Consolidated Comment On War On Drugs Petitions

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
MANILA
EN BANC
AILEEN ALMORA, JEFFERSON

SORIANO AND ROWENA
APARRI,
Petitioners,
-versus- G.R. NO. 234359
DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD

DELA ROSA, in his capacity as
the Chief of the Philippine
National Police, and all officers,
agents, or other persons acting
under his authority and
supervision, and HONORABLE
CATALINO CUY, in his capacity
as Officer-In-Charge of the
Department of the Interior and
Local Government, and all
officers, agents, or other
persons acting under his
authority and supervision,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------x
SR. MA. JUANITA R. DAO, RGS,

RSW, VICTORIA F. FACTOR,
ELIZABETH G. OPLIDA,
CORAZON B. ESTELA, AVELINA
L. FELICIDARIO, EDNA
VILLANUEVA JULLAR,
ROSALINDA C. AGUILAR,
JOSEPHINE L. LITANG, ABELLA
B. MATIN-AO, ELEONA C.
MARTINEZ, MARILYN M.
POBOCAN, MA. LOURDES
FREIRES, MARIA ELSA J.
IBARRA, ROSIE J. MATIONG,
ANGELINA G. MUOZ,
REMEDIOS G. ESPINA,
MARIETTA B. RODRIGUEZ,
CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Almora v. DG dela Rosa and
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
LUCILA A. CAMULO, ANAFE

MENDOZA, VALERIE AGUILAN,
ANGEL EDER, BELLA S. EDER,
MARIEL SUPNET, RUSSEL
SALVADOR, ABBY S. EDER,
FRANCISCO BLANCO, JR.,
MARIE TAMAYO, ZHAYCA
ESTRELLER, MARILYN
ESTRELLER, MICHELLE
ESTRELLER, MARY JANE
ESTRELLER, ZENAIDA T.
JAVIER, ROSALINDA N. TAN,
MARY LUV JAVIER, EMILIANO
M. RODRIGUEZ, HAIDEE O.
SUELEN, PAZ R. OREGAS, MARY
ROSE B. TONDO, FRANKLIN L.
ORFILLA
Petitioners,
- versus - G.R. No. 234484
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

POLICE (PNP), represented by
PDG RONALD DELA ROSA, Chief,
Philippine National Police,
PSSUPT. JOEL NAPOLEON M.
CORONEL, Manila Police District
(MPD) Director, PSUPT. OLIVIA
ANCHETA SAGAYSAY, MPD
Police Station 6 Station
Commander, PSUPT. JERRY B.
CORPUZ, former MPD Police
Station 6 Station Commander,
PSUPT. ROBERTO C. DOMINGO,
former MPD Police Station 6
Station Commander, PO2
RHAFAEL RODRIGUEZ, PO2
PRINCETON FELIA, PO1 HARRY
ALLAN R. CRUZ, PO1 KENNITH
A. GAA, PO1 EFREN G.
GUITERING, PO2 JOCELYN M.
SAMSON, PO3 ALLAN
ESCRAMOSA, PO2 FRANCISCO
MENDOZA, PO2 ROESTRELL
Page 2 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
OCAMPO, PO3 RODOLFO

OCAMPO, JR., PSI CON-CORCIO
PANGILINAN, AN ALIAS
HARRY, AN ALIAS JR, AN
ALIAS IVAN, POLICE
OFFICERS JOHN AND JANE
DOES, and THE PHILIPPINE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
(PDEA),
Respondents.
x----------------------------------x
THE RESPONDENTS, through the Office of the Solicitor

General, respectfully state:
PREFATORY STATEMENT
Ten years ago, this Honorable Court promulgated

Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 07-9-12-SC, otherwise
known as the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, as a proactive
response to the problems of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. The extraordinary writ of amparo was
specifically devised to safeguard and protect every person's
right to life, liberty, and security guaranteed by no less than
the 1987 Constitution. However, extreme caution should be
exercised in granting said relief to prevent its noble purpose
from being utilized as a mere subterfuge to harass, vex, or
hinder public authorities in the legitimate exercise of their
duties, or as a ploy to extract vital information that may later
be used against the State.
For a petition for a writ of amparo to prosper, the

petitioner must rely on concrete evidence. The two petitions
before this Honorable Court, however, are marred by
speculations, unfounded information, and unsubstantiated
arguments. The challenge on the Philippine National Polices
Tokhang and High Value Target (HVT) Projects as well as
DILGs Mamamayang Ayaw sa Anomalya, Mamamayang Ayaw
Page 3 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
sa Iligal Na Droga (MASA MASID) Project are classic

illustrations of how the governments War on Drugs is being
emasculated and undermined under the guise of human rights
protection.
NATURE OF THE PETITIONS
1. The consolidated Petitions for Writ Amparo, and

Writs of Amparo, Injunction and Prohibition, Temporary
Protection Order and Temporary Restraining Order seek to
prohibit the implementation of the Philippine National Police
Command Memorandum Circular (CMC) No. 2016-16 and
DILG Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2017-112.
THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL FACTS
2. On July 1, 2016, the Philippine National Police

issued CMC No. 16-2016 otherwise known as the PNP Anti-
Illegal Drugs Campaign Plan-Project: "Double Barrel". The
Project is two-pronged, namely: Project Tokhang (the Lower
Barrel), aimed at cleansing drug-affected barangays, and
Project High Value Target (the Upper Barrel), an anti-illegal
drug operation against syndicates and drug personalities.
Project Tokhang consists of five stages: (1) collection and
validation of information, (2) coordination, (3) house-to-
house visitation, (4) processing and documentation, and (5)
monitoring and evaluation.
For G.R. No. 234359 (Almora Petition)
3. On July 28, 2016, a drug buy-bust operation was

conducted against Ryan Dave Almora in Baguio City. During
the buy-bust operation, Almora drew his firearm and fired
against the police officers which prompted the latter to fire
back resulting in the death of Almora.
4. In a separate incident on September 13, 2016, in

Tondo, Manila, Rex Bustamante Aparri was killed in Tondo,
Manila during a routine Tokhang operation after he drew his
gun and fired shots against approaching police officers.
Page 4 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
5. On June 17, 2017, petitioner Jefferson Acena

Soriano was shot three times by an unknown motorcycle-
riding man in Brgy. Holy Spirit, Commonwealth, Quezon City.
For G.R. No. 234484 (Dao Petition)
6. Eighteen of the thirty-nine petitioners are members

of the San Andres Bukid community and concerned citizens.
According to the petitioners, the respondents are responsible
for the following strategic and organized acts:
a. extralegal killings of Conrado Berona,1 Jefferson

Bunuan, Mark Anthony Bunuan and Jomar
Manaois;2 Ryan Eder,3 Willy de Leon,4 Alvin
Mendoza,5 Jerson Colaban, Jossing Colaban and
Joseph Baculi;6 Jose Buguelme,7 Emiliano Blanco,8
Jerry Estreller, Jr. and Randy Concordia;9 Delfin
Sicson,10 Ramil Gallo,11 Eduardo M. Gores,12 Joshua
Merced, Leo Geluz and Bimbo Merced;13 Ryan
Dimacali,14 Reynaldo Javier, Jr.,15 Dennis Padpad,16
Ramon Rodriguez,17 Edwin Eduardo,18 John Paul
Michael Enrera,19 Rolly and Ronnie Veros;20 Crisente
Baquial,21 Ernesto Martinez Cruz and Elmer Cayubit
Lagunzad;22 Manuel Roy Maalac, John Paul
Martinez, Rollyn Frias and a certain Patricia;23
1
Petition for the Grant of the Privilege of the Writ of Amparo for Individual Persons and for all the Residents
of 28 Barangays in San Andres Bukid, Manila dated 18 October 2017 (hereinafter the Dao Petition), p.
18.
2
Id., p. 19.
3
Id., p. 20.
4
Id., p. 21.
5
Id., pp. 21-22.
6
Id., pp. 22-23.
7
Id., p. 23.
8
Id., pp. 23-24.
9
Id., pp. 25-27.
10
Id., p. 27.
11
Id., pp. 27-28.
12
Id., p. 28.
13
Id., pp. 28-31.
14
Id., p. 31.
15
Id., pp. 31-32.
16
Id., p. 32.
17
Id., p. 33.
18
Id., p. 34.
19
Id., p. 34.
20
Id., p. 34.
21
Id., p. 35.
22
Id., p. 35.
23
Id., p. 35.
Page 5 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
b. falsified non-bailable charges against Valerie

Aguilan, Bella Eder, and Mariel Supnet;24
c. illegally arrested Marie Tamayo and Hilario

Miravive;25
d. committed extortion on Francisco Blanco and Raul

Zapanta,26 Reynaldo Javier, Jr.s pregnant partner
and mother;27 and
e. shot Jeffrey Degala.28
7. Due to the aforementioned circumstances, the

petitioners felt threatened by the armed men in civilian
clothes who routinely conduct foot patrols at night in their
communities.
8. Meanwhile, on August 29, 2017, the Department of

Interior and Local Government issued MC No. 2017-112
entitled Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of
Mamamayang Ayaw sa Anomalya, Mamayang Ayaw sa Iligal
Na Droga (MASA MASID) which requires all cities,
municipalities, and barangays to establish a system of
reporting in various modes to gather and assess information
regarding corruption, illegal drugs, criminality, violent
extremism and other threats to peace and security.
9. On October 10, 2017, President Duterte issued a

memorandum29 directing all government agencies concerned
to leave to the PDEA, as sole agency, the conduct of all
campaigns and operations against all those involved in or
connected with illegal drugs.
10. On October 11 and 20, 2017, the Office of the

Solicitor General received copies of the Petitions dated
October 10 and 18, 2017, respectively.
11. On November 7, 2017, the OSG received this

Honorable Courts Resolution dated November 7, 2017,
24
Id., pp. 20-21.
25
Id., p. 24.
26
Id at 24-25.
27
Id. at 31-32.
28
Id. at 34.
29
Memorandum from the President, hereto attached as Annex 1.
Page 6 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
consolidating the petitions and requiring respondents to

comment on the consolidated petitions within a non-
extendible period of ten days from notice.
GROUNDS FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONS
PROCEDURAL
THE DAO PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED

BECAUSE A CLASS SUIT IS IMPROPER.
II
THE DAO PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED

BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS HAVE NO LOCUS
STANDI.
III
THE PETITIONS SHOULD BE DISMISSED

BECAUSE THEY INVOLVE MISJOINDERS OF
CAUSES OF ACTION.
IV
THE PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE

TO LACK OF PROPER VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
SUBSTANTIVE
THE CMC NO. 16-2016 AND DILG MEMORANDUM

CIRCULAR NO. 2017-112 ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.
ARGUMENTS
Page 7 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
I. Procedural
A. A class suit in the Dao

petition is improper.
x------------------------------x
12. The petitioners in Dao alleged that they are

collectively filing this petition as a class suit for and in behalf
of all the residents of twenty-six barangays of the San Andres
Bukid community.30
13. Their resort to class suit to establish their legal

standing, however, is not proper.
14. Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a

class suit as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject

matter of the controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons so numerous
that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a
number of them which the court finds to be
sufficiently numerous and representative as to
fully protect the interests of all concerned may
sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in
interest shall have the right to intervene to
protect his individual interest.
15. From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a

class suit are: (1) the subject matter of the controversy is one
of common or general interest to many persons; (2) the
parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all to court; and (3) the parties bringing the class
suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class
and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.31
16. These requirements are wanting in this case.
17. First, the subject matter of the controversy is not

one of common or general interest. This case seeks redress
for the separate alleged wrongdoings against several persons.
While petitioners claim that the means employed by the
respondents in the commission of these alleged wrongdoings
30
Dao Petition, p.14.
31
Banda, et al., v. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
Page 8 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
were similar or were executed pursuant to a single plan, the

alleged extralegal killings do not create a common or
general interest among those who have been allegedly
wronged that would entitle them to maintain a class suit. It is
well settled that separate wrongs to separate persons,
although committed by similar means and even pursuant to
a single plan, do not alone create a 'common' or 'general'
interest in those who are wronged so as to entitle them to
maintain a representative action.32
18. In Mathay, et al. v. Consolidated Bank & Trust Co.,33

this Honorable Court referred to the subject matter of an
action in relation to a class suit as:
Although it has been remarked that the

