has incessantly admonished members of the bench to administer justice
without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice denied. The present clogged dockets in all
levels of our judicial system cannot be cleared unless every magistrate earnestly,
painstakingly and faithfully complies with the mandate of the law. Undue delay in the
disposition of cases amounts to a denial of justice which, in turn, brings the courts into
disrepute and ultimately erodes the faith and confidence of the public in the judiciary.118
On this point, our ruling in another case is instructive:
The Court finds deserving of due consideration, the explanation of respondent Judge for
leaving ten (10) undecided cases before his retirement from the service. Serious illness may justify the
inability of a judge to perform his official duties and functions. But then, the Court has to enforce what
is required by law and to impose a reasonable punishment for violation thereof. The members of the
judiciary have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. Failure to decide cases within
the period fixed by law constitutes a neglect of duty, which warrants the imposition of administrative
sanctions. When he was hindered by a grave malignancy, it was incumbent upon the respondent
Judge to request this Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, for additional time to
decide the cases which he could not seasonably act upon and decide. For failing to do so, respondent
Judge has to suffer the consequences of his omission.119 (emphasis supplied)
Aware of the caseload of judges, this Court has viewed with understanding requests
for extension made by judges. Hence, should a judge find himself unable to decide cases
within the 90-day period for doing so, he can ask for an extension of time for deciding the
same. Such requests are generally granted.120
In his letter, Judge Ubiadas acknowledged that it would have been better had he
requested for an extension of time to decide the cases. Yet, he hoped that this Court would
understand his failure by explaining that, [t]o my mind, the measure of a judges efficiency
and hard work should be viewed more in the light of the total work accomplished rather than
ask for a prior excuse to decide the case beyond the period allowed by the Rules.
Judge Ubiadas position is untenable. This Court wishes to remind him that as an official
of the Judiciary, he is expected to follow the rules laid down by this Court for the prompt and
speedy disposition of cases. Failure to decide cases and other matters within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction. If a judge can not comply with this Courts directives on the matter
of disposition of cases, he may seek extensions from this Court to avoid administrative
liability.
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the OCA that Judge Ubiadas should be held
administratively liable. Records show that prior to these consolidated cases, he had been
held administratively liable four (4) times.121 Had he not compulsorily retired on July 3, 2006,
the OCA opined that the appropriate penalty would have been dismissal from service with
forfeiture of his retirement benefits except his earned leave credits, and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporation.
Instead, the OCA recommended that Judge Ubiadas be meted the penalty of a fine
equivalent to six (6) months of his salary. We approve the recommended penalty. In one
case,122 We explained, thus:
We have always considered the failure of judge to decide a case within ninety (90) days as
gross inefficiency and imposed either fine or suspension from service without pay for such. The fines
imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the
reglementary period and other factors, to wit: the presence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstancesthe damage suffered by the parties as a result of delay, the health and age of the
judge, etc. Thus, in one case, we set the fine at ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) for failure of a judge
to decide 82 cases within the reglementary period, taking into consideration the mitigating
circumstance that it was the judges first offense. In another case, the fine imposed was sixty thousand
pesos (P60,000.00), for the judge had not decided about 25 or 27 cases. Still in other cases, the fines
were variably set at fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), for nineteen (19) cases left undecided, taking
into consideration that it was the judges first offense; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), for three
(3) undecided criminal cases; eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00), for not deciding a criminal case for
three (3) years; forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), for not deciding 278 cases within the prescribed
period, taking note of the judges failing health and age; and ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), for
belatedly rendering a judgment of acquittal in a murder case, after one-half years from the date the
case was submitted for decision. In another case, suspension without pay for a period of six (6) months
was imposed since, besides the judges failure to timely decide an election protest for eight (8) months,
the judge submitted false certificates of services and was found guilty of habitual absenteeism.
(emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Here, Judge Ubiadas failed to decide 15 cases and 33 motions which were beyond the reglementary period to
decide/resolve. Here were also other matters that were not acted upon. In affirming the OCA recommended
penalty, we took into consideration Judge Ubiadas health. We also noted that his caseload then was 1,300 more
or less and that during his tenure, as in his letter, he has done [his] best and in utmost good faith to serve the ends
of justice and perform [his] duties as a judge. However, previous administrative sanctions imposed upon him must
likewise to given appropriate weight.
With respect to Judge Caguioa, records show that his letter was referred to the OCA
for evaluation, report and recommendation. At the time of the consolidation of these two
administrative matters, the OCA has yet to submit its report.
We shall dispense with the report and rule on Judge Caguioas liability, if any. In gist,
Judge Caguioa explained that the unresolved cases and motions were not brought to his
attention; hence, he was unaware that there are still matters that he had to address or he
could have asked from the Court an extension of time to decide on them.
The Court takes this opportunity to again remind judges, clerks of court, and all other
court employees that they share the same duty and obligation to dispense justice promptly.
They should strive to work together and mutually assist each other to achieve this goal.
Nonetheless, judges have the primary responsibility of maintaining the professional
competence of their staff. Judges should organize and supervise their court personnel to
ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance
of high standards of public service and fidelity.123
Although Judge Caguioa was merely the acting presiding Judge of Branch 72, he ought to have been
vigilant and probing in the management of the said court. His proffered excuse, that the undecided cases and
unresolved motions were not brought to his attention, is untenable. Accordingly, Judge Caguioa is hereby
reminded to be more circumspect in performing his functions as a judge, whether in his own court or in other
courts where he is just in an acting capacity.
With respect to Branch Clerk of Court Gerry R. Gruspe, the OCA recommended that he should be held
administratively liable for gross inefficiency and violations of SC circular and that he be fined in the amount
of P2,000.00.
The OCAs findings are quoted below:
As mentioned, at the end of each month the branch clerk of court shall be responsible for the
preparation of the monthly report of cases and shall be certified under oath as true and correct by the
branch clerk of court and must be also be certified by the presiding judge to the correctness of the
report (A.C. No. 4-2004 dated February 4, 2004).
Notably, the reports for the months of January to April 2005 were solely signed by Branch
Clerk of Court Gruspe and filed only on June 15, 2005 (Annexes E, F, G). Also, a comparison of the List
of Cases submitted for decision contained in the aforesaid monthly reports and in the letter-request
of Judge Farrales reveals that there are cases in the request which were not included in the reports as
submitted for decision to wit:
Date
Case No. Case Title
Submitted
1. CV No. 354-0-94 G. Dela Llana vs. City of Olongapo 03-21-95
2. CV No. 28-0-00 L. Viacrusis vs. J. Asada, etc. 07-12-00
3. CV No.652-0-00 E. Stewart vs. Fely Baldos 06-04-04
4. CV No. 456-0-02 E. Stewart vs. Fely Baldos 06-14-04
5. CR No. 55-01 Pp vs. Wang Chan Chun 03-24-04
6. CR No. 626-02 Pp vs. Judith Villatema 10-20-04
Under the foregoing circumstances, it appears that the negligence of Branch Clerk of Court
Gerry Gruspe in the performance of his duties and responsibilities compounded the delay in the
disposition of cases and his lackadaisical attitude in the supervision of court personnel aggravated the
mismanagement of the courts business. If he is only assiduous in the performance of his official duties
and in supervising the court personnel and managing the courts dockets, the prompt disposition of
the courts business will be attained, despite the failure of Judge Ubiadas to adopt an efficient system
of court management.
A Clerk of Court who is lax in the supervision of court personnel is subject to disciplinary action.
However, considering that this is the first time that the said Clerk of Court has committed the
said infraction and in order to avoid repetition of similar offense, a fine in the amount of Two Thousand
Pesos (Php2,000.00) with a stern warning that his failure to submit the reportorial requirements on
time and similar lapses in the future will be dealt with more severely.
In his letter, Atty. Gruspe informed the Court that he personally prepared the data in the Monthly
Report of Cases Form and that he had already issued writs of executions in Criminal Cases Nos. 124-03 (B.
Sangco), 296-03 and 297-03 (I-Baula) and 501-03. He apologized for the delay in its submission due to heavy
workload. Also, Atty. Gruspe averred that he has been a Clerk of Court V in Branch 72 and legal researcher
at the same time since September 1, 2000. In the early part of 2005, he assumed the duties of the interpreter
in addition to his functions and other duties assigned by his judge. His duty as interpreter lasted for several
months until the appointment of a regular interpreter.
After consideration of the foregoing, We agree with the OCAs findings and
recommendation. In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of Cases in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City,124 we held that a branch clerk of courts
administrative functions are just as vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice.
A branch clerk of court is charged with the efficient recording, filing and management of court
records, besides having supervision over court personnel. Having been assigned a key role in
the complement of the court, one cannot be permitted to slacken on ones job under one
pretext or another. The clerk of court in this case was advised to be assiduous in performing
official duties and in supervising and managing court dockets and records.
In another case,125 We held:
Clerks of Court Caparros and Pulgar-Navarro should be reminded that they are ranking officers
in our judicial system. It is their basic responsibilities to conduct docket inventory and to ensure that
the records of each case are constantly accounted for. The volume of work cannot be an excuse for
their being remiss in the performance of these functions, and it may not be underscored enough that
the office of a clerk of court involves the performance of delicate administrative duties essential to
the prompt and proper administration of justice. (citations omitted)
Thus, under Section 52 (B)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable by suspension from office
for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal for the
second offense. Considering that this is Atty. Gruspes first offense, he should be imposed a
fine of P2,000.00.
As regards the docket books, the OCA did not receive any updates from Misses Catalina A. Atienza
and Rizanilla R. Vito from the time that the Memorandum dated October 23, 2007 was submitted to the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Court rules as follows:
1. Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, retired Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo
City, is GUILTY of gross inefficiency and violations of SC circular and hereby
FINED an amount equivalent to his six (6) months salary;
2. Judge Ramon S. Caguio, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 74, Olongapo City, is
REMINDED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties;
3. Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Gerry R. Gruspe RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City, is
GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and hereby FINED the amount of Two
Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely;
4. Misses Catalina A. Atienza and Rizanilla R. Vito, Clerks-in-Charge of the Docket

Books, same Court, are DIRECTED to submit quarterly reports until the updating
of the docket books are completed with a STERN WARNING that repetition of
the same lapses shall be dealt with more severely;
5. The Documentation Division-Legal OCA is DIRECTED to collect from Pacific

Union Insurance Company Incorporated its liability for forfeited bonds in the
following cases:
CERTIFICATION NO. ISSUED TOTAL AMOUNT OF
THE BOND
Atty. John V. Aquino
488-0, Series of 2005 Office of the Clerk of Php256,000.00

Court
Branch Case Numbers Amount of Remarks
Bond
72 CR No. 435-02 Php 12,000.00 Bond of accused

Cecilia Asuncion
amounting to
Php80,000.00 which
was reduced to 15%
included in the
Php530,000.00
reduced bond.
74 CR Nos. 321-02- 64,000.00
and 270-02
75 CR Nos. 662-03, 180,000.00 Not paid yet paid to
the OCC
134-03 and 743-
03
6. the Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to report on and recommend

guidelines for the reduction of the liability of the bondsmen in forfeited bonds
within sixty (60) days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151970 May 7, 2008
WINSTON MENDOZA and FE MICLAT, petitioners,

vs.
FERNANDO ALARMA and FAUSTA ALARMA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 9 July 2001 and Resolution3
dated 30 January 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58139.
The Facts
Spouses Fernando and Fausta Alarma (respondents) are the owners of an 11.7 hectare parcel of land (land)
located in Iba, Zambales. The land, identified as Cadastral Lot No. 2087 of Iba Cadastre, was posted as a
property bond for the provisional liberty of a certain Joselito Mayo, charged with illegal possession of firearms in
Criminal Case No. 1417-I, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Gregorio Cayan, et al."
When the accused failed to appear in court as directed on 19 March 1984, the trial court ordered his arrest and
the confiscation of his bail bond in favor of the government. It also directed the bondsmen to produce within a
period of 30 days the person of the accused and to show cause why judgment should not be entered against the
bail bond. However, without a judgment being rendered against the bondsmen, the trial court issued a writ of
execution against the land in an Order dated 14 April 1986.4 The land was eventually sold at public auction and
petitioners Winston Mendoza and Fe Miclat emerged as the highest bidders. Thus, the land was awarded to
petitioners and they immediately took possession of the same.
Sometime thereafter, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of property against petitioners with the Regional
Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 70,5 grounded on the nullity of the entire proceedings relating to the
property bond. During the pre-trial conducted on 3 May 1988, the parties agreed that the property would be
placed in the possession of respondents. On 2 August 1989, the court rendered its decision dismissing the
complaint and declaring that the Order dated 14 April 1986 was a judgment on the bond.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and nullified the proceedings on the
execution, sale, and issuance of the writ of possession.6 Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition for review on
certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 101103 and entitled "Winston Mendoza, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al." In a Resolution dated 18 March 1992, this Court denied the petition and ruled with finality that
the assailed 14 April 1986 Order was not a judgment on the bond.7
Meanwhile, petitioners applied for the registration of the land with the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales,
Branch 70.8 On 9 September 1987, the trial court granted the registration and issued Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. O-7249 in the name of petitioners.
The Trial Courts Ruling
Respondents then filed an action for the annulment of title and reconveyance of ownership of the land covered
by OCT No. O-7249 with the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71.9 On 24 September 1997, the trial
court dismissed the action contending that it had no jurisdiction to annul the judgment rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 70, a co-equal court.10 The trial court declared further that since the issue
of the case was the validity of OCT No. O-7249, the case should have been filed with the Court of Appeals which
has exclusive original jurisdiction over annulment of judgments of a Regional Trial Court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondents filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which reversed the findings of the trial court and annulled
OCT No. O-7249.11 The appellate court also ordered that a new title over the property be issued in the name of
respondents. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the appellate court denied in a Resolution
dated 30 January 2002.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding a defect in the proceedings and
in ordering the annulment of OCT No. O-7249.
Petitioners contend that even if the execution proceedings were nullified, they were not privy to the irregularities
of the auction sale. Thus, as buyers in good faith, they must be protected by the law.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the basis for the acquisition of the land and the issuance of title
over it had already been declared void by this Court in G.R. No. 101103. Thus, petitioners cannot now claim
good faith. With no valid title to the land, petitioners must reconvey the land to respondents.
The Courts Ruling

