South African Journal of Philosophy

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Deconstruction and complexity: a critical economy

Rika Preiser , Paul Cilliers & Oliver Human

To cite this article: Rika Preiser , Paul Cilliers & Oliver Human (2013) Deconstruction and
complexity: a critical economy, South African Journal of Philosophy, 32:3, 261-273, DOI:
10.1080/02580136.2013.837656

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South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(3): 261273 Copyright South African Journal of Philosophy
Printed in South Africa All rights reserved SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
ISSN 0258-0136 EISSN 2073-4867
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2013.837656

Deconstruction and complexity: a critical economy

Rika Preiser1, Paul Cilliers2 and Oliver Human

Centre for Studies in Complexity, Department of Philosophy, University of Stellenbosch,
Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602, South Africa
rika@sun.ac.za

In this paper we argue for the contribution that deconstruction can make towards an
understanding of complex systems. We begin with a description of what we mean by
complexity and how Derridas thought illustrates a sensitivity towards the problems
we face when dealing with complex systems. This is especially clear in Derridas
deconstruction of the structuralist linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure. We compare
this critique with the work of Edgar Morin, one of the foremost thinkers of contem-
porary complexity and argue for the possible contributions that both thinkers provide
towards an understanding of complex phenomena in the world. We then move on
to illustrate the particular economy of thinking we are forced to engage with when
dealing with complex systems. This economy is inspired by Derridas deconstruction
of Batailles general economy. This economy illustrates the fundamental nature of
critique in the process of dealing with complex systems, the third concept we explore
in this paper. The process of critique illustrates the necessity for both cutting apart
and weaving together of economies in order to maintain the possibility for divergent
ways of being in the world. We conclude with the ethical implications of dealing with
complex systems and some first steps towards an ethics of complexity.

Introduction
The notion of complexity is currently subject to a number of interpretations (Rasch 1991,
Chu et al. 2003, Alhadeff-Jones 2008). We argue that a perspective on complexity informed by
deconstruction is particularly fruitful. Not only does it help to develop a theory of complexity that
resists positivist reductionism, it also contributes to the development of deconstruction in a way
that resists faddish extravagances.
After a brief introduction to what is meant by the notion of complexity and how it relates
to deconstruction, the focus will be on the notion of economy. It will be illustrated how the
economy of deconstruction can be applied to a critical theory of complexity.
The general economy upon which deconstruction is based allows one to make provisional
interventions in the world, yet forces one to acknowledge that these interventions are always
contingently based upon a set of exclusions one necessarily has to make in order to be able to
say anything about the world at all. This forces one into a position of modesty. At the same time
it opens up the possibility for a truly critical project to arise. In the third part of this paper we
therefore explore the notion of critical complexity as a basis for opening up a new form of critique
made possible by the joining of complexity thinking and deconstruction. Throughout this paper we
underline the inevitable normativity of our engagement with complex systems and in conclusion
we expand upon the possibility of an ethics of complexity, underlining the provisional nature of
such a program.

1 Corresponding author.
2 Sadly, shortly after writing this article, Paul Cilliers passed away. He is sorely missed by the co-authors and those who had the privilege
of knowing him. His contribution to thinking through the problems of complexity is invaluable and the lack of future contributions from
him leaves us forever short.

South African Journal of Philosophy is co-published by Taylor & Francis and NISC (Pty) Ltd
262 Preiser, Cilliers and Human

Systems of meaning
Complexity is the characteristic of a system, not of atomistic entities. The link between
deconstruction and complexity can thus be made through the notion of system of difference.
Such a system of differences can be used to describe how a complex system works in much the same
way as Ferdinand de Saussure (1974) described how language works. These descriptions can then be
meaningfully expanded by incorporating insights gained from Derridas deconstruction of Saussure
(Cilliers 1998: pp. 17, 3747).
Systems understood in this way consist of a number of components that interact non-linearly. The
properties of the system do not reside in the components, but is a result of these interactions. If these
interactions were ordered, homogenous and symmetrical, no interesting behaviour would arise. There
has to be asymmetry. This is another way of stating that the relationships between the components
are relationships of difference. If one sticks to a purely structuralist (i.e. Saussurian) understanding
of complex systems, one ends up with a model which argues that things may be relational and very
complicated, but if you work hard enough, with clever enough techniques, you can figure the system
out essentially the general structuralist claim. This understanding would correspond to what Morin
(2007) calls restricted complexity. A general understanding of complexity requires a more reflexive
and transformative approach. It is exactly in this respect that deconstruction makes a vital contribution.
It allows us to describe the dynamic nature of the play of differences.
The interactions in a complex system can be described by Derridas concepts of trace and
diffrance. The concept trace can be used to refer to the individual differences between the
components in a system. Each trace has no meaning in itself, but through their interaction the
meaning of a sign emerges. The notion of diffrance can be used to describe the dynamics of
complex networks. The analogy works in the following way: the interaction between a number of
components in the system generates a pattern of activity, traces of which reverberate through the
whole network. Given there are loops in the network, these traces are reflected back after a certain
propagation delay (deferral), and alter (make different) the activity that has produced them in the
first place. Given that complex systems always contain loops and feedback, delayed self-altering
will be one of the networks characteristics; a characteristic described quite precisely by Derridas
notion of diffrance a concept that indicates difference and deference, that is suspended between
the passive and active modes, and that has both spatial and temporal components (Derrida 1982:
pp. 127). Difference is therefore not simply the static differences between components in the
system; they are constantly transformed.
Nevertheless, if we merely insist on an abundance of difference that is irreducible, we are not
saying enough about how complexity is constituted. A limitless play of difference does not lead to
the generation of meaning, nor can a complex system function without being constrained in some
way. On the epistemological level (our descriptions of complex systems) as well as the ontological
level (the functioning of complex systems in the real world), boundaries are required. There is a
certain economy involved. A better understanding of this requires a closer look at the roles of
limits and constraints.