"innocent 'common or general interest'
requirement is not very helpful in determining
whether or not the suit is proper", the decided
cases in our jurisdiction have more incisively
certified the matter when there is such common
or general interest in the subject matter of the
controversy. By the phrase "subject matter
of the action" is meant "the physical facts,
the things real or personal, the money,
lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to
which the suit is prosecuted, and not the
delict or wrong committed by the
defendant."
19. In Dao, eighteen of the thirty-nine petitioners are

concerned citizens and members of the Religious of the Good
Shepherd (RGS) who are representing the relatives of alleged
Tokhang victims who are supposedly unable or unwilling to
join in the petition. The other twenty petitioners are either
relatives or live-in partners of alleged Tokhang victims, and
one petitioner is a drug surrenderee and self-proclaimed
Tokhang target.
20. Each of the petitioners has a distinct and separate

interest over his/her own life, liberty, and security. Any
alleged wrong suffered by a drug surrenderee who claims to
be a Tokhang target is different from an alleged wrong
suffered by a supposed Tokhang survivor. The alleged
32
Mathay, et al. V. Consolidated Trust & Bank, Co., G.R. No. L-23136, 26, August 26, 1974.
33
G.R. No. L-23136, 26, August 26, 1974; Emphasis supplied.
Page 9 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
violations of rights are likewise different from the wrongs

purportedly suffered by the relatives of Tokhang victims. At
the same time, the alleged wrongs suffered by concerned
citizens, assuming arguendo that they can validly maintain
this suit, are separate and distinct from the various alleged
wrongs suffered by the relatives of alleged Tokhang victims.
21. Clearly, the claimed invasion or violation of the

rights of each of the petitioners is different from one another.
Although the alleged extralegal killings are somehow
associated with or linked to the implementation of the PNP's
Oplan Double Barrel Reloaded, these alleged violations by
themselves do not create a common or general interest
so as to entitle petitioners to maintain a class suit.
22. To emphasize, what makes a situation a proper case

for a class suit is the circumstance that there is only one right
or cause of action pertaining or belonging in common to many
persons, not separately or severally to distinct individuals.
The object of the suit is to obtain relief for or against
numerous persons as a group or as an integral entity, and not
as separate, distinct individuals whose rights or liabilities are
separate from and independent of those affecting others.34
23. Second, an action does not become a class suit

merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings.
Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the
attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating
the class action. The petition should allege the existence of
the necessary facts, to wit: the existence of a subject matter
of common interest, and the existence of a class and the
number of persons in the alleged class, in order that the court
might be enabled to determine whether the members of the
class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court, to contrast the number appearing
on the record with the number in the class and to determine
whether claimants on record adequately represent the class
and the subject matter of general or common interest.35
24. Here, petitioner cannot validly claim to have

obtained the authority to represent the entire residents of the
34
Re: Request of the Plaintiffs, Heirs of the Passengers of the Doa Paz to Set Aside the Order Dated January
4, 1988 of Judge B.D. Chingcuangco, A.M. 88-1-646-0, March 3, 1988.
35
Banda, et al., v. Ermita, et al., supra note 49
Page 10 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
twenty-six barangays in San Andres Bukid, Manila. The

petitioners did not present proof of or even allege the total
population in the said barangays. There is thus no criterion by
which to measure the sufficiency of the affected parties who
are representing the class and whether they are numerous or
representative enough to ensure full protection of all
concerned interests. Even more telling against the claim of
the Dano petitioners, all twenty-six barangay captains,
referred to by petitioners, repudiated in a sworn statement
dated November 7, 2017,36 the allegation regarding the peace
and order situation in San Andres Bukid as set forth in the
petition. The barangay captains pointedly condemned the
Religious Good Shepherd Foundation for acting on their behalf
without their explicit or implicit permission.
25. Thus, this Honorable Court would not be able to

determine if the petitioners are sufficiently numerous and
representative enough of the class that they claim they
belong to and represent. Such omission likewise prevents this
Honorable Court from deciding whether the alleged residents
being represented in the petition are indeed so numerous that
it would be impracticable to bring them before this Honorable
Court.
26. Third, there is no proof that all the residents of the

twenty-six barangays in San Andres Bukid, Manila, agree with
petitioners allegations, such that those in agreement with
them are numerous enough to be represented in a class suit.
27. Conversely, several residents from the barangays

have expressed their support and gratitude to the PNP for
their efforts to curb the proliferation of illegal drugs in the
involved communities.37 The show of support by residents in
the same community directly contradicts the perceived
common or general interest of the petitioners. The
residents who have manifested their support to the PNP's
Oplan Double Barrel Reloaded can also claim to have a unique
interest in curbing the proliferation of illegal drugs in their
communities. The conflicting interests of the petitioners and
other residents of the twenty-six barangays in San Andres
36
Manifesto ng Pagsasalaysay is hereto attached as Annex 2.
37
The Resolutions of the 67 Barangay Councils are hereto attached as Annexes 3-A to 3-OOO. Due to
sheer volume, the affidavits of residents and civic groups are not attached to this comment but can be made
available, if so directed by this Honorable Court.
Page 11 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
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Bukid clearly show that the petitioners have no legal standing

or capacity to institute the alleged class suit.
28. The impropriety in the maintenance of this case as

a class action is further highlighted by the nature of the
petition filed herein. The Rule on Amparo provides:
SEC. 2. Who May File. The petition may

be filed by the aggrieved party or by any
qualified person or entity in the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family,

namely: the spouse, children and parents of the
aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral

relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in
default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization,

association or institution, if there is no known
member of the immediate family or relative of
the aggrieved party.
29. As this Honorable Court held in Boac v. Cadapan:38
The exclusive and successive order

mandated by the above-quoted provision
must be followed. The order of priority is
not without reason to prevent the
indiscriminate and groundless filing of
petitions for amparo which may even
prejudice the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party.
The Court notes that the parents of

Sherlyn and Karen also, filed the petition for
habeas corpus on Merinos behalf. No objection
was raised therein for, in a habeas corpus
proceeding, any person may apply for the writ
on behalf of the aggrieved party.
It is thus only with respect to the amparo

petition that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen
are precluded from filing the application on
38
G.R. Nos. 184461-62, May 31, 2011.
Page 12 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
Merinos behalf as they are not authorized

parties under the Rule.39
30. Since Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

establishes a successive and exclusive list of persons who
may file the petition in behalf of an aggrieved party, it
impliedly prohibits immediate relatives and collateral relatives
of an aggrieved party to be co-petitioners in the same
petition. In the same manner, any concerned individual or
organization cannot validly join as petitioners in the presence
of other relatives of the aggrieved party. Given the strict
hierarchy of parties established in Section 2, maintaining a
class suit becomes impossible.
B. The petitioners in Dao

have no locus standi to file
the petition.
x------------------------------x
31. Legal standing or locus standi refers to a partys

personal and substantial interest in a case, arising from the
direct injury he has sustained or will sustain as a result of the
challenged governmental action.40 Locus standi likewise
means that a party shall be allowed to litigate only when he
can demonstrate that: (1) he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by the remedy being sought.41
32. An inquiry into the legal standing of a party requires

that the party bringing suit has "sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged." There must be "a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy" on the part of the petitioner so as not to
unnecessarily impede the judicial process. "For courts to
indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and
suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and
39
Emphasis supplied.
40
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC) and Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010.
41
Lozano, et al. v. Nograles, G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009; Biraogo v. Nograles, G.R. No. 187910, June
16, 2009.
Page 13 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
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ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of

justice."42
33. The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule

but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution which mandates courts of
justice to settle only "actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable."43 As stated in
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.,44 viz:
Courts are neither free to decide all kinds

of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free
to open their doors to all parties or entities
claiming a grievance. The rationale for this
constitutional requirement of locus standi is by
no means trifle. It is intended to assure a
vigorous adversary presentation of the case,
and, perhaps more importantly to warrant the
judiciarys overruling the determination of a
coordinate, democratically elected organ of
government. It thus goes to the very essence
of representative democracies.
34. Fundamentally, only parties who have sustained a

direct injury are allowed to bring the suit in court. Rule 3,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides that every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the person
who would benefit or be injured by the court's judgment. This
person is known as the real party-in-interest.45
35. In House International Building Tenants Association,

Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,46 this Honorable Court
has defined the real party-in-interest as follows:
The real party-in-interest is the party who

stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule
42
Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017.
43
Lozano v. Nograles, supra note 60.
44
Kilosbayan Incorporated et al. Teofisto Guingona Jr. et al., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994.
45
Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, citing Rules of Court, Rule 3,
Sec. 2:
Section 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
46
G.R. No. 75287, June 30, 1987.
Page 14 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
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means material interest, an interest in issue and

to be affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or
a mere incidental interest.
36. Thus, interest within the meaning of the Rules of

Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved.47 The interest of the party must be personal and not
one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of
some third and unrelated party.48
37. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo categorically

enumerates those who may file the petition, viz:
SEC. 2. Who May File. The petition may be filed

by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or
entity in the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family,

namely: the spouse, children and
parents of the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral

relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity, in default of those mentioned
in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization,

association or institution, if there is no
known member of the immediate
family or relative of the aggrieved
party.
The filing of a petition by the aggrieved

party suspends the right of all other authorized
parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the
filing of the petition by an authorized party on
behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right
of all others, observing the order established
herein.49
47
Spouses Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006.
48
Tankiko v. Cezar, G.R. No. 131277, February 2, 1999.
49
Emphasis supplied.
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Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
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38. Section 2 requires the observance of this order such

that once the aggrieved party has filed a petition, the right of
the others to file similar petitions is suspended. In the same
manner, when the aggrieved party refuses to file a case due
to fear or threats, the order must be strictly followed.
39. In the case of Dao, eighteen of the thirty-nine

petitioners in this case, anchor their standing on: (1) being
members of the San Andres Bukid community, and (2) being
concerned citizens acting in behalf of all other alleged victims
whose relatives are not able or unwilling to join in the Petition,
viz:
STANDING
No. Address PETITIONER NAME Member of Concerned
Community Citizen
San Andres Sr. Ma. Juanita R.
1 Bukid Dao
2 Sta. Ana Victoria F. Factor
San Andres Elizabeth G. Oplida
3 Bukid
4 Sta. Ana Corazon B. Estela
5 Sta. Ana Avelina L. Felicidario
San Andres Edna Villanueva
6 Bukid Jullar
San Andres Rosalinda C. Aguilar
7 Bukid
8 Sta. Ana Josephine L. Litang
San Andres Abella B. Matin-Ao
9 Bukid
San Andres Eleiona C. Martinez
10 Bukid
11 Sta. Ana Marilyn M. Pobocan
San Andres Ma. Lourdes Freires
12 Bukid
San Andres Maria Elsa J. Ibarra
13 Bukid
14 Sta. Ana Rosie J. Mationg
15 Sta. Ana Angelina G. Muoz
16 Sta. Ana Remedios G. Espina
San Andres Marietta B.
17 Bukid Rodriguez
18 Sta. Ana Lucila A. Camulo
40. The remaining petitioners, on the other hand, are

composed of one alleged aggrieved party, and family
members of alleged aggrieved parties, viz:
Page 16 of 63
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G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
STANDING
No. PETITIONER Address Concerned
NAME Citizen Other Reason
Anafe Sta. Ana, Mother Alvin Mendoza

