t

.3 .. 1,/,
5+

C O M P A R A T IAVNEA L Y S I S
A R A BA N D I S R A E L IC O M B APTE R F O R M A N C E
1967 AND 1973 I,|ARS

{ri
-at at
F - -

= 3 1I
t;rrl
J
.lt F
a D <
F .

O D
. D
I ]
) F
-xa
e t 9
O

i-

-E
IF

l,tt
f A Report Preparedfor
3 j 0ffice, Assistant Secretary of Defense
F J June 1976
ela
F
Undercontract No. DNA001-76-A-0089
t3

\
J

This work sponsoredby the DefenseNuclearAgencyunder:

RDT&E RMSSCodex337076469Q8sQAxYx91220

a
EYAIUATIOil
HISTORICAT ORGA}IIZATIO}I
ANDRTSTARCH

L+r6. I
 ERRATA

Comparative Analysis
Arab and Israeli CombatPerformance
1957 and 1973 V'lars

d+
.J .:.lcture Chanqe

7 2 Column 7 heading from L/I2 Dj.v to read 1/8 Div

1/36 Bde L/24 Bde

) 6 Eng. No, 67-2 should read Abu Ageila-i.l.mKatef

-0 I .June 8, columns 3 and 4 should read 10.I(i00) and

10.I(4) respectively

10 9 \tune 5 line should read across: 28, 79, (1)18,

1(46),(10), (32)r.., .., ..,

23 33 For engagements 22, 23, 24, change Anab CEV col-umn

to read down: I.70, 0.73, 0.26

23 33 For engagements 22, 23, 24, change Israeli CEV

column to read down: 0.59, 1.36, 3.85

24 35 For 1967 - West Bank (far left column) change

Israeli CEV to 1.95 (far right colurnn)

26 last Change first line to read: In 1970, following an

para, equally dismal performance against Jordan, there
had been one more coup dtetat, led this time by
the then Ministen of Vrlar, Aln Force General
Hafez aI Assad.
 TABLEOF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 3
?
O b j e c t iv e
Data Sounces 3
A
P a r t i c i o a n ts t

COMBAT IN THE1967 I,'|AR

PERFORMANCES
The Data 5
D a t aA n a l y s i s 5

COMBAT IN THE 1973 WAR

PERFORMANCE 15

TheData 15
D a t aA n a l y s i s 15
C a m p a ' igAnn a l yse s 15

OVERALL EVALUATION
COMPARATIVE (J

IONS
CONCLUS 28

List of Fjgures

1 . A p p ro xi ma te F o rceS tre n g ths, Sjx- DayW ar , 1967 7

? . Es t ima te dIsra e l i A rma ment Summ ar ies, 1967 7
3 . Es t ima te dE g yp ti a nA rma ment Summ ar ies, 1967 7
4 . Es t ima te dJo rd a n i a nA rma ment Summ ar ies, 1967 8
5 . Es t ima te dS yri a n A rma ment Summ ar ies, 1967 B
6. EngagemenS t si,x - D a yW a r , J u n e 1 9 6 7 9
7 . E s t i m a t eA d l l o c a t i o no f B a t t l e C a s u a l t i e s S , inai Front,
J u n e5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e 10
8 . E s t i m a t e dA l l o c a t i o n o f T a n kL o s s e s ,S i n a i F r o n t ,
J u n e5 - 8 , 1 . 9 6 7I,n c ] u s i v e 10
9 . E s t j m a t e dC l o s eA i r S u p p o r tF i g h t e r - B o m b S e ro r t i e s
S u e z - S i n aFi r o n t , J u n e5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c ] u s i v e t0
1 0 . E s t i m a t e dA l l o c a t i o n o f B a t t l e C a s u a l t ' i e sJ, o r d a nF r o n t ,
J u n e5 - 7 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e 10
1 1 . E s t i m a t e dA l l o c a t i o n o f T a n kL o s s e s ,J o r d a nF r o n t
J u n e5 - 7 , L 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e 11
L 2 . E s t i m a t e dC l o s eA i r S u p p o r tF i g h t e r - B o m b S e ro r t i e s ,
J o r d a n i a nF r o n t , J u n e5 - 7, L 9 6 7 , I n c ' l u s i v e 11
1 3 . E s t j m a t eA d l l o c a t i o no f B a t t l e C a s u a l t j e s G , o l a nF r o n t ,
J u n e9 - 1 0 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c ] u s i v e 11
1 4 . E s t i m a t e dA l l o c a t ' i o no f T a n kL o s s e s ,S y r j a n F r o n t ,
J u n e9 - 1 0 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e 11
1 5 . E s t i m a t e dC l o s eA i r S u p p o r tF i g h t e r - B o m b e Sro r t i e s ,
G o l a nF r o n t , J u n e9 - 1 0 , L 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e 11
1 6 . E n g a g e m eDnat t a C a l c u l a t i o nI n p u t S h e e t L2
1 7 . M o d e l( E n g a g e m e nCt a) l c u l a t i o nF o r m 13
1 8 . P r e l i m i n a r y1 9 6 7A r a b - I s r a e l i W a rA n a l y s i s t4
1 9 . 1 9 6 7A r a b - I s r a ei l W a rA n a l y s i s - R e f i n e d 14
 (continued)
0F C0NTENTS
TABLE Page

L i s t o f F i g u r e s( c o n t i n u e d )
2 0 - A . E sti ma te dGro u n dS trengths,0ctober 1973 16
B . E sti ma te dL o sse s,October1973 16
z L - A . A i r F o rceS tre n g th s,October1973 t7
B . E sti ma te dA i r L o sse s,0ctober 1973 L7
2 2 . E sti ma te dIsra e l i A rma m ent Summ ar ies, 1973 18
23. EstimatedEgyptianArmament Surmaries, 1.973 18
24. EstimatedSyrian Arrnament Summaries, 1973 19
2 5 . S i n a i F ro n t E n g a g e ments, October1973 19
26, Estimated Allocation o f B a t t l e C a s u a l t i e s ,S i n a i F r o n t n
0 c t o b e r6 - 2 4 , L 9 7 3 ,I n c l u s i v e 20
27. Estimated A l l o c a t i o no f T a n kL o s s e s ,S i n a i F r o n t ,
0ctoberr6-24, Incl usi ve 20
2 8 . Esti ma te dC l o seA i r S u ppor tFighter - Bomber Sor ties,
S u e z-S i n a F i ro n t, October6- 24, L973 21
29. Golan Front Engagements, 0ctober 1973 , . 2t
30. Estimated A l l o c a t i o no f B a t t l e C a s u a l t j e s ,G o l a nF r o n t ,
0 c t o b e r6 - 2 2 , 1 9 7 3 ,I n c l u s i v e 22
31. Estimated A ] l o c a t i o no f T a n kL o s s e s ,G o l a nF r o n t ,
Octo b e r6 -2 2 , 1 .9 7 3 22
3 2 . E sti ma te dC l o seA i r S u ppor tFighter Bomber Sor ties,
Go 'l a nF ro n t, 0 cto b er 6- 22, L973 23
3 3 . P r e l i m i n a r y1 9 7 3A r a b - I s r a e l iW a rA n a l y s i s 23
3 4 . 1 97 3A ra b -Isra e li l ,l a rAnalysis- Ref i ned 24
3 5 . C omp a ra ti ve C a mp a 'i gAnnalyses,1967, 1973 24
 COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS,ARABANDISRAELI COMBAT
PERFORMANCE
1967AND1973WARS
A HER0Report

INTRODUCTION

OBJ ECT IVE

T h e p u r p o s eo f t h i s s t u d y b y t h e H i s t o r j c a l E v a l u a t i o na n d R e s e a r c 0h r g a n i z a -
t i o n ( H E R 0 )w , a s s t a t e d i n t h e T a s k0 r d e r t o b e a s f o l l o w s :

U t i I i zi n g d a ta a 1re a d y a va i' ab] l e to HERO, with such additions and

r e f i n e m e ntsa s a re mu tu a l l y a g r eedby HERO and OASD( I)to be necessar y
a n d f e a s i b l e w i t h i n b u d g e t a r yl i m i t s o f t h e s t u d' level
y , H E Rw
Oi l l a n a l y z e
a p p r o x i m a te 'lte y n e n g a g e me n ts, each, at br igade or higher , for the
1 9 6 7Si x Da yWa r, a n d th e 1 9 7 3OctoberW ar , em ployingboth the Quantified
J u d g m e nMt e t h o do f A n a l y s i so f H i s t o r i c a l C o m b aDt a t a ( Q J M Aa) n d q u a l i t a -
t i v e h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y t i c a l t e c h n i q u e s ,i n o r d e r t o a s c e r t a i nt h e f o l l o w i n g :
a . Re l a ti ve co mb a e t ffe cti v enessof the opposedfor ces in each
e ng a g e me n t;
b . P a t t e r n so r d i f f e r e n c e si n r e l a t i v e c o m b aet f f e c t i v e n e s so f
d j f f e r e n t A r a bu n i t s a n d a r m i e s ;
c . P a t t e r n so r d i f f e r e n c e sb e t w e e nr e l a t i v e A r a b - I s r a e l i c o m b a t
p e r f o r m a n cien 1 9 6 7a n d i n 1 9 7 3 ;
d . T h e e x t e n t t o w h i c hA r a b a n d I s r a e l i r e l a t i v e p e r f o r m a n c e
c ha n g e db e tw e e no ffe n sive and defensivepostur es;
e . T he e xte n t to w h i ch th e pr esenceor lack of air powerappear s
t o h a ve i n fl u e n ce dco mbatout om es;
t . T he e xte n t to w h i ch o u tcom es wer e jnfluencedb.yany other
v a r i a b ] e so f c o m b a t .
Th e t a s k s t o b e p e rfo rme da n d th e pr ocedur esto be followed, accor dingto the T as k
0rder, were:
1. C o m p i l a t ' i oonf d a t a ; t o i n c l u d e s u c ha d d i t i o n so r r e f i n e m'el n t so f
e x is t i n g H E R O d a ta a s ma ybe necessar y,assur ing compati b' i i ty,
t o t h e e x t e n t p o s s i b l e nw i t h d a t a u s e di n o n g o i n ga n a l y s e so f t h e
M id d ]e E a s t B a la n c e ;
2 . Q u a n t i t a t i v ea n a l y s i so f t h e 1 9 6 7W a rd a t a b y 0 J M ;
3 . Q u a l i t a t i v ea n a l y s i so f 1 9 6 7W a rd a t a ;
4 . Q u a n t i t a t i v ea n a l y s i so f 1 9 7 3W a rd a t a b y Q J M ;
5 . Q u a l i t a t i v ea n a l y s i so f 1 9 7 3W a rd a t a ;
6 . C o m p a r a t i veev a l u a t i o no f r e s u l t s o f s t e p s 2 - 5 , i n c l u s i v e ;
7 . P r e p a r a t i o no f R e p o r t .
DATASOURCES
I n t h e p e r f o r m a n coef S t e p 1 , d a t a o n t h e 1 9 7 3w a r a l r e a d ya v a i l a b l e t o H E R w 0 as
re v i e w e da n d re fi n e d o n th e b a si s of infor mation collected for a r epor t on "The
M i d d l eE a s t W a ri n H i s t o r i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e , "p r e p a r e df o r t h e D i r e c t o r o f N e t A s s e s s -
m e n t , D e p a r t m e notf D e f e n s e a, n d a d d j t ' i o n a li n f o r m a t i o nr e c e i v e di n c o n v e r s a t i o n s
w i t h M a j o rG e n e r a Al vraham A d a n ,I s r a e l ' i A r m y ,a n d C o l o n e lA v r a h a m A y a ' l o n ,I s r a e l i
Army.
 D a t ao n th e 1 9 6 7h l a r i s th a t com piledin an unpublished oper ationalnar rati v e
of that war p re p a re d
b y C o l o n e lT .N" Dupuy, USA, Ret.., with assistance of member s
o f t h e H ER Q sta i f, w h i ch has b e e n r eviewed and comm ented on by militar y offici al s
of the I s r a el i , E g yp ti a na n d Jo rd anian ar med for ces.
A c u r s o ry ch e cko f so mei te ms of classified data on the 0ctoberl,{ arled t o a
c o n c l u s i o nt h l t t h e H E R u 0 n c l a s s i f i e dd a t a i s p r o b a b l yj u s t a s a c c u r a t e ;t h u s n o
c l a s s i f i e d d a t a w a su s e di n t h e s t u d y , a n d a c c o r d ' i n g ltyh i s r e p o r t i s n o t c l a s s i -
fied.
PARTI CI PANTS
M o s to f th e w o rk o n th i s stu dy and this r epor t wasdoneby ColonelT.N. Dupuy ,
U S A ,R e t . , a n d C o l o n e lJ o h nA . C . A n d r e w sU, S A FR , e t . C o n t r i b u t i o n st o t h e s t u d y
w e r e a l s o ma d eb y Gra ceP . H a ye sand Vivian Lyons,of the HERO staff. The un der -
s i g n e dt a k e s f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t yf o r t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e s t u d ya n d t h i s r e p o r t .

D u n nL o r i n g , V i r g i n i a T.N. Dupuy
1 5 J u n e1 9 7 6 ExecutiveDir ector
 COMBAT
PERFORMANCES
IN THE1967 t^lAR

THEDATA
nsix DayW a r ,"
f i g u r e 1 i :_ a su rma ryo f ma j or statistical data of the 1967
in c l u d i n g o v era l l stre n g th s a n d i osses of per sonneland selectedm ajor iiem s ot
! 9 u l R m e nfto r a ' l l ^ m a i o rp a r t i c i p a n t s . F i g u r e s2 , 3 , 4 , a n d 5 p r e s e n tm o r ed e -
t a i l e d l i s t i n g s o f th e p ri n ci p a l var ietiei of weiponsind combbtequipmentes ti -
m a t e dt o b e o n h a n di n th e Isra e l i , Egyptian,Jor danianand Syr ian' ar m iesas of
f . J g n e L 9 6 7 , sh o w i n gp re su mead'l l ocationsto m ajor combatfor m ations, such as
divisions andbrigades.
_ F i g u r e6 i s a ' l i s t i n g o f a l l m a j o r e n g a g e m e notns a l l t h r e e f r o n t s , b e t w e e n
J u n e 5 a n d J u n e 1 0 . F i g u re 7 i s an estim atedbr eakdown of the pr esum ed total
I s r a e l i a n d F g y p t i a nc a i u a ' l t i e so n t h e S i n a i f r o n t , w i t h a l l o c a t i o n s t o d a y s a n d
e n g a g e m e nba ts se du p o np ro fe ssi o nalhistor ical and m ilitar y judgm entin coir s i der a-
t io n o f t h e Du p u yd e ta i l e d n a rra ti v e of oper ationscited uir aerr Data sour ces"i n
t h e I n t r o d u cti o n to th i s re p o rt. Figur e 8 is a com par able br eakdown of pr esu m ed
I s r a e ' l i ^ a n dEg yp ti a nta n k l o sse s on the Sinai fr ont, by day and by engagem ent.
Fig u r e 9 i s a co mp a ra b l be re a kd o wn of estim ateddir ect air - suppor i alioiations by
t h e I s r a e l i an d E g yp ti a na i r fo rces, also r elated to engagem ehls and dates.
F i g u r e s1 0 , 1 1 , a n d 1 2 p r o v i d ec o m p a r a b ldea t a e s t i m a t e sf o r t h e J o r d a n ,W e s t
B a n k ,F r o n t , J u n e5 - 7 , 1 9 6 7 . F i g u r e s1 3 , 1 4 , a n d 1 5 p r o v i d ec o m p a r a b ldea t a e s t i -
ma t e sf o r t h e S yri a n , Go l a n , F ro n t, June 9- 10, 1967.
Av a i l a b l e re so u rce so f ti me and funds per mitted analysis of onl,ytwelve en-
gagements of the 1967War-four on each front. This was a total of two more 1967
wa r e n g a g e m e a t a 'l yse sth a n w a s pr ovidedfor in the Task 0r der .
nn
DATAANALYSIS
F i g u r e 1 6 !s_ a sa mp l ee n g a g ement data sheet for Engagem ent 67- L, the Bat tl e of
R a f a , J u n e6 , 1 9 6 7 . F i g u r e 1 7 i s a s a m p l ee n g a g e m ecnitl i u l a t i o n s h e e t f o r t h e
e n g a g e m e nst ,h o w i n g .th ea p p l i ca ti on of the data to the for m ulaeof the Quant i fi ed
J u d g m e nMt o de l(QJM). T h e e n tri e s for Figur e 18, "Pr eliminar y1967Ar ab- Isr ael i
W a rA n a l y s i s , " a r e d e r i v e df r o m t h e s e a n d - c o m p a r a bd' a l et a a n d - c a l c u l a t i o ns h e e t s
f o r t h e o t h e r e 'l e ve ne n g a g e me n ts.That figur e pr ovidesa sur nm ation of the QJ M
a n a l y s e so f t h e s e _ q l g a g e m e nat sn ,d i s t h e e s s e n c eo f t h i s s t u d y ' s q u a n t i t a t i v e
a n a l y s i so f t h e 1 9 6 7W a r .
T h e c o l u m n so f F i g u r e 1 8 a r e d e s c r i b e da s f o l l o w s :
1 . E n g a g e mennut mb e r(se e Figur e 6)
2 . N u me ri cama l n p o w eco r mpar ison( Ar abwith r espect to Isr aeli)
3 . F i re p o w e rco mp a ri so n ratio
4 . R e l a t i v ec o m b aP t o w e r ,b a s i c c a l c u l a t i o n , i n w h i c ha l r r e a d i l y -
i d e n t i f i a b l e c o m b avt a r i a b l e s h a v eb e e nc o n s i d e r e d i
5 . T h e e ffe cts o f su rp ri se, r eflecting effects of sur pr ise on r elativ e
m o b i l i t y a n d v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s o f t h e o p p o n e n tas s c a l c u l a t e df o r
W o r l dW a rI I e n g a g e m e n t s . l
6 . M o d i fi e d co mb a tP o w e rRatio ( to r eflect effects of sur pr ise)
7 . Engagement outcomes
8 . E ffe cti ve C o mb aPt o w erRatioi the r atio that would have been
r e q u i r e df o r a v e r a g er a t i o - r e s u l t r e l a t i o n s h i p i n w o r l d w a r I I
e n g a g e me d nat ta b a se ( ( n - n) /S + t )
9 . A r a b C o m b aEt f f e c t i v e n e s sV a l u e ( C f V 1 ;c a l c u ' l a t e db y d i v i d i n g e n t r y
i n c o l u m n8 b y t h a t i n c o l u m n6 .
1 0 . I sra e l i C E V(re cr'p ro calof Ar ab CEV)