Knowledge and limits

To fully understand a complex system, we need to understand it in all its complexity. Furthermore,
because complex systems are open systems, we need to understand the systems complete
environment before we can understand the system, and, of course, the environment is complex in
itself. There is no human way of doing this. The knowledge we have of complex systems is based
on the models we make of these systems, but in order to function as models and not merely as a
repetition of the system they have to reduce the complexity of the system. This means that some
aspects of the system are always left out of consideration. The problem is compounded by the fact
that that which is left out, interacts with the rest of the system in a non-linear way and we cannot,
therefore, predict what the effects of our reduction of the complexity will be, especially not as the
system and its environment develop and transform in time.3

3 These ideas are elaborated upon in Cilliers (2000, 2001).

South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(3): 261273 263

We cannot have complete knowledge of complex systems; we can only have knowledge in terms
of a certain framework. There is no stepping outside of complexity (we are finite beings), thus
there is no framework for frameworks. One should be careful not to interpret this state of affairs
as somehow inadequate, as something to be improved upon. There is a necessary relationship
between the imposition of a limiting framework and the generation of knowledge. One cannot
have knowledge without a framework. Despite the fact that our knowledge is of necessity limited,
these limits are enabling, they allow us to make claims that are neither relativistic nor vague (see
Cilliers 2005). At the same time, however, such knowledge is not the result of free-floating truths;
it is contextualised in time and space. Because it is not objective, and because we know that,
we cannot use this knowledge as if it is objective. There is always a normative dimension to the
claims we make, and we have to stand in for them. We cannot shift the responsibility for the
effects of our claims onto some process we call scientific. It should be clear that this position
shares the most important aspects of that which constitutes deconstruction.

Derrida and Morin

It is clear that Derridas argument is based on the fact that meaning is constituted through
complex interaction. Although he did not explicitly develop a theory of complexity, a sensitivity
to complexity permeates his thinking. There are still many fruitful insights to be gained from a
sustained interaction between deconstruction and complexity theory.4 This interaction can be
commenced by comparing some aspects of deconstruction with the work of Edgar Morin.5
Morin distinguishes between a general and a restricted understanding of complexity (Morin
2007). The restricted understanding is clearly related to the Saussurian position. It acknowledges
the basic structure of complexity, but balks before the more radical consequences. In Morins
terms, it opens up the understanding towards relational thinking, but it cannot get rid of the
reductive apparatus that should qualify this work as science (Morin 2007). As a result, this
approach to complexity and we would put much of the work historically done under the umbrella
of the so-called Santa F School in this category reverts to an instrumental strategy in the hope
of making purely objective claims in the same way as Saussures claim that we can get at the
correct meaning of the sign. It is precisely this denial of a normative element in our dealing with
complexity which makes this position restricted. In developing a deeper understanding of what a
general understanding of complexity could be, something for which Morin thinks we do not yet
have a language, insights from deconstruction could play a vital role (Morin 2007).
In the paradigm of general complexity the assumptions made by classical science are not taken
for granted. Although one has to make some assumptions in order to get something done at all,
these assumptions should be seen for what they are, namely reductions of the complexity.

In opposition to reduction, complexity requires that one tries to comprehend the relations
between the whole and the parts. The principle of disjunction, of separation (between
objects, between disciplines, between notions, between subject and object of knowledge)
should be substituted by a principle that maintains the distinction, but that tries to establish
the relation (Morin 2007: pp. 1011).