19 Mendoza Manila
DETAINED
in Manila City Live in
Valerie Jail partner RYAN EDER
20 Aguilan a.k.a.
San Andres Sister Buwaya
21 Angel Eder Bukid
San Andres
22 Abby S. Eder Bukid Sister
DETAINED Mother
in Manila City
23 Bella S. Eder Jail
DETAINED Cousin
in Manila City
Mariel Jail
24 Supnet
San Andres Father of
Bukid sister Angel
Russel Eders live-
25 Salvador in-partner
Francisco San Andres Brother
26 Blanco Jr. Bukid EMILIANO BLANCO
DETAINED
in Manila City Live in
Marie Jail partner
27 Tamayo
San Andres
ZhaycaEstrel Bukid Wife
28 ler JERRY ESTRELLER
Marilyn San Andres Mother
29 Estreller Bukid
Michelle San Andres Sister in law
30 Estreller Bukid
Mary Jane San Andres Sister
31 Estreller Bukid
DETAINED
Zenaida T. in Manila City Mother REYNALDO T.
32 Javier Jail JAVIER JR.
Rosalinda N. Makati City Aunt
33 Tan
Mary Luv Cavite City Sister
34 Javier
Emiliano M. San Andres Twin Brother RAMON M.
35 Rodriguez Bukid RODRIGUEZ
Haidee O. Sta. Ana Niece
36 Suellen
Paz R. Sta. Ana Sister
37 Oregas
Mary Rose B. Sta. Ana Wife of an unnamed Tokhang
38 Tondo Target
Franklin L. San Andres Drug Surrenderee and a Tokhang

39 Orfilla Bukid Target
Page 17 of 63
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X-------------------------------------------X
41. The Rule on Amparo is clear when it requires that

those mentioned in paragraph (b) can only file in default of
those mentioned in paragraph (a). In the present case, the
collateral relatives of some of the alleged aggrieved
parties have also joined in the petition despite the fact
that an ascendant or spouse has already joined as a
petitioner in their behalf, in a glaring violation of said Rule.
42. Moreover, a concerned citizen, organization,

association or institution, as provided under paragraph (c),
can only file a suit if there is no known member of the
immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party. The
existence of a known member of the immediate family or
relative excludes a concerned citizen, organization or
institution.
43. Notwithstanding this rule, petitioners Sr. Ma. Juanita

Dao, Victoria Factor, Elizabeth Oplida, Corazon Estela,
Avelina Felicidario, Edna Jullar, Rosalinda Aguilar, Josephine
Litang, Abella Matin-Ao, Eleona Martinez, Marilyn Pobocan,
Ma. Lourdes Freires, Maria Elsa Ibarra, Rosie Mationg,
Angeline Munoz, Remedios Espina, Marietta Rodriguez, and
Lucila Camulo all filed the case as concerned citizens with
respect to the killings of all other victims in the San Andres
Bukid community whose relatives are not able or unwilling
to join in this petition for fear of retaliation by the police.50
44. By their own admission in the petition, the

petitioners are disqualified from instituting this amparo
proceeding because a concerned citizen, organization,
association, or institution may file the petition only if there is
no known member of the immediate family or relative of the
aggrieved party. The inability or unwillingness of said
relatives, as alleged in the petition, does not authorize
concerned citizens and other entities to file a petition in their
stead. The only instance wherein concerned citizens may file
a petition under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is when there
are no known members of the immediate family or relative of
the aggrieved party. There is no proof that there are no known
immediate family members or relatives of the alleged victims.
Also, the allegation that the known family members or
50
Dao Petition, pp. 5-10; Emphasis supplied.
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G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
relatives of the alleged victims are not able or not willing to

file a petition for fear of retaliation by the police does not
automatically authorize said members of the community or
concerned citizens to file the petition in their behalf. As
concerned citizens, the petitioners cannot substitute the right
of relatives to file this petition. Thus, these petitioners are
bereft of any interest.
C. The petitions involve

misjoinders of causes of
action.
x-----------------------------x
45. By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder

of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more
demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of
more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union
of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be
made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint,
declaration or petition.51
46. Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are

intended to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the
efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done
without prejudice to the rights of the litigants.52
C.1. Petitions for prohibition

and amparo cannot be joined.
Joinder of causes of action
cannot involve special civil
actions.
47. There is misjoinder of causes of action when the

conditions for joinder under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court are not met. Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. A

party may in one pleading assert, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of
action as he may have against an opposing party,
subject to the following conditions: (a) The party
51
Sps. Perez v. Hermano, G.R. No. 147417, July 8, 2005.
52
Id.
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G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
joining the causes of action shall comply with the

rules on joinder of parties; (b) The joinder
shall not include special civil actions or
actions governed by special rules; (c) Where
the causes of action are between the same
parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the
Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes
of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court
and the venue lies therein; and (d) Where the
claims in all the causes of action are principally
for recovery of money, the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.53
48. The cause of action in a petition for prohibition is

lack or excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
respondent,54 while that for a writ of amparo is the threat to
a petitioners life, liberty or security.55 Prohibition is governed
by Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure while amparo is
governed by a separate rule, the Rule on Amparo.
49. Both petitions are special civil actions that are

governed by distinct rules. As such, their joinder is expressly
proscribed by Section 5 (b), Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
C.2 The amparo petitions

should have been separately
filed.
50. Significantly, even the inclusion of the incidents

involving Ryan Dave Almora, Rex Aparri and Jefferson Soriano
should not have been made in one petition. Likewise, the
joinder of Conrado Berona, Jefferson Bunuan and the thirty-
three (33) other alleged aggrieved parties in the Dao petition
was improper. Since these arose from separate incidents, the
merits of each claim will have to be separately determined.
Consequently, the purpose of a joinder of causes of action
would not be achieved.
51. The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid

multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject
53
Id.; Emphasis supplied.
54
Section 2, Rule 65, Rules of Court.
55
Section 1, The Rule on Amparo.
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matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a

complete determination of all matters in controversy and
litigation between the parties involving one subject matter,
and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost.
The provision should be construed so as to avoid such
multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of
the litigants.56
52. In these cases, the misjoinder of the amparo

petitions would not do away with the multiple proceedings
therefor, albeit within the same case.
53. While any procedural accommodation on misjoined

amparo petitions may appear to be justifiable under the liberal
application of the rules, such liberality would be prejudicial to
law enforcers who, in a single petition (e.g., G.R. No.234484),
might be unduly burdened in complying with voluminous
documentary requirements within the very limited time
allowed.
54. Separate petitions for amparo would ensure

observance of the due process right of the parties which, in
turn, would allow a more judicious determination of each
petitions merits.
D. The petitions should be

dismissed due to lack of
proper verification and
certification against forum
shopping.
x-----------------------------x
55. The two petitions filed before this Honorable Court

contain falsified verifications and certifications against forum
shopping considering that said petitions were inexistent at
the time these were verified and certified by the petitioners.
Such perjurious acts warrant the outright dismissal of both
petitions.
56. Section 5 of the Rule on Amparo requires that a

petition for amparo be verified. Relative thereto, Section 4,
56
Supra note 69.
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G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which has suppletory application57

to petitions for writ of amparo, instructs how a pleading
should be verified:
Section 4. Verification. Except when

otherwise specifically required by law or rule,
pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that

the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his
knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which

contains a verification based on "information
and belief", or upon "knowledge, information
and belief", or lacks a proper verification, shall
be treated as an unsigned pleading.
57. In view of the suppletory application of the Rules of

Court, the petitions, being initiatory pleadings, should likewise
attach a certification against forum shopping pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum

shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or
in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has
not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to
the best of his knowledge, no such other action
or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such
other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c)
if he should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing
57
Sec. 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar
as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.
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requirements shall not be curable by mere

amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
submission of a false certification or non-
compliance with any of the undertakings therein
shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts
of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same
shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt,
as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
58. It must be stressed at this juncture that without a

valid verification, there can be no assurance that the
allegations in the petitions were made in good faith and are
true and correct and based on personal knowledge or on
authentic records. This Honorable Court in Spouses Valmonte
v. Clarita Alcala,58 explained the importance of verification:
Verification, when required, is intended to

secure an assurance that the allegations of a
pleading are true and correct; are not
speculative or merely imagined; and have been
made in good faith. To achieve this purpose, the
verification of a pleading is made through an
affidavit or sworn statement confirming that the
affiant has read the pleading whose allegations
are true and correct of the affiants personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.
59. This Honorable Court in Chua v. Torres,59

emphasized that a pleading without a proper verification is
treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal
effect and is dismissible. It ruled:
The verification requirement is significant,

as it is intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct
and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the pleading is
filed in good faith. The absence of a proper
verification is cause to treat the pleading as
unsigned and dismissible.
58
G.R. No. 168667, July 23, 2008.
59
G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005.
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X-------------------------------------------X
60. The need to abide by the Rules of Court and the

procedural requirements it imposes has been constantly
underscored by this Honorable Court. One of the procedural
requirements is the certificate of non-forum shopping which,
time and again, has been declared as basic, necessary and
mandatory for procedural orderliness. In Vda. De Formoso v.
Philippine National Bank,60 this Honorable Court reiterated the
guidelines respecting non-compliance with or submission of a
defective certificate of non-forum shopping, to wit:
4) As to certification against forum

shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or
correction thereof, unless there is a need to
relax the Rule on the ground of substantial
compliance or presence of special circumstances
or compelling reasons.
The requirement of strict compliance with

the provisions on certification against forum
shopping merely underscores its mandatory
nature to the effect that the certification cannot
altogether be dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded.61
61. The dismissal of the petitions on the basis of

procedural infirmity is not novel and the emerging trend of
jurisprudence favors its outright dismissal.
62. In the recent case of De Lima v. Guerrero, et al.,62

this Honorable Court dismissed Senator Leila De Limas
petition for her failure to take an oath before the notary
public, which thereby rendered false the jurat and
consequently invalidated her verification and certification
against forum shopping, thus:
Case law states that "[v]erification is

required to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the petition have been made in
60
G.R. No. 154704, June 1, 2011.
61
Fernandez v. Villegas, G.R. No. 200191, August 20, 2014.
62
G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017, citing William Go Que Construction v. CA, G.R. No. 191699, April
19, 2016, Kilosbayan v. Janolo, Jr., G.R. No. 180543, August 18, 2010, Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 180917, 23 April 2010; Emphasis and italization from the original.
Page 24 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
good faith or are true and correct, and not

merely speculative." On the other hand, "[t]he
certification against forum shopping is required
based on the principle that a party-litigant
should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in different fora." The important
purposes behind these requirements
cannot be simply brushed aside absent any
sustainable explanation justifying their
relaxation.63
It must be noted that verification is not an

empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its
import must never be sacrificed in the name of
mere expedience or sheer caprice,as what
apparently happenedin the present case.
63. In Almora, petitioners signed the Verification and

