PILAR Y. GOYENA v.

AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO

395 SCRA 117 (2003), THIRD DIVISION

Amparo Ledesma-Gustilo filed a Petition for Letters of Guardianship over the person
and property of her sister Julieta since she is not in a position to take care of
herself anymore due to her old age, general weakness, and suffering from a mini-
stroke thereby requiring the assistance of a guardian to manage her interests
in various enterprises.

Pilar Y. Goyena, Julietas close friend for more than six decades, opposed the petition.
She claims that Julieta is competent and sane enough to manage her person and
property. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared Julieta to be incompetent and
incapable of taking care of herself and her property and Gustilo was appointed to be
her guardian. The RTC decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in finding Julieta to be incompetent and incapable of
taking care of herself

HELD:

It is well-entrenched doctrine that questions of fact are not proper subjects

of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is
confined to questions of law. The test of whether the question is one of law or of fact
is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a question of law; otherwise, it is question
of fact.

In support of an affirmative answer, Goyena posits as follows:

1. The Court of Appeals basis for its decision that there are no antagonistic interests
between Julieta and Amparo is contrary to the evidence on record,

2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that there is no showing that Amparo is
hostile to the best interest of Julieta, and

3. Julieta Ledesmas appointed representatives are most suitable to be appointed as

her guardian.

Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in support of Goyenas position require a
review of the evidence, hence, not proper for consideration in the petition at bar. The
Court cannot thus be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties
and analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and appellate court
were correct in according them superior credit.
That the issues raised are factual is in fact admitted by Goyena in her Reply. Goyena
claims that the petition falls within the exceptions to the rule because the findings of
the Court of Appeals are clearly belied by the evidence on record.

In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals
directly with the parties. As the Court said in Feliciano v. Comahort: As a rule, when
it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian,
and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are
urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made
very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.

In the case at bar, Goyena has not shown that the lower courts committed any error.
Goyenas assertion that Amparos intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is
to take control of Julietas properties and use them for her own benefit is purely
speculative and finds no support from the records.

The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, represented by her legal guardian,

AMPAROEVANGELISTAv.COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION),
PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADAG.R. No. 110427, February
24, 1997, NARVASA,C.J.A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the
testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has
no effect whatever and no right can be claimedthereunder, the law being quite explicit.
Facts:Carmen Caiza was declared incompetent because of her advanced age, so
her niece,Amparo Evangelista, was appointed her legal guardian. Pursuant to her
authority, Amparocommenced an ejectment suit against Spouses Estrada who were
occupying a house belonging toCarmen. The Spouses argued that they have been
occupying the house in consideration of their faitful service to Carmen, and that, in
fact, Carmen had already executed a will bequeathing to them the disputed property.
When the case reached the CA, it ruled in favor of the Spouses, holding that though
not yet probated, the will was indicative of intent and desire on Carmens part that the
Spouses were to remain and continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so
that Carmens supervening incompetency cannot be said to have vested in
Amparo, her guardian, the right/authority to drive them out.
Issue: Whether or not the holographic will, though not yet probated, vested title to the
Spouses Estrada.
Ruling: No. Under law, no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. An owner's intention to
confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not
inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason
deemed sufficient. In this case, that there was sufficient cause for the owner's
resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house
on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.

Neri vs Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy GR No 194366 10 October 2012

Facts: This case is a petition for review on certiorari by petitioners: Napoleon, Alicia,
Visminda, Rosa, Douglas, Eutropia, and Victoria seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision of the CA which annulled the Decision of the RTC of Davao del Norte, and
entered a new one dismissing Ps complaint for annulment of sale and damages
against herein respondent.

During the lifetime of Ps mother, Anunciacion, she and her 2 nd husband, Enrique,
acquired several homestead properties. When Anunciacion died, however, Enrique in
his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas,
together with, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement
of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale (1979) adjudicating among themselves the
said homestead properties, and thereafter, sold the properties to the late spouses Uy
for a consideration of 80,000.

On 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of the said sale
against spouses Uy, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the
prohibited period. And, also, for having been executed without the consent or approval
of Eutropia, Victoria, Rosa and Douglas; thus, depriving the latter siblings of their
legitime.

Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5 year prohibitory period from the
issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied that Eutropia and Victoria were
excluded from the Extra-judicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and
interposed further the defense of prescription and laches.

RTC rendered a Decision annulling the Extra-judicial settlement of estate with

Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that the sale is void because Eutropia and Victoria
were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to
sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.

