J. Marine Sci. Appl.

(2012) 11: 402-409

DOI: 10.1007/s11804-012-1149-7

Risk Management of Key Issues of FPSO

Liping Sun* and Hai Sun
College of Shipbuilding Engineering, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China

Abstract: Risk analysis of key systems have become a growing topic late of because of the development of
offshore structures. Equipment failures of offloading system and fire accidents were analyzed based on the
floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO) features. Fault tree analysis (FTA), and failure modes and
effects analysis (FMEA) methods were examined based on information already researched on modules of relex
reliability studio (RRS). Equipment failures were also analyzed qualitatively by establishing a fault tree and
Boolean structure function based on the shortage of failure cases, statistical data, and risk control measures
examined. Failure modes of fire accident were classified according to the different areas of fire occurrences
during the FMEA process, using risk priority number (RPN) methods to evaluate their severity rank. The
qualitative analysis of FTA gave the basic insight of forming the failure modes of FPSO offloading, and the fire
FMEA gave the priorities and suggested processes. The research has practical importance for the security
analysis problems of FPSO.
Keywords: fault tree analysis (FTA); failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA); risk priority number; floating
production, storage and offloading ( FPSO); risk management
Article ID: 1671-9433(2012)04-0402-08

1 Introduction1 scheme, underwater hose scheme, and buoy support hose

Today the processing and storing of offshore oil and gas
industry is a very competitive industry. The floating
production, storage and offloading (FPSO) allow for the
storage of oil and gas in shutter tankers through an offloading
system, which significantly improves the economics of the oil
field operations(Yan et.al. 2010; Zhang et.al 2005;
Yoshihide, 2002; Fucatu, 2003). The offloading procedures
are conducted in tandems that allow for transporting of the
hydrocarbons from FPSO to linear shuttle tankers more
effectively. This transporting system is widely used in the
movement of low crude offloading systems. The shuttle
tanker can be easily moored as each bow or bow to be stern
of FPSO is controllable. The floating, semi-submersible hose
or a pipe supporting rotary joint is the mechanism used to
transport crude from one system to another.
Offloading in tandem can be more adaptable to adverse
working conditions in contrast to the offloading in adjacent,
and adaptable to mooring of different sizes of shuttle tankers,
which has been used as the primary choice for offloading.
scheme. However, the characteristics of mobility of the FPSO
and shuttle tanker add more uncertainties the offloading
system because of its sensitivity to sea conditions (Meek,
2009), horizontal slow oscillation, the uncertainties of relative
position between FPSO and shuttle tanker intensified working
conditions of the offloading system equipment. More
seriously, these uncertainties may lead to secondary failures
(such as oil spill and hose rupture). Therefore, reliability
analysis of offloading system in tandem is a very important
research study.
2 Reliability analysis methods and relex
reliability studio
The components and relationship of an offloading hose
system include: hose, emergency and control system and are a
somewhat complex research study. For this reason, it is
necessary to create a sound analysis method, for conducting
the study. The two logical analysis methods utilized are: fault
tree analysis (FTA) and failure model and effective analysis
(FMEA).