Certification against Forum Shopping on September 8, 2017,
September 12, 2017, and October 3, 2017, respectively,
weeks before the petition was executed on October 10,
2017. Likewise, in Dao, the petitioners signed the
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping on
October 16, 2017 or two days before the petition was made
on October 18, 2017. Hence, it is readily apparent that both
petitions were inexistent at the time they were verified and
certified by the petitioners.
64. It should be noted that the petitioners have not

proffered any reason or explanation to justify their perjurious
acts. There is, therefore, no justification to relax the rules and
excuse the petitioners' non-compliance therewith.64 The
instant petitions should thus be dismissed for containing
falsified verifications and certifications against forum
shopping.
E.1. In Almora, the allegations

are fatally deficient.
65. Section 5 of the Rule on Amparo provides:
Sec. 5. Contents of Petition. The petition

shall be signed and verified and shall allege the
63
Id., Emphasis supplied
64
De Lima v. Guerrero, et al., supra note 80.
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G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
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following:
(a) The personal circumstances of the

petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the

respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or
uncertain, the respondent may be described by
an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the

aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any,

specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct
of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the

petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts
of the aggrieved party and the identity of the
person responsible for the threat, act or
omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer

for other just and equitable reliefs.
66. In Almora, petitioners did not comply with the

above-enumerated requirements. The allegations in the
petition are totally bereft of the required details that would
warrant judicial scrutiny. Petitioners did not even bother to
implead as respondent any person who may have been
directly involved in the acts complained of.
67. Giving due course to patently baseless amparo

petitions that are devoid of the required information would
only serve to countenance harassment suits and fishing
expeditions that only distract law enforcement agencies from
their principal duties or, worse, might dampen their zeal in the
Page 26 of 63
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G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
pursuit of criminal elements.
68. It is respectfully submitted that, from its tenor, the

aforequoted Section 5 of the Rule on Amparo is mandatory.
As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute
implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty
which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor
of this meaning or where public interest is involved.65 The
petitioners failure to comply with the aforestated provisions
therefore constitutes a fatal defect that warrants outright
dismissal of the amparo petitions.
II. Substantive
A. CMC No. 16-2016 and

DILG Memo Circular No.
2017-112 are
constitutional.
x-----------------------------x
A.1. The Almora petition

collaterally questions the
constitutionality of the assailed
memorandum circulars.
69. Significantly, the misjoinder of the prohibition and

amparo petitions is further aggravated by the fact that the
former questions the constitutionality of the PNP and DILG
circulars. In making such contention in a prohibition petition,
the petitioners are effectively attacking the validity of the said
circulars collaterally, in violation of prevailing doctrine.
70. For reasons of public policy, a collateral attack on a

presumably valid law is not permissible.66 Furthermore, the
constitutionality or validity of laws, orders, or such other rules
with the force of law cannot be attacked collaterally. There is
a legal presumption of validity of these laws and rules.67
Unless a law or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the
legal presumption of its validity stands.68
65
Pilar v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995.
66
See PNB vs. Palma, et al., G.R. No. 157279, August 9, 2005.
67
Dasmarias Water District v. Monterey Foods Corporation, 565 SCRA 624 (2008).
68
Vivas vs. Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 191424, August 7, 2013.
Page 27 of 63
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G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
71. In any case, even if the prohibition petition is

considered a direct attack, it would still present a distinct
cause of action (the constitutionality issue) that bars it from
being joined with the amparo petitions.
A.2. Respondent PNP Chief

and respondent DILG
Secretary have the authority
to promulgate PNP CMC No.
16-2016 and DILG MC No.
2017-112, respectively.
72. Contrary to the petitioners assertions, the subject

circular was issued by respondent PNP Chief pursuant to his
existing statutory authority under Section 26 of R.A. No.
6975, otherwise known as the Department of the Interior and
Local Government Act of 1990, which provides:
SEC. 26. Powers, Functions and term of

Office of the PNP Chief. The command and
direction of the PNP shall be vested in the
Chief of the PNP who shall have the power
to direct and control tactical as well as
strategic movements, deployment,
placement, utilization of the PNP or any of
its units and personnel, including its
equipment, facilities and other resources.
Such command and direction of the Chief of the
PNP may be delegated to subordinate officials
with the respect to the units under their
respective commands, in accordance with the
rules and regulations prescribed by the
Commission. The Chief of the PNP shall also
have the power to issue detailed implementing
policies and instructions regarding personnel,
funds, properties, records, correspondence and
such other matters as may be necessary to
effectivity carry out the functions, powers and
duties of the Bureau. The Chief of the PNP shall
be appointed by the President from among the
senior officers down to the rank of chief
superintendent, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments: Provided, That
the Chief of the PNP shall serve a term of office
not to exceed four (4) years: Provided, further,
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X-------------------------------------------X
That in times of war or other national

emergency declared by Congress, the President
may extend such term of office.69
73. The power to direct and control tactical as well as

strategic movements, deployment, placement, utilization of
the PNP or any of its units and personnel, including its
equipment, facilities and other resources is unquestionably
vested upon the PNP Chief by the above law.
74. The PNP Chiefs issuance of the subject

memorandum circular cannot be considered as an
encroachment into the Presidents Ordinance Power under
Book III, Title 1, Chapter 2 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. The
authority of the PNP Chief to issue CMC No. 16-2016 is not
dependent on the Presidents Ordinance Power since it has its
own statutory basis.
75. Also, respondent DILG Secretary has the authority

to issue MC No. 2017-112 in view of paragraphs (3) and (4)
of Section 7, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292,
in relation to Section 3, Chapter 1, Title 12 of the same law,
thus:
BOOK IV
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
CHAPTER 2
SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES, AND
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES
xxx
Section 7. Powers and Functions of the

Secretary. - The Secretary shall:
(1) Advise the President in issuing executive

orders, regulations, proclamations and other
issuances, the promulgation of which is
expressly vested by law in the President relative
to matters under the jurisdiction of the
Department;
69
Emphasis supplied.
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X-------------------------------------------X
(2) Establish the policies and standards for the

operation of the Department pursuant to the
approved programs of governments;
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations

necessary to carry out department
objectives, policies, functions, plans,
programs and projects;
(4) Promulgate administrative issuances

necessary for the efficient administration
of the offices under the Secretary and for
proper execution of the laws relative
thereto. These issuances shall not
prescribe penalties for their violation,
except when expressly authorized by law;
(5) Exercise disciplinary powers over officers

and employees under the Secretary in
accordance with law, including their
investigation and the designation of a
committee or officer to conduct such
investigation;
(6) Appoint all officers and employees of the

Department except those whose appointments
are vested in the President or in some other
appointing authority; Provided, however, that
where the Department is regionalized on a
department-wide basis, the Secretary shall
appoint employees to positions in the second
level in the regional offices as defined in this
Code;
(7) Exercise jurisdiction over all bureaus,

offices, agencies and corporations under the
Department as are provided by law, and in
accordance with the applicable relationships as
specified in Chapters 7, 8, and 9 of this Book;
(8) Delegate authority to officers and

employees under the Secretary's direction in
accordance with this Code; and
(9) Perform such other functions as may be

provided by law.70
Title XII
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
70
Emphasis supplied.
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X-------------------------------------------X
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
xxx
Section 3. Powers and Functions. - To

accomplish its mandate, the Department shall:
(1) Advise the President on the promulgation of

policies, rules, regulations and other issuances
relative to the general supervision of local
government units;
(2) Establish and prescribe rules, regulations

and other issuances and implementing laws on
the general supervision of local government
units and on the promotion of local autonomy
and monitor compliance thereof by said units;
(3) Provide assistance in the preparation of

national legislation affecting local government
units;
(4) Establish and prescribe plans, policies,

programs and projects to strengthen the
administrative, technical and fiscal capabilities
of local government offices and personnel;
(5) Formulate and implement policies, plans,

programs and projects to meet national and
local emergencies arising from natural and
man-made disasters; and
(6) Perform such other functions as may be

provided by law.
A.3. PNP CMC No. 16-2016

does not direct the
commission of any illegal
act.
A.3.1. The terms negated

and neutralized cannot be
construed as referring to the
killing of drug personalities.
76. The petitioners imputation of unconstitutionality

against the subject PNP memorandum circular is principally
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X-------------------------------------------X
focused on the use of the terms negated and neutralized

therein. They construed these terms, in the light of supposed
statements by respondent PNP Chief, as synonymous to
killing. They thus concluded that PNP CMC No. 16-2016
directs the killing of drug personalities.
77. The petitioners deliberately present a skewed

interpretation of the terms negate and neutralize.
78. Blacks Law Dictionary defines negate as to deny;

to nullify; to render ineffective.71 On the other hand,
neutralization is defined as the act of making something
ineffective.72 Viewed in its purely legal context, negate and
neutralize should not be construed as code words for
extralegal killing.
79. Besides, the petitioners contention apparently

ignores fundamental statutory construction principles.
80. Administrative regulations under legislative

authority by a particular department must be in harmony with
the provision of the law for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions.73 The subject memorandum
circular therefore should be deemed in harmony with the
provision of R.A. No. 6975, particularly Section 24 thereof
which provides:
SECTION 24. Powers and Functions.

The PNP shall have the following powers and
functions:
(a) Enforce all laws and ordinances

relative to the protection of lives and
properties
81. Moreover, the subject PNP memorandum circular

should likewise be deemed in harmony with other statutes
(e.g., The Revised Penal Code) that proscribe unjustified or
extralegal killings. Indeed, it is axiomatic that each and every
statute must be construed in a way that would avoid conflict
with existing laws.74
71
Blacks Law Dictionary, 10th Edition, p. 1195
72
Id., p. 1203
73
Gelmart Industries, Inc., v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 70554, August 10, 1989.
74
Rubberworld, Phils. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 126773, April 14, 1999.
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82. Additionally, petitioners assail the use of the words

negated and neutralized in isolation or without
determining its context in light of the other provisions of the
circular. In doing so, petitioners did not bother to consider the
provisions of Section 8 of the same PNP Circular that expressly
mandate:
8. Coordinating Instructions
xxx
e. All operations shall conform with the

provisions of R.A. No. 9165, the Rules of Court,
and strictly observe the Right of the Accused
enshrined in the Bill of Rights under the
Philippine Constitution, other allied laws, rules
and regulations, as well as the internationally
accepted principles of international laws, public
policy, and with due observance of human
rights.
f. All concerned personnel shall strictly

observe the rights of persons arrested, detained
or under custodial investigation pursuant to R.A.
No. 7438 and other existing rules and
regulations of the PNP in the promotion of
human rights
83. Basic is the maxim in statutory construction that a

statute must be read or construed as a whole or in its entirety.
All parts, provisions, or sections, must be read, considered or
construed together, and each must be considered with respect
to all others, and in harmony with the whole.75
84. The rules of statutory construction govern

interpretation of laws and administrative issuances. The
petitioners personal opinions cannot supplant what these
rules provide.
A.3.2. PNP CMC No. 16-2016

did not do away with evidence
gathering.
85. The petitioners claim that, with CMC No. 16-2016,

75
Valera v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 167278, February 27, 2008.
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the PNP has done away with the basic police work of evidence
gathering by replacing it with mere lists of drug personalities
supplied by barangay officials. Allegedly, it mandates the
police to neutralize the persons whose names appear on
these lists.76
86. Again, the petitioners are mistaken. Evidence

gathering remains to be an integral part of police investigation
as it was not dispensed with by CMC No. 16-2016. On the
contrary, Annex A of CMC No. 16-2016 shows that, in cases
of hostile drug personalities, arrest and seizure of hostile drug
personalities would be effected only [u]pon generation of
sufficient information and evidence to warrant the filing of
criminal action against the hostile drug pusher. Significantly,
this same provision likewise belies the petitioners claim that
any suspected drug personality would be killed: there is no
such instruction. Rather the filing of a criminal action is what
is provided in said provision.
A.3.3. The drop box method

under DILG MC No. 2017-112
does not violate the right to be
presumed innocent.
87. DILG M.C. No. 2017-112 was issued on August 29,