On appeal, however, CA reserved and set aside RTC decision. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether Enrique, as guardian of his children and co-owner (with his children),
sell their co-owned property?
Decision: No, as to the shares of the minor children because as a natural guardian,
he is merely clothed with powers of administration.
Doctrine: Parents should apply for judicial guardianship in order for them to sell
properties of their children.
*Even the parents of their minor children are bound to post bond.*

With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the
settlement and sale, their NATURAL GUARDIAN and father, Enrique, represented
them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time,
Enrique was merely clothed with POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION and bereft of any
authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.

Power of dominion, is granted by law only to a JUDICIAL GUARDIAN of the wards

property and even then only with courts prior approval secured in accordance with the
proceedings set forth by the Rules.

Exception: RATIFICATION
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children
without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of
majority, is unenforceable in accordance with Art. 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code.

Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate with absolute deed of sale. The same, however, is not true with respect to
Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.

THEREFORE, the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and not binding on
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas. Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs
became pro indiviso co-owners of the homestead properties with Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas, who retained title to their respective shares.

Oropesa vs Oropesa GR No 184528 25 April 2012

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision rendered
by the CA affirming the Order of the RTC in a Special Proceedings which dismissed
Nilo Oropesas, peitioner, petition for guardianship over the properties of his father,
respondent, Cirilo Oropesa. Petitioner filed with the RTC of Paraaque City, a petition
for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property
of his father, respondent, Cirilo Oropesa. In said petition, petitioner alleged that
respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over 10
years already having suffered a stroke, that his judgment and memory were impaired
and such has been evident after his hospitalization. That due to his age and medical
condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become
easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly his girlfriend,
Ms. Luisa Agamata.
Respondent filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship filed by his (ever caring
and loving) son.

During trial, petitioner presented his evidence which consists of his, his sister, and
respondents former nurses testimony.

After presenting evidence, petitioner rested his case but failed to file his written formal
offer of evidence. Respondent, thereafter, filed his Omnibus Motion to declare that
petitioner has waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and Evidence since they
were not formally offered; To expunge the documents of the petitioner from records;
and to grant leave to the Oppositor to file Demurrer to Evid. A subsequent Demurrer
was filed and was granted.

MR was filed by petitioner and appealed the case to CA; failed, now to the SC.

Issue: Whether respondent is considered incompetent as per the Rules who should
be placed under guardianship?

Decision: No.The only medical document on record is the Report of

Neuropsychological Screening. Said report, was ambivalent at best, although had
negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained
finding that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent.

Castro vs Gregorio GR No 188801 15 October 2014

Facts: This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which
denied the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before
the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted Rs
decree of adoption. Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner).
Unfortunately, they separated later on due to their incompatibilities and Joses alleged
homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who
succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease, and
Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner). On August 2000, A petition for
adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina)
was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina were his
illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosarios housekeeper). After a Home
Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was
granted. A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She
alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the
past 36 year; that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne
while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even
went to the extent of adopting Larrys two children, Jed and Regina, without her and
Joanne knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that he had remiss
his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always offered help but it was often
declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children thats why
he adopted them. Later on Atty. Castro died.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the
decision of the TC approving Jed and Reginas adoption.

Petitioner allege that Rosarios consent was not obtained and the document purporting
as Rosarios affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Reginas
birth certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while
another set of NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry. P further alleged that
Jed and Regina are not actually Joses illegitimate children but the legitimate children
of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. CA denied the petition.

CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the
adoption, it ruled that there is no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and
legitimate child of the adopter. . . should be personally notified of the hearing.

CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of
birth certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated
therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment.
The alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an
action for annulment of judgment.

Issues:
1. Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case?
2. Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the
adopter is required?

Decision:
1. The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as the trial court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained
through extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other
interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the
fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony
during the trial.

Joses actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity
to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial
court would have hesitated to grant Joses petition since he failed to fulfill the
necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that
because of Joses acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent
circumstances.

2. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock
obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate
children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)

As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however,
provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse
seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint
adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the
consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to
adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since
her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopters children if they are 10 years
old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners consent was required by Republic Act No.
8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all
legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough
to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
HERBERT CANG VS CA

FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's
extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a
divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole custody of the 3
minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor
children. Herbert contest the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the
court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the
written consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent
of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed
to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of
a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.

RULING:

Yes.
Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written
consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by
the child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly
intemperate or has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for
the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that
the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports
"any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform
the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."

In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute
abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is
not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was not
remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children.
The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular
communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and send
them packages catered to their whims.