l s e e , T . N . D u p u y,T h e Qu a n ti ,!ied M ethodof Analysis of Histor ica l

Co m b aDt a t a . H E R 0 D llg4gment
, un
 D u p in gth e p ro ce sso f a n a l y sis of the data in F' igur eLB, and that of Fi gur e 34
( c o n t a i n in gs'i mi l a r a n a l yti ca l data fr om 1973W arengagement analyses) ,thr e e anal y -
t i c a l h y po th e sehsa veb e e nfo rmulated:
1 . A ra b p e rfo rma n ce i n si tuations and ci' r cumstances in whichthey wer e fol l ow -
i n g c a r e f ul l y p re p a re dp re -w a rplans was substantially better than whencop i ngw i th
u n a n t i c i pa te dco mb asi t tu a ti o n s ; this ability is est' imate{at abouta 30%im pr ov e-
m e n to v e r sta n d a rdp e rfo rma n ce in pr e- planned oper ations.z
2 . Th e e ffe cts o f su rp ri s e in 1967and 1973com batsituations wasclear l y m or e
s i g n i f i c a nt th a n i t h a d b e e ni n com batbetween the Ger m ans and the W ester nAl l i es i n
1 9 4 3a n d 19 4 4 ;th i s i n cre a sea p pear ed to be pr opor tiona'to l the gr eater ave r agedi s -
p e r s i o no f tro o p s i n th e sew a rs ( about4,000 squar emeter sper m an)than in W or l d
W a rI I ( a b o u t3 , 0 0 0s q u a r em e t e r sp e r m a n ) . T h i s e n h a n c evda l u eo f s u r p r i s ei n a n
t ith Soviet
l n v i r o n m e ns te e m tso b e c o n s i s t e n w
i n c r e a s i n g ' lsyc i e n t i f i c - t e c h n i c a e
a s s e s s m en ts, a s re p re se n te d b y the following quotationfr om ScientificlTeqln!!q]-
ProgressaqlIdt1eRbvo.|utionjirMiljtar.vAffijrsbyCo1onelGffis.

S c i e n t i f i c - t e c h n i c apl r o g r e s si s t h e m a t e r i a lb a s i s o f t h o s er e v o l u t i o n a r y
c h a n g ew s h i chh a veo ccu rre din the Soviet Ar medFor cesin r ecent year s.
. . / T n i s Z r e v o l u t i o ni n m j ' l i t a r ya f f a i r s t o a s i g n i f i c a n td e q r e eh a s
r a i s - e dt-h ei mp o rta n ce o f sur pr ise. High combatr eadinessof the Soviet
Ar m e dF o rce si s ca u se db y the m ost impor tantof all the tasks confr ont' i ng
t h e m -th a t i s, to th w a rt th e intentions and pr ovidea decisiveand com-
p l e t e d e fe a t to a n y a g g re ssor . The pr esentcapabilities of the Soviet
Ar m e dF o rce sma kei t p o ssi bleto solve th' is pr ob' lem .
3 . Th ed i sru p ti ve e ffe cts of sur pr ise evidently continuefor at least tw o day s
a f t e r t h e s u r p r i s ei s a c h i e v e d . F o r t h e f j r s t d a y i t i s a b o u tt w o - t h i r d st h e d i s -
r u p t i v e e ffe ct o f th e su rp ri se as calculatedfor the day it occur s, and abo utone-
t h i r d t h e ' i n i t i a l s u r p r i s ed i s r u p t i v ee f f e c t o n t h e s e c o n d a y a f t e r s u r p r i s ej s
a c he i ved.
T h ea p p l i c a t j o no f t h e s eh y p o t h e s et so t h e a n a l y t i c a l r e s u l t s o f F i g u r e1 8 p r o -
v ' i d e ss o me w h a ret fi n e d va l u e sfor com bateffectiveness,as shownin Figur e 19.
T h e re fi n e d a n a l ysi s re fl e cted by the values in Figur e 19 showsr emar kabl cy on-
s i s t e n t v a l u e s ' i n r e l a t i v e c o m b aet f f e c t i v e n e s so f t h e o p p o n e n tws i t h i n e a c ho f t h e
t h r e e s e t s o f fo u r e n g a g e me non ts the thr ee separ atefr onts. It showsthat the
I s r a e ' l j c o mb aet ffe cti ve n e sssu per ior ity over the Egyptianswason the average96% ,
o r a C E Vo f 1 . 9 6 ;t h e i r s u p e r i o r i t yo v e r t h e J o r d a n i a nw s a so n t h e a v e r a g e5 3 % o ,r a
C E V0 f 1 . 6 3 ; I s r a e l i s u p e r i o r i t yo v e r t h e S y r i a n sw a so n t h e a v e r a g e
3 1 3 % o, r a CEV
of 4 . 1 3 .
N o r ma l i zi n gth e se re l a t'i o nshipson the Syr ian per for m ance pr ovidesthe fol l ow -
i n g i n t e r e s t i n gc o m p a r i s o n :
Israeljs 4.13 (1.63) (1.96)
Jordanian 2.53 (i.00) (1.20)
Esyptian 2.11 (1.00) (t.oo)
Syrian 1.00

2 t h i s p h e n o m e n ohna s a l s o b e e n n o t e d ' i n W o r l d W a r I I e n g a g e m e n tbse t w e e nR u s -

s i a n a n d G e r m a nf o r c e s , s u p p o r t j n g a m o r e g e n e r a l h y p o t h e s i s : w h e na f o r c e o f l o w e r
c o m b a te f f e c t i v e n e s s ' i s a b l e t o s e i z e t h e i n i t j a t i v e a n d o p e r a t e ' i n a c c o r d a n c w e ith
c a r e f u l ' l y p r e p a r e d p ' l a n sf o r e i t h e r o f f e n s e o r d e f e n s e , t h e c o m b a te f f e c t i v e n e s s
d i f f e r e n t i a ' l i s r e d u c e db y o n e - t h i r d .
 Figure 1. APPR0XIMATE
F0RCESTRENGTHS,
SIX-0AY t{AR, 1967

totraI
I s rael Arahs EqvDt Jordan Svria
Mobilized Manpower 210,000 309,000 200,000 45,000 6 3 , 0 0 0
Tanks r nnna t ?47 t ,3000 zeTt 750
APC 1, 5 0 0 b 1, 8 4 5 t,050 2r0 585
Arrtti l l e r y P i e c e s ?03 962 575 72 315
SAM 50 160 160 0 0
AA Guns 550 2,050+ 950 ? 1, 1 0 0
Combat
C ombaA
t ircraft 286c 682 431e 18 tzTr 106
4 2 0 0 M - 4 8 , 2 5 0 C e n t u r i o n s , 1 5 0 A M X - 1 3 ,4 0 0 S h e r m a n - S u p eSr h e m a n .
u H aI t t r a c k s .
clncludes 92 Mirage, 24 Superli|ystere, 72 Mystere, 55 ouragan, 24
light bombers.
d l n c l u d e s 4 0 0 T - 3 4 , 4 5 0 T - 5 4 l 5 5 , 1 O OS u - 1 0 0 . l O 0 J S - 3 .
e l n c l u d e s 5 5 5 u - 7 , 1 6 3 M i G - 2 1 ,4 0 M i G - 1 9 ,1 0 0 M i G - i 5 / 1 7 , 3 0 T u - 1 6 ,
4 J l t - l d : s n o r f ,0 t o l t o t s .
rlncludes 200 M-48. 80 Centurions.
9 I n c l u d e s4 0 s u p e r s o n l c ,6 8 M i c - 1 5 / 1 7 , 1 5 T u - 1 6 , 4 I t - 2 8 .

Figure 2. ESTIMATED
ISRAELIARI'lAlrtENT
SUI4MARIES,
1967

Ll 12 Div 9 2 l4 2 8 l
Fleczd Armd Armd Arty 1/36 Bde Arty Amd I n f , / P a r a Meczd Armd I
Inf Bde Bde Bde Rgt Rst l'1isc Unlts Rgts Rgts Bde Bde Bde Totals
Personnel 4,300 4,300 3,600 2,000 I,000 25,000 9,000 4,000 6 0 , 2 0 0 I 600 28,800 | 135,600
P is t o l 430 430 360 200 100 2,500 900 400 6,020 860 2 aan | 1? qf,n
Rifle 3,870 3,870 3,240 I,800 900 22,500 8 ,1 0 0 3,600 5 4 , 1 8 0 7 740 ?5,920 1122,040
l ' 4 a c hnie G u n , I t 120 80 40 30 10 250 270 60 1, 6 8 0 160 320 | 2,740
l ' l a c h i n eG u n , h v y 80 60 40 420 270 1, 1 2 0 1?0 320 | 2.310
l4ortar, 81m 20 10 :o :' 280 20 I loo
llortar, 4.2" I2 I 168 16 i84
I
Bazooka 20 10 45 280 20 | 3eo
A T M i s s il e 5 5 - 1 0 / 1 1 4
. :
'.' 78 1u 168 8 |I 254
RR, 106m 6
.:- : : 84 8 | O? '-
APC,Halftrack 50 200 ?0 3 tlo it 24 700 400 160 I 1,437
A A ,, l t , 2 0 m 16 T2 6 2 140 18 224 24 96 | 514
AA
Hawk
A,, l t , 4 0 m 4 76 36 I
| '::
t l ?
50 i r u
How, 105m ti lgo
How w,, 1 5 5 m (31,72 | 1 "
G un, 155m
G uu nn,, 1 7 5 m
(t)24
(i)12
: :: | ,i
I I ?
Tanks l0 30 90 40 : : 80 I40 oo tzo | 1,ooo
AI1X- 113 10 ( 3 0 ) ( 4 0 )( 1 0 ) (80)(20) ?0 (z+01 150
'tiol 1
M-48 (90) 't | 200
Super Sherman l0 io t g otis o l iol i40 io 720)(480)| 400
Centuri on 'io ' :" : : ' ) q 'i6o I z5o
A
AP PC C,,H a l f t r a c k so ziro 3 125 ?7 400 160| 1,436
TI rruucc k s 150 150 150 75 100 2,500 900 150 2,100 300 1 , 2 0 0I 8,586
sP
S PM ti o u n t s 30 30 38 19 200 225 38 420 304i 1,263

Figure 3. ESTIMATED
EGYPTIAN
ARMAMENT
SUMMARIES,
1967

15 5 2 7
Tank Tank Inf Arty 1 / 1 0D i v Arty tnt Tank Inf Tank
Inf u1v Dlv Bde boe Rgt illsc Unit Rgts Divs u 1v s Bdes Bdes Tota l s
Personnel 10,000 10,000 3,500 4,000 I,000 1 5, 0 0 0 I 5 , 0 0 0 50,000 20,000 20,000 2 4 , 5 0 0 1 4 4, 5 0 0
Pisto l 1,000 1,000 350 400 100 I,500 1,500 5,000 2,000 2,000 2,450 14,450
Rif'le 9,000 9,000 3,150 3 ,6 0 0 900 1 3 , 5 0 0 13,500 45,000 18,000 18,000 22,050 130,050
M a c h i n eG u n , l t 360 270 85 T?O 75 200 I,ta) 1,800 540 600 595 4,860
M a c h i n eG u n , h v y ?40 160 55 80 75 i50 trLa) I,200 320 400 385 3,580
Mortar,2" 2A 10 12 10 100 20 50 84 304
Mortar, Sarn 50 16 :o : : 250 80 330
l',!ortar, 120m 12 'roo 60 20 80
RL, 40nn 50 io 16 10 250 20 80 500
GAT, B5mn 48 ?4 24 .':' 240 48 r20 408
S c h m eA l TMissile 24 T2 I 120 24 40 184
RR, 107m 24 t2 8 120 24 40 184
AMGZPU-2 9 9 6 6 o 100 90 45 18 30 42 Jaa
AMG ZPU-4 9 9 t00 45 18 163
AA,37mn 6 o 50 30 12 92
M, 57mn 12 6 50 60 122
AA, 85mm (5)120 120
Mortar, 240m (4) s6 96
ilow, 122m so (3) 72 270 72 414
Gun How, 15 nn T2 (2) 48 60 108
uunr lJUm (1)24 'oo 24
AT Su-100SP ;^
I' 10 4 20 20 100
JS-3 10 4 60 20 20 100
PT-76 30 10 60 70 130
T-34 io 100 30 100 200 ?LO 510
T-54155 150 50 'ooo 300 350 650
A P CB T R - 5 0 tio 30 10 30 3 45 60 t50 70 925
A P C3
8TR-152 20 i0 ? 100 2A 14 134
Truck 800 600 200 zio roo 500 r,soo 4,000 I,800 I,250 I,400 10,450
Motor
lilotorcycl e 60 50 ?0 20 30 'reo 300 100 100 140 670
SP l4o
l4ount 36 30 10 iz 50 180 60 50 520
 F i g u T e4 . E S T I M A T JEO
DR D A N I A R
N M A M ESNUTM M A R I E
1S9 6. 7

B z 4
INT Armd Arty 1/10 Bde Inf Armd Arty
Bde Bde Bn M i s cU n i t s Bdes Bdes Bns Total s
Personnel 500 4,0oo 500 2,000 3 6, 0 0 0 8,000 2,000 48,000
P is t ol 450 400 50 200 3,600 800 200 4,900
Rifle 050 3,600 450 1, 8 0 0 32,400 7,200 I,800 43,200
M a c h i n eG u n ,1 t t20 40 10 25 960 80 40 1, 1 0 5
M a c h i n eG u n ,h v y BO 40 640 BO BO 842
Mortar, 8lmm 20 i0 :o 160 20 180
M o r t a r4 . 2 " L2 6 96 16 T12
B a z okoa 20 10 10 160 ?0 io 2t0
RR, 106mm 6 48 8 56
AA, 1t, 20nrm 16 I2 6 T2 r28 24 24 188
AA,1t,40mm 1.2 t2
G u n ,2 5 p d r 1.2 tafiz 7?
How,105mm (tzt. (2)24 (t)rz 36
How,155mm (2)24 24
Gun,155mm (l) I 8
Tanks ..:, 240
M-48 90 180 180
C e n t u roi n 30 60 60
T r u c ks 150 150 50 250 1,200 300 20 r,770
S PM o u n t s 20 20 20 160 40 220
A r L , r v tI .Jr, ) a r a c e n 50 20 10 400 40 540