2017 by respondent DILG Officer-in-Charge Cuy. It aims to
promote synergy between the state and the private sector to
contribute in ridding the country of corruption, illegal drugs,
criminality, and violent extremism and other threats to peace
and security. 77 Specifically, this memorandum aims, inter
alia, to (s)et up a mechanism of reporting in the community
level mobilizing community volunteers.
88. DILG MC No. 2017-112 is in furtherance of the

declared policy in Section 2, R.A. No. 9165, which provides:
Declaration of policy. It is the policy of

the State to safeguard the integrity of its
territory and the well-being of its citizenry
particularly the youth, from the harmful effects
of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental
76
Almora Petition, p. 26, par. 26.
77
MC No. 2017-112, par. 3.
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well-being, and to defend the same against acts

or omissions detrimental to their development
and preservation. In view of the foregoing, the
State needs to enhance further the efficacy of
the law against dangerous drugs, it being one of
today's more serious social ills.
89. The petitioners however incorrectly assail the

constitutionality of the said DILG memorandum circular
alleging that this violates the drug personalities right to due
process of law and to be presumed innocent.
90. The collection of information respecting drug

personalities is not violative of any of the drug personalities
rights. Such activity can be considered as a legally allowable
government activity that taps into the citizenrys sense of
social responsibility to protect their respective neighborhoods.
Thereby, the ordinary citizens are given the opportunity to
take part in the governments anti-drug program.
91. Significantly, the collection of drug-related

information through drop boxes in the DILG memorandum
circular is essentially no different from the collection of the
same information by law enforcement agencies from
informants. Only, the use of drop boxes for anonymous
collection of information is more effective since it encourages
greater participation by residents who, considering the
anonymity provided by the process, would no longer be afraid
to cooperate in criminal investigations.
92. The drop box method allows ordinary citizens to

overcome their usual reticence to assist the police in criminal
investigation which this Honorable Court has noted, viz: It is
not uncommon for ordinary people to refrain from getting
involved. This is a matter of judicial notice. Sometimes, the
fear of possible reprisals compels them to remain silent
especially if the personalities involved are known notorious
characters in the neighborhood.78
93. In any case, the information gathered would not be

the basis for criminal prosecution. Such information would
still be subject to verification by adequate competent
evidence before any criminal action may be filed.
78
People v. Macalino, G.R. No. 79387, August 31, 1989.
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94. At this point, it is respectfully submitted that the

petitioners concerns with respect to both the PNP and DILG
memorandum circulars essentially pertain to the respective
implementations thereof which have no bearing on their
intrinsic validity. The constitutionality of a statute or
regulation is determined solely by what is contained in its
provisions and, as such, is not undermined by any issue
respecting its implementation.
A.3.4. It is legal for the PNP to

conduct house-to-house visits
to persuade notorious drug
personalities to stop their
illegal activities.
95. Petitioners in Almora contend that the house-to-house

visits being conducted by the PNP are unconstitutional
because (i) they are not limited to so-called drug
personalities; (ii) their real purpose is not to persuade drug
offenders to stop their illegal activities but rather to kill or
negate those who refuse to be persuaded as well as those
who deny involvement in criminal activity; and (iii) they are
based on furtive fingers of unknown informants.79
96. This contention holds no water.
97. The conduct of house-to-house visitations, pursuant to

the PNP CMC No. 16-2016 of respondent PNP Chief dela Rosa,
to persuade possible illegal drug personalities to turn
themselves in is well within the mandate of PNP under
Republic Act No. 6975 otherwise known as Department of the
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990 to maintain peace
and order and to prevent crimes that threaten the life, limb
and property of persons:
Section 24. Powers and Functions.

The PNP shall have the following powers and
functions:
79
Almora Petition, p. 28.
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(a) Enforce all laws and ordinances

relative to the protection of
lives and properties;
(b) Maintain peace and order and
take all necessary steps to
ensure public safety;
(c) Investigate and prevent crimes,
effect the arrest of criminal
offenders, bring offenders to justice
and assist in their prosecution;
(d) Exercise the general powers to
make arrest, search and seizure in
accordance with the Constitution
and pertinent laws;
(e) Detain an arrested person for a
period not beyond what is
prescribed by law, informing the
person so detained of all his rights
under the Constitution;
(f) Issue licenses for the possession of
firearms and explosives in
accordance with law;
(g) Supervise and control the training
and operations of security agencies
and issue licenses to operate
security agencies, and to security
guards and private detectives, for
the practice of their professions;
and
(h) Perform such other duties and
exercise all other functions as may
be provided by law.80
98. The PNP CMC No. 2016-16 provides for house-to-house

visitations which is merely one of the strategies employed by
the PNP to curb the proliferation of illegal drugs. It must be
noted that the PNPs function to serve and to protect
necessarily encompasses not only responding to crimes
already committed but also preventing their commission.
99. This mandate of the police force to maintain peace and

order in the communities is recognized by this Honorable
Court in the case of Alejandro v. Office of the Ombudsman
Fact-finding Bureau:81
80
Emphasis supplied.
81
G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013.
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While the petitioner [punong barangay]

has general charge of the affairs in the
barangay, the maintenance of peace and order
is largely a police matter, with police authority
being predominant especially when the police
has began to act on an enforcement matter. The
maintenance of peace and order in the
community is a general function undertaken by
the punong barangay. It is a task expressly
conferred to the punong barangay under
Section 389(b)(3) of RA 7160. On the other
hand, the maintenance of peace and order
carries both general and specific functions on
the part of the police. Section 24 of RA 6975
(otherwise known as "the Department of the
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990"), as
amended, enumerates the powers and functions
of the police. In addition to the maintenance of
peace and order, the police has the authority to
"investigate and prevent crimes, effect the
arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to
justice and assist in their prosecution," and are
charged with the enforcement of "laws and
ordinances relative to the protection of lives and
properties."
100. The petitioners claim that persuading a suspected

offender to stop committing illegal drug activities is useless
unless there is a corresponding punishment.
101. Respondents beg to disagree.
102. The CMC was not meant for punishment but to set
the guidelines, procedures and tasks for police officers in the
conduct of the PNP's anti-illegal drug campaign. The purpose
of persuading persons of interest is to give them a chance to
surrender, change their ways and start to lead a normal life.
103. Nowhere is it stated in CMC No. 16-2016 that those

who deny or refuse the house-to-house visitation shall be
punished. Under CMC, in case a person suspected to be
involved in illegal drug trafficking denies or refuses the house-
to-house visitation, he shall be referred to the Anti-Illegal
Drug Units for immediate case build-up.
104. They also argue that the house-to-house visitations

are based on furtive fingers of unknown informants. This is
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without merit. The police operations are conducted based on

intelligence work and information-gathering activities of the
PNP. These information undergo a verification process
through surveillance or reconnaissance.
105. Further, the petitioners argue that Project Tokhang is

unconstitutional because it authorizes the police to invade and
search homes and arrest residents without warrant.82
106. To reiterate, the purpose of Project Tokhang is to

persuade the surrender of suspected drug personalities, not
to effect their arrest. it is undeniably a valid police measure.
A.3.5. The submission of

firearms, including serial
numbers and description, of
monthly reports in nanlaban
cases amounts to a fishing
expedition.
107. In Almora, the petitioners allege that the instances

of nanlaban cases where persons under police custody were
killed deserve judicial intervention. This judicial intervention,
however, should not be made through the blanket issuance of
the writ of amparo. Petitioners further pray that all the
firearms used in the nanlaban cases be submitted to the NBI
for forensic examination and that monthly reports be
submitted to the court on the status of the investigation of
these nanlaban cases.
108. Petitioners err.
109. While judicial intervention is equally available to

these petitioners, it could not be done through the blanket
issuance of a writ of amparo. If at all, the petitioners should
file the proper administrative and criminal cases against
erring police officers. Significantly, a separate proceeding
may be the appropriate remedy for those contesting the so-
called nanlaban cases of the PNP. An order calling for an NBI
investigation is not contemplated under the Rules on Amparo.
82
Almora Petition, p. 29.
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A.3.6. The process is far from

being a custodial investigation,
and is not violative of the right
against self-incrimination.
110. The petitioners in Dao allege that Operation

Tokhang is already a process involving custodial investigation
and therefore tends to violate constitutional right against self-
incrimination.83
111. Their contention is without merit. Custodial

interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused
persons" means "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."84
112. In Mesina v. People of the Philippines,85 citing

People v. Marra,86 custodial investigation is defined as:
[C]ustodial investigation involves any

questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant manner. The safeguards
during custodial investigation begin to operate
as soon as the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into a still unsolved crime, and
the interrogation is then focused on a particular
suspect who has been taken into custody and to
whom the police would then direct interrogatory
questions that tend to elicit incriminating
statements. The situation contemplated is more
precisely described as one where - After a
person is arrested and his custodial
investigation begins a confrontation arises
which at best may be termed unequal. The
detainee is brought to an army camp or police
headquarters and there questioned and cross-
examined not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break
down his morale. He finds himself in a strange
and unfamiliar surrounding, and every person
he meets he considers hostile to him. The
83
Dao Petition, pp. 44-45, par. 195.
84
People vs. Judge Ayson, G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989.
85
G.R. No. 162489, June 17, 2015.
86
G.R. No. 108494, September 20, 1994.
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investigators are well-trained and seasoned in

their work. They employ all the methods and
means that experience and study has taught
them to extract the truth, or what may pass for
it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights.
113. Contrary to the petitioners allegation in Dao,

Operation Tokhang is not tantamount to a custodial
investigation, as the subjects therein are not taken into
custody thereby. Since there is no custody to speak of, the
rule on custodial investigation does not apply.
114. From the foregoing discussion, there is no question

that CMC 16-2016 and MC 2017-112 are constitutional.
115. Be that as it may, it is worthy to note that on

October 10, 2017, President Duterte issued a Memorandum
from the President transferring the implementation of R.A.
No. 9165 to the PDEA.87 Considering that the conduct of all
campaigns and operations involving illegal drugs have been
left to the PDEA, CMC 16-2016 and MC 2017-112 have been
superseded. As a result, the Court has no reason to resolve
its constitutionality for being moot.
116. Pursuant thereto, The Directorate for Operations

(TDO) of the PNP issued a memorandum88 dated October 12,
2017 directing all PNP units to adhere to the presidential
directive and for the PNP Drug Enforcement Group (PNP-DEG)
to limit its functions to immediate submission of drug related
intelligence reports/information to PDEA. Likewise, all PNP
units were directed to focus all operations on anti-criminality,
Internal Security Operations (ISO) and anti-terrorism through
the strategy implementation of Enhanced Managing Police
Operations (E-MPO).
117. Also, the Regional Director of the National Capital

Regional Police Office (NCRPO) issued a memorandum89 dated
November 10, 2017 dissolving all Drug Enforcement Units
(DEUs) from Police Regional Offices (PROs) down to police
stations and convert the DEUs to Detectives/Police Intel
87
See footnote 50
88
Memorandum from TDO dated October 12, 2017, hereto attached as Annex 4.
89
Memorandum from RD, NCRPO dated November 10, 2017, hereto attached as Annex 5.
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Operatives who are responsible for detection prevention and

solution of street crimes. Likewise, the PNP-DEG was directed
to limit its function to intelligence gathering and consolidation
to immediate submission to PDEA.
118. Considering the foregoing issuances, the DEGs

function has been limited to mere submission of drug-related
intelligence reports to the PDEA. The DEUs on the other hand
are no longer in operation. Thus, the relief asking to prohibit
the implementation of CMC No. 16-2016 has been rendered
moot.
119. A moot case is one that ceases to present a

justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value.90 An action is considered moot when it no longer
presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved
have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute
has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to
judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised
again between the parties. Simply stated, there is nothing for
the court to resolve as its determination has been overtaken
by subsequent events.91
A.4. The petitioners failed to

establish by substantial
evidence that the respondents
violated their right to life,
liberty or security; hence, they
are not entitled to the issuance
of a writ of amparo.
120. The petitioners are not entitled to the issuance of a

writ of amparo, as they failed to establish by substantial
evidence that the respondents violated their right to life,
liberty, or security.
121. The remedy of the writ of amparo is an equitable

and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people
to life, liberty, and security as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution. The Rule on Amparo was issued by this
Funa v. Ermita,G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.