FPSO offloading system can be varied according to working
condition and mooring system of FPSO (Lars, et.al., 2009).
Three oil-transporting methods are included in the illustration
of FPSO sector weathercock mooring scheme: floating hose
Received date: 2012-10-19.
Foundation item: Supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the
Central Universities (HEUCFR1109) and 111 projects foundation (Grant
No.B07019) from State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs of China
and Ministry of Education of China.
*Corresponding author Email: sunliping@hrbeu.edu.cn
Harbin Engineering University and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
2.1 FTA analysis method
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a deductive, top-down method
aimed at analyzing the effects of initiating faults and events
on a complex system. Boolean logic theory was applied to
decompose top-event undesired state systems, identify
specific events and the root cause factors and relationships
associated with the study. An in-depth analysis was
performed to identify certain gate symbols for depicting
factors and various relationships. The final aim of FTA is
not only to get the probability of top-event, but also, more
Journal of Marine Science and Application (2012) 11: 402-409
important was to find the weakest segments of the system,
and measures to improve the safety and reliability of a
system.
2.2 FMEA analysis method
The failure modes and effects' analysis (FMEA) is a
systematic method used for analyzing potential failure modes,
causes and effects within the classified systems and severity
and probability of the failures in the product development
operations in a bottom-up procedure.
Failure modes consist of any errors or defects in a process,
design, or item that is potential or actual. The effects' analysis
refers to the study of the consequences of those failures. Any
FMEA conducted properly and appropriately helps a team to
define, identify and eliminate known and/or potential failures,
problems, and errors. Based on past experiences with similar
products or processes, the research study will provide future
practitioners with useful information to aid in the reduction of
risk load to the system design, process and service, for a more
effective performance.
2.3 Reliability analysis based on relex studio
The system reliability studies software tools, including FMEA
module, FTA module considered in this paper using relex
studio (www.relex.com).
The FMEA/FMECA module uses the same data libraries as
the prediction modules. The project system configuration may
be entered graphically in either tree level-of-indenture or
tabular spread sheet form. Results are compatible with
logistic system analysis format (LSAR). The FTA program
applies cut-set algorithms for quantitative solution and offers
Lambda-Tau representation of well-maintained systems. Four
standard procedures and three measures of component
importance are also provided: Birnbaum, Criticality or
Fussell-Vessely.
Fig.1 Configuration of offloading Hose system
403
3 Structure and hazard analysis of system
The term risk identification offloading systems is referred as
the reliability analysis, because the method helps to determine
possible risk factors and qualitative estimations associated
with offloading risk factors (Jan, 2007). The reliability
analysis provides an explanation for the possible risk factors;
gives a breakdown of the risk factors and helps determine
which risk factors are most important for future research
studies.
3.1 Structure of offloading system
For the purpose of this research paper, the FPSO offloading
system has been divided into five parts as listed: hydraulic
control system, auxiliary system, emergency shutdown
system, offloading hose system, and the control system.
First, the hydraulic control system consists of hydraulic
equipment and valve subassembly. Second, the auxiliary
system consists of crane, hydraulic power device and
closed-circuit television (CCTV). Third, the emergency
shutdown system (ESD) consists of programmable logic
controller system (PLC), sound and light alarm disc. Fourth,
the module PLC system or distribution control system (DCS)
consist of communication. Lastly, offloading hose system
consists of three parts: hose FPSO connection, hose floating
in the sea, and hose connected with shuttle tanker. The
research study focused on the reliability on an offloading
hose system. Figure1 below provide details of the
configuration of an Offloading Hose system, and Table 1
show the code and its corresponding items (Wang, et.al.,
2010).
404 Liping Sun, et al. Risk Management of Key Issues of FPSO

