STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
CONSTRUCTION DEFINED
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the
meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application
to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by
reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
1. CALTEX V. PALOMAR
FACTS:
In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a
promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. The
contest was entitled Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, which calls for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at
each Caltex station will dispense during a specific period.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails for publicizing the contest and also
for the transmission of communications, representations were made by
Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for
mailing. This was formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the Post master
General, in which Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest
rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate
the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law.
Unfortunately, Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltexs
request stating that the contest scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-
lottery Provision and ultimately, declined Clatexs request for clearance.
Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration
involved in part of the contestant, the contest was not commendable as a
lottery. However, the Postmaster General maintained his view that the
contest involves consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration
it still falls as Gift Enterprise, which was equally banned by the Postal
Law.
ISSUE/HELD: W/N the scheme proposed by Caltex is within the coverage of
the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law? ! NO
Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?
Lottery Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance; e.g.
policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as
various forms of gambling.
Three Essential Elements:
1) Consideration
2) Prize
3) Chance
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According to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it
appears to be more of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is
any requirements that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any
services be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate. Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex
Station, request for the entry form which is available on demand and
accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Because of
this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would
brand it as a lottery.
Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property
by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party
receiving the chance, but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which a
valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the
chance to draw a prize.
Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in
the way of increased patronage be considered as a consideration and
thus violates the Postal Law?
No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit
derived by the sponsors of the contest. The true test lies on whether or not
the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance of winning and
not whether or not those conducting the enterprise receiver something of
value for the distribution of the prize.
Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?
Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there appears to
be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term
is common applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for
their market value but by way of inducement to purchase the product, the
purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case at bar
since there is not sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as
an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified
contestant irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellees products.
The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that
every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision. It is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is
consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.
In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision
of the Postal Law, gift enterprise and similar schemes therein contemplated
are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of
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consideration. Finding non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee
may not be denied the use of the mails for the purpose thereof.
2. RCBC V. IAC (1992)
3. RCBC V. IAC (1999)
FACTS:
On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a Petition for Rehabilitation and for
Declaration of Suspension of Payments with the SEC.
RCBC, one of the creditors listed in BF Homes inventory of creditors and
liabilities, on October 26, 1984, requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to
extra-judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage on some properties of BF
Homes. BF Homes opposed the auction sale and the SEC ordered the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioners filing of a bond.
Presumably unaware of the filing of the bond on the very day of the auction
sale, the sheriff proceeded with the public auction sale in which RCBC was
the highest bidder for the properties auctioned. But because of the
proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld the delivery to RCBC of the
certificate of sale covering the auctioned properties.
On March 13, 1985, despite the SEC case, RCBC filed with RTC an action
for mandamus against the provincial sheriff of Rizal to compel him to execute
in its favor a certificate of sale of the auctioned properties.
On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF
Homes.
Consequently, the trial court granted RCBCs motion for judgment on the
pleading ordering respondents to execute and deliver to petitioner the
Certificate of Auction Sale.
On appeal, the SC affirmed CAs decision (setting aside RTCs decision
dismissing the mandamus case and suspending issuance to RCBC of new
land titles until the resolution of the SEC case) ruling that whenever a
distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of
payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference but
stand on equal footing with other creditors. Hence, this Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE: When should the suspension of actions for claims against BF Homes
take effect?
HELD:
1992 SUPREME COURT RULING: By ordering the suspension of
registration of titles, the appellate court clearly intended to have BF Homes
assets/properties remain untouched during the period of rehabilitation so as
not to render the SEC Management Committee irrelevant and inutile and
to give it unhampered "rescue efforts" over the distressed firm.
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While it is recognized that RCBC is a preferred creditor and likewise the
highest bidder at the auction sale, we have however stated that whenever a
distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of
payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference, but as
earlier stated, stand on equal footing with other creditors. Foreclosure shall
be disallowed so as not to prejudice other creditors, or cause discrimination
among them. If foreclosure is undertaken despite the fact that a petition for
rehabilitation has been filed, the certificate of sale shall not be delivered
pending rehabilitation. Likewise, if this has also been done, no transfer of title
shall be effected also, within the period of rehabilitation. The rationale
behind PD 902-A, as amended, is to effect a feasible and viable
rehabilitation. This cannot be achieved if one creditor is preferred over the
others.
In this connection, the prohibition against foreclosure attaches as soon
as a petition for rehabilitation is filed. Were it otherwise, what is to prevent
the petitioner from delaying the creation of the Management Committee and
in the meantime dissipate all its assets. The sooner the SEC takes over and
imposes a freeze on all the assets, the better for all concerned
1999 SUPREME COURT RULING: The issue of whether or not preferred
creditors of distressed corporations stand on equal footing with all other
creditors gains relevance and materiality only upon the appointment of a
management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body.
Upon cursory reading of Section 6, par (c) of PD 902-A, it is adequately
clear that suspension of claims against a corporation under rehabilitation is
counted or figured up only upon the appointment of a management
committee or a rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application or a
petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC may to some, be more logical
and wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the
law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical and noble would be to
encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law ---
plainly judicial legislation.
Once a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body is
appointed pursuant to PD 902-A, all actions for claims against a distressed
corporation pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be
suspended accordingly; Suspension shall not prejudice or render ineffective
the status of a secured creditor as compared to a totally unsecured creditor.
What it merely provides is that all actions for claims against the corporation,
partnership or association shall be suspended. This should give the receiver
a chance to rehabilitate the corporation if there should still be a possibility for
doing so. In the event that rehabilitation is no longer feasible and claims
against the distressed corporation would eventually have to be settled, the
secured creditors shall enjoy preference over the unsecured creditors subject
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only to the provisions of the Civil Code on Concurrence and Preferences of
Credit.
4. CHINA BANKING CORP. V. ORTEGA
FACTS:
On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against Bautista
Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino
Bautista for the collection of a sum of money. The trial court declared the
defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period,
and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy Clerk to receive the
plaintiff's evidence. On January 20, 1970 judgment by default was rendered
against the defendants.
To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank
deposit of the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation with the
China Banking Corporation. A notice of garnishment was issued by the
Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its cashier,
Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank's cashier invited the attention of the Deputy
Sheriff to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was alleged,
prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. Plaintiff
filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of court.
The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion. However, Tan Kim Liong was
ordered "to inform the Court within five days from receipt of this order
whether or not there is a deposit in the China Banking Corporation of
defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any
deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further
order from this Court." Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned
down. He was directed "to comply with the order of this Court dated March 4,
1972 within ten (10) days from the receipt of copy of this order, otherwise his
arrest and confinement will be ordered by the Court." Resisting the two
orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong instituted the
instant petition.
ISSUE/HELD: W/N petitioner may validly refuse to comply with a court
process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 ! NO
Sec. 2, RA No. 1405: All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines ..... are hereby considered as of absolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into
EXCEPT UPON:
1. Written permission of the depositor
2. Cases of impeachment
3. Cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials
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4. Cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation.
Petitioners: the disclosure of the information required by the court does not
fall within any of the four exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the
questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable
and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by the depositor.
Specifically referring to this case, the position of the petitioners is that the
bank deposit of judgment debtor cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy
a final judgment against it in view of Section 2 of RA No. 1405.
Court: The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the
deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the
law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the
defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China
Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so
that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until
further order.
In the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill
No. 3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, it is sufficiently clear from
the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or
inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its
being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real
inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the
disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive
that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade
payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the
expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a
bank.
5. CHAVEZ V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was
added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the
JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with
each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from
the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present
[2013], Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C.
Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents
argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of
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Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House
of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of
Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its
substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as
the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their
respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to
legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of
a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each
from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
ISSUE/HELD: Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its
functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of
Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution !
YES
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It
is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and
unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution that in the phrase, a representative of Congress, the use
of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of
what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is,
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been
the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would
sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or
phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings,
its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every
meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the
context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is
always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may
be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this
case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member
composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in voting.
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It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its
primary function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the
process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-
play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This,
however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the
term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
only.
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of
Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC,
any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of
Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an
absurdity.
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception of the Doctrine of
Operative Fact applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its
finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid.
The Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to
guard the Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in
confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial
activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance. In cases
like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court
to perform either an excision or an insertion that will change the manifest
intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional
representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter
which was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional
mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional provisions in order to
accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the
proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court
declines.
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6. MATABUENA V. CERVANTES
FACTS:
In 1956, Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse,
Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years
after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September
13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter,appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of
being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a
claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the
estate and inheritance taxes thereon. This is inpursuant to Article 133 of
Civil Code which provides "Every donation between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the
donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and
Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code
inapplicable.
ISSUE/HELD: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during
a marriage applies to a common-law relationship ! YES
It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the
law is as much a part of it as what is written. If there is ever any occasion
where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of
the law is as much a part of it as what is written, then such would be it.
Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be
attained.
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the
spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent
character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. As stated in
Buenaventura v. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because
of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then
there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.The lack of
validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily
result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a
widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving
sister to the other half. Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters
or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled
to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to
the other half.
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7. DE CASTRO V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10,
2010. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President
from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for
the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of
the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice
Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had
the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on
the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure
its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political
pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President
shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC
properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the
oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the
JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the
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President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUES/HELD: W/N the incumbent President can appoint the successor of
Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement ! YES
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to
fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department):
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department):
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three,
five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done
only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does
not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character,
in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section
14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the
Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that
every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to
assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14
and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely
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inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof
8. LOKIN, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was an organized party-
list for the 2007 elections. Through its President, Emmanuel
Villanueva, they submitted a list of 5 nominees for the elections: (in
order) Villanueva, Lokin Jr, Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna, Galang, and
such was published in PDI and PhilStar.
Prior to the elections, CIBAC filed for a motion for substitution
replacing the original line-up with the following: (in order)
Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales, Borje.
CIBAC, through its counsel, filed a motion seeking the proclamation
of Lokin as its second nominee, which was opposed by Villanueva
and Cruz-Gonzales.
CIBAC won in the May 2007 elections with an additional seat.
On September 2007, COMELEC en banc approved the withdrawal of
Loki, Tugna and Galang and substitution of Cruz-Gonzales as
second nominee, and Borje as third nominee. As a result, they
proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
Lokin filed petition for mandamus to compel COMELEC to proclaim
him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. He assails Sec 13 of
Resolution No. 7804 which approves CIBACs withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang based on the right of
CIBAC to change its nominees.
ISSUE AND HELD: W/N Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is
unconstitutional and violates R.A. No. 7491 (Party-List System Act) YES.
Sec. 8 of R.A No. 7941 does not allow party-list organizations to
change their nominees or to alter the order of their nominees once
the list is submitted to the COMELEC. Exceptions: a) Nominee dies,
b) nominee withdraws in writing his nomination, c) nominee becomes
incapacitated. These exceptions in Sec. 8 are exclusive, and what
Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 7804 did was expand the said law by
adding an additional exception, which is: when the nomination is
withdrawn by the party. The Court ruled that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it expanded the statutory grounds for
substituting a nominee.
The COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section
8 of R.A. No. 7491 because it established an entirely new ground not
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found in the text of the provision. The new ground granted to the
party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination
already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No.
7491 did not allow to be done.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the
Government in the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the
authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the
law it seeks to implement thereby.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
IRRs should always accord with the law to be implemented, and
should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the
IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.
Administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the
Government under legislative authority must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying
the laws general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be
expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress.
An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law. In case of conflict
between the law and the IRR, the law prevails. An IRR or any of its
parts not adopted pursuant to the law is no law at all and has neither
the force nor the effect of law. The invalid rule, regulation or part
thereof cannot be a valid source of any right, obligation or power.
Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any
doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against
the exception.
9. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK V. CALLANGAN
FACTS:
Respondent Justina F. Callangan, the Director of the Corporation
Finance Department of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), sent Philippine Veterans Bank (the Bank) a letter, informing it
that it qualifies as a "public company" under Section 17.2 of the
Securities Regulation Code (SRC) in relation with Rule 3(1) (m) of
the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the SRC. The
Bank is thus required to comply with the reportorial requirements set
forth in Section17.1 of the SRC.
The Bank responded by explaining that it should not be considered a
"public company" because it is a private company whose shares of
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stock are available only to a limited class or sector, i.e., to World War
II veterans, and not to the general public.
Director Callangan rejected the Banks explanation and assessed it a
penalty for failing to comply with the SRC reportorial requirements
from 2001 to 2003.
The Bank moved for the reconsideration of the assessment, but
Director Callangan denied the motion.
The Bank then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
(CA) but the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed
SEC ruling. The CA also denied the Banks motion for
reconsideration, opening the way for the Banks petition for review on
certiorari filed with the Supreme Court but the Supreme Court denied
the Banks petition for failure to show any reversible error in the
assailed CA decision and resolution.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by the Bank before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE AND HELD: W/N Philippine Veterans Bank is considered a Public
Company under the Securities Regulation Code (SRC). YES.
Under the Rule 3(1)(m) of the Amended Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the SRC, which defines a "public company" as "any
corporation with a class of equity securities listed on an Exchange or
with assets in excess of Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) and
having two hundred (200) or more holders, at least two hundred
(200) of which are holding at least one hundred (100) shares of a
class of its equity securities."
From these provisions, it is clear that a "public company," as
contemplated by the SRC, is not limited to a company whose shares
of stock are publicly listed; even companies like the Bank, whose
shares are offered only to a specific group of people, are considered
a public company, provided they meet the requirements enumerated
above.
The records establish, and the Bank does not dispute, that the Bank
has assets exceeding P50,000,000.00 and has 395,998
shareholders. It is thus considered a public company that must
comply with the reportorial requirements set forth in Section 17.1 of
the SRC.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law.
Construction and interpretation come only after a demonstration that
the application of the law is impossible or inadequate unless
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
interpretation is resorted to. In this case, the law is very clear and
free from any doubt or ambiguity; thus, no room exists for
construction or interpretation.
10. PARAS V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Danilo Paras is the incumbent barangay captain
of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay
election in 1994. A petition for his recall was filed by the registered
voters of the barangay. A recall election was set, against which
petitioner filed a petition.
Petitioner cites Section 74 (b) of the Local Government Code, which
states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the
date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election. Petitioner insists that the
scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No.
7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years
thereafter.
Petitioner maintains that the SK election is a regular local election,
hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate
the SK election from the recall election.
ISSUE AND HELD: W/N the Sangguniang Kabataan election is a regular
local election. NO.
The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official
to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b)
construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period
when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election,
that is, during the second year of his term of office.
Subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local
election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel
provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of
removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of
his term.
If the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three
years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the
phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner,
then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall
provision of the Local Government Code.
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a
statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained
away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or
nugatory.
It is also a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute
should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction;
hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit
and intent.
11. CAGAYAN VALLEY ENT, INC. VS. CA
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
Ejusdem generis - Latin for "of the same kind," used to interpret
loosely written statutes. Where a law lists specific classes of persons
or things and then refers to them in general, the general statements
only apply to the same kind of persons or things specifically listed.
Example: if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles
and other motor-powered vehicles, "vehicles" would not include
airplanes, since the list was of land-based transportation.
The rule of ejusdem generis cannot be applied in this case. To limit
the coverage of the law only to those enumerated or of the same
kind or class as those specifically mentioned will defeat the very
purpose of the law. Such rule of ejusdem generis is to be resorted to
only for the purpose of determining what the intent of the legislature
was in enacting the law. If that intent clearly appears from other parts
of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the
result which would be reached by the appreciation of the rule of
ejusdem generis, the latter must give way.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
12. DEL MAR V. PAGCOR
FACTS:
PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as
to whether or not it is authorized by its Charter to operate and
manage jai-alai frontons (courts) in the country.
The Secretary of Justice opined that the authority of PAGCOR to
operate and maintain games of chance or gambling extends to jai-
alai which is a form of sport or game played for bets, and that the
Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a legislative franchise for the
purpose.
Petitioner Raoul B. Del Mar initially filed a Petition for Prohibition to
prevent PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or
Basque pelota games, by itself of in agreement with Belle
Corporation, on the ground that the controverted act is patently
illegal and devoid of any basis either from the Constitution or
PAGCORs own Charter.