90
Galicto v. Aquino, G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012 citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
91
128517, September 10, 1998.
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Honorable as an exercise of its power to promulgate rules

concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. It aims to address concerns such as extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, among others.92
122. Section 5 of the Rule on Amparo enumerates what

must be contained in a petition filed thereunder. Thus:
Sec. 5. Contents of Petition. - The

petition shall be signed and verified and
shall allege the following:
b) The name and personal

circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or
uncertain, the respondent may be
described by an assumed appellation;
c) The right to life, liberty and

security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of the respondent, and
how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits.
123. Thus, for the petition to prosper, the petitioners

must satisfy the following requisites: (a) the life, liberty, and
security of the aggrieved party, or in this case, the petitioners,
are violated; (b) the acts complained of must be unlawful;
and (c) the manner in which the violation or threat of violation
of life, liberty, and security was committed must be detailed
in supporting affidavits. Paragraph (c), Section 5 of the Rule
also requires that the petitioners allege the cause of action in
as complete a manner as possible and submit affidavits to
facilitate the resolution of the petition, consistent with the
summary nature of the proceeding.93
124. The petitioners failed to satisfy the requirements
92
De Lima v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528, February 19, 2013; Citations omitted.
93
Annotation to the Writ of Amparo.
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for the issuance of the writ.
125. First, the petitioners in G.R. No. 234484,

particularly Sr. Dao and the seventeen lay mission partners
of RGS, are not the aggrieved parties within the
contemplation of the law who are entitled to the benefit and
protection of the writ. As pointed out earlier, they do not have
the locus standi to institute the present petitions, as they do
not stand to be benefitted or injured by the grant or denial of
the petitions.
126. Neither are they qualified under Section 2 of the

Rule to file the petition. Section 2 provides:
Sec. 2. Who may File. - The petition may

be filed by the aggrieved party or by any
qualified person or entity in the following order:
(a) Any member of the

immediate family, namely: the
spouse, children and parents of the
aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant,

descendant or collateral relative of
the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity, in default of those
mentioned in the preceding
paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen,

organization, association or
institution, if there is no known
member of the immediate
family or relative of the
aggrieved party.
127. Section 2 provides the order of priority of persons

who can sue for the writ. The right to sue belongs first and
foremost belongs to the aggrieved party, that is, the person
whose right to life, liberty and security is being threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or
of a private individual or entity. In cases where the
whereabouts of the aggrieved party is unknown, the petition
may be filed by the authorized parties enumerated under
Section 2 of the Rule, in the following order: (a) any member
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of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and

parents of the aggrieved party;(b) any ascendant, descendant
or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those
mentioned in Paragraph (a); or (c) any concerned citizen,
organization, association or institution, if there is no known
member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved
party.94The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends
the rights of all other authorized parties to file similar
petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition by an authorized
party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of
all others, observing the order established therein.95
128. In Boac v. Cadapan,96 this Honorable Court

dismissed the amparo suit filed by strangers under the guise
that they are concerned with the alleged victim of an
enforced disappearance or extralegal killing, thus:
Petitioners finally point out that the

parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the
requisite standing to file the amparo petition on
behalf of Merino. They call attention to the fact
that in the amparo petition, the parents of
Sherlyn and Karen merely indicated that they
were concerned with Manuel Merino as basis for
filing the petition on his behalf.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of

Amparo provides:
The filing of a petition by the

aggrieved party suspends the rights
of all other authorized parties to file
similar petitions. Likewise, the filing
of the petition by an authorized
party on behalf of the aggrieved
party suspends the right of all
others, observing the order
established therein.
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen

failed to allege that there were no known
members of the immediate family or relatives of
Merino. The exclusive and successive order
mandated by the above-quoted provision must
94
See: Annotation to the Writ of Amparo.
95
Boac v. Cadapan, G.R. Nos. 184461-62, May 31, 2011.
96
Id.
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be followed. The order of priority is not without

reason to prevent the indiscriminate and
groundless filing of petitions for amparo which
may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party.
The Court notes that the parents of

Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition
for habeas corpus on Merinos behalf. No
objection was raised therein for, in a habeas
corpus proceeding, any person may apply for
the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party.
129. Sr. Dao and the seventeen lay mission partners

causes must suffer the same fate. They themselves admit that
they are not related to those whose who were allegedly killed
by members of the PNP. They also did not allege in their
petition that the aggrieved parties have no known members
of the immediate family or other relatives. Applying Boac,
they have no personality to institute the present petitions.
Thus, their causes of action deserve outright dismissal.
130. The following petitioners are also barred from

joining the suit in G.R. No. 234484 as they violated the order
of those who may file a petition for a writ of amparo under
Section 2 of the Rule:
Petitioners Relationship to the

deceased
VALERIE AGUILAN Live-in partner of the
deceased RYAN EDER
ANGEL S. EDER Sister of the deceased RYAN
EDER
MARIEL SUPNET Cousin of the deceased
RYAN EDER
RUSSEL SALVADOR Father of petitioner Angel
Eders live-in partner
ABBY S. EDER Sister of the deceased RYAN
EDER
MARIE TAMAYO Live-in partner of the
deceased EMILIANO
BLANCO
MICHELLE Sister-in-law of the
ESTRELLER deceased JERRY
ESTRELLER, JR.
MARY JANE Sister of the deceased
ESTRELLER JERRY ESTRELLER, JR.
ROSALINDA N. TAN Aunt of the deceased
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REYNALDO T. JAVIER, JR.

MARY LUV JAVIER Sister of the deceased
REYNALDO T. JAVIER, JR.
HAIDEE O. SUELEN Niece of the deceased,
RAMON RODRIGUEZ
131. Second, the petitioners failed to prove that the

respondents committed any unlawful act as they failed to
establish their allegations by substantial evidence.
132. Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule specifically require

that the parties establish their claims by substantial evidence
before the privilege of the writ may be granted to them.
Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing
or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the
person charged.97
133. A revisit of the petitions and the affidavits attached

to them will reveal that the petitioners allegations are
unsupported by competent eyewitness accounts or
corroborative evidence. The petitions are hinged mainly on
hearsay and on the assumption that the men in plainclothes
lurking near the crime scenes were police officers.
Considering that the petitioners allegations are not
adequately supported by substantial evidence, their claim
that the anti-drug operations conducted by the respondents
are illegal has no leg to stand on.
134. Apropos is the pronouncement of this Honorable

Court in Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo,viz:
The liberality accorded to amparo and

habeas data cases does not mean that a
claimant is dispensed with the onus of proving
his case. Indeed, even the liberal standard of
substantial evidence demands some adequate
evidence.98
135. Third, the allegations of violations or threats of

violation of the petitioners right to life, liberty, and security
97
Mamba vs. Bueno, G.R. No. 191416, February 7, 2017.
98
G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012.
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are based merely on hearsay and speculation. In particular,

Sr. Dao and the seventeen lay mission partners merely took
the cudgels for the victims and their families who are
[allegedly] unwilling to join the petition for fear of retaliation,
and based their allegations on news articles and information
they gathered during their visits to the wake of the alleged
victims. On the other hand, while the affidavits submitted by
the other petitioners detailed the circumstances or incidents
surrounding the death of the alleged victims, there is nothing
in the affidavits which remotely indicate that the respondents
violated or threatened to violate the petitioners life, liberty,
or security.
136. The petition alleges threats against the petitioners

life, liberty, and security by reason of their being either a
member or a relative of a member of the community of San
Andres Bukid. However, the threats allegedly made lack the
required specificity, thus, the petitioners claim stands on
nebulous grounds. Verily, while mere threats fall within the
mantle of protection of the writ of amparo, said threats must
still find rational basis in the surrounding circumstances of the
case.99
137. It is unfortunate that loss of lives resulted from the

operations of the police officers. But these incidents do not
automatically render the anti-drug operation conducted by
the respondents unlawful as would entitle the petitioners to
the protection of a writ of amparo. To iterate, the petitioners
failed to prove their allegations by substantial evidence. To
give due course to the petitioners patently baseless petitions
would only serve to countenance harassment suits and
fishing expeditions that distract law enforcement agencies
from their principal duties or, worse, dampen their zeal in the
pursuit of criminal elements. Ultimately, the ones who will
benefit from the grant these petitions will be those who are
engaged in the illegal drug trade. This should not be
countenanced by this Honorable Court.
A.4.1. Petitioners allegations

in Dao are based on hearsay
evidence.
99
Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012.
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138. The petitioners allegations in Dao are based solely

on hearsay evidence which failed to satisfy the quantum of
evidence required by the law.
139. It is a basic legal tenet that a witness can only

testify on matters that are of his or her own personal
knowledge.100 This rule does not change even if the required
standard be substantial evidence, preponderance of evidence,
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or clear and convincing
evidence.101
140. In Ladaga v. Mapagu, however, this Honorable

Court held that the evidentiary proceedings in amparo cases
allow a certain flexibility in considering evidence that would
otherwise be disregarded, to wit:
Suitable to, and consistent with this

incipiently unique and informal treatment of
amparo cases, the Court eventually recognized
the evidentiary difficulties that beset amparo
petitioners, arising as they normally would from
the fact that the State itself, through its own
agents, is involved in the enforced
disappearance or extrajudicial killing that it is
supposedly tasked by law to investigate. Thus,
in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court laid down a
new standard of relaxed admissibility of
evidence to enable amparo petitioners to meet
the required amount of proof showing the
State's direct or indirect involvement in the
purported violations and found it a fair and
proper rule in amparo cases to consider all
the pieces of evidence adduced in their
totality and to consider any evidence
otherwise inadmissible under our usual
rules to be admissible if it is consistent
with the admissible evidence adduced. Put
simply, evidence is not to be rejected outright
because it is inadmissible under the rules for as
long as it satisfies the most basic test of
reason i.e., relevance of the evidence to
the issue at hand and its consistency with
all other pieces of adduced evidence.
This measure of flexibility in the

admissibility of evidence, however, does not do
100
Jose v. Angeles, G.R. No. 187899, October 23, 2013.
101
Separate Opinion of Justice Bersamin in Umali, Jr. v. Hernandez, IPI No. 15-35-SB-J, February 23, 2016.
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away with the requirement of substantial

evidence in showing the State's involvement in
the enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killing
or threats thereof. It merely permits, in the
absence of hard-to-produce direct evidence, a
closer look at the relevance and significance of
every available evidence, including those that
are, strictly speaking, hearsay where the
circumstances of the case so require, and allows
the consideration of the evidence adduced in
terms of their consistency with the totality of the
evidence.102
141. Thus, evidence that is otherwise inadmissible may

be considered. This, however, is subject to the qualification
that the otherwise inadmissible evidence must be consistent
with the admissible evidence adduced.
142. The allegations presented by a majority of the

petitioners in the Dao petition are based solely on hearsay
evidence. The plea for a writ of amparo rests on mere news
reports and/or the Judicial Affidavits of the petitioners Dao
and RGS lay mission partners, all of whom lack personal
knowledge on the supposed threats to life, liberty or security.
143. The petitioners cited news reports from various

online sources relative to the deaths of the following: (1)
Conrado Berona; (2) Jefferson Bunuan, Mark Anthony
Bunuan, Jomar Manaois; (3) Jerson Colaban, Jossing
Colaban, Joseph Baculi; (4) Gilbert Beguelme; (5) Emiliano
Blanco; (6) Delfin Sicson; (7) Joshua Merced, Leo Geluz and
Bimbo Merced; (8) Ryan Dimacali; (9) SPO3 Dennis Padpad;
(10) John Paul Enrera; (11) Rolly Veros and Ronnie Veros;
(12) Crisente Baquial; and (13) Manuel Roy Manalac.103
144. Petitioner Dao also admitted that she does not