Fiqure 5. ESTIMATE
SDYRIAN
A R M A M ESNUTM M A R I E1 S
96,7

10 6 3
Inf Meczd Tank Arty 1/11Bde Arty Inf Meczd tanK I
Bde Bde Bde Rgt M i s cU n i t s Bde Bde Bde Hatp 1 T o t a ls

P e r s o n nI e 4,000 4,500 3, 5 0 0 800 4 ,000 8,000 24,000 13,500 10,500 60,000

P is t o l 400 450 350 BO 400 800 2 , 4 0 0 1,350 1, 0 5 0 6 , 0 0 0
Rifle 3, 6 0 0 4, 0 5 0 3,150 720 3, 6 0 0 7 ,200 2 1 , 6 0 0 1 2 l ( n 9,450 54,000
M a c h i nGe u n , 1 t 270 300 B5 75 50 750 r , 6 2 0 900 2Eq | ? q7q
M a c h i n eG u n ,h v y 160 180 960 900 i;; I r:;i;
Mortar, B2mm 20 ?0 :u .10 .':o 120 60
|I
teo
^.
Mortar,120mm 4 4 24 T2 l r o
RL, 40mm IO 16 10 10 25 100 96 48 30 | 299
GAT,85mm 32 3? T9? 96 I 288
RR, lo7mm B I tJ : : : : : 48 24 241 e6
AAMG ZPU-2 6 ? b 25 60 36 18 el 148
AAMG ZPU-4 6 b ?5 36 18 el 88
AA, 37mm t+ 20 24 1.? 12l 68
M, 57mm 20 1 5 6
AA, B5mm (2)48 ..r.., 1 4 8
Mortar,240nun (r)24 .':.0 1 2 4
Katus hya ' (1) R
;,. l 8
How, 1Z2rrun LI 72 ( 4) e 6 II JO
| 204
G u nH o w ,1 5 2 n m (3)72 t 7 2
Gun, 130nrn (r)24 1 2 4
A T S u - 1 0 0S P l2 L2 72 72 JO 36 | 144
J S -3 B B 24 48 24 72 | L44
PI 76 10 1n 30 3ol 60
T-34 30 ?n 180 e0 | 270
T- 54/55 60 60 180 180 I 360
A P CB T R - 5 0 40 60 20 10 30 240 180 60 | 520
A P CB T R - 1 5 2 i0 10 5 I 60 30 15 | 107
Truck 250 275 250 roo 720 I ,000 I ,500 825 7 5 0| 4 , 1 9 5
Motorcycle 20 20 20 10 't)o t20 60 60 I 250
S PM o u n t 10 20 10 T2 12 60 60 30 I 282
 F i g u re 6 . E N GAGEM ENTS, t,lAR,JUNE1967
SIX- DAY

EngNo E n g a g e meD
net sig n a ti o n Arab Forces Isr aeli F or c es
S'inai June Egyptian
6 7- I 5 Ra fa h PLA&TInfDiv T a l' s D i v
6 7- 2 5/6 Ab y A g e i l a -U mK a te f 2 Inf Div S h a r o n ' sD i v
67- 3 5-7 Ga zaS tri p P L AD i v T a l' s D iv
67- 4 5/6 El Arish 7 Inf Div T a l' s D i v
67- 5 5/6 Bi r L a h fa n 3 Inf Div Y o f f e ' s D iv
67- 6 6 JebelLibni 3 Inf Div Yoffe'sDiv
67- 7 7 B i r H a m a - B iGr ifgafa 3 I n f D i v & 2 1 T a n kD i v T a l' s D i v
67- 8 7 B i r H a s s n a - B iTr h a m a d a 3 I n f D i v & 4 T a n kD i v Y o f f e 's D iv
67- 9 7/B Mitla Pass 3 Inf, 6 Inf Divs Yoffe'sDiv
6 7 -1 0 8 Bir Gifgafa 4 T a n kD i v Tal'sDiv
67-10.1 8 Nakhl 6 M e c z dD i v S h a r o n 'D
s iv

J er us ale m -
Wes tBank Jor danian
67-LT 5-7 J e ru sael m J e r u s a ' l eB
md e ( + ) Central Command
6 7- t 2 5/a J e n in 25 Inf Bde P e le d' s D iv
67-t3 6/7 Kabat'iya 40 Ar m dBde, 25 Inf Bde P ee l d's D'iv
67-t4 6/t T i I fi t-Z a b a b i d a 40 Ar m dBde, 25 Inf Bde R a m ' sB d e
67-t5 7 N a bul s Br i gadeequ' iv R a m ' sB d e , K o c h v a ' Bde
s

G o l a nH t s Syri an
67-21 9 Za o u ra -K a l 11 Inf Bde M e n delr ' s B d e
67-22 9 Tel Fahar 11 Inf Bde G o l a n iB d e
67-23 9 Rawiya 8 Inf Bde R a m ' sB d e
67-24 10 B a nai s - M a s a a d a 11 Inf Bde G o l a n iB d e
67-25 10 Ku n etra
i Syri an MeczdBde M e n delr ' s B d e
67-26 10 Boutmi.ya Syrian ArmdBde P e l e d ' sD i v
 F i q u r e7 . E S T I M A TAELDL O C A T 0 SS
I 0FNB A T T LCEA S U A L T I E I N, A IF R O N T
JU' N E5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 , I N C I U S I V E

Date E n g a g e m e n t s E g y p t ia n ' Israel i

UA v LUnU- Ua v 'I
June Egypt Israel lSyLt I srael E qy p t Israel Eqypt I sr a e l Enq M is c I ati ve Enq M is c ati ve
5 ( 1 )3 , o o o ( l ) 5 o o I 3,000 3,000 500 .. i 500
( 2 )l , o o o| ( z ) z o o (3) 250 (3) 45 (4) 250 ( 4 ) 85 1, 5 0 0 4,500 300 30 i 860
i
b (3) soo (3) 20 500 u:o 5 , 5 0 0 20 .. i 880
( 5 ) 5 0 0i ( 5 ) 5 0 500 . 6,000 50 .. I e3o
7 (6). (6).40 (7). (t].ou (8) 600 (8) 30 1 , 7 0 0 t:ulo 9 , 2 0 0 115 ro i r,045
.5oo . 6 0 0i (e) 600 (e) 60 600 9,800 60 . . 1,105
8 ( 1 0 ) 5 o o ( 1 0 )4 0 (11) uroi (rr) ro 1,184 I ,900 t2,884 64 15 r ,794

F i q u T e8 , ESTII4ATE
ADLLOCATIO
ONF T A N KL O S S E SS, I N A ] F R O N TJ, U N E5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 , I N C L U S I V E

Date E n g a g e m e n t Egyptian Israeli

I cum
D a i l y Cum D a li y Net Dai1yI cum ouiry I r'r.i
June s r a el n+ Israpl Fovnt Israel E q v pt Israel LOSS L 0 ss R e t u r n 'L o s s L o s s i Loss Returni loq
5 (1) (1) 15 ' i 70r 70 . 7 0 ls I i5 j t q
.70 lzj (2) 19 (3) 60 (3) ( 4 ) 80 (4) 13 180 250 . 250 36 5t
I | i
6 ':o (3) 30 /?\ A
| 30 2Bo J I I J 4 1 5 5 a 2J
(sj t s ji r | 30 310 . JUf, 11 uu i o q
I
7 (6)
.30
(6) 10 li\ o). (8) 30 ,ui1 0 ( e ) 1 o o( 9 ) 1 6
I so 4oo
100 500
18 377 25 | e1 o l 8 3
. 477 16 i07
| i e e
I ( 1 o )l o o ( 1 0 ) 1 1 ,rt,t ( 1 1 )4 200 700 27 650 15 | 722 s lros
10 640 44 I or

Fisure 9. ESTII'IATE CD L 0 5 EA I R S U P P 0 RFTI G H T E R - B 0 l 1 SB0ERRT I E S

S U E Z - S I N AFI R O N TJ, U N E5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 , I N C L U S I V E

D at e ffirir" *"* E n q a q e m e n t s
une tl .lsrae
5 ul (1)51 ,r] ()\
.rt (2) 0 t:j is (4) 38
6 20 r52 (5) 20 (5) 76
7 0 t5? (6) 0 (6) 52 (7) 0 t'i (B) 40
r sjio
8 0 245 ( 1 0 )o ( 1 0 ) 1 2 3( 1 1 )o (1r)12

FiquTe10. E S T I M A T EADL L O C A T I O
ONF BATTLE
C A S U A L T I E JSO
, R D AFNR O N TJ, U N E5 - 7 , 1 9 6 7 , I N C L U S I V E

oate E n g a g e m e n t s J o r d a n ia n Israel i
I -
;-f Jordan Israel Jordan I Israel
Cumu-
Iati
Daily
M is c
tu-mu-
'l
ati ve
5 (' 1
- -1').1. , 5- 0 0 (' 1
- '1-)-6l 0 0 I,500 1 , 0 0 0 3 , 0 0 0 600 100 700
( 1 2 : 8) 0 0 ( 1 2 ) 4 o o
\ r' 800 I , 2 0 0 4 , 5 0 0 400 I ,100
|
I
b (n)l,ooo (il)8ool .. (14) 500 ( 1 4 ) 2 5 3 2 , 5 0 0I 1 , 0 0 0I B , 0 0 0 I , 6 0 3 100 'lul'
. r 1 , 0 0 01 9 , 0 0 0
7 ( r 1 ) 1 , o o o( 1 r ) 3 5| 0 ( t 5 ) 1 , o o ot ri luoo 2,000 l
z , o o oi 1 3 , 0 0 0

10
 FiguTe 11. F R O N T J, U N E5 - 7 , 1 9 6 7 , I N C L U S I V E
E S T I M A T EADL L O C A T I OONF T A N KL O S S E SJ, O R D A N

Date r E n g a g e m e n t J o r d a ni a n Israeli

Dailyl C u mi D a i l y N e t Net
June rael Loss I LossI Return Los
( 1 1 ) 5 0 ( 1 1) 2 0 50 50 50 20
tril+o trzlie 40 eoi eo 38
6 ( 1 1) 2 0 ( 1 11) o 100 190 6 184 78
7 ( 1 1 ) 2 0 ( 1 11) 0 ( 1 5) 4 6 (1s)18 bb 256 12 238 96
t0 228 56

CLOSEAIR SUPPORT
F i g u r e1 2 , ESTIMATED SORTIES
FIGHTER-BOMBER
FRONT,
JORDANIAN JUNE5-7, 1967, INCLUSIVE

te A v a iI a b e S o r t i e E n g a g e m e n t s
Jordan I s r a e ln srael Jordan I s r a eI ,J0rdan lsraeI I J o r dl n
f, '1 1
'l
11 ( 1 1 )J d
38 ( 12\ 0 (12) 0 ir " l
6 0 trz ,., { r 1 )40 a1?\ ( 1 3 )2 1i ( 1 4 ) 0 i ( 1 4 )2 1
1n t l
r l
7 0 104 ) o ( 1 1 )A L f1q\ 0 ( 1 5 ) 52

F i g u r e 1 3 . E S T I M A TAELDL 0 C A T I00FNB A T T LCEA S U A L T I G

ES0 ,L A F
NR 0 N TJ,U N E
9 - 1 0 , 1 9 6 7 ,I N C L U S I V E

Date E n q a q e m e n t s Syri an Israeli

I u a rl y r Lumu- D a 1l - y i Tumu::-
L
June S y r ia Israel Syria i Israel S y r ia I srael S y n ia Israel I Eno t Misc lative E n o r M i s cI I t i v e
I ( 2 1) 1 , 0 0 0 ( 2 1 ) 1 o o ( 2 2 ) 1 , 5 0 0 ( 2 2 . ) 1 . 5 0 | 2,500i1,003 0 ,15 0 0 2 5 0 1 tat)
(22) 600 (23)68 | 600 400 4.500 ur 3i8
l
10 (24) 500 ( 2 4 )5 0 ( 2 5 ) 5 0 0 ( 2 5 ) 5 0 (26) 500 (26)50 | 1 . 5 0 0| 6 0 0 6 . 6 0 0 1 5 0| 468

F i g u r e1 4 . E S T I M A TAELDL o C A T I0oFNT A N K
t o S S E SS, Y R I AFNR o N TJ,U N E
9 - 1 0 , 1 9 6 7 ,I N C L U S I V E

D a t e l E n g a g e m e n t Syrian Israel i

i uum luur'l
- - i ^
Daily Cum Daily I Net D a i 1 y C u m D a i 1 vI N e t
June Syria I s n a e l Svri a I Srae | \vr] a Israel Syri a Israel L 0 5S L o s s R e t u r nI L o s s L o s s I L o s s R e t u r n il o s
J (21)15 (21\40 (?2\10 (22) s za 2 5 i 2 5 4 5 1 4 5 1 4 5
(23)10 tzilio 10 Jf, Jf, 1 0 ' 5 5 i 5 5
i
'
l0 (24)15 r r o l r u ( 2 5 ) 2 0l 2 C \ ? q r26\?n (26)35 of, tnn ? I 07
105 160 o I rf,c
$ , 9 2 74 i 80

F i g u r e1 5 . ESTIMATEDCLOSEAIR SUPPORT FIGHTER.BOMBER

SORTIES
G O L AFNR O N TJ ,U N E
9-10, 1967.INCLUSIVE

Date Available Sorties E n g a q e m e n t s

5yrr a lsrael Svri a Israel Svrla I s r a el 5rvt a
0 238 (21\ 0 ( 2 1 ) 1 1 e(22) 0 (22)1le
( 2 3 )o tirj o
10 0 231 (24) 0 (24) 77 0 (25) 77 ( 2 6 )o (26) 77

l1
 Fiqure 16. ENGAGEMENT INPUTSHEET
DATACALCULATION

E n g a g e m e nNt o : 6 7 - I Date of Calc: 17 May '76 EngagementNo: 67-1 Dateof Calc: 17 Mav '76
.l967
E n g a g e m e nDt a t e : 5 J u n e E n g a g e m e nDt a t e : 5 J u n e 1 9 6 7
Terrain: Flat l4ixed/Desert Terrain: Flat Mixed/Desert
Posture: F o r t / P r e p a r e dD e f e n s e Posture: Attack
Weather: Hot, Dry Weather: Hot, Dry
Season: S p r in g S e as o n: S p r in g
Unit: 7 t h D i v ( - ) & P L AD i v ( - ) , E g y p l Unit: Tal Div, Israel
D e p t h : B .B Q: -45 Depth: B.B Q: 45
P e r s o n nl e L o s s e s : 3 , 0 0 0 P e r s o n n e lL o s s e s : 5 0 0
T a n kL o s s e s : 7 0 T a n kL o s s e s : 1 5
MissionFactor: 2 MissionFactor: 9

Total
Number OLI
N Personnel 19,500 N Personnel 10 qrn

l,ls Pistol, Beretta 0 . 0 3 I ,950 59 l,'ls Pistol, cal .45 0.02 1 0(2 ?q

Rifle, AK-47 0 . 2 6 1 7 , 5 5 0 4, 5 6 3 R i f 1 e ,G a 1 i 1 0.22 17,568 3,865

t ^ l mM
g GL t . , S G M
7.62 0 .5 8 485 281 W r nM a c h i n eg u n , c a l 7 . 6 2 n n 0.82 283 232
M GH v y ., D K1 2 . 7 0 .8 9 323 287 M a c h i n ge u n , c a l 1 , 2 . 7 n n 1. 0 4 292 304
W6*Mortar, 50mm ?7 48 1 )OA W 6 *M o r t a r , 8 l m m 50 20 I,000
Mortar, B2mm 44 47 2,068 Mortar,4.2" (107nrm) 90 t2 I,080
Mortar, 120mm 5B L2 696 Halftrack, ltl3 3,375
A P C ,B T R - 5 0 5B 109 W g iB a z o o k a 574
A P C ,B T R - 1 5 2 a5 9 __2W A T MS S 1 0 / 1 1 18 ota