The petition lacks merit.
Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
SEC. 21. Forfeiture of bail. When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules,
his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused
fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty
(30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered
against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:
(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally,
for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen,
unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.
The provision clearly provides for the procedure to be followed before a bail bond may be forfeited and a
judgment on the bond rendered against the surety. In Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Amante, Jr.,12 we
outlined the two occasions upon which the trial court judge may rule adversely against the bondsmen in cases
when the accused fails to appear in court. First, the non-appearance by the accused is cause for the judge to
summarily declare the bond as forfeited. Second, the bondsmen, after the summary forfeiture of the bond, are
given 30 days within which to produce the principal and to show cause why a judgment should not be rendered
against them for the amount of the bond. It is only after this 30-day period, during which the bondsmen are
afforded the opportunity to be heard by the trial court, that the trial court may render a judgment on the bond
against the bondsmen. Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such judgment is preceded
by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the accused or to adduce
satisfactory reason for their inability to do so.13
In the present case, it is undisputed that the accused failed to appear in person before the court and that the trial
court declared his bail forfeited. The trial court gave the bondsmen, respondents in this case, a 30-day period to
produce the accused or a reasonable explanation for their non-production. However, two years had passed from
the time the court ordered the forfeiture and still no judgment had been rendered against the bondsmen for the
amount of the bail. Instead, an order of execution was issued and the property was put up for sale and awarded
to petitioners, the highest bidders.
These turn of events distinctly show that there was a failure of due process of law. The execution was issued,
not on a judgment, because there was none, but simply and solely on the declaration of forfeiture.
An order of forfeiture of the bail bond is conditional and interlocutory, there being something more to be done
such as the production of the accused within 30 days. This process is also called confiscation of bond. In People
v. Dizon,14 we held that an order of forfeiture is interlocutory and merely requires appellant "to show cause why
judgment should not be rendered against it for the amount of the bond." Such order is different from a judgment
on the bond which is issued if the accused was not produced within the 30-day period. The judgment on the
bond is the one that ultimately determines the liability of the surety, and when it becomes final, execution may
issue at once.15 However, in this case, no such judgment was ever issued and neither has an amount been fixed
for which the bondsmen may be held liable. The law was not strictly observed and this violated respondents
right to procedural due process.
In addition, we find that the issue of good faith in buying the property at the auction sale is no longer material.
This Court in a previous case had already ruled upon the invalidity of the execution and sale of the land. As a
result, the basis for which title to the land had been issued has no more leg to stand on. The appellate court,
therefore, was correct in ordering the annulment of the title to the land as a matter of course. There being no
valid title nor any right to possess the land, reconveyance to the respondents is only proper under the
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 9 July 2001 Decision and 30 January 2002 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58139.
SO ORDERED.
Section 22
G.R. Nos. 156687-88 May 21, 2009
PANFILO D. BONGCAC, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FORTUNATO LIM, and
TORIBIO BON, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Facts
The Mayor of Tagbilaran City, Jose V. Torralba, designated his secretary, petitioner Panfilo D. Bongcac
(petitioner), as the "Mayors representative to the City Market Committee," "Consultant and Coordinator on market
matters," and "adviser to the Acting Market Administrator." In January 1991, respondents Engr. Fortunato Lim
(Lim) and Toribio Bon (Bon) applied for stalls or tiendas in the Cogon Public Market in Tagbilaran City and were
referred to petitioner. Petitioner showed them the Minutes of the City Market Committee meeting held on 9 January
1991 which included their names as among the awardees of the market stalls. Petitioner informed Lim and Bon
that the city government could not afford to construct a new market and if they were interested, they should give
him more money for the construction of the stalls or tiendas they were applying for. Accordingly, Lim issued and
delivered to petitioner a BPI check, pay to cash, in the amount of 62,000. Bon issued and delivered to petitioner
two Metrobank checks, pay to cash, in the amounts of 30,000 and 10,000. Petitioner issued handwritten
receipts to Lim and Bon. Petitioner assured Lim that his stalls would be finished on or before 30 June 1991 and
promised Bon that his stall would be finished before the fiesta in Tagbilaran City. The checks were subsequently
encashed.
Thereafter, Lim and Bon read in the 30 June 1991 issue of a local newspaper that petitioner was "sacked" as
market body consultant and was terminated as secretary to the Mayor. They looked for him and demanded that
he either make an accounting of the money he received or deliver the stalls or tiendas already constructed.
Petitioner failed to do so. Thus, he was charged with two counts of Estafa defined and penalized under Article
315, 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code before the Sandiganbayan. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
18005 and 18006.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued and the cases were tried jointly.
On 28 March 2001, the Fourth Division1 of the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of Estafa,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 18005, the accused, PANFILO D. BONGCAC, is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA (of the amount of 54,000.00) defined under subdivision 1, paragraph
(b), and penalized under the 1st paragraph, both of Article 315, Revised Rules of Court, and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to Eleven (11) Years of prision mayor, as maximum, to indemnify Engr.
Fortunato Lim in the amount of 54,000.00 plus 10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
In Criminal Case No. 18006, the same accused, PANFILO D. BONGCAC, is likewise found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the same crime of ESTAFA (of the amount of 35,000.00) defined and penalized under the
aforestated law, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Two (2) Years, Three (3) Months
and Five (5) Days of prision correccional, as minimum, to Nine (9) Years of prision mayor, as maximum, to
indemnify Toribio Bon in the amount of 35,000.00; and to pay the costs.2
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 28 March 2001 Decision of the Sandiganbayan. The motion was
denied in the Resolution dated 3 September 2001.3
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari4 with this Court, which was docketed as G.R. Nos.
149711-12. The petition sought the reversal of the 28 March 2001 Decision of the Sandiganbayan.
On 20 February 2002, this Court, in G.R. Nos. 149711-12, issued a Resolution denying the petition for: (a) failure
of the petition to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error in the challenged
decision and resolution; and (b) failure of the petition to show extraordinary circumstance justifying a departure
from the established doctrine that findings of facts of the Sandiganbayan are well-nigh conclusive on this Court
and will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal.5 No motion for reconsideration was filed. Consequently, the
Resolution of 20 February 2002 became final and executory on 2 April 2002.6
On 4 December 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a notice to petitioner and counsel directing them to be present
on 8 January 2003 for the execution of judgment in the criminal cases.7
On 26 December 2002, petitioner filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 a Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief with
this Court. The petition sought to "reverse and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan" and to "declare that
petitioner is acquitted of the offense charged."8
Meanwhile, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, in Criminal Case Nos. 18005 and 18006, a Manifestation and
Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings praying that the execution of judgment be held in abeyance
to await the action of this Court on the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief he filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-
12.9
On 10 January 2003, the Fourth Division10 of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Criminal Case Nos. 18005
and 18006 denying, for lack of merit, petitioners Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Further
Proceedings. It further directed the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner to serve the sentence
imposed upon him. The cash bond posted by petitioner for his temporary liberty was ordered cancelled. Petitioner
was given five days to voluntarily surrender.11
On 3 March 2003, this Court issued a Resolution in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 denying, for lack of merit, the Very
Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief.
Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order praying that the Resolution dated 10 January 2003 issued by the
Sandiganbayan be set aside and that the bench warrant of arrest and the order cancelling the bail bond pending
resolution of the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief be recalled. Petitioner likewise sought to suspend
the final execution of the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision until after the resolution of the Very Urgent
Petition for Extraordinary Relief.
Respondents People of the Philippines (People) and Lim filed their respective Comments to the petition.
Respondent Bon did not file his comment and the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of the comment as the
notices sent to him were returned with the notation "RTS party abroad, USA."12
The People, in its Comment, asserted that this Court had no more jurisdiction to entertain the Very Urgent Petition
for Extraordinary Relief because the Courts Resolution of 20 February 2002 in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 had already
become final and executory. Petitioners bail bond was deemed automatically cancelled upon execution of the
judgment of conviction.
In his Comment, respondent Lim alleged that the instant petition should be dismissed outright. He argued that the
present petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days and that the Very Urgent Petition for
Extraordinary Relief was not sanctioned by the Rules of Civil Procedure and was barred by res judicata. He further
argued that the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief and the present petition are obviously dilatory tactics
to delay the execution of judgment in the criminal cases.
Issue
The resolution of the present petition hinges on the sole issue of whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying petitioners motion to hold in abeyance the
execution of judgment.
The Courts Ruling
We dismiss the petition.