have personal knowledge as to what transpired, but that she
merely gathered information from the debriefing sessions
conducted by her and by the RGS lay mission partners with
the family members of those killed, to viz:
Q 19. What do you do at the wakes, if any?
A19. We would offer a prayer, then we would
102
Citations omitted.
103
See footnotes in Dao Petition, pp. 18-35.
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hold a debriefing session for the victims family

members and relatives. Thats how we would
find out the details of the killings. 104
145. The handwritten Salaysay of some petitioners who

are RGS lay mission partners, that their respective tokhang
stories are actually not their own, but are sourced from
accounts they heard from neighbors, acquaintances, or
relatives etc.:
Ako si Abella Matin-ao, babae, ang edad

ko ay 50 years old, may asawa. xxxx Base sa
kuento ng kapitbahay namin na si Ferdinand
Emotan, may kaibigan daw siya na buong
pamilia na hinuli tapos ang isang anak ng oras
na iyon wala sa bahay nila. Hinuli daw yon dahil
sa mga user sila. Tapos ng nasa kulungan na,
dinalaw daw ang ina ng isang anak sa [sic]
babae sa kulungan, tapos yong anak di na
nakauwi isinama na doon sa kulungan ng nanay.
At ang base sa salaysay ng pulis ay kasama siya
doon sa nagdrodroga.
Ako si Remedios G. Espina, babae, 49,

may asawa Ang aking isasalaysay ay iyong
pangyayari sa aming barangay na nagkaroong
[sic] ng operasyon kung saan iyon ay ang
paghuhuli sa mga gumagamit ng droga at sa
mga nagbebenta. nakatanggap ako ng text
message mula sa isa naming kasama na si Vicky
Factor. Ang sabi niya halika dito Medy, dito
kami sa barangay 770, madaming pulis. Agad
ay pumuntga ako at ang aking kasama na si
Corazon Estella sa brg [sic] 770, habang
naglalakad kami, napahinto kami dahil
nakasalubong namin ang PEDEA [sic],
nakakatakot sila, ang laki ng katawan at puro
armado. alas 10:00 ng gabi nakatanggap ako
ng chat mula kay Vicky Factor...at ang sabi
niya...maraming nahuli, mga 25 katao. Nahuli
na si Boyet, si Omar at Binay...
Ako si Avelina L. Felicidario, may sapat na

gulang, anim na pot taong gulang isang biyuda
may pitong anak Ang isang member
namin sa Basic Ecclesial Community (BEC) ang
kanyang anak ay binaril na kumakain sa
karinderia ayon sa kanyang ina na si Anafe
104
Judicial Affidavit of Sr. Ma. Juanita R. Dao, p. 6, Annex A in the Dao Petition.
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Mendoza na hindi ko na maalala kung kailan

nangyari iyon. [K]ailan lang May 23, na may
napatay at hinuli ang asawang babae at ang
nanay nito. Ayon sa kwento ni Eufrocina
Palomique, isang (BEC member din) nakita niya
na ang bumaril ay may takip ang mukha hindi
nya nakita ang pagbaril sa loob ng bahay pero
narinig nya ang dalawang putok ng baril kaya
ang kwento nya sobra syang natakot at
nerbiyos kaya ayon sa kanyang kwento ako ay
lubhang natatakot din.
Ako si Josephine L. Litang, babae, 54 taon

gulang at biyuda Noon may narinig ako na
balita na may pinatay dito banda sa may Oro A
Extension na biktima ng EJK kahit na ako ay
may takot pinuntahan ko ang lugar at bahay na
pinanyarihan ang aking nakausap ay ang
kapitbahay at kumpare ng isa sa biktima ng EJK.
Ako si Edna V. Jullar, isang babaeng may

hustong edad na (52 yrs) may asawa xxxx Ang
tokhang story ko po ay tungkol sa aking
kapitbahay na hinaras po siya ng mga pulis, pilit
dinala
Ako po si Marietta B. Rodriguez, babae,

43 years old, may asawa. xxxx Ilang buwan na
po ang nakalipas yong kalapit kong kapitbahay
ay pinasok ng mga pulis ng biglaan. xxxx Ang
kwentong ito ay narinig ko mismo sa anak ko
kasi nong nangyari ito siya ay kasalukuyang
nasa labas, at pag-akyat niya ay sinabi nga ng
anak ko na maraming pulis polis ang pumasok
doon sa kalapit bahay.
Ako po si Maria Elsa J. Ibarra, isang

babae, nasa hustong gulang, idad (54 years
old), hiwalay sa asawa. xxxx Ang aking
kwentong tokhang ay naganap sa lugar naming
sa brgy 775. Ang lugar naming ay talamak rin
sa droga kaya lang sa awa ng diyos wala pa
napatay sa lugar namin xxxx Pero ayon sa
narinig ko may asset daw na nagsumbong sa
pulis.
Ako si Corazon Estela, babae 59 na

taong gulang, may asawa at anak xxxx Sa
pangyayari ng tokhang, nagsusurvey kami sa
bahay bahay. May isang babae na nagsabi na
marami raw Police at PDA [sic] sa lugar Oro B.
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Sabi niya mayroong silang huhulihin kaya punta

kami doon sa lugar nagsabi noon babae mga
alas kwatro ng hapon noon.
Ako po si Rosalinda C. Aguilar, babae,

59 yrs.old may asawa. xxxx Ang akin pong
kuwentong tokhang ay tungkol sa anak ng
kasamahan naming sa BEC na si Anafe. Narinig
ko sa mga nakakita na itoy nangyari bandang
alas-dos ng madaling araw.
Ako po si Elizabeth G. Oplida, may asawa

at apat na anak Noong May 6, 2017,
nakabalita ako ng natokhang xxxx Siya si Ryan
Dimacali alyas Oxo natokhang daw siya dahil
sa pwestuhan ng bahay niya ng droga. Pero
bago daw natokhang ilang beses na raw syang
pinagsabihan na itigil na ang kangyang gawaing
papapapwesto ngunit di siya nakinig nagpatuloy
pa rin siya.105
146. In Razon Jr. v. Tagitis, this Honorable Court

emphasized that a relaxation of the rules on the admissibility
of hearsay evidence does not equate to a total disregard of
the standards set forth by the rules of court:
Suffice it to say that we continue to

adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, with some
adjustments for flexibility in considering the
evidence presented. When we ruled that
hearsay evidence (usually considered
inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence) may be admitted as the
circumstances of the case may require, we did
not thereby dispense with the substantial
evidence rule; we merely relaxed the
evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence,
maintaining all the time the standards of reason
and relevance that underlie every evidentiary
situation. This, we did, by considering the
105
Salaysay of Abella Matin-ao, dated 29 May 2017, marked DAO-W, attached to the Judicial Affidavit of
Sr. Ma. Juanita R. Dao, Annex A in Petition dated October 18, 2017; Salaysay of Remedios G. Espina,
dated 29 May 2017, marked DAO-X, attached to the Judicial Affidavit of Sr. Ma. Juanita R. Dao, Annex
A in Petition dated October 18, 2017; Salaysay of Avelina L. Felicidario, dated 29 May 2017, marked
DAO-Y, attached to the Judicial Affidavit of Sr. Ma. Juanita R. Dao, Annex A in Petition dated October
18, 2017; Salaysay of Corazon Estela, dated 29 May 2017, marked DAO-DD, attached to the Judicial
Affidavit of Sr. Ma. Juanita R. Dao, Annex A in Petition dated October 18, 2017; Salaysay of Rosalinda
C. Aguilar, dated 29 May 2017, marked DAO-EE, attached to the Judicial Affidavit of Sr. Ma. Juanita R.
Dao, Annex A in Petition dated October 18, 2017; Salaysay of Elizabeth G. Oplida, dated 29 May 2017,
marked DAO-GG, attached to the Judicial Affidavit of Sr. Ma. Juanita R. Dao, Annex A in Petition
dated October 18, 2017.
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X-------------------------------------------X
totality of the obtaining situation and the

consistency of the hearsay evidence with the
other available evidence in the case.106
147. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant

evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of
wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of
liability against the person charged.107
148. Information gathered by petitioners Dao and the

RGS lay mission partners through debriefing sessions with
family members of the persons killed, and from stories
relayed by neighbors and other persons who allegedly
witnessed or heard other details about killings, can barely be
considered substantial evidence. Their lack of personal
knowledge thus makes the information they have as double
or multiple hearsay, since it is based upon third-hand
information related to them by someone who heard it from
others.108
149. Multiple hearsay is no more competent than single

hearsay,109 and such statements on their own do not satisfy
the standards provided by the Rule on Amparo. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence.110
150. The fact that the evidence presented by petitioners

are hearsay in character already casts doubt on the veracity
and trustworthiness of their allegations. All the more when
these hearsay evidence are not supplemented or corroborated
by any other admissible evidence.
151. Hearsay allegations make up the majority of

petitioners evidence. Thus, while the evidentiary rule on the
admissibility of evidence was relaxed in amparo cases as held
in Razon v. Tagitis,111 the totality of the evidence presented
in the Dao petition still failed to meet the quantum of
106
G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010.
107
Ladaga v. Mapagu, G.R. Nos. 189689 91, November 13, 2012 citing Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R.
No. 183871, February 18, 2010.
108
People v. Garcia and Caranguinan, G.R. No. 124514. July 6, 2000.
109
Id.
110
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940 citing Consolidated
Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.
111
Supra note 139.
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evidence required.
B. These petitions have been

trivialized by the remedies
sought by the petitioners
diluting the imperative for the
issuance of the writ.
152. The remedies sought by both petitions are beyond

the scope of an amparo petition.
153. Dao, et al. devoted seven pages in their petition

in asking for twenty-four remedies, while Almora has five
pages containing five main remedies and seventeen sub-
remedies.
154. The Almora petition prays, among others, that:
a. A temporary restraining order and/or

preliminary injunction be issued;
b. Respondents or any of their agents,

representatives or assigns be
prohibited from implementing or
enforcing any instructions, commands
or utterances of President Duterte to
the PNP and/or DILG in relation to the
war on drugs;
c. The Writ of Amparo be granted and

issued to safeguard the peoples right
to life, liberty and security;
d. The PNP, through the PNP Chief, be

held directly responsible for the
disclosure of material facts known to
the government and to their offices
regarding the extralegal killings of
Ryan Dave Almora and Rex Appari and
the shooting of Jefferson Soriano;
e. The NBI be directed to conduct a

thorough and impartial investigation
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into the deaths of Ryan Dave Almora

and Rex Appari and the shooting of
Jefferson Soriano;
f. The police officers involved in all cases

of nanlaban to submit: (a) the
firearm/s allegedly used by the
deceased to the NBI for forensic
examination and safekeeping, and (b)
the firearms/ that the police
discharged to the NBI for forensic
examination;
g. The IAS and/or NAPOLCOM be

required to submit a monthly report to
the Court;
h. The above-mentioned obligations be

directly enforceable against whoever
may be the incumbent PNP Chief and
DILG Secretary or Officer-in-Charge,
under pain of contempt.112
155. On the other hand, the Dao petition seeks, among

others, viz:
a. To direct respondents PDG Dela Rosa

and C/Supt Joel Napoleon Coronel to
relieve or cause the relief of
respondents Domingo, Corpuz,
Sagaysay and the entire MPD Station
6 and to transfer or cause their
transfer to another territory outside of
Metro Manila.
b. To direct the Commission on Human