PAGCOR later entered into an agreement with Belle Jai Alai
Corporation, wherein Belle will make available to PAGCOR the
required facilities, as well as provide the needed funding for jai-alai
operations with no financial outlay from PAGCOR, while PAGCOR
handles the actual management and operation of jai-alai.
Petitioner Del Mar filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari
questioning the validity of the agreement on the ground that
PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, legislative franchise, authority or
power to enter into such Agreement for the opening, establishment,
operation, control and management of jai-alai games.
Petitioners Federico S. Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor filed a
Petition for Injunction to enjoin PAGCOR from operating or managing
said jai-alai games.
In this case, a Petition in Intervention was filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri
alleging that the operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it
is not included in the scope of PAGCORs franchise which covers
only games of chance.
ISSUE AND HELD:
W/N PAGCOR has the authorization to manage or otherwise operate jai-alai
games. NO.
A historical study of the creation, growth and development of
PAGCOR will show that it was never given a legislative franchise to
operate jai-alai.
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Section 1 of PD 1067-B provides the nature and term of PAGCORs
franchise to maintain gambling casinos (not a franchise to operate
jai-alai);
Section 2 of the same decree spells out of the scope of the PAGCOR
franchise to maintain gambling casinos (not a franchise to operate
jai-alai);
PD 1399, amending PD 1067-A and PD 1067-B did not have any
amendments that changed the nature and scope of the PAGCOR
franchise to maintain gambling casinos.
EO No. 169, issued by President Corazon Aquino, revoked the
franchise of the Philippines Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation
controlled by the Romualdezes to operate jai-alai in Manila.
PAGCORs franchise to operate gambling casinos was not revoked;
but neither was it given a franchise to operate jai-alai.
It is abundantly clear from the aforequoted laws, executive orders
and decrees that the legislative practice is that a franchise to operate
jai-alai is granted solely for that purpose and the terms and
conditions of the grant are unequivocably defined by the grantor.
Such express grant and its conditionalities protective of the public
interest are evidently wanting in PD 1869, the present Charter of
PAGCOR.
In fine, PD 1869 does not have the standard marks of a law granting
a franchise to operate jai-alai as those found under PD 810 or EO
135. PD 1869 deals with details pertinent alone to the operation of
gambling casinos. PD 1869 does not have the usual provisions with
regards to jai-alai. The logical inference is that PAGCOR was not
given a franchise to operate jai-alai frontons.
Legislative franchise to operate jai-alai is imbued with public interest
and involves an exercise of police power. The familiar rule is that
laws which grant the right to exercise a part of the police power of
the state are to be construed strictly and any doubt must be resolved
against the grant.
A statute which legalizes a gambling activity or business should be
strictly construed and every reasonable doubt must be resolved to
limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
Acts of incorporation, and statutes granting other franchises or
special benefits or privileges to corporations, are to be construed
strictly against the corporations; and whatever is not given in
unequivocal terms is understood to be withheld.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
The fact that the statute admits of different interpretations is the best
evidence that the statute is vague and ambiguous. It is widely
acknowledged that a statute is ambiguous when it is capable of
being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of
two or more senses.
The term jai-ail was never used and is nowhere found in the law.
The conclusion that it is included in the franchise granted to
PAGCOR cannot be based on a mere cursory perusal of and a blind
reliance on the ordinary and plain meaning of the statutory terms
used such as gaming pools and lotteries.
13. BASBACIO V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Felicito Basbacio (petitioner) was convicted with his son-in-law, Balderama,
of murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon, the victim, and wounding
his wife and son. Petitioner had a land dispute with the victim and was at the
scene of the crime when his son-in-law started shooting the victim. On this
basis, the prosecution found probable guilt to charge petitioner with
conspiracy to commit the murder. However, on appeal, petitioner was
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy. Petitioner then
filed a claim before the Board of Claims on the ground that he was unjustly
accused in accordance with Section 3 of RA 7309, which provides:
Section 3. Who may File Claims. The following may file claims for
compensation before the Board:
(a) any person who was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned
but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal;
(b) any person who was unjustly detained and released without
being charged;
(c) any victim of arbitrary or illegal detention by the authorities as
defined in the Revised Penal Code under a final judgment of the
court; and
(d) any person who is a victim of violent crimes. For purposes of this
Act, violent crimes shall include rape and shall likewise refer to
offenses committed with malice which resulted in death or serious
physical and/or psychological injuries, permanent incapacity or
disability, insanity, abortion, serious trauma, or committed with
torture, cruelly or barbarity.
Issue:
W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309
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Held:
NO, he is not.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an
accused is acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the
theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of
sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that
when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural
meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word
"unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The following may file
claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
acquittal."
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and]
imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is
acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An
accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the
trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. The accused must
have been unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly
convicted and then imprisoned if the prosecution is not malicious any
conviction even though based on less than the required quantum of proof in
criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4 [Rules of Court], the question for
the prosecutor in filing a case in court is not whether the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt but only whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof. Hence, an accusation which is based on probable guilt is not an
unjust accusation and a conviction based on such degree of proof is not
necessarily an unjust judgment but only an erroneous one
In the case at bar, Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was
unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was guilty. Thus, he
does not fall under RA 7309.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
14. URSUA V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Mr. Cesario Ursua filed a petition for a review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed his conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City for violating Sec.1 C.A. 142 as amended by R.A. 6085 otherwise known
as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases.
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty. To be able
to get a copy of the complaint against him, Ursua was asked by Atty.
Palmones to take his letter-request to the office of the Ombudsman because
his Law firm messenger Oscar Perez has to attend to some personal
matters. Ursua was advised by Oscar Perez that if acknowledgement receipt
is required he can use his name to sign the said receipt.
Upon entry to the Office of the Ombudsman at Davao city, he wrote Oscar
Perez at the visitors logbook, then went to the Administrative Division where
he gave the letter-request of Atty. Palmones to Chief of the Administrative
Division, Ms. Loida who gave him the copy of the complaint, receipt of which
he acknowledge by writing the name Oscar Perez.
Before leaving the premises, Ursua was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa
Amparo, who also worked for the same office. When Ursua left, Ms. Loida
found out that the person who introduced himself as Oscar Perez was
Cesario Ursua. She then reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman.
The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec.1 C.A.142 as amened by R.A.
6085. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
He now files a petition to review his conviction as he reasserts his innocence.
That he did not violated the Sec.1 CA 142 as amended as R.A. 6085. That
he has never used nay alias name; neither Oscar Perez is his alias.
According to him an Alias is a term that uses another name habitually by
which the person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as
Oscar Perez and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was
with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. He further argues that the
Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was
charged under the wrong law.
Issue:
Whether or not Cesario Urusas conviction for violating Sec.1 CA 142 as
amended by R.A. 6085 otherwise known as An Act of Regulating the Use of
Aliases is proper
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Held:
No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict
application of C.A. No. 142, as amended, in this case only leads to absurdity
something which could not have been intended by the lawmakers.
Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not
allowed to use a name or an alias other than his registered name or that
which he was baptized. Under the law, what makes the use of alias illegal is
the fact that it is being used habitually and publicly in business transactions
without prior authorization by competent authority. In this case, Ursua merely
used the name Oscar Perez once, it was not used in a business
transaction, the use of the name was with the consent of Oscar Perez
himself, and even if he used a different name, in this instance, he was
not even required to disclose his identity at the Office of the Ombudsman.
When he was requesting a copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his
identity because the complaint is a public record open to the public.
In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought
about when Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict application of
the law is not warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no
fraud was committed; there was no crime committed punishable under
C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is to punish evils defined therein so
when no such evil was produced by Ursuas act, said law need not be
applied.
15. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL V. COMELEC
Facts:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President
Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime
of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada
explicitly states that He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of President but was opposed by three petitions
seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases prospered and MRs were
denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second
highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the
[10]
political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a
local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former
President Estrada before the COMELEC because of Estradas Conviction for
Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied
on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division,
dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estradas
right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested
upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-
intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the second highest votes intervene and seek
to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal
and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President
Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the
pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
Held:
NO. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The
arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any
factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were
issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts
to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or were
so patent and gross as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to
seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of
the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous,
and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation
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of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its
accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states
that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights, expressly
remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the
LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is
worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape
from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or
amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or
national position.