Vda. De Jacob vs CA GR No 135216 19 August 1999

Facts: Plaintiff-Appellant Tomasa Vda. De Jacob (P) claimed to be the surviving

spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for
the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract
between herself and the deceased. Defendant-Appellee (Pedro Pilapil)(D) on the other
hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he
presented an Order issued by then Judge Jose Moya, CFI Cam Sur, granting the
petition for adoption filed by the deceased Alfredo in favor of Defendant. During the
settlement of estate proceeding of the deceased of Alfredo Jacob initiated by
Petitioner, Defendant sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceaseds
estate as Alfredos adopted son and his sole surviving heir. Defendant questioned the
validity of the marriage between Petitioner and Alfredo. Petitioner on the other hand,
opposed the Motion for Intervention of Defendant. She questioned the claim of
Defendant as Alfredos legal heir.

1st Issue: To prove Petitioners marriage: She presented a reconstructed marriage

contract as she could not present the original copy was lost when Msgr. Yllana,
solemnizing officer, gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration.

During Trial:

Court a quo observed: No copy of their marriage contract was sent to the local civil
registrar; Irregularity exist in the signature of Alfredo Jacob on the alleged marriage
contract; Msgr. Yllana never mentioned in his affidavit that he gave the marriage
contract to Mr. Jose Centenera.

2nd Issue: To prove his adoption: D presented an Order allegedly issued by Judge
Jose Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared
that D as the legally adopted son of Alfredo.

Court a quo observed: P questioned the validity of Judge Moyas signature. Both
parties presented handwriting experts to test the authenticity and genuineness of said
Judge Moyas signature.
RTC ruled that the signature of Judge Moya is authentic and genuine and declared
the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. CA affirmed the
Decision of the Trial Court.

Issues:
1. Whether the marriage between P and Alfredo was valid?
2. Whether D is the legally adopted son of Alfredo.

Decision:

1. Due execution and the fact of loss was proven by sufficient evidence. Therefore,
the secondary evidence testimonial and documentary is admissible.
Due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present
during the marriage ceremony, and of the petitioner herself as a party to the event.
The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the solemnizing
officer, Msgr. Yllana, as well as by Ps own declaration in court. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Even if the Court will sustain TC to disregard the
reconstructed marriage contract, it must be emphasize that this certificate is not the
only proof of the union between P and Alfredo. (Testimonies of P and the solemnizing
officer can prove the fact of marriage)

2. No, he is not. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person
claiming such relationship. D failed to do so. Moreover, the evidence presented by
P shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.

PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY DOES NOT APPLY

As a rule, factual findings of the Trial Court are accorded great weight and respect by
the appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or falsity of a testimony.

Above rule does not apply in the instant case because it was Judge Augusto Cledera,
not the ponente (Judge Moya), who heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses.

AUTHENTICITY OF JUDGE MOYAS SIGNATURE

During the deposition of Judge Moya, he said that he do not remember issuing the
Order of adoption. Also, the signature therein, he categorically declared that it was not
his signature. Although he was suffering from glaucoma, Judge Moya could with
medication still read the newspapers; he even read the document shown to him by the
defense counsel.

Such declaration was supported by the testimony of handwriting expert Bienvenido

Albacea. Albacea found that the questioned and the standard signature Jose L. Moya
were not written by one and the same person.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The alleged Order was purportedly made in open Court. In his Deposition,
however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases.
He only do so on criminal cases in which the accused pleaded guilty.
Judge Moya insisted that the branch where was assigned was always indicated in
his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information.
Pilapils conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption,
as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed
thereafter.
No proof was presented that Alfredo Jacob had treated him as an adopted child.
Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of The
Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Cam sur, issued Certifications that there was no
record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob.

Republic vs. CA and Castro

GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994
FACTS:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found
out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said
cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave
birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter
wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition
seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that
there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven
by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by
Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior
to the solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar
unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did
not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the
testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny
her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore,
Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license.

Reyes vs Mauricio GR No 175080 24 November 2010

Facts: This case stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos,
Bulacan by Respondents (Librada Mauricio, and her alleged daughter Leonida) for
annulment of contract between Librada and Eugenio parties.Eugenio Reyes was the
registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan. Subject land
herein.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio, who
was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest
to the subject land; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means,
Eugenio caused the preparation of a document to eject Respondents from the subject
property, and had the same notarized in Pasig; that Librada never appeared before
the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the said contract
(Kasunduan) were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantages
of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada
in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of consent.

Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, DARAB ruled in favor of

Respondents. On appeal with the CA, Petitioner assailed the status of Leonida as a
legal heir and her capacity to substitute Librada who died during the pendency of the
case. Petitioner averred that Leonida is merely a ward of Librada.

Issue: Whether Leonidas filiation may be attacked collaterally?

Decision: No. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.

Citing Dr. Tolentinos book, Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence, Dr. Tolentino explained thus:

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral

issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action
directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code
(article 335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband
or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest
made in any other way is void. This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles
170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to the action to impugn
the legitimacy. This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within
the periods fixed in the present articles.