Wgi RL, 40rnm ?o 60 1,200 R R - S P1, 0 6 r m 6 798

S c h m eAl T M i s s i l e 34 23 782 lr.lg HowSP, 105rm 48 7,690
RR, 107rnm 101 23 H o wS P , 1 5 5 r m 24 5,640
GunAT, D-48, B5nrn 192 oa 11,904 G u nS P , 1 5 5 m m T2 ? 6?6

Gun, 100rnm 229 T2 2 , 74 8 W o ,G u nA A , S P , L t 2 0 m m 67 9,308

H o w ,M - 3 8 , 1 2 2 n r n 159 aa 8, 2 6 8 GunAA, SP, Lt 40nun 20 2 q2n

G u nH o w ,D - 2 0 , 1 5 2 m m 231 4 924 S A MH . awk 4 1, 2 0 0

wgyMMG,ZPU-2 27 Jb 972 lili T a n k ,M 4 ( l O S n r n 1 45 2 1, 1 5 0
AAMG, ZPU-4 5t 16 592 Tank, M4B(90rnm) 45 21,330
AAG,37nn 66 B 528 T a n k ,C e n t u r i o n 45 24,r20
GunAA 5-60, 57nm 168 10 I,680 T a n k ,A M X - 1 (39 0 m ) 105 3 3, 7 0 5
Wi G u n , A T , S P , S U - 1 0 0( T D ) 388 tl 4, 6 5 6 lt,ly MystereIV 23/2 17,963
Tank Hvy, T-10/JS-3 281 T2 1 77t Super-Mystere a

Tank Lt, PT-76 2t? 13 Total 0LI 175,677

Tank, T-34 280 1 2, 6 0 0 Trucks I ,105
Tank, Sherman 210 50 10,500 APCT , r a c k ,H a fl t r a c k 361
Tank, T-54 )
av.505 65 ?2 A2q He1i copters 39
Tank, T-55 )
wy MiG-17 7
Total OLI 120,988
Trucks 1, 2 0 9
A P C ,T a c k , H a l f t r a c k 155
Motorcycle BB
He1i copters 2?

t?
 Figure 17. MODEL (ENGAGEMENT) CALCUIATTON FORM

Engagement: No, Engagenent Date: 5 June 1967 calculation r7 MaY 1976

Date:
tEyptian Unit: POStufe: F^rf/DrAh naf Israeli Unit: Posture I Attack
. Mission Factor 2 Mi-ssion Factor 9
sf = (ws + W^9 + wh, + wgi) * rn S" = (W" + W*g + Wh, + wgi) * r,
(Lltozz + sbS + t Oltl + te zo1) ,<.l 5 (390!t + 536 +6.1ti + t98't) /,1{
= 30.3n = tt)?gt
(wq + wqy) (r*n x h"n x zwg x wyg) (wg + wgy) (r"n x hsg x z"n x wyg)
( r f ? , / or a z 7 2 ) ( r x I ( , x , g ) QA%6 t Ot tl n lt z,rtts.- to't t 9) /z) A ri K i x i. I
= l ' t ,r ' l l = a9,lc5
w i x r w i x \ i wixrwix\i
6 G 7 0 1x . 1 5 / l - 63,373 lOo,3O5 x.9l x I = qr,29o
wytt"y*h"y*""y*"yy wY*tu{Yxh*x'*Y"*YY
t o 5 7 J > - xI l x l x , &
= d,263 31 loi Y-lx I x I x l, I = 3 7 ,5 2 o
sf (tota1) = ue)lL6 = i 73,21)o
!'f - Nf x ur,/r, " G;/St x vy x vr V. = N. x 5,/ru ",EJ% x vy x vr
lgt00 * .g5r4.lq x t,23ll x l.lr,l ie'zOx r/r x.60S3x.?xl
'f = I - vf/sf = l-.logLl v"=I-Ve,/se = l-,O79t
= ,1202
vF - o.E10b
l4obi l r ty Fdctor (Nf + l2J + Wi ) x tr\,,/N M = 1,q66'l Mobility Factor (Nc + ,ZJ + w; ) x rq,6/N. M- = v,25 tb
bge-oo t r z(rzog i e rc t z zo)i Lc.tofii.qVcmo LrqtaO r | 2.(t I 06 + 722 +39o) l rooa6.,Ji, r/res.zb
nd=r ""=@-Zru =i[Ar-6,o = t,2890 ma = Ma - ( 1 _- r . x \)(Mu - 1) = i, 2 7.{t'
l , z E 9- ( l - . c t ( r ) ( , z e i )
Pf = Sf x m x ]e x t
x o x b x u" x ru X h, x zu X vf Pe = S. x mx le x t x o xb x us x ru x hu x zu x ve
lt3 ilto * I xt x ' xlx lxl,13( t.l? x I x I t,.7El2
= 185,qoo' t T g , z o o \l , 2 7 1 6 N l ( | x l r l x I x l r | * l x , 4 z o z - = 202, t'2Y

Pf/Pe = P"/P1= t,O?

0,?2

Effects of Surprise

lra = fiIZEG-r s = 2.2326 ma = 2,1?ro

vf = 1 - (2 x .1094)= O.7AI2 ve = 1 - (.6 x .0798) = .9521

Pf = 153,063 Pe = 364'655
Pg/Pg = 6.4472 Ps/P" = 2.2363

Result calculat

Q = 45, Df = 8.8, casg = 3,699. case = 5oo

Er.. -- (S. x us.)/pg x u"g) x (4Q + De)/3Df Eesp = r'(Sf x u51)/(Ss x u.") x lAQ + Df)/}De

Yr,r3otr< r/t,it t ('l('1t +e.o/e ^ 8,9 - 2,5534 v = I,b66

^ T- |
tu- u"",/S6) - Vloocasf/Nfl E e c a s= , f- " - V]00crc../'t1,,
Efcas = lV(cu". x u"6,/S")/(Cast x l lVtcast x use,/sf)/(casu x u"6/5.) I
,qobsiffi ^ffi@-rydtu -J, isto.- . ctoz 765 fi@t7;te __E4t_
Rf= F f+E fs p +E fc a s = 2-2.5t -3, t7 = -3. /qO3 R^ = MF- * E"so * Eecas = 1 +2,1o7+,5A = i2,tL,_

Rf - Re = '15,93 Re-Rf = +t5,13

1J
 o
Ct) r . o ( ' ) ( f )

l-
q 9 1
o d d s

\O F. t\ (O l,.o F
q? 1\ qI
dc\l dd ca<f

<f,F-lo@ (I,.. Orsf (Ost (lJ.. sf @@(O Cr..

(IJ @@Otd gt(U (OC!F\@ gt(U cnmC\llr) C',q)
. . . . G ' 0 , . . . . ( t ' O r . . . . . d g )
'- ddd(\t,- (o
c, l-
dddd L.d
(l)L
(r)Str)cr) L.rJ
(I)!
>o >q., >(U
> - - . 6 > - ( d > - ( >
lrl .o ad rd
(5 ro c) -o i+cO d(Or+- Or dr.- $(ts O ctOl CO rts
l- t-.. l! tr)|J)rr)<l-e(F |r)@l()lr)e(F cOC\ldC!F(F
o L . . . . G t F . . . . ( o F . . . . 6 F
C\l (r-) oooo-c rd oooo-c .o oooo-E
+, {J +'
i(\t dc! d(\l
P
(u> f\(\F\CO F-Or@d (Orr)<t'Cf) ()
(uo-
.+oto(t rosfc!@ c l c l o r(\l
<f,
loU @orF.@ (o<f ord Lost-(f)ro (\l ct <\l c\J co (n sf cn (\r (\l c!
L O 9-.\
dd(\t<\ iid(\l c!ct()(f) q- o- oaoo c)ooo oooo
Ld

o & ao@Ortr) OiO@ r\(Osl@

UJ Ortr)C\J@ f\OrOlOr @(OOt\
,d> cDc\I(.olr) OF\dF\ z. I
!uJ lJ) tr) (f) cO (O (.o 1r) r+ mc!d$J lodstr.O ooc'r(gt\ r\t\c\tlo
<(-) LL d d d d | | | | d d d d
U t t t t t l l l

I
V) (n
P
U) Tf Ot.ocO (O<tC\l@ C!NlOt<f a/, Et(gdo d(\OO ct@cttn
cJ -i NI CO (\I C!
'\c ooo
rF o-
l+
Cf) CD + CN C! C\J C! c\J
J 1ilq 91i\ \111
O- Vt O O O O O O O O O O d O
z, u z.

I
cn@OrLO O d O @ F\ (O <r- @
= I
crr rl) C\.1 @ F\ Or Ol Ot @ C D O N = i F
.coFr
sl' l'\
.F-@
lr)d+r.o cOOr(ON F-F\C!1r)
t t t l J . F . P . o o . o o
tr t r t l r t t l u o

at1 VI

I o-a tr)@(!r} C)CDA1O (olr)lr)lr) I t 0 r'-+@ F- (n (\I

'\ oa .+ tr) f.- t.o (ost@O rr,F.to@ l-.r c') Gt (f) (o (o (f)

o- a./1
ci c;.-; d d. tJ', d

N 1..

Ol OJ
l o orcld stst c! d Osl@lf) C\J(ONO ro@rolr)
3- .r < c f ) l o . @ @ . . . . s t Clcf)+lo Or!O(OCO r..OrF\

u ) d cicic; c>ci .c; -;G;Jd c;cic;c; c;c;+c;

o;
z (u
= c)
L (uL
o- (\lOdtf, tdCDt3 r.Or()clrrn .O'F O
UJ Ot@<l(O F-lO@CO rr)F\('o@ .d o- +J co co cf) (n co (Y) (t ca
a , - r o
o- dJJci cic;c;d dd,";ci LL < 4 J . d
OJ LI
tt,

t l - I L
o(u Or(O\OCD Cvsf F\F\ (Y)lr)F\O 0Jo Or r.O (O Co C\t i+ F. r\ d) rJ) l'\ O
L =
. r O
(o O Or rr) st'(f) (o K) <l'6 N (o r = \o O Or rr) (+ (O (O ro st rf, r.. (O
!
= u-o d-icid c;oc;d c;c;Jd 1 ! O - o d o o o o o o o o d o

z O\o<t(O OrF\F\C\l OrdOcO z. O(O<i(.o OrF*F-C! ChdO@

OOr<Or +rr)F\O C)dC)N OOrr+Or +Ii)F*O OdOF\
rt' (d
z. -id,-; c; ci ci d -i -i--; J d z d C ) d O o O O d d d d c )

. 6 C . 6 C
t r ' E l - . . 6 E L .
l{- (I, .O.d d =
r+_ (U .6|! .O =
+) c) -C >iE -C +J O r . G
(o
> r E S
0r G| .o d,oo c') ro roiuo
o
E ,.u c, =.F .O .6 rO E rlj .d =.F fd |! .o
(U rf = N L l- q.o.o -- B c c, q - = N ! l - E 5 - O F F - C
rd.o r!.r (lJ (L, (o,o (o O (o tu rE.o r!.F (l, (U l! rd f6 O' |l' l!
16 d<(.'CO F)F)szN O.Fdco 16 d<(5CO r)F)Sz F{ CTFdCO

U U
.iJ-;d J(.i-;< -;(.;-;.+ -; c.; ..;; J c.; -; .+ J c.; ,.; i
d d r d N ( ! c ! N dddd Rj$j(\l(\l

14
 COMBAT IN THE1973 }{AR
PERFOMANCE

THEDATA
"October
Figure 20 is a sumnaryof the major statistical grounddata of the 1973
h lar , " i n c l u d i n g o ve ra l l stre n g th s a nd losses of per sonneland se' lecteditems of
equi p m e nfto r a l l ma Jo rp a rti ci p a n ts.' Figur e 21 pr ovidescom par able air str ength
a n d l o s s d a t a . F i g u r e s2 2 , 2 3 , ' a n d 2 4 p r e s e n tmored e t a i l e d l i s t i n g s of the princi-
pal varieties of giound weaponsand combatequipmentestimated to be on hand in the
I s ra e l i , Eg y p ti a n ,a n d S yri a n a rrn i esas of 6 October ' 1,973, showingpr esum ed allo -
c at io n s t o m a j o r co mb a fo t rma ti o n s, such as divisions and br igades.
F i g u r e 2 5 i s a l i sti n g o f a l 'l m ajor engagem ents on the Suez- Sinaiand Gola n
Fronts from October6 through 25. Figure 26 is an estimatedbreakdown of the pre-
s u m e dt o t a l o f Isra e l i a n d E g yp ti a ncasualties on that fr ont, with allocations to
day s a n d e n g a g e me nbtsa se du p o np ro fessionalhistor ical and m ilitar y judgm entin
nar r ative of oper ationscited under "Data Sour c es "
c o n s i d e r a t i o n -o fth e d e ta i l e d H E R O
in t h e I n t r o d u cti o n to th i s re p o rt. Figur e 27 is a compar able br eakdown of pr es um ed
I s ra e l i a n d Eg yp ti a nta n k l o sse s o n the Suez- Sinaifr ont, by day and by engage m ent.
Figu r e . 2 8i s a co mp a ra b l b e re a kd o wnof estimateddir ect air suppor tallocations by
t he I s r a e l i a n d E g yp ti a na i r fo rce s, also r elated to engagements and dates. Fi gur e
2 9 i s a l i s t i n g o f e n g a g e m e notns t h e G o l a nF r o n t . F i g u r e s3 0 , 3 1 , a n d 3 2 g i v e c o m -
para b l e b r e a k d o w nosf e sti ma te dca sualties, tank losses and dir ect air suppor t s or -
t i e s o n t h e G o l a nF r o n t .
As i n t h e ca se o f a n a 'l ysi so f the 1967W ardata, available r esour cesper mi tted
analysesof only twe'lveengagements on the Suez-SinaiFront and four engagements on
t h e G o l a nf r o n t. T h i s w a s a to ta l of six m or e1973W arengagements than pr ovid ed
f or i n t h e T a sk 0 rd e r, o r a to ta l o f eight m or eengagements over all than pr ovid ed
f or i n t h e T a sk 0 rd e r.
DATAANALYSIS
F i g u r ^ e3 3 , " P re l i mi n a ry1 9 7 3A rab- Isr aeli W arAnalysis," pr ovidesthe samek i nd
of o v e r a l l s u m ma ry o f th i s stu d y's quantitative analysis of the 1973war as is found
in F i g u r e 1 8 f or th e 1 9 6 7Wa ra n a l yses. Figur e 34 pr ovidesa fur ther r efinem entof
t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l ysi s a fte r a p p lication to the 1973ldardata of the samethr ee
h y p o t h e s e st h a t w e re re fl e cte d i n F i gur e 19 for the 1967W ar .
A s w i t h t h e 1 9 6 7Wa r, th e re fi n ed analysis shownin Figur e 26 showsr em ark abl y
c o n s i s t e n t v a l ue s i n re l a ti ve co mb ateffectivenessof the opponentsin eachof the
t wo s e t s o f d a ta : th a t fo r th e S u ez- Sinaifr ont, and that for the Golanfr ont. It
s how st h a t t h e Isra e l i co mb a te ffe ctivenesssuper ior ity over the Egyptianswas on
t he a v e r a g eL L 6 %,o r a C E Vo f 2 .1 6 ; Isr aeli super ior ity over the Syr ianswas 17 5%
o r a C E Vo f 2 . 7 5 .
A n o r m a l ize dco mp a ri so nsi , mi l ar to that for the 1967W ar , is shownbelow:
I s r a e il s 2.75 (2.16)
Egyptians 1.27 (1.00)
Syrians 1.00
CAMPAIGN ANALYSES
per for mance,and of air p ow er ,
I n o r d e r t o se e k p o ssi b l e e ffe cts of high comm and
on t h e o v e r a l l ca mp a i g nre su l ts a n d on calculated CEVs- asopposedto the indiv i dual
engagement results-QJM analyseswere performedon the overall campaigndata and
re s u l t s f o r t h e th re e 1 9 6 7Wa rca mpaigns and the two 1973l^|arcampaigns.The res ul ts
of t h e s e a n a l y se sa re su mn a ri ze d i n Figur e 35.