16. JMM Promotions and Management Inc. v NLRC
Facts:
Petitioners appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor
Relations Commission on the ground of failure to post the require appeal
bond citing the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as
amended and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
as amended which provides:
Article 223. In a case of a judgment involving monetary award, an
appeal of the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the commission in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
Section 6. Bond In case the decision of a labor arbiter involves a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the commission or Supreme
Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
The petitioner insists that the appeal bond is not necessary for it already paid
a license fee of P30,000.00, a cash bond of P100,000.00 and a surety bond
of P50,000.00 as required under section 4, rule II, book II of the POEA Rules.
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of
P200,000.00 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section
17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, to primarily answer for valid and legal
claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money
claims.
Issue:
W/N the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal
from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
Held:
YES. Petitioners contention has no merit.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition
to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal
from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to
further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if
it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a
set of rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof
be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated
measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res
magis valeat quam pereat that the thing may rather have effect than
be destroyed.
Under the petitioners interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of
the POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and
escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6
as a superfluity but there is no such redundancy. On the contrary, Section 6
complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that
would render a provision inoperative should be avoided. Instead, apparently
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inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, the Court holds that in addition to the monetary obligations of
the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA
Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is
necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book
VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a
decision of the POEA.
17. FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDE AUTHORITY V. MANILA PEST
CONTROL
Facts:
Pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1144, the Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (petitioner) was created as an attached agency of the Department
of Agriculture.
Respondent MAPECON is a franchised and licensed urban pest control
operator, and duly accredited by the National Committee on Urban Pest
Control (NCUPC). MAPECON has been licensed and accredited to engage
in the manufacture, distribution, and application of its patented pest control
products and has operated its urban pest control business since the 1960s.
Upon the request of Pablo Turtal, Jr., Manager of Supreme Pest Control
(SUPESCON), a competitor of MAPECON, Vicente Laohan, the FPA
Dumaguete Office Provincial Coordinator, issued a certificate that
MAPECON-Dumaguete City branch had no license to operate, and that its
pesticide products were not licensed and registered with the FPA. Thus, it
could not engage in pest control operation because of its alleged violation of
the provisions of P.D. No. 1144. Using the certificate issued by Laohan,
Turtal also sent letters to respondents current and prospective clients, urging
them to desist from dealing with respondent MAPECON.
Respondents MAPECON and Catan, the MAPECON Dumaguete City branch
manager, filed a complaint before the RTC of Dumaguete City and sought to
enjoin Laohan and Turtal from disturbing their business operations and from
requiring them to obtain a license from the FPA. Respondents MAPECON
and Catan alleged that they were being eased out of business, and that their
good name and reputation were being destroyed by defendants Laohan and
Turtal and their representatives and other persons working for and in their
behalf.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
RTC ruled in favor of MAPECON. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC,
which ruled that the FPA did not have jurisdiction or regulatory power over
the acts and business operations of MAPECON. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
W/N the acts and business operations of MAPECON are under the
jurisdiction or regulatory power of FPA
Held:
The Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The FPA has jurisdiction only over agricultural pesticides, not over urban
pest control products. Pesticides in P.D. No. 1144 refer only to those used in
farming and other agricultural activities, as distinguished from pesticides
used in households, business establishments, and offices in urban areas.
Significantly, the above-quoted provision of P.D. No. 1144 sets the
parameters of the powers and duties of the FPA. First, the FPA is designated
as an attached agency of the Department of Agriculture. Urban pest control
or pesticide use in households, offices, hotels and other commercial
establishments has nothing to do with agriculture. Second, it spells out the
purposes for which the FPA was created, viz: for the purpose of assuring the
agricultural sector of adequate supplies of fertilizer and pesticide at
reasonable prices, rationalizing the manufacture and marketing of fertilizer,
protecting the public from the risks inherent in the use of pesticides, and
educating the agricultural sector in the use of these inputs. All these
purposes limit the jurisdiction of the FPA to agricultural pesticides.
We go back to the basics of statutory construction. In interpreting the
meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a review of the whole law
must be made, and its intendment must be given effect. The various
provisions of P.D. No. 1144 show its consistent intent to apply the term
pesticides only to agricultural use. Thus, urban pest control operators
and their urban pesticides are excluded from its coverage.
18. LACSON V. ROQUE
Facts:
The then mayor of Manila, Arsenio Lacson, broadcasted some allegedly
defamatory and libelous utterances against a certain judge (Judge Montesa).
Montesa then filed a libel case against Lacson. A special prosecutor was
assigned to the case. The special prosecutor recommended the suspension
of Lacson to the President. The President, through acting Executive
Secretary Mariano Roque, issued a suspension order against Lacson.
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Issue:
Whether or not the Mayor may be suspended by the president from his post
Held:
NO. There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the
President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. It is true
that the President shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local
governments, but supervision does not contemplate control.
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend
municipal officers is not well taken. Removal and suspension of public
officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper
construction subject to constitutional limitations.
The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in
section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be done
conformably to law; and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
he may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority
under the Government of the Philippines. Again, this power of removal must
be exercised conformably to law, in this case, the allege libelous act of
Lacson cannot be considered as disloyalty.
An administrative policy or practice not predicated on constitutional or
statutory authority can have no binding force and effect in matters not purely
political or governmental. Where individual right, honor and reputation are in
jeopardy, it is only law or the Constitution which can give legality to executive
actions. It has been shown that nothing in the Constitution, law, or decision
warrants the petitioners suspension.
19. QUINTOS V. LACSON
Facts:
Jose Quintos was appointed patrolman in the Manila Police Department and
was later promoted to the position of detective to the same police
department. On July 2, 1952, Mayor Arsenio A. Lacson of Manila dismissed
five detectives, including Quintos, supposedly for lack or loss of confidence.
Quintos then filed a complaint against Mayor Lacson and Chief of Police
Dionisio Ojeda in the Court of First Instance of Manila in order to annul this
order of dismissal and to prevent its execution. During the pendency of the
trial for said complaint, the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin the defendants not to carry out the order of dismissal. After hearing,
the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff in accordance with Republic Act 557,
which provides:
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
Republic Act 557: AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SUSPENSION
OR REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE PROVINCIAL
GUARDS,CITY POLICE AND MUNICIPAL POLICE BY THE
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, CITY MAYOR OR MUNICIPAL
MAYOR
SECTION 1 - Members of the provincial guards, city police and
municipal police shall not be removed and, except in cases
of resignation, shall not be discharged except for misconduct or
incompetency, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Philippine Government,
serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation
of law or duty
The court enjoined defendants to reinstate Quintos to his former position and
pay him whatever amount has been withheld from his salary during the
period of his suspension at a rate of P1,560 per annum. Mayor Lacson and
Chief of Police Ojeda appealed from that judgment questioning the validity of
a summary dismissal of a Manila city detective under the provisions of
Executive Order 264 in view of RA 557. The Court ruled that city detectives
are members of the police force and the manner of their dismissal is
governed by the provisions of RA 557. The Court decision also had reference
to Oscar Olegario v. Arsenio Lacson which ruled that: the lower court held
that the dismissal was illegal under RA 557. Pertinent portions of the decision
in that case provide:
It is contended that (1) The position of detectives is confidential in
nature having been declared by EO 264 and that RA 557 did not
repeal EO264 and (2) Olegario was not a civil service eligible, so his
appointment was merely temporary and was not subject to summary
dismissal at the expiration of three months.
Issue:
Whether or not a summary dismissal of Manila city detective under E0 264
and RA 557 is valid
Held:
Invalid. A Manila city detective may only be dismissed in accordance with RA
557; an unjustified summary dismissal is invalid.
Unless a detectives appointment was temporary, he may not be dismissed
except in accordance with RA 557. Previous rulings of the court in cases
such as Uy v. Rodriguez, Palamine, et al. v. Zagado, Mission, et al. v. Del
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Rosario, Abella v.Rodriguez, reinstate the fact that there is no need to review
or revise the previous decision of the court.