Petitioner appealed the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision via a petition for review on certiorari before this
Court. The appeal was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149711-12. This Court, however, denied that petition in the
Resolution of 20 February 2002. The Resolution of 20 February 2002 became final and executory on 2 April 2002
after petitioner failed to file a timely motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan
Decision likewise became final and executory. Petitioner could no longer seek a reversal of the judgment of
conviction rendered by the Sandiganbayan, as what petitioner did when he filed the Very Urgent Petition for
Extraordinary Relief. 1avv phi1.zw+
In the present petition, petitioner prayed that the execution of the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision be
"suspended until after final resolution of petitioners Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief." The Very Urgent
Petition for Extraordinary Relief filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 sought to "reverse and set aside the decision of the
Sandiganbayan" and to "declare that petitioner is acquitted of the offense charged." While technically, the Very
Urgent Petition for Extraodinary Relief filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 is not sanctioned by the rules, nonetheless,
that petition was likewise denied in the Courts Resolution of 3 March 2003. It is clear, therefore, that the Very
Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief and the instant petition are merely dilatory tactics employed by petitioner
in his efforts to delay the execution of the judgment in the criminal cases for estafa which had long become final
and executory.
Petitioner cannot perpetually file any petition or pleading to forestall the execution of a final judgment. Execution
of a final judgment is the fruit and end of the suit. While a litigants right to initiate an action in court is fully respected,
once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he should not be permitted to
initiate similar suits in the hope of securing a favorable ruling. The 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision has
attained finality. Such definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon
finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for correction of
clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment
is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. This is the
principle of immutability of final judgment. In Lim v. Jabalde,13 this Court further explained the necessity of adhering
to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, thus:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to
bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any
attempt to prolong them.
Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. For just as a
losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is
the "life of the law."14 To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts,
time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that we should write finis to this litigation.
Consequently, we find no grave abuse of discretion when the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion to hold
in abeyance the execution of judgment. 1av vphi1
On the cancellation of petitioners cash bailbond as ordered in the Resolution of 10 January 2003 of the
Sandiganbayan, the cancellation of the bailbond was due to the execution of the final judgment of conviction.
Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides:
SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail. - Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may
be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or
execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail. (emphasis supplied).
From this provision, it is clear that the cancellation of bail is automatic upon execution of the judgment of conviction.
The Sandiganbayan did not err in cancelling petitioners cash bailbond after the judgment of conviction became
final and executory and its execution became ministerial.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution dated 10 January 2003 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 18005 and 18006. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 157147 April 17, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
WILFREDO CAWALING, Accused -Appellant.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
We are confronted with conflicting accounts of the commission of a crime, a reverse whodunit1 rivaling the murder mysteries of
Agatha Christie, in this review of the Court of Appeals (CAs) conviction of accused Wilfredo Cawaling for murder and imposing
on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.2 However, unlike Agatha Christie, we are guided by the test of moral certainty in
ascertaining the guilt of the accused.
This legal poser arose because, after the prosecution presented an eyewitness to the crime pointing to Cawaling as the
perpetrator thereof, the defense offered the testimony of a person, initially charged with Cawaling in the same Information and
who previously pled not guilty to the crime, confessing that it was he, and not Cawaling, who murdered the victim.
Even the two courts below us parleyed and rendered conflicting decisions. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) partially upheld the
defenses version of the events, rejected the prosecutions eyewitness account of the murder and convicted Cawaling only as an
accomplice to the offense of homicide. In stark contrast, the CA found the eyewitness testimony credible and convicted Cawaling
of murder.
The following are the long and arduous facts, seen and appreciated from two different perspectives by the lower courts.
Cawaling was charged with Murder in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 19th day of April, 1987, in sitio Hinulugan, barangay Agcogon, municipality of San Jose, province of
Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, conspired
and confederated with Palti Umambong whose case was already dismissed after arraignment, did then and there by means of
treachery, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with a firearm the late ex-vice mayor Leodegario
Capispisan, inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal gunshot wounds in different parts of his body which were the direct and
immediately (sic) cause of his instantaneous death, thus causing damage and prejudice to his family.
Contrary to law.3
The RTC laid out the facts based on the testimonies of the witnesses, to wit:
The forerunner of the case at bench was OD-275, for murder. It was filed on June 24, 1987.
The respondents were Palti Umambong and Wilfredo Cawaling.
The case against Umambong was dismissed on January 25, 1991 on the basis of an affidavit of desistance.
On February 4, 1991, this Court likewise dismissed the case against Cawaling upon the initiative of the prosecution.
Four (4) years thereafter, specifically on August 17, 1995, Cawaling was arrested, the case against him for murder having been
revived and accordingly docketed as OD-852.
xxx
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
The Prosecution presented three (3) witnesses.
Rommel Brigido, 29 years old, married and a resident of Busay, San Jose, Romblon, testified as follows:
That witness was with the accused Wilfredo and Palti in coming from the town of San Jose to barangay Busay.
That they passed by the house of Porferio Bina where they drank the locally fermented "tuba."
Later, he saw accused Wilfredo sitting on a bench under the "talisay" tree on the other side of the road.
Thereafter, he saw Leodegario, Gloria, Roberto and Leon passing by the road. When Leodegario got near the bench where
Wilfredo was seated, the latter suddenly stood up and pointed his gun to Leodegario saying "who is brave," and two shots rang
out and that there was a handkerchief covering the gun (t.s.n., p. 4, 8/23/95).
That the distance between Wilfredo and Leodegario was six (6) meters.
Witness, on direct examination, declared that although he was the companion of Wilfredo in coming from the town, he ran away
and that he did not anymore know what happened to Leodegario (t.s.n., p. 5, supra).
On cross-examination, witness Rommel admitted that he executed and affixed his signature on an affidavit (Exh. "1" and "1-A")
and that the same was executed only on July 27, 1995 narrating therein the incident that happened [in] April 1987.
Asked as to why witness took a long time before executing the affidavit, he commented that the case then was dismissed, and
that Wilfredo is a dangerous man having recently killed his uncle Rexinol Brigido.
Rommel elaborated further that he was ten (10) meters away from Wilfredo and also of the same distance to Leodegario.
Rommel declared that Palti was on a stump of a chainsawed coconut tree and about six (6) meters away from Wilfredo (t.s.n., p.
13, August 23, 1995).
Palti did not [run] away (t.s.n., p. 15, supra).
When asked what was Wilfredo doing after the shooting of Leodegario, Rommel said that Wilfredo was going around, "pointing
his gun and firing out, causing people to scamper away (t.s.n., p. 5, August 25, 1995).
On clarificatory questions of the Court, Rommel admitted that "it was only Wilfredo who pointed a gun towards Leodegario,
although Palti was also holding a gun but pointed downward."
Gloria Valentin Capispisan, 34 years old, married and a resident of Busay, San Jose, Romblon, the second witness for the
Prosecution testified thus
She know(s) Wilfredo since childhood and that the victim Leodegario is her father-in-law.
At about six oclock in the evening of April 19, 1987 she was near the house of Porferio after coming from the political caucus at
the house of Romy Roldan who was then the OIC Mayor of San Jose, and a supporter of Natalio Beltran, Jr.
She was in the company of Themestocles Sulat, Jojo Sulat, Noe Antonio, Leon Barrientos, Roberto Capispisan, Leodegario
Capispisan and two others, and that she is the wife of Roberto Capispisan.
While negotiating the way home she saw Wilfredo seated on a bench along the road about ten (10) meters away from her and
demonstrated that Wilfredos hands were on his lap, the left covered by a handkerchief and the right over the handkerchief.
Wilfredo, according to witness, suddenly stood up and pointed his gun towards Leodegario and "I heard two shots" with
Leodegario falling to the ground on his back (t.s.n. p. 6, 8/24/95).
She attempted to approach Leodegario, her father-in-law but "she saw Palti with a gun" so she ran away (t.s.n. p. 8, supra).
On question of the private prosecutor whether she saw the gun while Wilfredo was sitting, she replied that she could not see it
because it was covered by a handkerchief.
Asked as to the possible reasons why Wilfredo shot Leodegario, Gloria hinted that her father-in-law left the SAKADA and
secondly, because of politics, the victim being the supporter of Natalio Beltran, Jr., while Wilfredo was for Manuel Martinez,
candidates then for Congressmen.
Likewise, she testified that the case against Wilfredo relative to the incident of 1987 where Leodegario was the victim was
dismissed because of settlement, the accused and Lilia Capispisan, the wife of the victim, are first cousins.
Queried as to whether the agreed settlement came about, Gloria said that the accused was able to produce only one-half of the
monetary consideration, and that the condition that Wilfredo will not stay in San Jose, Romblon was not complied with because
the latter even ran as barangay captain and that accused shot and killed the nephew of her father-in-law, Rexinol Brigido and
even pointed the gun to her husband for two (2) times (t.s.n. p. 11, 8/24/95).
In the course of the cross-examination of Gloria she admitted having seen the affidavit of waiver and desistance (Exh. "2" for the
defense).
Gloria testified that before the shooting, she "saw Palti Umambong having a gun" (t.s.n. p. 14, Ibid).
In the hearing of August 25, 1995, Gloria admitted that she saw Palti when Leodegario was already dead and that "he chased
us."
After the shooting, Gloria testified that she saw Wilfredo [run] after her companions, firing a gun (t.s.n. p. 7, supra)
Elaborating further, Gloria testified that she "saw Palti who had a gun" and Palti chased her with a gun on his hand (t.s.n. p. 17,
supra) and that Palti was near Leodegario lying on the ground, about three (3) meters.
On additional cross-examination of Gloria, she admitted that she executed an affidavit, regarding the incident on May 5, 1987
(Exh. "2" and "2-A" for the defense), while the signatures of the witnesses on the first and second pages were marked as Exhibit
"2-B" and "2-C".
Relative to her affidavit, Gloria narrated in her sworn affidavit that "without any reason he just shot my father-in-law."
As to why she did not include the name Rommel in her affidavit, she said it was because Rommel was the companion of Wilfredo
(t.s.n. p. 10, 1/12/98)
To establish the presence of Rommel during the incident, Gloria categorically stated that Rommel was at the side of Wilfredo.
xxxx
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
Palti Umambong, 53 years old, married, farmer, and resident of Hinulogan, San Jose, Romblon narrated thus
That it was him who shot and killed Leodegario.
On April 19, 1987, he was in the cockpit of San Jose, and that his fighting cock was pitted against that being handled by
Leodegario.
He bet 100.00 and referee Pedro Venus declared his cock as the winner. He demanded his winning from the one listing the
bets but was told that the bettor on the losing side did not pay, and when he demanded from Leodegario his winning bet, he was
told by the latter that he will not pay because the decision of the referee was unfair (t.s.n., p. 6, 7/17/98).
Leodegario stood up and swung his right arm forward with a clenched fist and because of this Palti got angry prompting him to go
home, but passed by the house of Porferio.
Near the house of Porferio he shot Leodegario because the latter did not pay him.
When he reached the road fronting that of Porferio, he stopped because he was called by Wilfredo who was seated on a bench
beside the road and asked as to what happened in the cockpit and told the latter that he won except that he was not paid by
Leodegario (t.s.n., pp. 11 and 12, supra).
Later on, as witness testified, Leodegario passed by near the house of Porferio and Palti accosted him and demanded payment,
but Leodegario retreated two steps backward and was getting something from his waist as if drawing a gun and then he shot the
victim twice resulting to Leodegario falling down on his back (t.s.n., pp. 3-4, supra).
After the shooting he walked towards his house, and told his wife that hed done something wrong, that is, that he killed a person
a certain Leodegario and that he (witness) will go away. He looked for a sailboat and found one at Pinamihagan. He hired the
sailboat and reached Aklan (t.s.n., pp. 16, 17, supra).
He stayed in Aklan for three years.
Palti, on redirect and recross examination, testified that he hid his gun before proceeding to the cockpit and retrieved the same
on his way from the cockpit and before he met Wilfredo (t.s.n., p. 34, 8/24/98).
xxxx
Wilfredo Cawaling, 56 years old, married, a resident of Nabas, Aklan, and the accused in this case testified as follows:
He testified that noontime of April 19, 1987 he was at Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon at the residence of his sister, Heide
Casimero where he took his lunch.
Thereafter, accused went to his parents[] house at Hinulugan, Busay, San Jose, in the company of Rommel and Rudy de Villa,
and that while walking towards Hinulugan they passed by the house of Porferio where he bought "tuba." All the time, he was with
Rommel except for Rudy de Villa who proceeded to Busay.
While waiting for the "tuba," Rommel went to the back of the house of Porferio where he played volleyball together with Ricky and
the latters['] brothers.
At the time he was waiting for the "tuba" he saw Palti walking along the road towards the house of Porferio. Thereafter, he
beckoned Palti to come to him and asked him about the cockfight. Palti informed him that the latters fighting cock won but that
he was not paid his wining bet (t.s.n., p. 8, 10/24/98).
That while he was conversing with Palti, he saw Leodegario on the road walking towards them in the company of Leon.
Immediately, Palti turned his back and faced Leodegario and demanded again his winnings (t.s.n., p. 18, 10/14/98). Thereafter,
he heard, Leodegario shouting "bakit ka makulit" and Palti retort[ed] by saying, "manloloko ka." At this point in time, with Palti
pointing his three fingers to Leodegario, the latter retreated two steps backward and acted as if to draw something from his right
waist which prompted Palti to raise his t-shirt and draw a revolver and fired at the victim. (t.s.n., p. 19, supra). As a result of which
the victim fell down on his back. Leon who was in the company of the victim ran away after the shooting incident.
And that Rommel who was at the back of the house of Porferio also ran away (t.s.n., p. 22, 10/14/98).
After the incident he stayed in his parents[] residence at sitio Hinulugan and the following day the 23rd of May, he returned to
Nabas, Aklan where he resides.
Failing to get his visa for Saudi Arabia, accused looked for a job in Manila, and finally worked at a logging company in Baler,
Quezon where he was the operations manager. He worked in that logging company for almost two years, and after his work was
terminated he went back to Nabas, Aklan.
In 1998 he returned again to Manila. While in the city he received a letter from his father informing him that he together with Palti
were charged of murder before this Court and that there will be a hearing of their case and so he attended the same.
The case against him was dismissed [in] February 1991 (Exhibit "2") because the complainant, the wife of the victim, executed
an affidavit of waiver (Exhibit "1").
After the dismissal of the case, accused went to Papua, New Guinea and upon his return in 1992 he ran and was elected as
barangay captain of Busay, San Jose, Romblon.
In 1995 he ran for mayor but lost the election to Mayor Filipino Tandog. He then filed an election protest in this Court. On the
scheduled hearing of his protest, he was arrested and upon inquiry with the arresting officer he was told that the dismissed case
was refiled, by the same prosecutor who dismissed the original case.
Accused denied the assertion of Rommel that he shot the victim contending this witness was at the back portion of the house of
Porferio at the time of the incident (t.s.n., p. 30, 10/14/98).
That when Palti confronted Leodegario about the formers winning bet in the cockfight he was five (5) meters distant from them
and that he not only heard Palti saying "manloloko ka" but pointed his fingers to the victim.
At that instant, witness continued, the victim withdrew by about two (2) steps and appeared to be pulling out something.
Thereafter, Palti raised his t-shirt, drew his gun and shot the victim (t.s.n., p. 6, 11/4/98).
Accused could determine the distance of Palti from where he was but Paltis back was facing towards him and Leodegario was in
front of Palti.
Thereafter, he saw Palti [run] towards Busay and found himself running too in the direction of his fathers house, also in Busay.4
On the other hand, the findings of fact of the CA are set forth, as follows:
The version of the prosecution is narrated in good detail in the Peoples Brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General:
At about six oclock in the evening of April 19, 1987, at Hinulugan, San Jose, Romblon while on their way home from the town
proper, Wilfredo Cawaling, Palti Umambong and Rommel Brigido passed-by (sic) the house of Porferia Vina to have a drink of
tuba. While drinking tuba, Leodegario Capispisan, Gloria Capispisan, Roberto Capispisan, Leon Barrientos, Themosticles Sulat,
Jojo Sulat, Noe Antonio and two others came heading toward their direction (pp. 2-4, tsn, August 23, 1995). When Leodegario
Capispisan was about two meters near appellant, who was seated on the bench by the road, appellant stood up, pointed his gun
to (sic) Leodegario and taunted the latter for his bravery. Thereafter, two (2) gun shots were heard (p. 4, tsn, August 23, 1995).
All the while, Brigido was seated on the table fronting the road drinking tuba with the others. He was about ten (10) meters from
the talisay tree where appellant was seated. Palti Umambong, on the other hand, was standing on the stump of the coconut tree
at about six (6) meters distance from appellant (pp. 7-8, tsn, August 23, 1995). From said distance, he saw Leodegario step back
by about one (1) meter, raising his hand in surrender. Brigido then heard two (2) gunshots. Brigido also saw Palti Umambong
holding a gun but the same was pointed downward (p. 4, Records; pp. 23-24, tsn, August 23, 1995).
Upon hearing the shots, the people scampered away, including Brigido and Gloria, who also panicked and ran, leaving appellant
and Umambong behind Leodegario Capispisan sprawled on the ground dead (p. 25, tsn, August 23, 1995; see also pp. 3-8, tsn,
August 24, 1995).
The defendant, for his part, understandably presented a different version.
Accused claimed that about four oclock in the afternoon of April 19, 1987, he left his sisters house to go to Barangay Busay
together with Rommel Brigido and Rudy de Villa who happened to pass by his sisters house on their way to Hinulugan where
they also reside; that on their way to Hinulugan he and Brigido stopped to buy tuba at the house of Porfiria Bina while Rudy de
Villa continued on his way home; that while he was sitting in front of the house of Porfirio Bina, Palti Umambong came walking
along the road and he asked Palti about the cockfight that afternoon; that Palti told him that he was not paid his winning bet of
100.00 by Leodegario when his (Paltis) cock won; that Leodegario refused to pay him alleging that the decision of the referee
was unfair; that when he insisted to collect from Leodegario the amount he won, Leodegario got angry at him and wanted to
punch him.
Appellant at this time saw Leodegario and Lean Barrientos walking along the road towards their direction. When the two came
upon them, Palti stopped Leodegario and asked him again to pay him what he won; that Leodegario remarked "bakit ka
makulit?"; that Palti reacted by shouting "manloloko ka" at the same time pointing a finger at Leodegario.
At this point, Leodegario moved two steps backward and acted as if to draw something from his waist which prompted Palti to fire
his revolver at the victim.
Leodegario then fell down on his back.