Rights, the Department of Health and
the Department of Social Welfare and
Development to conduct visitation of
detained petitioners twice a month.
112
Almora petition, pp. 36 to 40.
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c. To direct respondents to furnish all

the documents, reports, and evidence
in connection with all the deaths
subject of this case.
d. To direct respondents to obtain the

written consent of the next of kin of
any victim to deliver the cadaver to
particular funeral parlor.113
156. The writ of amparo cannot include the visitation of

the detainees by the CHR, DOH, and DSWD,114 submission to
the Office of the City Prosecutor or the Office of the
Ombudsman of documents or evidence relating to police
operations prior to the filing of any complaint,115 direct the
respondents to furnish relatives or victims next of kins copies
of documents and evidence without need of demands,116 and
an order directing the respondents to deliver the cadaver to a
funeral parlor.117 These prayers are not only beyond the scope
and contemplation of the rule on amparo, they would also
consume significant resources of the PNP, if granted, which
would impinge on the ability of the PNP to perform its
mandate to keep law and order. The fundamental function of
the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details
concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced
disappearance of an aggrieved party.118 While the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting
remedies to address an enforced disappearance or
extrajudicial killing, it cannot (without violating the nature of
the writ of Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and
prolong rather than expedite the investigations already
ongoing.119
157. Moreover, the alleged extralegal killings transpired

sometime in 2016 and early 2017. If indeed petitioners lives
were on the line, they would have filed the present actions at
the earliest possible time to prevent accountable police
113
Dao petition, pp. 52 to 58.
114
Dao petition, p. 53, par. c of the Reliefs sought
115
Dao petition, p. 57, par. q of the Reliefs sought
116
Dao petition, p. 55 & 57, pars. f & r of the Reliefs sought
117
Dao petition, p. 87, par. v of the Reliefs sought
118
Mison v. Gallegos, G.R. No. 210759, June 23, 2015.
119
Burgos v. Esperon, Jr., G.R. No. 178497, February 4, 2014.
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officers from committing any further human rights violation.
158. For this reason, the petitions should be dismissed.
C. The application for writ

of preliminary injunction,
temporary restraining
order, prohibition and
interim reliefs must be
denied.
x-----------------------------x
159. The above allegations are hereby reproduced by

reference in support of respondents' opposition to the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO. In
addition, respondents state that:
C.1. Petitioners failed to show the

existence of a material right to
warrant the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO.
160. The requisites for the grant of a preliminary

injunction are as follows:120
(1) The applicant must have a clear and

unmistakable right to be protected,
that is, a right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial

invasion of such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to

prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and

adequate remedy exists to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury.121
161. To be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners

must show that there exists a right to be protected which is
120
Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Atlocan Wireless System, Inc., G.R. Nos. 205875 & 208916, June
30, 2015.
121
Emphasis supplied.
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directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined.

Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of
the right is material and substantial and that there is an
urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.122
162. In both petitions, petitioners ground their claim for

the issuance of a Writ of Amparo on the violation of, and
continuous threats to, their life, liberty and security. In
particular, Dao, et al. allege that respondents anti-illegal
drug campaign violates several constitutional and statutory
provisions, as well as administrative rules and regulations
such as the Revised Philippine National Police Operational
Procedures and Department of Justice Circular No. 61.
163. It is however, evident that petitioners in both Dao

and Almora failed to show any clear legal right for the
injunctive relief to issue. The petitioners failed to show
compelling evidence that their life, liberty and security are in
imminent danger. In fact, the very nature of the ultimate
reliefs they pray for could be characterized as a broad plea to
strike down prevailing law enforcement practices on alleged
constitutional grounds rather than on distinctive and personal
threats to their lives and safety.
164. It would not be amiss to state that the alleged

extralegal killings transpired sometime in 2016 and early
2017. If indeed petitioners lives were on the line, they would
have filed the present actions at the soonest possible instance
to prevent accountable police officers from committing any
further human rights violation.
165. Likewise, noteworthy is the fact that many

barangay officials who unwittingly signed the petition in the
Dao case are retracting their signatures.
166. Where there is absence of any clear prima facie

showing that the life, liberty or security of a petitioner is in
immediate or continuing danger, there would be no basis for
any issuance of a TRO or Preliminary Injunction.
122
Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Fernando, Pampanga v. Soriano, Jr., G.R. Nos. 153829 & 160909,
August 17, 2011, citing Ocampo v. Sison Vda. De Fernandez, G.R. No. 164529, June 19, 2007.
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C.2. There is no basis to grant

interim reliefs.
167. Section 14, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the Rule on

Amparo states:
SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing

of the petition or at anytime before final
judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant
any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The

court, justice or judge, upon motion or
motu proprio, may order that the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any
member of the immediate family be
protected in a government agency or by
an accredited person or private institution
capable of keeping and securing their
safety. If the petitioner is an organization,
association or institution referred to in
Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection
may be extended to the officers
involved.
(c) Production Order. The court, justice

or judge, upon verified motion and after
due hearing, may order any person in
possession, custody or control of any
designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, or objects in digitized or
electronic form, which constitute or
contain evidence relevant to the petition
or the return, to produce and permit their
inspection, copying or photographing by
or on behalf of the movant.
168. In Lozada, Jr., et al. vs. President Arroyo,123 this

Honorable Court ruled that interim reliefs in amparo
proceedings can only be availed of if there is clear showing of
an imminent and continuing threat on the life and liberty of a
petitioner. Absent such showing, this Honorable Court will
dismiss applications for Temporary Protection Orders, viz.:
Finally, with respect to the interim reliefs

123
G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012.
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sought by petitioners, this Court, in Yano v.

Sanchez, declined to grant the prayer for the
issuance of a TPO, as well as Inspection and
Production Orders, upon a finding that the
implicated public officials were not accountable
for the disappearance subject of that case.
Analogously, it would be incongruous to grant
herein petitioners prayer for a TPO and
Inspection and Production Orders and at the
same time rule that there no longer exists any
imminent or continuing threat to Lozadas right
to life, liberty and security. Thus, there is no
basis on which a prayer for the issuance of these
interim reliefs can be anchored.
169. Petitioners were not able to present the slightest

credible showing that threats on their life, liberty, and security
are continuing and persistent. Petitioners in Almora did not
even discuss the nature of threats they were being subjected
to by the respondents. Dao petitioners, on the other hand,
failed to show a credible nexus between the series of alleged
extralegal killings in San Andres Bukid and the present threat
to their safety. There is thus no justification for the issuance
of a Temporary Protection Order.
170. Ironically, what would effectively produce the

threats to the lives and well-being of the residents of San
Andres Bukid would be to grant the Dao petitioners prayer
for a one-kilometer perimeter124 where respondent law
enforcers would not be allowed to enter.
171. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975 states:
Section 24. Powers and Functions. The

PNP shall have the following powers and
functions:
(a) Enforce all laws and

ordinances relative to the
protection of lives and
properties;
(b) Maintain peace and order and

take all necessary steps to
ensure public safety;
124
Dao Petition, p. 52.
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(c) Investigate and prevent

crimes, effect the arrest of
criminal offenders, bring
offenders to justice and assist
in their prosecution;125
172. Preventing law enforcers from entering certain

areas would effectively create police-free zones. Such peculiar
law enforcement structures will unwittingly establish criminal
safe havens within the community. Moreover, police
authorities would be unable to perform their mandate to
enforce law and order throughout the country.
173. Prescinding, the petitioners prayer for issuance of

a production order must also be denied as it is predicated on
bare allegations of extralegal killings, falsification, illegal
arrest, and extortion committed by the respondents.
174. In Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo126, this Honorable

Court upheld the trial courts denial of the grant of
production and inspection orders predicated on bare
allegations. The High Court added that a court cannot
sanction a fishing expedition by precipitate issuance of
production orders on the basis of insufficient demands of one
party, to wit:
An inspection order is an interim relief

designed to give support or strengthen the claim
of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to
aid the court before making a decision. A basic
requirement before an amparo court may grant
an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably determinable from the
allegations of the party seeking the order. In
this case, the issuance of inspection order was
properly denied since the petitioners specified
several military and police establishments based
merely on the allegation that the testimonies of
victims and witnesses in previous incidents of
similar abductions involving activists disclosed
that those premises were used as detention
centers. In the same vein, the prayer for
issuance of a production order was predicated
on petitioners bare allegation that it obtained
125
Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of
1990.
126
Ibid.
Page 62 of 63
Dao v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------------X
confidential information from an unidentified

military source, that the name of James was
included in the so-called Order of Battle.
Indeed, the trial court could not have sanctioned
any "fishing expedition" by precipitate issuance
of inspection and production orders on the basis
of insufficient claims of one party.127
175. Also, the issuance of a production order would

entail tremendous expenditure and use of government
resources if every police operation would be subject to a strict
scrutiny simply on the basis of empty accusations and
baseless speculations.
176. Clearly, petitioners failed to establish substantial

evidence of an actual violation of or threat to petitioners'
rights to life, liberty and security that would entitle them to
the grant of the interim reliefs prayed for.
PRAYER
The respondents consequently pray that this Honorable

Court:
1. DISMISS the consolidated petitions for lack of

merit;
2. DENY the application for the issuance of a writ of
amparo;
3. DENY the application for interim reliefs; and
4. DENY the application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.
The respondents also pray for such further or other relief

that the Court may deem just and equitable under the
premises.
Makati City for the City of Manila, November 16, 2017.
127
Underscoring supplied.
Page 63 of 63

Consolidated Comment On War On Drugs Petitions

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Consolidated Comment On War On Drugs Petitions

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Republic of the Philippines

AILEEN ALMORA, JEFFERSON

DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD

SR. MA. JUANITA R. DAO, RGS,

LUCILA A. CAMULO, ANAFE

- versus - G.R. No. 234484

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

OCAMPO, PO3 RODOLFO

THE RESPONDENTS, through the Office of the Solicitor

Ten years ago, this Honorable Court promulgated

For a petition for a writ of amparo to prosper, the

sa Iligal Na Droga (MASA MASID) Project are classic

NATURE OF THE PETITIONS

1. The consolidated Petitions for Writ Amparo, and

THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL FACTS

2. On July 1, 2016, the Philippine National Police

For G.R. No. 234359 (Almora Petition)

3. On July 28, 2016, a drug buy-bust operation was

4. In a separate incident on September 13, 2016, in

5. On June 17, 2017, petitioner Jefferson Acena

For G.R. No. 234484 (Dao Petition)

6. Eighteen of the thirty-nine petitioners are members

a. extralegal killings of Conrado Berona,1 Jefferson

b. falsified non-bailable charges against Valerie

c. illegally arrested Marie Tamayo and Hilario

d. committed extortion on Francisco Blanco and Raul

e. shot Jeffrey Degala.28

7. Due to the aforementioned circumstances, the

8. Meanwhile, on August 29, 2017, the Department of

9. On October 10, 2017, President Duterte issued a

10. On October 11 and 20, 2017, the Office of the

11. On November 7, 2017, the OSG received this

consolidating the petitions and requiring respondents to

GROUNDS FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONS

THE DAO PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED

THE DAO PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED

THE PETITIONS SHOULD BE DISMISSED

THE PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE

THE CMC NO. 16-2016 AND DILG MEMORANDUM

A. A class suit in the Dao

12. The petitioners in Dao alleged that they are

13. Their resort to class suit to establish their legal

14. Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a

Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject

15. From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a

16. These requirements are wanting in this case.

17. First, the subject matter of the controversy is not

were similar or were executed pursuant to a single plan, the

18. In Mathay, et al. v. Consolidated Bank & Trust Co.,33

Although it has been remarked that the

19. In Dao, eighteen of the thirty-nine petitioners are

20. Each of the petitioners has a distinct and separate

violations of rights are likewise different from the wrongs

21. Clearly, the claimed invasion or violation of the

22. To emphasize, what makes a situation a proper case

23. Second, an action does not become a class suit

24. Here, petitioner cannot validly claim to have

twenty-six barangays in San Andres Bukid, Manila. The

25. Thus, this Honorable Court would not be able to

26. Third, there is no proof that all the residents of the

27. Conversely, several residents from the barangays

Bukid clearly show that the petitioners have no legal standing

28. The impropriety in the maintenance of this case as