15
 F i q u r e Z 0 - A . E S T I M A TG
EDROUN
SDTRENGTH
0CST
, 0 B E1R9 7 3

Total
Arab
Arabs ll Total Potentia l
Avajl able ArmyManpowerl 3 1 0 , 0 0 0 505,000 3 1 5 , 0 0 0 140,oo0 20,000 5 , 0 0 0 2 5 , 0 0 0 9 5 , 0 0 07 5 , 0 0 0 6 5 0 , 0 0 0
T a n k / A r m o r eDdi v i s i o n s 7 5 2 2 I 2 I I
I n f a n t r y / M e c h a n i z eDd i v s 'ie 1 1 8 4 18
S e p a r a t eB r i g a d e s 47 20_ ?1 1 ? 46
M e d i u mT a n k s z,oool 4, 9 4 1 2,2005 l , 8 2 0 : , 300 150 5t L 1,200 540 6,131
APCs 4,000r 4,3?0 2,400 I ,300 300 ?00 720 1,500 550 5,870
Arti l I ery (over 100nm) 570 2, 0 5 5 1,210 655 54 36 100 600 320 2,885
M u l t i p l e R o c k e tL a u n c h e r s 'ris 90 70 20
: : 90
Mortars (over 100nm) 650+ 350 300 650+
I
S S ML a u n c h e r s ')s 42 30 L2
: 4?
SAMLaunchers 1,280 8800 36010 zo 20 1, 2 8 0
S t r e lI a 3,000 2,000_ 1 , 0 0 0.- ? ? ; 3,000
M Guns 1.000 3,650+ 2 . 7 5 0 1 1,eooll ? ? :
7 3,650+
A TM i s s i l e s 2804 1,200 8508 350rr ? 1, 2 0 0
AT Rockets 650 q ?on+ 2,500 2,800 ? i 7 5, 3 0 0 +
AT Guns ?,200+ 1,300 900 ; ? ; ? 2,200+

N o t e s : 1 0 n t y t i e t d a r m ya n d d i r e c t s u p p o r tm a n p o w e rf ;o r i n s t a n c e , t o t a l / I n c ' l u d e s1 5 0 Z S U - 2 3 - 4 .
I s r a e l i m o b i l i z e ds t r e n g t hw a so v e r 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 ,E g y p t i a no v e r 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . S M o s t l yS a g g e r ,s o m eS n a p p e r .
2 I n c l u d e s 1 5 0 c a p t u r e dI - 5 4 / 5 5 , m o d i f i e d .
9 I n c lu d e s T - 6 2 .
3 I n c l u d e s3 , 5 0 0 +h a l f - t r a c k s , 5 0 0 M - 1 1 3 .
l 0 I n c l u d e s6 0 s A - 6 .
4 I n c l u d e sS S - 1 0a n d S S - 1 1 ,a p p a r e n t l yn o t u s e d .
l l l n c l u d e s 1 0 0Z S U - 2 3 - 4 .
5 I n c lu d e sT - 6 2 .
l 2 M o s t l y S a g g e r ,s o m eS n a p p e r .
6 I n c l u d e s8 0 5 A - 6 .

L 0DS S E S0' C T 0 B E1R9 7 3

Figure 20-B. ESTIMATE

Arab
I srae'l Total
P e r s o n nl e
Killed 2 9?R* 8,528 5,000 3,100 28 300
l^lounded B, 8 0 0 * 19,549 12,0006,000 49 1,000
P r i s o n e r so r M i s s i n q 508 8 , 0 3 1 500 20
Tanks** 840 2,554 1, 1 0 0 1 , 2 0 0 200
APCs 400 850+ 450 400 ?
ArtiIIery Pieces 550+ 300 250 ?
S A MB a t t e r i e s -10, 47 44 3
Ai rcraft JOU 223 rt7
'l?
20
H e 1i c o p t e r s 55 42
N a v a l V e s s esl 1 10 5 :.
* A b o u t 1 0 %h a s b e e na d d e dt o o f f i c i a l l y r e p o r t e d I s r a e l i c a s u a l t i e s t o r e p r e -
s e n t a p p r o x i m a t e l yt h e w o u n d e w d h od i e d o f t h e i r i n i u r i e s , a n d t h e f a c t t h a t
o f f i c i a l I s r a e l i f i g u r e s a p p a r e n t l yd o n o t i n c l u d e t h o s ew o u n d endo t e v a u c a t e d
f r o m a i d s t a t i o n sa n d f i e l d h o s p i t a l s .
* * T a n k sd e s t r o y e do r p u t o u t o f a c t i o n f o r o n e o r m o r ed a y s . F o r i n s t a n c e ,
t h e I s r a e l i s s e e mt o h a v er e n a i r e da n d r e t u r n e dt o o p e r a t i o na b o u t 4 0 0 o f t h e t a n k
l o s s e s s h o w nh e r e . T h e ya l s o r e c o v e r e da b o u t 3 0 0 r e p a i r a b l e A r a b t a n k s .

16
 F i g u r e2 1 - A . A I R F 0 R CS
E T R E N G T H0SC, T 0 B E1R9 7 3

I S R A E L I S

Fi qhters
-fiidzl
160 ld 311 A-4, Skyhawk 150
M ic - l 9 60 60 F-4 Phantom 140
Mic- 17 200 3s1 M ir a g e 50
Su-7
Hunter t': 5L 219
21
SuperMystere 12
Mirage
Total Fighters 3f,U
-n -9m.
28

Bombers
-T[:16'
t8 18 V a u t o u r ,l t b o m b e r B
Il -28 30
--Tg 30
Total Bombers 48 o
Total Combat 598 1,038 360
Transports
-In-If-
30 'ri 30 c-130 6
Il-14 .Z c-47 12
Il-18 .o: c-97 10
-7d -16 ---36 N o r a tal s 30
Total Transports 66
H el i c o p t e r s
--Tr-:6-
L2 6 18 S u p e rF r e lo n I
l'1i-8 70 30 1 LN-f,J 12
-130' AB 205 30
Total Helicopters 6Z 50 f,U
Total Non-combat taL 52 21,6 I lo

Total Air Inventory 750 327 |,254 476

Losses 265 131 M7 109
Resupply* LZa 288 56+

Total At Endof War 648 321 I,095 423+

14anpower ,? nnn 9,000 32,000+ 17,000
* 0 c t o b e r9 - 2 3 . i n c l u s i v e .

F i g u r e 2 1 - 8 . E S T I M A TA
EIDR L 0 S S E S0,C T 0 8 E1R9 7 3

| | | l o t n e r l A r a ib
i E q y p It S y r i aI l r a o I A r a b sI r o t u t i I s r a e t
A. By Type
Fi ghter 222 rt7 2t 30 390
Bomber
Transport
I
'q) 1
1
I
1':
H e li c o o t e r IJ
--q
Totals 265 - ; ; * 109
B. By Cause
Ai r"-to-Air 287 2l
To SAl4 77 40
To AAA 19 31
Miscor Unknown bb 15
Friendly Forces 58 2
TotaI s 447 109
C. Damage

Damaged r25 (50

R e p a i r e di n O n eW e e k ,2
215

17
 Figure 22. E S T I M A T EID
S R A E L IA R M A M E S
NUT M M A R I E1S9, 7 3

1/1.2Div 30 5 16 11 | 10
I t'leczd Armd Armd Arty 1 / 3 6B d e Arty Armd I nf/ Para f4eczd j Anmd
' - - ' t " - " Bde R9t Rgt Misc tJnits Rgts Rgts Bde Bde i Bde Total s

P e r so n ne l 4 , 3 0 0 I 4, o o o 3 , 6 0 0 l ,700 1,000 30,000 3 0 , 0 0 0 a Enn 6 8 , 8 0 0 4 4 , 0 0 0 | 3 6 , 0 0 0 2 7 7, 3 0 0

Pistol, Cal .45 430 | 400 360 170 100 3,000 3,000 850 6 ,880 4,400 i 3,600 27,730
( G a ] i 15 . 5 6 I
Krrre 3,870 i 3,600 3,240 I 900 27,000 27,000 67,920 3 9 , 6 0 0 3 2 , 4 0 0 1 9 5 , 5 7 0
]FN i
l , l a c h i n eG u n , l t , C a l 1.20 BO 40 30 10 300 300 150 1, 9 2 0 880 I 400 3,9s0
r v i a c h i nG e u n , h v y ,C a l 80 60 40 30 20 500 600 I f,U 1, 2 8 0 660 400 3 ,590
l'lortar, 81mm 20 10 320 11 0 430
Yortar, 4.2", 107nrn L ' 192 88 I 280
t4ortan, 120mm ( 4 ) 96 64 44 I 204
\4ortar, 160mm : . ? ')s 'roo 1 (
A P CM - 1 1 3 10 )o 10 5 220 I 100 505
H a lf t r a c k 1 4 3 50 200 20 10 3 I5I go 30 800 2,200 200 3,471
B az o ok a/ L A W 20 10 5 55 150 320 11 0 635
R E C G8, 4 m m
RRSP,106nrn 6 YO 96 192
AA,lt,20mm IO t2 172 6o lo 256 tiz rio 770
AA, lt, 40mm 120 212
S A MH a w k I J 75
H o w ,S P , 1 0 S m m ( e) 2 1 6 216
H o w ,S P , 1 5 5 m m (e)21,6 ato
G u n ,S P , 1 5 5 m m (4) e6 96
G u n ,S P , 1 7 5 m m (3) 72 72
H o w ,S P , 8 " \L I L' 12
Tanks 20 48 240 zio sia goo 2 , 0 4 8
T a n k s , | \ 4 4 8( 9 0 m m ) 100
T a n k s , | \ 4 4 8( 1 0 5 n r m ) 600
T a n k s, C e n t u r jo n 600
Tanks, 1,460 400
Tanks, T54l55 (105mm) 200
Tanks,M4 (105mm) 'zio 148
A P C ,M l 1 3 10 5 'rir 'so 160 100 505
H a lf t r a c k s 20 10 3 800 2,200 200 3,491
Trucks I50 t a 100 3, 0 0 0 3, 0 0 0 2,400 I,650 1 , s oIo 11, 9 2 5
SP t'lts 38 19 25 300 750 608 418 380|

Fiqure 23. E S T I I 4 A T ETDG Y P T I AA

NR M A I 4 ES
NUT M M A R I E1S9, 7 3

1 / 1 0D i v 5 I
Armd l4eczd Army Spt Inf Armd I l'leczd I Inf Armd
I n f D iv L J ' IV Div Units D iv s Divsl Divsl Bdes Bdes T o t a ls

P e r so n n eI 12,000 4, 0 0 0 3, 5 0 0 6 4, 0 0 0 5 0, 0 0 0 2 0, 0 0 0 36,000 4 8, 0 0 0 2 8 , 0 0 0 2 4 6, 0 0 0
P i s t o l , g m mB e r e t t a 1. 2 0 0 400 350 6,400 5, 0 0 0 2, 0 0 0 3, 6 0 0 4 , 8 0 0 2 , 8 0 0 2 4, 6 0 0
I A-47 25,200 221,400
Rifle )^,,., 9.000 9. 0 0 0 3, 6 0 0 5 7, 6 0 0 45,000 3 2 , 4 0 0 4 3, 2 0 0
f 4 G ,l t , s c r , r7 . 6 2 360 270 360 1.20 1,800 540 1,080 1,440 680 7,340
M G ,h v v , D K 1 2 . 7 240 ':o 240 80 1, 2 0 0 32.0 720 960 olo 4,840
Mortar,82mm 50 50 lo 250 150 192 . 592
t4ortar,12Omm T2 t2 4 206 60 Jb 48 'ie 350
R P G - 7 ,8 2 m m 100 20 100 30 100 s00 40 300 360 1, 3 4 8
S ag g e r 40 16 40 L2 l5 200 120 144 32 543
Inf RR, 82mm ?0 20 6 100 60 12 232
Inf RR, 107mm l0 10 3 50 30 36 116
SPG-9 RR,73mm 30 24 30 10 50 150 qs 90 2(a
G A TD - 4 8 , 8 5 m m lo 16 'zio BO 4B 125
G A TM - 5 5 , 1 0 0 m m 8 I2 8 40 )q 24 ' ;- 'iq 298
AAI4G ZPU.4 g 9 9 3 300 45 1B 27 JO 450
A A M GZ U - 2 3 9 9 9 3 300 45 18 27 36 24 450
AAMG ZSU-23-4 T2 I2 T2 4 100 60 24 36 4B 5a 300
A A M GS - 6 0 , 5 7 m m T2 I L T2 350 60 24 36 4B J' 550
l4RL,l22mm T2 4 !2 20 60 I JO ''riq 124
How,122mm 54 36 54 224 270 t2 ro( 872
G u nH o w , 1 2 2 r n m 'sq 'io 'rso
, a
GunHow, 152rnm
Gun, 180mm -Jb :' 36
S c u dF / rog 20/10 '250 20/10
brat | )A-l so 100 920
s A2 / 3 800 800
SA-6 80 80
G u nA T - S u - 1 0 0 ,S P T2 60 36 48 r44
Tank, lt, PT76 10 10 ' r o o 60 30 'tio 80 170
Tank, med,T54l55 80 80 520 240 640 1, 6 2 0
Tank, hvy, T62 30 30 'zis 140 90 ' ?40 470
A P CB T R 6 O 110 7T 'ie 330 t44
:. 820
A P CB T R s O 720 I' 46 'rso 360 'iz vb 550
A P CB R D M 1 120 6 36 360 48 720
APC BRDI42 o tf, 18 12 45
A P CB M P 4 1 10 72 ' 7 2 B 44
B M PS/ ag g e r 6 lf, 18 45
T r u ck 800 zoo 2, 0 0 0 4,000 r,zoo 2,400 3, 0 0 0 r,ooo 14,200
It4otorcyc'le 60 20 100 300 100 180 240 160 1,080
SP l"lounts 44 10 200 220 68 LJ' 168 80 868

l8
 Figure 24. ESTIMATED ARMAMENT
SYRIAN SUMMARIES,
1973*

1/10Div 1 L L 1 1 1 1 0
Armd Inf Armd Army Spt Meczd Inf Armd S e pI n f l S e pA r m d
Inf Div Div Bde Bde Units Div D iv s D iv s BdesI Bdes Totals
Personnel 1 0, 0 0 0 l 0 , 0 0 0 4 000 500 2 5 , 0 0 0 1 3 , 0 0 02 0 , 0 0 0 20,000 4 4 , 0 0 0| 3 5 , 0 0 0i s 7 , 0 0 0
Pistol, Markarov 1 , 0 0 0 1, 0 0 0 400 ?6n 2 ,500 I ,300 2 , 0 0 0 2,000 4 , 4 0 0| 3 , 5 0 0 1 5 , 7 0 0
Rifle, AK-47 9 ,000 9, 0 0 0 600 150 2 2 , 5 0 0 11, 7 0 0 1 B , 0 0 0 1 8 , 0 0 0 3 9 , 6 0 0| 3 1 , 5 0 0, 1 4 1 , 3 o o
M G ,I t , 7 . 6 2 300 200 90 80 100 300 600 400 990| 800 3,190
M g ,h v y , 1 2 . 7 200 160 60 50 200 200 400 JLV 660 I s00 2,280
Mortar, S2mm 50 lo 50 100 1 7 6I 326
Mortar, l20mm t2 50 12 24 ^^ |. - l rto
RPG-7,82rnm 100 30 30 l0 J5U 120 200 eo 3 3 0| 100 1,160
Sagger 50 20 1? b EN 100 40 132 | 60 382
SPG-9,73mm 60 24 20 I 30 60 120 4B 220 | 80 sSB
GATM-55, 100mm 24 t2 ?4 48 24 I .. 246
AAMGZPU-4 9 J 150 9 18 i8 33 | 30 258
AAMG ZU-23 9 J 150 9 -td l6 33 I 30 258
AAMG ZSU.23-4 L2 I2 4 40 tz 24 24 44 i 40 184
AAMG 5-60, 57mm t? t2 4 150 L2 l.+ 24 44 i 40 294
M R L ,1 2 2 m m 12 10 1Z 24 +o
How, 122mm 54 JO L2 L2 50 54 110 iz t32 120 538
Gun How, 152nrn 24 12 24 60
Gun, lBOrm t2 I . . 1 2
Frog L2 i l z
GraiI SA-7 io 36 t2 t2 100 72 72 132 i r20 532
sA2/3 300 :u i .. 300
sA-6 60 60
GATSU-1OO ,,, t2 tq 44 B0
Tank,lt, PT76 30 10 10 oo I 100 170
T a n k , m e d ,T 5 4 l 5 5 180 60 60 360 I 5Bo 1,ooo
T a n k , m e d ,T 6 2 90 30 20 180 250 450
T a n k ,h v y , J S 1 1 1 / 1 1 0 30 i . . 3 0
T a n k , m e d ,T - 3 4 20 10 40 'ioi 110 70 220
APCBTR6O 50 ?0 10 10 150 200 100 1 1 0r 100 700
APCBRDM1 30 10 E 5 100 100 60 1 20j 55 ; 50 385
q
APCBRDMz l q 10 50 30 10 44 i 40 184
APCBMP 20 20 5 5 45 20 40 40' 55 50 250
Trucks 800 600 ZJU 200 500 800 I , 6 0 0 I 1 , 2 0 0, ? , 7 5 0| 2,000 B,Bso
Motorcycles 50 40 20 ?0 20 50 100 I 80 1 ?201 2001 670
SP Mounts 44 34 14 10 100 44 8B 68l 154r 100' 554
* P l u s 1 M o r r o c a ni n f a n t r y b r i g a d e , I J o r d a n i a na r m o r e db r i q a d e , a n d 1 I r a q i a r m o r e dd i v i s i o n .