The widow and the children of Leodegario Capispisan executed an Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance dated January 24, 1991
signed by Lilia M. Capispisan and her eight (8) children praying the authorities concerned "to consider the investigation of the
criminal case against Wilfredo Cawaling, et al., terminated or caused to be terminated."
Accordingly, Judge Cezar R. Maravilla issued the Order dated February 4, 1991 dismissing the case against Wilfredo Cawaling
without cost.
Four (4) years later, an Information charging Cawaling with murder was refiled.
On December 15, 1999, following the submission of the case for decision, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 82, Odiongan,
Romblon, rendered judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, WILFREDO CAWALING is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice
to the offense of homicide and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of prision correccional as minimum to prision
mayor medium as maximum there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, or, from 4 years and 2 months to 8 years
and 1 day with all its accessory penalties.
The accused shall be entitled to the benefits of Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code on preventive imprisonment.
Accused, in case of appeal of the Decision, may apply for bail pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Consistent with paragraph 2,6 Section 13 of Rule 124, the CA certified the case and elevated the records to us for review.
Cawaling, in his Appellants Brief, posits the following assignment of errors:
1. The Court of Appeals seriously erred when it convicted the herein accused-appellant of Murder without
sufficient and credible evidence.
2. The Court of Appeals seriously erred when it disregarded the findings of the trial court on the aspect of the
credibility of the prosecutions witnesses and their testimonies, despite well-established jurisprudence on the
matter.7
As the assigned errors are intertwined, we shall discuss and resolve both simultaneously.
Cawaling maintains that the prosecution failed to discharge the requisite burden of proof in criminal cases because the
eyewitness testimony of Rommel Brigido, as corroborated by Gloria Capispisan, is not credible. He asserts that the RTCs
findings on the credibility of the witnesses should not have been disregarded by the CA. Specifically, Cawaling points out that, as
held by the RTC, the testimony of Palti Umambong, the self-confessed killer of the victim, was more worthy of credence. As such,
Cawaling prays that the decision of the CA be reversed and set aside, and a new one issued, acquitting and exonerating him of
the crime charged.
Conversely, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the RTC overlooked facts and circumstances when it found
Cawaling liable merely as an accomplice to the crime of homicide. The OSG avers that the delay in the execution of Rommel
Brigidos affidavit and the failure of the witnesses to identify the gun used by Cawaling do not diminish their credibility. In all, the
OSG insists that the CAs reversal of the RTC decision was warranted.
Consequently, we juxtapose the conflicting findings of the two lower courts.
The RTCs findings zero in on Rommel Brigidos belated execution of an affidavit which, for the lower court, completely
diminished his credibility, to wit:
FINDINGS OF THE COURT