In many ways, this dialogical thinking agrees with the double movement of deconstruc-
tion. Derrida (1998) argues that the strategy of deconstruction involves a double activity. In
deconstructing a system, one has to make use of the resources provided by the system itself. One
is thus simultaneously confirming and undermining central elements of the system. This simulta-
neous give and take is a much more complex process than simply replacing something with
something else. It implies that one transforms something by using the thing itself in novel ways.
Deconstruction is thus not a critique from the outside, a critique that knows where it stands and

4 See also Preiser and Cilliers (2010: 271274).

5 Edgar Morin is a French intellectual. He is Emeritus Director of Research at the CNRS (the French National Research Centre). His latest
book, On Complexity (2008), is a summary of his multivolume work on the notion of complex thought.
264 Preiser, Cilliers and Human

what it wants to do. It is a critique that acknowledges that it is in transformation itself because it
cannot depart from a perfect understanding, neither of itself, nor of that which it is transforming.
In many ways dealing with complex problems has to engage with the same dynamic. When we
use models we make exclusions and simplifications, consciously or not, and these exclusions
have effects. The benefit gained from a general notion of complexity is precisely to make
us aware of the fact that the process of modelling the world, an unavoidable process, is never
neutral or objective.
The difficulty in constructing models of the world is partly explained by the notion of play.
Play is inaugurated by the differential and as a result of the non-linear interactions that take
place within complex systems. This play is subject to the economy of diffrance and therefore
resists any form of comprehensive reduction. Nevertheless, complex systems, such as systems
of language and living systems, are also robust, they persist in time despite their complexity.
This robustness can fruitfully be compared to Derridas notion of iterability (Derrida 1977:
p. 7). Although systems constantly change, there is simultaneously structural repeatability that
allows one to say something about the system that is not arbitrary or relativistic. This iterable
economy of the system opens up the possibility of modelling the system, albeit it never in a
final way. Thus, complex systems are simultaneously limited enough for us to be able to say
something about them and open enough for them to constantly slip from the models we create.
One can look at the relationship between the notions that constitute our models, as well as the
relationships that constitute the system itself, as a type of economy similar to that upon which
deconstruction works.

The economy of complex systems

When we think of the term economy a certain set of meanings is brought to mind. Primarily
these include usages of the term in relation to the study of economics. The dictionary definition
of an economy is a twofold definition of, first, the concern with the production and consumption
of resources and, second, the orderly interplay between the parts of a system (Collins English
Dictionary 2006). In effect then one can state that an economy is the concern with the production
and consumption of resources made possible by the orderly interplay of the parts of a system.
However, when one thinks through the general use of the term a defining feature appears to
be that in order for an economy to exist there must be some form of scarcity, thus its usage in
statements such as to economise or economical. A consequence of the limited use of resources
is that a system is developed which needs to prioritise what should be produced and in what
amounts (Fleming 1969). However, this system of prioritisation not only determines what should
be produced but also what can be produced, it determines or establishes the system, the orderly
interplay between parts. An economy then operates on the principle of a relationship of feedback
between the use of limited resources (production and consumption) and what the system is able
to do with these resources and vice versa. This system of production and the limited resources it
exploits results in the fact that certain areas or facets of life are prioritised over others. As Derrida
(1992: pp. 67) argues in relation to the classical Hegelian notion of economy:

Among its irreducible predicates or semantic values, economy no doubt includes the values
of law (nomos) and of home (oikos). Nomos does not only signify the law in general but
also the law of distribution (nemein), the law of sharing or partition (partage) As soon
as there is law, there is partition: as soon as there is nomy, there is economy. Besides
the values of law and home, of distribution and partition, economy implies the idea of
exchange, of circulation, of return. The figure of the circle is obviously at the centre, if that
can still be said of a circle This motif of circulation can lead one to think that the law of
economy is the-circular-return to the point of departure, to the origin, also to the home.

In order for a system to produce something it must receive in return, indeed it would be difficult
to conceive of an economy, as an economy, that only distributes or disseminates without return.
This can also be read as the foundation or basis of a system, in a certain sense then an economy,
South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(3): 261273 265