Counsel for appellants, conscious of the previous ruling of this court on the
subject suggests, even urges the Court to review such ruling. The Courts see
no reason or occasion for making any change of revision. The Courts are
convinced that our interpretation and application of the laws involved is
correct. If said laws are deemed unwise and detrimental to the
discipline and efficiency of detectives in Manila and other chartered
cities, proper representations and requests may be made to the
Legislature. As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional
provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of
whether or not they are wise or salutary.
20. JUAN D. VICTORIA V. COMELEC
FACTS:
suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay
Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and
functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor.
vice-governor should be occupied by the highest ranking
Sangguniang member
the COMELEC issued a resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying
him as first in the order of ranking with petitioner herein as second
ranking member.
COMELEC based its certification on the number of votes obtained by
the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of registered
voters in the district.
February 15, 1993, Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III of the Department
of Interior and Local Government designated private respondent as
acting Vice-Governor of the province.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC
resolution which was denied on February 22, 1993. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated
January 22, 1993, which certified respondent James Calisin as the highest
ranking member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Albayshould be set aside
2. W/N its Resolution dated February 22, 1993, which denied the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
Petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not
only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number
of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who
actually voted therein. He further argues that a district may have a large
number of registered voters but only a few actually voted, in which case the
winning candidate would register a low percentage of the number of votes
obtained. Conversely, a district may have a smaller number of registered
voters but may have a big voters' turn-out, in which case the winning
candidate would get a higher percentage of the votes. Applying his formula,
petitioner would come out to be the highest ranking Sanggunian member.
Petitioner gives the following illustration:
1. for private respondent.
107,216 (actually voted)
x 28,335 (votes obtained) = 23.40%
129,793 (registered voters)
(Rollo, pp. 24, 25 and 30)
2. for petitioner
121,423 (actually voted)
x 32,918 (votes obtained) = 25.84% voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to
154,665 (registered voters)
The Local Government provides:
Sec. 44.Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor, Vice-
Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-
mayor concerned shall become governor or mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or
vice- mayor, the highest ranking Sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking Sanggunian member,
shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the
case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other Sanggunian members according to their
ranking as defined herein.
xxx xxx xxx
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the
Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered
voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.
(Emphasis ours)
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HELD:
The COMELEC came up with the following ranking of the top three
Sanggunian members:
NAME District Registered Votes Percent Rank
of Elected Voters Obtained Dist'n
Candidates
ALBAY
CALISIN,
JESUS JAMES B. 1st 130,085 28,335 21.78 1st
VICTORIA,
JUAN D. 2nd 155.318 32,918 21.19 2nd
MARCELLANA
JESUS, M. 2nd 155.318 26,030 16.76 3rd
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on
the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate
of the total number of registered
merely apply the
law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature
apart from the
words.
There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in
issuing the Resolution dated January 22, 1993
21. UP V. COA
FACTS:
Petition for Injunction in Special Civil Case No. 45953 filed by Messrs
Camilo V. Pea (Assistant Cashier, PGH) and Domingo Cajipe
(Special Disbursing Officer and Collection Officer, PGH) petitioned
with the Court of First Instance of Manila on 4 January 1961 as they
wereadministratively charged and investigated (with seven others) by
a UP-PGH Investigating Committee for "grave misconduct and
dishonesty" and "infidelity in the custody of public documents."
After 59 hearings, excluding executive sessions, the Committee
submitted its report to the UP authorities which resulted to the Board
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
of Regents adopting a resolution approving the report and fixing the
penalties, which, with respect to respondents herein, was dismissal.
petitioners filed a petition for injunction to restrain the UP President
from dismissing them and to declare as a matter of legal right that
they should not be dismissed from the PGH by the UP President but
by the Civil Service Commissioner
appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals under RA 2260 (Civil
Service Act of 1959) to declare petitioners who are classified civil
service employees as governed by RA 2260 and not by the UP
Charter in so far as removal, dismissal or separation from the
government service are concerned: and to nullify the findings of the
Investigating Committee.
RTC issued an order restraining the petitioner herein from carrying out
the acts complained of
a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the said court.
6 February 1961, Pea and Cajipe filed a supplemental petition for
injunction, impleading the Board of Regents of the UP and the
Director of the PGH as additional respondent.
after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision granting
both the original and supplemental petitions for injunction, and
making permanent the preliminary writ restraining respondents
therein from dismissing petitioners Pea and Cajipe. A motion to
have the decision reconsidered was denied.
petitioner herein appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in its
decision, sustained the trial court's judgment.
A motion for reconsideration was also filed, but the same was denied.
Hence, this instant petition for Review by Certiorari with this Court.
contention of private respondents herein (petitioners below) that,
despite the transfer of the Hospital to the U.P., the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commissioner over them, as civil
service employees, in matters affecting administrative discipline,
suspension, and removal, as provided in the various Civil Service
laws, remained unimpaired and did not pass to the University
authorities
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of respondents by the Board of Regents is final, or
requires further action by the Civil Service Commission.
Republic Act No. 51:
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SECTION 1.In order to meet the exigencies attendant upon the
establishment of the free and independent Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, and for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and
efficiency in its operation, the President of the Philippines is authorized to
effect by executive order from time to time, for a period not exceeding one
year from the date of the approval of this Act, and within the limits of the total
authorized appropriation for the fiscal year nineteen hundred and forty-seven,
such reforms and changes in the different executive departments, bureaus,
offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of the Government, including the
corporations owned or controlled by the Government, as he may deem
necessary, with the power to diminish, add to or abolish those existing and
create new ones; consolidate related undertakings; transfer functions,
appropriations, equipment, property, records, and personnel from one
department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality to another; eliminate
duplicated services or authorize new ones not provided for; classify,
combine, split or abolish positions; standardize salaries; and do whatever is
necessary and desirable to effect economy and promote efficiency in the
government service.
Executive Order No. 94, series of
1947, section 158, prescribed as follows:
The PGH is hereby transferred from the Office of the President to the
University of the Philippines, together with its personnel, powers, functions,
duties, records, equipment, supplies and unexpended balance of
appropriations. The appropriations for the Philippine General Hospital shall
continue to be itemized in the annual general appropriations act.
Section 695 of the Revised Administrative Code
SEC. 695.Administrative discipline of subordinate officers and employees.
The Commissioner of Civil Service shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the
removal, separation and suspension of subordinate officers and employees
in the Civil Service and over all other matters relating to the conduct,
discipline, and efficiency of such subordinate officers and employees, and
shall have exclusive charge of all formal administrative investigations against
them. He may, for neglect of duty or violation of reasonable office
regulations, or in the interest of the public service, remove any subordinate
officer or employee from the service, suspend him without pay for not more
than two months, reduce his salary or compensation, or deduct therefrom
any sum not exceeding one month's pay. From any decision of the
Commissioner of Civil Service on administrative investigations, an appeal
may be taken by the officer or employee concerned to the Civil Service
Board of Appeals within thirty days after receipt by him of the decision.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
Section 16 of the Civil Service Law of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260)
(i)Except as otherwise provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon
the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and
employees in the competitive or classified service and upon all matters
relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and
employees; and to prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing
the administration of discipline; (Emphasis supplied)
HELD: The employees' contention, that the Civil Service Commissioner's
statutory jurisdiction excludes that of the UP authorities, would be cogent and
tenable were it not for the fact that the Legislature itself has established
specific exceptions to the exclusive authority of the Civil Service
Commissioner, by lodging in various entities administrative disciplinary power
over their employees. One instance is that of the UP Charter, Section 6(e),
heretofore quoted.
Since it must be presumed that the President was cognizant of the
administrative disciplinary powers, particularly that of removal, vested by law
(the UP Charter) upon its Board of Regents and President, the act of the
Chief Executive in transferring the Philippine General Hospital from the Office
of the President to the University of the Philippines clearly evinced the
intention to place the Hospital employees under the administrative power of
the University in matters of their discipline, suspension or removal, on a par
with the other employees of the University.