THE SAME RULE IS APPLIED TO ADOPTION

It also cannot be made subject to collateral attack.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia,
her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir,
and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy
Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should
be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and
hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her
mother.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name.

RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to
what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue
of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother.

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim

GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were
unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children
making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She
then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided
to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals
who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already
married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband
including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an
affidavit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
HELD:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not
present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised
parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband
and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is
but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario
will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an
American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The
requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical
character and well-being.

A.C. No. 10196 September 9, 2014

MELODY R. NERY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA,
Respondent.

FACTS:

Nery alleged that in June 2008, she engaged the services of Sampana for the
annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition
for annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid P200,000.00 to Sampana. As
for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they could represent
as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage
contract, which they would use for her adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana
P100,000.00, in installment: (a) P10,000.00 on 10 September 2008; (b) P50,000.00
on 2 October 2008; and (c) P40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer
asked for receipts since she trusted Sampana. Sampana admitted that he received
"one package fee" for both cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving
this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short of his
duty of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampanas proffered excuse of waiting
for the certification before filing the petition for adoption is disingenuous and
flimsy. Inhis position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter
would be married to her close relative, the intended adoption could be possible. Under
the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter
can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of
his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the aliens qualification to adopt is
waived. Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana
misinformed Nery of the status of the petition. He then conceded that the
annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected
the legal matter entrusted tohim. He even kept the money given him.

Commissioner Antiquiera found Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery

believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for failing to file the
petition despite receiving his legal fees. Thus, Commissioner Antiquiera
recommended a penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE:

Should respondent be held administratively liable for violating the Code of

Professional Responsibility?

RULING:

Yes. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client

relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. Every
case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence,
regardless of importance. A lawyer also owes it to the court, their clients, and other
lawyers to be candid and fair. Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly
states:

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings
and transactions with his client.

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client
thatmay come into his possession.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. x x x.

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Respondent even kept the
money given him, in violation of the Codes mandate to deliver the clients funds upon
demand. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to
the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal profession.

Castro vs Gregorio GR No 188801 15 October 2014

Facts: This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which
denied the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before
the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted Rs
decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they
separated later on due to their incompatibilities and Joses alleged homosexual
tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death
after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta
Charissima Castro (Petitioner).

On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana
Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro
alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio
(Rosarios housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare
Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.
A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that
Jose had been remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year;
that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose
had been showering gifts to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even went to the
extent of adopting Larrys two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne
knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that he had remiss his
fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always offered help but it was often
declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children thats why
he adopted them. Later on Atty. Castro died.

Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the
decision of the TC approving Jed and Reginas adoption.

Petitioner allege that Rosarios consent was not obtained and the document purporting
as Rosarios affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Reginas
birth certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while
another set of NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry. P further alleged that
Jed and Regina are not actually Joses illegitimate children but the legitimate children
of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. CA denied the petition.

CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the
adoption, it ruled that there is no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and
legitimate child of the adopter. . . should be personally notified of the hearing.

CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of
birth certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated
therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment.
The alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an
action for annulment of judgment.

Issues:
1. Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case?
2. Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the
adopter is required?
Decision:
1. The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as the trial court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained
through extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other
interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the
fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony
during the trial.

Joses actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity
to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial
court would have hesitated to grant Joses petition since he failed to fulfill the
necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that
because of Joses acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent
circumstances.

2. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock
obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate
children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)

As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however,
provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse
seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint
adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the
consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to
adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since
her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopters children if they are 10 years
old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners consent was required by Republic Act No.
8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all
legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough
to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
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Bartolome vs Social Security System
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014

Facts: John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by
Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February
2008. As such, he was enrolled under the governments Employees Compensation
Program (ECP). Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the
vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the following
day. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining
beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security
System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in
a letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim on the ground
that due to the Adoption of John by Cornelio Colcol, petitioner Bartolome is no longer
entitled to be the beneficiary as the parent of John.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the pension of the deceased biological
child despite adoption.

Held: Yes. When Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old,
petitioners parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked,
one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelios death, was that when the
adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still
a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor in the case at
bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted
in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling
that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by
virtue of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter
passed away?

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological
parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552),
otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted,
the parental authority of the adoptees biological parent(s), if known, or the legal
custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee
to each other shall be extinguished.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries
for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Law. While
RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly
allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member
unlike in PD 626, Johns deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at
least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently,
the confluence of circumstances from Cornelios death during Johns minority, the
restoration of petitioners parental authority, the documents showing singularity of
address, and Johns clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary effectively
made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary
beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.