conceived of as a circle, is inherently conservative, it aims to preserve its point of departure or its
structure. Yet these limits are not necessarily bad things, not only are they enabling (Cilliers 2001)
but furthermore they are necessary for the existence of the system in the first place, something that
has no boundaries, which is claimed to be and do everything, is indeed nothing.
In comparison to the distinction between restricted and general complexity, George Bataille (1989,
1991, 1993) makes a distinction between restricted and general economies. In his discussion of
Bataille, Derrida (1978) argues that one cannot postulate two economies, the restricted, utilitarian
economy Bataille critiques and the other of this economy, the general economy, which experiences
only loss and waste. Rather, one must read the notion of a general economy as if it is a restricted
economy. It is this understanding of economy that we pursue in complexity thinking. This is due to
the fact that when we model a complex system our analysis will always be restricted, due not only to
our limited perspectives but also due to the fact that our models are obliged to fulfil the demands of
reason, coherence or logic and will thereby always be exceeded by an excess. This is due to the fact
that excess, by definition, exceeds reason (Derrida 1978: p. 255, quoting Bataille). It is as such that
despite being limited in a certain sense, an economy at the same time will always be exceeded by an
excess that it cannot capture and reincorporate into its circular imagery. What the notion of general
economy does is to establish a relationship to this excess (Derrida 1978), it establishes a relation-
ship to the loss that an economy experiences, to that which does not return to its origin and to the
possibility of using limited resources without any utilitarian gain. Therefore, in Derridas explora-
tion of Bataille we can note the double-handed movement of the deconstructive process that aims to
maintain the radical nature of Batailles critique whilst at the same time illustrating the impossibility
of a pure excess without an economy to which it corresponds.
Derrida argues that we need to remember that we can only speak of one economy (of one
discourse); it is senseless in this regard to postulate two different kinds of economy, one restricted
and the other excessive or general. That is, we cannot postulate an economy of excess that runs
parallel to the restricted economy or a general economy in which there is only excess. When we
speak of a general economy, it is not an economy separate from a restricted economy, rather, it is
a single economy that is not closed but is both open to random chance events as well as predict-
ability, open to the possibility of destruction and yet robust, whether it comes from the play of
forces inside the system or from its relationship to its environment (Derrida 1978). The models we
construct of such systems are therefore often adequate for the systems we aim to model. However,
we must keep in mind the fact that a system does not run on an entirely rational, utilitarian basis
but is open to the possibility of paradox or inconsistencies, as well as the effects of play, which
will always escape our ability to model.
In this light our understanding of complex systems as operating under a general economy must
walk a narrow strait. In one sense, our models of complex systems are often adequate for the task
at hand. However, we must be careful to build on top of this adequacy an arrogance that assumes
mastery over the world. In the same light, stepping back and stating that we cannot act in the world
due to the excess that exceeds us, leaving this world to the hands of Gods or scientism, is equally
problematic. The acknowledgement of complexity therefore demands a critical stance that includes
deconstructing (opening up, transforming, not dismissing) the foundations and limits upon which
knowledge is built.

Complexity and critique

In her book called Philosophy in Turbulent Times, Elisabeth Roudinesco (2008) argues that the
lack of critical thought is marked by intellectual activity that only knows how to classify, rank,
calculate, measure, put a price on (and) normalize... in the name of a bogus modernity that
undermines every form of critical intelligence grounded in the analysis of the complexity of things
and persons (p. xi). Roudinesco reminds us that the last word on the critical project has not yet
been spoken. An and remains.
Reflecting on the meaning of the concept and, Derrida (2000) responds to an edited collection
of essays (Royle 2000) by offering a parody on the logic of the and, and notes that the conjunc-
tion is resistant not only to association but also to serialization, and it protests against a reduction
266 Preiser, Cilliers and Human

that is at bottom absurd and even ridiculous... (Derrida 2000: p. 283). The opening lines of his
essay read as follows:

And in the beginning, there is the and.

What is there in an and? And I wonder what a deconstruction can do with such a little,
almost insignificant word (Derrida 2000: p. 282).

And here we are again, suggesting an and of some sort. This time, the workings of deconstruc-
tion are supplemented with the notion of complexity and critique. This and not only joins
seemingly unrelated paradigms of thought but, as Derrida reminds us, it also represents a gap
between the two traditions. Hence, the double bind of the gap and the bringing together of these
two traditions cause a rupture in the unsurpassable dilemma of the somewhat stale critical project.
From this rupture the possibility of critique is born. By thinking deconstruction and complexity
together, a liminal space is opened in which both traditions are challenged to negotiate new ways
of thinking and knowing that may infuse critiques grammar (Pavlich 2005) with new vigour.

The crisis of critique

Recounting the possible difficulties one is faced with by subscribing to postmetaphysical forms
of critique, recent literature on the notion of critique suggests that the search for new critical
directions is driven from a sense that critique has become stagnanthas fallen into crisis or
malaise (Chryssostalis and Tuitt 2005: p. 1). To explain in more detail, it seems that the crisis
critique faces today stems from the historical changes it underwent since the inception of the
critical project with Kant. The problem of the possibility of a postmetaphysical form of critique
more specifically, is directly related to the problem of the loss of the outside, which in turn
can be identified as a problem of legitimisation as famously argued by Habermas (1975). The
insistence of poststructuralist positions to reject any foundationalist position from where to
ascertain the validity of criteria for legitimising or justifying the acceptance of certain norms
remains a challenge to the critical tradition. If there is no outside or metaposition from where
critique can assume a basis in which to situate its grounding norms, then the whole critical
project falls prey to relativism and indifference or to what Sloterdijk (1987: p. xxxii) calls the
self-abdication of critique. By asking the questions What can critique achieve today? What
can it still hope for in a time that is so sick of theory?, Sloterdijk (1987: pp. xxxiixxxiii)
suggests that in the process of Enlightenment critique, the critical project has undermined its
own impetus. By having exposed the foundations from where the norms of critique could be
legitimised, the loss of the outside also implies that there is no standpoint for a description,
no central perspective for a convincing form of critique. Moreover, along the way critique has
lost its ability to perform exactly what it set out to do originally, namely to be a cutting force
that lays bare the conditions of possibility under which reason can know and judge the world in
which we live.
With the loss of a fixed foundation on which critique can be grounded, forms of postmeta-
physical critique has not only run into the difficulty of finding alternative concepts or ground-
ings from where to justify a non-foundational, non-essentialist critique but, moreover, the notion
of critique itself has been compromised. In the process of wanting to avoid transcendental
categories and metaphysical positions from which it launches its judgements, critique has lost its
conceptional ground from which it could offer any substantive norm or name in which to incur
judgement. It seems that the end of the age of grand narratives and the death of God also silenced
critiques capability to start a revolution in philosophical thinking. Fear that the modernist project
might be revoked by the ghost of utopia and the accusation that one might actually know what a
perfect society should look like are also affecting the possibility to come up with vibrant notions
of postmetaphysical forms of critique. The loss of metaphysical claims robbed poststructural forms
of critique from the possibility to bring forth a philosophy of heroism (Roudinesco 2008), seeing
that postmetaphysical forms of critique are often criticised to subscribe to a form of pluralism that
is as anarchistic as anything goes and as nihilistic as nothing matters (Hoy 2005: p. 231).
South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(3): 261273 267