Figure 25. SINAI FR0NTENGAGEMENTS,

OCT0BER
1973

Eng No D a t e I E n g a g e m eD
n te s i g n a t i o n Egyptian Forces I s r a e li F o r c e s

| S u e zC a n a lA s s a u l t ( N )
1a 1
6 SecondArmy E l e m e n t s1 a r m d& 1 i n f b d e
73- 2 6 | S u e zC a n a lA s s a u l t ( S ) Third Arrny ElementsI armd & I Inf bde
/J- J 7 | SecondArmyBuildup SecondArmy M e n d l e rD i v ( - ) & e l m s A d a n& S h a r o n
73- 4 7 | T h i r d A r m yB u i l d u p Third Army M e n d l e rD i v ( - )
t5- ) 8 | Kantara-Firdan SecondArmy A d a n& S h a r o nD i v s ( - )
73- 6 1 4 I E g y p tO f f e n s i v e ( N ) SecondArmy S a s s o o nA
, d a n& S h a r o nD i v s
1 4 | E g y p t0 f f e n s i v e ( S N ) Third Army Magen ) ( +
/J- ti l 5 l 1 6 I D e v e r s o i r ( C h i n e s eF a r m 1 / 7 7 6 D i v , 1 / 2 2 1 .D i v Sharon
73- 9 1 6 / 1 7| C h i n e s eF a r m( I I ) 1/2 16 Div. 1/2 ?1 Div(+) Adan( +)
7 3 -1 0 1 8 | D e v e r s o i rW e s t SecondArmy elms Adan(+)
73-11 l9-21 | Jebel Geneifa Third Army elms Adan & Magen
73-t2 l9-22 | Ismailia SecondArmy elms Sharon
73-13 Third Army elms Magen
73-14 22 | ShallufaI Third Army elms Adan
73-15 Third Army elms Adan
/J-IO 2 4 | S h a l l u f aI I Third Army elms Adan(-)

19
 F i 9 U T C2 6 . E S T I M A TA
ELDL O C A T IO
OFNB A T T LC
E A S U A L T I ESSI N
, A IF R O N TO, C T O B 6E-R2 4 , T 9 7 3 ,I N C L U S I V E

Da E n g a g e m e n t s Egyptian I s r a e li
u a rl y uumu-
'I u a rl y uuiltu-
'|
0ct Eqypt Israel Egvpt I sr a e l E qv p t I srael Enq I Misc ati ve E n q I M is c ati ve
6 (1) 3oo / 1 \ 1rE (?\ 200 ( 2 \ t 3 500 500
200 200 400
(3) 350 (3) 400( 4 )
I |
a a u ( 4 ) 300 600 1, 1 0 0
700 100 1,200
(5) 1,000 (5)1,000 | |
B r , 0 0 0j 100 2,200 1,000 200 2,400
9 |
I 500 2 , 7 O O 200 2,600
|
10 | :oo 3 , 0 0 0 100 2,700
|
11 :oo 3 , 3 0 0 I r00 2,8oo
/
I roo
L2 300 3 , 6 0 0 2,900
|
13 200 3,800 100 3 , 0 0 0
l4 ( 6 ) 1 , 6 0 0 ( 6 ) 1 5 0 ( 7 ) 2 , 0 0 0 ( 7 ) 250 I |
3,600 1 0 0 7,500 400I 150 3 , 5 0 0
|
l5
( a j ' z o o(8) 3oo 700
| 200 7 , 7 0 0
8,400
I rso
3 0 0 .1 .
3,600
3,900
(e) eoo(e) 400 |
16 e00 200 g , 5 0 0 400 100 4,400
| |
T7 (e) eoo(e) 400 eoo 2oo 1 0 , 6 0 0 400 100 4,900
(r o l e o o ( 1 0 ) 3 o o | |
18 e00 200 11, 7 0 0 300 1oo 5, 3 0 0
19 ( 12\ ( 1 2 )1 0 0 1 1 ) ? ? 4 ( 1 1 ) 1 o o | I
?7q
70e let 12,600 200 100 5,600
20 ( 1 2 )1 0 0 1 1 ) 3 3 3 ( t t ) t o o I |
l 1t\ ?7q
708 rez 1 3, 5 0 0 200 100 5, 9 0 0
2L ( 1 2 ) . 3 7 5 ( 1 2 )l o o 1 1 ) ? ? ? ( 1 1 ) 1 0 0
I |
708 | 192 1 4 , 4 0 0 200| 100 6, 2 0 0
( 1 3 ) 2 o o( 1 3 ) 5 0 2oo
I 14,600 501 6,250
22 (tzl 37s ( 1 2 )t o o r q i r , s o (o1 4 )1 5 0 - ^ - - l
I,6/5 | / 1 5 L7,200 zsoI roo 6 , 6 0 0
23 (15) 400 r 1 5 l l q n 16) 5oo (16) 50 I
9 0 0 2 , 3 0 0 2 0, 4 0 0 200 50 6 , 8 5 0
(l5) 400 ( 1 5 )1 5 0 16) 500 (16) 50 |
24 e o o 2 , 3 0 02 3 , 6 0 0 200 s0 7, 1 0 0
| |

F i q u T e2 7 . E S T I M A TA
ELDL O C A T IO
OFNT A N KL O S S E S
S,I N A IF R O N TO, C T O B 6E.R
24,1973, INcLUsIVE

E n q a g e m e n t s Eqyot Israel
LUm
i D a il y Cum Daily Net D a il y Cum D a i l y Net
0ct Israel E q y D t I s r a e l Loss L o ss Return Loss L o ss L o ss Return Loss
( 1 )r o 5 0 i ( 2 ) 3 0 ( 2 ) 50 40 40 40 100 100 100
(3)
l(r)
7 1 0l ( 3 ) 40j (4) 10 ( 4 ) 50 20 60 5B 90 190 l0 180
(5) ro (s) 10 70 64
i ao3 LY tJb

9 25i 10I 25 v5 f, B4 10 275 26 220

10 25110r aa 1.20 r02 10 285 28 202
11 251 t o i 25 145 11 116 10 295 a6 184
72 ,UI tnl 25 170 o 133 10 305 20 t74
13 - -0 ll
2 101 20 190 10 143 10 315 t2 172
l4 ( 6 ) 1 1 0 ( 6 ) .- ,-.l r' ^- l' -, .-n" (6) 25 260 450 11 392 40 355 5 207
|
15 1 01
( 8 ) 5 0 ( 8 ) 191
10 460 LO 376 10 365 B 209
50 510 426 30 395 8
(e) eo (e) : : l
a3L
I
16 90 600 24 492 l6 411 l0
( e )r 5 0 ( e ) l' o: ll
t5l
17
|
150 750 34 608 427 11 ?42
I IO

18 ( 1 0 )7 0 ( 1 0 )1 5 70 820 38 640 15 442 11 246

| 1
19 ( 1 2 )3 0| ( 1 2 )1 5 ( 1 1 ) 3 0 / 1 1 \ t u l 60 BBO 40 660 30 472 a 268
|
20 ( r 2 ) 3 0 ( 1 2 ) 8 ( 1 1 ) 3 0 r ' 1 1) B l 60 940 25 695 IO 4BB 11 273
| |
2l ( 1 2 )3 0 ( 1 2 ) 8 | ( 1 1 ) 3 0 ( t t 1 8 l 60 1, 0 0 0 25 730 16 504 9 280
I ( r : 12 e
I . | I IJ / tol 20 r,020 ta 728 10 514 10 280
22 ( 1 2 )3 0 ( 1 2 )1 0 ( 1 4 ) 3 0 ( 1 4 ) t o l 60 1, 0 8 0 17 77r 20 B 292
| |
IJ ( 1 5 )2 s ( 1 5 )1 2 l r 1 6 \ ? E ( 1 6) T ' I 6 0
^ L v v I ,140 t7 814 24 558 9 307
| l \ r v l

24 ( l s ) 2 5I ( l s ) r z | ( r o )s s ( 1 6 ) t 2 l 6 0 I ,200 17 857 24 582 B 323

800 5t 29r

2A
 FiguTe 28. ESTIMATED
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
FIGHTER-BOMBER
SORTIES
SUEZ.SINAIFRONT,OCTOBER6-24, T973

A v a il a b l e T h i s
Date Front for CAS E n g a g e m e n t s
Eqypt I srael EqvDt I srael EqvDt ISrae I I Lovot sra
6 208 141 (1) 104 (1) 70 (2) 104 (2) 70
|
7 20r 135 (s) too (3) 67 (4) loo (4) 67
J
8 200 t32 ( 5 ) 1 o o ( s ) 6 6I
o 195 66**
10 191 65**
11 187 62**
t2 180 60**
13 179 60**
I4 tto 289 (6) 44 ( 6 ) 7 2 ( 7 ) l7\ 72
l5 175 116**
16 167 229 ( e ) 1 6 7 (s) 22s . :
L7 160 305 ( e ) l 6 0 ( e ) 3 0 5 r. .
1B I f,Y 305 ( 1 0 ) 1 5 e( 10)30s
l9 148 240 ( 1 2 ) 7 4 ( 1 2 ) r 2 o( 1 1 )7 4 (ll)120
20 l3l 302 (12)l1s(12\1q1 1rrl11c /rr\1R1

2t L?3 239 ( 1 2 )6 1 / 1 2 ) 1 1 0 l / 1 1 \ A 1
\ - ^ / v r
1111110

22 113 248 ( 1 2 ) 3 8 ( 1 2 )8 3 ( 1 3 ) 3 7 r 1 ? \e 2 ( t +1 ( 1 4 )8 2
a5 IIz 309 ( 1 5 ) s 6 ( 1 5 ) 1 5 4( 1 6 ) s 6 (l 6 )1 5 4
24 115 309 ( 1 s ) 5 7 ( l s ) 1 5 4 (' 1 6 ) s 7 (16)154
*0ctober 6-13, inclusive, one-third Israe'li air effort allocated to this front,
two-thirds to Golan; thereafter two-thirds to this front, one-third to Golan.
* * 0 n d a t e s w h e r e n o e n g a g e m e n tasr e s h o w no n t h i s f r o n t , h a l f a v a i l a b l e I s r a e l i
C A Ss o r t i e s a r e a l l o c a t e d t o o t h e r f r o n t . a n d v i c e v e r s a .

Figure 29. GOLAN

FRONT
ENGAGEMENTS,
0CTOBER
1973

Eng No Date E n g a g e m e nDte s ig n a t i o n Arab Forces Israel i Forces

ucf,
73-21 6/7 Ahmadiye 7 I n f D i v ( + ), 1 / 2 9 I n f D i v 7 A r m dB d e , 1 / 2 G o l a n iB d e
73-22 6/7 R a f id 5 M e c z dD i v ( + ) , 1 / 2 9 I n f D i v 1 B BA r m dB d e , 1 / 2 G o l a n i B d e
73-23 7-9 Mt. Hermonit 7 I n f D i v ( + ), t / Z 9 I n f D i v , 3 d T a n k D i v 7 A r m dB d e ( - ) , l / 3 c o l a n i B d e
73-24 7/8 Nafekh 5 M e c z dD i v , 1 , / 2 9 I n f D i v , 1 s t T a n k D i v L a n e r & P e l e d D i v s ( - )
73-25 8 Mt HermonI M o r o c c a nB d e ( + ) G o l a n iB d e ( - )
I5-tO B/g Hushniya 5 M e c z d ,L / 2 9 l n f , l s t T a n k Laner & Peled
73-27 t0-12 S a a s s a0 f f e n s i v e l,3,5,7,9 Divs(+) Eytan& Laner
73-28 1? Tel el Hara Iraqi 3d Tank Div Laner
73-29 l 5 Kfar Sharms I r a q i 3 d T a n kD i v ( + ) Laner
/J-JU 16 Naba J o r d a n i a n4 0 B d e ( + ) L a n e r( - )
7 3 - 3I 19 A r a b C o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e I r a q i 3 d , J o r d a n i a n4 0 ( + ) Peled
73-32 at Mt HermonII M o r r o c a nB d e ( + ) Golani Bde
7 3 -3 3 lt M t H e r m o nI I I M o r r o c a nB d e ( + ) Golani Bde(+)

21
 F i s u r e 3 0 . E S T I M A TAELDL Q C A T I00FNB A T T LCEA S U A L T I E
GS0,L A N -22,7973' INCLUSIVE
F R 0 N T0,C T 0 B E6R

Date E n g a q e m e n t s I s r a e li

'| v u-
0ct Arab at ive Mi ive
6 (2t)2oo ( 2 1 ) 1 0 0(2?)4oo( 2 2 ) 3 o o 600 400 400
(22)400 ( 2 2 ) 3 0 0 400 : : I r,ooo 300 : : 700
7 ( 2 1 ) 2 0 0( 2 1 ) 1 o o( 2 4 ) 3 o o( 2 4 ) 2 0 0 500 300 1,000
( 2 3 ) e o o( 2 3 ) 3 s o 900 : : | ,:400 350 1 ?Rn

8 ( 2 4 ) 3 0 0(24)200 I r F \ 1 n n /2q\1nn 400 2oo | 3,000 300 100 1,750

( z : ) g o o t z i t i s o( 2 6 ) s o o( 2 6 ) 2 0 0 1, 4 0 0 I 4,4oo 550 2,300
Y ( 2 6 ) 5 o o( ? 6 ) 2 0 0 500 2oo I s,100 200 100 2,600
10 (27) 600 (27)3oo 600 tnn I E Ann 300 100 3,000
11 ( 2 7 ) 5 o o(27)2oo 500 200 | 6,500 200 100 3, 3 0 0
12 ( 2 7 ) 5 o o( 2 7 ) 1 o o 500 200 | 7,200 100 100 3,500
13 ( 2 8 ) 6 0 0( 2 8 ) i 5 0 600 2oo I B,0oo 1 5 0 1 0 0 3, 7 0 0
i4 200 | 8,200 100 3,800
15 ( 2 e ) 6 0 0( 2 e ) 1 0 0 ooo 200 I 9,000 1 0 0 100 4,000
16 ( 3 0 ) 4 0 0( 3 0 ) 1 o o 400 200 | 9,600 100 50 4,150
t7 200 I 9,800 50 4,200
18 200 | 10,000 50 4,?50
19 rslt6oo ooo 200 | 10,800 ,oo 100 4,550
20 200 | 11,000 50 4,600
21. ( 3 2 ) 2 0 0t r z l i s o 200 150 | 11,350 150 50 4,800
22 ( 3 3 ) 2 0 0( 3 3 ) 2 0 0 200 100 | 1 1 , 6 5 0 200 50 5,050