Table 1 Codes and items Table 2 Risk factors

Code Item Fault
Description
T FPSO Offloading system Categories
S1 Auxiliary System Hose fracture; accidental release of hose;
S2 Emergency Shutdown System(ESD) Equipment release of security broken joints; abrasion
S3 Offloading Hose System failures or tearing of terminal hose; failure of
S4 Hydraulic Control System emergency shutdown valve.
S5 Center Control System Misoperation of emergency shutdown
Misoperation
P1 Crane valve; misoperation of hose release device.
P2 Closed-circuit Television (CCTV) Hose release caused by release or
Occasional
P3 Hydraulic Equipment disconnection of cable, some emergency
event
P4 Programmable Logic Controller(PLC) system events like fire.
P5 Sound and Light Alarm Disc
P6 The Module for PLC System or Distribution Control
System (DCS) Communication
P7 Hose Connected with Shuttle Tanker Furthermore, the feature of the FPSO function, including
P8 Hose Floating in The Sea
crude production, storage and offloading, makes it
P9 Hose Connected with FPSO
necessary for the reliability analysis of the fire accidents to
P10 Valve Subassembly
achieve proper operation in the offloading system.
P11 Hydraulic Equipment
X1 Hose
X2 Quick Coupling 4 Analysis of Equipment Failure
X3 Ball Stud
4.1 Equipment failures
X4 Rapid Cut-off Valve
X5 Rapid Release Device
Most of the reports on the FPSO equipment failures like hose
X6 Flange leaks, a hawser broken, are still under security and the data of
X7 Locking Device of Cam the FPSO offloading system is in shortage, thus qualitative
X8 Hose Winch analysis of a FPSO offloading system has been researched in
X9 Deploying and Retracting Device this study.
X10 Base of Hose Winch
X11 Working Platform 4.1.1 FTA Construction
X12 Rupture Joint The offloading equipment failure was selected as the
top-event based on the principles utilizing the three mid
3.2 Identification of risk factor events' structure analysis of offloading system and practical
The examination of risk analysis theory and other technical engineering experiences. The research examined three
theories regarding the operating processes associated with elements of the offloading equipment: hose fracture,
equipment failure of offloading hose systems have been accidental release of hose, abrasion or tearing of a hose.
identified, analyzed and compared in hopes of moving
forward for future improved techniques for safer offloading Each of elements leads to the top event, and thus explained
of crude oil and gases (Urban, 1998; Eric et.al., 2008). the causes for the failure of equipment. The process was
repeated for the decompose segment that provides no
Events associated with causes associated with failure have explanation for the lower event. Figure 2 shows the fault tree
been grouped into three aspects according to the factors of offloading equipment failure, which consists of 17 minimal
tabulated in Table 2: equipment failure, incorrect cut sets, X2, , X are the event codes of basic events.(Xi is
manipulation, and occasional event. However, the failure the code to an event, i)
cases and statistical data of the offloading system indicate
the equipment failures are the main factors leading to the
system failure; and therefore, creating the need to analyze
and study faulty equipment of an offloading system have
been examined.
Journal of Marine Science and Application (2012) 11: 402-409 405