On the third issue, the Court painstakingly perused the record of the case with objectivity and an open mind, probing and
analyzing the pros and cons so as to arrive at a definitive conclusion thus eliminating the possibility of error and misjudgment.
In the testimony of Rommel in 1995 during the hearing of the petition for bail, the following incidents came into light.
Rommel asseverated that he was the companion of Wilfredo and Palti when they came from the town of San Jose, Romblon.
When Leodegario got near the bench where Wilfredo was seated, the latter "pointed his gun towards Leodegario and two shots
rang out" and that there was a handkerchief covering the gun (t.s.n., p. 4, 9/28).
When he saw Wilfredo pointing his gun towards Leodegario, he also "saw Palti holding a gun pointing downward."
By a simple process of mathematical computation Rommel who initially testified in 1995 at age 29 was only 20 or 21 at the time
of the incident in 1987. For one to remember the minutest details of events that happened eight years ago, merits the Courts
attention why it is so.
When the witness testified that the gun which Wilfredo was holding was covered with a handkerchief, it is crystal clear that he did
not see the gun itself but probably the likeness of a gun, or, after the death of Leodegario his mind had been conditioned to
conclude that what was covered by the handkerchief was a gun.
By testifying that he saw "Palti holding a gun" at the time that Wilfredo was pointing his gun towards Leodegario, a disquieting
poser comes up: Why was Palti holding a gun? Did he fire his gun? Or did he not?
Although Rommel said Palti did not fire his gun, it cannot be the gospel truth. It does not mean that Palti did not fire his gun,
those critical moments of April 19, 1987.
Remember that Rommel categorically stated that he was ten (10) meters distant from Wilfredo when the incident happened. Six
oclock in the afternoon, the beginning of nighttime and the end of daytime, is "nag-aagaw ang liwanag at dilim." And with the
distance mentioned by Rommel it is hard to say with definiteness as to whose gun the shot came from, unless there is only one
person in the vicinity. It could be from the gun of Palti who was visibly seen by Gloria and Rommel as holding a gun and not
Wilfredo because his hand allegedly with a gun was covered by a handkerchief thus impairing their vision of the firearm.
The squeezing of a trigger requires only a fraction of a second, without unnecessary movement of body. For one to say he saw
someone pulling the trigger of a gun at a distance of ten (10) meters and at a semi-darkness of the day is stretching the mind too
far. One may hear the report of a gun but not the pulling of the trigger at the distance aforestated.
A presumption thus arises that a person allegedly holding a gun covered by a handkerchief, if said person is the only one in the
premises, the report of a gun could be attributed to him.
But what if there were two persons? As in this case?
As to the credibility of Rommel, it may be stated that when the case originally filed against Wilfredo and Palti on June 24, 1987
and docketed as OD-275, Rommel was not listed as a witness for the prosecution. It was only in 1995 when the case was
revived that he gave his testimony for the prosecution. So, it took him eight (8) years after 1987 to air his side of the incident. Like
in the case filed in 1987 Rommel was also not listed in the information filed in 1995 as a witness for the prosecution. This creates
a [sic] serious doubts in the mind of the Court.
A surprise witness.
The explanation for the delay was because the case was dismissed. Yes, the explanation seems plausible but one cannot
disregard the fact that Rommel never did execute an affidavit or sworn statement inculpating Wilfredo as the assailant of
Leodegario from 1987 to the early part of 1995.
He only surfaced in 1995.
Whatever is in the mind of Rommel, is beyond this Courts comprehension, although such state of mind and the forces at work
can be reasonably inferred from the acts and submission of the witness.
What, therefore, prompted Rommel to come out of his self-imposed silence for eight years and [give] his testimony in this case?
First of all, as the record would show Rommel was more or less, an "alalay" or friend of Wilfredo. For short, they are in good
terms with one another. In 1987 and prior to that.
This harmonious relationship may have ended when Rommel was not taken in as a candidate for vice mayor by Wilfredo when
the latter ran for mayor.
As things go by, Rommel instead ran for vice mayor as an independent, but lost. With this, it means a break-up in their personal
relationship.
Politics had taken a toll.
Finally, Rommel emerged as a winner in the last political exercise where he was elected to the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose,
under another political patronage.
The testimony of Rommel, therefore, remains suspect considering that he testified that (a) Wilfredo is a dangerous man and had
killed his uncle Rexinel Brigido, (b) he saw a gun in the hand of Wilfredo "but covered by handkerchief, (c) he saw Palti at that
critical moment holding a gun, (d) the long delay in giving his testimony, and (e) the supervening events after 1987.
These circumstances have created doubts in the mind of the Court.
xxxx
The undisputed assertion of Gloria and Rommel that Palti was holding a gun pointed downward (Rommel) and that she saw
before the shooting Palti holding a gun (Gloria) are proof enough that Palti was holding a gun before, during and after the killing
of Leodegario. Coupled by the admission in open Court by Palti that it was him who shot the victim, these pieces of evidence
bear the earmarks of truth, no evidence to the contrary having been proved and established by the prosecution.
Why was Palti holding a gun at the crucial minutes of the incident? Did he or did not fire his gun?
What had motivated Palti to shoot Leodegario as alleged by him? What possible reason would it be?
Remember that he was not paid his winning bet of 100.00 by Leodegario despite his repeated demands. The words
"manloloko" (Palti) and "makulit ka" (Leodegario) are expletives bordering on violence.
What did the prosecution witnesses say about Palti? As pointed out by this court Paltis participation was downgraded to the
point that Palti was merely "holding a gun." The heat was on Wilfredo not Palti. It is understandable because it would be an
exercise in futility to pin down Palti in the killing because he cannot anymore be proceeded against in view of the double jeopardy
rule.
These circumstances amply suffice [to support] the Courts findings that Palti committed the offense.
xxxx
Be that as it may, circumstances are aplenty by Paltis admission and the testimony of Rommel and Gloria that he (Palti) was
holding a gun that if put on the dock Palti would have been found culpable for homicide and not murder. The lesser offense of
homicide because the prosecution failed to establish and prove that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation existed
in the commission of the offense. Three requisites must be duly proved before evident premeditation may be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, namely: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating
that the accused clung to his determination, and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such a determination and execution to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
The killing of Leodegario was at the spur of the moment. An unpremeditated killing.
xxxx
The question to be asked: Could an accomplice be convicted even if the principal has not been tried and convicted? The answer
is yes. If principal is at large, still an accomplice can be convicted so long as the crime is fully established and the requisites for
conviction as an accomplice are present.
Again, reliance on the autopsy report of Dr. Edmundo Reloj (Exh. "A") is necessary if only to determine the number of bullet
wounds the victim sustained. The doctor mentioned of two (2) wounds, entrance and exit. In other words, only one bullet entered
the body of the victim, resulting however to two (2) wounds, the entrance and the exit. Therefore, there as only one assailant,
contrary to the allegation in the information that the victim suffered "serious and mortal gunshot wounds in different part[s] of his
body" and the testimony of Rommel and Gloria that "two shots rang out."
xxxx
Wilfredo, on the other hand, cannot be faulted for the killing of Leodegario, but is found, on the basis of the evidence, as an
accomplice in that Wilfredo according to Rommel was "going around pointing his gun to different directions," and Gloria testifying
that "Wilfredo ran after her companions, firing a gun."
The case of People v. Crisostomo, 46 Phil. 775 where the accused prevented others in helping the victim by scaring them away
is deemed an accomplice only.
In case of doubt the Court must lean to the milder form of penalty, that of an accomplice. (People v. Manlangit, 73 SCRA 49).8
Cawaling took exception to the portion of the RTC decision that convicted him as accomplice to homicide, and appealed to the
CA. But as previously mentioned, the CA reversed the RTC decision, convicted Cawaling of murder, and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua. The CA found that:
Scrutinizing the evidence on record, this Court is convinced that the prosecution has successfully overthrown the constitutional
presumption of innocence of the accused.
Primarily, the appellant questions the credibility of Gloria Capispisan and prosecution rebuttal witness Rommel Brigido who were
present at the time of the commission of the offense. We find no reason, however, why they would lie to implicate the accused.
We find their testimonies straightforward, unhesitating and sincere. Between the self-serving testimonies of the accused and the
positive identification of the assailant made by prosecution witnesses, the latter deserves greater credence.
As correctly pointed out by the appellee, herein appellant was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the one who
shot the victim, as follows:
Testimony of Rommel Brigido
Q: When Leodegario Capispisan came near Wilfredo Cawaling, who was seated on the bench by the road, what
happen? (sic)
A: Wilfredo Cawaling suddenly stood up and pointed his gun to Leodegario Capispisan saying: "Who is brave",
and two shots rung out.
Q: You have demonstrated that the gun came from the lap of Wilfredo Cawaling, what if any covers that gun?
A: There was a handkerchief covering that gun.
Q: How far was Leodegario Capispisan when Wilfredo Cawaling stood up and fired against Leodegario
Capispisan?
A: Witness pointing at the door with a distance of six (6) meters.
Q: What happen (sic) to Leodegario Capispisan when two shots rung out?
A: He fall (sic) down.
Q: Under this set up, was there an opportunity for Leodegario Capispisan to be avoiding (sic) the hit?
A: No, sir, because he has no chance to avoid that incident, he raised his two hands, (witness demonstrating by
raising his right and left hands) and moreover the other side of the road is a cliff.
xxxx
Q: What did the accused Cawaling do, the first time that you saw Capispisan approaching on April 19, 1987?
A: Wilfredo Cawaling suddenly stood up and pointed his gun and two shots rung out.
xxxx
Testimony of Gloria Capispisan
Q: Mrs. Capispisan, do you know the accused, Wilfredo Cawaling in this case?
A: Yes, sir, I know.
Q: Since when have you known him?
A: I know him since I was a child, since childhood because he was engage (sic) in buying fish.
Q: Where were you residing at the time when you knew Wilfredo Cawaling?
A: Sta. Fe, Romblon.
Q: And where was he buying fish during your younger days?
A: He is buying fish from the fishermen at Cabalian, Sta. Fe, Romblon.
Q: Now, since you have known Wilfredo Cawaling for long, please look around and point to him if he is in the
courtroom this morning?
A: I can see him (witness pointing to somebody in the courtroom who when asked his name, replied that he is
Wilfredo Cawaling).
Q: Do you know Leodegario Capispisan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How are you related to the late Leodegario Capispisan?
A: Leodegario Capispisan is my father-in-law.
Q: And where is Leodegario Capispisan now?
A: He is already dead, he was shot by Wilfredo Cawaling.
Q: On April 19, 1987, about six oclock in the evening, where were you?
A: We were near Porferio Vina.
Q: Where did you come from?
A: We came from the caucus of Romy Roldan.
xxxx
Q: According to you, you attended a caucus in the house of Romy Roldan, who were your companions in going
home from there?
A: My companions were: Themosticles Sulat, Jojo Sulat, Noe Antonio, Leon Barrientos, Roberto Capispisan,
Leodegario Capispisan and two other tagalogs and myself.
xxxx
Q: Now, who was ahead while you were on your way home?
A: We were ahead.
Q: When you reached near the place of Porferio Vina, do you know where was Wilfredo Cawaling?
A: I saw him sir.
Q: Where was he?
A: He is sitting in the bench near the street.
Q: Why were you passing the street?
A: That is the only road that we will be passing to Busay.
Q: You claimed that you saw Wilfredo Cawaling seated on a bench, how was he seated, will you demonstrate
that to this Honorable Court?
A: (Witness demonstrating by putting her two hands over her lap with her hand covered by her handkerchief and
the right hand over the handkerchief).
Q: About how far were you from Wilfredo Cawaling when you noticed his sitting in a manner you have portrayed?
A: About ten (10) meters, sir.
Q: Now, when you were near the place already where he was sitting, what happened?
A: Wilfredo Cawaling suddenly stood up and he pointed his gun and saying who is brave, by dropping the
handkerchief.
Q: Now, when Wilfredo Cawaling pointed his gun, to whom was it pointed?
A: To Leodegario Capispisan, sir.
Q: When Wilfredo said who is brave, what did he do with his gun which he was pointing to Leodegario
Capispisan?
A: It was pointed to Leodegario Capispisan and simultaneously I heard two shots.
Q: Did he fell (sic) down with his back or his stomach?
A: He fell down on his back with blood oozing from his breast.
xxxx
Q: What did Wilfredo Cawaling do after firing his gun and after Leodegario Capispisan fell?
A: He pointed his gun towards me.
Q: What else?
A: After telling him that I did not know this man, referring to my father-in-law, he ran after my companions firing
his gun.9
From the foregoing contradictory findings, it is obvious that the resolution of this case hinges on which version of the case is
more worthy of credence. In other words, we must rule on whether the prosecutions belatedly proffered eyewitness testimony of
Rommel Brigido trumps the similarly belated testimony of Palti Umambong who now claims authorship of the crime.
It is well-settled that the credibility of witnesses is best determined by the trial judge, who has the direct opportunity and unique
advantage to observe at close range their conduct and deportment on the witness stand.10 The general rule is that findings of fact
of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, and the probative weight thereof, as well as
its conclusions based on said finding, are accorded by the appellate court utmost respect, if not conclusive effect, and can only
be set aside upon a clear showing that it overlooked, ignored, misconstrued and misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances
which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.11
This principle notwithstanding, we hold that the appellate court did not err in reversing the trial court and convicting Cawaling of
murder, as we fully agree with the argument of the OSG that
In this case, the judge who rendered the appealed decision, Judge Francisco F. Fanlo Jr., is not the same judge who heard the
prosecution witnesses, namely, Rommel Brigido, who testified on August 23, 1995 and Gloria Capispisan, who testified on
August 24, and 25, 1995. When these two witnesses testified in 1995 the presiding Judge was Judge Cesar Maravilla. It was
only on January 12, 1998 or three years later when Judge Fanlo, Jr. took over the case and heard these witnesses for additional
cross-examination. The additional cross-examination centered on the affidavits executed by these witnesses after the incident
and not on the incident itself. The rule on the weight to be given to the findings of the trial court does not unqualifiedly apply,
when the judge who rendered the decision did not hear the principal evidence of the prosecution. For in such, case, his
evaluation of the evidence is based on the transcript of stenographic notes, which also forms the basis for the Court of Appeals
to review the trial courts decision and render its own decision.12
Moreover, Rommel Brigidos belated execution of an affidavit does not detract from or diminish the weight of his direct and
positive testimony that Cawaling shot Leodegario, viz:
Q: Do you know Wilfredo Cawaling?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Since when have you known him?
A: Since I was born because we were neighbor[s].
xxxx
Q: In the afternoon of April 19, 1987, did you see Wilfredo Cawaling?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where for the first time did you see him that afternoon of April 19, 1987?
A: In sitio Hinulugan, Brgy. Busay.
Q: Where did you come from that afternoon?
A: We came from the town.
Q: The town of what?
A: San Jose.
Q: Aside from Wilfredo Cawaling, do you have any companion in going to the town of San Jose, Romblon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who were your companion (sic)?
A: Palti Umambong.
xxxx
Q: Now, on your way home, where did you go?
A: We passed by Porferia Vina coming from the town.
Q: What did you do in the place of Porferia Vina?
A: We were together in drinking two (2) balls of tuba.
xxxx
Q: Now, while drinking tube, what happen[ed]?
A: While our drinking is not yet finished, I saw Wilfredo Cawaling sitting along the other side of the road.
xxxx
Q: How far was Wilfredo Cawaling sitting on the bench from the road where Leodegario Capispisan and his group
were passing?
A: It was near, because the bench was just along the side of the road.
Q: When Leodegario Capispisan came near Wilfredo Cawaling, who was [seated] on the bench by the road, what
happen[ed]?
A: Wilfredo Cawaling suddenly stood up and pointed his gun to Leodegario Capispisan saying: "Who is brave,"
and two shots [rang] out.
xxxx
Q: How far was Leodegario Capispisan when Wilfredo Cawaling stood up and fired against Leodegario
Capispisan?
A: Witness pointing at the door, with a distance of six (6) meters.13
We have had occasion to hold that delay in making a criminal accusation will not necessarily impair the credibility
of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained.14 In this case, Rommel Brigido, on cross examination,
explained, thus:
Q: Why did it take you so long to execute this affidavit where the incident took place way back on April [19] 1987
and you only executed your affidavit in support of this information on July 27, 1995?
A: Because that case was dismissed and [Wilfredo] Cawaling was at large at that time and I was asked to
execute an affidavit.
xxxx
Q: Why did you say that [Cawaling] is a dangerous man?
A: He killed so many people and recently also shot my uncle, Rexinol Brigido.15
Gloria Capispisan likewise satisfactorily explained her failure to include the name of Rommel Brigido in her earlier account of the
killing in April 1987, as the latter was the companion of Cawaling. Subsequent thereto, Gloria categorically testified that Rommel
was at the side of Cawaling during the incident.
The RTC erred in convicting Cawaling merely as an accomplice to homicide, and in giving full faith and credence to Palti
Umambongs testimony that he was the one who shot the victim.
We have gone through the trial courts lengthy disquisition and tried to find a rational explanation why Palti, who previously pled
not guilty to the crime, will now accept responsibility for the murder of Leodegario. Obviously, it is because the case against him
had already been dismissed, and he can no longer be successfully prosecuted for the offense without breaching the rule on
double jeopardy. Thus, with Palti securely shielded from punishment by the principle of double jeopardy, he was at liberty to own
authorship of the crime. Accordingly, Paltis credibility as a witness directly debunking Rommels testimony is tainted by a serious
cloud of doubt.
Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, in his treatise on Evidence, writes: "the credibility of a witness depends as much upon himself as
upon his testimony, upon his interest as upon his mental cultivation, his conduct before and at the trial, the consistency of his
behavior from the time he became aware of the fact to the time he relates it."16 Not surprisingly, Palti is now motivated to confess
to a crime for which he can no longer be held liable because of our rule on double jeopardy.17
We note that it was only Palti who was arraigned and who pled not guilty to the initial Information for murder. At that time,
Cawaling was at large. After the case against Palti was dismissed, and now no longer in peril of punishment, he acknowledges
commission of the crime and conveniently absolves Cawaling who had remained at large. We perceive a brazen conspiracy to
escape criminal liability for murder.
Justice Francisco, in the same book, states that when there is conflicting evidence, the court is compelled to examine closely the
motives of the witnesses for telling the truth or for falsely testifying.18 As between Rommel and Palti, there is, in the former, an
absence of proof, except for the defenses bare allegations of political motivations, of an improper motive that would have
impelled him to testify for the prosecution and accuse his former friend and companion, Cawaling, of murder.19 As no improper
motive can be imputed to Rommel, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credence.
One other thing has sealed the conviction of Cawaling. We note that he jumped bail and fled. On this score, jurisprudence has
consistently held that flight of an accused is indicative of his guilt.20
As to the propriety of Cawalings conviction for murder, the CA correctly appreciated the circumstance of treachery.21 We quote
with favor the appellate courts ruling thereon:
The Solicitor General submits that the commission of the crime in the present case was attended by treachery as clearly
established by Rommel Brigido and Gloria Capispisan, who testified that they saw appellant stand up from where he was seated
and without warning, pointed his gun at Leodegario and instantaneously fired the same, thus killing Leodegario on the spot.
It is contended that "the attack being sudden and unexpected, Leodegario was not given any chance to retaliate or defend
himself from such attack."
We agree.
Treachery may be appreciated even if the attack was frontal but no less unexpected and sudden, giving the victim no
opportunity, to repel it or offer any defense of his person. Frontal attach can be treachery when it is sudden and unexpected and
the victim was unarmed.22
We likewise agree with the OSG that the heirs of the victim must be awarded moral damages in the amount of 50,000.00
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.23
Lastly, we dispose of a corollary incident the Manifestation with Motion to withdraw property bond and post cash bond in lieu
thereof filed by bondsperson Margarita Cruz. In this connection, Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is explicit:
SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail. Upon application of the bondsmen with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled
upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the
judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.
With the conviction of Cawaling for murder, and the Courts consequent failure to execute the judgment of conviction because of
Cawalings flight, the motion must be denied. The posted property bond cannot be cancelled, much less withdrawn and replaced
with a cash bond by movant Cruz, unless Cawaling is surrendered to the Court, or adequate proof of his death is presented.
We are not unmindful that Cruz posted the property bond simply to accommodate Cawaling, a relative, obtain provisional liberty.
However, under Section 124 of Rule 114, Cruz, as a bondsman, guarantees the appearance of the accused before any court as
required under specified conditions.
It is beyond cavil that, with the property bond posted by Cruz, Cawaling was allowed temporary liberty, which made it possible,
quite easily, to flee and evade punishment. As it stands now, Cawaling, a convicted felon, is beyond reach of the law, and the
property bond cannot be released. 1avvphi1
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant Wilfredo Cawaling
is found GUILTY of Murder and ordered to pay, 50,000.00 as indemnity and another 50,000.00 as moral damages, to the
heirs of the victim. The Manifestation with Motion of Movant Cruz is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Section 23
G.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio vs. Hon. Benigno C. Gaviola,
etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as the Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying reconsideration, be set
aside.
On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in
Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional
liberty.
On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the
Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against
accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval
resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the Department of
Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on
Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Court's
finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet been arraigned
because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to
show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and
permission of this Court" (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988.
Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence, this
Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.
After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we resolved to give due course and to decide the
case.
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July 1988, (1) on
the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the scheduled arraignments could not be held
because there was a pending Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel can be
impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety
or public health."
We perceive no reversible error.
1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent that it was
filed long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several arraignments had already been scheduled
and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-appearance. In fact, said Motion to Quash was set for hearing only on 19
February 1988. Convincingly shown by the Trial Court and conformed to by respondent Appellate Court is the
concurrence of the following circumstances:
1. The records will show that the information was filed on October 14, 1985. Until this date (28 July
1988), the case had yet to be arraigned. Several scheduled arraignments were cancelled and
reset, mostly due to the failure of accused Silverio to appear. The reason for accused Silverio's
failure to appear had invariably been because he is abroad in the United States of America;
2. Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had never appeared in person
before the Court;
3. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and warrants of arrest had been
issued against him all for the same reason failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.
In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has given accused Silverio more than
enough consideration. The limit had long been reached (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case No. CBU-
6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).
Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not based on erroneous
facts, as Petitioner would want this Court to believe. To all appearances, the pendency of a Motion to Quash came
about only after several settings for arraignment had been scheduled and cancelled by reason of Petitioner's non-
appearance.
2) Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that the right to
travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security,
public safety or public health."
To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had been cancelled
and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both instances, of his failure to appear at
scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for violation of the conditions of his
bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the
law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court when so required by the
Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).
The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the Court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from
leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138).
So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts
to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).
Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail
the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel
only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on
freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under one provision. Article III, Section
1wphi 1
1(4) thereof reads:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired.
The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court or
when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health (Article IV,
Section 5).
The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and treats them differently, to wit:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law.
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the grounds
of "national security, public safety, or public health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be
impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed
with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public
safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text
(The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the
1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there
was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested
party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power
of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them.
When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).
Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect that the
condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to make himself available at all times whenever the Court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on the right to travel no longer holds under the 1987
Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail bond has remained unchanged whether under
the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation of
that laid down long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear
before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be
rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial
confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be
dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines.
It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue
delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner, Ricardo C. Silverio.
SO ORDERED.
Section 25
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1850 July 14, 2004
JUDGE LORINDA T. MUPAS, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Damarias, Cavite, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a letter-complaint1 dated October 29, 2001 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA for brevity),
Judge Lorinda T. Mupas (complainant Judge for brevity) of the Municipal Trial Court of Dasmarias, Cavite (MTC
for brevity), charges Judge Dolores L. Espaol, Regional Trial Court (Branch 90) of Dasmarias, Cavite (RTC for
brevity), in her capacity as Executive Judge, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Usurpation of Authority.
It appears from the records that on August 23, 2001, private complainants Leonora Bituon, Florencio Cantada,
Anita Mendoza, Rodelia Callo and Cael M. Glorioso (private complainants for brevity) filed three separate criminal
complaints for syndicated estafa against Eva Malihan, Sister Trinidad Sinagbulo, Mely Vargas, Geraldine Sine
Baldovino, Belen Liwanag, Juanita Sanchez and Nelia Tizon before the MTC, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
01-1485 to 01-1487.2 On August 24, 2001, acting upon a motion of private complainants,3 herein complainant Judge
conducted a preliminary investigation.4 On the same day, she issued a warrant of arrest against the accused and
recommended no bail for their provisional liberty.5 On August 28, 2001, private complainants filed a motion to
transfer accused Eva Malihan from the municipal jail to the provincial jail.6 On August 29, 2001, complainant Judge
required the Chief of Police of Dasmarias, Cavite to comment on the motion to transfer within five days from
receipt of the order.7 Meanwhile, on August 31, 2001, accused Eva Malihan filed an urgent petition for bail. 8 On
September 3, 2001, the private complainants filed a supplemental pleading to support their previous motion to
transfer accused Eva Malihan.9 Invoking that the Executive Judge has authority to supervise all detainees in the
municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite under Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the private complainants sent copies of the motion to transfer and supplemental pleading to respondent. On
September 4, 2001, complainant Judge required the private complainants in the criminal case to file their comment
or opposition to the petition for bail.10 However, on that same day, respondent issued two orders in connection with
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-1485 to 01-1487. The first Order directed the transfer of the accused Eva Malihan from
the Municipal Jail to the Provincial Jail,11 while the second Order directed the Commissioner on Immigration and
Deportation to hold and prevent the departure from the Philippines of the accused Eva Malihan while the cases
are pending.12
Complainant Judge alleges that respondent's act of issuing said assailed orders, despite the fact that the cases
are pending with the MTC, constitutes gross ignorance of the law and usurpation of authority.
In her Comment13 dated February 4, 2002, respondent claims that the complaint is baseless and retaliatory as it is
founded on intrigue and spite for blowing the whistle concerning complainant's activities that are pernicious to the
judiciary. Respondent states that complainant's involvement in a "scam in the form of commissions from bail bond
applicants" is the main reason why complainant clings dearly to the delegated authority in the conduct of
preliminary investigation of cases filed with her court.
Respondent explains that she was surprised when she was furnished a copy of the two pleadings relating to cases
pending with the MTC, but admits that she acted on the motions as Executive Judge "in order not to frustrate the
administration of justice."
With respect to the transfer order, she claims that under Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, she has the authority to supervise all persons in custody.
As regards the hold-departure order, she argues that she is authorized under Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97,
which does not require that the subject criminal cases be in her court for the issuance of a hold-departure order.
She argues further that she issued the questioned hold-departure order based on the allegation of the complaining
witnesses that accused is trying to abscond from prosecution in the criminal case. Furthermore, she decided to
act on the motions because of the fact that complainant chose to ignore said motions to the prejudice of the
complaining witnesses.
Subsequently, in a letter14 dated February 8, 2002, complainant Judge iterates her earlier inquiry in 1999 involving
the practice of respondent in granting bail on cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
On May 15, 2002, the OCA treated complainant's letter as a supplemental complaint and referred it to respondent
for her comment.15
In a letter16 dated July 3, 2002, respondent avers that the matter raised in the supplemental complaint is a mutation
of A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348, entitled Judge Dolores L. Espaol, et al. vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas, pending resolution
with the Court along with A.M. No. 01-2-39-RTC, entitled Wilma Go-Amposta and Medy M. Patricio vs. Judge
Lorinda T. Mupas, and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1352, entitled Employees of MTC Dasmarias, Cavite vs. Judge Lorinda
T. Mupas. She alleges that the issue raised in said supplemental complaint is one of complainant's defenses in
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348. Consequently, she submits that this issue should not be treated as separate and distinct
therefrom.
In her comment to the supplemental complaint17 dated July 31, 2002, respondent further maintains that the issue
of granting bail is subject of investigation in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348.
She contends that the complaint is frivolous considering that the hold-departure order she issued against Eva
Malihan was sustained by the prosecutor. She claims that it is complainant Judge who should be investigated on
irregularities in approving bail bonds of detention prisoners. She avers further that complainant Judge falsified her
report on detention prisoners and purposely delayed the resolution of preliminary investigation cases until after a
considerable period of time which is a clear instance of complainant Judge's gross abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law.
In her Reply18 dated May 29, 2003, complainant Judge brandishes as lies the allegations of respondent in her
Comment. She adds that the issues therein are subject of investigation in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348. Moreover, in
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1352, which was allegedly initiated by employees of her court through an anonymous letter, she
claims that the said employees denied authorship of the anonymous letter. With respect to A.M. No. 01-2-39-RTC,
she alleges that the said complaint has already been dismissed by the court. As regards the hold-departure order,
complainant Judge claims that the case was eventually dismissed by the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Lastly, she claims
that respondent continues to defy the rules on bail since she still issues release orders on detention prisoners
whose cases are filed either for preliminary investigation or trial in the MTC.
On February 28, 2004, complainant Judge filed a supplement19 to her allegations in the letter dated February 8,
2002 regarding the practice of respondent to grant bail in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. She
cites nine cases pending with the MTC wherein respondent granted bail and subsequently released the accused
even though the judge where the case is pending is neither absent, unavailable nor even alleged to be absent or
unavailable.
Complainant Judge emphatically submits that without the necessity of a formal investigation on the matter, the
records of the case involved will bear out the culpability of respondent Judge Espaol and will more than justify
the imposition of the most severe penalty upon her.
In its Memorandum20 dated May 19, 2004, the OCA opines that respondent's order to transfer the accused from
the municipal jail to the provincial jail cannot be justified under Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides, in part:
SEC. 25. Court supervision of detainees. The court shall exercise supervision over all persons
in custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention. The executive judges of the
Regional Trial Courts shall conduct monthly personal inspections of provincial, city and municipal
jails and the prisoners within their respective jurisdictions. They shall ascertain the number of
detainees, inquire on their proper accommodation and health and examine the condition of the jail
facilities. They shall order the segregation of sexes and of minors from adults, ensure the
observance of the right of detainees to confer privately with counsel, and strive to eliminate
conditions inimical to detainees.
The OCA expounds that as Executive Judge, respondent exercises supervision over all persons in custody for the
purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention but the rule does not give her the authority to arrogate upon herself
a power vested upon a presiding judge of the court where the case is pending. Instead of issuing an order
transferring the accused, the OCA observes that respondent should have called the attention of the complainant
regarding the motions which allegedly required immediate action; that there was no showing that she called the
attention of complainant Judge on the alleged motion to transfer accused Eva Malihan, neither was there any
indication that the accused in the subject cases was in a situation which requires the interference of the Executive
Judge. The OCA concludes that respondent encroached upon the power of complaining judge when respondent
took cognizance of the motions not pending in her court.
With regard to the hold-departure order, the OCA opines that the same cannot be sustained since it is contrary to
the mandates of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 inasmuch as at the time of its issuance, no case has yet been
filed in the RTC. It adds that while Section 1 of said circular states that "Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued
only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court" the same should be read that
the subject criminal case has been filed and pending with the RTC. In the criminal cases subject of the present
administrative case, there is even no final determination yet of a prima facie case that would warrant the filing of
an information in court. The determination made by an MTC would still be reviewed by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. The OCA concludes that respondent went against the injunction in Circular No. 39-97 that judges of
the RTC's should be cautious and avoid the indiscriminate issuance of hold-departure orders as this results in
inconvenience to the parties affected and is tantamount to an infringement on the right and liberty of an individual
to travel.
With regard to the Supplemental Complaint, the OCA opines that the same should be incorporated with A.M. No.
MTJ-01-1348 entitled Judge Dolores Espaol, et al. vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1358
entitled Wilma Go-Amposta and Medy Particio vs. Judge Lorinda Mupas inasmuch as the issues raised in the
supplemental complaint containing the granting of bail are the same as those raised and taken up in A.M. No.
MTJ-01-1348.
Thus, the OCA recommends to the Court that: (a) respondent be admonished for issuing an order transferring the
accused from the municipal jail to the provincial jail; (b) respondent be reprimanded for issuing a hold departure
order in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-1435 to 01-1437 considering that it is not within her authority to issue hold
departure orders in cases pending preliminary investigation in the MTC; and (c) the Supplemental Complaint be
incorporated with A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348 entitled Judge Dolores Espaol, et al. vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas.21
Respondent compulsorily retired from service on January 9, 2004.
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, except as to the recommended penalty.
Respondent urges that her conduct was nothing more than the zealous fulfillment of her duties as Executive Judge
of the RTC, Dasmarias, Cavite. However, it is elementary that an Executive Judge only has administrative
supervision over lower courts. Her function relates only to the management of first and second level courts, within
her administrative area with a view to attaining prompt and convenient dispatch of its business. Acting as such,
she cannot unilaterally override the MTC's actions in cases pending with it under the guise of "administrative
supervision," without running afoul of the orderly administration of justice. Only when her court's jurisdiction is
appropriately invoked in an appeal or certiorari and other special civil actions can respondent judge, in her judicial
capacity, override the lower court's judgment.
Although the "Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers,
Prerogatives and Duties,"22 to wit:
SECTION 1. Executive Judges; general powers, prerogatives and duties. Executive Judges
shall, within their respective area of administrative supervision:
(a) Provide leadership in, and coordinate with the management of the first and second level courts;
(b) Exercise supervision over the judges and personnel;
(c) Balance the workload among the courts and maintain equitable distribution of cases in
accordance with relevant existing issuances;
(d) Recommend and implement policies concerning court operations;
(e) Identify, address and resolve problems in court administration which do not require any
intervention by the Supreme Court or the Court Administrator.
(f) Direct, through the Clerk of Court, the undertaking of staff support activities to improve judiciary
services in accordance with relevant existing issuances;
(g) Initiate, propose, and supervise the implementation of professional development programs for
judicial personnel that the Philippine Judicial Academy, in coordination with the Office of the Court
Administrator, may undertake;
(h) Exercise such other powers and prerogatives as may be necessary or incidental to the
performance of their functions in relation to court administration; and
(i) Perform such other functions and duties as may be assigned by the Supreme Court or the Court
Administrator.
the same is a mere reiteration of what has been in effect before said Circular.
Administrative Order No. 6, which took effect on July 1, 1975, narrates the specific power, prerogative and duties
of an executive judge. Portions pertinent to his duties with respect to lower level courts, read as follows:
IV. Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties

The specific powers, prerogatives and duties of the Executive Judge are as follows:
1. To investigate administrative complaints against Municipal and City Judges, and other court
personnel within his administrative area; and to submit his findings and recommendations to the
Supreme Court.
...
10. To visit and inspect municipal and provincial jails and their prisoners as required by Section
1730 of the Revised Administrative Code and by applicable rules and regulations.
...
12. To designate, with immediate notice to the Supreme Court, the municipal judge to try cases in
other municipalities within his area of administrative supervision, in case of absence or incapacity
of the municipal judge concerned, which designation shall be effective immediately, unless revoked
by the Supreme Court.
13. To assign, with the prior approval of the Chief Justice, Municipal and City Judges to hear and
determine cadastral cases as provided by law.
...
the executive judge has not been given any authority to interfere with the transfer of detainees in cases handled
by other judges, be it of the first or second level; nor to grant hold-departure orders in cases not assigned to her
sala.
The powers of an executive judge relate only to those necessary or incidental to the performance of his/her
functions in relation to court administration.
Time and again the Court has adverted to the solemn obligation of judges to be very zealous in the discharge of
their bounden duties. Nonetheless, the earnest efforts of judges to promote a speedy administration of justice must
at all times be exercised with due recognition of the boundaries and limits of their jurisdiction or authority.
Respondent's ardent determination to expedite the case and render prompt justice may be a noble objective but
she did so in a manner which took away from the complainant MTC judge the initiative which by constitutional and
legal mandates properly belongs to her.
The Court agrees with the observations of the OCA that respondent should have conferred with complainant
regarding the criminal cases and relayed her concerns to the latter, rather than precipitately issuing the assailed
orders.
The Court further notes that, contrary to respondent's allegation, complainant did not choose to simply ignore the
pending motion to transfer but, in fact, promptly directed the Chief of Police to comment thereon.
With regard to the hold-departure order, Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts.23 Criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first
level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular. It is logical to state that the criminal cases must be pending
in the sala of the RTC concerned.
In this case, at time of the issuance of the hold-departure order, the criminal cases were only in the preliminary
investigation stage in the MTC to determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe that accused Eva
Malihan is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial. Complainant Judge's findings had not yet
been elevated to and reviewed by the provincial prosecutor. Respondent's issuance of the hold-departure order
was therefore premature and clearly contravenes the mandate of Circular No. 39-97 proscribing the precipitate
and indiscriminate issuance of hold-departure orders. All told, respondent's claim of good intention finds no
convincing justification.
The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good
faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment.
Where, however, the procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error,
to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law.24
Considering the respondent's ten years of service as a judge, her judicial mind should have been tempered with
the delicate intricacies of the law and procedure. Respondent's confusion between her administrative and judicial
functions betrays the degree of her competency and displays her unfamiliarity with basic procedural rules.
Respondent ought to have known the correct procedure to be followed in order to ensure proper administration of
justice with due regard to her jurisdictional boundaries. She was bound to discharge her duties with competence,
prudence, caution and attention inasmuch as she is a reflection of the entire judiciary.
Thus, the Court finds the penalty of admonition and reprimand recommended by the OCA to be too lenient.
Besides, the recent cases25 wherein the penalty of reprimand was imposed on erring judges for the issuance of
hold-departure orders beyond the ambit of Circular 39-97 is not applicable because of the different circumstance
in this case where respondent precipitately issued orders in criminal cases still undergoing preliminary
investigation in the MTC.
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of Justices
and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge
which carries with it a penalty of either dismissal from service, suspension or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but
not exceeding P40,000.00. However, considering that the incident took place on September 4, 2001 which is
before A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC took effect, the Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is sufficient for unduly transferring
the detainee and arrogating upon herself the authority to issue a hold-departure order.
With regard to the Supplemental Complaint, the Court finds the recommendation of the OCA that the same should
be incorporated with A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348 to be well-taken since it refers to an issue subject of said
administrative case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Dolores L. Espaol is found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and is FINED
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits due her. With regard to the
supplemental complaint, the same is incorporated with A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348 entitled "Judge Dolores Espaol,
et al. vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas."
SO ORDERED.
Section 26
G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010
JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE
LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) assails via the present petition for review filed on May 30, 2008 the August 30,
2007 Decision1 and the April 18, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 that affirmed
the trial courts Orders of January 24, 31, February 7, 8, all in 2007, and denied the motion for reconsideration,
respectively.
Petitioner was, by Information3 of January 16, 2007, charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on
January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Branch 150 to which the case was raffled,
presided by Judge Elmo Alameda, forthwith issued a commitment order4 against petitioner who was placed under
police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center.5
After petitioner posted a 40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved,6 he was released from detention, and
his arraignment was set on January 24, 2007.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus
Motion7 praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the
evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 20078 deferring petitioners arraignment and allowing the
prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a recommendation within 30
days from its inception, inter alia; and (2) Order of January 31, 20079 denying reconsideration of the first order.
Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the trial court to defer acting on the
public prosecutors recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate court resolves his application
for injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the prosecutors recommendation and
thereafter set a hearing for the judicial determination of probable cause.10 Petitioner also separately moved for the
inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer action on the admission of the Amended Information.11
The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, viz: (1) Order of February 7, 200712 that admitted the
Amended Information13 for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and (2) Order of February 8,
200714 which set the arraignment on February 13, 2007. Petitioner questioned these two orders via supplemental
petition before the appellate court.
The appellate court dismissed petitioners petition, hence, his present petition, arguing that:
PRIVATE RESPONDENT DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO CAUSE THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CRIMINAL
CASE BELOW WHEN THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH THE LOWER
COURT. HENCE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING SUCH
REINVESTIGATION DESPITE HAVING NO BASIS IN THE RULES OF COURT[;]
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ADMITTING STATE PROSECUTOR
VELASCOS AMENDED INFORMATION, ISSUING A WARRANT OF ARREST, AND SETTING THE CASE
BELOW FOR ARRAIGNMENT, CONSIDERING THAT THE VALIDITY AND LEGALITY OF HIS ORDERS DATED
24 AND 31 JANUARY 2007, WHICH LED TO THE QUESTIONABLE REINVESTIGATION AND ILLEGAL
AMENDED INFORMATION[,] ARE YET TO BE RESOLVED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT (sic); [AND]
CONSIDERING THAT PROSECUTOR VELASCOS FINDINGS IN HIS RESOLUTION DATED 2 FEBRUARY