Critique as stricture: simultaneous rupture and reconciliation

In what follows, a deconstructive reading of the concept critique will be undertaken in order to
find a solution to the problem of legitimation. An analysis into the nature and meaning of the word
critique reveals that the concept itself deconstructs6 when its roots are traced back to the meaning
Kant (1998) ascribed to it in his critical project.
The implementation of the word Kritik in the titles of Kants three Critiques, refers to an
understanding of the word as found in the tradition dating back to Cicero and the appropriation
thereof in relation to the interpretation of ars critica (as read in French) as critique during
the seventeenth century (Hffe 2004: p. 35). As argued by Hffe (2004) this notion of critique
(as it was used in theatre and art criticism) was appropriated by Kant and employed in a manner
contrary to the common use of the word, which was understood to mean disapproval, objection
or disagreement.
In addition, Hffe (2004: p. 35) explains that the term Kritik in Kants critical project should be
interpreted to coincide with the process of judgement or thorough examination as found in a court of
law. Kants interpretation of critique as a form of judgment unmasks the assumptions of traditional
metaphysics in the same way criminal proceedings examine the false intentions and statements of the
accused. Hence, the examination of the possibilities and limits of reason resembles a judiciary trial
(van Niekerk 1980: p. 164, Hffe 2004: p. 35). As Bernstein (1991: p. 6) argues, a judicious critique
is the type of critique where one seeks to do justice to what is being said and also steps back in
order to evaluate critically strengths and weaknesses, insights and blindnesses, truth and falsity
(italics in original text). Related to this interpretation of the notion of critique as judgement, the task
of the critic can be explained as that of being a good judge who can evaluate the authenticity,
truth, validity or beauty of a given subject matter (Benhabib 1986: p. 19). For Kant, the use of the
judiciary metaphor gave him the opportunity to put a case forward that philosophical method should
not exclusively use the mathematical method as standard model for verifying truth claims.
However, a closer look at the concept critique reveals that in addition to signalling the act of
passing judgement, it also means incisive cutting (Hanssen 2000: p. 4, Alhadeff-Jones 2010:
p. 48). Etymologically, the word kritik is derived from its Greek roots, Krinein and kritikos,
which can be translated to mean to cut, rift, separate, discriminate, but also to decide or
passing judgment (Hanssen 2000: p. 4). Following the economy of the double movement, the
interpretation of critique that coincides with the process of judgement ruptures itself when the
German form of the word judgement, namely Entscheidung (meaning decision or judgement),
is considered in deconstructive fashion. A certain self-division (or deconstruction)7 occurs that can
be explained as follows:
When the German term Entscheidung is orthographically divided into Ent- plus -Scheidung,
it literally becomes to mean de- plus separate, thus: to de-separate or to put an end to
Scheidung, therefore, to bring together or reconcile. Hence, the self-cutting overturns the hierarchy
(to judge/to cut) and a new or supplemented understanding of critique arises. A displacement
takes place. Not only does it become apparent that what seemed to be the primary term to judge
is dependent on to cut, but when we overturn the hierarchy and use the secondary meaning to
separate (or to rupture), the displacement reveals the double bind that is present in the concept
of critique: at once it means to judge and cut apart, but also to de-separate, thus to bring together
and reconcile. Here the logic of the and becomes apparent as Derrida (2000: p. 282) proposes
that deconstruction introduces an and of association and dissociation at the very heart of each
thing, ...it recognises this self-division within each concept.
The key for this new impetus lies in the and that is also located in this deconstructed
understanding of critique. Moreover, it is exactly in this double bind that the inner logic of the