Fig.2 Fault tree of equipment

4.1.2 Qualitative analysis

Qualitative analysis includes applying Boolean algebra to
fault tree to obtain the equation for each gate of the fault
tree. This section also describes a methodology for
obtaining the minimal cut sets (Min. CS) of the fault tree.
Min. CS is the unique set of basic events that can lead to top
event, when any basic event is removed from the set, the
remaining events collectively can no longer cause top event.
Therefore, Min. CS can be used to measure system severity.
Generally, Min. CS with less basic events is more likely to
happen than the one with more basic events, thus Min. CS
with less basic events should be paid more attention.
Fussell-Vessely algorithm is applied in this paper to obtain
Min. CS. Table 3 show the Min. CS of fault tree of
offloading equipment failure.
(a) Hose accidents
Table3 Minimal cut sets of FTA of FPSO offloading system
Procedure
0 1 2 3BICS 4Min. CS
T E1 X1 X1 X1
E2 X2 X2 X2
E3 X3 X3 X3
E4 X4 X4
X6 X5 X5
X7 X6 X6
E5 X7 X7
X11 X8 X8
E6 X9 X9
X15 X10 X10
X16 X11 X11
(b) Abrasion accidents
X17 X12 X12
Fig.3 Fault tree of equipment failures
X13 X13
X14 X14
4.2 Risk control measures:
X15 X15
X16 X16
FTA analysis and expertise, risk control measures for the risk
X17 X17 factors are put forward and should be strictly followed based
on the practical engineering experience:
406
4.2.1 Hose
1) High integrity hoses, valves, joint, and other offloading
system devices are used and periodical maintenances are
required.
2) An automatic cut-off valve should be equipped in the
upstream of the joints in the hose system, also low-pressure
sensor or similar sensors are necessary to detect leakage.
3) Independent low-pressure sensors need to be installed in
the upstream of each offloading-pumps check valve;
4) The rate of transmission is required to be controlled at a
reasonable level;
5) Periodic inspection, maintenance and replacement
4.2.2 Occurrence of crude leakage
1) Valve should be installed in hose ends to prevent oil
pollution caused by the release of the hose.
2) If the floating hose broken or disconnected, either person
in charge at any time should be responsible to pay attention to
the leakage, and acknowledge emergency control center to
immediately stop the cargo pumps to prevent leakage
expansion. Similarly, under such circumstance, if the
terminal's cargo oil pump does not stop, shuttle tankers will
be not allowed to stop mentioning the valve manifold.
3) Well-developed oil drainage control procedures should be
established.
5 FMEA analysis of fire accident
Risk occurrence can be very high during the long time of
production test, trial operation. Fire, explosion, crash, leakage,
dangerous chemical, accidents of important operations etc.
are all likely to be risk factors through FPSO service, oil
tankers and oil fuel pipelines and different pipelines prone to
intertwined as the feature of FPSO distribution, thus fire and
explosion are the main risk factors. Once a fire starts, it will
not only lead to the cabin smoke large, low visibility, high
temperature, toxic gases, the difficulties for personnel escape,
but also lead to very fast combustion, explosion and the
formation of three-dimensional fires, which often results in
platform ruin and person die. Thus, reliability analysis is of
great importance (Reyes J S 1998) .
The analysis of this software and processing include 4 steps:
(1) establishment of system information, (2) FMEA analysis,
(3) improvement measures recommendation, and (4) output
of report.
5.1 FMEA analysis
FMEA analysis includes five segments, (1) definition of
objects or processes, (2) identification of the potential failure
modes; (3) identification of the failure effects, (4)
Liping Sun, et al. Risk Management of Key Issues of FPSO
establishment of the failure causes, and (5) risk assessment.
Identification of the potential failure modes and their
descriptions are showed in Table 4. Based on the feature of
function and distribution of FPSO, failure modes can be
studied according to different areas fire occurs: 1) Oil
warehouse or sites fire, 2) Restricted space fire, 3) Living
area fire, and 4) Fire in other areas (Eleftheria, 2007; Shetty
et.al., 1998; Vinnem, 2000; Dino, 2005; Jaime, 2001).
Table 4 Failure Models
Failure modes Description
Process treating cabin, cargo oil storage,
Oil warehouse
methanol storage, glycol dehydration unit,
or sites fire
aviation fuel storage, gas cylinder storage.
Hazardous air environment: overmuch or
scanty oxygen, toxic air environment,
Restricted Explosive air environment.
space fire Dangerous position: place of low visibility,
movable part of equipment, place of
unstable parts.
Living area Place for personnel rest, like kitchen,
fire bedroom and other recreational areas.
Fire could happen when Facilities
Fire in other Maintenance, such as Offloading
areas operation areas, thunder preventive
facilities.
1) Risk Assessment can be classified into failure modes
identification, RPN, and suggestions. The areas of fire
accident are divided into 4 categories: oil warehouse fire,
restricted space fire, living area fire and other areas.
2) The FMEA procedure assigns a numerical value to each
risk associated with causing a failure, using severity,
occurrence and detection as metrics. Severity refers to the
impact of the failure model on a system level; occurrence
refers to the likelihood that the failure will occur; detection
refers to rate the likelihood that the root-cause will be
detected before a failure can occur. These are then combined
into a risk priority number (RPN), which can be used to
analyze the system. RPN is calculated by multiplying the
severity by the occurrence by the detection of the risk. As the
risk increases, the values of the ranking rise. So the risky
elements of the design can be measured by the rank of high-
value RPNs. Particularly, RPN can be used to sort the
problems in analysis, but in actual FMEA, high-level of
severity, high RPN values should be first taken into account
for evaluating a corrective measures prevention project. This
order must be observed to reduce the risk levels: severe
degree, occurred degrees, detection degrees (Hoseynabadi H
A 2010).
3) Then the task is to determine the value of severity,
occurrence and detection based on the corresponding risk
criteria. Generally, As low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)
principle is used to determine whether the risk is acceptable
Journal of Marine Science and Application (2012) 11: 402-409 407