2007 ARE BLATANTLY BASED ON MERE SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES, WITHOUT ANY
SUBSTANTIAL OR MATERIAL NEW EVIDENCE BEING ADDUCED DURING THE REINVESTIGATION,
RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST ALLOWED PETITIONERS MOTION FOR A HEARING FOR
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE.15 (emphasis in the original omitted)
Records show that the arraignment scheduled on March 21, 2007 pushed through during which petitioner refused
to plead, drawing the trial court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.
Prior thereto or on February 23, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti
Cautela16 which the trial court, after hearings thereon, granted by Order of May 21, 2007,17 it finding that the
evidence of guilt for the crime of murder is not strong. It accordingly allowed petitioner to post bail in the amount
of 300,000 for his provisional liberty.
The trial court, absent any writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court, went on to try petitioner under the
Amended Information. By Decision of January 14, 2009, the trial court found petitioner guilty of homicide,
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12
years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. From the Decision, petitioner filed an appeal to the appellate
court, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, during the pendency of which he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal. The appellate court denied petitioners application which this Court, in G.R. No.
189122, affirmed by Decision of March 17, 2010.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) later argued that the present petition had been rendered moot since the
presentation of evidence, wherein petitioner actively participated, had been concluded.18
Waiver on the part of the accused must be distinguished from mootness of the petition, for in the present case,
petitioner did not, by his active participation in the trial, waive his stated objections.
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. An application
for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the
warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation
of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter
as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.
By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to challenge the regularity of the reinvestigation of the charge
against him, the validity of the admission of the Amended Information, and the legality of his arrest under the
Amended Information, as he vigorously raised them prior to his arraignment. During the arraignment on March 21,
2007, petitioner refused to enter his plea since the issues he raised were still pending resolution by the appellate
court, thus prompting the trial court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.
The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment from questioning the illegal arrest or the
lack of or irregular preliminary investigation applies "only if he voluntarily enters his plea and
participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto."19 There must be clear and convincing
proof that petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish his right to question the existence of probable cause.
When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and
indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of
his conduct is possible.20
From the given circumstances, the Court cannot reasonably infer a valid waiver on the part of petitioner to preclude
him from obtaining a definite resolution of the objections he so timely invoked. Other than its allegation of active
participation, the OSG offered no clear and convincing proof that petitioners participation in the trial was
unconditional with the intent to voluntarily and unequivocally abandon his petition. In fact, on January 26, 2010,
petitioner still moved for the early resolution of the present petition.21
Whatever delay arising from petitioners availment of remedies against the trial courts Orders cannot be imputed
to petitioner to operate as a valid waiver on his part. Neither can the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
be deemed as a voluntary relinquishment of petitioners principal prayer. The non-issuance of such injunctive relief
only means that the appellate court did not preliminarily find any exception22 to the long-standing doctrine that
injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution.23 Consequently, the trial of the case took its course.
The petition is now moot, however, in view of the trial courts rendition of judgment.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,
so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.24
The judgment convicting petitioner of homicide under the Amended Information for murder operates as a
supervening event that mooted the present petition. Assuming that there is ground25 to annul the finding of probable
cause for murder, there is no practical use or value in abrogating the concluded proceedings and retrying the case
under the original Information for homicide just to arrive, more likely or even definitely, at the same conviction of
homicide. Mootness would have also set in had petitioner been convicted of murder, for proof beyond reasonable
doubt, which is much higher than probable cause, would have been established in that instance.
Instead, however, of denying the petition outright on the ground of mootness, the Court proceeds to resolve the
legal issues in order to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public. 26 In the present case,
there is compelling reason to clarify the remedies available before and after the filing of an information in cases
subject of inquest.
After going over into the substance of the petition and the assailed issuances, the Court finds no reversible error
on the part of the appellate court in finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the four trial court
Orders.
In his first assignment of error, petitioner posits that the prosecution has no right under the Rules to seek from the
trial court an investigation or reevaluation of the case except through a petition for review before the Department
of Justice (DOJ). In cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, petitioner contends that the remedy of
preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused.
The contention lacks merit.