6 Gasch (1994: p. 26) describes the operation of deconstruction as to represent the moment where, in a text, the argument begins to un-
dermine itself; or the relation of a message of communication to itself that, thus, becomes its own object; or finally, the self-revelation
and indication by the text of its own principles of organisation and operation.
7 Through the play of this separation between the two markings, it will be possible to carry out at the same time a deconstruction by inver-
sion and a deconstruction by positive displacement, transgression (Derrida and Houdebine 1973: p. 35).
268 Preiser, Cilliers and Human

notion of critique is exposed to be what Derrida calls a stricture that characterises the new
displaced form of the concept critique. Derrida (1998: p. 36) proposes that it is

this double bind (that) is the question of analysis itself. Not that one must assume the
double bind. By definition a double bind cannot be assumed; one can only endure it in
passion. Likewise, a double bind cannot be fully analysed; one can only unbind one of its
knots by pulling on the other to make it tighter, in the movement called stricture.

Falling into the same category as Derridas other terms such as diffrance, trace, supplement, the
double bind and stricture are not substitutions for a truth or one-place function (Hobson 1998:
p. 162). It is this sense of stricture that inhabits the notion of critique: the constant movement of
bringing together and pulling apart, that allows for some legitimate (albeit temporal) position from
where critical practices can emerge.

The economy of critique as stricture

Drawing on the earlier discussion concerning the relation between the restricted and general
economy, it is obvious that critique as stricture also operates within the currency of the general
economy.
From this deconstructed interpretation of the concept of critique, critique as stricture changes
our critical engagement with complex phenomena to such an extent that it can be described as
a mode of critical practice that can be employed to negotiate the labyrinth of different and often
opposing epistemologies. Critique as stricture offers us the possibility to find some legitimisa-
tion in the fact that it surpasses the reified positions as found in the binary logic of seemingly
opposing positions. Critique as stricture poses a restorative critical practice, which allows for new
and alternative ways of negotiating complex realities.
The role of critique is thus changed from providing a measure or standard against which to judge
norms and notions of truth, to that of becoming a resisting force that undermines and frustrates
totalising projects and calls in question the binary oppositions through which knowledge about
reality is mastered. Moreover, critique as stricture cannot be an absolute negative critique in the
sense that it just resists any kind of affirmation blindly. It aligns itself to some positive affirma-
tions whilst simultaneously knowing that the moment of affirmation also implies the transgres-
sion thereof. Its scepticism towards a blind faith in the power of reason and totalising discourses
that suggest a unity of science or reification of knowledge on the one hand is mirrored by the
same measure of scepticism towards total negativity that amounts to an irresponsible kind of
nihilism or relativism. By being mindful of the fact that the in-betwix is a constellation of clustered
and juxtaposed differences and irreducible propositions and principles, our way of thinking is
challenged to change in such a way that it resists total reduction and total reconciliation simulta-
neously. In the name of this simulated kind of thinking, the affirmation of a critique that has the
capability to rupture and reconcile at once is found.
Moreover, as a theory that exposes the limits of scientific methods and the implications
of reductionist methodologies, the grammar of critique as stricture not only coincides with
the grammar of the critical project but also transcends it in the same way that deconstruction
transcends classification as being a critical theory. Hence, the act of criticising not only results in
the bridging of opposing paradigms, but simultaneously disrupts and ruptures unified ideas and
totalitarian dogmatism. As an intervention, critique as stricture becomes a relentless undercurrent
of resistance that never rests.
In a more existential sense, the general economy of critique as stricture can be understood to
simultaneously mean a critiqueof (being a strategy or mode of questioning) as well as to mean
critiqueas (becoming an attitude or strategy of thinking). It is this double understanding of
critique that allows us a kind of thinking that is more thoughtful to the questions of what it means
to be human in a complex world. As will be discussed here below, this kind of thinking can be
found in the notion of critical complexity thinking a mode of thinking that is informed by the
logic of the general economy.
South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(3): 261273 269

The economy of critical complexity thinking

By inscribing the generative movement of the Derridean double bind into both the concepts
critique and complexity, a synergy is formed that amounts to the notion of critical
complexity. Influenced by this double reading of Derrida and Morin, it is possible to interpret
the idea of critical complex thinking as the embodiment of both diffrance and the double
bind. It alludes to a kind of thinking that takes place in the force field where the tension between
differences are upheld, brought together and kept apart at the same time.
Considering that the first meaning of the word complexity stems from the Latin noun complexus,
which means what is woven together (Morin 2007: p. 6), the notion of critical complexity thinking
can supplement the new deconstructed meaning of the concept of critique as stricture. The way in
which the weaving together should be understood is demonstrated by Morin (2008) and Cilliers
(1998, 2007, 2010) when they speak of complex thinking. Derived from a complex systems
understanding of how meaning and our interpretation of reality arises, the logic of critical complex
thinking proposes a type of thinking that necessitates a double movement similar to what Derrida
calls the double bind. It suggests that the concept and its counterpart (the yes and the no) are thought
simultaneously. Morin (2007) calls this the logical core of complexity, which is dialogical and
economical in nature. However, the art lies not in thinking one in terms of the other in binary
motion, but in terms of how the one is dependent and determined by the other. The knack lies not
in describing opposites when making knowledge claims, but in thinking both at the same time. It is
described as a dialogic (that) is not the response to these paradoxes, but the means of facing them,
by considering the productive play of complementary antagonisms (Morin 2007: p. 20).
Not only does the economy of critical complexity thinking join seemingly unrelated paradigms of
thought, but it simultaneously also represents a gap between different traditions. From this double
bind of the gap and the bringing together of seemingly contradictory traditions, a rupture emerges.
From this rupture, in turn, the possibility of interruption is born where a liminal space is opened
in which all orientations are challenged to critically negotiate new ways of thinking and knowing.
The economy of the critical complexity approach takes on a dynamic character that has the ability
to remain alive whilst operating in the tension of the paradoxical stricture. As a mode of thinking it
becomes a relentless undercurrent of interruption that never rests. The interruption is characterised by
the recognition of the limitations that each different orientation of thought has to offer. In the concep-
tual opening that is generated by the performative tension in which the logic of critical complexity
negotiates between crude reductionism and totalising holism or stringent forms of rule-making and
interpretation, a crack emerges from where dichotomies are destabilised and exposed.
From this position of interruption a gap opens up that offers us a way through discourses that
pronounce the end of science (Horgan 1996) and philosophy (Badiou 2006). We are not left at
some dead end where all scientific and philosophic endeavours or the nature of reality is just a
construction of the human mind with no relation to an outside. An understanding of the related-
ness of the different orientations affords us the possibility to engage in philosophic practise that
amounts to an endeavour that is neither absolute, nor eternal, but open to excess, innovation and
creativity. Complex thinking and its critical imperative allow us to be more thoughtful and open to
the call of questions relating to injustice, exploitation and different forms of oppression. Hidden in
the heart of critical complex thinking is the possibility of thinking differently about what it means
to be human in a world that is changing more rapidly than we can control.

Towards an ethics of critical complexity

In this paper we have argued that Derridas work can contribute towards a deeper understanding
of complex systems. Part of the argument was to show that when dealing with complexity, we
never escape the realm of choice and that consequently, there are always implicitly or explicitly
normative issues involved. In the final part of the paper we hope to make some first steps in
developing an ethics of complexity that can give some content to this normative dimension.
The argument for the inevitability of an ethical position when dealing with complexity can be
made in the following way: since we cannot have complete knowledge of complex things we
cannot calculate their behaviour in any deterministic way. We have to interpret and evaluate. Our
270 Preiser, Cilliers and Human

decisions always involve an element of choice that cannot be justified objectively. What is more,
no matter how careful our actions are considered, they may turn out to have been a mistake. Thus,
acknowledging that values and choice are involved does not provide any guarantee that good will
come of what we do. Critical complexity tells us that ethics will be involved, but does not tell us
what that ethics actually entails. The ethics of complexity is thus radically or perpetually ethical.
There is no a priori principle we can follow, nor utility we can compute. We do not escape the
realm of choice.
The problem with developing an ethics of complexity is, of course, nothing new that one could
ascribe to be unique to the study of complexity.8 There are many different forms of postmeta-
physical theories that deal with the problem of the loss of the outside or the so-called death of
the transcendental subject that makes it impossible to find a legitimate point from outside our
systems of knowing from where to justify what norms are acceptable and which are objection-
able. Thus, the dilemma that all poststructural ethical theories face is the problem that there is no
a priori principle that can be followed that could guarantee that the norms and criteria we choose
will produce ethical behaviour or that justice might flow from it. This problematic is expressed
clearly in Frasers (2008: p. 406) critique of poststructural theories of justice when she states
that the so-called loss of the outside amounts to the fact that the basic parameters of justice are
contested and that it results in a lack of authoritative standards for assessing the merits of justice
claims. Stated in different terms, allegiance to a poststructural position implies that there is no
transcendental Archimedic point that can provide us with something to hold unto.
The implications of trying to find legitimate justifications for adopting ethical standards after
having denounced all objective or transcendental positions is summed up poignantly by Praeg
(2010: p. 259) in his discussion of the hegemonic powers that are at work in developing countries
and how they position themselves in a globally changing world of power relations:

There is no outside of/to a global complex network. This means that the signifiers
hitherto used in order to invent and legitimize such systems of differentiation from the
outsideGod, time, autonomy, evolution, rationality, Freedom, Democracy and so
forthhave and will increasingly become drawn into the system Contorted remnants of
previous legitimations, they will increasingly give rise to a symptomatic relativism: whose
rationality? Whose concept of freedom? Whose notion of democracy? Whose freedom
fighter and whose terrorist? When this occurs we will have moved, in the terms of analysis
offered here, from a politics to an ethics. More precisely, we will have witnessed the end of
(modernist) politics and a return of/to the ethical.