or further measures are necessary, to define a reasonable certain compensating preventions but not limited are given
value. Figure 4 shows ALARP principle. According to the (Sun and Sun, 2010) :
assessment of risk factors, if the data results are above the
intolerable line, then the results indicate an intolerable zone, 1) Reinforcement of the usages of fire and electrical safety. 2)
and the risk is not acceptable, except in special Strict control of welding. 3) Abide by crude and gas
circumstances. However, if the assessment of risk factors is processing, transportation and holding-cleaning. 4) Inspection
below the negligible line, then the results will fall into the and maintenance of the security and fire facilities 5) Doing
negligible zone, and allows for an acceptable risk and no well on layout. 6) Fire surface protection. 7) Enhance the
need for safety improvements. However, if the assessment personnel management and training. 8) Strengthen the
of risk factors is between the negligible line and intolerable inspection, maintenance and management of
line, then the results indicate the tolerance zone is divided thunder-preventive facilities, electric equipment. 9) Adopt
into two levels, and the level of risk would meet the ALARP new technology and equipment.
standard of approval. In combination with engineering
experience and other expertise, the scale and criteria of Table 6 Occurrence rating scale for FMEA
severity, occurrence and detection are tabulated separately
in Tables 5, 6, 7. Scale Description Criteria

Table 5 Severity rating scale for FMEA Extremely Probability of occurrence is less
1~3
unlikely than 0.0001
Scale Description Criteria
Probability of occurrence is
4~5 Remote
between 0.0001 and 0.001
Urgent repair is
3 Minor Probability of occurrence is
required 6~7 Occasional
between 0.001 and 0.01
Person injured and
5 Marginal Reasonably Probability of occurrence is
platform damaged 8~10
Probable greater than 0.01
Person die and
7 Critical
platform damaged
Person die and Table 7 Detection rating scale for FMEA
10 Catastrophic
platform scrapped
Scale Description Criteria

Current monitoring methods

1-3 Almost certain almost always will detect the
failure

Good likelihood current

4-5 High monitoring methods will
detect the failure

Low likelihood current

6-7 Low monitoring methods will
detect the failure
Fig.4: ALARP Principle
Almost No known monitoring methods
8-10
impossible available to detect the failure
5.2 The FMEA results for fire accident
The result of FMEA, which built in Relex, is show below in
Figure 5.

According to the FMEA in Figure 6, the highest RPNs are

electrical fault ignition and misoperation, in such cases,
408
Fig.5 Fire FMEA table in Relex 2009
Fig.6 TOP 10 RPN results according to FMEA
6 Conclusions
The proposed research studied, examined the risk factors,
control measure involved, and failures associated with
modes of fire accidents in the FTA, FPSO and FMEA
system analysis. Based on the analysis findings solutions
were recommended for the improvement of faulty
equipment of offloading oil and gas supplies. The results of
the research paper provided feasible technical solutions for
the FPSO offloading system tandem.
(1) FTA including Min. CS are established based on Relex
Studio qualitatively referring to Boolean equation, which can
be used in risk countermeasures for further study.
Liping Sun, et al. Risk Management of Key Issues of FPSO
(2) FMEA specifically on fire accident which has serious
consequences is established, RPN and certain compensating
preventions are given.
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The 23rd International Ocean and Polar Engineering Conference

ISOPE-2013 Anchorage Conference
The 23rd International Offshore (Ocean) and Polar Engineering Conference will be held in Anchorage, Alaska, USA from June 30 to
July 5, 2013. The conference will cover the following technical areas and special symposia:

Offshore Technology & Ocean Engineering High-Performance Materials Symposium

Frontier Energy Resources Technology Nanotechnologies For Clean Energy
Renewable Energy & Environment Strain-Based Design
Geotechnical Engineering Arctic Materials
Offshore Mechanics Corrosion Control
Hydrodynamics & CFD Polar Science & Tech
Sloshing Dynamics & Design Advanced Ship Technology
Tsunami and Safety Underwater Systems & Oceanology
Coastal Engineering Underwater Systems & Oceanology
Mechanics, Safety & Reliability CFD & Computational Mechanics
Subsea, Pipelines, Risers, Positioning Metocean

Organized by: Technical Program Committee, ISOPE

Sponsored by: International Society of Offshore and Polar Engineers (ISOPE)

Website: http://www.isope2013.org/