It was ruled that the President and Board of Regents of the University of the
Philippines possess full and final authority in the disciplining, suspension and
removal of the civil service employees of the University, including those of
the Philippine General Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of Civil
Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals
22. BELLO V. COA
FACTS:
A petition for review from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners spouses were charged for estafa before the City Court of
Pasay for allegedly having misappropriated a ladys ring with a value
of 1,000.00 pesos received by them from Atty. De Guzman for sale
on commission basis.
six months and one day or prision correctional and to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of 1,000.00 pesos with costs of suit.
Petitioners notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the CFI
Pasay City, but was dismissedon the ground that since the case was
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the CFI and trial
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have been duly recoded, the appeal should have been taken directly
to the COA as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, RA 296,
as amended.
Petitioners opposed the prosecutions dismissal action under an
analogous provision of Rule 50, section 3 directing the COA in cases
erroneously brought to it shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall
certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear
statement of the grounds therefor, prayed of the Court of First
Instance if an appeal have been wrongly brought before it. The Court
of First Instance did find that the appeal should have been taken
directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the
appeal and remand of the records to the city court for execution of
judgment.
Petitions claim that they were not notified of such and only learned
when they were called for execution of the judgment of conviction.
Hence, they filed with the city court their motion to elevate appeal to
Court of Appeals stating that through inadvertence and or
excusable neglect they had erroneously filed a notice of appeal to
the court of first instance instead of to the Court of Appeals as the
proper court and prayed that the city court elevate the records to the
Court of Appeals for proper review.
Respondent city court denied petitioners motion for having been
erroneously addressed to this court instead of to the court of first
instance ignoring petitioners predicament.
Petitioners spouses then filed their petition for prohibition and
mandamus against the People and respondent city court to prohibit
the execution of the judgment to compel respondent city court to
elevate their appeal to the Court of Appeals.
OSG answered we shall not interpose any objection whichever point
is adopted by this Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently
conflicting principles of lawfinality of judicial decision or equity in
judicial decision.
COA dismissed the petition for finding that the city courts judgment
was directly appealable to it. CFI should not have dismissed the
appeal but should have directed the appeal to the Court of Appeals.
It held that since petitioners did not implead the court of first instance
as principal party respondent it could not grant any relief at all
even on the assumption that petitioners can be said to deserve some
equities
Petitioners moved for reconsideration and for elevation of their
appeal to the Court of Appeals, stressing the merits of their appeal
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
and of their defense to the charge but was denied by the appellate
court for lack of sufficient merit.
Petitioners then filed the present petition for review. The case, upon
the comment of the OSG resolved to consider the case as a special
civil action with such comment as an answer and the case submitted
for decision in the interest of justice and speedy adjudication.
23. SALARIA VS. BUENVIAJE
FACTS:
petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur.
Ramon Salaria (petitioner) had been staying on the land of Eliodoro
Cailao as a lessee since September 18, 1930 when he bought the
house of Rugino Llagas constructed thereon.
Petitioner and Eliodoro Cailao agreed that the former pay a monthly
rental of 6.oo pesos, later raised to 10.oo pesos, but they had no
agreement regarding its duration.
December 1972, Cailao advised Salaria not to pay anymore to
vacate the land for he was selling it to Ceferina Flores, wife of
Antonio Mendiola, private respondent herein. The land was
eventually sold to Mr. And Mrs. Antonio Mendiola for 300.00 pesos
as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 15,1974
although the sale was consummated as early as 1973.May 16,1974,
Caferina Flores wrote the petitioner a letter asking him to vacate the
premises until July 1974, otherwise a suit would be filed against the
latter. On August 23, 1974, a complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed by Antonio Mendiola against Ramon Salaria in Branch II of the
City Court of Iriga.
Salaria filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action, as Presidential Decree No. 20
suspends the provision of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil
Code and that the need of the respondent of the premises for his
own use does not fall within the exception provided by the said
Decree.
Respondent judge denied the defendants motion to dismiss and set the case
for hearing.
Counterclaim: Petitioner admitted that he has been occupying the lot of
Eliodoro Cailao as lessee, but that the lease was without a fixed period. He
denied the allegation that the lease was on a monthly basis and asserted that
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it was only on a yearly basis. He also admitted that he received a letter from
the wife of the plaintiff but denied the rest of the allegations. Defendant
alleged that the complaint states no cause of action against the defendant as
the same is suspended by Presidential Decree No. 20, Section 4; and that
the City Court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the matter at issue, there
being no law to support it. Petitioner alleged that because of unwarranted
filing of the instant action, plaintiff knowing fully well that it has no basis in
fact or in law, defendant was exposed to actual and moral damages for which
plaintiff should be held liable.
City Courts Decision:
1. Ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question within
three months from receipt of decision
2. Considering that the defendant is financially hard up, he is excused
by this Court to pay the back rentals from January 1973 up to the
time he vacates the premises and for which reason the Clerk of
Court is directed to deliver to the defendant upon demand the
amount of 200 pesos as consignation by him
3. There is no award for damages to plaintiff but the counterclaim is
dismissed for lack of merit and defendant ordered to pay the cost of
the suit.
Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, the decision
was affirmed with modification. The defendant was ordered to vacate the
premises and the plaintiff was granted the authority to withdraw the amount
of 200 pesos from the Clerk of Court.
ISSUE:
1. W/N under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 20, the private
respondent can eject the petitioner from the lot in question on the
ground that he needs the lot for his own use;
2. W/N this case is covered by Presidential Decree No. 20
SECTION 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20 states that
Sec 4. Except when the lease is for a definite period, the provisions
of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or land on which anothers
dwelling is located shall be suspended until otherwise provided; but
other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court of the
Philippines on lease contract, insofar as they are not in conflict with
the provisions of this Act shall apply.
ARTICLE 1673 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
Art 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the
following causes:
1. When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the
duration of leases under Articles 1682 and 1687, has expired;
2, 3, and 4 mention the lack of payment, violation of conditions
agreed upon and the usage of the thing leased which causes the
deterioration thereof.
It appearing that no fixed period has been agreed upon for the duration of the
lease between the original owner of the subject lot and the petitioner, the
case comes under the provisions of Article 1687 of the Civil Code, which
states
Art 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is
understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is
annually; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if
the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be pain daily.
However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the
lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease
after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the
rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period
after the lessee has been in possession for over six months, in case
of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee
has stayed in the place for over one month.
HELD: The judgment is reversed.
Construing Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20 in relation to Art 1673
par 1 and Art 1678 of the Civil Code, it is clear and explicit that
presidential Decree No 20 suspends paragraph 1 of Article 1673. Hence,
petitioner cannot be ejected at the expiration of the period provided
under Art 1678 of the Civil Code.
The grounds relied upon by the lessor in this case is not one of the
causes for judicial ejectment of lessees enumerated in Article 1673 of the
New Civil Code in relation to Section 4 of Republic Act No 6359, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 20.
The decision appealed from is reversed, except with respect to that
portion of the decision which authorized Antonio Mendiola to
withdraw the amount of 200 pesos from the Clerk of Court of the City
Court. The petitioner is, however, ordered to pay back rentals for the
period of his stay on the land at the rate of 10 pesos per month,
which is not covered by the deposit. No costs.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
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CONSTRUCTION BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERMENT: The
construction by the executive branch of government of a particular law
although not binding upon the courts must be given weight as the
construction comes from that branch of government called upon to
implement the law.
24. BARRAMEDA VS. MOIR
FACTS: This is an original application for a writ of mandamus.
Petitioner was defendant in a suit brought before a justice of the peace to try
to title a parcel of land; that the case was decided adversely to him; that he
appealed to the Court of First Instance; and that the judge of that court, on
motion of the appellee, dismissed the appeal with directions to the justice of
the peace to proceed with the enforcement of the judgment. The said judge
has demurred to the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The basis of the demurrer is that
Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131, conferring original jurisdiction upon justices of the
peace to try title to real estate, are inconsistent with and repugnant to the
Philippine Bill of July 1,1902.