F i q u r e3 1 . E S T I T ' I A T
AELL
D0 C A T I0 F
NT A N K G,O L AFNR 0 N T , 0 C T 0 B6E- 2R2 , 1 9 7 3
LOSSES

Date E n g a q e m e n t Arab I srael

LUm
D a il y Cum D a i l y Net D a i l y Cum Daily Net
0ct Arab I sr a e l Arab Israel Arab I s r a e l L o s s Loss Return I ncc ln<c I ncs Return
6 (21) 75 ( 2 1 ) B ( ? ? \ 50 ( 2 ? \ 35 L2s t25 43 43
q
50 J5 50 t75 B 167 35 7B 73
7 (21) 75 ( 2 1 ) o ( 2 4 ) 3B ( 2 4 ) I 113 288 t? ao6 16 94 B tJI
( 2 3 ) 1 o s( 2 3 ) 25 105 393 20 J3J 25 119 9 97
.J ( 2 4 ) 3 8 (241' 8 ()r,\ n ()q\ n 5d 431 25 366 8 t27 t? 93
( z i l i o s( 2 3 )25 (26) 75 (26) l 5 180 6 1 1 30 516 40 t67 t2 721
9 ( 2 6 ) 1 o o( 2 6 ) 1 4 100 711 31 585 14 181 13 r22
()7\ qn (27) 7 37 598 7 188 10 119
10 50 761
11 (27) 40 (?7\ 7 40 801 30 608 7 195 11 11s
t2 ( ? 7 ) 4 0 ( 2 7) 7 40 841 29 619 7 202 7 115
13 (28)roo (28) 7 100 941 a6 693 7 209 9 113
L4 25 t2 37 978 23 700 3 212 ? 113
15 (2e) 60 ( 2A\ 7 l2 7? 1,050 16 749 7 219 L17
IO " : ' . u u ,r:, 1 0 L2 7 B 1, 1 2 8 19 802 1n 229 1 124
l7 ?0 3 20 1 , 1 4 8 20 802 232 124
1B 1B 3 1B I , 1 6 6 20 820 5 235 3 724
l9 ( 3 1 ) 1 0 0( 3 1 ) t 1 20 r20 1 , 2 8 6 15 925 1t ?46 r32
20 30 30 I , 3 1 6 2 I 934 ?50 3 IJJ

(7)\ 134
2l n rs2l0 2o 4 2 0 1, 3 3 6 19 935 4 254
22 ( 3 3 ) o | ??'l 0 18 4 1B I . 3 5 4 16 937 4 258 lJ5

34 903 6 LIJ

22
 FiguTe32. ESTIMATEIJ
CLOSE
AIR SUPPORT
FIGHTER SORTIES
BOMBER
GoLAN
FRoNT,oCToBER
6-22, L973

A v a il a b l e T h i s
Date Front for CAS E n g a g e m e n t s
Arab ISrae I Arab I srael Arab lsrael I Arab srae
6 143 2Bl (21\ 71 ( 2 1 ) 1 4 0( ? ? \ 7 1 (22)140
1
139 269 ( 2 1 )6 e ( 2 1 ) 1 3 4(24) 6s (24)r34
B 132 264 ( 2 3 )6 6 (23)r32 (24) 66 (24)r32
9 tzB 349 ( 2 3 )6 4 (23)174 ( 2 5 )6 4 (26)17
4
10 t28 3?5 (27)r28 (27)32s
l1 tL7 310 (27)rr7 ( 2 7 ) 3 1 0
12 113 300 (27)rL3 ( 2 7 ) 3 o o
l3 103 299 ( 2 8 ) 1 0 3(28)zee
14 100 5B**
l5 97 232 ( 2q\ 9 7 (2e)232
16 140 lls ( 3 0 ) l40 ":'l'u
17 87 61**
18 Rq 61**
19 87 120 , a rt ' 87 ( 3 1 ) 1 2 0
20 88 61**
2l 85 119 (v\ 85 r s z l i r s
22 79 t24 /l?\ 7 9 ( 3 3 )1 2 4
*October6-13, inclusive, two-thirds of Israeli air
effort allocated to this
front, one-third to Suez-Sinai; thereafter one-third to this front, two-thirds
t o S u e z - Si n a i .
* * 0 n d a t e s w h e n n o e n g a g e m e n tasr e s h o w no n t h i s f r o n t ,
half available Israeli
C A Ss o r t i e s a r e a l l o c a t e d t o o t h e r f r o n t , a n d v i c e v e r s a .

F i g u r e3 3 . P R E L I M I N A1R
97Y3A R A B - I S R A W
E LAI R
ANALYSTS

N./N1 Fi re- Sur- P/P Effect Arab Israel i

Engagement I power P/P pri se (s&D)R - R P/P cEv CEV
l. C a n aC l r o s s i n gN , | 7.68 4.07 1.01 ?.57 2.60 6.03 2.27 0 .8 5 1.18
2. CanaC l r o s s i n gS, | 7.92 4.76 1.29 2.40 3 .1 0 7. 2 7 2.45 0.79 1.27
3. E g y p tB u i l d u p ,N I q.ZZ 2.33 0 .9 4 0 .9 4 2.68 I .54 1. 5 4 0.61
4. E g y p tB u i l d u p ,S | 3.90 2.42 0.99 0.99 2.92 1.58 1.59 0 .6 3
5. A d a nC o u n t e r a t t a c kI Z.48 1.79 ?,OB 2.08 5 .5 4 2.LL 1.01 0.99
6. E g y p tO f f e n s i v e ,N | 1.98 1.41 0.71 0.71 -9.34 0.35 0. 4 9 2.04
7. E g y p t0 f f e n s . i v e S
, I Z.l9 t.64 n a ? 0 .' 9l ? 3 -6.45 0 .3 8 0.41 2.44
8. 0 p G a z e l l e( C a n a l )| 1.20 0 .9 3 1.31 0.86 I -J.64 0. 4 6 0. 4 5 2.22
9. ChinesF earm I t.zs 0 .9 4 - 6 .5 0 0. 4 3 0 .3 0
10. 3.09
D e v e r s o i r ,W e s t I O.gS 0.92 1.49 I .49 -3.35 0 .6 0 0 .4 0 2.50
11. G e n ef ai I t. og 0.85 l. 14 1.14 - t . 1 3 0.39 0 .3 9 2.9?
I2. I s m alii a | 1.40 1.09 1.45 1.45 - 0 .4 0 0.93 0 .5 4 1. 5 6
21. Ahmadiye l,.tu I 1q 0 .3 0 1.80 0.54 -o.5v 0.44 0.81 1.23
22. Rafid I g.c0 t.74 0.68 2.17 I .48 7. 5 7 a.ar 0 .5 9 I .70
23. Mt. Hermonit I S.qO 3.03 0.72 0.72 -4.46 N R?
1.36
24. 0.73
Nafekh I t. te 1.01 t.75 r./5 - 6 .t 4 0.45 3 .8 5 0.26

23
 Figure 34. 1 9 7 3 A R A B - I S R A E lL, lI A RA N A L Y S I S - R E F I N E D

Arab
Fi re- S e t - Pe
i ce Sur- D is r u p - P / P Effect CEVs
Engagement I Na/Ni power F a c t o r P/P p r is e tion (s&D) R - R P/P A r a b I I s r a e li Average

1. C a n a lC r o s sni g , N | 7.68 4.07 3 1.31 J. +J 4.49 O.UJ ?.2r 0.4e | 2.03 |

2. C a n a lC r o s s ni g, S | 7. 9 2 4.76 3 1 .6 8 3.20 5.38 7. 2 7 2.45 0.45 | 2,20 I
3. E g y p tB u i l d u p , N | 4.22 4.55 J r. aa 2.61 3 .1 8 2.68 - t. 3 + 0.4e | 2.06 |
4. E g y p tB u i 1 d u o .S | 3.90 2. 4 2 3 r.29 2.47 3 .1 9 2.92 1.58 0.s0 | 2.02 i
5. AdanCounterattack | 1.79 2.33 4.22 5.54 2.11 0.50| 2 . 0 0|
6.
7.
E g y p t0 f f e n s i v e , N |
E q y o t0 f f e n s i v e , S |
2.48
1.98
2.I9
1.41
\.64
: 0. 7 1
0.93
i:' 0 .7 1
0.93
-v.J+
-8.23
0.35
0.38
o.4e I
n 4 1 |
z.o+ |
? L L I
B. 0 p G a z e l l e( C a n a l )| 1.20 n o? 1 ?1 o .i o 0.92 - 5 .B 2 0.46 o : 5 0| z . o oI
9. C h i n e s eF a r m I l.?5 0.94 1. JJ 0.80 1. 0 6 - 6 .5 0 0.43 0.40 | 2.47 |
10. Deversoir,West | 0.95 0.92 1.49 0.90 1. 3 4 -3.35 0.60 0.45 | 2.23 I
11 . G e n efia I 1. 0 9 0.86 1 .1 4 1 .1 4 -7.75 0 .3 9 0.34 I 2.92 |
12. I s m a li i a | 1.40 1.09 1. 4 5 1.45 -0.40 0.93 0 . 6 4 t 1 . 5 6 t 2 . L 6
I t half average: 2.06
h a 1f a v e r a g e : 2 . 2 7
zL. Ahmadiye I ,. ru 1 .1 9 9 0.57 2.40 1. 3 7 -O.JL 0 .4 4 0 . 3 2I 3.i1 |
22. Rafid | 3.46 1.74 J 1.29 2.90 : : 3 . 74 7. 5 7 L . 1 l 0.67 | 1.4eI
23. Mt. Hermonit I 5.40 J. UJ 0.72 t.17 -+. JU 0 .5 3 0.45| 2.21I
7-4. Nafekh I t.ta 1.01 1.75 1.15 2.0t - 5 .1 4 0.49 o . z 4| q.v I z.7s
t half average: 2.30
2 half average: 3.19

F i g u r e 3 5 . C 0 M P A R A TCI V
AEM P A IA
GNNA L Y S E1S9,6 7 ,1 9 7 3

Arab Revised
Fire- Calc S e t - P ei c e C a lc S ur - P/P Effect I CEVs
Nu/Ni power* P/P F act o r P/P pri se** ( s & D ) R - R P / P I A r a b t I s r a e li
1 9 6 7- S i n a i 1.82 1.37 2.28 1.1 4.40 0 .3 9 0.96 -t2.t4 0.2e 3.31
1967- WestBank - 7. 3 1 1 0 . 3 0I
0.95 0 .6 5 1 .1 4 1.1 t.25 0.64 0 .B 0 0 . 4 1 1 0 . 3 8 1 2 . 1 0
1 9 6 7- G o l a n 1. 4 8 1 ? ? 2 .1 0 1.1 L . J T 0 .8 3 * * * 1.92 - 1 1. 4 6 0 . 3 0 0 .1 4 6.40
1 9 7 3- S i n a i -3.08 I I
2.37 3 .0 3 1.41 1.1 1 .5 5 I .04 1.61 0.62 2.60
1 9 7 3- G o l a n 2.86 2.23 -4.65 l0.3Bl
1. 9 3 1 1 ?.t2 1.04 ?.20 0 .s 2 | 0 .2 3 | 4.23
* I n c l u d e s a c t u a l d a i ' l y a i r e f f o r t s o f o p p o s i n gs i d e s , n o t a i r s t r e n g t h s p r i o r
to war.
* * A s s u m e sf u l l e f f e c t f o r f i r s t t h r e e d a y s ; t h e r e a f t e r p r o r a t e d .
***Reflects Israeli surprise night attacks, June9-10.

Z4
 OVERALL
COMPARATIVE
EVALUATION

0 f a l l o f t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s , t h e m o s ts i g n i f i c a n t a r e
t h e r e l a t i v e I s r a e l i - E g y p t i a nC E V sf o r 1 9 6 7a n d 1 9 7 3 . I n b o t h i n s t a n c e st h e
opponentw s e re re p re se n ta ti veo f the best militar y for ce the r espectivenat i ons
c o u l d a t t h a t t i m e p u t i n t h e f i e l d , w i t h e x p e r i e n c eodf f i c e r c o r p s , a n d w i t h w e a -
p o n so f c o m p a r a b lqeu a l i t y a n d s o p h i s t i c a t ' i o n . I n t h e 1 9 6 7W a rt h e E g y p t i a n s
s u f f e r e dt h e d i s r u p t i o n r e s u l t i n g f r o m m o d e r a t e o r s u b s t a n t i a ls u r p r i i L ; i n t h e
1 9 7 3W a rt h e I s r a e l i s s u f f e r e dd i s r u p t i o n f r o m p r a c t i c a l l y c o m p l e t es u r p r i s e .
A f t e r a l l o w i n g f o r t h e s u r p r i s e d i s r u p t i o n b y i d e n t i c a ' lp r o c e d u r e isn b o t h
c a s e s ,a n d c o n s i s t e n t l ya p p l y i n gt h e o t h e r v a r i a b l e so f c o m b atto t h e f o r c e s c o m -
mi t t e d i n a n u mb eor f b a ttl e s, the aver ageIsr aelj CEVwith r espect to the E' gy F bp-t-
tians was1.96 (a'lthough a p p a r e n t l yi n c r e a s i n qa s t i m e w e n t o n ; s e e b e l o w ) .
l o w i n g t h e ' i d e n t i c a l p r o c e d u r ef o r t h e 1 9 7 3W i r t h e a v e r a g eI s r a e l i C E Vw i t h
r e s p e c tt o t h e E g y p t i a n sf o r t h e w a r w a s 2 . 1 6 , a l t h o u g hi t w a sa p p a r e n t l yo n l y
2 . 0 6 a f t e r f o u r d a y so f c o m b a t . W h i c h e v evra l u e w e u a e ( 2 . t 6 f o r t h e w a i a s i
w h o l e , o r 2 . 0 6 f o r a c o m p a r a b 'pl ee r i o d o f f o u r d a y so f c o m b a t )t h e c o n c l u s ' i o ins
t h e s a m e . I n t h e o n e i n s t a n c et h e n u m b e r su g g e s t h a t t h e I s r a e l i c o m b aet f f e c -
t i v e n e s ss u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e E g y p t i a n sh a d i n i r e a s e db y a b o u t l 0 % i n t h e ' i n t e r -
v e n i n gs i x y e a r s , i n t h e o t h e r c a s et h a t t h e g a p h a d w i d e n e db y s % .
T h e s i g n i f i c a n t t h i n g i s t h a t , a l t h o u g ht h e d i f f e r e n t i a l w a s s t ' i l l c l o s e t o
t h e s a m e - ab o u ttw o -to -o n efa cto r in favor of the Isr aelis- the qap had not nar -
ro w e dl e t w e e n 1 9 6 7a n d 1 9 2 3 ; i f anythinq it had widened. Th@-
-
t r a d i c t o r y t o t h e c o n v e n t i o n arl e a s o n i n g , . w h i chha s s u g g e s t e tdh a t t h e A r a b sd i d
s o m u c hb e t t e r i n 1 9 7 3t h a n i n 1 9 6 7b e c a u s e t h e y h a d l e a r n e df r o m t h e i r 1 9 6 7l e s -
s o n s , a n d h a d u t i l i z e d t h e t i m e t o i m p r o v et h e m s e l v e sw, h i l e t h e I s r a e l i s , a r r o g a n t
a n d o v e r c o n fi d e n t,h a d n o t ma d ecom par able effor ts.
Se r i o u sstu d y o f th e ma tte r , however ,r .evealsnot o n l y t h a t t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l
r e a s o n i n gi s w r o n g ,i t a l s o r e v e a l sw h y i t i s w r o n g .
D e m o nstra t'i othn a t th e 1 9 7 3per for m ance is not an i n d j c a t o r o f i m p r o v e d Arab
p e r f o r m a n cies a s f o l l o w s :
1 . l n 1 9 6 7 ,t h e I s r a e l i s s t a r t e d w i t h s u r p r i s e ; t h e A r a b sn e v e rr e c o v e r e d ,
in f a c t n e v e r h a d a ch a n ceto re cover :
2 . I n 1 9 7 3t h e A r a b ss t a r t e d w i t h g r e a t e r s u r p r i s e t h a n t h e I s r a e l i s a c h i e v e d
i n 1 9 6 7 . Y e t w i t h i n t h r e e d a y st h e I s r a e l i s h a d r e c o v e r e d a
, n d w e r ef i g h t i n g o n
e q u a l t e r m s w i th th e A ra b s. T h i s i s o n e o f t h e m o s tr e m a r k a b lree c o v e r i e si n m i l i -
t a r y h i s t o r y.
3 . O n er e a s o nt h e i n i t i a l I s r a e l i f r o n t i e r v i c t o r i e s ' i n 1 9 6 7w e r ef o l l o w e ds o
q u i c k l y b y A r a bc o l l a p s ei s t h a t t h e I s r a e l i s h a d e l i m i n a t e dt h e A r a ba i r a r m , a n d
w e r e a b l e t o u s e t h e i r o w na i r i n u n c h a l l e n g e dm, a s s i v ea t t a c k s t h a t c o m D l e t etdh e
demoralization o f t h e A r a b g r o u n df o r c e s . T h a n k st o t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f S o v j e t a j r
d e f e n s ew e a p o n s ' i ng r e a t n u m b e rbs e t w e e n1 9 6 7a n d 1 9 7 3 ,j n t h e l a t e s t w a r t h e A r a b s
w e r e a b l e t o p r e v e n tt h e I s r a e l i a i r f r o m h a v i n ga c o m p a r a b lfei e l d d a y .
4 . I n 1 9 6 7t h e o v e r a l l A r a b c o m m a n dienr c h i e f , a n d t h e m a nd ' i r e c t l y r e s p o n -
s i b l e f o r t h e S i n a j f r o n t , w a sa p o l i t i c a l a p p o i n t e ea, d r u n ka n d a d r u gi d d i c t ,
w h o s e e m st o h a ve b e e nu n d e r b o th of the lattelinfluences shor tl.y aftei he l ear ned
o f t h e d e s t r u c t i o no f h i s a i r f o r c e . I n 1 9 7 3t h e E g y o t i a n s( a n d ' i t s o t h e S y r i a n s )
w e r e l.e d b y m e nw h o , i f n o t t h e e q u a l o f t h e i r I s r a e l i o p p o n e n t (sI s m a i t p r i l U a b l y
q q ! b e c o m p a r endo t u n f a v o r a b l yw i t h t h e m ) ,w e r ea t l e a s t c o m p e t e nsto l d i e r s w h o
d i d n o t l o s e t h e i r h e a d se i t h e r i n v i c t o r y o r i n a d v e r s i t y .
B e c a u so e f t h e a s s u m p t i o ni sn v o l v e d , t h e o v e r a l l c a m p a i gann a l y s e ss h o w n ' i n
F i g u r e 3 5 a r e n o t s o r e l i a b l e a s t h o s e f o r t h e e n g a g e m e n t sH. o w e v e rt,h e y s u g g e s t