Section 6,27 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads:
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided
an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest
prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on
the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation
must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within
five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce
evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule. (underscoring supplied)
A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the
penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to fine.28 As an exception,
the rules provide that there is no need for a preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful arrest without a warrant29
involving such type of offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has been conducted.30
Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal cases
involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the
purpose of determining whether said persons should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in
court.31
It is imperative to first take a closer look at the predicament of both the arrested person and the private complainant
during the brief period of inquest, to grasp the respective remedies available to them before and after the filing of
a complaint or information in court.
BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN COURT, the private complainant may proceed in
coordinating with the arresting officer and the inquest officer during the latters conduct of inquest. Meanwhile, the
arrested person has the option to avail of a 15-day preliminary investigation, provided he duly signs a waiver of
any objection against delay in his delivery to the proper judicial authorities under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. For obvious reasons, this remedy is not available to the private complainant since he cannot waive what he
does not have. The benefit of the provisions of Article 125, which requires the filing of a complaint or information
with the proper judicial authorities within the applicable period,32 belongs to the arrested person.
The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary nature and the attendant risk of running against Article
125, ends with either the prompt filing of an information in court or the immediate release of the arrested person.33
Notably, the rules on inquest do not provide for a motion for reconsideration.34
Contrary to petitioners position that private complainant should have appealed to the DOJ Secretary, such remedy
is not immediately available in cases subject of inquest.
Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary is by "petition by a proper party under such rules
as the Department of Justice may prescribe."35 The rule referred to is the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule
on Appeal,36 Section 1 of which provides that the Rule shall "apply to appeals from resolutions x x x in cases
subject of preliminary investigation/ reinvestigation." In cases subject of inquest, therefore, the private party should
first avail of a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before elevating the matter to the DOJ Secretary.
In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the private complainant may pursue the case through
the regular course of a preliminary investigation.
ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, the rules yet provide the accused with another
opportunity to ask for a preliminary investigation within five days from the time he learns of its filing. The Rules of
Court and the New Rules on Inquest are silent, however, on whether the private complainant could invoke, as
respondent heirs of the victim did in the present case, a similar right to ask for a reinvestigation.
The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to and in light of the ensuing
disquisition.
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of the public prosecutor.37 The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a witness and not a party to the
case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the information had been filed in court,
the proper party for that being the public prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of the case.38 Thus, in
cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal action,39 and is granted the
authority to prosecute,40 the private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can
file a motion for reinvestigation.
In fact, the DOJ instructs that before the arraignment of the accused, trial prosecutors must "examine the
Information vis--vis the resolution of the investigating prosecutor in order to make the necessary corrections or
revisions and to ensure that the information is sufficient in form and substance."41
x x x Since no evidence has been presented at that stage, the error would appear or be discoverable from a review
of the records of the preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact may be perceived by the trial judge himself but,
again, realistically it will be the prosecutor who can initially determine the same. That is why such error need
not be manifest or evident, nor is it required that such nuances as offenses includible in the offense charged be
taken into account. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor can and should institute remedial
measures[.]42 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of the government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our
laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors
which are best appreciated by prosecutors.43
The prosecutions discretion is not boundless or infinite, however.44 The standing principle is that once an
information is filed in court, any remedial measure such as a reinvestigation must be addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. Interestingly, petitioner supports this view.45 Indeed, the Court ruled in one case that:
The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case,
whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the
court. Although the prosecutor retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even when the
case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion upon the tribunal. For while it is true that the prosecutor has
the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had
already been brought therein any disposition the prosecutor may deem proper thereafter
should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. The only qualification is that the action of the
court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
xxxx
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the
permission or consent of the court must be secured. If after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent
basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action
may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.46 (underscoring supplied)
While Abugotal v. Judge Tiro47 held that to ferret out the truth, a trial is to be preferred to a reinvestigation, the
Court therein recognized that a trial court may, where the interest of justice so requires, grant a motion for
reinvestigation of a criminal case pending before it.
Once the trial court grants the prosecutions motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to
the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the
prosecution is thus equipped with discretion wide and far reaching regarding the disposition thereof,48 subject
to the trial courts approval of the resulting proposed course of action.
Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal information as what happened in the present case,
the Courts holding is bolstered by the rule on amendment of an information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court:
A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made
with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any
accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its
order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with section 11, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court
may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (emphasis supplied)
In fine, before the accused enters a plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may
be made without leave of court.49 After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave
of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is
proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.50
It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to entry of plea.
An information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal.51 An amendment which
operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise impermissible.52
Considering the general rule that an information may be amended even in substance and even without leave of
court at any time before entry of plea, does it mean that the conduct of a reinvestigation at that stage is a mere
superfluity?
It is not.
Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation be it a complete disposition or an intermediate
modification53 of the charge is eventually addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which must make
an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. Since the trial court would ultimately make the
determination on the proposed course of action, it is for the prosecution to consider whether a reinvestigation is
necessary to adduce and review the evidence for purposes of buttressing the appropriate motion to be filed in
court.
More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial amendment of the information. Due
process of law demands that no substantial amendment of an information may be admitted without conducting
another or a new preliminary investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the Sandiganbayan,54 the Court ruled
that a substantial amendment in an information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation, unless
the amended information contains a charge related to or is included in the original Information.
The question to be resolved is whether the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered
a substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary
investigation.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following have been
held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the
court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different
or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume;
(4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment
that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material
facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information
and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information
as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might
have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an
information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the
offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held
to be one of form and not of substance.55 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Matalam adds that the mere fact that the two charges are related does not necessarily or automatically deprive
the accused of his right to another preliminary investigation. Notatu dignum is the fact that both the original
Information and the amended Information in Matalam were similarly charging the accused with violation of Section
3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In one case,56 it was squarely held that the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is "one of
substance with very serious consequences."57 The amendment involved in the present case consists of additional
averments of the circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty, which qualify the offense charged
from homicide to murder. It being a new and material element of the offense, petitioner should be given the chance
to adduce evidence on the matter. Not being merely clarificatory, the amendment essentially varies the
prosecutions original theory of the case and certainly affects not just the form but the weight of defense to be
mustered by petitioner.
The Court distinguishes the factual milieus in Buhat v. CA58 and Pacoy v. Cajigal,59 wherein the amendment of the
caption of the Information from homicide to murder was not considered substantial because there was no real
change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged as alleged in the body of the Information, as the
allegations of qualifying circumstances were already clearly embedded in the original Information. Buhat pointed
out that the original Information for homicide already alleged the use of superior strength, while Pacoy states that
the averments in the amended Information for murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original
Information for homicide. None of these peculiar circumstances obtains in the present case.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what was conducted in the
present case was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no
substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the
same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial.60 What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder61
after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.
Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed
amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and declined to
actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation. Mercado v. Court of Appeals states that the
rules do not even require, as a condition sine qua non to the validity of a preliminary investigation, the presence
of the respondent as long as efforts to reach him were made and an opportunity to controvert the complainants
evidence was accorded him.62
In his second assignment of error, petitioner basically assails the hurried issuance of the last two assailed RTC
Orders despite the pendency before the appellate court of the petition for certiorari challenging the first two trial
court Orders allowing a reinvestigation.
The Rules categorically state that the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
retraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued.63 The appellate court, by Resolution of February
15, 2007,64 denied petitioners application for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
Supplementary efforts to seek injunctive reliefs proved futile.65 The appellate court thus did not err in finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it proceeded with the case and eventually arraigned
the accused on March 21, 2007, there being no injunction order from the appellate court. Moreover, petitioner
opted to forego appealing to the DOJ Secretary, a post-inquest remedy that was available after the reinvestigation
and which could have suspended the arraignment.66 1av vphi 1
Regarding petitioners protestations of haste, suffice to state that the pace in resolving incidents of the case is not
per se an indication of bias. In Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice,67 the Court held:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to
an injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The orderly
administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the
circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with
such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying
of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating
Panels initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular
performance of not just one but five state prosecutors.68
There is no ground for petitioners protestations against the DOJ Secretarys sudden designation of Senior State
Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco as Acting City Prosecutor of Makati City for the present case69 and the latters
conformity to the motion for reinvestigation.
In granting the reinvestigation, Judge Alameda cannot choose the public prosecutor who will conduct the
reinvestigation or preliminary investigation.70 There is a hierarchy of officials in the prosecutory arm of the executive
branch headed by the Secretary of Justice71 who is vested with the prerogative to appoint a special prosecutor or
designate an acting prosecutor to handle a particular case, which broad power of control has been recognized by
jurisprudence.72
As for the trial courts ignoring the DOJ Secretarys uncontested statements to the media which aired his opinion
that if the assailant merely intended to maim and not to kill the victim, one bullet would have sufficed the DOJ
Secretary reportedly uttered that "the filing of the case of homicide against ano against Leviste lintek naman eh I
told you to watch over that case there should be a report about the ballistics, about the paraffin, etc., then thats
not a complete investigation, thats why you should use that as a ground" no abuse of discretion, much less a
grave one, can be imputed to it.
The statements of the DOJ Secretary do not evince a "determination to file the Information even in the absence of
probable cause."73 On the contrary, the remarks merely underscored the importance of securing basic investigative
reports to support a finding of probable cause. The original Resolution even recognized that probable cause for
the crime of murder cannot be determined based on the evidence obtained "[u]nless and until a more thorough
investigation is conducted and eyewitness/es [is/]are presented in evidence[.]"74
The trial court concluded that "the wound sustained by the victim at the back of his head, the absence of paraffin
test and ballistic examination, and the handling of physical evidence,"75 as rationalized by the prosecution in its
motion, are sufficient circumstances that require further inquiry.
That the evidence of guilt was not strong as subsequently assessed in the bail hearings does not affect the prior
determination of probable cause because, as the appellate court correctly stated, the standard of strong evidence
of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable
cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case.76
In his third assignment of error, petitioner faults the trial court for not conducting, at the very least, a hearing for
judicial determination of probable cause, considering the lack of substantial or material new evidence adduced
during the reinvestigation.
Petitioners argument is specious.
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of
probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom
he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated,
such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.
Whether that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may
not be compelled to pass upon.77
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there
is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.78 Paragraph (a), Section 5,79 Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed by the RTC.
To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a mere superfluity, for with or without
such motion, the judge is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the
supporting evidence. In fact, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.80
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause,
and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable cause; and
(2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.81 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued.82 Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a
hearing for judicial determination of probable cause. Certainly, petitioner "cannot determine beforehand how
cursory or exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the records should be [since t]he extent of the judges
examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case require." 83 In one
case, the Court emphatically stated:
The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such, the judge must
determine the presence or absence of probable cause within such periods. The Sandiganbayans determination
of probable cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature, not adversarial. The Judge should not be stymied
and distracted from his determination of probable cause by needless motions for determination of
probable cause filed by the accused.84 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner proceeds to discuss at length evidentiary matters, arguing that no circumstances exist that would qualify
the crime from homicide to murder.
The allegation of lack of substantial or material new evidence deserves no credence, because new pieces of
evidence are not prerequisites for a valid conduct of reinvestigation. It is not material that no new matter or
evidence was presented during the reinvestigation of the case. It should be stressed that reinvestigation, as the
word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for
a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor to review and re-evaluate its findings and the
evidence already submitted.85
Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in, and be subject of, a petition
for review on certiorari since this Court is not a trier of facts. The Court cannot thus review the evidence adduced
by the parties on the issue of the absence or presence of probable cause, as there exists no exceptional
circumstances to warrant a factual review.86
In a petition for certiorari, like that filed by petitioner before the appellate court, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow
in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions and
1avv phi 1
issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment.87 The courts duty in the pertinent case is confined
to determining whether the executive and judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Although it is possible that error may be committed in the discharge
of lawful functions, this does not render the act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.88
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97761 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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Section 4

Republic of the Philippines

A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC November 24, 2009

RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW

November 24, 2009.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

REVISED RULE ON CHILDREN IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW

To attain this objective, the Rule seeks:

Section 4. Definitions. - As used in this Rule,

(a) Assign an alias to the child;

(e) Present proper identification to the child;

(a) status offences;

(c) mendicancy under Presidential Decree No. 1563; and

(d) sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619.

(a) Written or oral reprimand or citation;

(b) Written or oral apology;

(c) Payment of the damage caused;

(e) Payment of the cost of the proceedings;

(f) Return of the property;

(g) Guidance and supervision orders;

(h) Counseling for the child and his family;

(j) Participation in available community-based programs;

(k) Work-detail program in the community; or

(a) To be presumed innocent until guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt;

(ii) To immediate free legal assistance in the absence of private counsel;

(i) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him/her;

(5) To confer with the prosecutor in the case;

(11) To full and timely restitution as provided in law;

(12) To proceedings that are free from unreasonable delay; and

(3) No corporal punishment shall be imposed.

(1) Care, guidance, and supervision of orders;

(2) Community service orders;

(3) Drug and alcohol treatment

(4) Participation in group counseling and similar activities; and

See A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, April 15, 2002

Republic Act No. 9346 June 24, 2006

AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.

FRANKLIN DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

OSCAR G. YABES ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Approved: June 24, 2006

G.R. No. 187464, November 25, 2015

The Petition for Certiorari

After due consideration, we resolve to DISMISS the petition.

The case is already moot

The petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of judicial hierarchy.

The grave abuse of discretion issue

a. The grant of the motion to fix bail

c. Non-inhibition of Judge Balindong

RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL A.M. No. 06-6-340-RTC

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

1. Judge Alvarez failed to act on 27 cases for a considerable length of time.

a. failed to decide Civil Case No. 3 (206) within the

b. failed to resolve pending incidents in Civil Case No. 53 for

c. failed to resolve a motion for reconsideration in Civil

Thus, the audit team recommended to the OCA to:

2. Direct Judge Bugtas to: