TRANSPORTATION CASES REVIEWER & DOCTRINES

CONCEPT OF COMMON CARRIER CARRIAGE OF GOODS

CARRIAGE OF
PASSENGERS
Common Carriers Art. 1732 As to Parties
a) are persons, corporations, firms or associations Common carrier
b) engaged in the business of carrying or Common carrier
Shipper
transporting passengers or goods or both Passenger
Consignee
c) by land, water, or air As to Cause of Liability
d) for compensation Delay in delivery, loss,
e) offering their services to the public destruction or Death or injury
deterioration of goods
4 TESTS OF COMMON CARRIER OF GOODS As to Duration of Liability
(1ST Philippine Industrial Corp vs. CA):
From the time the goods The duty of a common
1. He must be engaged in the business of carrying are unconditionally carrier to provide safety
goods for others as a public employment, and placed in the possession to its passengers so
must hold himself out as ready to engage in the of, and received by the obligates it not only
transportation of goods for person generally as a carrier for transportation during the course of the
until the same are trip, but for so long
business and not as a casual occupation
delivered actually or as the passengers are
constructively by the within its premises and
2. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to carrier to the consignee where they ought to be in
which his business is confined or to the person who has pursuance to the contract
the right to receive them of carriage.
3. He must undertake to carry by the method by
which his business is conducted and over his
established roads and Illustrative Cases and Doctrines

4. The transportation must be for hire. I. DEFINITION

True Test: It has been held that the true test of a common De Guzman vs. CA
carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, provided it Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose
has space, for all who opt to avail themselves of its principal business activity is the carrying of persons or
transportation service for a fee. goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as
an ancillary activity.
Private Carrier One which, without being engaged in Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
the business of carrying as a public employment, between a person or enterprise offering transportation
undertakes to deliver goods or passengers for service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering
compensation. such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
basis.
COMMON CARRIER PRIVATE CARRIER
As to Availability National Steel Corp vs. CA
Contracts with a It has been held that the true test of a common carrier is
Holds himself out for all
particular individuals or the carriage of passengers or goods, provided it has
people indiscriminately
groups only space, for all who opt to avail themselves of its
As to Required Diligence transportation service for a fee. A carrier which does not
Extraordinary diligence Ordinary diligence qualify under the above test is deemed a private carrier.
As to Regulation The most typical, although not the only form of private
Not subjected to the carriage, is the charter party.
Subject to State
regulations imposed by
regulation
the State 1ST Philippine Industrial Corp vs. CA
Stipulation Limiting Liability A "common carrier" may be defined, broadly, as one who
Parties may not agree on Parties may limit the holds himself out to the public as engaged in the business
limiting the carriers carriers liability, provided of transporting persons or property from place to place,
liability except when it is not contrary to law, for compensation, offering his services to the public
provided by law morals or good customs generally.
Exempting Circumstances
It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, that is,
Prove extraordinary to all persons who choose to employ its services, and
diligence and 1733 Fortuitous event transports the goods by land and for compensation. The
(NCC) fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude
Presumption of Negligence it from the definition of a common carrier.
There is always a
presumption of Calvo vs. UCPB Insurance
negligence or fault unless No presumption of Article 1732 does not distinguish between a carrier
proved that they negligence offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the
exercised extraordinary general community or population, and one who offers
diligence and 1733, NCC services or solicits business only from a narrow segment
Governing Law of the general population. Article 1732 deliberately
Laws on obligations and refrained from making such distinctions.
Law on common carriers
contracts

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FGU Insurance Corp vs. G.P. Sarmiento
The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of
passengers or goods, providing space for those who opt
to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee.
Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water,
or air, for hire or compensation, offering their services to
the public, whether to the public in general or to a limited
clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis.
Philippine American General Insurance (PhilAmGen)
vs. PKS Shipping
Much of the distinction between a common or public carrier and
a private or special carrier lies in the character of the business,
such that if the undertaking is an isolated transaction, not a part
of the business or occupation, and the carrier does not hold itself
out to carry the goods for the general public or to a limited
clientele, although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the
person or corporation providing such service could very well be
just a private carrier.
Asia Lighterage vs. CA
It is a common carrier whether its carrying of goods is
done on an irregular rather than scheduled manner, and
with an only limited clientele. A common carrier need not
have fixed and publicly known routes. Neither does it have
to maintain terminals or issue tickets.
The test to determine a common carrier is whether the
given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by
the carrier which he has held out to the general public as
his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the
business transacted.
Spouses Cruz vs. Sun Holidays
Its ferry services are so intertwined with its main business
as to be properly considered ancillary thereto. The
constancy of respondents ferry services in its resort
operations is underscored by its having its own Coco
Beach boats. And the tour packages it offers, which
include the ferry services, may be availed of by anyone
who can afford to pay the same. These services are thus
available to the public.
Bascos vs. CA
Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by
them. Accordingly, they are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated. There are very few instances
when the presumption of negligence does not attach and
these instances are enumerated in Article 1734.
A.F. Sanchez Brokerage vs. CA and FGU Insurance
A common carrier is mandated to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods it transports
according to all the circumstances of each case. In the
event that the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, it
is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary
diligence.
A common carrier is liable to the resulting damage to the
goods if the improper packaging is known to the carrier or
his employees or is apparent upon ordinary observation,
but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or
exception.
Crisostomo vs. CA
A contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a
certain person or association of persons obligate
themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one
place to another for a fixed price. Such person or
association of persons are regarded as carriers and are
classified as private or special carriers and common or
public carriers.
It is not a common carrier where its business is simply to
make travel arrangements in their behalf. Respondents
services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and
facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking
customers for tours. It is in this sense that the contract
between the parties in this case was an ordinary one for
services and not one of carriage.
Asian Terminals vs Daehan Fire & Marine
In the performance of its obligations, an arrastre operator
should observe the same degree of diligence as that
required of a common carrier & a warehouseman. Being
the custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel, an
arrastre operators duty is to take good care of the goods
and to turn them over to the party entitled to their
possession.
Spouses Pereas vs. Spouses Zarate
The diligence required of a private carrier is only ordinary,
that is, the diligence of a good father of the family. In
contrast, a common carrier is required to observe
extraordinary diligence, and is presumed to be at fault or
to have acted negligently in case of the loss of the effects
of passengers, or the death or injuries to passengers. The
Pereas operated as a common carrier because they held
themselves out as a ready transportation indiscriminately
to the students of a particular school living within or near
where they operated the service and for a fee.
II. CHARACTERISTICS
Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Co.
Common carriers exercise a sort of public office, and have
duties to perform in which the public is interested. Their
business is, therefore, affected with a public interest, and
is subject of public regulation. The right to enter the public
employment as a common carrier and to offer one's
services to the public for hire does not carry with it the
right to conduct that business as one pleases, without
regard to the interest of the public and free from such
reasonable and just regulations as may be prescribed for
the protection of the public from the reckless or careless
indifference of the carrier as to the public welfare and for
the prevention of unjust and unreasonable discrimination
of any kind whatsoever in the performance of the carrier's
duties as a servant of the public (Act No. 98).
U.S. vs Quinajon
Quinajon and Quitariano charged 10 cents per sack when
their normal rate was only 6 cents. The Court ruled that
defendants did not violated Act No. 98. It is only unjust,
undue and unreasonable discrimination which the law
forbids.
Loadstar Shipping Co. Inc. vs. CA
It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate
of public convenience, and this public character is not
altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in
question was periodic, occasional, episodic or
unscheduled. The bare fact that the vessel was carrying
a particular type of cargo for one shipper, which appears
to be purely coincidental, is not reason enough to convert
the vessel from a common to a private carrier, especially
where, as in this case, it was shown that the vessel was
also carrying passengers.
The doctrine of limited liability does not apply where there
was negligence on the part of the vessel owner or agent.
III. COMMON VS. PRIVATE CARRIER
Home Insurance Co vs. American Steamship
The provisions of our Civil Code on common carriers were
taken from Anglo-American law. Under American
jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a
special cargo or chartered to a special person
2|A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a
stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the
negligence of its agent is not against public policy, and is
deemed valid.
The Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not
be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as
a private carrier. The stipulation in the charter party
absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the
negligence of its agent would be void only if the strict
public policy governing common carriers is applied. Such
policy has no force where the public at large is not
involved, as in the case of a ship totally chartered for the
use of a single party.
San Pablo vs. Pantranco South Express
The contention of Pantranco that its ferry service
operation is as a private carrier, not as a common carrier
for its exclusive use in the ferrying of its passenger buses
and cargo trucks is absurd. Pantranco does not deny that
it charges its passengers separately from the charges for
the bus trips and issues separate tickets whenever they
board the MV "Black Double" that crosses Matnog to
Allen.
Planters Products Inc. vs. Soriamont Steamship &
Kyosei Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha & CA\
A public/common carrier shall remain as such,
notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a
vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is
limited to the ship only, as in the case of a time-charter or
voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both
the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise that a
common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the
particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned.
IV. GOVERNMENT REGULATION
KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr.
Given the task of determining sensitive and delicate
matters as route-fixing and rate-making for the transport
sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with
the power of subordinate legislation. The LTFRB, may
implement broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling
in" the details which the Legislature may neither have time
or competence to provide.
The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus
operators to set a fare range over and above the
authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is
tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority.
Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr.
While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to
serve the public, they do not by themselves constitute a
public utility. What constitutes a public utility is not their
ownership but their use to serve the public.
There is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a
public utility and the ownership of the facilities and
equipment used to serve the public. The operation of a
rail system as a public utility includes the transportation of
passengers from one point to another point, their loading
and unloading at designated places and the movement of
the trains at pre-scheduled times.
V. GOVERNING LAW
Samar Mining Company vs. Nordeutscher Lloyd
The carrier may be relieved of the responsibility for loss
or damage to the goods upon actual or constructive
delivery of the same by the carrier to the consignee, or to
the person who has a right to receive them. There is
actual delivery in contracts for the transport of goods
when possession has been turned over to the consignee
or to his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is
given him to remove the goods. In the present case, there
was actual delivery to the consignee through its duly
authorized agent, the carrier.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. IAC
The law of the country to which the goods are to be
transported governs the liability of the common carrier in
case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. However,
in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and
obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the
Code of Commerce and by special laws. Thus, the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is suppletory
to the provisions of the Civil Code.
National Development Company vs. CA
The law of the country to which the goods are to be
transported governs the liability of the common carrier in
case of their loss, destruction or deterioration.
Gelisan vs. Alday
As the registered owner of a public service vehicle, owner
should be responsible for all damages that may arise as
consequences of the operation of their service. The claim
that owner is not liable in view of the lease contract
executed by and between the contracting parties should
exempt the owner from liability to third persons cannot be
sustained because it appears that the lease contract had
not been approved by the Public Service Commission.
Since the lease is without approval, owner is still
continued to be the operator in contemplation of law and
thus should be jointly and severally liable with the drive
for damages incurred.
Benedicto vs. IAC
The prevailing doctrine on common carriers makes the
registered owner liable for consequences flowing from the
operations of the carrier, even though the specific vehicle
involved may already have been transferred to another
person. This doctrine rests upon the principle that in
dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service
Law, the public has the right to assume that the registered
owner is the actual or lawful owner thereof.
The registered owner is not allowed to deny liability by
proving the identity of the alleged transferee.
Philtranco Services Enterprises vs. CA
The liability of the registered owner of a public service
vehicle for damages arising from the tortious acts of the
driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary
with the driver.
Equitable Leasing Corp vs. Lucita Suyon
The registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the
public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it
is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences
of its operation. In the eyes of the law, the owner/operator
of record is the employer of the driver, the actual
owner/operator being considered as merely the agent of
the registered owner/operator. The principle applies even
if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for
public service.
Santos vs. Sibug
The registered owner/operator and grantee of the
franchise, is directly and primarily responsible and liable
for the damages caused to the injured party, as a
consequence of the negligent or careless operation of the
vehicle.
Lita Enterprise vs. IAC
The kabit system" is whereby a person who has been
granted a certificate of convenience allows another
person who owns motors vehicles to operate under such
franchise for a fee. A certificate of public convenience is
a special privilege conferred by the government. Abuse of
3|A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
this privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be
countenanced.
Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense,
the "kabit system" is invariably recognized as being
contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and
inexistent under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. It is a
fundamental principle that the court will not aid either
party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them
both where it finds them.
Teja Marketing vs. IAC
The "kabit system" has been identified as one of the root
causes of the prevalence of graft and corruption in the
government transportation offices. It is a fundamental
principle that the court will not aid either party to enforce
an illegal contract, but will leave both where it finds them.
Magboo vs. Bernardo
There is an employer-employee relationship under a
boundary system arrangement. The fact that the driver
does not receive a fixed wage but gets only the excess of
the receipt of fares collected by him is not sufficient to
withdraw the relationship between them from that of
employer and employee. To exempt from liability the
owner of a public vehicle who operates it under the
"boundary system" on the ground that he is a mere lessor
would be not only to abet flagrant violations of the Public
Service law but also to place the riding public at the mercy
of reckless and irresponsible drivers.
TRANSPORTATION OF GOODS
3 REQUISITE FOR A VALID STIPULATION LIMITING
LIABILITY OF CARRIER: (Art. 1744)
1. In writing, signed by shipper or owner
2. Supported by a valuable consideration other than
the service rendered by carriers
3. It must be reasonable, just, and not contrary to
public policy
5 CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WILL EXEMPT FROM
LIABILITY:
1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other
natural disaster or calamity
2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether
international or civil
3. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the
goods
4. The character of goods or defects in the packing
or in the containers
5. Order or act of competent authority
I. EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. CA & First Nationwide
Assurance Co.
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary
vigilance over goods according to all circumstances of
each case. Once the carrier has failed to establish any
caso fortuito, the presumption by law of fault of negligence
on the part of carriers applies.
Delsan Transport Lines vs. CA
From the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, common carriers are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
and for the safety of passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case. In all
other cases, if the goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.
Philippine Charter Insurance vs. Unknown Owner
Common carriers duty to observe the requisite diligence
in the shipment of goods last from the times the articles
are surrendered to, or unconditionally placed in the
possession of, and received by, the carriers for
transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a
reasonable time for their acceptance, by the person
entitiled to receive them.
Saludo vs. CA
Extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins
from the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. This
responsibility remains in full force and effect even when
they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless
the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in
transitu, and terminates only after the lapse of a
reasonable time for the acceptance of the goods by the
consignee or such other person entitled to receive them.
And, there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are
ready for and have been placed in the exclusive
possession, custody and control of the carrier for the
purpose of their immediate transportation and the carrier
has accepted them.
Where such a delivery has thus been accepted by the
carrier, the liability of the common carrier commences eo
instanti.
Lorenzo Shipping vs. BJ Marthel
In determining whether time is of the essence in a
contract, the ultimate criterion is the actual or apparent
intention of the parties and before time may be so
regarded by a court, there must be a sufficient
manifestation, either in the contract itself or
the surrounding circumstances of that intention. The law
implies, however, that if no time is fixed, delivery shall be
made within a reasonable time, in the absence of anything
to show that an immediate delivery intended.
Sealoader Shipping vs. Grand Cement
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused
the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
loss. The antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not
preclude him from recovering damages caused by the
supervening negligence of defendant, who had the last
fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise
of due diligence.
II. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
FGU Insurance vs. CA & San Miguel Corp
Caso fortuito or force majeure by definition, are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events
that could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen,
were inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event
should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is
commonly believed but it must be one impossible to
foresee or to avoid. To be exempted from responsibility,
the natural disaster should have been the proximate and
only cause of the loss. There must have been no
contributory negligence on the part of the common carrier.
Delsan Transport vs. American Home
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by
them. They are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated. To overcome the presumption of negligence
4|A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
in case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods,
the common carrier must prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence. There are, however, exceptions
to this rule found in Article 1734 of the NCC.
Maersk Lines vs. CA
While it is true that common carriers are not obligated by
law to carry and to deliver merchandise, and persons are
not vested with the right to prompt delivery, unless such
common carriers previously assume the obligation to
deliver at a given date or time, delivery of shipment or
cargo should at least be made within reasonable time.
DSR-Senator Lines vs. Federal Phoenix
Fire is not one of those enumerated under Article 1734
which exempts a carrier from liability for loss or
destruction of the cargo. Common carrier shall be
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the
extraordinary diligence required by law. Even if fire were
to be considered a natural disaster within the purview of
Article 1734, it is required under Article 1739of the same
Code that the natural disaster must have been the
proximate and only cause of the loss, and that the carrier
has exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the
loss before, during or after the occurrence of the disaster.
Philamgen vs. CA & Transpacific Towage, Inc.
The cargo having been lost due to typhoon "Saling", and
the delay incurred in its unloading not being due to
negligence, private respondent is exempt from liability for
the loss of the cargo, pursuant to Article 1740 of the Civil
Code. The records also show that before, during and after
the occurrence of typhoon "Saling", private respondent
through its shipmaster exercised due negligence to
prevent or minimize the loss of the cargo. The
diligence exercised by the shipmaster further supports
the exemption of private respondent from liability for the
loss of the cargo.
Belgian Overseas vs. Philippine First Insurance
Mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a
common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their
destination constitutes a prima facie cause of fault or
negligence against the carrier. If no adequate explanation
is given as to how the deterioration, the loss or the
destructions of the goods happened, the transporter or
the carrier shall be held responsible.
Cokaliong vs. UCPB General
Having originated from an unchecked crack in the fuel
oil service tank, the fire could not have been caused by
force majeure. May refer to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. A stipulation that limits
liability is valid as long as it is not against public policy.
Sarkies Tours vs. IAC
The cause of the loss in the case at bar was petitioner's
negligence in not ensuring that the doors of the baggage
compartment of its bus were securely fastened. As a
result of this lack of care, almost all of the luggage was
lost, to the prejudice of the paying passengers.
Where a common carrier accepted its passengers
baggage for transportation and even had it placed in the
vehicle, it is responsible for the consequent loss of the
baggage.
Valenzuela Hardwood vs. CA
In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly
stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on
the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for
loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the
negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of
the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely
entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties
may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which
perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in contract
involving a common carrier, private carriage does not
involve the general public.
Yobido vs. CA
The explosion of the new tire is not a fortuitous event.
There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact
that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free
from manufacturing defects or that it was properly
mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire
bought and used is of a brand name noted for quality,
resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within
five days use. Itis settled that an accident caused either
by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of
its driver is not a caso fortuito. Moreover, a common
carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force
majeure. A common carrier must still prove that it was not
negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from the
accident. Thus, having failed to overthrow the
presumption of negligence with clear and convincing
evidence, petitioners are hereby held liable for damages.
III. DEFENSES AND CONDITIONS
Central Shipping Co. Inc vs. Insurance Company of
North America
A common carrier is presumed to be at fault or negligent.
It shall be liable for the loss, destruction or deterioration
of its cargo, unless it can prove that the sole and
proximate cause of such event is one of the causes
enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code, or that it
exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent or minimize
the loss.
The doctrine of limited liability under Article 587 of the
Code of Commerce is not applicable to the present case.
This rule does not apply to situations in which the loss or
the injury is due to the concurrent negligence of the ship-
owner and the captain.
Everett Steamship vs. CA & Hernandez Trading
A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the common
carriers liability for loss or destruction of a cargo to a
certain sum, unless the shipper or owner declares a
greater value, is sanctioned by law. It is required that the
stipulation limiting the common carriers liability for loss
must be reasonable and just under the circumstances,
and has been freely agreed upon.
Spouses Cruz vs. Sun Holidays
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case. They are bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard for all the circumstances.
When a passenger dies or is injured in the discharge of a
contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common
carrier is at fault or negligent. In fact, there is even no
need for the court to make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the common carrier. This
statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence
that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence.
5|A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
Southern Lines, Inc. vs. CA
If the fact of improper packing is known to the carrier or
his servants, or apparent upon ordinary observation, but
it accepts the goods notwithstanding such condition, it is
not relieved of liability for loss or injury resulting therefrom.
IV. DURATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
Mitsui OSK Lines vs. CA
As defined in the Civil Code and as applied to Section
3(6), paragraph 4 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
loss contemplates merely a situation where no delivery at
all was made by the shipper of the goods because the
same had perished, gone out of commerce, or
disappeared in such a way that their existence is unknown
or they cannot be recovered. As long as it is claimed,
therefore, as it is done here, that the losses or damages
suffered by the shipper or consignee were due to the
arrival of the goods in damaged or deteriorated condition,
the action is still basically one for damage to the goods,
and must be filed within the period of one year from
delivery or receipt.
Sulpicio Lines vs. First Lepanto-Taisho Insurance
Damage to the packaging is not tantamount to damage to
the cargo. It must be stressed that the damage sustained
by the packaging of the cargo while in carriers custody
resulted in its unfitness to be transported to its consignee
in Singapore. Such failure to ship the cargo to its final
destination because of the ruined packaging, indeed,
resulted in damages on the part of the owner of the goods.
A common carrier is bound to transport its cargo and its
passengers safely "as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, with due regard to all circumstances." The
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to
know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding
the damage to, or destruction of, the goods entrusted to it
for safe carriage and delivery.
Coastwise Lighterage Corporation vs. CA
Two kinds of charter partiescharter by demise or
bareboat charter, and contract of affreightment. Although
a charter party may transform a common carrier into a
private one, the same however is not true in a contract of
affreightment.
Common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to
have been at fault or negligent if the goods they
transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. It may
also logically, follow that a person without license to
navigate, lacks not just the skill to do so, but also the
utmost familiarity with the usual and safe routes taken by
seasoned and legally authorized ones
Philippine First Insurance vs. Wallem First Shipping
The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier
lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed
in the possession of, and received by the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the
person who has a right to receive them. A ship captain is
liable for the cargo from the time it is turned over to him at
the dock or afloat alongside the vessel at the port of
loading, until he delivers it on the shore or on the
discharging wharf at the port of unloading, unless agreed
otherwise.
It is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes
while being unloaded generally remain under the custody
of the carrier. In the instant case, the damage or losses
were incurred during the discharge of the shipment while
under the supervision of the carrier. Consequently, the
carrier is liable for the damage or losses caused to the
shipment.
Samar Mining Company vs. Nordeutscher Lloyd
The carrier may be relieved of the responsibility for loss
or damage to the goods upon actual or constructive
delivery of the same by the carrier to the consignee, or to
the person who has a right to receive them. There is
actual delivery in contracts for the transport of goods
when possession has been turned over to the consignee
or to his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is
given him to remove the goods. In the present case, there
was actual delivery to the consignee through its duly
authorized agent, the carrier. Upon such delivery, the
appellant, as erstwhile carrier, ceases to be responsible
for any loss or damage that may befall the goods from that
point onwards.
Ganzon vs. CA
By the said act of delivery, the scraps were
unconditionally placed in the possession and control of
the common carrier, and upon their receipt, the contract
of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, the
petitioner-carrier's extraordinary responsibility for the
loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods
commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary
responsibility would cease only upon the delivery, actual
or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the
person who has a right to receive them. The fact that part
of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter
did not impair the said contract of transportation as the
goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier,
albeit still unloaded.
The petitioner has failed to show that the loss of the
scraps was due to any of the following causes
enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code. Hence, the
petitioner is presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently.
Saludo vs. CA
Extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins
from the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. This
responsibility remains in full force and effect even when
they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless
the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in
transitu, and terminates only after the lapse of a
reasonable time for the acceptance of the goods by the
consignee or such other person entitled to receive them.
And, there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are
ready for and have been placed in the exclusive
possession, custody and control of the carrier for the
purpose of their immediate transportation and the carrier
has accepted them.
Where such a delivery has thus been accepted by the
carrier, the liability of the common carrier commences eo
instanti.
Macam vs. CA
It is a standard maritime practice when immediate delivery
is of the essence, for shipper to request or instruct the
carrier to deliver the goods to the buyer upon arrival at the
port of destination without requiring presentation of bill of
lading as that usually takes time. After all, the cargoes
consist of perishable fresh fruits and immediate delivery
thereof the buyer/importer is essentially a factor to reckon
with. We emphasize that the extraordinary responsibility
of the common carriers lasts until actual or constructive
delivery of the cargoes to the consignee or to the person
who has a right to receive them.
6|A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
 V. LIMITING CARRIERS LIABILITY
PAL vs. CA
The law of the country to which the goods are to be
transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier
for their loss, destruction or deterioration. Since the
passenger's destination in this case was the Philippines,
Philippine law governs the liability of the carrier for the
loss of the passenger's luggage.
Cathay Pacific vs. CA
Common carriers breach its contract of carriage with
private respondent when it failed to deliver his luggage at
the designated place and time, it being the obligation of a
common carrier to carry its passengers and their luggage
safely to their destination, which includes the duty not to
delay their transportation.
Moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of
carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the
mishap results in death of a passenger, or where the
carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith.
Although the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect
of law in this country, being a treaty commitment assumed
by the Philippine government, said convention does not
operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances for
declaring a carrier liable for breach of contract of carriage
or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability.
Trans-Asia Shipping Lines vs. CA
For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately
equipped for the voyage and manned with a sufficient
number of competent officers and crew. The failure of
a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its
vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach
of is duty prescribed in Article 1755 of the NCC. In
allowing its unseaworthy M/V Asia Thailand to leave the
port of origin and undertake the contracted voyage, with
full awareness that it was exposed to perils of the sea, it
deliberately disregarded its solemn duty to exercise
extraordinary diligence and obviously acted with bad faith
and in a wanton and reckless manner.
Sweet Lines vs. Teves
The Supreme Court held that the condition printed at the
back of the ticket limiting the venue of actions arising from
the contract is void and unenforceable because it
subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of
proceeding. Furthermore, it will prejudice the rights and
interests of innumerable passengers located in different
places of the country, who, under the condition, will have
to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu.
Thus, such condition will likewise defeat the ends of
justice.
VI. AMOUNT OF LIABILITY
Ysmael & Co. vs. Barreto
The validity of the stipulations limiting carriers liability is
to be determined by their reasonableness and their
conformity to the sound public policy. It cannot lawfully
stipulate for exemption from liability, unless such
exemption is just and reasonable, and unless the contract
is freely and fairly made.
In the case at bar, to limit the defendants liability for each
case of silk for loss or damage from any cause or for any
reason would put it in the power of the defendants to have
taken the whole cargo. Such limitation of value is
unconscionable and void as against public policy.
Shewaram vs. PAL
In accordance with the provision of Article 1750 of the
New Civil Code, the pecuniary liability of a common
carrier may, by contract, be limited to a fixed amount. It is
required, however, that the contract must be "reasonable
and just under the circumstances and has been fairly and
freely agreed upon." The requirements must be complied
with before a common carrier can claim a limitation of its
pecuniary liability in case of loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods it has undertaken to transport.
In the case before at bar, the Supreme Court believe that
the requirements of said article have not been met. It
having been clearly found by the trial court that the
transistor radio and the camera of the appellee were lost
as a result of the negligence of the appellant as a common
carrier, the liability of the appellant is clear it must pay
the appellee the value of those two articles.
Ong Yiu vs. CA
No bad faith committed when airline company exerted
due diligence with its duty in locating a passengers lost
luggage. Bad faith means a breach of a known duty
through some motive of interest or ill will. In the absence
of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith,
petitioner is not entitled to moral damages. Exemplary
damages can be granted if the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner, which has not been proven in this case.
Sea-Land Service, Inc vs. IAC
Since the liability of a common carrier for loss of or
damage to goods transported by it under a contract of
carriage is governed by the laws of the country of
destination and the goods in question were shipped from
the United States to the Philippines, the liability of Sea-
Land has Cue is governed primarily by the Civil Code, and
as ordained by the said Code, supplementary, in all
matters not cluttered thereby, by the Code of Commerce
and special laws. One of these supplementary special
laws is the Carriage of goods by Sea Act (COGSA), made
applicable to all contracts for the carriage by sea to and
from the Philippines Ports in Foreign Trade.
Not only is there nothing in the Civil Code which
absolutely prohibits agreements between shipper and
carrier limiting the latter's liability for loss of or damage to
cargo shipped under contracts of carriage. A stipulation
that the common carrier's liability is limited to the value of
the goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the
shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding.
Citadel Lines vs. CA
The Supreme Court held that that the subject shipment
was lost while it was still in the custody of herein petitioner
Citadel Lines, Inc., and considering further that it failed to
prove that the loss was occasioned by an excepted
cause, the inescapable conclusion is that the CARRIER
was negligent and should be held liable.
The duty of the consignee is to prove merely that the
goods were lost. Thereafter, the burden is shifted to the
carrier to prove that it has exercised the extraordinary
diligence required by law.
British Airways vs. CA
American jurisprudence provides that an air carrier is not
liable for the loss of baggage in an amount in excess of
the limits specified in the tariff which was filed with the
proper authorities, such tariff being binding on the
passenger regardless of the passengers lack of
knowledge thereof or assent thereto. This doctrine is
recognized in this jurisdiction.
Benefits of limited liability are subject to waiver such as
when the air carrier failed to raise timely objections during
the trial when questions and answers regarding the actual
claims and damages sustained by the passenger were
asked.
Given the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that
British Airways had waived the defense of limited liability
7|A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
when it allowed Mahtani to testify as to the actual
damages he incurred due to the misplacement of his
luggage, without any objection.
Loadstar Shipping Co. vs. CA
The law imposes duties and liabilities upon common
carriers for the safety and protection of those who utilize
their services and the law cannot allow a common carrier
to render such duties and liabilities merely facultative by
simply failing to obtain the necessary permits and
authorizations.
A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the
incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions
governing common carriers. That liability arises the
moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier,
without regard to whether or not such carrier has also
complied with the requirements of the applicable
regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has
been granted a certificate of public convenience or other
franchise. To exempt private respondent from the
liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured
the necessary certificate of public convenience, would be
offensive to sound public policy.
VII. PASSENGERS BAGGAGE
Quisumbing, Sr. vs. CA
The Court ruled that under the highjacking-robbery was
force majeure. Observing that hijackers do not board an
airplane through a blatant display of firepower and violent
fury. The robbers were able to gain entrance to the plane
with the guns they used already in their possession, which
fact could not have been prevented nor avoided by the
defendant. Hence, making it force majeure. The Court
ruled that PAL could not be faulted for want of diligence,
particularly for failing to take positive measures.
Pan American World Airways vs. Jose Rapadas & CA
Plane ticket is what is known as a contract of "adhesion",
in regards which it has been said that contracts of
adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready-made form
of contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the case at
bar, are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who
adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely;
if he adheres, he gives his consent.
If the loss of life or property is caused by the gross
negligence or arbitrary acts of the airline or the contents
of the lost luggage are proved by satisfactory evidence
other than the self-serving declarations of one party, the
Court will not hesitate to disregard the fine print in a
contract of adhesion. Otherwise, the Court is constrained
to rule and to enforce the contract as it is the only
reasonable basis to arrive at a just award.
British Airways vs. CA
The nature of an airline's contract of carriage partakes of
two types, namely: a contract to deliver a cargo or
merchandise to its destination and a contract to transport
passengers to their destination. A business intended to
serve the traveling public primarily, it is imbued with public
interest, hence, the law governing common carriers
imposes an exacting standard.
Neglect or malfeasance by the carrier's employees could
predictably furnish bases for an action for damages.
However, the Supreme Court has held that benefits of
limited liability are subject to waiver such as when the air
carrier failed to raise timely objections during the trial
when questions and answers regarding the actual claims
and damages sustained by the passenger were asked.
TRANSPORTATION OF PASSENGERS
I. EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE
Norcum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company
While it is true the passengers of appellant's bus should
not be made to suffer for something over which they had
no control, fairness demands that in measuring a common
carrier's duty towards its passengers, allowance must be
given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense
of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their
common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will
not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and
limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own.
Of course, when there are sufficient indications that the
representations of the passenger regarding the nature of
his baggage may not be true, in the interest of the
common safety of all, the assistance of the police
authorities may be solicited, not necessarily to force the
passenger to open his baggage, but to conduct the
needed investigation consistent with the rules of propriety
Mecenas vs. CA
The behavior of the captain of the Don Juan in tills
instance playing mahjong before and up to the time of
collision constitutes behavior that is simply unacceptable
on the part of the master of a vessel to whose hands the
lives and welfare of at least 750 passengers had been
entrusted. Whether or not Captain Santisteban was "off-
duty" or "on-duty" at or around the time of actual collision
is quite immaterial; there is, both realistically speaking
and in contemplation of law, no such thing as "off-duty"
hours for the master of a vessel at sea that is a common
carrier upon whom the law imposes the duty of
extraordinary diligence.
Article 1755 repeats this same qualification: "A common
carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for
all the circumstances."
Negros Navigation vs. CA
The Court relied on the findings of this Court in Mecenas
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was brought
for the death of other passengers. In that case it was
found that although the proximate cause of the mishap
was the negligence of the crew. Negros Navigation was
found equally negligent in tolerating the playing of
mahjong by the ship captain and other crew members
while on board the ship and failing to keep the M/V Don
Juan seaworthy so much so that the ship sank.
Calalas vs. CA
In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas
in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely
by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that
the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case
of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil
Code provides that common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.
Pilapil vs. CA
A common carrier does not give its consent to become an
insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It
merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the public
as the law imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach
thereof.
A tort committed by a stranger, which causes injury to a
passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action
against the carrier. The negligence for which a common
carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the
8|A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being
committed when the same could have been foreseen and
prevented by them.
A. Last Clear Chance Doctrine
Philippine Rabbit Bus vs. IAC
The principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for
application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the
two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to
exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners
on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence.
Bustamante vs. CA
The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though
a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of
peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to
recovery. A person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person
imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident. Since
the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and
drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the
heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners
and drivers of the colliding vehicles the court erred
in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from
liability.
B. Accommodation Passenger
Lara vs. Valencia
The deceased, as well as his companions who rode in the
pick-up of Valencia, were merely accommodation
passengers who paid nothing for the service and so they
can be considered as invited guests within the meaning
of the law. As accommodation passengers or invited
guests, Valencia as owner and driver of the pick-up owes
to them merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so
that they may be transported safely to their destination.
The rule is established by the weight of authority that the
owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an
invited guest to exercise reasonable care in its operation,
and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury
by increasing the hazard of travel. Since one riding in an
automobile is no less a guest because he asked for the
privilege of doing so. Valencia, therefore, is only required
to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty bound to
exercise extraordinary diligence as required of a common
carrier by Philippine law.
C. Not an Insurer Against All Risks
Necessito vs. Paras
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the
passengers, the manufacturer of the defective appliance
is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good
repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from
liability. The rationale of the carriers liability is the fact that
the passengers has no privity with the manufacturer of the
defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against
him, while the carrier has.
Japan Airlines vs. CA
When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of
force majeure, the general rule is that he cannot be held
liable for damages for non-performance. When JAL was
prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the
effects of the eruption, whatever losses or damages in the
form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded
passengers incurred cannot be charged to JAL. The
predicament of the private respondents was not due to the
fault or negligence of JAL. JAL had the duty to arrange
the respondents flight back to Manila. However, it failed
to look after the comfort and convenience of its
passengers when it made the passengers arrange their
flight back to Manila on their own and after waiting in the
airport for a whole day.
II. DURATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
Jesusa Vda. De Nueca vs. Manila Railroad
Even disregarding the matter of tickets, and assuming
Nueca intended to be a passenger, he was never
accepted as such by MRC as he did not present himself
at the proper place and in a proper manner to be
transported. Nueca was not a passenger thus, MRC did
not owe him extraordinary diligence. While railroad
companies are not bound to the same degree of care in
regard to strangers who are unlawfully upon the premises
of its passengers, it may still be liable to such strangers
for negligent or tortious acts. The train was under the
complete control of the railroad company at the time of the
accident. The baggage car would not have been derailed
if the train had been properly operated.
Dangwa Transportation vs. CA
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the
platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger
and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to
such a contractual relation. Hence, it has been held that
the duty which the carrier passengers owes to its patrons
extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those
alighting therefrom. It is the duty of common carriers of
passengers, including common carriers by railroad train,
streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a
reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an
opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for
injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from
the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances
while they are doing so.
La Mallorca vs CA
The relation of carrier and passenger does not
necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the
car, aids the carrier's servant or employee in removing his
baggage from the car. The issue to be determined here is
whether as to the child, who was already led by the father
to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability
of the carrier for her safety under the contract of carriage
also persisted.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier
and passenger does not cease at the moment the
passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place
selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but
continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time
or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
premises.
Aboitiz Shipping vs. CA
All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable
time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed
passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from
all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to
see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The
carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by
the fact that the person transported has been carried to
his destination if, for example, such person remains in the
carrier's premises to claim his baggage.
Yet, even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier,
his presence in petitioner's premises was not without
9|A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was
possible only one (1) hour after the vessel arrived since it
was admittedly standard procedure in the case of
petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall
start only after that time.
Mallari vs. CA
The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane
for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is
clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety.
Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to
the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he
was violating a traffic regulation.
Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is liable
for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the formers employees. This
liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof
that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection of its employees.
LRTA vs. Navidad
Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of
the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its
premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the
contract of carriage. The statutory provisions render a
common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers
(a) through the negligence or willful acts of its
employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence
of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers
employees through the exercise of due diligence could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of
carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises
from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of the common
carrier.
III. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
Pestao vs. Sumayang
As a professional driver operating a public transport bus,
Pestao should have anticipated that overtaking at a
junction was a perilous maneuver and should have
exercised extreme caution. When an injury is caused by
the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master
or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the
selection or in the supervision of that employee. This
presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily
showing that the employer exercised the care and the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
the supervision of its employee. Allowing Pestao to ply
his route with a defective speedometer showed laxity on
the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and
in the supervision of its employees. The negligence
alluded is in its supervision over its driver, not in that which
directly caused the accident.
Ludo vs. CA
Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself)
contemplates that where the thing which causes injury is
shown to be under the management of the defendant, and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. The doctrine recognizes
that parties may establish prima facie negligence without
direct proof and allows the principle to substitute for
specific proof of negligence. This is invoked when under
the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available.
Petitioner did not have direct evidence on what transpired
within as the officers and crew maneuvered the vessel to
its berthing place. Applying now the above, there exists a
presumption of negligence against private respondents
which we opine the latter failed to overcome.
Philippine Rabbit Lines vs. IAC
The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with
the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage.
The rationale behind this is readily discernible.
Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and
the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the
carrier is exclusively responsible to the passenger, even
if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver. .
Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally liable
with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability
personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently,
entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to
the driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Article
2181 of the New Civil Code.
Juntilla vs. Fontanar
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still
good because the grooves of the tire were still visible, this
fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a
fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show that
the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that
precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to
compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents.
Common carriers should teach their drivers not to
overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal
speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take
when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of
passengers at all times.
Bayasen vs. CA
It is obvious that the proximate cause of the tragedy was
the skidding of the rear wheels of the jeep and not the
"unreasonable speed" of the petitioner because there is
no evidence on record to prove or support the finding that
the petitioner was driving at "an unreasonable speed".
It is a well-known physical tact that cars may skid on
greasy or slippery roads, as in the instant case, without
fault on account of the manner of handling the car.
Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the
car under circumstances not necessarily implying
negligence. It may occur without fault. Under the
particular circumstances of the instant case, the
petitioner-driver who skidded could not be regarded as
negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so that
the petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his
regular course.
Cervantes vs. CA
Under Article 1989 of the New Civil Code, the acts an
agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the
principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or
impliedly. Furthermore, when the third person (herein
petitioner) knows that the agent was acting beyond his
power or authority, the principal cannot be held liable for
the acts of the agent. If the said third person is aware of
such limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled
to recover damages from the agent, unless the latter
undertook to secure the principal's ratification.
Petitioner knew there was a strong possibility that he
could not use the subject ticket, so much so that he
bought a back-up ticket to ensure his departure. Should
there be a finding of bad faith, it should be on the
petitioner. What the employees of PAL did was one of
simple negligence. No injury resulted on the part of
petitioner.
10 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
Calalas vs. CA
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat"
placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was
petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually
negligent in transporting passengers.
Exceptions
A. Negligence or Intentional Assault by Carriers
Employee
Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad
There can be no quarrel with the principle that a
passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence
by the carrier or its agents or employees, since the
contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport
a passenger safely to his destination. But under the law
of the case, this responsibility extends only to those that
the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of
the degree of car and diligence required of it.
The act of guard Devesa in shooting passenger Gillaco
(because of a personal grudge nurtured against the latter
since the Japanese occupation) was entirely
unforeseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. The latter had
no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would
meet, nor could it reasonably foresee every personal
rancor that might exist between each one of its many
employees and any one of the thousands of eventual
passengers riding in its trains.
Maranan vs. Perez
Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated
in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad that the carrier is under no
absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the
passengers. The attendant facts and controlling law of
that case and the one at bar are very different however.
In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the
scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee.
In the case at bar, the killing was perpetrated by the driver
of the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose
hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the
contract of carriage. Unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of
the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the
guilty employee and when the employee was acting within
the scope of his duties. The death of the passenger in
the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which
exempted the carrier from liability
Doctrine of Respondeat Superior the carrier is liable
only when the act of the employee is within the scope of
his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be
within the course of employment only.
Principle of Implied Duty it is enough that the assault
happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no
defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of
authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The
carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it
practically secures the passengers from assaults
committed by its own employees
The Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule
based on the second view
B. Passengers Duty to Observe Diligence to Avoid
Injury; Contributory Negligence
PNR vs. CA
The petitioner does not deny, that the train boarded by the
deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he
and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on
the open platforms between the coaches of the train.
Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers
gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the
performance of its obligation under the contract of
carriage.
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence as required by law, it appears that the deceased
was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he
opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of
the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on
the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to
avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory
negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability,
nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount
adjudicated as moral damages.
Isaac vs. Al Ammen
Principles governing the liability of a common carrier:
1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon
breach of its obligation;
2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having
due regard for all the circumstances;
3) a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted
negligently in case of death of, or injury to,
passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence; and
4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel.
One who is placed in such a predicament cannot exercise
such coolness or accuracy of judgment as is required of
him under ordinary circumstances and he cannot
therefore be expected to observe the same judgment,
care and precaution as in the latter. . Considering all the
circumstances, the Court is persuaded to conclude that
the driver of the bus has done what a prudent man could
have done to avoid the collision and in our opinion this
relieves appellee from legibility under our law.
A circumstances which miliates against the stand of
appellant is the fact borne out by the evidence that when
he boarded the bus in question, he seated himself on the
left side thereof resting his left arm on the window sill but
with his left elbow outside the window, this being his
position in the bus when the collision took place. It is for
this reason that the collision resulted in the severance of
said left arm from the body of appellant thus doing him a
great damage. It is therefore apparent that appellant is
guilty of contributory negligence. Had he not placed his
left arm on the window sill with a portion thereof protruding
outside, perhaps the injury would have been avoided
C. Injury to Passenger Due to the Acts of Co-
passenger or Stranger
Bachelor Express vs. CA
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate
cause of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and
panic among the passengers such that the passengers
started running to the sole exit shoving each other
resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and
Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of
the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus
is within the context of force majeure.
In order that a common carrier may be absolved from
liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the
accident was caused by force majeure. The common
carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing
the injuries resulting from such accident. However, the
petitioners failed to prove that the deaths of the two
passengers were exclusively due to force majeure and
11 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
not to the failure of the petitioners to observe
extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the
passengers to their destinations as warranted by law.
Fortune Express vs. CA
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at
Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take
revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses
and the assurance of petitioners operation manager,
Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be
taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its
passengers.
Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would
not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large
quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances,
simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of
passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting
their baggage, before allowing them on board could have
been employed without violating the passengers
constitutional rights.
Deceased cannot be held guilty of contributory negligence
for his attempt to help the driver of the bust by pleading
for his life against the malefactors.
Manila Railroad vs. Ballesteros
No professional chauffeur shall permit any unlicensed
person to drive the motor vehicle under his control, or
permit a person, sitting beside him or in any other part of
the car, to interfere with him in the operation of the motor
vehicle, by allowing said person to take hold of the
steering wheel, or in any other manner take part in the
manipulation or control of the car.
Smith Bell vs. Borja
Petitioners vessel was carrying chemical cargo. While
knowing that their vessel was carrying dangerous
inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew failed to take
all the necessary precautions to prevent an accident.
Petitioner was, therefore, negligent. Hence, the owner or
the person in possession and control of a vessel and the
vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damage
caused to persons and property by reason of negligent
management or navigation.
IV. LIMITED LIABILITY AND DEFENSES
Yobido vs. CA
The explosion of the new tire may not be considered a
fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the
situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that
it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it
was properly mounted on the vehicle. The common
carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing
the death or injury resulting from an accident.
Bayasen vs. CA
Under the particular circumstances of the instant case,
the petitioner- driver who skidded could not be regarded
as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so
that the petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure
from his regular course. The negligence of the petitioner
not having been sufficiently established, his guilt of the
crime charged has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. He is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.
Gatchalian vs. Delim
For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be
contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs.
Waiver (Joint Affidavit) signed by the victims cannot be
considered as a valid waiver limiting the bus companys
liability after the incident took place as well as waive their
right to action or file a complaint.
Fortune Express vs. CA
The armed men actually allowed Atty. Caorong to retrieve
something from the bus. What apparently angered them
was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading
for his life. He was playing the role of the Good Samaritan.
Certainly, this act cannot considered an act of negligence,
let alone recklessness.
Singson vs. CA
Cathay cannot argue that their liability is limited upon the
fact that Singson was a chance passenger. The round
trip ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger was in
itself a complete written contract by and between the
carrier and the passenger. It had all the elements of a
complete written contract. In fact, the contract of carriage
in the instant case was already partially executed as the
carrier complied with its obligation to transport the
passenger to his destination.
BILL OF LADING
Bill of Lading It is a written acknowledgment of the
receipt of goods and an agreement to transport and to
deliver them at a specified place to a person named or on
his or her order. Not indispensable for creation of contract
of carriage.
FUNCTIONS
a. Operates as a receipt for the goods shipped.
Carries a presumption that goods were
delivered to the carrier issuing the bill.
b. Bill of lading operates as a contract by which
three parties named the shipper, the carrier, and
the consignee.
c. It is also a document title. Bill lading issued by
the master to the charterer, as shipper, is in fact
and in legal contemplation merely a receipt and
a document title.
Heacock vs. Macondary
A common carrier, by stipulations inserted in the bill of
lading, can limit its liability for the loss of or damage to the
cargo to an agreed valuation.
Three kinds of stipulations have often been made in a bill
of lading:
1. One exempting the carrier from any and all liability
for loss or damage occasioned by its own
negligence.
2. One providing for an unqualified limitation of such
liability to an agreed valuation.
3. One limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed
valuation unless the shipper declares a higher
value and pays a higher rate of freight.
According to an almost uniform weight of authority, the
first and second kinds of stipulations are invalid as being
contrary to public policy, but the third is valid and
enforceable. The present case falls within the third
stipulation.
Macondray Co. vs. Acting Commissioner of Customs
This is for the simple reason that while a manifest is a
declaration of the entire cargo, a bill of lading is but a
declaration of a specific part of the cargo and is a matter
of business convenience based exclusively on a contract.
12 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G

MANIFEST CARGO BILL OF LADING
to furnish the customs ordinarily merely a
officers with a list to convenient commercial
check against, to inform instrument designed to
our revenue officers what protect the importer or
goods are being brought consignee
into the country, and to
provide a safeguard
against goods being
brought into this country
on a vessel and then
smuggled ashore
absolutely essential to
the exportation or
importation of property in
all vessels
The purpose served by the manifest is far different from
that of the bill of lading, the Court cannot accept or place
an imprimatur on the contention of petitioner that the
entries in the bill of lading adequately supplied the
deficiency of the manifest and cured it of its infirmity.
Magellan Manufacturing vs. CA
Transhipment is defined as the act of taking
cargo out of one ship and loading it in
another or; the transfer of goods from the
vessel stipulated in the contract of
affreightment to another vessel before the
place of destination named in the contract
has been reached.
It is a long standing jurisprudential rule that a bill of lading
operates both as a receipt and as a contract. It is a receipt
for the goods shipped and a contract to transport and
deliver the same as therein stipulated.
The holding in most jurisdictions has been that a shipper
who receives a bill of lading without objection after an
opportunity to inspect it, and permits the carrier to act on
it by proceeding with the shipment is presumed to have
accepted it as correctly stating the contract and to have
assented to its terms. In other words, the acceptance of
the bill without dissent raises the presumption that all the
terms therein were brought to the knowledge of the
shipper and agreed to by him and, in the absence of fraud
or mistake, he is estopped from thereafter denying that he
assented to such terms.
Saludo vs. CA
Extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins
from the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. This
responsibility remains in full force and effect even when
they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless
the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in
transitu, and terminates only after the lapse of a
reasonable time for the acceptance of the goods by the
consignee or such other person entitled to receive them.
And, there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are
ready for and have been placed in the exclusive
possession, custody and control of the carrier for the
purpose of their immediate transportation and the carrier
has accepted them.
Where such a delivery has thus been accepted by the
carrier, the liability of the common carrier commences eo
instanti.
Ysmael vs. Barretto
The parties may, if they see fit, fix by agreement a shorter
time for the bringing of suit on the contract than that
provided by the statute of limitations, and if the period
therein limited is reasonable, suit must be brought within
that time or the shippers right of action will be barred.
Such a provision is prohibited by no rule of law nor by any
consideration of public policy. Nor is it at all affected by
the existence within the jurisdiction of a statutory or
constitutional prohibition against carriers limiting or
restricting their common law liability, since it is held that
such a stipulation does not in any way defeat the
complete vestiture of the right to recover, but merely
requires the assertion of that right by action at an earlier
period than would be necessary to defeat it through the
operation of the ordinary statute of limitations. But the
limitation must be reasonable, and if the period of time
specified is such that under the facts of the particular case
the shipper could not with reasonable diligence be
enabled to bring suit before it expired, the attempted
limitation is void. Thus, a provision that suit must be
brought within thirty days after the loss or damage
occurred has been held unreasonable. carrier cannot limit
its liability for injury to or loss of goods shipped where
such injury or loss was caused by its own negligence.
Shewaram vs. PAL
It cannot be said that the appellee had actually entered
into a contract with the appellant, embodying the
conditions as printed at the back of the ticket stub that was
issued by the appellant to the appellee. The fact that
those conditions are printed at the back of the ticket stub
in letters so small that they are hard to read would not
warrant the presumption that the appellee was aware of
those conditions such that he had "fairly and freely
agreed" to those conditions.
Ong Yiu vs. CA
The total liability of the Carrier for lost or damaged
baggage of the passenger is LIMITED TO P100.00 for
each ticket unless a passenger declares a higher
valuation in excess of P100.00, but not in excess,
however, of a total valuation of P1,000.00 and additional
charges are paid pursuant to Carrier's tariffs. There is no
dispute that petitioner did not declare any higher value for
his luggage, much less did he pay any additional
transportation charge.
While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the
plane ticket, he is nevertheless bound by the provisions
thereof. "Such provisions have been held to be a part of
the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the
passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or
assent to the regulation" (known as contract of adhesion).
Considering, therefore, that petitioner had failed to
declare a higher value for his baggage, he cannot be
permitted a recovery in excess of P100.00. Besides,
passengers are advised not to place valuable items inside
their baggage but "to avail of our V-cargo service ". It is
likewise to be noted that there is nothing in the evidence
to show the actual value of the goods allegedly lost by
petitioner.
Aboitiz Shipping vs. CA
While it is true that in the bill of lading there is such
stipulation that the liability of the carrier is US$500.00 per
package/container/customary freight, there is an
exception, that is, when the nature and value of such
goods have been declared by the shipper before
shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.
In no event shall the carrier be liable for more than the
amount of damage actually sustained. Neither the carrier
nor the ship shall be responsible in any event for loss or
damage to or in connection with the transportation of the
goods if the nature or value thereof has been knowingly
and fraudulently misstated by the shipper in the bill of
lading. In this case the description of the nature and the
value of the goods shipped are declared and reflected in
the bills of lading. Thus, it is the basis of the liability of the
carrier as the actual value of the loss.
13 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
Sea-Land vs. IAC
Sec. 4(5) of Carriage of Goods by Sea Act reads:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event
be or become liable for any loss or damage to or
in connection with the transportation of goods in
an amount exceeding $500 per package lawful
money of the United States, or in case of goods
not shipped in packages, per customary freight
unit, or the equivalent of that sum in other
currency, unless the nature and value of such
goods have been declared by the shipper before
shipment and inserted in the bill of lading. This
declaration, if embodied in the bill of lading, shall
be prima facie evidence, but shall not be
conclusive on the carrier.
There is no question of right of a consignee in a bill of
lading to recover from the carrier shipper for loss of, or
damage to, goods being transported under said bill,
although that document may have been drawn up only by
the consignor and the carrier without the intervention of
the consignee.
Citadel Lines vs. CA
It is clearly and expressly provided under Clause 6 of the
aforementioned bills of lading issued by the CARRIER
that its liability is limited to $2.00 per kilo. Basic is the rule,
long since enshrined as a statutory provision that a
stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier to the value of
the goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the
shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding.
Further, a contract fixing the sum that may be recovered
by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and
just under the circumstances, and has been fairly and
freely agreed upon.
Everett Steamship
In the bill of lading, the carrier made it clear that its liability
would only be up to One Hundred Thousand
(Y100,000.00) Yen. However, the shipper, Maruman
Trading, had the option to declare a higher valuation if the
value of its cargo was higher than the limited liability of the
carrier. Considering that the shipper did not declare a
higher valuation, it had itself to blame for not complying
with the stipulations.
To defeat the carriers limited liability, the aforecited
Clause 18 of the bill of lading requires that the shipper
should have declared in writing a higher valuation of its
goods before receipt thereof by the carrier and insert the
said declaration in the bill of lading, with the extra freight
paid. These requirements in the bill of lading were never
complied with by the shipper, hence, the liability of the
carrier under the limited liability clause stands.
British Airways vs. CA
American jurisprudence provides that an air carrier is not
liable for the loss of baggage in an amount in excess of
the limits specified in the tariff which was filed with the
proper authorities, such tariff being binding, on the
passenger regardless of the passenger's lack of
knowledge thereof or assent thereto. This doctrine is
recognized in this jurisdiction.
The Court, in addition, held that benefits of limited liability
are subject to waiver such as when the air carrier failed to
raise timely objections during the trial when questions and
answers regarding the actual claims and damages
sustained by the passenger were asked. Given the
foregoing postulates, the inescapable conclusion is that
BA had waived the defense of limited liability when it
allowed Mahtani to testify as to the actual damages he
incurred due to the misplacement of his luggage, without
any objection.
Sweet Lines vs. Teves
The Supreme Court held that the condition printed at the
back of the ticket limiting the venue of actions arising from
the contract is void and unenforceable because it
subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of
proceeding. Furthermore, it will prejudice the rights and
interests of innumerable passengers located in different
places of the country, who, under the condition, will have
to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu.
Thus, such condition will likewise defeat the ends of
justice.
Alitalia vs. IAC
Under the Warsaw Convention, an air carrier is made
liable for damages for the delay in the transportation by
air of passengers, luggage or goods. The Convention also
purports to limit the liability of the carriers. The Warsaw
Convention however denies to the carrier availment "of
the provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if the
damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such
default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the
court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to
willful misconduct.
In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper
conduct may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner
airline; and Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned
to her, belatedly, it is true, but without appreciable
damage.
As the petitioner put it, she "was really shocked and
distraught and confused." Certainly, the compensation for
the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot under the
circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the
Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of baggage.
Pan American World Airways vs. IAC
Petitioner cites the case of Ong Yiu, where the Court
sustained the validity of a printed stipulation at the back
of an airline ticket limiting the liability of the carrier for lost
baggage to a specified amount and ruled that the carrier's
liability was limited to said amount since the passenger
did not declare a higher value, much less pay additional
charges. The petition has merit, and Ong Yiu is applicable
to the instant case.
In view thereof petitioner's liability for the lost baggage is
limited to $20.00 per kilo or $600.00, as stipulated at the
back of the ticket.
China Airlines vs. Chiok
It is significant to note that the contract of air
transportation was between CAL and respondent, with the
former endorsing to PAL the Hong Kong to Manila
segment of the journey. Such contract of carriage has
always been treated in this jurisdiction as a single
operation. Warsaw Convention provides that:
transportation to be performed by several successive air
carriers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this
Convention, to be one undivided transportation, if it has
been regarded by the parties as a single operation,
whether it has been agreed upon under the form of a
single contract or of a series of contracts.
Since he had secured confirmation of his flight not only
once, but twice by personally going to the carriers offices
where he was consistently assured of a seat thereon
PALs negligence was so gross and reckless that it
amounted to bad faith. In view of the foregoing, we rule
that moral and exemplary damages were properly
awarded by the lower courts.
Santos III vs. Northwest Orient Airlines
The Warsaw Convention is a treaty commitment
voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as
such, has the force and effect of law in this country.
14 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
By its own terms, it applies to all international
transportation of persons performed by aircraft for hire.
Since the flight involved in this case is international, it is
subject to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
The place of destination, within the meaning of the
Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the
contract or carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket.
Examination of petitioners ticket shows that his ultimate
destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the
return flight was left open, the contract of carriage
between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to
transport petitioner from Manila to San Francisco. Manila
should therefore be considered merely an agreed
stopping place and not the destination. Hence, Philippine
courts have no jurisdiction over the case.
United Airlines vs. Uy
Supreme Court held that although the 2-year prescriptive
period under the Warsaw Convention has lapsed, it did
not preclude the application of other pertinent provisions
of the Civil Code which prescribe a different period or
procedure for instituting the action, specifically, Art. 1146
thereof which prescribes four (4) years for filing an action
based on torts. Thus, the action for damages could still be
filed.
Supreme Court found that there was an exception to the
applicability of the 2-year prescriptive period that is
when the airline employed delaying tactics and gave the
passenger the run-around. Verily, respondent filed his
complaint more than two (2) years later, but it is obvious
that respondent was forestalled from immediately filing an
action by but not giving in to his demands.
Also, the Convention does not preclude the operation of
the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not
regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for
damages for violating the rights of its passengers under
the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on
the part of the carrier's employees is found or established.
ON ACTIONS AND DAMAGES IN CASE OF BREACH
Spouses Fabre vs. CA
The Supreme Court held that this case actually involves
a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not
have to be engaged in the business of public
transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers to apply to them. Art. 1732 makes no
distinction between one whose principal business activity
is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who
does such carrying only as an ancillary activity.
Air France vs. Carrascoso
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France
and Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish
Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said
contract was breached when Air France failed to furnish
first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there
was bad faith when Air Frances employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
berth after he was already, seated and to take a seat in
the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in
moral damages.
There is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees
with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are entitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses
from such employees.
Tiu vs. Arriesgado
This is because under the said contract of carriage, the
petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport
the respondent and his wife to their destination safely and
to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all
circumstances. Any injury suffered by the passengers in
the course thereof is immediately attributable to the
negligence of the carrier. Upon the happening of the
accident, the presumption of negligence at once arises,
and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that
he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers.
Phil. Am. Gen. Insurance & Tagum vs. Sweet Lines
Philamgen asserted that the bills of lading with
prescriptive period were contracts of adhesion and that
such provisions were contrary to law and public policy
and thus, Sweet Lines cannot avail of such prescriptive
period as a valid defense. The SC said that Philamgens
failure to deny under oath the existence of the bills of
lading was tantamount to an admission of its existence.
In Ong Yu vs CA SC held that contracts of adhesion are
not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres
he gives his consent. Philamgen, thus, gave its consent
to the contractsthe bills of ladingincluding consent to
the prescriptive periods therein. The SC also agreed with
the CA that parties can stipulate a shorter prescriptive
period for the filing of suits.
The SC said ruled the validity of a contractual limitation of
time for filing the suit itself against a carrier shorter than
the statutory period therefor has generally been upheld as
such stipulation merely affects the shipper's remedy and
does not affect the liability of the carrier. In the absence
of any statutory limitation and subject only to the
requirement on the reasonableness of the stipulated
limitation period, the parties to a contract of carriage may
fix by agreement a shorter time for the bringing of suit on
a claim for the loss of or damage to the shipment than that
provided by the statute of limitations.
Dole Phils. Inc. vs. Maritime Co. of the Philippines
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, in its Section 3, paragraph 6,
provides that:
the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all
liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is
brought within one year after delivery of the goods
or the date when the goods should have been
delivered; Provided, That, if a notice of loss or
damage, either apparent or conceded, is not given
as provided for in this section, that fact shall not
affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring
suit within one year after the delivery of the goods
or the date when the goods should have been
delivered
The substance of its argument is that since the provisions
of the Civil Code are, by express mandate of said Code,
suppletory of deficiencies in the Code of Commerce and
special laws in matters governed by the latter, and there
being "a patent deficiency with respect to the tolling of the
prescriptive period" provided for in the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act, prescription under said Act is subject to the
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code on tolling.
These arguments might merit weightier consideration
were it not for the fact that the question has already
received a definitive answer. To which, the Supreme
Court ruled that in a case governed by the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, the general provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure on prescription should not be made to
apply.
Similarly, we now hold that in such a case the general
provisions of the new Civil Code (Art. 1155) cannot be
made to apply, as such application would have the effect
of extending the one-year period of prescription fixed in
15 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
the law. It is desirable that matters affecting transportation
of goods by sea be decided in as short a time as possible;
the application of the provisions of Article 1155 of the new
Civil Code would unnecessarily extend the period and
permit delays in the settlement of questions affecting
transportation, contrary to the clear intent and purpose of
the law.
Maritime Agencies vs. CA
A voyage charter being a private carriage, the parties may
freely contract respecting liability for damage to the goods
and other matters. The basic principle is that "the
responsibility for cargo loss falls on the one who agreed
to perform the duty involved" in accordance with the terms
of most voyage charters. This is true in the present cases
where the charterer was responsible for loading, stowage
and discharging at the ports visited, while the owner was
responsible for the care of the cargo during the voyage.
The liability imposable upon it cannot be borne by
Maritime which, as a mere agent, is not answerable for
injury caused by its principal. It is a well-settled principle
that the agent shall be liable for the act or omission of the
principal only if the latter is undisclosed. The charterer did
not represent itself as a carrier and indeed assumed
responsibility ability only for the unloading of the cargo,
i.e, after the goods were already outside the custody of
the vessel. Maritime acted in representation of the
charterer and not of the vessel; thus cannot be considered
a ship agent. As a mere charterer's agent, it cannot be
held solidarily liable with Transcontinental for the
losses/damages to the cargo outside the custody of the
vessel.
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees
with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are titled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses
from such employees. So it is, that any rude or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against
the carrier. Where a conductor uses language to a
passenger which is calculated to insult, humiliate, or
wound the feelings of a person of ordinary feelings and
sensibilities, the carrier is liable, because the contract of
carriage impliedly stipulates for decent, courteous, and
respectful treatment, at hands of the carrier's employees.
Gatchalian vs. Delim
To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim
damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances
like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and
weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted
by the law from common carriers and hence to render that
standard unenforceable.
Because what is involved here is the liability of a common
carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of
whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, SC construed any such purported
waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a
waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to
law, morals, public policy or good customs.
Marchan vs. Mendoza
The riding public is not expected to inquire from time to
time before they board the passenger bus whether or not
the driver who is at the steering wheel of said bus was
authorized to drive said vehicle or that said driver is acting
within the scope of his authority and observing the
existing rules and regulations required of him by the
management. To hold otherwise would in effect render
the provision of law (Article 1759) ineffective.
De Caliston vs. CA
Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code: The amount of
damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall
be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances. In addition, the
defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid
to the heirs of the latter. The pension of the decedent
being a sure income that was cut short by her death for
which Dalmacio was responsible, the surviving heir of the
former is entitled to the award of P 10,000.00 which is just
equivalent to the pension the decedent would have
received for one year if she did not die.
Trans World Airlines vs. CA
The Court held that the petitioner is liable for moral and
exemplary damages. The discrimination in this case is
obvious and the humiliation brought to the respondent is
indisputable. The petitioner showed lack of care in
accommodating the respondent in the class that the latter
contracted. In addition, the petitioner rudely informed the
respondent of such downgrading of class. Such awarding
of damages would serve as an example and a
discouragement to carriers who may repeat such
oppressive and discriminatory acts.
Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport System Inc.
A careful review of the records makes it readily apparent
that the injuries sustained by Dra. Prudenciado are not as
serious or extensive as they were claimed to be, to
warrant the damages awarded by the trial court. In fact, a
closer scrutiny of the exhibits showed only a moderate
damage to the car, not to mention the fact that such
injuries were not supported by the medical findings
presented.
Unquestionably, therefore, the damages imposed by the
lower court should be reduced to more reasonable level.
On the other hand, it will be observed that the reduction
of the damages made by the Court of Appeals is both too
drastic and unrealistic, to pass the test of reasonableness,
which appears to be the underlying basis to justify such
reduction. While the damages sought to be recovered
were not satisfactorily established to the extent desired by
the petitioner, it was nonetheless not disputed that an
accident occurred due to the fault and negligence of the
respondent.
16 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
 MARITIME LAW
Maritime Law is the system of laws which particularly
relates to the affairs and business of:
a. the sea
b. to ships
c. their crews
d. navigation
e. marine conveyances
Vessel is any kind, class or type of craft or artificial
contrivance:
a. capable of floating in water
b. capable of being used as a means of water
transport for carriage of passenger or cargo
or both
c. capable of utilizing its own motive power or
that of another
CHARACTERISTICS OF MARITIME TRANSACTION
1. Real
Similar to transaction over real property with
respect to effectivity against third persons which
is done through registration
2. Hypothecary
The liability of the carrier in connection is confined
to the vessel, which stands as the guaranty for
their settlement
LIMITED LIABILITY RULE: The exclusively real and
hypothecary nature of maritime law operates to limit the
liability of the ship-owner to the value of
a. the vessel
b. earned freightage
c. proceeds of insurance, if any
When applicable?
Code of Commerce sanctions the application of
the doctrine in the following cases:
1. Civil liability for indemnities in favor of third
persons which arise from the conduct of the
captain in the case of the goods
2. Civil liability arising from collisions
3. Unpaid wages of the captain and the crew if the
vessel and its cargo are totally lost by reason of
capture and shipwreck
What are the exceptions?
1. Injury to or death of a passenger is due either to
the fault of the shipowner or to the concurring
negligence of shipowner and the captain
2. Vessel is insured
3. Workmens compensation claim
4. When presumption of negligence was not
overcome
Abandonment shipowner or agent may exempt
themselves from liability by abandoning the vessel with all
her equipment and the freight it may have earned.
If insured, abandonment covers the insurance
proceeds while the vessel itself shall be
abandoned in favor of the insurer
Illustrative Cases and Doctrines
Yangco vs. Laserna
It was held that the liability of a shipowner is limited to the
value of the vessel or to the insurance thereon. Despite
the total loss of the vessel therefore, its insurance
answers for the damages that a shipowner or agent may
be held liable for by reason of the death of its passengers.
Under Article 587 of the Code of Commerce, a shipowner
or agent has the right of abandonment; and by necessary
implication, his liability is confined to that which he is
entitled as of right to abandon the vessel with all her
equipments and the freight it may have earned during the
voyage
The limited liability doctrine applies not only to the goods
but also in all cases like death or injury to passengers
wherein the shipowner or agent may properly be held
liable for the negligent or illicit acts of the captain.
Dela Torre vs. CA
No vessel, no liability expresses in a nutshell the limited
liability rule. The shipowners or agents liability is merely
coextensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total
loss thereof results in its extinction. The total destruction
of the vessel extinguishes maritime liens because there is
no longer any res to which it can attach.
Chua Yek Hong vs. IAC
The term ship agent as used in Art.587 is broad enough
to include the ship owner. Pursuant to said provision, both
he ship owner and ship agent are civilly and directly liable
for the indemnities in favor of third persons which may
arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of goods
transported, as well as for the safety of passengers
transported. However, this direct liability is moderated and
limited by the ship agent's or ship owner's right of
abandonment of the vessel and earned freight. This
expressed the universal principle of limited liability.
The most fundamental effect of abandonment is the
cessation of the responsibility of the ship agent/owner.
The ship owner's or agent's liability is merely co-extensive
with the interest in the vessel such that a total loss thereof
results in its extinction.
Philippine Refining Corporation vs. Jarque
Vessels are considered personal property under the civil
law. Since the term "personal property" includes vessels,
they are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions
of the Chattel Mortgage Law. The only difference between
a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of
other personalty is that it is not now necessary for a
chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted in the registry of
the register of deeds, but it is essential that a record of
documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the
record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry.
The Chattel Mortgage Law in describing what shall be
deemed sufficient to constitute a good chattel mortgage,
includes the requirement of an affidavit of good faith
appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith. The
absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against
creditors and subsequent encumbrancers.
Philippine American General Insurance vs. CA
Ships liability can be limited through abandonment of the
vessel, its equipment and freightage as provided in Art.
587. Nonetheless, there are exceptional circumstances
wherein the ship agent could still be held answerable
despite the abandonment, as where the loss or injury was
due to the fault of the shipowner and the captain. The
international rule is to the effect that the right of
abandonment of vessels, as a legal limitation of a
shipowners liability, does not apply to cases where the
18 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
injury or average was occasioned by the shipowners own
fault. Where the shipowner is likewise to be blamed, Art.
587 will not apply, and such situation will be covered by
the provisions of the Civil Code on common carrier.
Sweet Lines vs. CA
A captain who, having agreed to make a voyage, fails to
fulfill his undertaking, without being prevented by
fortuitous event or force majeure, shall indemnify all the
losses which his failure may cause, without prejudice to
criminal penalties which may be proper.
In case of interruption of a voyage already begun, the
passengers shall only be obliged to pay the fare in
proportion to the distance covered, without right to
recover damages if the interruption is due to fortuitous
event or force majeure, but with a right to indemnity, if the
interruption should have been caused by the captain
exclusively. If the interruption should be caused by the
disability of the vessel, and the passenger should agree
to wait for her repairs, he may not be required to pay any
increased fare of passage, but his living expenses during
the delay shall be for his own account.
Firemans Fund Insurance vs. Metroport Services
The legal relationship between the consignee and the
arrastre operator is akin to that of a depositor and
warehouseman. The relationship between the consignee
and the common carrier is similar to that of the consignee
and the arrastre operator. Since it is the duty of the
arrastre to take good care of the goods that are in its
custody and to deliver them in good condition to the
consignee, such responsibility also devolves upon the
carrier. Both the arrastre and the carrier are therefore
charged with and obligated to deliver the goods in good
condition to the consignee.
International Container Terminal vs. Prudential
Normally, a request for a bad order survey is made in case
there is an apparent or presumed loss or damage. The
consignee made no such request despite being provided
by the petitioner a form therefor. The lack of a bad order
survey does not toll the prescriptive period for filing a
claim for loss, because the consignee can always file a
provisional claim within 15 days from the time it discovers
the loss or damage. Such a claim would place the arrastre
operator on notice that the shipment sustained damage
or loss, even if the exact amount thereof could not be
specified at the moment.
In this manner, the arrastre operator can immediately
verify its culpability and liability. This is to give arrastre
contractor a reasonable opportunity to check the validity
of the claim, while the facts are still fresh in the minds of
the persons who took part in the transaction, and while
the pertinent documents are still available. The period of
15 days is sufficient for the consignee to file a provisional
claim after the discharge of the goods from the vessel.
Far Eastern Shipping vs. CA
A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and
licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in
certain waters, to guide vessels into or out of ports, and
entrusted with the navigation of vessels on the high seas.
The pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the
command and navigation of the ship, and his orders must
be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation.
He becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all
directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing
anchoring, towing and the like. The master is still in
command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of
a pilot. There are occasions when the master may and
should interfere and even displace the pilot, as when the
pilot is obviously incompetent or intoxicated and the
circumstances may require the master to displace a
compulsory pilot because of incompetency or physical
incapacity.
CHARTER PARTY is a contract by which with the entire
ship or some principal part thereof is let by the owner to
another person for a specified period of time.
Two Types of Charter Parties
1. Contract of Affreightment which involves the
use of shipping space leased by the owner in
part or as a whole, to carry goods for others:
a. Time Charter lease for a fixed
period of time
b. Voyage for a single voyage
2. Charter by Demise or Bareboat by which the
whole vessel is let to the charterer which
transfers to him its entire command and
possession and consequent control over its
navigation, including the master and crew
who are his servants.
BAREBOAT AFFREIGHTMENT
As to Liability
Charterer becomes liable Owner remains liable as
to others caused by its carrier and must answer
negligence for any breach
As to Owner
Charterer becomes owner Charterer not regarded as
pro hac vice owner
As to Possession & Command of Vessel
Owner of vessel The vessel owner retains
relinquishes possession, possession, command,
command, and navigation and navigation of the ship
to charterer
As to Conversion
Common carrier is Common carrier is not
converted to private converted to a private
carrier carrier
REQUISITES OF A VALID CHARTER PARTY: (CEFC)
a. Consent of the contracting parties
b. Existing vessel which should be placed at the
disposition of the shipper
c. Freight
d. Compliance with Art. 652 of Code of Commerce
Jason Clause a stipulation in a charter party that in
case of a maritime accident for which the shipowner is
not responsible by law, contract, or otherwise, the
cargo shippers, consignees or owners shall
contribute with the shipowner in general average
Paramount Clause a clause in charter party
providing that the COGSA shall apply even through the
transportation is domestic
Illustrative Cases and Doctrines
Litonjua Shipping vs. National Seamen Board
What the time charterer acquires is the right to utilize the
carrying capacity and facilities of the vessel and to
designate her destinations during the term of the charter.
A voyage charter, or trip charter, is simply a contract of
affreightment, that is, a contract for the carriage of goods,
from one or more ports of loading to one or more ports of
unloading, on one or on a series of voyages. In a voyage
charter, master and crew remain in the employ of the
owner of the vessel.
It is well settled that in a demise or bare boat charter, the
charterer is treated as owner pro hac vice (for this
occasion) of the vessel, the charterer assuming in large
19 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
measure the customary rights and liabilities of the Types of Bill of Lading:
shipowner in relation to third persons who have dealt with
him or with the vessel. In such case, the Master of the 1. On Board Bill of Lading it states that the goods
vessel is the agent of the charterer and not of the have been received on board the specified vessel
shipowner. The charterer or owner pro hac vice, and not that will carry them
the general owner of the vessel, is held liable for the
expenses of the voyage including the wages of the 2. Received Shipment Bill of Lading it states that
seamen. the goods have been received for shipment with
or without specifying the vessel on which they are
Planters Products vs. CA to be shipped
When PPI chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum", the ship
captain, its officers and compliment were under the RIGHTS AND OBLIGATION OF PARTIES
employ of the shipowner and therefore continued to be
under its direct supervision and control. Hardly then can Shipowner or Agent Charterer
we charge the charterer, a stranger to the crew and to the (NO-US-LPB) (AFL-WES)
ship, with the duty of caring for his cargo when the
charterer did not have any control of the means in doing 1. Not to accept cargo 1. Pay agreed charter
so. from others if the price
vessel is wholly 2. Pay freightage on
Caltex vs. Suspicio Lines chartered unboarded cargo
The charterer of a vessel has no obligation before 2. Observe represented 3. Pay loses to others for
transporting its cargo to ensure that the vessel it chartered capacity loading uncontracted
complied with all legal requirements. The duty rests upon 3. Unload cargo and illicit cargo
the common carrier simply for being engaged in public clandestinely placed 4. Wait if the vessel
service. The Civil Code demands diligence which is 4. Substitute another needs repairs
required by the nature of the obligation and that which vessel if load is less 5. Pay expenses for
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, the than 3/5 of capacity deviation
time and the place. 5. Leave port if charterer 6. Sub-charter
Towage is not a charter party. It is a contract for the hire does not bring the
of services by which a vessel engaged to tow another cargo within lay days
vessel from one port to another for consideration. 6. Place vessel in a
Whereas a charter party is a contract whereby the whole condition to navigate
of part of the ship is let. 7. Bring cargo to nearest
neutral port in case of
The sum of money due by war or blockade
express contract for the
detention of the vessel in
DEMURRAGE loading or unloading, BOTTOMRY RESPONSENTIA
beyond the time allowed Definition
for that purpose in the
charter party a. Loan secured by the a. Loan secured by the
The amount paid by or shipowner of ship owner of the cargo
recoverable from a agent b. Guaranteed by the
charterer of a ship for the b. Guaranteed by the cargo
DEADFREIGHT portion of the ships vessel c. Payable upon safe
capacity the latter c. Payable only upon arrival of the cargo
contracted but failed to arrival of vessel at at destination
occupy destination
Bonus to be paid to the
PRIMAGE captain after the Common Elements
successful voyage
1. Exposure of security to marine peril
Fortuitous Cases: (WIPE-B) 2. Obligation of the debtor conditioned upon safe
a. War or interdiction of commerce arrival
b. Inability of the vessel to navigate
c. Prohibition to receive cargo Forms
d. Embargo May be executed by means of:
e. Blockade 1. Public instrument
2. Policy signed by the contracting parties and the
Delivery of Goods without Surrender of Bill of Lading broker taking part therein
The obligation of the carrier is also terminated if 3. Private instrument
the goods are delivered even if the bill of lading was not
surrendered. The surrender of the BoL is not necessary Hypothecary Nature of Bottomry/Respondentia
for the discharge of the obligation of the carrier The obligation of the borrower to pay the loan is
extinguished if the goods are absolutely lost by reason of
Evidence of existence of an accident in sea during voyage unless loss is due to:
contract of carriage of a. Inherent defect
cargo b. Barratry on part of the captain
FUNCTIONS OF A BILL
Commercial document, if c. Fault or malice of the borrower
OF LADING (ECR)
negotiable may be d. Vessel engaged in contraband
transferred e. Cargo loaded is different from what agreed
Receipt of cargo

20 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
 GENERAL AVERAGE
Includes all damages and expenses
which are deliberately cause in order
Definition to save the vessel, its cargo, or both at
the same time from real and known
risks
a. Common danger to ship and the
cargo after loading
b. For common safety, vessel or the
cargo or both is sacrificed
deliberately
Requisites
c. Successful saving of the vessel and
cargo
d. Expenses should have been
incurred after taking legal steps and
authority
1. Resolution of the captain
2. Resolution must be entered in the
logbook
a. Stating reasons and motives for
Formalities
dissent
b. Signatures of all present
c. Detail of jettisoned goods and
injuries caused to those on board
PARTICULAR AVERAGE
Are all the expenses and damages
caused to the vessel or to her cargo
Definition which have not inured to the benefit
and common profit of all persons
interested in the vessel and cargo
COLLISIONS it refers to the contact of two moving
vessels. If one vessel is moving while the other is
stationary, the same is more appropriately called allusion
DOCTRINE OF INSCRUTABLE FAULT
In a collision, the vessel at fault shall indemnify
the damages sustained or losses incurred and if both
vessels were at fault, each shall suffer its own damages,
both shall be solidarily liable to others.
This solidarity has been held to preclude a
common carrier from interposing a defense of due
diligence in selection and supervision.
RULES ON COLLISION OF VESSELS
Who is at Fault Who shall be Liable
Owner of the vessel at fault
Fault of one vessel
shall be liable
Each vessel shall suffer its own
losses. BUT both owners shall
Both vessel at fault
be jointly and severally liable to
owners of cargoes
Each bears own loss BUT both
Undeterminable fault owners shall be solidarily liable
to owners of cargoes
Fortuitous event Each bears own loss
3rd vessels fault 3rd vessel is liable
Fortuitous event but
The vessel run into shall suffer
vessel properly
its own damage or expense
anchored & moored
DOCTRINE OF ERROR IN EXTREMIS
There are 3 zones in collision
a. FIRST ZONE time up to the moment when risk
of collision begins
b. SECON ZONE time between moment when risj
of collision begins up to the moment it becomes
practical certainty
c. THIRD ZONE time when collision is certain up
to the time of impact
If a vessel having a right of way suddenly changes its
course during the third zone, in an effort to avoid an
imminent collision due to the fault of another, such act is
said to be done in extremis.
Illustrative Cases and Doctrines
Williams vs. Yangco
The fault of the first vessel in failing to exhibit proper lights
or to take the proper side of the channel will relieve from
liability one who negligently runs into such vessels before
he sees it; although it will not be a defense to one who,
having timely warning of the danger of collision, fails to
use proper care to avoid it.
Smith and Bell Company vs. CA
Rule 18 (a) of the International Rules of the Road: When
two power-driven vessels are meeting end on, or nearly
end on, so as to involve risk of collision, each shall alter
her course to starboard, so that each may pass on the
port side of the other. Rule I (B) Under Rule 29 of the
same set of Rules: A "proper lookout" is one who has
been trained as such and who is given no other duty save
to act as a look-out and who is stationed where he can
see and hear best and maintain good communication with
the officer in charge of the vessel, and who must, of
course, be vigilant.
The fact that Second Mate German was allowed to be in
command of "Don Carlos" and not the chief or the sailing
mate in the absence of Captain Rivera, gives rise to no
other conclusion except that said vessel [had] no chief
mate.
National Development Corporation vs. CA
The law of the country to which the goods are to be
transported governs the liability of the common carrier in
case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. Since the
goods in question are transported from San Francisco,
California and Tokyo, Japan to the Philippines and that
they were lost or due to a collision which was found to
have been caused by the negligence or fault of both
captains of the colliding vessels the laws of the
Philippines will apply.
Macenas vs. CA
The Court found the respondent to be gross negligent
based on certain instances. Such instances are first,
the captain was playing mahjong at the time of the
collision and the captain stated that he was on break
during the emergency when he should take charge of the
ship, second, the ship was overloaded with passengers
than that prescribed number of passengers and lastly,
there was no ample number of life saving devices such as
rafts due to the overloading of passengers. The
respondent cannot also raise the defense that it followed
the International Rules of the Road when it had the
chance to prevent the collision with proper care and skill.
The doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied in the
case as well because the doctrine is only applicable
between two drivers that are negligent against each other
and not to a passenger claiming for damages to the
carrier.
21 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
Aboitiz Shipping vs. General Accident and Life
The only time the Limited Liability Rule does not apply is
when there is an actual finding of negligence on the part
of the vessel owner or agent. Among the inherent duties
of a captain is to examine a vessel before sailing and to
comply with the laws of navigation. The rights of a vessel
owner or agent under the Limited Liability Rule are akin to
those of the rights of shareholders to limited liability under
our corporation law. Both are privileges granted by
statute, and while not absolute, must be swept aside only
in the established existence of the most compelling of
reasons.
Philippine American General vs. CA
The international rule is to the effect that the right of
abandonment of vessels, as a legal limitation of a ship
owner's liability, does not apply to cases where the injury
or average was occasioned by the ship owner's own fault.
It must be stressed at this point that Art. 587 speaks only
of situations where the fault or negligence is committed
solely by the captain. Where the ship owner is likewise to
be blamed, Art. 587 will not apply, and such situation will
be covered by the provisions of the Civil Code on common
carrier.
ARRIVAL UNDER STRESS it is the arrival of the vessel
at the nearest and most convenient port, if during the
voyage the vessel cannot continue the trip to the port of
destination due to: (LAW)
a. Lack of provisions
b. Well-founded fear of seizure, privateers or pirates
c. By reason of any accident of the sea disabling it
to navigate
It is unlawful when: (MINE)
a. Lack of provisions due to negligence to carry
according to usage and customs
b. Risk of enemy not well known or manifest
c. Defect of vessel due to improper repair
d. Malice, negligence, lack of foresight or skill of
captain
SALVAGE LAW
There is salvage where a person (or persons)
picks up and conveys to a safe place a vessel or its cargo
which are beyond the control of the crew or shall have
been abandoned by them. However, there can also be a
contract of salvage that may be voluntarily agreed upon
by the parties.
Requisites to a Valid Salvage claim: (MVSS)
1. There must be a marine peril
2. Vessel is shipwrecked beyond the control of the
crew or shall have been abandoned
3. Services voluntarily rendered
4. Service must have been successful in whole or in
part
Subjects of Salvage
1. Ship itself
2. Jetsam goods that were thrown off a ship which
was in danger
3. Floatsam goods which float upon the sea when
cast overboard
4. Ligan or Lagan goods cast into the sea tied to
a buoy so that they may be found again by
owners
DERELICT: a ship or her cargo which is abandoned and
deserted at sea by those who are in charge of it, without
any hope of recovering it, or without any intention of
returning to it.
Persons who have no Right to a Reward for Salvage:
1. Crew of the vessel saved
2. Person who commenced salvage in spite of
opposition of the Captain or his representative
3. A person who fails to deliver a salvaged vessel or
cargo to the Collector of Customs
SALVAGE TOWAGE
As to Governing Law
Governed by special law Governed by NCC on
(Act 2616) contract of lease
As to Requisite of Success
Requires success Success is not required
otherwise no payment
As to Consent
Must be done with Only the consent of the
consent of the captain or tugboat owner is needed
crewmen
As to Involvement of vessel in the Accident
Vessel must be involved Need not to be involved in
in an accident an accident
As to Fees
Fees distributed among Fees belong to the
crewmen tugboat owner
Illustrative Cases and Doctrines
Erlanger & Galinger vs. Swedish East Asiatic
The question whether or not a particular ship and her
cargo is an object of salvage depends upon her condition
at the time the salvage services are performed. In the
present case the plaintiff-appellant claims that the Nippon
was a derelict or quasi-derelict and that their claim should
be adjudged upon this basis. Whether property is to be
adjudged derelict is determined by ascertaining what was
the intention and expectation of those in charge of it when
they quitted it. If those in charge left within the intention of
returning, or of procuring assistance, the property is not
derelict, but if they quitted the property with the intention
of finally leaving it, it is derelict, and a change of their
intention and an attempt to return will not change of their
intention and an attempt to return will not change its
nature.
Barrios vs. Go Thong
A ship in a desperate condition with passengers and
persons on board but who are unable to do anything for
their own safety may be considered a quasi-derelict.
When the engine failure occurred the seas were calm and
the weather was clear. In fact the ship did not drift too far
from the location where its engines failed. Further, the
captain and crew of the MV Don Alfredo did not find it
necessary to jettison the vessels cargo as a safety
measure. Therefore the MV Don Alfredo cannot even be
considered as a quasi-derelict. Although the service of the
defendant did not constitute as salvage, it can be
considered as a quasi-contract of towage. However in a
contract of towage, only the owner of the towing vessel is
entitled to remuneration.
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT (COGSA)
Applicability:
The transportation must be:
a. Water/maritime transport
b. For the carriage of goods
c. Overseas, international, foreign
Parties:
a. Carrier includes the charterer
b. Shipper
22 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
Duties of Carrier under COGSA
1. Make ship seaworthy
2. Properly manned, equip, and supply the ship
3. Properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry,
keep, care and discharge the goods
4. Make the holds, refrigerating, and cooling
chambers
5. Issue to the shipper a bill of lading
One-year prescriptive period:
The prescriptive period of one year starts after the
delivery of the goods or the date the goods should have
been delivered. The period does not apply to conversions
or misdeliveries. A stipulation reducing the one year
period is null and void, but a written agreement to
suspend it is valid.
The rule applies in cases of collision, but it starts
not from the date of the collision but when the
goods should have been delivered
Period is not suspended by an extrajudicial
demand. Suspended only by: 1) express
agreement of the parties; 2) filing of an action in
court until it is dismissed
Illustrative Cases and Doctrines
Elser vs. CA
Clause 18 must of necessity yields to the provisions of the
COGSA in view of the proviso contained in the same Act
which says: any clause, covenant, or agreement in a
contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from
liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the
goods . . . or lessening such liability otherwise than as
provided in this Act, shall be null and void. This means
that a carrier cannot limit its liability in a manner contrary
to what is provided for in said act. And so Clause 18 of
the bill of lading must of necessity be null and void.
Ang vs. Compania Maritima
The action of Ang is based on misdelivery of the cargo
which should be distinguished from loss thereof. The one-
year period provided for in Section 3 (6) of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act refers to loss of the cargo. What is
applicable is the four-year period of prescription for quasi-
delicts prescribed in Article 1146 (2) of the Civil Code or
ten years for violation of a written contract as provided for
in Article 1144 (1) of the same Code. Four-year period of
prescription for quasi-delicts or ten-year period for
violation of written contract, applicable to case at bar.
DOLE Philippines vs. Maritime Company
The demand in this instance would be the claim for
damages filed by Dole with Maritime on May 4, 1972. The
effect of that demand would have been to renew the one
year prescriptive period from the date of its making.
Stated otherwise, under Dole's theory, when its claim was
received by Maritime, the one-year prescriptive period
was interrupted (or tolled) and began to run anew from
May 4, 1972, affording Dole another period of one year
counted from that date within which to institute action on
its claim for damage. Unfortunately, Dole let the new
period lapse without filing action.
Sea-Land Services vs. IAC
There can be no doubt about the validity and
enforceability of freely-agreed-upon stipulations in an bill
of lading limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed
valuation unless the shipper declares a higher value and
inserts it into said contract or bill.
Since the liability of a common carrier for loss of damage
to goods transported by it under a contract of carriage is
governed by the laws of the country in destination, the
liability of Sea-Land to the consignee is governed
primarily by the Civil Code and suppletorily by the Code
of Commerce and special laws such as the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act. The stipulation in the questioned bill
of lading limiting Sea-Lands liability for loss or damage to
the shipment covered by said bill to $500 per package is
held valid and binding on private respondent.
Maritime Agencies vs. CA
The one-year period in the present cases should
commence on 20 October 1979, when the last item was
delivered to the consignee. Unions complaint was filed
against Hong Kong on 19September 1980, but tardily
against Macondray on 20 April 1981. The consequence is
that the action is considered prescribed as far as
Macondray is concerned but not against its principal,
which is what matters anyway.
Mayer Steel Corp. vs. CA
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act governs the relationship
between the carrier on the one hand and the shipper, the
consignee and/or the insurer on the other hand. It defines
the obligations of the carrier under the contract of
carriage. It does not, however, affect the relationship
between the shipper and the insurer. This case is
governed by the Insurance Code. The insurer exercising
its right of subrogation is bound by the one-year
prescriptive period. However, it does not apply to claim
against the insurer for the insurance proceeds because
the claim against the insurer is based on contract, it
expires in 10 days.
AVIATION LAW
The governing law is now Republic Act No. 9497 of the
Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008 which was passed on
March 4, 2008.
WARSAW CONVENTION applies to international
transportation by air. There is international transportation
when:
a. The place of departure and the place of
destination are within the territories of two
contracting countries regardless of whether or not
there was a break in transportation or
b. The place of departure and the place of
destination are within the territory of a single
contracting country if there is an agreed stopping
place within a territory subject to the sovereignty,
mandate or authority of another power even
though the power is not a party to the Convention
Damage or Injury for which Carrier is Liable:
A. Passenger if injury took place: 1) on board the
aircraft; 2) in the course of any of the operations
of embarking; 3) in the course of disembarking; 4)
when there was or because of delay
B. Checked baggage or goods damage occurred
during air transportation or when there is delay
Limit of Liability:
1. Passengers $10,000 to $100,000
o except: agreement to a higher limit
2. Checked-in baggage $20 / kg
o except: consigner declared its value and paid
a supplementary sum, carrier liable to not
more than the declared sum unless it proves
the sum is greater than its actual value
3. Hand-carry baggage $400 to $1000/passenger
23 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
Note: The Hague Protocol amended the Warsaw PUBLIC SERVICE ACT (CA 146)
Convention by removing the provision that if the airline
took all necessary steps to avoid the damage, it could Public Service: Includes any person who may own,
exculpate itself completely operate, manage, or control in the Philippines for hire or
compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether
SPECIAL RULES ON LIABILITIES OF AIRLINE permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for
CARRIERS general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad,
street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle,
1. In case of flight diversion due to bad weather or steamboat, or steamship line, ferries, and water craft,
other circumstances beyond the pilots control, shipyard, ice-plant, electric light, heat and power or any
the relation between carrier and passenger continues public utility
until the latter has been landed at the port of
destination and has left the carriers premises. The Government Agencies that replaces the Public
carrier should exercise extraordinary diligence in Service Commission
safeguarding the safety of its stranded passengers
until they have reached their final destination Land Transportation Franchising
LTFRB
Regulatory Board
2. Even where overbooking of passengers is allowed MARINA Maritime Industry Authority
as a commercial practice, the airline company would National Telecommunications
NTC
still be guilty of bad faith and still be liable for Commission
damages if it did not properly inform passenger that it ERC Energy Regulatory Commission
could breach the contract of carriage even if they NWRC National Water Resources Council
were confirmed passengers CAA Civil Aviation Authority
Department of Transportation and
DoTC
Communication
3. An open-dated ticket constitutes a complete TRB Toll Regulatory Board
contract between the carrier and passenger. Hence, LTO Land Transportation Office
the airline company is liable if it refused to confirm a
passengers flight reservation
CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE
4. An airline company which issued a confirmed No public service shall operate without having been
ticket to a passenger covering successive trips on issued a certificate of public convenience or a
different airlines can be held liable for damages certificate of public convenience and necessity
occasioned by bumping off by one of the successive
airlines The certificate constitutes neither a franchise nor a
contract, confers no property right, and is a mere
license or privilege. The holder of said certificate does
5. An airline ticket providing that carriage by not acquire a property right in the route covered
successive air carriers is to be regarded as a thereby. Nor does it confer any property right, interest
single operation is to make the issuing carrier or interest in the public highways. Revocation of this
liable for the tortuous conduct of the other carrier. A certificate deprives him of no vested right. New and
printed provision in the ticket limiting liability only to its additional burdens, alteration of the certificate, or
own conduct is not enough to rebut that liability even revocation or annulment thereof is reserved to
the State
JURISDICTION OR VENUE:
a. Court where the carrier is domiciled CERTIFICATE OF
CERTIFICATE OF
b. Court where the carrier has its principal place of PUBLIC CONVENIENCE
PUBLIC CONVENIENCE
business AND NECESSITY
c. Court where the carrier has an establishment by Any authorization to
which the contract has been made operate public service
d. Court of the place of destination issued by the Public Requires franchise
Service Commission for issued by the legislative
NOTICE OF CLAIM AND PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD: which no franchise either department
a. Notice of Claim or Complaint this is municipal or legislative is
mandatory or a condition precedent. The required
complaint or notice must be files with the
international carrier Grounds for revocation of certificate:
i. Baggage within 3 days from receipt a. Where holder is a mere dummy
ii. Baggage in case of delay of delivery b. Where operator ceased operation and placed
within 14 days from the time the baggage his buses on storage
was placed at the disposal of the c. Where operator totally abandons the service
passenger
iii. Goods 7 days from delivery
b. Prescription of Action The case must be filed Requirements for granting certificate:
in court within a. Citizen of the Philippines, or a corporation, etc.
i. 2 years from receipt in case of an action constituted and organized under the laws of the
for damage to passengers baggage Philippines at least 60% of its stock or paid-up
capital must belong entirely to citizens of the
ii. If the action is for tort including
Philippines
humiliation at the hands of the airline
employees, filed within 4 years b. Financially capable of undertaking the proposed
service
c. Proof of public necessity, interest and
convenience

24 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
 Illustrative Cases and Doctrines
Luzon Stevedoring vs. Public Service Commision
C.A. No. 146 clearly declares that an enterprise of any of
the kind therein enumerated is a public service if
conducted for hire or compensation even if the operator
deals only with a portion of the public or limited clientele.
The term 'public service' includes every person that now
or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the
Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or
limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or
accidental, and done for general business purposes any
common carrier.
It is not necessary, in order to be a public service, that an
organization be dedicated to public use, i.e., ready and
willing to serve the public as a class. It is only necessary
that it must in some way be impressed with a public
interest; and whether the operation of a business is a
public utility depends upon whether or not the service
rendered by it is of a public character and of public
consequence and concern.
San Pablo vs. Pantranco
A ferry service is distinguished from a motorship or
motorboat service engaged in the coastwise trade in that
the latter is intended for the transportation of passengers
and/or freight for hire or compensation between ports or
places in the Philippines without definite routes or lines of
service. Under no circumstance can the sea between
Matnog and Allen be considered a continuation of the
highway. While a ferry boat service has been considered
as a continuation of the highway when crossing rivers or
even lakes, which are small body of waters separating the
land, however, when as in this case the two terminals,
Matnog and Allen are separated by an open sea it cannot
be considered as a continuation of the highway.
Respondent Pantranco should secure a separate CPC for
the operation of an inter-island or coastwise shipping
service in accordance with the provisions of law. Its CPC
as a bus transportation cannot be merely amended to
include this water service under the guise that it is a mere
private ferry service.
authority to operate its facilities for public service, cannot
be taken or interfered with without due process of law.
KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia
LTFRB is authorized under EO 202, s. 1987 to determin
e, prescribe, approve andperiodically review and adjust,
reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative
to the operation of public land transportation services
provided by motorized vehicles. However, LTFRB is not
authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a
transport operator, or other public service. Authority given
by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare
range over and above the authorized existing fare, is
illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue
delegation of legislative authority. Rate should not be
confiscatory as would place an operator in a situation
where he will continue to operate at a loss; rate should
enable public utilities to generate revenues sufficient to
cover operational costs and provide reasonable return on
the investments.
Tatad vs. Garcia
What EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd. owns are the rail
tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations,
terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a
franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the
public, they do not by themselves constitute a public
utility. What constitutes a public utility is not their
ownership but their use to serve the public. In law, there
is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a public
utility and the ownership of the facilities and equipment
used to serve the public. The right to operate a public
utility may exist independently and separately from the
ownership of the facilities thereof
Philippine Airlines vs. Civil Aeronautics Board
Under RA 776, CAB has the authority to issue Certificate
of Public Convenience and Necessity. A legislative
franchise is not a precedent requirement because the
Congress has delegated the authority to authorize the
operation of domestic air transport services to the CAB,
an administrative agency.

Manzanal vs. Ausejo

There was no testimony whatsoever that her vehicles are
of such kind which may endanger the lives of the
passengers or are not suitable for the peculiar
characteristics of the area serviced. There is no proof that
petitioner is not in a position to cope with the obligations
and responsibilities of the service and to maintain a
complete number of units as authorized. While the Court
agree with respondent Commission that said provision
does not necessarily require a "passenger-operator"
relationship, the Court disagrees that a single hold-up
incident which does not clearly link petition's taxicab can
be comprehended within its meaning. There is no proof
that she has hired a driver with criminal record or bad
moral character or has kept under her employ, such driver
despite knowledge about his moral behavior,
discourteous conduct or criminal record.

Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Assoc. vs. CA

A certificate of public convenience can be sold by the
holder thereof because it has considerable material value
and is considered as valuable asset. Although there is no
doubt that it is private property, it is affected with a public
interest and must be submitted to the control of the
government for the common good. Insofar as the interest
of the State is involved, a certificate of public convenience
does not confer upon the holder any proprietary right or
interest or franchise in the route covered thereby and in
the public highways. However, with respect to other
persons and other public utilities, a certificate of public
convenience as property, which represents the right and
25 | A L Y S S A C A B A L A N G
 SUMMARY OF THE SENGERS
RIGHTS OF AIR PAS

UPON PURCHASE OF TICKET AND UPON ARRIVAL AT THE AIRPORT

Based on Joint DOTC-DTI Admin. Order No. 01 or the Air Passenger Bill of Rights

Major Rights of an Air Passenger

Right to be Right to receive Right to
provided with the full value of compensation
accurate the service
information before purchased
purchase

RIGHT TO RECEIVE THE FULL VALUE OF

THE SERVICE PURCHASED

Right to be Processed for Check-In

A passenger shall not be considered late or a
no-show, and shall not be denied check-in if
he or she is within the air carriers cordoned
or other designated check-in area at least
one (1) hour before the published Estimated
HOUR BEFORE ETD
Time of Departure (ETD), or within the
prescribed time set by the air carrier.

Right to Sufficient Processing Time

INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS NEARING PRIORITY LANE
AIRPORTS CHECK-IN DEADLINE FOR PWDs
OPEN OPEN

HOURS BEFORE ETD HOUR BEFORE ETD

Check-in counters in A separate There must be at
international airports dedicated counter least one (1)
and in other airports must be opened for a check-in counter
designated by the flight nearing which will prioritize
DOTC must be open at check-in deadline to PWDs, senior
least two (2) hours facilitate the citizens, and
before the (ETD). checking in of persons requiring
passengers at least special assistance
one (1) hour before or handling, if
the published ETD. practicable.
OPEN

FOR ALL OTHER AIRPORTS, check-in counters

must be open at least one (1) hour before the ETD.
HOUR BEFORE ETD

Right to Board Aircraft for the Purpose of Flight

GENERAL RULE:
A passenger cannot be denied the
right to board the aircraft without
his consent.

EXCEPTIONS:
IN CASE OF OVERBOOKING:

Overbooking The airline/air If the number of volunteers

carrier must look is not enough, the air
for volunteers carrier shall increase the
willing to give up compensation package until
their seats. the required number of
Legal or volunteers is met.
other valid
causes
This is known as the auction system.
 RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
Right to Compensation and Amenities in
Case of Cancellation of Flight
Situations of Rights of Passengers
Cancellation

To be notified beforehand of the fact of

Cancellation at cancellation
least 24 hours Rebook or reimburse the passenger, at the
before the ETD, option of the latter.
attributable to the
air carrier

To be notified beforehand of the fact of

cancellation

To amenities*

To be reimbursed of the value of the fare, taxes

and surcharges, and other optional fees
Cancellation less
than 24 hours To be endorsed to another air carrier without
before the ETD, paying any fare difference
attributable to the
air carrier To rebook the ticket without additional charge

Cancellation due To be reimbursed of the full value of the fare

to other causes
(i.e. force majeure, safety
and/or security reasons)

*AMENITIES may include food and drinks,

hotel accommodations, etc.
 Right to Compensation and Amenities in
Case of Flight Delay and Exceptions Thereto.
Hours of Delay Rights of Passengers

To avail of refreshments or meals

Terminal delay of
To free phone calls, text or e-mails, and
at least three (3) first aid, if necessary
hours after the
ETD, whether or To rebook or refund his/her ticket
not such is
attributable to the To be endorsed to another carrier
carrier.

To consider the flight cancelled for the

purpose of availing the rights and amenities
provided for in case of actual cancellation

Additional compensation equivalent to at

Terminal Delay of least the value of the sector delayed
at least six (6)
hours after the To board the flight if it takes place more
ETD for causes than six (6) hours after the ETD and the
attributable to the affected passenger has not opted to rebook
carrier and/or refund.

Tarmac Delay of To sufficient food and beverage

at least two (2)
hours after the
ETD
Right to Compensation for Delayed, Lost,
and Damaged Baggage
THE PASSENGER HAS THE RIGHT TO:
Be informed of the fact of off-loading

Php2,000 compensation to the passenger for every

twenty-four (24) hours of delay

Refund of checked baggage fees if the baggage was not

delivered within twenty-four (24) hours from the arrival of
flight

If the baggage is lost or if it suffered any damage:

FOR INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS:

The relevant convention shall apply.

FOR DOMESTIC FLIGHTS:

The passenger has the right to a maximum amount
equivalent to half of the amount in the relevant
convention (for international flights) in its Peso
equivalent.

PRESUMPTION OF LOSS: If after a period of seven (7) days

from when the passenger or consignee should have received
the baggage and it is not delivered, it is presumed lost.

Right to Compensation in Case of Death or

Bodily Injury of a Passenger
FOR INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS:
The relevant convention and inter-carrier agreements apply

FOR DOMESTIC FLIGHTS:

Compensation will be based on the stipulated amount in the
relevant convention which governs international flights
Right to Immediate Payment of
Compensation
PAYMENT MUST BE AVAILABLE TO THE AFFECTED PASSENGER:

at the air carriers counters at the airport on the

date when the incident occurred, or

at the main office or any branch of the air carrier,

at the discretion of the passenger.

MODE:
By tendering a check, or

Cash, or

The document necessary to claim the

compensation or benefits. The document shall be
convertible to cash within fifteen (15) days from the
date when the occasion occurred.

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