25
a n i n t e r e s t i n g q u a n t i t a t i v e c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f t h e q u a l i t a t ' i v e a r g u m e n t sp r e s e n t e d
above.
T h e i 9 6 7 J o r d a n i a nc a r n p a i g pn e r f o r m a n c ea n a l y s i s s u g g e s t sa n I s r a e l i C E Vw i t h
r e s p e c t t o t h e J o r d a nA r m yo f 2 . 1 , 0 ,w h i c h i s 2 9 %h ' i g h e rt h a n t h e a v e r a g eC E Vf o r
t h e f o u r b a t t l e s a n a l y z e d . S i n c e t h e J o r d a n i a nh i g h c o r n m a nddo e s n o t s e e mt o h a v e
m a d ea n . ys e r i o u s b l u n d e r s d u r i n g t h e c a m p a ' i g ni,t c a n b e h y p o t h e s i z e dt h a t m o s t o f
t h e 2 9 %d i f f e r e n c e i s d u e p r i m a r i l y t o t h e e f f e c t s o f a i r p o w e r o n t h e o v e r a l l o u t -
come.
T h e 1 9 6 7 E g y p t ' i a nc a m p a i g np e r f o r m a n c ea n a l y s i s p r o v i d e s a n I s r a e l i / E g y p t i a n
C E Vo f 3 . 3 1 , w h i c h i s 6 9 %h i g h e r t h a n t h e a v e r a g eC E Vf o r t h e f o u r b a t t ' l e s a n a l y z e d .
I f w e a c c e p t t h e s a m eh y p o t h e s i sf o r t h e d e m o r a l j z i n ga n d c a s u a l t y - p r o d u c i n ge f f e c t
o f t h e v i g o r o u sa p p l i c a t i o n o f u n c h a l l e n g e a d i r p o w e r , t h i s l e a v e s 4 0 %a t t r i b u t a b l e
t o t h e i n e p t l e a d e r s h i po f F i e l d M a r s h a lA m e r .
T h e 1 9 6 7S y r i a n c a m p a i g np e r f o r m a n c ea n a l y s i s i n d ' i c a t e s a n I s r a e l i C E Vw i t h
r e s p e c t t o t h e S y r i a n A r m yo f 6 . 4 0 , w h i c h i s 5 5 %h i g h e r t h a n t h e a v e r a g eI s r a e ' l i
C E Vf o r t h e f o u r b a t t l e s a n a l y z e d . A g a i n h y p o t h e s i z i n gt h a t 2 9 %o f t h i s d i f f e r e n -
t i a l j s d u e t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f I s r a e l i a i r p o w e r , t h ' i s l e a v e s 2 6 %a t t r i b u t a b l e t o
t h e e x t r e m ei n e p t i t u d e o f t h e S y r i a n h j g h c o m m a n dw, h i c h f a i l e d t o e m p l o yi t s
f o r c e s a d e q u a t e l y ,o r t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f t h o s e u n i t s t h a t w e r e e n g a g e d .
I n t h e S u e z - S i n a i1 9 7 3c a m p a i g a n n a l y s i s , h o w e v e r ,t h e r e l a t i v e I s r a e l i -
E g y p t i a n C E Vf o r t h e c a m p a i g ni s 2 0 %h i g h e r t h a n t h e a v e r a g ec a l c u l a t e d f o r t h e
b a t t l e s a n a l y z e do n t h a t f r o n t . T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n tw i t h a q u a l i t a t i v e a s s e s s m e n t
t h a t I s r a e l i a i r p o w e rd i d n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t t h e o v e r a l l o u t c o m eo f t h e s e l a n d
c a m p a i g n s a, n d t h a t t h e h i g h - 1 e v e l A r a b l e a d e r s h i p w a s s o m e w h al te s s c o m p e t e n ti n
p e r f o r m a n c et h a n w e r e t h e s u b o r d i n a t eu n i t s . T h e o v e r a l l a n a l y s i s f o r t h e S y r i a n
f r o n t s h o w sa n I s r a e l i - A r a b C E U5 4 %h i g h e r t h a n f o r t h e e n g a g e m e n a t sn a l . y z e d . T h i s
s u g g e s t st h a t t h e E g y p t i a nh i g h c o m m a nwda s a b o u t 3 4 %m o r e c o m p e t e n t h a n t h a t o f
the Syrians.
A c o m p a n i s o on f t h e I s r a e l i v s . S y r i a n p e r f o r m a n c ei n t h e t w o w a r s m i g h t , a t
f i r s t g l a n c e , a p p e a rt o c o n t r a d i c t t h e a r g u m e n t sp r e s e n t e da b o v e . I n f a c t , h o w e v e r ,
t h e S y r i a n s i t u a t i o n w a s u n i q u e , a n d c a n n o t b e t h e b a s j s f o r a n y c o m p a r i s o on f t h i s
sort.
T h e S y r i a n p e r f o r m a n c ei n 1 9 6 7v l a s o n e o f t h e m o s t a b y s m a li n t h e h i s t o r y o f
c o n v e n t i o n a lw a r f a r e . l , J h i l et h e I s r a e ' l ' i p e r f o r m a n c eo n J u n e 9 - 1 0 , 1 9 6 7 , w a s c o n m e n -
d a b l e , t h e r e s u l t s a c h i e v e dw o u l d h a v e b e e n i m p o s s i b l ea g a i n s t e v e n a m o d e r a t e l y
c o m p e t e nm t i l i t a r y p e r f o r m a n c e . I t i s a l m o s t j n c r e d i b l e t o a m i l i t a r y o b s e r v e rt h a t
a n y m i l i t a r y f o r c e c o u l d h a v e s c a l e d t h e e s c a r p m e nf tr o m t h e H u l e hV a l l e y t o t h e
G o l a n P l a t e a u i n a f e w h o u r s a g a i n s t a f o r c e w j t h t h e w e a l t h o f w e a p o n sa n d e q u i p -
m e n t a v a i ' l a b l et o t h e S y r i a n s . O n em u s t d r a w t h e c o n c l u s i o nt h a t , w i t h a f e w j n d j -
v i d u a l e x c e p t i o n s , t h e S y r i a n A r m yw a s h a r d l y b e t t e r t h a n a m o bi n u n i f o r m , c o m m a n d e d
b y i n d i v i d u a l s w h o c o u l d n o t c o o p e r a t ew i t h e a c h o t h e r , o r c o o r d i n a t es u b o r d i n a t e s .
T h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s e v i d e n t j n t h e h i s t o r y o f S y r i a b e t w e e n1 9 4 9a n d 1 9 6 7 .
T h e r e h a d b e e n n i n e m i ' l i t a r y c o u p sd ' e t a t , a n d a f t e r e a c h c o u p t h e s u c c e s s f u l u p s t a r t
h a d c l e a r e d o u t a l l p o t e n t i a ' l r i v a l s o r e n e m i e si n t h e o f f i c e r c o r p s . T h e r e s u l t w a s
t u r m o i l i n t h e a r m e df o r c e s , w i t h ' i n e v i t a b l e i n c o m p e t e n coef t h e s o r t d e m o n s t r a t ejdn
t h e 1 9 6 7W a r .
D u r i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g w i n t e r , h o w e v e r ,t h e r e h a d b e e no n e m o r ec o u p d ' e t a t , l e d
this time by the then Mjnister of War, Air Force General Hafezal Assad. The new
P r e s i d e n t a g a i n s w e p t t h e s e n i o r c o n u n a n d ear sw a y ( t h e e v i d e n c eo f t h e r e c e n t w a r
s u g g e s t st h a t t h i s c o u l d n o t h a v e d o n e s e r j o u s h a r m ) , a n d p u t ' i n h ' i s o w nm e n ,w h o
h a v e r e m a i n e da s t h e m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e c o u n t r y e v e r s j n c e . T h u s a n i m p r o v e -
m e n t i n S y r i a n p e r f o r m a n c ea , m a j o r i m p r o v e m e n tw, a s i n e v j t a b l e , n o m a t t e r w h a t t h e
I s r a e l i s , t h e E g y p t i a n s ,o r a n y o n ee l s e h a d a l s o d o n e i n t h e m e a n t i m e . I t w o u l d
s e e ms u r p r i s i n g , i n f a c t , i f t h e i m p r o v e m e n w t ,i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e I s r a e l i s , h a d n o t
b e e n a t l e a s t f r o m a C E Vo f 0 . 2 4 t o o n e o f 0 . 4 0 . T h e r e i s n o k n o w ni n f o r m a t i o n o r
t e c h n i q u ea v a i l a b l e w h i c h c a n t e l l u s w h e t h e r i t w o u l d h a v e b e e n g r e a t e r i f t h e
I s r a e l i s h a d n o t a l s o i m p r o v e d ,a s i s e v i d e n c e df r o m t h e a n a l y s i s o f o p e r a t ' i o n s
against the Egyptians.

26
 The Israelis had not only not fallen behindin the years between1967and 1973
but in fact had continuedto widenthe combateffectivenessgap betweenthemselves
a n d t h e E g yp ti a n sfo r ma n yre asons,whichcan be sur nmar ized as follows:
a . C o n ti n u o uIsra s e l i e ffor ts to im pr ovem ilitar y per for m ance at all l ev el s
a n di n a l l r e s p e c t s : t r a i n i n g , s c h o o ' l i n gm, o b i l i z a t i o p
n l a n s a n d p r a c t i c e s ,e t c . ;
b . A su b sta n t'i a 1 lhyi g h er R&Dcapability, and appar ent' ly a mor einten s i v eR &D
effort;
c . S o u n do, b j e c t i v e , I s r a e l i p r o f e s s i o n am l i l i t a r y a n a l y s i so f h j s t o r i c a l
e x p e r i e n caen d c u r i e n t c a p a b i l ' i t i e s ,i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o t h e A r a bc u l t u r a l t e n -
d e i r c yt o a l l o w e m o t i o na n dw i s h f u l t h i n k i n g t o i n f l u e n c ee v a l u a t i o n p , l a n n i n ga n d
o p e r a t i o n alle a d e r s h i p .
F i r s t - h a n do b s e r v a t i o on f M i d d l eE a s ta r m i e ss u g g e stth a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n h a s
n o t c h a n g esdi n c e 1 9 7 3 .
An i n te re sti n g p h e n o menonn so consistentas to dem and r ecognition,is the fac t
t h a t i n 1 9 7 3 ,a s i n i g O Z ,a s e r i e s o f A r a bd e f e a t si s j n v a r i a b l yf o l l o w e db y d e c l i n -
i n g c o m b aet ffe cti ve n e ss. T her eis no suchphenom enon evidentas a r esult of the
f e w I s r a e l i d e fe a tsi n e a rl y 0ctober 1973,in fact quite the contr ar y. It i s bey ond
t h e s c op eo f th i s stu d y to i n i tiate any attem ptto quant' ifywhat' is almos tc er tai nl y
a m o r a lba n d /o rd i sru p ti o n p h enomenon. It is quite ger m ane to the obiecti v esof the
s t u d y , h o w e ve r,to n o te th a t the phenom enon exists, and must be given cons i der ati on
i n a n y effo rts to a sse ssA ra bcom bateffectiveness in the event of futur e confl i c t.

27
 CONCLUS
IONS

1 . C o mb apt e rfo rma n ce o f the Isr aelis with r espect to the opposingAr a b
a r m i e si n 1 96 7 , a n d th e p e n fo rmance of the Ar ab ar m ieswith r espect to eachother ,
c a n b e r e p r e se n te db y th e fo l l o w 'ingnumer icalCEVcompar isons:
Israelis 4.13 (1.63) (1.e6)
J o r d a nai n s 2.53 (r.oo1 (1.20)
Egyptians 2.LI (t'oo1 )1'oo)
S y r ia n s 1.00
or, in percentages:
a. I s r a e l i 6 3 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e J o r d a n i a n s ;
b. I s r a e l i 9 6 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e E g y p t i a n s ;
c. Isra e l i 3 1 ,3 % su p e ri or ity over the Syr ians;
d. J o r d a n i a n2 0 %s u p e r i o r j t y o v e r t h e E g y p t i a n s ;
e. J o r d a n i a n1 5 3 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e S y r i a n s ;
f. E g yp tia n l .L 7 %su p e rior ityover the Syr ians.
2 . C o mb apt e rfo rma n ce o f the Isr aelis with r espect to the opposingAr a b ar m i es
in 1 9 7 3 , a n d th e p e rfo rma n ce o f the Ar ab ar mieswith r espect to eachother , c an be
re p r e s e n t e db y th e fo l l o w i n g n u m er icalCEVcom par isons:
Israeljs Z.7S (2.16)
Egyptians 1.27 (t.OO1
Syrians 1.00
0r, in percentages:
a . I s r a e l i 1 1 6 %s u p e r i o r i t yo v e r t h e E g y p t i a n s ;
b . I s r a e l i 7 7 5 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e S y r i a n s ;
c . E g y p t i a n2 7 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e S y r i a n s .
3 . S p e c i a ' cl i r c u m s t a n c erse l a t i n g t o t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i po f
S y r i a j n 1 9 6 7a n d i n 1 9 7 3d o n o t p e r m i t t h e d r a w i n go f a n y f i r m c o n c l u s i o n sf r o m
t h e c o m p a r a ti veIsra e 'l i vs. S yri an com par isons in 1967and 1973.
4 . B e tw e e n1 9 6 7a n d 1 9 7 3th e gap in com bateffectivenessbetweenthe Is r ael i
a n d Eg y p t i ana rmi e sw i d e n e d .
5 . S a v ef o r t h e S y r i a n s , t h e r e i s n o r e a s o nt o b e l i e v e t h a t a n y o t h e r A r a b
a r m e df o r c e s i m p r o v e dt h e i r m i l i t a r y e f f e c t i v e n e s sr e l a t i v e t o t h e I s r a e l i s a n y m o r e
t h a n t h e E g y p t i a n s ;t h e S y r i a n i m p r o v e m e sn t i l l l e a v e st h e mc o n s i d e r a b l yb e h i n dt h e
Egyptians.
6 . T h e re i s n o re a so nto b elieve that the Ar abshave impr ovedtheir r el ati v e
e f f e c t i v e n e s sw i t h r e s p e c tt o t h e I s r a e l i s s j n c e 1 9 4 3 ;r a t h e r i t i s 1 i k e 1 yt h a t t h e
q u a l j t a t i v e g a p h a s w i d e n e df u r t h e r .

?8