Act No 2041, section 3: Justices of the peace shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of title to real estate or any interest therein
when the value of the property in litigation does not exceed two hundred
pesos, and where such value exceeds tow hundred pesos but is less than six
hundred pesos the justice of peace shall jurisdiction concurrent with the
Court of First Instance. By Act No 2131, section 1, the previous provision
was amended by substituting exclusive original jurisdiction for original
jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the concurrent jurisdiction conferred upon justices of
the peace by the disputed provisions of Acts 2041 and 2131 in cases
where the amount in controversy exceeds 200 pesos but is less than
600 pesos is valid.
2. Whether or not the respondent judge erred in judgment when he
ordered the justice of peace to proceed with the execution of the
judgment despite the demurrers of the justice of peace on the basis
of Acts Nos 2041 and 2131.
HELD: The writ is denied; injunction made permanent.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
The able brief of counsel by the respondent judge is based upon the a priori
assumption that original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance in real-estate
is, by the Organic Law made exclusive.
When a division of jurisdiction in a particular class of cases is based upon the
amount of controversy as it is the case with the provisions of acts nos 2041
and 2131 in question, a law providing that because of the inferior amount in
controversy a case should to the Court of First Instance, while another case
of the same nature, because of its greater amount, could be tried before a
justice of the peace, would be an anomaly and at way with the only logical
distribution of jurisdiction.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: The general rules is that where part of a
stature is void as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.
25. DUMLAO V. COMELEC
FACTS:
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in January 30, 1980.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec 4 received
retirement benefits age 65 no able to run Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the
afore cited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the
classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and,
therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of BP 51
and BP 52 and 6. Furthermore, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also
question Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section
9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate
for any public office shall be it. from any form of harassment and
discrimination. "
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be
declared null and void for being violative of the Constitution.
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ISSUES/HELD:
1.WON there was an actual controversy to be settle by the courts in the
case of Dumlao?
No. Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 being contrary to the equal protection
clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent
COMELEC from implementing said provision.
Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that
provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before
the COMELEC
2. WON Igot proper party to question the Constitutionality of BP 52 and
51?
NO. Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be
denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of
disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local
elective positions. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake.
they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress
Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works:
it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by
one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement.
it has been held:
question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys.
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP
Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the
disbursement of public funds
3. WON Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal
protection and due process rights.
No. No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification
based on reasonable and real differentiations. In the present case,
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
employees 65 years of age have been classifieddifferently from younger
employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter
are not.
Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials
because there can be retirees who are even younger and a 65year old
retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official who is not a retiree. But
there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run
for office because there is the need for new blood to assume relevance.
When an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
"the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs.
Vera, supra).
26. REYES V. DELA CRUZ
FACTS:
Marcial Asuncion, Eugenio, Lucia, and Alfonso de la Cruz, are heirs of the
deceased Anselmo S. Hilario. They entered into a contract of services with
plaintiff Reyes
The Repondets entered into an agreement with reyes stating that : For and
in consideration of the services which you are going to render to us in the
said case we will pay you 5 percent of the amount adjudicated to us. You will
not be paid in cash by us for the time being that the case is pending in court
The probate court had already ordered partition. It seems, however, that
there was delay in its execution and implementation and the main purpose of
hiring Atty. Reyes and the services to be rendered by him was to expedite
the said partition
The plaintiff filed this action to recover his fees, namely, 5 per cent of the
market value of all, said properties; and P10,000 as moral damages,
P10,000 as consequential damages, and P10,000 as attorney's fees.
The lower court denied the prayer for damages and attorney's fees. It held
that the 5 per cent mentioned in the contract for services referred to the
assessed value, not the market value, because the latter was too
speculative.
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Although Marcial de la Cruz was included in the complaint, he died before
the complaint was filed in court
ISSUE:
WON the contract for services referred to the assessed value or the market
value of the properties adjudicated to the four heirs.
HELD:
The Assessed Value. We agree with the trial court that the 5 per cent could
refer only to the assessed value, for that was the only value then known to
the parties to the contract, said value appearing in the inventory of the estate
of the decedent. Because the parties almost invariably cannot agree as to
the market value of the property to be expropriated, the court appoints
commissioners to hold hearings and receive evidence, and even then, the
commissioners not infrequently cannot agree among themselves.
The parties to the contract could not have had in mind the market value of
the properties to be adjudicated to the five heir, which market value was then
unknown and whose determination would be attended with difficulties and
disagreements. But there was one value which they all knew, and that was
the assessed value appearing in the inventory and on the basis of which the
partition was to be made
This side from the consideration that because of this tendency of real estate
values to rise, if the determination of the market value is to be made upon the
termination of the partition proceedings, then any undue delay in the said
proceedings would tend to increase said market value and might constitute a
temptation for a lawyer similarly situated to agree to, if not actually work for
said delay.
It was the plaintiff-appellant who prepared the contract for services. Being a
lawyer, he knew the meaning and value of every word or phrase used in said
contract. If the parties, including himself, really had in mind not the assessed
value but the market value, it would have been so easy for him to have used
and inserted said phrase, "market value", in order to remove and avoid all
ambiguity and uncertainty.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: The ambiguity of the case was settled
with the information that the plaintiff:
Being a lawyer would knew the meaning and value of every word or phrase
used in said contract. If the parties, including himself, really had in mind not
the assessed value but the market value,
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
The surrounding facts of the contract when that parties sign will be
considered in order for the court to determine which side is right
27. IDELFONSO V SIBAL
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 15371 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Lucio R.
Ildefonso and Ernesto Y. Sibal reached a compromise agreement and
thereafter filed a joint motion to dismiss the case. Acting upon the motion the
court granted it and dismissed the case. The parties then after created a
compromise agreement between them stating that:
a. That the defendant shall pay the plaintiff this date the amount of ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS;
b. That the defendant promises that within two (2) years from the date
hereof, he shall course through the plaintiff as Realtor the former's real estate
purchase or transaction and should he (defendant) fail thereof, that is, to
make such real estate purchase and to course the same to the plaintiff as
said Realtor, the defendant is liable further to pay the plaintiff an additional
sum of P2,000.00
c. That the defendant further agrees to dismiss his Counterclaim in the
above-entitled case on the ground of his amicable settlement.
The properties, however, were not sold by plaintiff but by defendant himself
sometime after the lapse of the 2 years period and at a price much higher
than that quoted to plaintiff. The other hand, plaintiff, during the period
agreed upon in line with defendant's expressed intention to purchase real
estate worth around P400,000.00 within the commercial district of Manila for
the future expansion of his business of selling books and school supplies-
looked for real properties for sale in Manila. , he offered to sell to defendant
at various times Defendant, however, told plaintiff that he could not buy any
of the properties because the property were to not aligned with what he
wanted
Claiming that defendant Sibal has failed and neglected to make the purchase
of real estate as promised in the compromise agreement above-quoted
within the two-year period stipulated therein, plaintiff instituted the present
action for the recovery of the penalty provided for in the paragraph 2 (b)
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Answering the complaint, defendant admitted the execution of the
compromise agreement but denied liability, alleging that under the said
agreement his liability may arise only in the event that he buys or sells real
estate
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant has violated the obligation imposed on him by
the compromise agreement
HELD:
NO. Under paragraph 2(b) of the compromise agreement, defendant-
appellee was under obligation to make a real estate purchase through
appellant as realtor within a period of two years from October 15, 1953, when
the agreement was signed, and his failure to make any such purchase made
him liable to pay the penalty of P2,000.00 provided therein. paragraph 2(b) of
the compromise agreement, in effect, constituted appellant for two years as
his exclusive agent in the purchase or sale or real property with liability to
pay P2,000.00 in case of breach.
it is hard to believe that a man of appellee's business acumen and stature
would give his consent to an agreement wherein he is under compulsion to
buy real estate--which may, as in this case, be not only in adequate or
inappropriate for his business, but, what is worse, also beyond his means--in
order to avoid liability under the penal clause therein stipulated.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
There is ambiguity in the provision of the compromise agreement in question
as a result of the explanatory clause ("that is, to make such real estate
purchase and to course the same to the plaint off as Realtor") inserted after
the phrase "should he fail thereof" which follows the statement of appellee's
obligation. But following the rule that ambiguities or obscure clauses in
contracts cannot favor the one who has caused them and it appearing that
the compromise agreement was drawn by appellant through his counsel, with
the paragraph in dispute creating an obligation in his favor, the ambiguity
found therein must be construed in favor of herein appellee.