What is highlighted in Praegs quote is the fact that the ethical is not to be found in the moment of
organised politics or in any moralising strategies. Moreover, there is a change in focus in terms of
when ethics enters into the picture. This view aptly describes the way in which the ethical turn takes
place in the formulation of the notion of critical complexity: when meaning emerges relationally in a
system of differences, the ethical moment is born when we have reached the limits of our computing
or equalling out strategies. When we know which decisions or strategies lead to what results or
outcomes, we dont need ethics, but moral codes of conduct protocols or best-practice manuals.
The ethical moment can thus be redefined as being situated in the moment in which we take the leap
from that which is known to that which is uncertain or unknown. Derrida (1999: p. 280) calls this
leap into the unknown the moment of undecidability and he describes it as follows:

I have to prepare a decision to know where I can go as well, as consciously as possible,

but I should acknowledge that between the accumulation of knowledge and the moment I
make a choice, I take a responsibility, I make a decision, there is an infinite abyss because
of the heterogeneity of these moments. That is why I so constantly insist on the undecid-
ability, which does not mean you are simply paralysed and neutralised because you dont

8 See Woermann and Cilliers (2012) for a more detailed discussion on the idea of an ethics of complexity.
South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(3): 261273 271

know what to do. Simply, in order for a decision to be a decision it has to go through a
moment when irrespective of what you know, you make a leap into the decision. This leap
into the responsibility is an infinite one and you take a decision only in a situation when
there is something undecidable, when you dont know what to do. You dont know. That is,
if you knew what to do, there would be no decision, you would have already done

What is very clear from the above is the fact that the ethical moment is born once we enter into
the gap of the infinite abyss that is created by the limits of our models. Being face to face with the
limit forces a change in terms of how we define the notion of ethics. Subsequently, it is suggested
that critical complexity thinking is informed by a kind of normative turn that emerges from an
understanding of ethics that is defined in terms of its situatedness of being in the gap where it
is faced with the unknown or stated differently the limit. Moreover, such an understanding
of ethics calls the moral agent not to choose between either a transcendental position or a
pragmatic one. Rather, it requires from the agent to enter into the ambiguity of the both/and logic
of the general economy. This argument is echoed by Baudrillard (1994) when he argues that
poststructural notions of ethics can only stand a chance of achieving any form of credibility if it
becomes a strategy of radical antagonism, a play upon reality, the issuing of a challenge to the
real, an attempt to put the real on the spot. Thus, the movement of stricture and the economy of the
double bind remain inescapable also for rethinking the notion of ethics when faced with the limits
of what we can know and do.

Conclusion
The project of critical complexity makes clear that we are always acting from a particular contin-
gent position with a limited amount of resources, in other words, from a particular economy.
This economy would be sufficient were complex systems closed and did not contain play.
However, things are not that simple and our economies of thought are always exceeded by an
excess. It is for this reason that the project of critical complexity can never rest on solid ground;
we are always forced to reassess our position. Yet we must act in the world and therefore we are
forced to act from the restricted economies we function with. Yet this is the possibility of action,
otherwise our actions would not be distinguishable. This is why often the strongest actions, be
they good or bad, arise from a very restricted worldview. But what is important to note is that
even though we may be successful for the time being, the ever-changing conditions of life mean
that this success is always limited in time and space, we will eventually be forced to find other
means of reaching our goals. The critical project grants us this insight that possibilities can be
found between the limits and in the stricture of the restricted economies we operate from and the
general milieu in which these actions rest. These possibilities are brought forth by the cutting
up and weaving together of possibilities, like the possibilities found in the weaving together of
deconstruction and complexity.
However, when we cut and weave we not only create new possibilities but we exclude others.
The ethics of complexity rests in this tension between the different economies, between what
remains in our economy and what we exclude. The ethics of complexity attempts to guide us
in acting in meaningful ways whilst taking into consideration that these actions are meaningful
precisely because they close down other possibilities. Our actions should always therefore be seen
as provisional (note this does not mean that we cannot be held accountable for our actions, quite to
the contrary). This ethics thereby reminds us that there is always the possibility for another process
of cutting and weaving, for another engagement with the general economy, in short this ethic
reminds us of the necessity of alternatives. The acknowledgment of the fact that our economies are
always restricted, that play exists within our economies, that there are always more possibilities
than we grant (both good and bad) is becoming increasingly important in a world more and more
committed to a single restricted economy. In order to make other worlds possible, even to simply
imagine an alternative means of existence, it is imperative that we engage with the restless resist-
ance that can be found in the cutting and weaving together of complexity and deconstruction, in
the possibilities that this dialogic reveals.
272 Preiser, Cilliers and Human

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