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28. QUA CHEE GAN v. LAW UNION AND ROCK INSURANCE
FACTS:
Qua Chee Gan, a merchant of Albay, instituted this action in 1940, in the
Court of First Instance of said province, seeking to recover the proceeds of
certain fire insurance policies totalling P370,000, issued by the Law Union &
Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., upon certain bodegas and merchandise of the
insured that were burned on June 21, 1940.
Fire of undetermined origin that broke out in the early morning of July 21,
1940, and lasted almost one week, gutted and completely destroyed
Bodegas Nos. 1, 2 and 4, with the merchandise stored therein. Plaintiff-
appellee informed the insurer by telegram on the same date; and on the next
day, the fire adjusters engaged by appellant insurance company arrived and
proceeded to examine and photograph the premises, pored over the books
of the insured and conducted an extensive investigation. The plaintiff having
submitted the corresponding fire claims, totalling P398,562.81 (but reduced
to the full amount of the insurance, P370,000), the Insurance Company
resisted payment, claiming violation of warranties and conditions, filing of
fraudulent claims, and that the fire had been deliberately caused by the
insured or by other persons in connivance with him.
Que Chee Gan, with his brother, Qua Chee Pao, and some employees of
his, were indicted and tried in 1940 for the crime of arson but was
subsequently acquitted
ISSUE/ HELD:
W/N Qua Chee Gan should be allowed to claim.
YES. It is a well settled rule of law that an insurer which with knowledge of
facts entitling it to treat a policy as no longer in force, receives and accepts a
preium on the policy, estopped to take advantage of the forfeiture.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
the well known rule that ambiguities or obscurities must be strictly interpreted
against the party that caused them, the "memo of warranty" invoked by
appellant bars the latter from questioning the existence of the appliances
called for in the insured premises, since its initial expression, "the undernoted
appliances for the extinction of fire being kept on the premises insured
hereby, . . . it is hereby warranted . . .", admists of interpretation as an
admission of the existence of such appliances which appellant cannot now
contradict, should the parol evidence rule apply.
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So long as insurance companies insist upon the use of ambiguous, intricate
and technical provisions, which conceal rather than frankly disclose, their
own intentions, the courts must, in fairness to those who purchase insurance,
construe every ambiguity in favor of the insured.
29. VILLIACORTA V. INSURANCE COMMISSION
FACTS:
Complainant was the owner of a car insured with respondent company. On
May 9, 1978, the vehicle was brought to the Sunday Machine Works, Inc., for
general check-up and repairs. While it was in the custody of the Sunday
Machine Works, the car was allegedly taken by six (6) persons and driven
out to Montalban, Rizal. While North at Montalban, Rizal, the car figured in
an accident, hitting and bumping a gravel and sand truck parked at the right
side of the road going south. As a consequence, the gravel and sand truck
veered to the right side of the pavement going south and the car veered to
the right side of the pavement going north. The driver, Benito Mabasa, and
one of the passengers died and the other four sustained physical injuries.
The car, as well, suffered extensive damage. Complainant, thereafter, filed a
claim for total loss with the respondent company but claim was denied.
Hence, complainant, was compelled to institute the present action.
ISSUE/HELD:
WON the complainan can claim for damages?
YES. First, respondent commissions ruling that the person who drove the
vehicle in the person of Benito Mabasa, who, according to its finding, was
one of the residents of the Sunday Machine Works, Inc. to whom the car had
been entrusted for general check-up and repairs was not an authorized
driver of petitioner-complainant is too restrictive and contrary to the
established principle that insurance contracts, being contracts of adhesion
where the only participation of the other party is the signing of his signature
or his adhesion thereto, obviously call for greater strictness and vigilance
on the part of courts of justice with a view of protecting the weaker party from
abuse and imposition, and prevent their becoming traps for the unwary.
Secondly, and independently of the foregoing (since when a car is unlawfully
taken, it is the theft clause, not the authorized driver clause, that applies),
where a car is admittedly as in this case unlawfully and wrongfully taken by
some people, be they employees of the car shop or not to whom it had been
entrusted, and taken on a long trip to Montalban without the owners consent
or knowledge, such taking constitutes or partakes of the nature of theft as
defined in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, viz. Who are liable for
theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latters consent, for purposes of
recovering the loss under the policy in question.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
The mere happenstance that the employees used the car for their own illicit
purpose does not mean that the authorized driver clause has been violated
so as to bar recovery, provided that such employee is duly qualified under a
valid drivers license. Moreover, when a person takes possession of a vehicle
belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft
because his intent to gain is evident since he derives utility, satisfaction,
enjoyment and pleasure. Hence, the insurer must indemnify the insured
under the theft clause, which properly applies in this case.
30. ROBLES V. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING COMPANY, ET AL
FACTS:
On November 28, 1956, the Zambales Chromite Mining Company filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Jose Robles in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, alleging among other things that
Robles and the Company entered into a contract whereby the latter delivered
the possession of certain mining properties over which it had control to
Robles who was to extract, mine and sell ores from said properties upon
payment of certain royalties; that Robles had violated the terms of the
contract; that the Company thereupon served notice on Robles to vacate the
premises; and that Robles failed to comply with said demand.
Robles filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Justice
of the Peace did not have jurisdiction, but the latter denied said motion.
Robles thereafter filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of
Zambales, alleging that the Justice of the Peace was without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the case for unlawful detainer involving mineral land.
The Court of First Instance ruled against Robles, holding that the provisions
of Section 1, Rule 72, of the Rules of Court, are sufficiently broad to cover
any kind of land, including mineral land. Robles has appealed.
ISSUE:
WON a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Justice of the
Peace did not have jurisdiction?
HELD:
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YES. The appeal is clearly without basis. Section 1, of Rule 72 provides that,
"a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination
of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied,
or the legal representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee,
or other person, may, at any time within one year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior
court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution
of such possession, together with damages and costs." Any land spoken of in
this provision obviously includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural,
residential or mineral. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that
where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
The appeal is clearly without basis. Section 1, of Rule 72 Any land spoken of
in this provision obviously includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural,
residential or mineral. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that
where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. THE LAW IS
CLEAR
31. COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC. V. GIMENEZ
FACTS:
Respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR) on ground of unfair labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to
bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing employees to
retract their membership with the union and restraining non-union members
from joining the union. The Office of the MOLE, upon petition of petitioner,
assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor
Code.
Petitioner pointed out that the allegations regarding dismissal from
employment due to union membership were false. It also averred that the
suspension and eventual dismissal of the three employees were due to
infractions committed by them and that the management reserves the right to
discipline erring employees. Petitioner also assailed the legality of the Union,
among others.
The minister rendered its decision, ruling that there was no merit in the
Unions complaint. It also ruled that the three dismissed employees were not
without fault but nonetheless ordered the reinstatement of the same. At the
same time, respondent Minister directly certified the respondent Union as the
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - ALIMURUNG

collective bargaining agent for the sales force in petitioner company and !
ordered the reinstatement of the three salesmen to the company on the
ground that the employees were first offenders.
!
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ISSUE: !
Whether or not the minister erred in directly certifying the Union based on the !
latters self-serving assertion that it enjoys the support of the majority of the
sales force in petitioners company and in ordering the reinstatement of the
!
three dismissed employees. !
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HELD: !
The Court held that the minister failed to determine with legal certainty
whether the Union indeed enjoyed majority representation. The Court held !
that by relying only on the Notice of Strike, the minister had encouraged !
disrespect of the law. He had also erroneously vested upon himself the right !
to choose the collective bargaining representative which ought to have been
upon the employees.
!
The Court held that the reinstatement of the three employees despite a clear !
finding of guilt on their part is not in conformity with law. Ruling otherwise !
would only encourage unequal protection of the laws with respect to the !
rights of the management and the employees.
The court rendered the decision of the minister reversed and set aside, !
ordering petitioners to give the three employees their separation pay. !
!
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: !
In the principle of statutory construction that "general terms may be restricted
by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by !
the specific language which indicates the statute's object and purpose." .The !
rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to cases where, except for !
one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one
specific class.
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